# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Slade v. Georgia (No. 07-1365)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2008

## Text

Supreme
p em hg: U.S.

a»
nc 071365 APR 28 2008
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Iu The
Supreme Court of the United States

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.,

Petitioner,

STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Georgia Court Of Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TODD M. JOHNSON,
Counsel of Record
JOHNSON LAW, P.C.
P.O. Box 48
Cohutta, GA 30710
(706) 694-4298

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OK CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2851

i
iL. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

_ When the State of Georgia requires claims of
ineffectiveness be brought at the earliest possible
opportunity or be lost and yet denies remand for proof
of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness does it violate the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution?

ITl.

li

Il. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................ccccseceees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................... iv
oe Be 6 Se ne 1
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS
NIMH hacia eos us Gan ihevsaaisiaseeavieesssincnes 1
A. Date of Orders to Be Reviewed ........... 1
B. Jurisdictional Basis For Review ......... 1
_ CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STAT-
SF ENED MERI ou incon cesvecvessoveescaccovesovees 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................... 3
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ...... 4

TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES BELOW... 9

ARGUMENT AS TO THE NECESSITY
II shesinisscseks ivcexicececcoi panes maveruntines 10

A. When the State of Georgia requires
claims of ineffectiveness be brought
at the earliest possible opportunity or
be lost and yet denies remand for
proof of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
does it violate the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution? ....................:c2c00 10

i. The Georgia Rule Denies the Right
To Counsel and Violates The Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution ............ 10

ili

Il. TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page

ii. Petitioner Made An Adequate
Showing of Performance Problems
and Harm to Require Remand ....... 13

Mees OI cies cceincaticcgecciensenteatecrechinv ees 14

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court
Case No. 05-CR-331 Final Disposition 16
Py FO kin App. 13

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court
Case No. 05-CR-227 Nolle Prosequi, 16 Feb-
ruary PR iixcibvisss ip cacnndenkshabsusigredbupestaabikient® App. 16

Slade i. State, Denial of Certiorari, Ga. Sup.Ct.
Case No. S07C1895 28 January 2008........... App. 18

Slade v. State, Ct.App. A07A0734 Brief Ex-
I sis Sciaiid sstiecsicnccecaencieiisamcksbeneesiaeeseaubines App. 19
|

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court
Case No. 05-CR-331 Accusation 5 October

State\v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court Case
No: 05-CR-227 Indictment 20 July 2005....... App. 30

lv

‘Ill. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
FEDERAL CASES
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123
S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003)............ 10, 11, 14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 20562, 80 L.B.2d 674 (1984)..........0cccceccececces.s 11
STATE CASES
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A. 2d 726 (2002).......... 12
Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 642 S.E.2d 668
1 5 SORES NSE tare tit teh at rate Ae RPG toe een a! 10
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE
Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
OS RESERVOIR ARE OO ARO EE Cte mn, 20, 42,34
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
5 SRO TAR Ge Peitioe rarer mao pe ae 2,10, 14
- gid 7 Say > | \: SR e na Reasiemee etre nan imer Carine fre oe kk 1
STATE STATUTES
a ns iGbbdaadcacaueo ese 2
Ir ae 23

Sas MINE Ts vhccon nia iccetsnisirvticrasounceuupnaeannsonapiaas 2,3

1

IV. OPINIONS BELOW
OFFICIAL REPORTS

|
Slade v. State, Ct.App. A07A0734 31 July 2007.....App. 1

Slade v. State, Order Granting Reconsideration
DS 11) 4 een App. 10

Slade v. State, Order Granting Motion to With-
draw by trial counsel 31 January 2007 ......... App. 12

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court
Case No. 05-CR-331 Final Disposition 16
February PI si siceckiaidbsnuncbiotinsdickertabeackocn App. 13

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court
Case No. 05-CR-227 Nolle Prosequi, 16 Feb-

ney ai shksdadsasconcknecasccncssisekosnnidecnemeccnanais App. 16
Slade vu. State, Denial of Certiorari, Ga. Sup.Ct.

Case No. S07C1895 28 January 2008........... App. 18

V. BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS
COURT

A. Date of Orders +» be Reviewed

On July 31, 2007, the seorgia Court of Appeals
affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on the two issues
presented in this petition. On January 28, 2008, the
Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner a writ of
certiorari on the two issues.

B. Jurisdictional Basis For Review

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. $1257, this
Court has jurisdiction to review the final order of a

2

lower state court when certiorari is denied by the
state’s court of last resort.

Vi. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STAT-
UTES AND RULES

This Petition involves the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, the
Georgia child hearsay statute, O.C.G.A. §24-3-16,
Georgia sodomy and aggravated sodomy provisions
0.C.G.A. §16-6-2, the Georgia child molestation and
aggravated child molestation provisions, O.C.G.A.
§16-6-4. —

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution states in pertinent part, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part, “... No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”

O.C.G.A. §16-6-2 states in relevant part: “(a)(1)
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or
she performs or submits to any sexual act involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another. (2) A person commits the offense of

3

aggravated sodomy when he or she commits sodomy
with force and against the will of the other person or
when he or she commits sodomy with a person who is
less than ten years of age. . . .”

0.C.G.A. §16-6-4 states in part, “(a) A person
commits the offense of child molestation when he or

_ she does anything immoral or indecent to or in the

presence of or with any child under the age of 16
years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desires of either the child or the person.” and “(c) A
person commits the offense of aggravated child mo-
lestation which act physically injures the child or
involves an act of sodomy.”

O0.C.G.A. §24-3-16 “A statement made by a child
under the age of 14 years describing any act of sexual
contact or physical abuse performed with or on the
child by another or performed with or on another in
the'presence of the child is admissible in evidence by
the testimony of the person or persons to whom made
if the child is available to testify in the proceedings
and| the court finds that the circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.”

