# Supplemental Appendix — Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Supplemental Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 817

## Text

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N°. ___031653 may 57 2008

OFFICE OF THE OLHRK

Fu The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

4

JOANNE HEDRICK,

Petitioner,
Vv

WESTERN RESERVE CARE SYSTEM;
FORUM HEALTH,

Respondent.
¥
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of
Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

¢

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

4

*IRA J. MIRKIN
Barry R. Laine
GREEN HAINES SGAMBATI CoO., L.P.A.
National City Bank Building
16 Wick Avenue, Suite 400
P.O. Box 849

Youngstown, OH 44501-0849
330-743-5101

Attorneys for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record

June, 2004

\
LEGAL ADVANTAGE @ 432 Walnut Street © Cincinnati, OH 45202
(800) 581-2252

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

Memorandum of Opinion and Order Granting
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division

Case No. 4:99 CV 630
Filed June 27, 2002

Pages Supp. App. | through 47

Supp. App. |

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JOANNE HEDRICK _ ) CASE NO. 4:99 CV 00630

)
Plaintiff ) JUDGE LESLEY WELLS
)
- VS - ) MEMORANDUM OF
) OPINION AND ORDER

WESTERN RESERVE ) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

CARE SYSTEM, et al. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT & DENYING

Defendants ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

) PARTIAL SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT

This case is currently before the Court on Defendants
Western Reserve Care System (WRCS) and Forum Health’s
motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff Joanne Hedrick’s
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

On 17 March 1999, Joanne Hedrick filed a complaint
- against defendants alleging that they discriminated against her
on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102 (ADA) and Ohio
Revised Code (ORC) §4112 and her age, in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 et

Supp. App. 2

ee ee ee

Sit iia

seq (ADEA).' On | May 2000, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment (doc. no. 20) and Plaintiff Hedrick filed
a motion for partial summary judgment against WRCS (doc.
no. 24). The parties filed responses and reply briefs and the
cross-motions for summary judgment were referred to
Magistrate Judge Nancy A. Vecchiarelli for a Report and
Recommendation (R&R). The Magistrate Judge filed her
R&R recommending that defendants’ motion for summary
judgment be granted and that plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment be denied.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
The relevant background facts are set forth in the R&R as
follows:
In 1973, Hedrick began working for WRCS and

its predecessors as a general duty staff nurse. As a

staff nurse, Hedrick performed typical bedside nursing

functions. During the 1980s, Hedrick was diagnosed

with osteoarthritis in her left knee. Since that time,

Dr. L. Kevin Nash, her primary care physician, and

Dr. Raymond Duffett, an orthopedic surgéon, have

treated her for arthritis in both knees.

On December 1, 1995, Hedrick fractured her
femur. While recuperating, she was unable to work
and took a leave of absence from work. She

' Hedrick filed an amended complaint on 14 January 2000.
(Doc. no. 16).

Supp. App. 3

recovered from the fracture, and Dr. Duffett released
her return to work as of June 1, 1996. Dr. Duffett did
not place any restrictions on Hedrick and advised her
to walk a lot.

On May 3, 1996, Hedrick went to see Dr. Nash
and told him she did not think she could return to
work and perform her duties because her arthritis
worsened after the fracture. Dr. Nash indicated in his
notes:

[Hedrick] has made good progress in the past

month. Dr. R. Duffett has told her that she

can return to work 6/1 — she is scared [ | to

consider this, but this may actually be a

reasonable goal...

(Nash Dep., Exh. D, attached to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment).
On July 1, 1996, Dr. Nash reported to Sue Yoder, the
Director of Nursing, that:

Ms. Joanne Hedrick has been making a very

slow recovery after her devastating fracture of

the left femur. Joanne has shared with me that

she does not believe that she is going to be

able to return to bedside nursing, and frankly

I share her reservations.

(Nash Depo., Ex. J).

On July 16, 1996, Hedrick underwent a Functional

Cz pacity Evaluation to determine her limitation and

Supp. App. 4

ability to work. The evaluation indicated that Hedrick
“would not be able to return to her previous level of
function as a staff nurse at Western Reserve Care
System secondary to limitations in bending, lifting,
and pain in knees.” (Steen Depo., Ex. 13, p. 14,
attached to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment). On August 7, 1996, Dr. Nash wrote a
letter to Jon Steen, the Human Resource Director,
stating:

Hedrick has been recuperating from a

complicated fracture of her left femur.

Recently, she underwent a functional perfor-

mance evaluation which indicated that she is

not going to be able to return to work in her

previous position as a general staff nurse at

Western Reserve Care System. Accordingly,

I recommend that she be considered for other

positions within the organizations.
(Steen Depo., Ex, 13, p. 16). Ina follow-up letter, Dr.
Nash described Hedrick’s limitations as:

1. Daily activities for short intervals

2. Able to walk for short distances

3. Able to stand for short periods of time

4. Able to [do] desk work (i.e. type, computer

skills, filing) for short periods of time due to

difficulty in maintaining a persistently flexed or

extended aspect with her left leg.

Supp. App. 5

5. Able to drive a care for short periods of time.
(Steen Depo., Ex. D, p. 18).
In July or August, 1996, Hedrick requested to be

placed on a list of employees claiming to have
permanent work restrictions, referred to as the “ADA
list.” Once placed on the list, WRCS attempted to
find suitable employment for employees who could no
longer perform their regular jobs. Once Hedrick was
placed on the list, WRCS began to identify vacancies
which would correspond with her restrictions.

In September 1996, WRCS informed Hedrick of
an opening for a Referral Center scheduler. Hedrick
interviewed for the position. Hedrick claims that
during the interview, she was asked about her ability
to walk and get in and out »f a chair. She told the
interviewers that she would not have any problem
with those tasks. However, upon learning the salary,
Hedrick indicated that she was not interested in the
job because it was too low. Hedrick testified during
her deposition that she believed she could have had
the job had she wanted it, but that she rejected the
position because she was overqualified and the salary
was too low. (Hedrick Depo., p. 36-7).

In late September 1996, WRCS informed Hedrick
of a Quality Assurance position which was opening.
In November 1996, Hedrick interviewed for the job.
Hedrick recalls telling the interviewer that although

Supp. App. 6

she would not have a problem walking, she might
walk slower than someone else. She also recalls
telling the interviewer that she would be able to carry
things. Hedrick claims that she asked for permission
to park in the physicians’ parking lot, which was
closer to the hospital. Hedrick was not offered the
position. Instead, Dan Donatelli was selected to fill
the vacancy.

