# Appendix — Policastro v. Kontogiannis (No. 07-1341)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2008

## Text

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-1471

[Filed January 24, 2008]

ANDREW POLICASTRO,
Appellant

Vs

DR. THEODORA P. KONTOGIANNIS,
Principal Tenafly High School;
TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION

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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1219
(Honorable Joel A. Pisano)

Before SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and
CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.

2a

Appellant Andrew Policastro, a teacher at Tenafly
High School, sued the school’s principal, Dr. Theodora
Kontogiannis, and the Tenafly Board of Education for
violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. Following a bench trial, the District Court
dismissed Policastro’s claims and entered judgment in
favor of both Kontogiannis and the school board. We
will affirm the judgment in part and dismiss in part.’

I.

Policastro is a science teacher at Tenafly High
School. On March 13, 2002, at 8:15 am. a
memorandum was distributed to all Tenafly High
School staff members through the _ teachers’
school-provided mailboxes. The memorandum involved
a labor dispute between teachers and their union over
negotiations of a proposed collective bargaining
contract. A ratification vote on the proposal was
scheduled that same afternoon. Policastro was one of
thirteen teachers who signed the memorandum.

In the words of the District Court, the
memorandum was “plain vanilla,” containing no
vulgarities or obscenities. Yet the memorandum
prompted complaints to Dr. Theodora Kontogiannis,
principal of Tenafly High School. One complaint
reported a “commotion in the library” over the
memorandum, and another reported arguments among
teachers. Kontogiannis, deciding the memorandum
was unacceptably disrupting school activities, removed

'' The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3a

all remaining copies from the teachers’ mailboxes.
Immediately thereafter, a teacher reinserted copies in
the. mailboxes. Kontogiannis again ordered the
memorandum removed and the mailroom door locked
for the remainder of the school day.

Based on these events, Policastro filed suit against
Kontogiannis and the school board. He alleged that
Kontogiannis’s removal of the memorandum violated
his First Amendment right to free speech, and he
challenged as unconstitutional a Tenafly School Board
policy restricting the use of teacher mailboxes.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The District Court granted the motion,
and Policastro appealed. We vacated the dismissal
and remanded to the District Court for further

proceedings. See Policastro v. Kontogiannis, No.
04-2883, 2005 WL 1005131 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2005).

The District Court conducted a bench trial at which
Policastro appeared pro se. At the conclusion of both
sides’ testimony, the District Court adjudicated
Policastro’s claims and found in favor of both
Kontogiannis and the school board and against
Policastro.? This appeal followed.

? Keen to the need for exigency in this matter, the District Court
issued an oral decision from the bench. The judgment employed
the term “dismissal,” but on review of the transcript it appears
plain the court was adjudicating Policastro’s claims. Any
confusion in wording may have been due to our prior decision
vacating the original dismissal for failure to state a claim and
remanding for fact finding. But the record reveals Policastro’s
claims were adjudicated following a bench trial that included
testimony from al] relevant parties and witnesses.

The Tenafly School Board has a written policy on
using teacher mailboxes (“Mailbox Policy”), which
provides:

Mailboxes are the property of the Tenafly Board
of Education and should be used for school
business. Any staff member wishing to
distribute flyers/announcements etc. (via the
mailboxes) must have prior approval from the
principal or vice-principal.

Policastro claims this policy is unconstitutional on its
face. The District Court characterized this claim as an
overbreadth challenge, stating it would try the issue of
whether the policy “impermissibly extends [to] .. .
speech that cannot be constitutionally restricted.” (Tr.
at 5:20-22). Policastro did not object.?

3 The amici curiae contend the Mailbox Policy is also
unconstitutionally vague. But there was ne testimony during the
bench trial about the risk of discriminatory application of the
Mailbox Policy or whether school officials were endowed with
undue discretion under the policy. These questions would be
central to a vagueness challenge. See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police for Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, we will only address overbreadth. See Gass v. Virgin
Islands Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is well
established that failure to raise an issue in the district court
constitutes a waiver of the argument. ... We only depart from this
rule when manifest injustice would result from a failure to

5a

A regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad where
there is “a likelihood that [it]s very existence will
inhibit free expression’ by ‘inhibiting the speech of
third parties who are not before the Court.” Saxe v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir.
2001) (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)). “[A]voidance of
this chilling effect is at the heart of the overbreadth
doctrine.” Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 317 (3d
Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). But a regulation’s
inhibiting nature must be “not only real but
substantial in relation to [it]s plainly legitimate
sweep” to be held unconstitutional. Saxe, 240 F.3d at
214 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
615 (1973)). “Because the overbreadth doctrine is
‘strong medicine,’ it is to be used sparingly, where the
demonstrated overbreadth is considerable.” Kreimer,

958 F.2d at 1265 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 769 (1982)) (some internal quotation marks
omitted).

Here, the District Court held the Mailbox Policy
had no actual or potential chilling effect. The court
found that Tenafly teachers, including Policastro, had
distributed personal documents through the teachers’
mailboxes both before and after the subject
memorandum was confiscated. The court also found,
and all parties agreed, that Tenafly High School
administrators had never denied prior approval of a
mass distribution, and that—with the exception of the
subject memorandum here—nothing had ever been

consider a novel issue.”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

6a

removed from the mailboxes. Furthermore, in terms of
the Mailbox Policy’s “legitimate sweep,” the court
credited Kontogiannis’s testimony that the purpose of |
the policy was to ensure that the mailboxes did not
become overstuffed to the point where documents
involving school business would be missed or lost.
Based on these facts, the court concluded that any
inhibiting impact of the Mailbox Policy was
insubstantial relative to its legitimate scope.

We agree that the record fails to show that the
Mailbox Policy has had an actual or potential chilling
effect on teacher speech. Policastro admits that “[s]ince
the removal of the memo .. . use of the mailboxes by
teachers for personal messages (memos, notes, cards,
etc.) has continued as usual, without prior approval.”

Policastro Brief at 5. Accordingly, we will affirm the
District Court’s denial of Policastro’s overbreadth
challenge.

B.

Policastro also claims the Mailbox Policy is
unconstitutional as it was applied to him. But
Kontogiannis testified at trial that she removed the
memorandum because of a disruption among the
teachers that threatened to disrupt the school’s
program. There is no evidence in the _ record
demonstrating the Mailbox Policy was the cause of the
memorandum’s removal. Accordingly, Policastro has
not shown he suffered any injury under the policy or
that the policy has ever in fact been applied to him. We
will affirm the District Court’s denial of Policastro’s
“as applied” challenge to the Mailbox Policy.

7a
Ill.

Policastro also claims his First Amendment right to
free speech was violated whether or not Kontogiannis
removed the subject memorandum under the Mailbox
Policy.‘ He did not seek damages. He seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief only, which, for the reasons set
forth below, are forms of relief we have no authority to
provide on the facts here. Therefore, we will dismiss
this claim as non-justiciable, because even if
meritorious, we could not redress it.

To bring and maintain a lawsuit through
adjudication, Policastro must have standing. E.g.,
Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d
Cir. 1996). “The three elements necessary to establish
the irreducible constituiicnal minimum of standing
are: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning

* Policastro’s pro se complaint has been liberally construed to
include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the school’s actions in
removing the memorandum infringed on his First Amendment
right to free speech. See Policastro v. Kontogiannis, No. 04-2883,
2005 WL 1005131 (3d Cir. 2005). This claim is distinct from his
“as applied” challenge to the Mailbox Policy, because he alleges
his speech was unconstitutionally silenced by the school’s actions
even if those actions were motivated by something other than the
Mailbox Policy.

8a

Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995)).

a |

In our prior opinion vacating the District Court’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim, we acted without
the benefit of fact-finding. Here, we have discovery and
a trial record. On prior review, Policastro’s standing
was not in question. Policastro’s pro se complaint,
construed liberally, alleged Kontogiannis removed the
offending memorandum from teacher mailboxes under
the school’s Mailbox Policy. Had this been proven,
equitable relief might have been proper if the policy
were unconstitutional, facially and/or as applied. But
the trial testimony unequivocally shows the subject
memorandum was removed because of the perceived
disturbance it caused, not because of the Mailbox
Policy. Because the school’s action in removing the
memorandum was an isolated occurrence wholly
unrelated to the Mailbox Policy, the facts present no
ongoing harm or controversy for us to remedy.
Accordingly, whether or not Policastro had standing
prior to remand, his claims are now moot.