Vil. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State indicted Petitioner on two counts of
child molestation. (App. 30, 31) A nolle prosequi was
entered on that indictment on the date Petitioner was
sentenced on the accusation this Petition concerns.
(App. 16)

4

The State’s Accusation charged Petitioner with
three counts of aggravated sodomy, two counts of
aggravated child molestation, and two counts of child
molestation. Petitioner waived indictment. (App. 23)
Petitioner was appointed Jerry Wayne “foncus as his
trial counsel.

At trial, the State’s similar transaction motion
was heard as to evidence from a 1997 allegation, which
had been dead docketed against Petitioner (involving
Grady Lavon Slade III, Petitioner’s son). (T-5) Peti-
tioner’s trial counsel objected that because the case
was rejected for prosecution, it could not now serve as
a credible similar transaction. (T-12) The trial court
then ruled that the 1997 allegations were ecm
as similar transactions.

Petitioner was tried before a jury on the 14th and
15th days of February, 2006. The jury convicted
Petitioner on all seven counts. (T-228) The Court
merged counts and sentenced on Counts One, Two,
Five and Six. Petitioner was sentenced to thirty years
to serve on Counts One and Two and twenty years on

counts Five and Six, all such time to run concurrent.
(App. 13-15)

Petitioner’s trial counsel timely filed his notice of
appeal, but withdrew before filing a brief. (App. 12)

VIII. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Petitioner’s trial counsel indicated he had official
objection to the use of child hearsay, but he understood

5

that the trial court would allow the use, the decla-
rants being present. (T-18) State Victim Witness
coordinator, Brenda Hoffmeyer was called to testify
about a conversation she undertook with RRF, the
alleged victim in the case. Hoffmeyer testified repeat-
edly with no objection by Petitioner’s trial counsel
that she told RRF to tell the truth. (T-36, 1-25; T-37, 1-
7,8; T-38, 1-4) Hoffmeyer testified that RRF told her
about threats and aggravated sodomy by Petitioner,
and then she stated with no objection by Petitioner's
attorney as follows:

b

“Are you telling the truth? and he said, ‘yes.
And I said, ‘Why didn’t you tell this when
you were interviewed, when you did your
videotape?’ and he looked at me and he said,
‘I was so scared.’ And I said, ‘Why are you
telling me this now?’ And he said, ‘because I
trust you.’” (T-39)

The State then called Petitioners wife, Billie
Slade. On cross examination, Petitioner’s trial coun-
sel asked her about RRF’s medication. The State
objected to questions about medication. (T-76) Peti-
tioner’s trial counsel indicated that he intended to
provide evidence illustrating RRF’s mood swings and
thought disorders, and ultimately calling into ques-
tion’ the credibility of RRF. (T-78) The trial court
sustained the State objection to relevancy (without an
expert). (T-78)

Billie Slade testified that when RRF was placed
with his other grandmother, Christine Forrest,
his mannerism changed towards everybody. (T-78)

es
Buna
Pore *

6

A custody case had been going on from 2002 through
2005. (T-195) Petitioner asked in what respect it
changed, and the State objected to bringing in spe-
cific instances of conduct. The trial court sustained
the State’s objection prior to argument of Petitioner’s
trial counsel. (T-78)

The State introduced testimony by Department
of Family and Children Services (DFCS) worker
Becky Haley as to the protocol of the investigation of
alleged sexual crimes, and she produced a 1997 video
tape of the interview done with Petitioner’s son,
Grady Slade, III, the State’s similar transaction
claim. (T-106) Petitioner’s son was born October 2,
1986, and was 19 years of age at trial. (T-118) The
video tape of the 1997 interview was moved for intro-
duction as State’s exhibit number two. Petitioner’s
trial counsel stated “No Objection” and the videotape
was introduced and played for the jury. (T-107) RRF
was placed in Petitioner’s home after the 1997 allega-
tion after a DFCS review. (T-155, 156)

Crystal Slade, mother of Grady Slade, III then
testified in response to State questioning “Do you
recall the words he used?” Crystal Slade replied, “He
just said that he was touching him.” On further
questioning, “He did tell me that he had fondled him
and at that point that’s when I[ had called the police.”
(T-125) and “... that he had masturbated him”
(T-128)

7

Crystal Slade continued as follows:

“He [Petitioner’s son] began pulling out his
eyelashes, constantly pulling his hair out,
cutting his self, punching his self, choking
his self even in class. I had to put him in pri-
vate school. The teachers couldn’t handle
him in public school. Soiling his pants. He
would hold his self until he would use the
bathroom on his self.” (T-129)

She clarified that Petitioner’s son’s hospitalization for
suicide attempts and the problem conduct was all
after he made the disclosures. (T-129) Petitioner’s
trial counsel did not object to Crystal Slade’s hearsay
characterizations or move to strike the testimony.

| Only later at trial did the adult Grady Slade, III
testify. (T-137-148) Having described the similar
transaction acts alleged (T-139-142), he testified “Yes,
those things I could remember, they did not come off
the tape.” (T-148)

iChristine Forrest, RRF’s grandmother, testified
she ,had had custody of RRF for four years. (T-151)
She| testified that RRF told her “Papaw Grady hurts
me”, and he didn’t want to visit. (T-152) Ms. Forrest
testified that the only thing she told RRF was to tell
the truth. (T-183)

Christine Forrest knew about the previous alle-
gations against Petitioner. (T-166) For two years she
and ‘Petitioner and his wife had shared custody of
RRF. half time. (T-155, 156) Petitioner and his wife
had icustody of RRF’s brother Zanthias. (T-165)