In January 1997, WRCS also informed Hedrick of
four Case Manager vacancies in tle Department of
Medicine. Hedrick met the minimum qualifications
for the positions and was referred to Dr. Bunn, the
chairman of the Department of Medicine, for an
interview. Hedrick claims that during the interview,
Dr. Bunn asked her about her physical limitations and
she responded that she would have no problems. Dr.
Bunn selected four other applicants to fil! the
positions.

In March 1997, WRCS informed Hedrick of
another Quality Assurance position which was
opening. She was told that she would be considered
for the position, but that it was unnecessary to
interview because she had recently interviewed for the
other similar position. Another applicant was selected
to fill that position.

In August 1997, WRCS contacted Hedrick
regarding a temporary assignment as an Admission

Supp. App. 7

Nurse. Hedrick accepted the assignment, returned to
work for WRCS on August 25, 1997, and continues to
work as an Admission Nurse for WRCS. Since
accepting that assignment, Hedrick has not inter-
viewed for any other Quality Assurance or Case
Manager positions that have become available.

Hedrick now claims that WRCS discriminated
against her on the basis of her disability and her age
because they did not assign her to the Quality
Assurance and Case Manager positions and instead
filled the vacancies with younger people who were not
disabled.

In their Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendants argue that (1) Hedrick never worked for
Forum Health, which is merely a parent holding
company that cannot be liable for discrimination, and,
therefore must be dismissed; (2) Hedrick was not
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) Hedrick
was offered a reasonable accommodation, but she
refused the assignment; and (4) Hedrick was not
entitled to reassignment to the Quality Assurance and
Case Manager positions as [ ] an accommodation,
because those positions were not comparable to her
position as a staff nurse.

R&R pp.2-6.

In her motion for partial summary judgment, Hedrick

seeks summary judgment on two issues: (1) whether she was

Supp. App. 8

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disabled within the meaning of ADA and O.R.C. §4112 at the
time WRCS denied her the vacant positions; and (2) whether
WRCS failed to reasonably accommodate her by refusing to
place her in the vacant positions for which she applied and

was qualified.
II. PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)
(C), the Court reviews de novo the portion of the Magistrate
Judge’s R&R to which specific objection was made.
Hedrick objected to the following conclusions in the
R&R:

(1) that Hedrick provided no direct evidence of
discrimination based on disability;

(2) that Hedrick failed to establish that (a) she was
substantially limited in a major life activity; (b) there
was a record of her disability; or (c) she was
“regarded as” disabled within the meaning of the
ADA by WRCS;

? Defendant argues that Hedrick has waived her objections to
some or all of the R&R because her objections are not
specific. Although the Court agrees that many of Hedrick’s
objections are general in nature, she does cite to specific
pages in her previous briefs for her arguments in support of
her objections. The Court, therefore, will consider her
objections “specific”.

Supp. App. 9

(3) that she failed to establish that she was a qualified
individual with a disability because she did not show
that she proposed, and was denied, a reasonable
accommodation;

(4) that she had not established a prima facie case of
disability discrimination;

(5) that WRCS asserted a legitimate reason for refusing
to assign Hedrick to the available Quality Assurance
and Case Manager positions for which she was
qualified;

(6) that she failed to produce any evidence showing that
WRCS’s reason for not assigning her to the vacant
positions she desired and for which she was qualified
was pretextual;

(7) recommending that Hedrick’s motion for partial
summary judgment be denied; and

(8) that defendants were entitled to summary judgment
dismissing her age discriminativn claim.’

> Hedrick has not objected to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that defendants be granted summary
judgment on Hedrick’s claim against Forum Health because
she did not exhaust her administrative remedies with regard
to the claims against Forum Health and failed to show that
WRCS and Forum Health should be treated as a single
employer. She also does not object to the conclusion that by
failing to argue that obesity was a disability in her motion for
partial summary judgment or in her response to defendants’
motion for summary judgment, she waived this argument.

Supp. App. 10

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
~ Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is

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appropriate if the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The Supreme Court has further explained:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element
| essential to that party’s case and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In
such a situation, there can be “no genuine
“issue as to material fact,” since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett_, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof in the
case, the initial burden on the moving party under Rule 56
“may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent,
_ having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.”

Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6"
Cir. 1996).

Supp. App. 11

“When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse
party’s pleading, but... must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the [nonmovant]’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion, Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. _, 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986), but “conclusory allegations standing alone will not

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
White v. York Int’ Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10" Cir. 1995).
IV. ANALYSIS

A. ADA.

The crux of Hedrick’s dispute with WRCS is that WRCS
discriminated against her by denying her employment in the
Quality Assurance or Case Manager positions as a reasonable
accommodation to her disability that rendered her unaole to
continue in her previous position of staff nurse.

The ADA provides that a covered employer may not
“discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and any

Supp. App. 12

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other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42
U.S.C. §12112(a). More particularly for purposes of these
motions, the Act provides that the term “discriminate”
includes “denying employment opportunities to a job
applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability if such denial is based on the need
of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to
the physical or mental impairments of the employee or
applicant.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(B).

To recover on a claim of employment discrimination
based on a disability under the ADA and Ohio law, ‘ the
plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) is disabled within the
meaning of the Act; (2) is otherwise qualified for the job, with
or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered an
adverse employment decision because of his or her disability.
Monette v. Electronic Data Systems, 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6"
Cir. 1996). An individual seeking redress for alleged discri-
mination under the ADA can proceed by presenting direct
evidence of discrimination, or by introducing indirect or
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, sufficient to
establish a prima facie case 0. presumption of discrimination.

* Because the essential elements of an ADA claim and a claim
under the Ohio handicap discrimination statute are the same,
the analysis under of Hedrick’s ADA claim also resolves her
handicap discrimination claims under Ohio law. Wohler v.
Toledo Stamping & Mfg. Co., 125 F.3d 856, **2 n. 1 (6" Cir.

1997); Hoffman vy. Fidelity Brokerage Servs., Inc., 959
F.Supp. 452, 457 n. 1 (W.D. Ohio 1997).