A mootness inquiry asks whether a claimant’s
standing continues throughout the litigation. “A case
is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Donovan ex. rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney
Area School Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). “The court’s ability to grant effective
relief lies at the heart of the mootness doctrine.” Jd.
“That is, if developments occur during the course of
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake
in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being
able to grant the requested relief, the case must be

9a

dismissed as moot.” Id.; see also Green v. Branson, 108
F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The touchstone of
the mootness inquiry is whether the controversy
continues to touch the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests in the outcome of the case.”)
(citation omitted). “The crucial question is whether
‘granting a present determination of the issues offered

. will have some effect in the real world.” Utah
Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371
F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).

At this juncture, no available remedy would redress
Policastro’s suit. He has not sought damages.°

° Policastro’s suit would likely survive a justiciability challenge if
he had sought damages. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
264 (1982) (holding the transfer tv anvther prison did not moot a
prisoner's claim for damages arising from placement in solitary
confienement); Donovan, 336 F.3d at 218 (holding claims for
damages and attorneys fees continued to present a live
controversy even though claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief were moot); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey,
772 F.2d 35, 41 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he availability of damages or
other monetary relief almost always avoids mootness. . . .”); Blau
v. Fort Thomas Public School Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 387 (6th Cir.
2005) (noting the existence of a damages claim “ensures that [a]
dispute is a live one over which Article III gives us continuing
authority.”) (multiple citations omitted). But Policastro chose not
to assert a claim for damages. A request for damages will
gencrally save a case from becoming moot when equitable relief no
longer provides an effective remedy, but courts will not read a
claim for damages into a complaint that contains no such request.
See Seven Words LLC v. Network Solutions, 260 F.3d 1089, 1097
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding claims moot where appellant sought only
injunctive and declaratory relief but failed to request damages).

10a

Injunctive relief would be unavailable for Policastro at
this time, and declaratory relief would amount to no
more than an advisory opinion regarding the
“wrongfulness” of past conduct. See, e.g., Green v.
Branson, 108 F.3d at 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A
party’s] ‘legal interest’ must be more than simply the
satisfaction of a declaration that a person was
wronged.”) (citing Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 755, 761
(1987)). The Supreme Court has consistently held “a
federal court has neither the power to render advisory
opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the
rights of litigants in the case before them.” Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quotation omitted).
The Court has provided further guidance on this point:

“In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not
the end but the means. At the end of the
rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or
cessation of action) by the defendant that the
judgment produces—the payment of damages, or
some specific performance, or the termination of
some conduct. Redress is sought through the
court, but from the defendant. This is no less
true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any
action. The real value of the judicial
pronouncement—what makes it a proper judicial
resolution of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than
an advisory opinion—is in the settling of some
dispute which affects the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff.”

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (quoting
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)) (emphases
in original).

lla

Accordingly, where Policastro has not sought
damages, and we are unable to afford him meaningful
alternative relief, his claim that Kontogiannis’s
removal of the subject memorandum from teacher
mailboxes violated his First Amendment right to free
speech is moot.®

© We note that the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception to mootness, e.g., Brody ex. rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957
F.2d 1108, 1113-15 (3d Cir. 1992), does not apply here. “This
extremely narrow exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable
only where: 1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be
fully litigated before the case will become moot; and 2) there is a
reasonabie expectation that the compiaining party wiii be
subjected to the same action again.” Donovan, 336 F.3d at 217
(citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam)).
The prospect of a similar memorandum being removed from
teacher mailboxes under the facts here is too speculative to
warrant invocation of this narrow exception. See, e.g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975) (“Any subjective fear [Plaintiff]
might entertain of being again [subjected to] circumstances
similar to those alleged in the complaint . . . is indeed remote and
speculative and hardly casts [a] ‘continuing and brooding
presence’ over him ... .”) (citation omitted). Even looking beyond
the unique circumstances of the union negotiations at the heart
this case, the record demonstrates, and Policastro himself asserts,
that no other item—among the many hundreds of items inserted
in teacher mailboxes—has been removed from teacher mailboxes,
either prior to or subsequent to the removal of his memorandum.
Moreover, because of email and other technologies, the teacher
mailboxes no longer serve as the primary means of communication
between the school and its teachers.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the
District Court’s denial of Policastro’s facial and as
applied challenges to the school’s Mailbox Policy. We
will also dismiss as non-justiciable Policastro’s claim
that his First Amendment right to free speech was
violated.

13a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR TSE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-1471

[Filed January 24, 2008]

ANDREW POLICASTRO,
Appellant

¥.

DR. THEODORA P. KONTOGIANNIS,
Principal Tenafly High School;
TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION.

i a ee a ee ee

On Appea! from the United States District Court
tor the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1219
(Honorable Joel A. Pisano)

Argued January 23, 2007

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and
CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause came to be heard on the recrod from the
United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey and was argued by counsel on January 23,
2007. On consideration whereof, it is now hereby

l4a

ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the
judgment of the District Court entered January 11,
2006, be, and the same is hereby affirmed in part and
appeilant’s claim that his First Amendment right to
free speech was violated is dismissed as non-
justiciable. Costs taxed against appellant. All of the
above in accordance with the opnion of this Court.

ATTEST:

/s/ Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

DATED: January 24, 2008

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CIVIL NO. 04-1219

[Dated January 11, 2006}

ANDREW POLICASTRO,
Plaintiff,
-VS-

DR. THEODORA KONTOGIANNIS,
TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendants.

Nem me ee ee ee ee ee “eee”

Newark, New Jersey
January 11, 2006

BEFORE:
THE HONORABLE JOEL A. PISANO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THE COURT: Back on Policastro. I have, since the
recess yesterday, considered all of the issues at some
length. I’ve also had the benefit of reading the

16a

transcript of the entire proceedings so I’m prepared to
rule on this.

Is there anything else anybody would like to argue,
Mr. Policastro, Mr. Thibault, anything you would like
to argue?

MR. THIBAULT: No, I think we argued everything
on the motion and partial summary judgment.

THE COURT: Mr. Policastro, do you have
anything else you would like to say about this?

MR. POLICASTRO: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

I’m going to do this from the bench without writing
a formal opinion for a couple of reasons. The first
being that this case has been pending for long enough,
I think for everybody’s purposes, having now occupied
the resources of five federal judges and their staff.

Based upon the experience in trying the case
yesterday, we had the participation of a significant
number of faculty of Tenafly High School, which has
been, from what I gather, not only explicitly from the
record but reading between the lines, been embroiled
in whatever this dispute came from since 2002.

I think the parties are interested in a speedy
resolution and so is the Court.

The second reason I’m not going to submit this to
formal writing is that, as I indicated yesterday, there

17a

doesn’t seem to be much of a dispute either as to the
law or the facts of this case. I don’t think it would
serve anybody’s purpose to add to the literature by
publishing or filing yet another opinion discussing the
legal landscape pertaining to the type of expression
which is in this case.

We've got a number of cases speaking about the
subject matter and we'll be citing to some of them.
They’re already in the briefs and they’re already in the
opinions, but taking as the law of the case the opinion
from the Third Circuit in this matter, there is a recital
of the legal landscape which is entirely consistent with
this Court’s legal discussion on the -- in the opinion in
which the Court dismissed the complaint originally.

The Third Circuit did not in any way change this
Court’s view of the law, but rather concluded that the
Court was improvident in dismissing this case without
making some findings of fact. That is to say, the Third
Circuit found that this was not an appropriate
dismissal based upon the allegations in the complaint,
but rather needed to develop a record as stated in the
slip opinion at page six; in order to require Tenafly to
put forth facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast a specific and significant fear of
disruption, not just some remote apprehension of
disturbance.

That, of course, is language that comes directly
from the Tinker case, which has been cited here more
times than we need to mention, and is also entirely
consistent with " : has been

se

published on the subject, particularly including the

18a

opinion in Saxe v. State College Area School District,
Third Circuit opinion, 240 F.3d at page 200.

The Saxe case is pretty interesting because it does
contain a very clear review of the Tinker standards
and then goes further into some discussion of some
other cases involving school law, retaliation,
employment decisions, of course which are not
implicated here, for example, from Hazelwood and
some other cases that we’re familiar with.

The other thing that’s interesting about the Saxe
opinion is that it also included a discussion of a
challenge, a facial challenge to a regulation which was
designed to restrict and control expression within the
school.