8

Following a second hearing, physical custody was
placed with Christine Forrest with every other week-
end visitation with RRF for Petitioner and his wife.
(T-155, 156) After the second hearing, when Forrest
regained full custody, Forrest received all of the
Social Security payment for RRF and his sister.
(T-159) Her attorney wouldn’t use the prior allega-
tions against Petitioner in the custody hearing.
. (T-167, 168) RRF had never talked with her about
allegations of oral sex. (T-168-169) He told her, “I
don’t want to talk about it” every time. (T-153) Peti-
tioner testified that RRF was always “very quiet and
to his self” (T-199)

RRF had not related any sexual contact apart
from a touching or fondling in his videotaped inter-
view at the Greenhouse, leading to the initial indict-
ment (T-39), and his only other testimony — not
through Brenda Hoffmeyer or his mother — and by
direct examination takes place from pages 181
through 185 as follows:

VEO. 6 BO ie Ee es SO. SR:
I'm nine.... June, the 6th.... Ninety-six.
1996.... Christine.... Yes.... Yeah....
78... . NG: so ee. . Seek... . YOR. .
Yeah. ... Yeah.... Yeah.... Yes....No....
Because this happened, because he’s really
not my papaw.... Because this happened,
because he’s really not my papaw....
7 cae SS cs es Bs
ss Ee ee Os ee Se
7 ss ee ck a ee
Yes.... Yes. ... Point. (T-181-185)

9

Petitioner took the stand and denied the 1997
transaction as reported by his adult son. (T-191) In
addition, Petitioner testified that he never molested
RRF. (T-193) He testified that he waived indictment
because he didn’t have anything to hide. (T-194) He
testified that he and his wife had once received half of
the Social Security funds for RRF (T-200) Petitioner
denied that he stated to his ex-wife Crystal Slade
that he was homosexual. (T-200) Petitioner testified
that eight individuals stayed at his home in the .
relevant time period from December 2004 through
July 2005. (T-196) Finally, he agreed with prior
testimony from Jennifer Norris and Christine Forrest
that RRF was not visiting for large periods during the
six-month period at issue. (T-198, 157, 172, 173)

Ix. TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES BELOW

|The Georgia Court of Appeals, in its reconsidered
opinion, found that Petitioners trial counsel aban-
doned his cross examination of a key witness on
RRF’s bias. (App. 5, 6) The Georgia Court of Appeals
found Petitioner’s trial counsel’s objection as to child
hearsay testimony was too general to be used to stop
hearsay played later for his adult son where Peti-
tioner’s trial counsel did not make contemporaneous
objection. (App. 3) In addition, it determined that the
requirement in the child hearsay statute to only allow
it when the “child” is present applied to the 19-year-
old adult, making objection unnecessary. (App. 3, 4)

10

Finally the Georgia Court of Appeals citing
Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 697, 642 S.E.2d 668
(2007) found that it could determine from the record
that it did not need to remand for a hearing on the
‘ineffectiveness claim. Petitioner had argued generally
and specifically as to ineffectiveness. (App. 19-22) The
Appeals Court found that no true “bolstering” was
allowed and that the trial attorney did not need to
object to child hearsay treatment for the adult wit-
ness, and it denied the remand. (App. 8, 9) 3

X. ARGUMENT AS TO THE NECESSITY OF
REVIEW

A. When the State of Georgia requires
claims of ineffectiveness be brought
at the earliest possible opportunity or
be lost and yet denies remand for
proof of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
does it violate the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution?

i. The Georgia Rule Denies the Right
To Counsel and Violates The Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution

Recently in Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003) this
Court noted the difficulty in reviewing ineffectiveness
claims on direct review absent evidentiary hearings,
as follows:

11

“When an ineffective-assistance claim is ©
brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel
and the court must proceed on a trial record
not developed precisely for the object of liti-
gating or preserving the claim and thus often
incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), a defendant claiming ineffective
counsel must show that counsel’s actions
were not supported by a reasonable strategy
and that the error was prejudicial. The evi-
dence introduced at trial, however, will be
devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and
the resulting record in many cases will not
disclose the facts necessary to decide either
prong of the Strickland analysis.”

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. at 505.

“On direct appeal it puts counsel into an
awkward position vis-a-vis trial counsel. Ap-
pellate counsel often need trial counsel’s as-
sistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy
record on a short deadline, but trial counsel
will be unwilling to help appellate counsel
familiarize himself with a record for the pur-
pose of understanding how it reflects trial
counsel’s own incompetence.”

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. at 506.

The Court opined that “ ... few such claims will
be capable of resolution on direct appeal and thus few

will benefit from earlier resolution.” Massaro uv.
United States, 538 U.S. at 507.

12

Georgia is one of only a handful of state jurisdic-
tions which impose an absolute rule. Commonwealth v.
Grant, 813 A. 2d 726, 738 (2002) at n.11 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania opinion referred to by the
Court held that “a claim raising trial counsel ineffec-
tiveness will no longer be considered waived because
new counsel on direct appeal did not raise a claim
related to prior counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Common-
wealth v. Grant, 813 A. 2d at 738.

Due to the Georgia Rule, Petitioner now forfeits
his federal right to have post-conviction relief in order
to satisfy the Georgia scheme which makes short
shrift of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under
the United States Constitution. Unlike citizens in
those states which allow appellate attorneys to delay
a resolution of the ineffectiveness claim in a more fact
intensive environment, Petitioner is forced to use only
such proof afforded by the transcript.

Petitioner urges this Court to take certiorari to
determine if Petitioner is denied the privileges of a
citizen and Due Process in the denial of an adequate
structure to present his ineffectiveness claim as well
as Equal Protection in the fact he will likely lose
other post-conviction remedies by his appeal when
other similarly situated citizens will not be forced to
forfeit the expression of their Sixth Amendment right
in direct appeal.