Supp. App. 13

Where, as here, a plaintiff uses the indirect method of
proof by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-
ment decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (4973); Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86. Under the burden
shifting approach of the McDonnell Douglas formula, if the
employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment action, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason is
pretextual by providing evidence from which a jury could
determine that the adverse action was based solely on the
employee’s disability. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86. Where
the plaintiff chooses the direct method of proof, the burden
does not shift to the employer to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Id. at 1180. Instead, the employee must show that the adverse

action was based solely on his or her disability. Id.
1. Direct Evidence. |

Hedrick’s first objection is to the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that she provided no direct evidence that WRCS
discriminated against her by not transferring her to the vacant
Quality Assessment and/or Case Manager positions as a
reasonable accommodation for her disability. Specifically,
Hedrick argues that the statement made by Lorraine Nelson to
Dr. Nash, in which Nelson “expressed concern to me that she

Supp. App. 14

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felt that JoAnn’s [sic] medical condition would prohibit her
from being able to perform this job as a case manager” (Nash
depo, p. 68), is evidence of a discriminatory animus.

The direct evidence standard essentially requires an
admission by the employer, or othe: direct evidence, that it
relied solely on the disability in making the adverse
employment decision. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178. Lorraine
Nelson’s comment to Dr. Nash regarding her concern about
Hedrick’s medical condition and the ability to perform the
Case Manager position is not sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that WRCS relied solely on Hedrick’s
alleged disability in making its decision not to place her in the
Quality Assessment or Case Manager positions. As set forth
below, without more, this isolated comment does not

establish direct evidence of discrimination.

Hedrick cites Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701
(6" Cir. 2001) in her citation of supplemental authority in
support of her objection to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion
that she has not provided direct evidence. Ross, however, is
distinguishable. In Ross, the Sixth Circuit found that a memo
referring to the plaintiff as a “back case” and inquiring when
this “problem person” could be brought to “termination
status” was direct evidence of discrimination. Id. at 704, 706-
707. Although the district court had determined that this
“isolated reference” was insufficient to constitute direct
evidence of a discriminatory animus, the Sixth Circuit
disagreed. Id. It found that the memo was not an isolated

Supp. App. 15

reference but occurred in the context of events reflecting on
Ross’s back condition and his ultimate termination from
Campbell Soup Company, “including the invitation for Ross
to retire and the proffered resume assistance, the creation of
a memo tracking Ross’s injury-related absences from work, :
Ross’s receipt of a letter detailing his ability to COBRA his
health benefits, and the comment made to Ross that ‘we can’t
have any more of this back thing.”” Id. at 707. For the Sixth
Circuit, these events taken together demonstrated the
prominence of Ross’s back condition in Campbell’s decisions
regarding his employment. Id.

In this case, however, Ms. Nelson’s alleged concern about
Hedrick’s ability to perform the required duties of the Case
Manager position is an isolated comment. There is no series
of comments or reports from WRCS indicating that Hedrick’s
osteoarthritis figured prominently in its decision to hire others
instead of her for the Qualified Assessment and Case
Manager positions. Hedrick argues that this “concern”
combined with other factors constitutes direct evidence.
However, the fact that WRCS agreed with Hedrick’s
assessment that she could not continue in her previous
position of staff nurse, tried to accommodate her physical
impairment by finding her another position in the hospital,
and asked her about her physical ability to perform the
specific functions of the positions for which she interviewed,
do not constitute direct evidence — even when taken in the
context of Ms. Nelson’s “concern” — that WRCS denied her

Supp. App. 16

the positions she sought solely based on her physical
impairment.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the evidence
presented by Hedrick is not direct evidence of discrimination.
2. Indirect Evidence.
To survive defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Hedrick must rely on indirect evidence by establishing a

prima facie case, or presumption of discrimination, under the
McDonnell! Douglas formula as adapted to ADA claims.

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability
‘discrimination by showing that: (1) he or she is disabled; (2)
he or she is otherwise qualified for the position, with or
without reasonable accommodation; (3) he or she suffered an
adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had
reason to know of the plaintiff's disability, and (5) the
position remained open while the employer sought other
applicants or the disabled-individual was replaced. Monette,
90 F.3d at 1186. The parties dispute only the first two
elements of Hedrick’s prima facie case: whether she was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA and, if so, whether
WRCS provided her with a reasonable accommodation under
the Act, when it offered_her the position of Referral Center

Scheduler position.

a. Definition of Disability Under the ADA.

In her second objection to the R&R, Hedrick objects to
the Magistrate Judge’s determination that she does not meet
the definition of “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.

Supp. App. 17

The parties do not dispute that Hedrick’s osteoarthritis is
a physical impairment. They do, however, disagree on
whether this physical impairment meets the definition of
“disability” under the ADA. The Act defines “disability” as
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(2). Hedrick asserts
that she has presented evidence under each of the Act’s three
methods of establishing disability sufficient to defeat
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and to establish
disability under her motion for partial summary judgment.

I. Physical Impairment that Substantially Limits a Major

Life Activity: 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A).
Hedrick claims that the osteoarthritis in both her knees

constitutes a disability under the ADA because it is a physical
impairment that substantially limits her major life activities.
Because the parties agree that Hedrick’s osteoarthritis is a
physical impairment, the disputed issue is whether her
osteoarthritis “substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A).

Hedrick does not provide the Court with a clear statement
of the “major life activities” she claims are substantially
limited by her osteoarthritis. However, in her objections to
the R&R, she relies on several pieces of evidence to support

her claim.

Supp. App. 18

—

First, Hedrick relies on a Functional Capacity Evaluation
that defendants performed on Hedrick in July of 1996:
Position Work Tolerance/Limitations: Client had
limitations with most nonmaterial handling activities.
Ina seated position, client reports being able to sit for
a few hours but with knee in a nonbent position
secondary to increase knee pressure. Standing was
limited to a few minutes. Walking was limited to
approximately 30 minutes continuously. Stair climb-
ing was limited to 2 flights maximum x 22 steps.
Crawling, kneeling and squatting were not assessed
secondary to knee pain...
* * *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Nursing skills limited to activities avoiding
bending, squatting, patient transfers, and excessive
walking.”
(Steen depo., Ex. 13, pp. 14-15.)
Next, Hedrick points to her own deposition in which she
explains:
I can no longer have activities like bowling, walking.
I can’t bend at the knees. I can’t kneel. I can’t stand
for long periods of time. What used to take me an
hour to two hours to do to clean, I can’t do it because
I have to take rests between because of the knees.
(Hedrick depo, p. 91), Although not specifically relied on by
Hedrick, the Court also notes Hedrick’s deposition in.which

Supp. App. 19

she testified that when asked during her interviews for the
Referral Center Scheduler and Quality Assurance positions if
she would have trouble walking, she stated that she would
not, that she “may not walk as fast as others but [ ] can get
from point A to point B”, and that her physician had only
advised that she not walk “long distances”. (Hedrick depo,
pp. 33, 40-41, 45).