So all of that being said, it appears to me that
there, as I indicate, is not much of a dispute as to what
the law in this case is. Generally speaking, quoting
from Sexe, referring to Tinker, page 211, “regulations
of student speech is generally permissible only when
the speech would substantially disrupt or interfere
with the work of the school or the rights of other
students.” Again, Saxe is talking about student
speech, not factually pertinent here, but the speech,
the regulation of the speech is subject to the same
legal standards.

And as oddly enough Judge Alito goes on, on page
211, “As subsequent cases have made clear, Tinker
requires a specific and significant fear of disruption,
not just some remote apprehension of the disturbance.”

19a

That’s an interesting quote because I believe it
serves as a basis to analyze both types of claims in this
case. We have in this case a challenge to the act of Dr.
Kontogiannis in removing from the teachers’ mailboxes
the exhibit P-1 that we have in evidence and closing
the teacher mailboxes thereafter; and, secondly, we
have a challenge to the regulations maintained by the
Tenafly High School and Board of Ed, which would
require prior approval if a teacher or staff member
wanted to make a mass distribution, either of written
materials in the teachers’ mailboxes or in the
electronic form in the e-mails.

I say that this quote which I'll read again, “Tinker
requires a specific and significant fear of disruption,
not just some remote apprehension of disturbance,”

that statement can be applied and can be analyzed in
the face of both types of claims in this case.

Now, the facts of the case again are really not much
in dispute. They were pretty much fleshed out in the
briefs before this Court on the motion to dismiss,
except for the fact that we didn’t have the benefit of
the testimony of some of the individuals who shed
some light on the ultimate question as framed by the
Third Circuit, which is whether Tenafly can come
forward with facts to demonstrate that there was a
substantial -- that there was a fear of significant
disruption or disturbance in school affairs.

The case appears to arise out of some sort of
internal Tenafly teacher union controversy. There
hasn’t been any direct testimony on the subject, but we
had the benefit of the testimony of a number of
teachers, including Mr. Policastro, who was a teacher,

20a

and still is from what I gather, a teacher at Tenafly
High School. We had the testimony of James Vere,
Douglas Golde, Anne Lander, Felice Loffredo, James
Sutera, Diane Kratz, Adam Rendell, April Celli,
Kenneth Berman and the secretary to the director of
athletics, Chloie Biscaldi. We also have had the
testimony from Dr. Kontogiannis, who was and is the
principal and who took the action here both to remove
the memorandum, exhibit P-1, and also shed light on
the purpose and theory of the regulation for prior
approval.

We also had the testimony of Howard Glaser who
was not a teacher at Tenafly High School, but rather
was in a position of leadership in the teachers’ union
and became aware of the facts that were ongoing on

the date in question of March 13, 2002.

In any event, the facts are, and I find as facts that
there was some sort of an internal, internecine
squabble among the rank and file of the Tenafly
Teachers’ Union; that on the day in question there was
to be a ratification vote as to a proposed contract which
had been negotiated by the teachers’ union on behalf
of its members; that on March 13, 2002, someone
created the document, P-1, which was ultimately
signed by 13 individuals, including Mr. Policastro, the
plaintiff here; Mr. Policastro did not author the
document nor did he distribute the document which I
also find to be an interesting ironic addition to this
factual scenario.

We have a plaintiff who neither authored nor
distributed the document that is in question, yet he is

2la

the one who is asserting some afront to his First
Amendment freedom of expression.

Be that as it may, he adopts the content of the
memo and we will assume, and there is no issue, that
his expression and rights to expression are in issue in
the case as a result, at least it hasn’t been challenged
on that basis.

Now, the language in the memorandum consists of
five questions as they are stated which were at least
hypothetically being directed to the negotiating team
who had arrived at whatever the deal was ultimately
going to be presented to the rank and file of the
teachers’ union. There is nothing in the record to
indicate whether or not these five questions or issues
had been raised previously in the negotiating process
or whether anybody who signed P-1 was even on the
negotiating team, but be that as it may, the document
appears to contain five questions directed toward the
negotiating team.

There is testimony that Douglas Golde, on the day
in question, is the individual who placed P-1 in each of
the teachers’ mailboxes in Tenafly High School and he
said that he remembered doing it somewhere about
8:30 in the morning. The facts are that he was told
sometime later that morning that they were gone, so
he went back into the mail room and replaced in every
teacher’s mailbox another copy of P-1.

There is no testimony as to how the document was
created, whether it was copied on school copy machine
utilizing public supplies, we don’t know where he got
it from, it doesn’t really matter. In any event, at

22a

sometime following Mr. Golde’s placement and
distribution of these two copies of the memo, P-1, it is
a fact that has been adduced not only through the
testimony of Dr. Kontogiannis but through the
testimony of some of the individuals who testified,
including Mr. DiGregorio, by the way, whom I left out
I believe of the statement of witnesses that I set forth.

It is clear from the testimony of the witnesses and
it is in the record that the memorandum, P-1, did
result in controversy within the Tenafly High School
building. That is testimony that came from Mrs.
Kratz, it is testimony that came from Miss Biscaldi, it
is testimony that came from Miss Loffredo and it is
testimony that came from Mr. DiGregorio and from Dr.
Kontogiannis herself. It was characterized somewhat
differently depending upon the frame of reference of
each individual who knew about it, but suffice it to
say, Dr. Kontogiannis summarized the scenario as
being one of disruption, confusion, there was
controversy, teachers were out of their classrooms
discussing the contents of the memo in the hallways,
in the library and she concluded that there was a
significant disruption in the operation of the school
such that she took it upon herself, first of all, to
remove P-1 from the mailboxes in the first instance
and then when she learned that they had been
replaced, to physically close the mail room in order to
restore order to the school community.

That testimony is corroborated, at least in
substance, by the testimony of the other individuals
who were aware of the controversy. Most significantly
her testimony, that is the testimony of the principal,
was corroborated significantly by Mr. DiGregorio, who

23a

was the library monitor, who testified that there was,
in fact, a significant disruption involving teachers who
were present in the library and who were not acting in
a way, to use the pedagogical term, on task. It is also
corroborated by the testimony of Miss Biscaldi, it is
corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Kratz and it is
corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Glaser, who was
at the time, I believe he still is, a special education
teacher at the middle school in a different building,
but in his capacity as a member of the personal rights
committee of the Tenafly Teachers’ Union, he received
notice of the problem and was asked to come over and
he did come over and speak to Dr. Kontogiannis about
the incident.

I find the foregoing to be facts that are supported in
this record.

Now, Mr. Poiicastro, as plaintiff, makes a claim
that his freedom of expression was violated and
restricted unconstitutionally, first of all, by the
conduct of Dr. Kontogiannis in removing the memo, P-
1, from the teacher mailboxes and subsequently
closing the mail room and secondly, that their exists in
the Tenafly High School a regulation promulgated by
the Board of Education which requires prior approval
in the event of a distribution on a wholesale basis of
any memos through the mailboxes or electronic
communications over the e-mail system.

Now, putting aside for the moment as we get to
that second claim, putting aside for the moment that
it appears to the Court that at least with respect to the
e-mail regulation, that it is utterly unenforceable.
Putting that aside for the moment, nevertheless, we

24a

need to determine whether, and this is interestingly,
as I say, discussed in the Saxe opinion, it is necessary
to determine whether there can be a facial challenge
that would succeed on a constitutional basis to that
regulation.

Mr. Policastro has testified, and the Court accepts
as facts, with respect to the second claim, that is the
challenge to the prior approval regulation, that as a
result of its very existence, Mr. Policastro has
refrained from making any attempt to distribute
wholesale any written communications in the
mailboxes at Tenafly High School.

Of course we cannot lose sight, and I find as a fact,
that James Sutera did make a wholesale distribution
of written material in the mailboxes without receiving
prior approval and he did so in November of 2003, and
I find as a fact that.Mr. Policastro himself chose to
make a wholesale distribution of written material
without prior approval in placing the exhibit P-18 in
the mailboxes on a date subsequent to March 13, 2002.