13

ii. Petitioner’ Made An Adequate
Showing of Performance Problems
and Harm to Require Remand.

Petitioner’s trial attorney waived objection to the
most harmful evidence. Although prior to this case,
Georgia had never allowed 19-year-old adults to be
benefited by the Georgia child hearsay statute, Peti-
tioner’ s attorney declined to object to the admission of

a harmful videotape and live witness hearsay: about
Grady Slade, III. (T-107)

The Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner’s trial
attorney waived his right to cross examine concerning |
the victim’s bias (App. 6), a critical area of question-
ing. It appears that Petitioner’s trial attorney just
didn’t have a plan to get the evidence introduced, and
that his lack of preparation severely damaged the
defense.

In addition, Petitioner’s trial attorney was cut
short in his cross about the alleged victim’s mood
swings and thought disorders because he had not
properly set up the testimony. (T-78) The live testi-
mony of RRF is recounted above as almost entirely
composed of yes answers to leading questions of the
District Attorney. Though the child’s stories had been
inconsistent at best, Petitioner’s trial attorney did
nothing to limit the State from having the child admit
the story the state preferred. Trial counsel never
made objection.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found numerous
waivers from Petitioner’s attorney, but based its

14

decision on remand only on its novel interpretation of
the Child Hearsay statute application to adults and
its determination that repetitive claims that the child
was told to tell the truth did not bolster the child’s .
statements. (App. 9) _

Without a remand to discover the extent of choice
or haphazard in the omission and commission listed -
above, Petitioner will be unable to adequately prove
ineffectiveness, much as this Court set out in Mas-
saro v. United States. Petitioner has made a facial
showing of harm and inadequate performance. He
asks this Court to allow him a chance to prove his
ineffectiveness claim.

XI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner is forced by Georgia Law to make his
initial proof of ineffectiveness on the transcript. He
shows that such a proof has been determined by this
Court to be inevitably inadequate. To give him the
Sixth Amendment rights enjoyed by citizens in the
vast majority of states, he asks this Court to find
the Georgia rule a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and grant Petitioner a remand on all
issues of ineffectiveness.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHNSON Law, P.C.

TopDD M. JOHNSON, State Bar #395651
P.O. Box 48

Cohutta, GA 30710

(706) 694-4298

App. l

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

FIRST DIVISION
ANDREWS, P. J.,
ELLINGTON and ADAMS, JJ.

July 31, 2007
A07A0734. SLADE v. THE STATE.
ADAMS, Judge.

Grady Levon Slade, Jr. was convicted by a jury of
three counts of aggravated sodomy, two counts of
aggravated child molestation, and two counts of child
molestation arising out of various acts involving R. R.
F.; his wife’s grandson. After the trial judge merged
three of the counts for sentencing purposes, Slade
was sentenced to a total of thirty years to serve. Slade
now appeals his conviction on a number of eviden-
tiary grounds and on the ground that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.

1. At trial, the State presented similar transac-
tion evidence of earlier incidents of reported abuse
involving Slade’s son, when the son was around ten
years old. Slade was never prosecuted in connection
with those incidents. The State presented testimony
from the son, the son’s mother and Becky Haley, a
child protective services worker, concerning the
reported abuse. The State also showed the jury a
videotaped interview with the son when he was ten
years old. At the time of the trial, Slade’s son was 19
years old. Slade contends that the mother’s testimony
and the videotape were inadmissible hearsay. He
argues that the admission of such evidence was error

App. 2°

because the Child Hearsay Statute, OCGA § 24-3-16,
should not apply where a former child victim is an
adult at the time of trial. But Slade raised no con-
temporaneous objection to this evidence, and thus
failed to preserve this argument for appeal. Nelson uv.
State, 279 Ga. App. 859, 864(1)(b) (632 SE2d 749)
(2006).

We acknowledge that Slade’s attorney made some
reference to an objection to child hearsay before the
trial began. The State announced in a pretrial motion
hearing that it intended to rely upon the Child Hear-
say Statute but noted that “the child” was available
and present at the hearing. It is unclear from this
statement whether the prosecutor was referring to
the child victim, Slade’s 19-year-old son, or both.
Slade’s attorney replied,

We would be objecting officially for the record
but we understand that because the child is
present, the court would overrule that objec-
tion, typically allow the testimony to be en-
tered. As long as the child is, in fact, — or
does, in fact, remain available, we don’t an-
ticipate that would be a problem. It’s my un-
derstanding the child will be called. If not,
we will be requesting that the court call the
child.

But it is well settled that

a general objection is too vague and indefi-
nite to present any question for decision
either by the trial court or by the appellate
courts. To preserve a ground for error, the

App. 3

objecting party must state the specific
ground upon which the objection is based;
the objecting party must do more than
merely state that he objects.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Maxwell v. State,
267 Ga. App. 227, 229(2) (699 SE2d 228) (2004). No
reference was ever made to an objection based upon
the age of Slade’s son, and we do not view his attor-
ney’s generalized pre-trial objection as sufficient to
notify the trial court of the legal ground at issue here
“so that its applicability could be measured and error
avoided.” Id. In any event, Slade’s attorney sought no
ruling from the court on such an objection.