Finally, Hedrick submits evidence trom Dr. Nash, her
primary treating physician. Specifically she relies on Dr.
Nash’s affidavit, dated 6 April 2000, in which he opines:

Based on my treatment of Joanne Hedrick, my review

of her medical records [ ], my knowledge of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, and my professional

education, training and experience, it is my opinion to

a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Joanne

Hedrick’s osteoarthritis to both knees has caused her

to be disabled within the meaning of the [ADA] prior

to and continuously since July of 1996.”

(Nash Aff. 95.) She also relies on a letter attached to the
affidavit from Dr. Nash to plaintiff's counsel dated 14 March
2000, in which he states that “Ms. Hedrick’s osteoarthritis is
a physical impairment constituting a disability that
substantially limits her ability to walk and perform her
activities of daily living”, and that she is “significantly limited
with respect to her ability to stand in place, remain in a seated
position, climb stairs, crawl, kneel and squat.” (Nash Aff. Ex.
C.) Finally, she submits testimony from Dr. Nash’s

Supp. App. 20

deposition that she is unable to perform a number of nursing
functions such as walking for long periods of time, lifting
patients, working in an operating room and responding to
emergency situations. (Nash depo., pp. 89-93).

The Court has independently reviewed Hedrick’s medical
records (dating from 1993 to 2000) attached to Dr. Nash’s
affidavit. Although not relied on by Hedrick, the Court finds
a series of letters between Dr. Nash and Jon Steen, WRCS
Human Resource Director, to be relevant in determining
whether Hedrick’s osteoarthritis was a disability under the
Act. On 7 August 1996, Dr. Nash wrote to Jon Steen
informing him that the functional capacity evaluation of
Hedrick “indicated that she is not going to be able to return to
work in her previous position as a general staff nurse” and
recommending that “she be considered for other positions
within the organization.” (Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M336.)
In his reply dated 16 September 1996, Steen asks Nash to
“provide [him] with a listing of [Hedrick’s] limitations so the
[WRCS] can evaluate her for other vacancies as they occur.”
(Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M337.) On 24 September 1996,
Dr. Nash responded to Steen’s request by attaching a copy of
the Functional Capacity Evaluation and stating that he agreed
with the evaluation and it recommendations. He summarized
Hedrick’s limitations at that time as follows:

1. Daily activities for short intervals

2. Able to walk short distances

3. Able to stand for short periods of time

Supp. App. 21

4. Able to [ ] desk work (i.e. type, computer skills,
filing) for short periods of time due to difficulty in
maintaining a persistently flexed or extended aspect
with her left leg
5. Able to drive a car for short periods of time.
(Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M357).°

Although the Act does not define the terms “major life
activity” or “substantially limits”, agency regulations provide
guidance as to their meaning.° HEW Regulations define
“major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(1). The
term “substantially limits” means “unable to perform a major

‘ There is a similar letter from Dr. Nash t« Jon Steen dated 23
September 1996. However, the letter is unsigned and appears
to be a draft. (Nash Aff., Ex. E, doc. no. M338.)

° There are two potential sources of regulatory guidance for
interpreting ADA provisions: regulations issued by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§706(8)(B) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guidelines interpreting the ADA.
Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 689
(2002). The persuasive authority of the HEW Rehabilitation
Act guidelines has been recognized. Id. However, the
persuasiveness of the EEOC regulations is less clear, as
Congress has not authorized any agency to issue regulations
interpreting the ADA. Id.

Supp. App. 22

life activity that the average person in the general population
can perform; or [ ] significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life activity.”
29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j).

The United States Supreme Court has recently examined
the terms “major life activities” and “substantially limited” as
used in the ADA, and determined they must be strictly
interpreted to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled under the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v.
Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691 (2002). According to the Court
in Williams, major life activities refer to “those activities that
are of central importance to daily life.” Id. Furthermore,
individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test

must do more than submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of
an impairment. “Instead the ADA requires those ‘claiming
the Act’s protection... to provide a disability by offering
evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their
impairment] in terms of their own experience... is
substantial.” Id. at 691-92 (quoting Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)). Whether or not a
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act requires an
individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 483 (1999); Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287
F.3d 593, 598 (6" Cir. 2002). An individualized assessment

Supp. App. 23

of the effect ot an impairment is particularly important where
the symptoms of that impairment vary widely between
individuals. Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 692.

(A) Walking, sitting, standing and climbing

stairs as major life activities

Hedrick’s evidence must show that her impairment
prevents or severely restricts her from doing activities that are
of central importance to most people’s daily lives. Williams
122 S.Ct. at 691. From the evidence Hedrick submitted,
walking, sitting, standing and climbing stairs qualify as

activities that are central to most people’s lives — and are,
therefore, major life activities. Bowling, crawling, kneeling
and squatting are not major life activities. -
As her primary treating physician, Dr. Nash’s testimony
and records regarding Hedrick’s impairment are relevant.
Under Williams, however, his conclusory opinion that her
osteoarthritis has caused her to be disabled under the Act does
nothing to further her claim, because it provides no evidence
of how her impairment affects her activities. 122 S.Ct. at
691. Likewise, his conclusion that she is “significantly
limited with respect to her ability to stand in place, remain in
a seated position, climb stairs”, etc. does little to inform the
Court about how Hedrick’s limited ability to perform these
activities compares to the “condition, manner, or duration
under which the average person in the general population can
perform these activities.” See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j). More to
the point, Dr. Nash’s 2 ‘ September 1996 letter to Jon Steen

Supp. App. 24

provides the type of evidence the Court requires to determine
whether Hedrick is disabled under the ADA because he
describes the activities in which Hedrick is limited and the
extent of her ‘imitation. In particular, he states that she is able
to walk short distances, and to stand, do desk work, drive a
car and perform unspecified “daily activities” for short
periods of time. He also states that he agrees with the
Functional Capacity Evaluation and its recommendations.