This, that is to say the distributions made by
Sutera and Policastro, in my view, undercut the
plaintiffs claim because there is further testimony in
the record, and I find as a fact, corroborated by Dr.
Kontogiannis, that approval, prior approval to make a
wholesale distribution had never been refused prior to
March 13, 2002, nor has it ever been refused
subsequent to March 13, 2002.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Policastro, in my view,
cannot be heard to complain that this regulation has
chilled his rights to expression simply because he has

25a

chosen not to pursue whatever it is he wanted to
communicate and his testimony was something about
running for president of the state NJEA, the education
association and that he made wholesale distributions
of materials to teachers in other buildings, but chose
to eliminate his own out of fear of enforcement,
selective enforcement of this regulation, which I find
as a fact was not going to happen.

So the question becomes, with respect to the second
type of claim, that directed toward the prior approval
regulation, whether that prior approval regulation
itself recognized a legitimate pedagogical concern of
the administration that there could be a substantial
disruption generated.

Now, what is the testimony on that? The testimony
as to the meaning and purpose of this prior approval
regulation comes from Dr. Kontogiannis and she
testified very forthrightly that the purpose for the
regulation was to make sure that if there was going to
be some wholesale distribution of non-school related
communication or material, that is to say something
less than a particular communication to some teachers
and not others, that she would have a legitimate
concern that other communications that are necessary
during the school day might be lost in the shuffle. This
isn’t, in my view, in any way unreasonable. It isn’t in
any way unreasonable and I must say, Mr. Policastro,
this complaint of yours with respect to that regulation
is a mystery to me.

So the Third Circuit’s opinion in this case raised
the question for its ultimate determination whether
Tenafly could put forth facts which might reasonably

26a

have led Dr. Kontogiannis to forecast a specific and
significant fear of disruption. Well, I have found and
I do conclude that Dr. Kontogiannis’ testimony is
entirely credible, it is corroborated by other witnesses
that I have just recounted, but her testimony is
entirely credible and believable; that there was
following the distribution of the memo, P-1, a
substantial disruption in the school.

It is beside the point, in my view, that the language
in the memorandum, P-1, was not lude, vulgar,
obscene or inflammatory, but it is only relevant to the
Court that the distribution of that memo resulted in
her mind a conclusion that there was a substantial
disruption, and she then set about to exercise her
discretion as principal in order to restore order to the

Tenafly High School.

I find her testimony to be credible, I find her
conduct to have been reasonable under all of the
circumstances and, indeed, as an aside, had she not
acted in the way she did, I *think. she could
significantly be criticized for permitting a situation of
chaos te continue where it certainly didn’t belong.

As a result, I conclude as a matter of law that there
has been demonstrated by Tenafly a specific -- there
has been demonstrated by Tenafly that a significant
disruption did occur and consequently as we move to
the second claim, that subsequent to March 138, 2002,
Mr. Policastro’s First Amendment rights had been
unconstitutionally chilled, it would seem to me that
the events of March 13, 2002, entirely justify the
existence of the prior approval regulation because in
the mind of Dr. Kontogiannis, if a memorandum,

27a

however plain vanilla, could cause a disruptive
situation on March 13, 2002, then why not some other
communication subsequently? This, of course, is again
in the context of there never having been the refusal to
make a wholesale distribution, nor did it prevent both
Mr. Policastro and Mr. Sutera and people that we
might not even knov about because they didn’t testify,
who may have made wholesale distributions of written
materials themselves.

So whether you look at it from the point of view
that the regulation is reasonable, that it has a
demonstrable reasonable basis from an educational
standpoint or whether you look at in connection with
and in addition to the events of March 13, it is entirely
reasonable for the principal to conclude that there
might be an occasion when she should exercise her
discretion and refuse to permit a wholesale mass
distribution of material.

While we're on the subject, having read the
language of this prior approval regulation, it is clear to
me from the first paragraph of it that there is
absolutely no preclusion from teachers making
communications through the use of mailboxes and, in
fact, the first paragraph of this regulation, in my view,
should be read to be encouraging communication
among teachers through the use of mailboxes.

The sentence in dispute, as testified to by Mr.
Policastro, relates only to the one part of the last
sentence in the second paragraph which requires prior
approval in the event of what I conclude is only a
wholesale mass distribution of materials and I think
the regulation is self-evident to make that distinction.

28a

Having said that and made those conclusions, the
same conclusions in my view apply to the e-mail
communications, although we know in the mvudern
world, we know as a practical matter that that
regulation is probably beyond enforcement and,
frankly, I don’t know what the Tenafly High School is
going to do about that. We have the exhibits which are
numerous of jokes, personal communications, frivolous
material back and forth, all to the utter waste of time,
effort and resources of the public entity.

On that subject, a little bit more. I would be remiss,
I think, if I did not recognize what I consider to be an
utterly inordinate expense of public resources, Mr.
Policastro, represented by this case. This case has
been pending in this court, in the Court of Appeals for
going on two years. You have a right of access to the

courts. Your right of access to the courts has been
honored.

I do not have a complaint personally or officially
with the fact that you filed this complaint, I do not
have any argument with you. You’re entitled to do it,
you're entitled to be heard fully and I believe you have
been fully heard, but taking into account the factual
scenario of this case, it is beyond my personal
comprehension, Mr. Policastro, first of all, why this
was so upsetting to you, but what is upsetting to me
and what I do take issue with is the fact that you
subpoenaed, while you didn’t subpoena them, the
Board of Education accommodated you, they indulged
your request, to require to be present in this
courthouse a large number of staff members of the
Tenafly Board of Education.

29a

You have a right to file this lawsuit, you have a
right to pursue your rights, I have no quarrel with it,
but this represents to me, for whatever your personal
motive may have been in pursuing this crusade, this
represents to me a tragic waste of public resources.

So for the reasons that I have expressed,
notwithstanding my most recent criticism, but for the
reasons that I have expressed based upon my fact
findings and conclusions of law, I am satisfied that this
complaint must be and is hereby dismissed in its
entirety and a judgment will be entered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff.

Thank you for comin2.
Mr. Policastro, I suggest you go back to work.

MR. POLICASTRO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there any application for costs?

MR. THIBAULT: Your Honor, I think the Tenafly
Board of Education at this point will be happy that the
complaint is just dismissed.

THE COURT: All right.

The case is dismissed without costs.
(Trial concluded.)

30a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil 04-1219 (JAP)

[Filed January 11, 2006]

Andrew Policastro,
Plaintiff,
_ys-
DR.Kontogiannis, et al.,

Defendant.

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JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

This action came before the Court fora NON JURY
TRIAL. The issues were tried and the Court rendered
its decision:

By its decision, the Court established that a
judgment of NO CAUSE FOR ACTION be entered in
favor of all the defendants, and against the plaintiff,
with prejudice and without costs. Ordered case
dismissed.

DATE January 11, 2006

S/ JOEL A. PISANO, U.S.D.J.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-2883

[Filed January 12, 2005]

Andrew POLICASTRO,
Appellant

¥.

Theodora P. KONTOGIANNIS,
Principal Tenafly High School;
Tenafly Board of Education

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Jan. 5, 2005
Decided Jan. 12, 2005
Order Denying Rehearing April 12, 2005

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 04-CV-01219)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano

Andrew Policastro, Tenafly, NJ, pro se.

Arthur R. Thibault, Jr., Apruzzese, McDermott,
Mastro & Murphy, Liberty Corner, NJ, for Appellees.

32a

Before: NYGAARD, VAN ANTWERPEN AND
ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER,
NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, MCKEE, RENDELL,
BARRY, AMBRO, SMITH, FUENTES, FISHER, VAN
ANTWERPEN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.’

OPINION
PER CURIAM.

Andrew Policastro, a teacher at Tenafly High
School in New Jersey, filed a pro se civil rights suit in
the District Court for the District of New Jersey,
alleging violation of his First Amendment right of
freedom of speech by the principal of Tenafly High
School, Theodora Kontogiannis, and the Tenafly Board
of Education, collectively “Tenafly.” Tenafly filed a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The District Court
granted the motion, and Policastro appeals. We will
vacate and remand.

I.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and we have appellate jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Our review of the District Court’s grant of a motion
to dismiss is plenary. Green v. America Online, 318

* Judge Aldisert’s vote is limited to panel rehearing only.

33a

F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 540 U.S. 877, 124
S.Ct. 200, 157 L.Ed.2d 140 (2003). We accept as true
the factual allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id.
We will affirm only if no relief can be granted under
any set of facts the plaintiff could prove. Id.

Il.