Even if Slade’s attorney had objected to the
evidence, however, we find no error. “The trial court
has broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of ‘child hearsay evidence, and we will reverse a trial
court's ruling on the admissibility of statements
under OCGA § 24-3-16 only if the trial court abused
its) discretion.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 224, 227(1)(b) (644
SE2d 153) (2007). And this Court has held that “i]t is
plain from the face of that statute that the age of the
child at the time the witness testifies is irrelevant as
long as the child’s statement about which the witness
testifies was made while the child was under 14 years
of age. ” Greer v. State, 201 Ga. App. 775, 776(4) (412
SE2d 843) (1991) (statute applied to statements by
seven-year-old victim who was fifteen at time of trial).
See also Darden v. State, 206 Ga. App. 400, 401(1)
(425 SE2d 409) (1992) (statute applied to statements

App. 4

of 13-year-old victim, who was 14 at trial). Compare
Foster v. State, 216 Ga. App. 26, 28(2) (453 SE2d 482)
(1994) (Child Hearsay Statute applies to child whose
chronological age, not mental age, was under 14 years
at time of statement). Slade’s son was ten at the time
he made the statements at issue, and thus they fall
within the provisions of the Child Hearsay Statute.
We see no reason to alter the application of the stat-
ute in this case simply because the witness was 19
years old at the time of trial.

2. Slade next asserts that the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding evidence about the de-
meanor of R. R. F., the victim in this case, during the
time of his reported incidents of abuse. “The defen-
dant in a child molestation case is entitled to a thor-
ough and sifting cross-examination of the State’s
witnesses. However, the scope of cross-examination is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not cause reversal unless the discretion is abused.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In re M.G., 239
Ga. App. 787, 788 (521 SE2d 918) (1999).

Slade’s wife, Billie Slade, testified that her
grandson R. R. F.’s_ behavior and mannerisms
changed “towards everybody” at that time, especially
when he came from his other grandmother’s house.
But when Slade’s trial counsel asked her what she
noticed with respect to the changes, the State ob-
jected stating, “I would object, your honor. He’s going

App. 5

into specific instances of conduct. That would be
improper.” The trial court sustained the objection.

Slade contends that this ruling denied him the
right to thoroughly cross-examine Billie Slade be-
cause he was unable to question her further about the
changes in R. R. F.’s behavior. He asserts on appeal
that this deprived him of his right to test the child’s
credibility or to explore the possibility that the child
could have been influenced by others, presumably
the child’s other grandmother, into making the
allegations. But the State is correct that Slade never
argued these issues to the trial court in response
to the objection. Instead, he continued his cross-
examination of Billie Slade on other issues. The trial
court, therefore, never had the opportunity to con-
sider these arguments in ruling upon the objection.

Accordingly, we must agree with the State that
Slade abandoned this argument at trial and acqui-
esced in the trial court’s ruling. While there was no
requirement that Slade make a formal exception to
the ruling, he was required to voice his position with

_ The exact basis for this objection is unclear from the
record, as evidenced by the fact that the State has asserted
differing grounds on appeal to support it. In its original appel-
late brief, the State asserted that it had objected to the rele-
vance of the evidence solicited, because the victim’s mannerisms
and specific instances of conduct toward “everybody” were not
relevant. In its motion for reconsideration, the State apparently
is asserting that its objection was supportable to the extent that
the! question sought to solicit evidence of specific instances of
bad character in order to impeach the victim.

App. 6

regard to the ruling after it was made in order to
preserve the issue for appeal. Plaza Properties v.
Prime Business Investments, 273 Ga. 97, 102 (538
SE2d 51) (2000); Stone v. State, 177 Ga. App. 750,
752(4) (341 SE2d 280) (1986). By arguing the issue on
the record, both the trial court and this Court would
have had the opportunity to consider whether the
evidence he sought with his questioning was admissi-
ble. Instead, we are left with a record that does not
clearly state what evidence was sought or what
evidence was excluded.’

Although we agree with Slade that he would
have been entitled to explore the issue of potential
bias or improper influence, he failed to inform the
trial court that he was seeking such evidence through
the line of questioning at issue. Thus while it cer-
tainly would have been error for a trial court to
prevent a defendant from seeking relevant evidence
of bias, no such error occurs where, as here, a defen-
dant acquiesces in the trial court’s ruling or abandons
an argument at trial. McGee v. State, 205 Ga. App.
722, 724(5) (423 SE2d 666) (1992); Jordan v. State,
172 Ga. App. 96, 97(2) (322 SE2d 106) (1984).

3. Slade also contends that the trial court abused
its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of

* We note, however, that the trial court could have properly
sustained an objection to any attempt by Slade to elicit specific
instances of misconduct in order to impeach the victim, as the
State contends. See Curtis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 326(3)a)
(638 SE2d 773) (2006).

App. 7

Becky Haley, the child protective services worker
involved with his son’s case. Slade attempted to
question Haley about whether in deciding to place a
child in a particular home, the Department of Family
and Children Services considered the criminal back-
ground of those residing in the home. The State
objected to the question on the ground of relevancy.
Slade’s attorney explained that he wanted to show
that DFACS allowed R. R. F. to be placed in Slade’s
home even though he had previously been charged
with child molestation. He argued the evidence went
to the issue of Slade’s credibility because the State
had determined that he was an appropriate individ-
ual to host children in his home. After an extensive
discussion, the trial court sustained the State’s objec-
tion stating that DFACS’ placement procedures and
decisions had no relevance to the issue of whether
Slade had committed the crimes charged.

“The admission or exclusion of evidence which is
objected to on the ground of relevancy lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse
of discretion.” Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. -884,
887(1), 635 SE2d 240 (2006). We find no abuse of
discretion. While this line of questioning may have
addressed the actions of DFACS employees, it had no
bearing on the issue of whether Slade committed the
acts of which he was accused.

4, Slede also argues that a remand is necessary
to develop a record on his claim that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in the trial below. But

App. 8

“it is not necessary to remand an appeal when the
appellate court can determine from the record
whether the appellant has satisfied the test to estab-
lish ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Citations
omitted.) Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 697(7) (642
SE2d 668) (2007). Under this test, Slade “must prove
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
this deficient performance prejudiced the defense;
that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different, but for counsel’s deficiency.” (Punctuation
and footnotes omitted.) Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. App.
870, 872(2) (635 SE2d 259) (2006).