The Functional Capacity Evaluation is more precise in
describing the extent to which her osteoarthritis limits
Hedrick’s activities. According to the Functional Capacity
Evaluation, Hedrick’s walking was limited to 30 minutes,
stair climbing was limited to two flights, and sitting was
limited to a few hours. i"edrick also testified that although
she might be slower than another person, she couid walk
“from point A to point B”, and did not consider the walking
involved in the Referral Center Scheduler or Quality
Assurance positions to be a problem. As for standing,
Hedrick’s testimony is that she cannot stand for long periods
of time.

Although her ability to perform these activities is limited,
it is not “significantly restricted” compared to the condition,
manner or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform those same major life
activities. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j). There is no showing that the
average person in the general population -walks more than 30

Supp. App. 25

minutes consecutively, climbs more than two flights of steps
at a time, sits for more than a few hours at a time or stands for
long periods of time. Hedrick has not shown, therefore, that
these limitations, are “substantial” within the meaning of
ADA, or that she is significantly restricted in the “condition,
manner or duration” that she can perform these activities
compared to the average person in the general population.
(B) Working as a major life activity.

As for the testimony of Dr. Nash that she is unable to
perform a number of nursing functions such as walking for
long periods of time, lifting patients, responding to emergency
situations, and working in an operating room (Nash depo., pp.
89-93), it is unclear from the briefs filed if Hedrick submits
this evidence in support of a claim that her physical
impairment substantially limits her in the maior life activity
of working. Nevertheless, the Court will assume that she
does claim that she is substantially limited in the major life
activity of working anc examine her evidence accordingly.’

’ To the extent Dr. Nash’s testimony may be intended to
bolster her claim that she is substantially limited in the major
life activities of walking, sitting, standing and climbing stairs,
her limited ability to perform certain fairly rigorous nursing
functions, such as responding to emergency situations, lifting
patients and working in an operating room, does not
demonstrate that she is significantly restricted in the
“condition, manner or duration” that she can walk, sit, stand
or climb stairs, compared to the condition, manner or duration

Supp. App. 26

Regarding the major life activity of working, the Supreme
Court has held that a claimant is required to show an inability
to work in a “broad range of jobs,” rather than a specific job.
Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 693; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). As the Court inSutton explained:

To be substantially limited in the major life activity of

working... one must be precluded from more than one
type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of
choice. If jobs utilizing an individual’s skills (but
perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available,
one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs.
Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are
available, one is not precluded from a broad range of
jobs.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. Considering the broad range of
nursing jobs, the evidence shows that while there may be
certain rigorous nursing functions that Hedrick can no longer
perform, such as walking for long periods of time, lifting
patients, responding to emergency situations, and working in
an operating room (Nash depo., pp. 89-93), there are nursing
jobs she can perform that utilize Hedrick’s nursing skills,
including the Referral Center Scheduler, Quality Assurance,
Case Manager and Admission Nurse positions. Under the
standards articulated in Sutton, therefore, Hedrick is not

under which the average person in the general population
performs the same activities.

Supp. App. 27

—_—

precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Id. The fact that
she is no longer able to perform the functions required by the
position of staff nurse, or other rigorous nursing functions, is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

In conclusion, therefore, the evidence presented is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact from
which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Hedrick’s
impairment of osteoarthritis in the knees substantially limits
her in the major life activities of walking, standing, sitting or
climbing stairs or in the major life activity of working.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that her impairment does
not constitute a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§12102(2)(A).

ii. Record of a Disability: 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B).

Hedrick also objects to the R&R’s conclusion that she has
not shown that WRCS’s records establish her disability under
42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B) of the Act. She claims that her
physicians’ letters to the hospital regarding her injury, her
leave of absence, the Functional Capacity Evaluation, and her
placement on WRCS’s “ADA List” establish a record of her
disability under the ADA. However, these records merely
indicate that WRCS had a record of Hedrick’s physical
impairment that limited her in certain activities — in particular

that she was unable to continue in her position of staff nurse.
Hedrick has not provided records showing that she was
substantially limited in a major life activity as required by the

Supp. App. 28

ADA. Therefore, the records do not raise a genuine issue of
material fact that WRCS had a record of a physical
impairment that substantially limits her in a major life
activity. See 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B).

iii. Regarded As Disabled: 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(c).

Finally, Hedrick objects to the Magistrate Judge's
conclusion that WRCS did not regard her as having a
disability that substantially impairs a major life activity.

To be “regarded as” disabled under the ADA, the

Supreme Court has provided as follows:

There are two apparent ways in which individuals
may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment

substantially limits one or more major life activities.

In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity

entertain misperception is about the individual — it

must believe either that one has a substantially

limiting impairment that one does not have or that one

has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact,

the impairment is not so limiting. These mis-

perceptions often “resul[t] from stereotypic assump-

tions not truly indicative of... individual ability.”
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(7) and
School Bd. of Nassau Cty. V. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284

Supp. App. 29

(1987)). Therefore, to meet the “regarded as” definition of
disabled under the Act, Hedrick must show that defendants
mistakenly regarded her osteoarthritis as “substantially
limiting” a “major life activity” within the meaning of the
ADA. To avoid summary judgment, she must raise a genuine
issue of material fact on this issue.

In support of her claim, Hedrick first points to the fact that
WRCS “was advised and agreed” that she could not resume
her staff nurse position and relied on the Functional Capacity
Evaluation and letters from her physicians that she would not
be able to return to her previous positions. The Court has
addressed why these facts do not create a genuine issue of
material fact that Hedrick is actually disabled under the ADA.
For the same reasons, these facts, without evidence of any
misperception, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
that WRCS regarded her as “substantially limited” in a “major
life activity.”

Next, Hedrick argues that WRCS’s placement of her on
the so-called “ADA list” establishes that defendant regarded
her as disabled, or at least creates a genuine issue of material
fact on that issue. This is a closer question. The fact that
defendant had a list, which was sometimes referred to as the
“ADA list”, raises a legitimate question as to whether a jury
could find that WRCS regarded Hedrick as disabled within
the meaning of ADA. On examination, however the Court
concludes for the following reasons that placement on the so-
called “ADA list” does not create a genuine issue of material

Supp. App. 30

sceianasiticas

fact of whether WRCS regarded her as substantially limited
in a major life activity.