Policastro’s complaint alleges that on the morning
of March 13, 2002, a memo entitled “Questions for the
Tenafly Negotiation Team” (hereinafter the “Memo”)
and signed by 13 teachers including himself was
placed in the internal mail boxes of the Tenafly High
School teachers. A35. The Memo was subsequently
removed by or at the authority of Principal
Kontogiannis. Jd. The Memo was again placed in the
mail boxes, and again removed by or at the authority
of Principal Kontogiannis. /d. The mail room was then
locked for the remainder of the day. Id. The
ratification vote for the teacher’s contract was held
later that day after school. Jd. Policastro also claims
that the internal mail boxes are used for “personal
messages, holiday cards, birthday cards, gifts, fliers
from local merchants, memos from teachers, notes
from teachers, notes from parents, notes from
students, U.S. tiail, union information and
administrative concerns.” Jd. Policastro sought as
relief (1) a declaration that the administrative policy
requiring prior approval of items placed in the mail
boxes is unconstitutional; (2) the removal of any
reference to the prior approval policy from the
administrative manual, teacher contracts, etc.; (3) a
declaration that the removal from the mail boxes of
any communication between Tenafly public school

34a

teachers is unconstitutional; (4) permission for Tenafly
public school teachers to use the school email system
for internal and external email between Tenafly
teachers; and (5) permission for Tenafly public school
teachers to use the school media facilities. Jd.

Construing this pro se complaint liberally, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30
L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), Policastro essentially claims that
his First Amendment rights are being violated by: (1)
the removal of the Memo from the teachers’ mail
boxes; (2) the policies and/or directives requiring the
teachers to obtain prior approval before placing
material in the mail boxes; and (3) the prohibition on
using the school’s email and other media facilities for
communications between Tenafly teachers. The prior
approval policy, documented in the Administrative
Manual for Teachers, states:

Mailboxes are the property of the Tenaily Board
of Education and should be used for school
business. Any staff member wishing to
distribute flyers/announcements, etc. (via the
mailboxes) must have prior approval from the
principal or vice-principal.

A36-37.’

' Although a court considering a motion to dismiss generally may
not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a court may
consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the
complaint.” Jn re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

It is well established that teachers do not “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech .. . at
the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21
L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). However, school officials may
still, “consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, . . . prescribe and control conduct in the
schools.” Jd. Thus, a school may categorically prohibit
lewd, vulgar or profane language. Saxe v. State Coll.
Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106
S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986)). A school may also
regulate school-sponsored speech on the basis of any
lecitimate nedagogical concern. /d. (citing Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108S.Ct. 562, 98
L.Ed.2d 592 (1988)). School-sponsored speech occurs
when the school “aims ‘to convey its own message”;
whereas private speech occurs when the school
“facilitates the expression of ‘a diversity of views from
private speakers’.” Child Evangelism Fellowship v.
Stafford Township Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34, 115 S.Ct. 2510,
132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995)). Any speech falling outside of
these two categories is subject to the general rule of
Tinker that the specch may be regulated “only if it
would substantially disrupt school operations or
interfere with the right of others.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at
214; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Sypniewski v.
Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254 (3d
Cir. 2002) (applying Tinker to school policy that

36a

prohibited students from wearing an expressive
t-shirt).

When, as in this case, the forum for the speech is a
school internal mail box, the forum is considered
non-public. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794
(1983). Accordingly, any regulation of the forum must
be “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum” and must be “viewpoint neutral.” Child
Evangelism, 386 F.3d at 526 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392-93, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993)); see
also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.°

B.

The Memo contained five questions regarding the
negotiation of the Tenafly teachers’ contract. See A10.
The Memo does not contain lewd or vulgar statements.
Tenafly appears to argue that any speech conducted
through the mailboxes is school-sponsored because the
mailboxes are the property of Tenafly. Brief on Behalf
of Appellees at 13-14 (arguing that Tenafly is not
required to promote speech through use of the
mailboxes, as opposed to tolerating speech as in

* Policastro argues that the internal mail boxes are a limited
public forum as to the teachers, and that Perry is distinguishable
because it involved non-school employce use of the mail boxes.
Informal Brief at 15-18. We need not reach this issue because, as
recognized by the District Court, a limited public forum is
governed by the same reasonableness and viewpoint neutral
standard as a non-public forum.Child Evangelism, 386 F.3d at

526

37a

Tinker). However, in light of Policastro’s allegations
that other personal materials are distributed in the
mailboxes, a reasonable inference can be made that he
is alleging that the Memo can not be viewed as
school-sponsored. Thus, the speech would fall under
the Tinker rule, whereby Tenafly can only regulate the
speech if it would “substantially disrupt school
operations or interfere with the right of others.” Saxe,
240 F.3d at 214.

The Tinker rule requires Tenafly to put forth facts
which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast “a specific and significant fear of disruption,
not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.” Jd.
at 211; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Whether or not
Tenafly can satisfy this burden involves factual issues
that are not appropriate for resolution at this stage of
the proceedings.’ See Asociacion de Educacion Privada
de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Echevarria-Vargas, 385 F.3d 81,
86 (1* Cir. 2004) (finding 12(b)(6) dismissal erroneous
where facts needed to be developed to determine
strength of state’s justification for regulation that
allegedly restricted First Amendment rights).
Accordingly, making all reasonable inferences in
Policastro’s favor, we find that the complaint
adequately states a claim that the Memo was not
within the scope of speech that could be

* Tenafly asserts in its motion to dismiss that the prior approval
policy is necessary because otherwise the mailboxes would
“become inundated with .. . non-school business related
documents,” and that “[w]ithout some control over what is placed
in the teacher mailboxes, important announcements from
administration officials could go unnoticed or be discarded by
teachers as simply junk mail.” Motion Dismiss Brief at 16.

38a

constitutionally restricted. For the same reasons, we
find that the complaint states a claim that the prior
approval policy also impermissibly extends to speech
that can not be constitutionally restricted.

The complaint also alleges that the mailboxes were
being used for other personal communications. Thus,
even if the Memo, specifically, and the mailboxes, in
general, could be constitutionally prescribed, we find
that the complaint also states a claim that the removal
of the Memo and/or the implementation of the prior
approval policy was not reasonable and not viewpoint
neutral. Child Evangelism, supra.

C.

As to the internal email system and other media
facilities,* it may be reasonably inferred that
Policastro is alleging that there are certain unspecified
restrictions on the use of these facilities, despite the
facilities being otherwise available for personal
communications. Policastro’s failure to identify any
specific restrictions and/or prohibited communications
makes this claim a much closer call. Nonetheless,
consistent with the notice pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), we find
Policastro’s allegations sufficient to state a claim that
Tenafly’s policy regarding email and media facility use

* Policastro’s use of the term ‘media facilities’ apparently
encompasses the teachers mailboxes as well as teacher billboards.
Informal Reply Brief at 1-2. Because we have previously
addressed the mailboxes, this discussion is limited to the teachers’
billboards.

39a

is unconstitutionally restrained. See Swierkiewicz uv.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152
L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (plaintiffs complaint need only “give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim
is and the grounds upon which it is based”).

D.

Lastly, on appeal Policastro argues that the
removal of the Memo violated the letters of the carrier
exception to the Postal Service’s restrictions on the
carrying of letters. See 39 C.F.R. § 310.3(b); Informal
Brief at 32-34. This claim was not presented in
Policastro’s complaint or otherwise raised in the
District Court. Accordingly, we decline to consider it on
appeal. Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC., 369 F.3d 263, 272-73
(3d Cir. 2004).

IV.

In conclusion, Policastro’s complaint adequately
states claims for violation of his First Amendment
right to free speech. Accordingly, we will vacate the
dismissal of the complaint, and remand for further
proceedings.

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
NYGAARD, J.

The Petition for rehearing filed by the Appellees in
the above-entitled matter having been submitted to
the judges who participated in the decision of this
court and to all other available circuit judges in
regular active service, and no judge who concurred in

40a

the decision having asked for rehearing, and a
majority of the circuit judges in regular active service
not having voted for rehearing by this court en banc,
the Petition for Rehearing is hereby DENIED.

It ‘s so ordered.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

No. 04-1219 (JAP)

[Filed June 8, 2004]

ANDREW POLICASTRO
v.

DR. THEODORA P. KONTOGIANNIS
and TENAFLY BOARD OF EDUCATION

PISANO, District Judge:

Defendants Dr. Theodora P. Kontogiannis
(“Kontogiannis”) and Tenafly Board of Education (the
“Board”) (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss
the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Andrew Policastro
(“Policastro”) opposes this motion. The Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331, and resolves this
motion without oral argument, as permitted under
Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion and dismisses the complaint with
prejudice.