Slade asserts that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to object to (1) the use of child hearsay
in connection with the similar transaction involving
Slade’s son and (2) purported bolstering by two wit-
nesses who testified that they told the victim to tell
the truth. We have already determined in Division 1
that no error occurred in the use of child hearsay in
connection with the incidents involving Slade’s son, so
a remand is not necessary in connection with that
argument.

With regard to the second argument, Slade
contends that his trial counsel should have objected
when the child advocate and R. R. F.’s other grand-
mother testified that they told the child to tell the
truth. Slade is correct that “under no circumstance
may a witness’s credibility be bolstered by the opinion
of another, even an expert, as to whether the witness is
telling the truth.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)

App. 9

Berman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 867, 870(3) (632 SE2d
757) (2006). But the statements at issue merely
consisted of the witnesses’ instructions to the victim
regarding the need to tell the truth. Such statements
do not constitute an opinion by the witnesses as to
whether the victim was, in fact, truthful. Berman v.
State, 279 Ga. App. at 870(3). Accordingly, no remand
is necessary to address Slade’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Elling-
ton, J., concur.

App. 10

Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, JUL 31 2007
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
A07A0734. SLADE v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the motion for reconsidera-
tion filed on behalf of the appellee in the above styled
case, said motion is hereby granted, and it is ordered
that the opinion of this court issued on and the judg-
ment entered on July 9, 2007, be hereby vacated and
that the opinion be withdrawn from the files. It is
further ordered that the opinion attached hereto be
substituted for the original opinion issued on July 9,
2007, and judgment shall issue accordingly.

It is further ordered that the April term of this
court be extended “‘relative to this case to enable
parties to file a motion for [reconsideration]. OCGA
§(§) 15-2-4(, 15-3-2).’ Haygood v. City of Doraville, 256
Ga. 566, 567 (350 SE2d 766) (1986).” Stuckey uv.
Richardson, 188 Ga. App. 147, 149(4) (372 SE2d 458)
(1988).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true ex-
tract from the minutes of the Court of
Appeals of Georgia.

App. 11

Witness my signature and the seal of
said court hereto affixed the day and
year last above written.

Clerk.
/s/ William L. Martin, III

App. 12

Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, JANUARY 17, 2007

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A07A0734.
GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR. v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel filed in this case, it is ordered that it be
hereby granted. The Clerk of this Court is ordered
and directed to remove the name of JERRY WAYNE
MONCUS as attorney of record for the appellant.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true ex-
tract from the minutes of the Court of
Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of
said court hereto affixed the day and
year last above written.

Clerk.
/s/ William L. Martin, III

EG Ee

App. 13

IN THE FINAL DISPOSITION
SUPERIOR COURT ;
OF MURRAY COUNTY —

THE STATE
OF GEORGIA

vs
GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

CRIMINAL
ACTION NO. —_(05-CR-331

OFFENSES CT. 1 & 2: AGGRAVATED |
SODOMY - F, CT. 3.& 4:
AGGRAVATED CHILD
MOLESTATION - F, CT. 5
& 6; CHILD MOLESTA-
TION - F, CT. 7: AGGRA-
VATED SODOMY - F

FEBRUARY TERM, 2006
(Filed Feb. 16, 2006)

|PLEA:

NEGOTIATED x | JURY

GUILTY ON NON-JURY
COUNTS)

NOLO CONTENDERE
| ON COUNT(S)

[ ]TO LESSER INCLUDED

OFFENSE(S)

ON COUNT(S)

App. 14

x | VERDICT: OTHER DISPOSITION:
x |GUILTY ON NOLLE PROSEQUI
COUNTS 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 ORDER ON COUNTS)

[ _]NOT GUILTY | |DEAD DOCKET

ON COUNT\S) ORDER ON COUNTS)
| ]GUILTY OF oe

INCLUDED

OFFENSE(S) OF

ON COUNT\S)

DEFENDANT WAS ADVISED OF HIS/HER RIGHT
TO HAVE THIS SENTENCE REVIEWED BY THE
SUPERIOR COURTS SENTENCE REVIEW PANEL.

[ x | FELONY | J]MISDEMEANOR
SENTENCE SENTENCE

WHEREAS, the above-named defendant has been
found guilty of the above-state offense, WHERE-
UPON, it is ordered and adjudged by the Court that
the said defendant is hereby sentenced to confine-
ment for a period of

CT. 1: THIRTY (30) YEARS TO SERVE

CT. 2: THIRTY (30) YEARS TO SERVE CON-
CURRENT WITH COUNT 1

CT. 3: MERGES WITH COUNT 1 FOR SEN-
TENCING PURPOSES

CT. 4: MERGES WITH COUNT 2 FOR SEN-
TENCING PURPOSES

CT. 5: TWENTY (20) YEARS TO SERVE CON-
CURRENT WITH COUNT I

App. 15

CT. 6: TWENTY (20) YEARS TO SERVE CON-
CURRENT WITH COUNT 1

CT.7: MERGES WITH COUNT 2 FOR SEN-
TENCING PURPOSES

In the State Penal System or such other institution as
the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of
Corrections or Court may direct, to be computed as
provided by law.

THIS OFFENSE CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS VIO-
LENT FELONY AND THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
SENTENCED PURSUANT TO 0O.C.G.A. 17-10-6.1

So ordered this 15th day of FEBRUARY, 2006.

/s/ Jack Partain
JACK PARTAIN, J.S.C.C.C.