Although Hedrick relies on the deposition of Jon Steen,
the Human Resource Director for WRCS, to support her
claim that by placing her on the “ADA list” WRCS
considered her disabled, Mr. Steen’s deposition does not
support her claim. According to Steen, the list was created
around the time the ADA was enacted as a way to implement
its preexisting practice of trying to accommodate employees
with permanent, physical restrictions by placing them in
positions that better suited their limitations. Steen testified
that an employee is placed on the list by requesting an
accommodation, and only after WRCS verifies that the
employee has a permanent restriction. Employees on the list
can either no longer perform the functions of their previous
position or have difficulty doing so. (Steen Depo.., pp. 16-26).

There is no evidence that WRCS made any attempt to
determine whether the individuals who are placed on the list
are “substantially limited” in a “major life activity”. As
discussed while analyzing Hedrick’s claim that she is actually
disabled, a determination of disability under the ADA
requires a separate analysis of the individual’s impairment,
the activities the impairment restricts and the extent to which
those activities are restricted. Here WRCS simply determined
that employees placed on the list have a physical impairment
that makes performing their former job difficult or
impossible. The fact that WRCS attempted to accommodate
employees with permanent physical restrictions, who might

Supp. App. 31

not be able to perform the functions of their former positions,
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that
WRCS mistakenly concluded that Hedrick’s osteoarthritis
“substantially limits” her in a “major life activity”.

Finally, Hedrick claims that WRCS regarded her as
“disabled” because, when she interviewed for positions after
being placed on the ADA list, WRCS officials asked her
questions evidencing that they were conscious of, and
concerned about, her limited ability to walk. This is further
demonstrated, she claims, by the fact that she asked for and
was told that if she was offered the position she could have a
parking space close to the building to accommodate her need —
to cut down on long-distance walking.

This is not evidence that defendant entertained any
misperceptions about Hedrick being disabled. Hedrick had
informed WRCS that she could no longer continue in her
previous position of staff nurse, in part because she could not
walk long distances. The fact that WRCS officials questioned
her about her physical restrictions in the context of
performing the duties of the job for which she was
interviewing shows that they recognized that she had a
physical restriction and supports the premise that they were
trying to accommodate her. The ADA was enacted, not to
accommodate every American with a physical or mental
impairment, but only those whose impairments substantially
limit a major life activity. See oyota M v.
Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002). Standing along, the

Supp. App. 32

fact that an employer attempts to accommodate an employee
with a physical impairment, who is not actually disabled
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A), cannot then
be used to demonstrate that the employee was “regarded as”
disabled under 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(C).

Hedrick has not submitted evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that WRCS “regarded” her as
having an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity.

In conclusion, ‘fedrick has failed to establish that she is a
member of the ADA’s protected class. She has not presented
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity; (2) has a record of
such an impairment; or (3) was “regarded as” having such an
impairment by WRCS. Therefore, WRCS is entitled to
summary judgment on Hedrick’s disability claims.

b. ified Individual With a Disability.

Even assuming Hedrick could show that she is “disabled”
and within the ADA’s protected class, to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination she must also show that she is a
“qualified individual with a disability”. The regulations
define a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an
individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill,
experience, education and other job-related requirements of
the employment position such individual holds or desires, and
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

Supp. App. 33

the essential function of such position.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2
(m). See alsoBurns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d
247, 257 (6" Cir. 2000).

Discrimination under the ADA includes not making
reasonable accommodations to an employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless the
employer can show that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship. Hoskins v. Oakland Cty, Sheriff's Dept., 227
F.3d 719, 724 (6" Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
$1211(b)(S5)(A)). In this case, Hedrick claims that WRCS
discriminated against her by denying her employment in the
Quality Assurance or Case Manager positions she desired as
a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. To be
a qualified individual with a disability, therefore, Hedrick
must show that she satisfies the requirements of these
positions and can perform the job related functions with or
without an accommodation.

A disabled employee who claims to be otherwise qualified
with a reasonable accommodation bears the initial burden of
proposing an accommodation and showing that the
accommodation is objectively reasonable. Cassidy v. Detroit
Edison Company, 138 F.3d 629, 633-34 (6" Cir. 1998);
Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183. A disabled employee cannot

* An employer then has the burden of persuasion to shown
that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. In this case, WRCS does not argue
that any of the alleged reasonable accommodations are an
undue hardship.

Supp. App. 34

demand that the employer provide her with a particular

accommodation when another reasonable accommodation is
made available to her. Hankins v. The Gap, 84 F.3d 797,
800-01 (6 Cir. 1996) (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986)); Hoskins, 227 F.3d at
728 n.3. The regulations also provide that an individual who
is disabled under the ADA is not required to accept a
particular accommodation offered by the employer. However,
if the disabled individual rejects a proposed “reasonable
accommodation” that enables the individual to perform the
position’s essential functions that they cannot perform
without an accommodation, the individual will no longer be
considered a “qualified individual with a disability” under the
ADA. 29 C.F.R. §1630.9(d).

The Act and the regulations provided that “reasonable
accommodation” may include reassignment to a vacant
position. 42 U.S.C. §12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(0)(2)
(ii). Generally, reassignment to another position is considered
only where accommodation in the employee’s prior position
is not possible. Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. Under Sixth
Circuit law, when a disabled employee can no longer perform
the functions of his or her previous position, even with
accommodation, an employer has a duty under the ADA to
consider transferring the employee to another position for
which that employee is otherwise qualified. Burns, 222 F.3d
at 257. However, an employer need only reassign adisabled
employee to a vacant position. Id. “Employers are not

Supp. App. 35

required to create new jobs, displace existing employees from
their positions, or violate other employees’ rights under a
collective bargaining agreement or other non-discriminatory
policy in order to accommodate a disabled individual.” Id. at
257-258, (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc.,
141 F.3d 667, 678 (7" Cir. 1998)). Furthermore, an employer
is under no obligation to keep an employee on unpaid leave

indefinitely until a suitable position becomes available.
Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187.

Generally, an employer is only required to transfer an
employee to a position comparable to the employee’s prior
position as a reasonable accommodation under the Act. See
Hoskins, 227 F.3d at 728 n.3. The Act does not require an
employer to offer an employee a promotion as a reasonable
accommodation. Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634. However, where
a comparable position is not vacant, an employer’s obligation
to reassign an employee under the ADA may include
assignment to a position with a lower grade of pay if the
employee meets the jobs qualifications. Cassidy, 138 F.2d at
634.