42a

In this matter, Policastro appears pro se and, as
such, this Court must construe his pleadings liberally.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Mindful
of this obligation, the Court reviews this motion by
taking as true all factual allegations in the complaint
and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them to determine whether Policastro may have a
viable cause of action. Higgens v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683,
688 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63,
65 (3d Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the facts recited below
are taken from Plaintiffs Complaint, and do not
represent this Court’s factual findings.

Policastro is a teacher at Tenafly High School.
Defendant Kontogiannis is the principal of Tenafly
High School. Plaintiff alleges that during the morning
of March 13, 2002, a memo, signed by thirteen
teachers, was placed in the teachers’ mailboxes and
was subsequently removed by or under the authority
of Kontogiannis. (Compl. J 6). The memo was again
placed back in the mailboxes and was again removed
by or under the authority of Kontogiannis. (Id. { 7).
March 13, 2002 was ratification day for the teachers’
contract, and the memo posed questions about the
proposed contract. (Id. ¥ 8; Affidavit of Arthur R.
Thibault, Jr. (hereinafter “Thibault Aff.”), Ex. B).
Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were
violated by Kontogiannis’ actions, and further alleges
that the teacher mailboxes are used for personal
messages, holiday cards, birthday cards, gifts, fliers
from local merchants, memos from teachers, notes
from teachers, notes from parents, notes from
students, U.S. mail, union information and
administrative concerns. (Compl. { 10).

43a

In Plaintiffs demand for relief, he requests that
this Court deem unconstitutional and remove any
language in any administrative manual for teachers,
teacher manual, teacher contract, school policy, board
policy, or administrative directive that requires
administrative permission or prior approval of items
placed in the teachers’ mailboxes. (Id. J 11). Plaintiff
also requests that this Court deem unconstitutional
the removal of memos or other communications
between teachers from teachers’ mailboxes. (Id. J 13).
Finally, Plaintiff requests that the teachers be allowed
use of the school email system as well as other media
facilities for personal messages. (Id. {J 14, 15).

The Administrative Manual (the “Manual”) for
teachers at Tenafly High School explains that the
teachers’ mailboxes in the high school “are the
property of the Tenafly Board of Education and should
be used for school business.” The Manual further
states that “any staff member wishing to distribute
flyers/announcements, etc. (via the mailboxes) must
have prior approval from the principal or vice-
principal.” (Thibault Aff., Ex. C).

The use of the teachers’ mailboxes is also addressed
in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”)
between the Tenafly Board of Education and the
Tenafly Education Association. The CBA provides that
“the Association shall have the right to make
reasonable use of the inter-school mail system for
distribution of Association materials provided this does
not interfere with school operations. The building
Principal shall be made aware of such use.” (Id., Ex.

D).

44a

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
court may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” In
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts as
true all of the factual allegations within the complaint
and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
them. Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir.
1992). Claims will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)
only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 4546 (1957).

Accordingly, a district court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint has a limited role. In
performing that role, the court determines not
“whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail,” but
“whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support
their claims.” Langford v. Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845,
847 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997);
Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp.
2d 318, 325 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Mobile Media Sec.
Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 922 (D.N.J. 1998).
Generally, the court’s task requires it to disregard any
material beyond the pleadings. Burlington Coat, 114
F.3d at 1426; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). A
district court may, however, consider the factual
allegations within other documents, including those
described or identified in the complaint and matters of
public record, if the plaintiffs claims are based upon
those documents. Burlington Coat, 114 F.3d at 1426;
In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 707 (3d
Cir. 1996); In re Donald J. Trump Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d

45a

357, 368 n.9 (38d Cir. 1993); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196. References to documents
attached to the complaint do not convert a motion to

dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Burlington
Coat, 114 F.3d at 1426.

Plaintiffs Complaint challenges the policy of the
Board that requires teachers who wish to utilize the
teacher mailboxes to obtain permission from the school
principal. Plaintiff alleges that the policy violates his
rights under the First Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that “teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969). First Amendment protection extends to
many places, including a teacher’s mailbox. Perry
Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S.
37, 44 (1983). However the Supreme Court has never
suggested “that students, teachers, or anyone else has
an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a
school building or its immediate environs. . . for
unlimited expressive purposes.” Id. (quoting Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 11718 (1972)).
Instead, the right to freedom of speech depends upon
the character of the property or forum at issue. Perry,
460 US. at 44.

In Perry, the Supreme Court distinguished between
three types of government property and _ the
government’s ability to limit speech on each type of
property. First, the Court discussed the traditional
public forum. Id. at 45. The traditional public forum is
comprised of streets and parks which “have

46a

immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id.
(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). For
the government to enforce a content-based exclusion in
the traditional public forum, the regulation must serve
a compelling state interest and must be narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest. Id. at 45.

The second type of public property “consists of
public property which the state has opened for use by
the public as a place for expressive activity.” Id.
Examples of this type of forum include university
meeting facilities, school board meetings, and
municipal theaters. Id. Although reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions are permitted, any

content-based prohibition can only be effectuated when
there is a compelling state interest. Id: at 46.

The third type of government property is the non-
public forum. Id.’ In addition to time, place, and
manner regulations, the state may place a content-
based prohibition “as long as the regulation on speech
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression

‘The courts have recently defined a fourth category of government
property called the limited public forum. A limited public forum
“is one that the government opens to particular type of
communicative activity, on the basis of subject matter and
speaker identity.” Child Evangelism of N.dJ., Inc. v. Stafford
Township Sch. Dist., 233 F.Supp. 2d. 647, 657 (D.N.J. 2002)
(citing Milford, 533 U.S. at 107). The government’s right to
restrict access to a limited public forum is subject to the same
level of scrutiny as the non-public forum.

47a

merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.” Id.

The Supreme Court held that the school mail
facility in Perry fell under the third category. Id. The
Court noted that the mailboxer are not open to the
general public, and instead, permission to use the
system must be given by the building principal. Id.
The Court concluded that the school district’s policy
restricting access to the mailboxes was reasonable. Id.
The policy preserved the property for its intended
purpose, communication with teachers, while
preventing the mail system “from becoming a
battlefield for inter-union squabbles.” Id. at 52.

In this case, as in Perry, the teacher’s mailboxes fall
under the category of a non-public forum.” Therefore,

the Court must determine whether the District’s policy
regarding the mailboxes is reasonabie in iight of the
purpose served by the forum, Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985),
and is not discriminate based on viewpoint. Good News

Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).

The Administrative Manual for teachers at Tenafly
High School sets forth that the mailboxes are the
property of the Tenafly Board of Education and should
be used for school business. (Thibault Aff., Ex. C).
The Manual further states that “any staff member
wishing to distribute flyer/announcements, etc. (via

* Although Plaintiff claims that the mailboxes are a limited public
forum, limited public forums and non-public forums are subject to
the same level of scrutiny.

48a

the mailboxes) must have prior approval from the
principal or vice-principal.” (Id.).

The Court finds that this policy is reasonable in
light of the purpose of the mailboxes, that is to allow
the administration to communicate with the teachers.
Moreover, the policy is necessary in order to make sure
the teacher’ mailboxes do not become inundated with
flyers and announcements not related to school
business that could interfere with the teachers’ ability
to receive important announcements from the school
administration. Finally, the policy is viewpoint
neutral.

Pursuant to the contract between the Tenafly
Board of Education and the Tenafly Education
Association (the “union”), the union has “the right to

make reasonable use of the interschool mail system for
distribution of Association material provided that this
does not interfere with school operations. The building
Principal shall be made aware of such use.” (Thibault
Aff., Ex. D). The contract permits the union to
communicate with their members as long as the school
principal is on notice of such use. However, Policastro
is not the union, he is a teacher. In order to use the
mailboxes, he was required to secure permission from
the school principal. Furthermore, Policastro could
have used other means of communication such as U.S.
mail, in person, via telephone, etc. to communicate
with the other teachers. The fact that the teacher
mailboxes may have been the most effective means of
communication does not mean that unrestricted access
is required by the First Amendment. See Cornelius,
473 US. at 809.