App. 16

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MURRAY COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

STATE OF GEORGIA : Indictment No: 05-CR-227

vs

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR. : CHILD MOLESTATION (2)

MOTION TO ENTER A NOLLE PROSEQUI
(Filed Feb. 16, 2006)

COMES NOW the State of Georgia and moves
this Court to enter a Nolle Prosequi in the above-
styled case. The defendant was re-accused and tried
on accusation no. 05-CR-331.

This the 16 day of February, 2006.

/s/ Steve Spencer
STEVE SPENCER ..
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CONASAUGA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

CONSENT

After having heard and considered the Motion of
the State to enter a Nolle Prosequi in the above-
styled case, the Court hereby grants consent.

This the 16th day of FEB, 2006.

/s/ Jack Partain
JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT
CONASAUGA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

App. 17

ce: JERRY MONCUS
GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

App. 18

SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA

CLERK’S OFFICE
ATLANTA
Date: January 28, 2008

Todd Mitchell Johnson
JOHNSON LAW, P.-C.
P. O. Box 48

Cohutta, GA 30710

Case No. S07C1895
GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR. v. THE STATE

COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. A07A0734

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for
certiorari in this case.

All the Justices concur.

Therese S. Barnes, Clerk

App. 19

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF GEORGIA

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

Appellant
ve Case No. A07A0734
THE STATE,

Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Respectfully Submitted: Appellant:
Todd M. Johnson Grady L. Slade, Jr.
State Bar #395651 GDC #1209673
Johnson Law, P.C. Phillips State Prison
P.O. Box 48 2989 W. Rock Quarry Road
Cohutta, GA 30710 Buford, GA 30519
(708) 694-4298 (770) 932-4500
(706) 694-3173 facsimile
* ** *

4. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective
and ®emand Is Required for Hearing.

The standard for assessing whether trial counsel
rendered constitutionally effective assistance is set
out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104

App. 20

SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 (1984), and adopted in Smith
v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 325 SE2d 362 (1985).

Under Strickland, a criminal defendant must
show both that his counsel’s performance was defi-
cient, and but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694.

“Both the performance and prejudice components
of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of
law and fact.” Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440, 435
S.E.2d 600 91993), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
698.

Here, the Appellant was denied an opportunity to
develop the errors of his trial counsel and their effect
upon his trial more fully in hearing and Appellant’s
trial counsel was unable.as a witness to raise those
errors under the cannons of ethics. Under Smith uv.
State, 255 Ga. 654, 656, 341 S.E.2d 5 (1986), remand
is appropriate where a facial showing of ineffective-
ness is made.

b. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective.

i. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Failed to Ob-
ject To Bolstering.

Appellant’s trial counsel failed to make one
objection to Brenda Hoffmeyer or Christine Forrest

App. 21

talking about how they told R. to tell the truth or that
R. said he was telling the truth. Hoffmeyer, an ex-
perienced employee of the District Attorney’s office is
a paid professional witness who took great liberties
by bolstering the story allegedly brought out of R.
Here, we anticipate that Appellant’s trial counsel will
testify that upon reading the transcript he was struck
with how many times the bolstering occurred without
challenge. He is a fine trial attorney, but he agrees he
dropped the ball.

ii. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Failed to
Make Specific Objection to Use of
Child Hearsay with an Adult.

_ Although one general objection was made (T-18),
when the prosecution attempted to admit the hearsay
videotape of Appellant’s adult son, State Exhibit 2,
Appellant’s trial attorney stated, “No Objection”.
Here, the use of the child hearsay statute was vio-
lated by the State with a fully capable adult. Should
this Court find that Appellant’s trial counsel failed to
preserve the error associated with child hearsay
statements of adult Grady Lavon Slade, III, Appel-
lant will show that his counsel did not perform up to
the| standard one would expect of a lawyer defending
child molestation charges.

Whether adequate time for preparation was
allowed in this case must rest upon its unique factual
situation. “The recurring theme of opinions concern-
ing ‘this problem has been that undue haste in the

App. 22

administration of justice is as much condemned as
unnecessary delay ..” Lowrance v. State, 183 Ga.
App. 421, 359 S.E.2d 196 (1987). Appellant shows
that his case was not properly prepared to his detri-
ment and he urges a reversal.

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 (1984), and a Smith
v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 325 SE2d 362 (1985), appel-
lant will show ineffectiveness and sufficient prejudice
for reversal of his case. He urges the court to grant
him a remand for a new trial hearing on ineffective-
ness.

App. 23

ACCUSATION

WITNESSES
_ NO. 05-CR-331 Brett Morrison, MCSO.
Murray Superior Court |) GRapy LAVON SLADE
August Term, 2005. |p WAIVE MY RIGHT
THE STATE OF TO INDICTMENT BY
GEORGIA GRAND JURY AND
vs. WISH TO PROCEED BY
GRADY LAVON ACCUSATION THIS 5th
SLADE, JR. DAY OF OCTOBER, 2005.
Cts. 1,2:AGGRAVATED |/s/ Grady Slade, Jr.
SODOMY - F GRADY LAVON
Cts. 3, 4: AGGRAVATED SLADE, JR.
CHILD
M OLESTATION — F /s/_ Jerry W. Moncus
: JERRY MONCUS,
Cts. 5,6 : CHILD
cm 7 ATTORNEY FOR
xe DEFENDANT

Ct. 7: AGGRAVATED
SODOMY - F

|

The Defendant,
GRADY LAVON
SLADE, JR., waives
formal arraignment, and
pleads

Not Guilty

October 5th, 2005
! Date

/s/ Grady Slade Jr.