The employer must first identify the full range of

alternative positions for which the individual satisfies

the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory pre-

requisites, and then determine whether the employee’s

own knowledge, skills, and abilities would enable her

to perform the essential functions of any of those

alternative positions, with or without reasonable

Supp. App. 36

3

accommodations. The employer’s duty to accommo-

date requires it to consider transferring the employee

to any of these other jobs, including those that would
represent a demotion. .

Burns, 222 F.3d at 257 (quoting Dalton, 141 F.2d at 677).
The parties agree that Hedrick could no longer perform

her job as staff nurse and that no reasonable accommodation

could be made for Hedrick in that position. They also agree

that Hedrick requested a reasonable accommodation when she

j contacted WRCS and requested to b> placed on the “ADA
list” so that another position, for which she was qualified,
might be found.

The issue in dispute, therefore, is whether there was a
“reasonable accommodation” of Hedrick under the Act.
WRCS claims that the position of Referral Center Scheduler

_was a reasonable accommodation. Hedrick was offered the
position but turned it down, claiming that the Referral Center
Scheduler position was not a reasonable accommodation
] because she was overqualified for the position.
The evidence shows that in July of 1996 Hedrick
| requested an accommodation because she could no longer
perform the functions of a staff nurse. Even assuming
Hedrick was disabled within the meaning of the Act, which
this Court has found she was not, Hedrick’s request for a
reasonable accommodation placed a duty on WRCS to
ascertain whether it had an available position that Hedrick
: would be able to perform. Burns, 222 F.3d at 257.

Supp. App. 37

According to Hedrick’s deposition testimony, after placement
on the list sometime in July of 1996, Hedrick requested to
return to work in August of 1996. Pursuant to WRCS’s
instructions, Hedrick periodically contacted Anne Martz
Ondo, WRCS’s Employment Coordinator, to determine what
positions WRCS might have available for her. She was
informed of the Referral Center Scheduler position and
interviewed for that position sometime in September of 1996.
During the interview, Hedrick informed Lorraine Nelson that
she was not interested in the position because she felt she was
overqualified and it was a “drastic” cut in pay from her
previous position of staff nurse. (Hedrick depo. p. 36).
Although the parties dispute whether WRCS made a formal
offer of the position to Hedrick before she told them she was
not interested, the facts are undisputed that Hedrick
understood that the job was hers if she wanted it.

At this point in time, WRCS absolved itself of its duty
under the ADA to make an further reasonable accommodation
for Hedrick’s alleged disability. Hedrick was qualified for the
position and the position accommodated her physical
limitations that made performance of the staff nurse position
no longer possible. Although Hedrick claims that she was
overqualified for the position, Sixth Circuit law obligated
WRCS to offer her a vacant position for which she was
qualified — even a demotion if a comparable position was not
available — as a reasonable accommodation when she

Supp. App. 38

requested a transfer to another position.” Burns, 222 F.3d at
257; Cassidy, 138 F. 3d at 634.

Even though Hedrick turned down WRCS’s offer of the
Referral Center Scheduler position as a_ reasonable
accommodation, WRCS did not terminate Hedrick. See
Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187 (employer is under no obligation to
keep employees on unpaid leave indefinitely until a

comparable position becomes available). Instead, WRCS
continued to inform her of positions for which she was
eligible to apply until ultimately Hedrick was placed in her
current admission nurse assignment in August of 1997. At
this point, however, Hedrick could no longer be considered a
“qualified individual with a disability” because she had

°If no vacant position exists for which the disabled employee
is qualified, but the employer knows that a comparable
position for which the applicant is qualified will become
vacant in a short period of time, the employer may be required
to offer the position to the employee. Monette, 90 F.3d at
1187 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 407-08); Hoskins, 227
F.3d at 728 n.3 (citing Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp.,
196 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999)) (reassigning an employee to
a position that includes a significant decrease in pay, benefits
or seniority, is not “reasonable” under the ADA, where a
comparable position for which the employee is qualified is
available at the same time). However, Hedrick has made no
showing that the Quality Assurance and Case Manager
positions were comparable to her staff nurse position, or that
WRCS knew these positions were about to become available
when it offered her the Referral Center Scheduler position.

Supp. App. 39

already turned down a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R.
§1630.9(d). Particularly where a transfe to another position
is involved, a disabled employee cannot demand that the
employer provide her with a particular accommodation when
another reasonable accommodation is made available to her.
Hankins, 84 F.3d at 800-01.

The Case Manager and Quality Assurance positions, to
which Hedrick claims she was entitled as a reasonable
accommodation did not become available until after she
turned down the Referral Center Scheduler position — at
which point she was no longer “otherwise qualified”.
Moreover, these positions were non-bargaining unit, salaried
positions as opposed to her prior position as an hourly paid
bargaining unit staff nurse and Hedrick has not shown that
they were comparabie to her prior position.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Hedrick failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the second
requirement of her prima facie case — that she was a qualified
individual with a disability. WRCS is therefore entitled to
summary judgment on this issue.

c. Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination.

Although Hedrick objects to the R&R’s conclusion that
she has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA, as demonstrated above,
Hedrick has not raised an genuine issue of material fact
regarding the disputed elements of her prima facie case. She
has not shown that she was disabled within the meaning of

Supp. App. 40

4
a

the Act or that she was an otherwise qualified individual, with
or without accommodation. '°

Because she has failed to establish a prima facie case,
WRCS is entitled to summary judgment on Hedrick’s claim
of discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law.

d. Legitimate Reason for Employment Action.

Although Hedrick has not established a prima facie case
of disability discrimination, the Court will address her
remaining objections to the R&R. Assuming Hedrick had

presented a prima facie case of disability discrimination under
the ADA, the employer must then offer a legitimate
explanation for its action. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86.
Hedrick objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
WRCS had asserted a legitimate reason for refusing to assign
Hedrick to the Quality Assurance and Case Manager
positions. Although WRCS asserts that Hedrick was not
chosen for these positions because she was not the most
qualified candidate, Hedrick claims that defendant’s reason is

\Hedrick’s objection is limited to her claim that she raised a
genuine issue of material fact that she is disabled within the
meaning of the Act and is, therefore, a member of the ADA’s
protected class. The Court has already reviewed, and
addressed, the evidence which she argues supports her claim
that she is actually substantially impaired in a major life
activity, has a record of such impairment and/or is regarded as
having such an impairment. Having previously concluded
that Hedrick did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on
these issues, the Court will not revisit them.