49a

Accepting ali of Policastro’s facts as true, he cannot
establish a violation of his First Amendment rights.
The teachers’ mailboxes are non-public forums, and
use can be regulated or restricted as long as it is
viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to the forum.
In this case, the policy requiring teachers to obtain
permission from the school principal before using the
mailboxes is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court
grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 8, 2004

/S/ JOEL A. PISANO, U.S.D.J

50a

APPENDIX E

Questions for the Tenafly Negotiation Team 3/8/02’

Tenafly Schools boasts high levels of success for its
student populations, as indicated by all statistical
review of State and National testing results as well as
other educational markers. We, the staff of the Tenafly
Schools, have much to do with this success.

The efforts of the negotiations team are much

appreciated. Still, we feel the following questions must
be addressed:

1. Why haven’t staff members been given salary
guides of other districts as a basis of comparison? We
feel this is crucial, given the steady decline in our
salaries over the past three contracts. Do we not
deserve parity with neighboring and/or comparable
districts?

2. Why have there been virtually no informational
meetings or other feedback (written correspondence)
pertaining to the status of negotiations?

3. Why are we being given only one (1) day to
review the proposed salary guide before ratifying the
contract? At a meeting with TEA negotiation members

' The memo, dated 3/8/02, was placed in the teacher mailboxes on
3/13/02.

5la

in February, a teacher asked for at least two (2) weeks
to review the proposed guide. There were no objections
to this from anyone in attendance, yet we get one day
to study our possible salaries. Why?

4. Why were no other contractual issues except
salary brought to the negotiations table? Building
representatives asked members for their contractual
concerns and suggestions. These concerns seem to
have been ignored. Why?

5. What was the negotiating team’s original
proposal to the Board?

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrew Policastro and 12 other
Tenafly High School teachers.

APPENDIX F

TENAFLY HIGH SCHOOL
TENAFLY, NEW JERSEY

MEMORANDUM

DATE: March 25, 2002
TO: Mr. Howard Glaser, TEA
FROM: Dr. Dora P. Kontogiannis

As per our conversation on March 14, 2002, we
discussed two issues that addressed the teachers’
mailroom. It was brought to my attention on
Wednesday, March 13 that a flyer was placed in the
teachers’ mailboxes without administrative
permission.

The administration removed the flyers from the
teachers’ mailboxes. Within ten minutes, I was, once
again, informed that the flyers were placed in the
teachers’ mailboxes. At that time a decision was made
to close and lock the mailroom to prevent further
disruption in the building.

Please be reminded, in the future, anyone wishing
to place information in teachers’ mailboxes must first
obtain administrative permission.

DPK:aq

APPENDIX G

From: Art Thibault [xxxx@xxxx]?

Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 9:58 AM
To: ‘Andrew Policastro’

Subject: RE: Local Rule 8.1

Mr. Policastro,

I acknowledge receipt of your statement of damages
and will accept same as compliance with Local Rule
8.1.

Arthur R. Thibault Jr., Esq.
APRUZZESE, McDERMOTT,
MASTRO & MURFHY, F.C.

25 Independence Blvd.

P.O. Box 112

Liberty Corner, New Jersey 07938
(xxx) XXX-XXKX

(xxx) xxx-xxxx (fax)

XXxXx@xxxx

From: Andrew Policastro
{mailto:apolicastro@optonline.net]
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 4:11 PM

'T intentionally blocked Mr. Thibault’s email address and phone
number for his privacy.

54a

To: xxxx@xxxx
Ce: apolicastro@optonline.net
Subject: Local Rule 8.1

Mr. Thibault,
‘Would your please reply back to this email if accepting
that I have comphed with your “Demand for Statement
of Damages”.

Besides all demands asked for in my original
complaint, demands 11-15, I ask for $10,000,000 (Ten
million dollars) as the amount of damages claimed in
this action.

Andrew Policastro

APPENDIX H

Excerpt of June 30, 2005 Hearing
before Judge Pisano
Asking for Ten Million Dollars in Damages

* * *

THE COURT: I understand all of that. You’ll have
a chance to raise all of that.

Is there any claim for damages here? Are you
making any claim for monetary damages? What is the
relief you seek?

MR. POLICASTRO: In the compiaint i have none.

Tenafly responded with, I forget what the letter
said, and I asked for ten million back for my --

THE COURT: You asked for what?

MR. POLICASTRO: Ten million.

THE COURT: $10 million?

MR. POLICASTRO: I asked for that so the lawsuit
wouldn’t stop.’

‘J did not know how to ask for one dollar in nominal damages. I
thought that if I asked for $1 and Tenafly sent me a check for $1

56a

THE COURT: Is that in the complaint?

MR. POLICASTRO: No. I’m asking for nothing in

the complaint.
THE COURT: All you want is injunctive relief?

MR. POLICASTRO: That’s correct.

* ok OK

the lawsuit would be over. That is why I asked for Ten million.
The excerpt is from pages 11-12 of the transcript.

APPENDIX I

From: Larry Tribe [xxxx@xxxx]’

Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 1:37 PM

To: apolicastro@optonline.net

Ce: ‘Amy Porter’; Kathy McGillicuddy’

Subject: Policastro v. Principal of Tenafly High
School and Tenafly Board of Education

Attachments: JANCASE.pdf; POLICASTRO TRIAL

BRIEF. pdf

Mr. Andrew Policastro
Tenafly High School

Dear Mr. Policastro:

I have read the Third Circuit opinion reversing the
district court’s decision to dismiss your complaint;
holding that you had indeed stated a cause of action
for a violation of your First Amendment rights under
the Tinker standard; essentially accepting the analysis
put forward quite ably in your trial brief, which I have
also read; and accordingly remanding the case for trial
under the appropriate constitutional standard.

Given the interlocutory posture of the proceedings,
there is clearly no plausible basis for the defendants to
seek further judicial review at this point, either in the

] intentionally blocked Prof. Tribe’s email address, address and
phone number for his privacy.

58a

Third Circuit en banc or in the U.S. Supreme Court,
much as they might wish to avoid a trial altogether.
And there is of course no reason you could possibly
want to complain of your own victory in the Third
Circuit. So you must be sceking not appellate
assistance, which is the only kind of assistance I ever
provide (and then usually only in the U.S. Supreme
Court), but assistance in conducting the trial against
the school principal and the board of education, which
is completely beyond the reach of my practice.

With best wishes,
Laurence Tribe

Laurence H. Tribe

Carl M. Loeb University Professor
Harvard University

XXXX |

Cambridge, Massachusetts xxxxx
Office: xxx-xxx-Xxxx

APPENDIX J

From: Eugene Gressman {xxxx@xxxx]!

Sent: Friday, September 09, 2605 12:28 PM
To: apolicastro@optonline.net

Subject: Teacher Tinker case

I am shocked to think that neither the ACLU nor the
techers union would offer you any help in your case.
And I must say you did a bang-up job in writing your
trial court brief. Are you sure you are not a lawyer?

Anyway, since you are facing a trial on the merits, I
find two critical factors that should be added to your
case.

1. Acopy of the memo, signed by 13 teachers, that
was placed in the teacher mailboxes and then reraoved
by the principal.

2. Some description, either through your testimony
or by some written paper, telling us what inspired your
memo. Was there some scheduled meeting of the
authorities to consider or ratify a new contract for the
teachers, including whatever inspired your memo?
Had there been other papers in the mailboxes telling
the teachers about some upcoming meeting of the
authorities and inviting any teacher comments? Was

' | intentionally blocked Prof. Gressman’s email address for his
privacy.

60a

this a meeting of the school board in which the
interests of the teachers would be expressed by the
teacher’s union? Were increased salaries an item to be
discussed at this meeting? Did the principal say that
he would represent all the interests of the teachers,
and did he invite any teacher comments about the
prospective meeting? You say that the meeting was
called to “ratify” the new contract, but had the
teachers been heard from in the earlier stages of
developing the contract? :

In short, build a record as to what this meeting was
about and whether you teachers were expected to, or
forbidden to, express any views. Or were you bound or
limited by what the teachers union proposed to say at
this meeting about ratification? What was it that the
principal feared might happen if your memo went

forward through the mailboxes to the teachers only?
Was this meeting open to the public, including
newspaper reporters? Finally, do you know why the
union and the ACLU refused to represent you in this
legal proceeding?

In short, I think it critical to your case that you
explain or submit a copy of the excluded memo. Good

luck.