Defendant
/s/ Jerry W. Moncus

Defendant’s Attorney

(Filed Oct. 5, 2005)

App. 24

/s/ Jerry W. Moncus

KERMIT MCMANUS,
District Attorney

STATE OF GEORGIA, MURRAY COUNTY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAID COUNTY

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
- with the offense of
AGGRAVATED SODOMY

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation
of 0.C.G.A. §16-6-2(a) commit the offense of Aggra-
vated Sodomy, when he did perform a sexual act
involving the mouth of the accused and the sex or-
gans of another person, to wit: R.R.F., R.R.F. being a
person less than ten years of age at the time the
described act of Sodomy was committed with him, by
placing his mouth into contact with the sex organs of
R.R.F., contrary to the laws of said State, the good
order, peace and dignity thereof,

App. 25

COUNT 2

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
with the offense of
AGGRAVATED SODOMY

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation
of 0.C.G.A. §16-6-2(a) commit the offense of Aggra-
vated Sodomy, when he did perform and submit to a
sexual act involvir g the sex organs of the accused and
the mouth of another person, to wit: R.R.F., R.R.F.
being a person less than ten years of age at the time
the'described ect of Sodor.y was committed with him,
by placing his penis into contact with and into said
child’s mouth, contrary to the laws of said State, the
good order, peace and dignity thereof.

COUNT 3

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

App. 26

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
with the offense of
AGGRAVATED CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation
of O.C.G.A. §16-6-4(c) commit the offense of Aggra-
vated Child Molestation, when he did perform an
immoral and indecent act which did involve an act of
sodomy to, with, and in the presence of R.R.F., a child
under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his
mouth into contact with said child’s penis, with intent
to arouse and satisfy the sexual] desires of said ac-
cused and child, contrary to the laws of said State,
the good order, peace and dignity thereof.

COUNT 4

in the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
with the offense of
AGGRAVATED CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation
of O0.C.G.A. §16-6-4(c) commit the offense of Aggra-
vated Child Molestation, when he did perform an
immoral and indecent act which did involve an act of

App. 27

sodomy to, with and in the presence of R.R.F., a child
under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his
penis into contact with and into said child’s mouth,
with intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of
said accused, contrary to the laws of said State, the
good order, peace and dignity thereof.

COUNT 5

Ini the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
with the offease of
CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation
of 0.C.G.A. §16-6-4(a) commit the offense of Child
Molestation, when he did an immoral and indecent
act 'to, with and in the presence of R.R.F., a child
under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his
hand into contact with R.R.F.’s penis, with intent to
arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused,
contrary to the laws of said State, the good order,
peace and dignity thereof.

App. 28

COUNT 6

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
with the offense of
CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) commit the offense of Child
Molestation, when he did an immoral and indecent
act to, with and in the presence of R.R.F., a child
under the age of sixteen (16) years, by taking said
child’s hand pulling it towards and placing it into
contact with the accused’s penis, with intent to arouse
and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused, con-
trary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace
and dignity thereof.

COUNT 7

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the
County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and
accuse

App. 29

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.
with the offense of
AGGRAVATED SODOMY

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violat’on
of | 0. C.G.A. §16-6-4(a) commit the offense of Aggra-
vated Sodomy, when he did perform a sexual act
involving the sex organs of the accused and the
mouth of another person, to-wit: R.R.F., by pushing
R.R.F’s head onto the accused’s penis, causing his
mouth to come into contact with the accused’s penis,
said act being done with force and against the will of
said person, contrary to the laws of said State, the
good order, peace and dignity thereof.

App. 30

SPECIAL WITNESSES
PRESENTMENT .

NO. 05-CR-227 Brett Morrison, MCSO,
Murray Superior Court | Christine Forrest 3
February Term, 2005. |9473 Old Highway 411,

THE STATE OF Chatsworth, Ga.

gore at Laura News, DFCS,
GRADY LAVON (Filed Jul. 20, 2005)
SLADE, JR.
2, Cts. CHILD
MOLESTATION — F
True BILL

/s/ Norris Kilgore Foreman

The Defendant,

GRADY LAVON SLADE,
JR., waives formal
arraignment, and pleads

Date

Defendant

aie Defendant’s Attorney

KERMIT MCMANUS,
District Attorney

i ae Cee SOR RD ime: ad tT i tbe aelh WD a Shak A ak Go ORT ES ns be oe oP OI ak a a ie tn ey.
: sites ae : : ; ane phe ee Ue a me sk

App. 31
STATE OF GEORGIA, MURRAY COUNTY 4
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAID COUNTY q

THE GRAND JURORS SELECTED, CHOSEN AND
SWORN FOR THE COUNTY OF MURRAY, TO-WIT:

Norris Allen Kilgore, Foreman

Johnny Elrod L.H. Hipp a
Richard Leon Hall Frank Walker 4
Lanell Charles Silvers Lisa K. Hudson ‘a
Mitchell Long Mark Terry Hensley
Albert Jay Green | Juanita Aline Parker

Kevin-ClaudeBeliew Absent TR-Perter Absent
Hubert Buddy Bagley, Jr Barbara B. Brookshire

Marsha Denise Parker John T. Mitchem a
Bruce G. Coulter Stephen D. Hahn a
Janice B. Durocher Bobby Steven Peden

Mary Nell Calfee Emma Jean Long

In 'the name and on the behalf of the citizens of
Georgia, charge and accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR
with the offense of
CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, did an immoral and indecent act upon the
person of R.R.F., a child under the age of sixteen (16)
years, by placing his hand on the penis of R.R.F., with
intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of said
accused, contrary to the laws of said State, the good
order, peace and dignity thereof.

App. 32

COUNT 2

AND THE GRAND JURORS, aforesaid, in the name
and on the behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge
and accuse 7

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.
with the offense of
CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and
_the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,
2005, did an immoral and indecent act with R.R.F., a
child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing
the hand of R.R.F. on his penis, with intent to arouse
and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused, con-
trary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace
and dignity thereof.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1417%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.