Supp. App. 41

conclusory and, therefore, inadequate to discharge its duty
under McDonnell Douglas to provide a specific reason for its

actions.

The adverse employment action Hedrick claims is
WRCS’s failure to place her in the Quality Assurance and
Case Manager positions as a reasonable accommodation to
her alleged disability. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting test, the employer need only offer or articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions is a
burden of production, not persuasion, and does not involve a
credibility assessment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). WRCS has produced such a
reason. Asserting that it chose the most qualified candidate
for each position (which was not Hedrick) is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment
action.

e. Pretext.

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden test, assuming the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case and the defendant
had articulated a legitimate reason for the adverse employ-
ment action, the burden returns to the plaintiff to establish
that defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185-86.
Hedrick might demonstrate that WRCS’s proffered reason
was pretextual by showing that it had no basis in fact, was not

the actual reason or was insufficient to explain the decision.

Supp. App. 42

Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882 (6" Cir.
1996).

Although a plaintiff may show pretext through indirect
evidence, the ultimate question remains whether the
defendant intentionally and illegally discriminated against the
plaintiff. “Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy
of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that

is probative of intentional discrimination.” Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 146. Establishing that the defendant’s proffered nondis-
criminatory reason for the adverse employment action is
unpersuasive or even contrived does not necessarily compel
a finding that the plaintiffs claim of discrimination is correct.
Id. “For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law if... the plaintiff created only a weak issue
of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and
there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence
that no discrimination had occurred.” Id. at 148.

In support of her argument that defendant’s proffered
reason is pretextual, Hedrick submits her own testimony that
she was the most qualified candidate for the vacant Quality
Assurance and Case Manager positions. She also argues that
there was conflicting testimony among defendant’s officials
as to who had the ultimate hiring authority for the vacant
Quality Assurance and Case Manager positions, and that
some officials had sketchy memories of the hiring decision
events and the particular qualifications of the candidates.
These facts are insufficient for a jury to conclude that

Supp. App. 43

WRCS’s articulated reason that Hedrick was not the most
qualified for the positions is false — and also insufficient for
a jury to infer that WRCS’s real reason for not placing her in
those positions was discrimination based on her disability.
Moreover, even if Hedrick’s submitted evidence were
sufficient to cast doubt on the defendant’s judgment in hiring
for these available positions, a court will not second-guess the
business judgment of the employer where the employer
chooses from equally qualified candidates for a position.
Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10" Cir. 1999).
Therefore, the Court concludes that Hedrick has not
submitted evidence from which a jury could conclude that

WRCS’s decision not to place her in the vacant Quality
Assurance and Case Manager positions was a pretext for
disability discrimination.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that
WRCS is entitled to summary judgment on Hedrick’s claim
of disability discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law.

3. Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.
Hedrick objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommen-

dation that her motion for partial summary judgment be
denied. Hedrick moved for summary judgment declaring that
(1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and
under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112; and that (2) WRCS
failed to reasonably accommodate her by refusing to place her
in the vacant positions for which she applied and was
qualified, thereby violating the ADA and Ohio law.

Supp. App. 44

SEE —— eee eer —_——— — oo

For the reasons discussed above, Hedrick’s motion for
partial summary judgment is denied.

B. Age Discrimination.

Hedrick claims that WRCS discriminated against her on
the basis of her age ir violation ot the ADEA when it failed
to appoint her to the available Quality Assurance and Case
Manager positions. Hedrick has not offered direct evidence
of age discrimination. To state a claim, therefore, she must
prove age discrimination by the McDonnell Douglas method
of establishing a prima facie case showing that (1) she is a
member of the protected class; (2) she was qualified for the
positions she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) a younger person was selected for the position
she desires. Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365,
371 (6" Cir. 1999).

The parties do not dispute, and the Magistrate Judge
agreed, that Hedrick established her prima facie case. The
evidence shows that she (1) is within the protected class
because she is over the age of 40, (2) met the minimum
qualifications for the positions she desired, (3) suffered an

adverse employment action when she failed to get any of the
positions she desired, and (4) five of the six successful
candidates were younger than she was. Having established
her prima facie case, the burden shifts to WRCS to articular
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not appointing her
to the Quality Assurance and Case Manager positions. Id.,
Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186-86.

Supp. App. 45

As in the disability discrimination claim, WRCS has
asserted that better qualified candidates were chosen to fill the
vacant positions instead of Hedrick -— a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Therefore, the burden
shifts back to Hedrick to show that WRCS’s reasons were
pretextual. Godfredson, 173 F.3d at 371; Monette, 90 F.3d at
1185-86. Pretext can be demonstrated by showing that the

proffered reason has no basis in fact, was not the actual reason
for the decision or is insufficient to explain the decision.
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882 (6" Cir.
1996).

As in her disability discrimination claim, Hedrick argues
that WRCS’s proffered reason is pretextual regarding age
discrimination because of her own testimony that she was the
most qualified candidate. She argues that a genuine issue of
material fact is shown by conflicting testimony among
defendant’s officials as to who had the ultimate hiring
authority for the vacant positions and sketchy memories of the
events surrounding the hiring decisions and the qualifications
of candidates. As in her claim of disability discrimination,
these facts are insufficient for a jury to conclude that WRCS’s
proffered reason — that the successful candidates were better
qualified than Hedrick — is false. A court will not second-
guess the business judgment of an employer who chooses
from equally qualified candidates for a position. Simms, 165
F.3d 1321, 1330 (10" Cir. 1999).

Furthermore, under Reeves, Hedrick must provide
sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that age

Supp. App. 46

discrimination was motivating factor in not hiring Hedrick to
fill these positions. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Even if WRCS’s
proffered reason were disbelieved, the evidence Hedrick
presents does not support an inference that age discrimination

was the motivating factor in WRCS’s hiring decision.

Accordingly, defendant’s are entitled to summary judgment
on Hedrick’s age discrimination claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies
Hedrick’s motion for partial summary judgment and grants

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Lesley Wells
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Supp. App. 47

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1770%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