Prof. Emeritus Eugene Gressman

APPENDIX K

From: Policastro, Andrew

Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 11:08 AM

To: Sherman, Morton; Mackay Staff; Maugham Staff;
Smith Staff; Stillman Staff; Middle School Staff; High
School Staff; Central Office Staff

Ce: ‘Don Kaplan’; ‘Janice Jacobs’; ‘Jon Teall’; ‘Julie
Segal’; ‘Mark Aronson’; ‘Phyllis Kesslen’; ‘Richard
Press’; ‘Rick Fooshee’; ‘Virginia Pirie’

Subject: RE: student management system

Dr. Sherman,

You email states, “So, how do we move ahead? We are
now involved with a management system that is
making many folks unhappy as it is perceived to not
meet our needs, is cumbersome, and some have said a
step back for us.”

I suggest that we move ahead by asking an outside
group or the Bergen County Commissioner of
Education to investigate the Cimple fiasco.

You wrote briefly about the 1999 appeal to the NY
Commissioner of Education (Decision No. 14, 274 —
December 21, 1999) and that the appeal was denied.

The following powerful quotes from the appeal, which
I am sure you read before Tenafly approved their
Cimple contract, reinforce the need for an outside
inquiry-

62a

“Although I am constrained to dismiss the Cimple
contract claim as untimely, I am deeply disturbed that
a contract in excess of one-half million dollars was
signed without review by the district’s attorney and
apparently without formal authorization by the board,
that the district contracted to pay a pre-performance
installment of $195,000, approximately 35% of the
entire contract, with no justification for such advance
payment provided in the record, and that such fiscal
practices were justified by the board on the basis of a
purported need to put these services in place as soon
as possible.

Although respondents assert that Dr. Sherman was
authorized to “sign” the contract on the board’s behalf,
respondents provide no evidence of such authority or
the means by which such authority was delegated to
Dr. Sherman.

Respondents also provide no proof that the board
actually performed its duty to evaluate the three
proposals and determined that the Cimple proposal
would be in the taxpayers’ best interests, as required
by General Municipal Law §104-b, prior to execution
of the contract. Respondents similarly provide no
evidence that the board or superintendent conducted
sufficient inquiry to assure that Cimple was capable of
performing the contract (Appeal of Brau Bus
Corporation, 22 Ed Dept Rep 76, Decision No. 10,886).”

The appeal also states, “Cimple breached its
obligations under the contract, and on February 11,
1998 the district terminated the contract and
demanded the return of $97,500, plus an additional
$48,750 for inadequate performance. The record

63a

indicates that Cimple had not repaid any of the money,
and the district was contemplating suit against
Cimple, as of the date of respondents’ answer.”

Frank Romano, our former Technology Director is now
Assistant Superintendent in Milburn. You have now
appointed Dr. Kontogiannis chair of the of the Cimple
Task force. Mr. Romano and Dr. Kontogiannis are
personal friends, she was also on his dissertation
committee. Out of the over 600 school districts in NJ,
Dr. Kontogiannis’ daughter just got her first teaching
position in Milburn.

I have no doubt that Dr. Kontogiannis can lead the
task force to investigate Cimple, but this appointment
does not pass the “smell test”.

We need an outside group to investigate.

Andrew Policastro

From: Sherman, Morton
Sent: Friday, September 28, 2007 12:58 PM

To: Mackay Staff; Maugham Staff; Smith Staff;
Stillman Staff; Middle School Staff; High School Staff;
Central Office Staff

Ce: Don Kaplan; Janice Jacobs; Jon Teall; Julie Segal;
Mark Aronson; Phyllis Kesslen; Richard Press; Rick
Fooshee; Virginia Pirie

Subject: student management system

To: All Tenafly Staff
From: Mort Sherman
Re: New Student Management System

64a

Date: September 28, 2007

Most of you know that we implemented a new student
management system, Cimple, during the summer.

All of us had hoped that the transition to the new
system would be easy, seamless, and quick. This has
not been the case so far.

The history of how we came to this point is clear. The
question of what we do now is not so easily answered.

During the 2006-07 school year, we were advised that
SASI, our student management system in place at that
time, was not going to be continued to be supported or
upgraded at some point down the line. In a proactive
and positive manner, our previous Asst. to the Supt for

Curriculum, Instruction, Assessment, and Technology
began looking at systems which would support our
scheduling, attendance, discipline, progress and report
cards, transcripts, and other student management
needs, as well as include a data management system
that could be tied into the student records. Our
previous system did not have that connection.

The intent was a very good one. We wanted to be
proactive as we offered connected, easy to use, and
professional systems to all of our staff. Our goals
continue as they were last winter and spring.

The process in reviewing available management
systems included administrators and_ staff
members. As early as last February and March, our
Asst. to the Supt for Curriculum, I, A,.and Technology
met with administrators and offered opportunities

65a

through them to staff to review what was being
proposed as a new student management system.
Recent concerns have indicated that the process should
have been more inclusive and should have looked
deeper at the systems.

However, now that we have had some experience with
Cimple, substantive questions have been raised which
must be addressed.

One of the questions is whether we can go back to the
old system. As we do research on this, we find that
SASI is still in the same place it was last year... being
phased out.

Another question is whether we must keep the present
system long term or can we begin a search for a new
student management system. The Cimple contract we
L. a 4nd 4hn pamnmanmese eves!) wmmant tha
slave Bua AALLOCO tliat vAic v-vVilipaily Wiss 21ACCU Usac
unique needs of our district or will give a 100% refund
at the end of the year.

A third question which has recently come up is about
my prior involvement with Cimple. There was an
appeal to the NY Commissioner’s office in 1999 (appeal
denied) two years after I left S. Orangetown, NY, as
superintendent. The claim was that the
business procedures did not follow standard practices |
in creating a contract with Cimple. The conclusion
was that there was little or no basis for the claims,
although the business manager of that district did not
stay. Because the system was implemented as I was
leaving, I had no direct experience with the
performance of Cimple in that district. When asked
last year about the N.Y.S. Ccommissioner’s appeal, my

66a

answer was then as it would be now: let’s find the best
system for our district. I thought about not allowing
consideration of Cimple; however, the review of the
product was very positive.

So, how do we move ahead? We are now involved with
a management system that is making many folks
unhappy as it is perceived to not meet our needs, is
cumbersome, and some have said a step back for us.
There are also some positives. One suggestion which
has been made is that we explore other systems
options... another suggestion is to work the best we can
through this year and then make a decision about the
present system under the contract which guarantees
success and satisfaction. If we think of this in a way
similar to the Lemon Laws protecting owners of cars,
we know that certain procedures and timetables have
to be followed. However, as we are follewing those
procedures and timetables, we are also looking at
other options and talking to other districts.

Perhaps the best course for us right now is to create
a task force of teachers, secretaries, and
administrators who will work with Michael Ulshoefer
(our new ‘Technology Coordinator) and Wayne
Demikoff (Business Administrator) to combine
both suggestions from above: look at other systems as
we continue through this year to make a final
determination under the existing contract.

The task force will be chaired by Dr. Dora
Kontogiannis, our high school principal. It is most
important that those who actually use the systems be
part of these reviews and final recommendations. I
would like to convene this task force within the next

67a

several weeks. The task force will meet regularly
throughout the year (the schedule can be determined
by the members) until recommendations are made. If
you are interested in being part of this task force,
please let Dora, Michael, or me know.

Thank you for your patience and professionalism.

Mort Sherman

APPENDIX L

Mr. Andrew Policastro October 4, 2007
59 Day Avenue
Tenafly, NJ 07670

Dear Mr. Policastro:

Effective immediately, Iam suspending your use of the
Tenafly network privileges in accordance with Policy
6142.10 “Acceptable Use of Educational Technology.”

Your broadcast use of our email system on Monday,
October 1, 2007, violated at least two provisions of this
policy:

-“...computer networked services are provided
exclusively for ...those purposes that relate to job
performances.”

-“The broadcasting of any message without first
seeking authorization from a building or district
administrator is not permitted.”

The suspension of your privileges or any use of the
Tenafly email system or any other parts of our
network is until further notice. Student record keeping
and other communication needs will be addressed by
you in cooperation with your immediate supervisor
and other members of the high school administration.

69a

Based on your violation of board policies, I am officially
reprimanding you for your conduct. Further violation
of board policies may lead to additional disciplinary
action.

Sincerely,
/s/

Morton Sherman, Ed.D.
Superintendent of Schools

C: Members, Board of Education
Dr. Dora Kontogiannis
Personnel File

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1394%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
