# Opposition Brief — Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan (No. 08-752)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2008

## Text

Supreme Count, U.S.
FILED
a FEB 1 1 2009
ae OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No. 08-752
In The

Supreme Court of the United States
BRENNAN’S, INC.,
Petitioner,

Ws

BERT CLARK BRENNAN
and BLAKE W. BRENNAN,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STEPHEN J. CARMODY
Counsel of Record
BRUNINI GRANTHAM GROWER & HEWES, PLLC
The Pinnacle Building, Suite 100
190 East Capitol Street
Post Office Drawer 119
Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Telephone: 601-948-3101
Facsimile: 601-960-6902

Attorneys for Respondents,
Bert Clark Brennan and
Blake W. Brennan

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner has presented compelling
reasons to grant the Petition, where the Fifth
Circuit’s Opinion affirming the District Court’s
rigorous analysis of the evidence presented at a
trademark infringement preliminary injunction
hearing does not conflict with a decision of this Court
or a Court of Appeals, and where Petitioner does not
claim the Fifth Circuit’s ruling implicates an
important federal question that has not been settled
by this Court.

a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .........sceeeees
Rt SIE CAPT EEREED 63 sp ciwsieceetenswe
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .. 0... ses cceees

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..............
I. The Underlying Dispute ............
II. The 1979 Settlement Agreement .....
lil. The 1998 Agreement ...............

IV. Trademark Infringement Claims .....

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ..

I. The District Court’s Ruling and Fifth
Circuit’s Affirmation Has Been

Mischaracterized by the Petitioner. ...

II. The Split in Circuit Court Decisions is

POVIIERR. 6g os ee eee
A. Consent Agreements — Defined ...
B. Consent Agreements — Usage ....

C. The Federal Circuit Considers
Consent Agreements in its
Likelihood of Confusion

Determummtion. .. i... ini elie eo.

D. Other Circuit Courts, District
Courts and Trademark Board
Decisions Allow Consent
Agreements to Be Considered
in the Determination of the

Likelihood of Confusion Factors. . .
®. Gummy ......c5+seese eee

ill

III. Contrary to the Company’s Baseless
Statement in its Petition, the Fifth
Circuit’s Affirmation of the District
Court’s Decision Does Not Result
in a Departure from Established
a os So en eb ok cee 32

IV. Even If a Circuit Court Conflict
Exists, this Case Is a Poor Vehicle for
PU Ls. xo oe oa neo ee OS 33

ONE hoo oF ba ee oa eee ee 35

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Amalgamated Bank v. Amalgamated Trust
& Sav. Bank, 842 F.2d 1270
SO A ogg PG bv 6 6 wo 23

American Chicle Co. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 112 F. Supp.
848 (D.N.Y. 1953), aff,
210 F.2d 680, 101 U.S.P.Q.
Dee ee es nk ek a ee Oe a eek 29

American Fid. & Liberty Ins. Co.
v. American Fid. Group,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138683,
44-45 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2000) ........... 29

Andersen Corp. v. Therm-O-Shield
International, Inc., 1985 WL 72080
(Trademark Tr. & Appeal Bd.) ........... 30

Bongrain Intl (Am.) Corp.
v. Delice de France, Inc.,
811 F.2d 1479, 1484-85
PE on CG ks dew she ew 27

Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan,
512 F. Supp. 2d 568-69 (S.D. Miss. 2006),
aff'd, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16890
a ee ee gee wise 16-18, 21

~

Vv

California Fruit Growers Exchange
v. Sunkist Baking Co.,
pee ee eee Ger. 2ST) ww. we 28

CBS, Inc. v. Morrow,
708 F.2d 1579, 218 U.S.P.Q. 198
a 24-26, 34

Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin,
aoe ¥.20 Go, oe (2a Cir. 1953) ........... 28

DC Comics v. Pan American Grain
Mfg. Co., Inc., 2005 WL 2093233
(Trademark Tr. & Appeal Bd.) .......... 30

Freedom Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
aoa F.30 4Ga (Grd Cir. 2005) ............. 28

In Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 1363 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ...... 22

In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.,
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........ 24, 25

In re N.A.D., Inc.,
754 F.2d 996 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ......... 26, 27

In re Pacific Life Insur. Co.,
2004 WI. 1090645 (Trademark Tr.
ec ee ew 30

In re Superior Outdoor Display, Inc.,
el ED hs, 24

vl

In re The Biltmore Company
A/K/A Biltmore Estate,
2002 WL 471795
(Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.) ............: 30

Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, Inc.,
955 F. Supp. 991,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ....... 29

McNeil Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home
Products Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804
ee 31

Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Ryu,
960 F.2d 486, 489 (5 Cir. 1992) .......... 32

Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Parry Corp.,
441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
alfa, G80 F.24 44 (2d Cir. 1978) .......... 29

Patsy’s Italian Restaurant, Inc.

v. Banas, 508 F. Supp. 2d 194
EE ol

Peyrat v. L. N. Renault & Sons, Inc.,
247 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ........ 29

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry
Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414,
Pee a LE Ae) eer 30

vii

Swedish Beer Export Co. Aktiebolag
v. Canada Dry Corp., 469 F.2d 1096
ee BTU 6 is a ok ee ona bees 23, 24

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co.,
578 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 746 F.2d 112,
923 U.S.P-@: 1000 (2d Cir. 198@ ......... 29

University of Southern California v. University
of South Carolina, 2008 WL 3333839
(Trademark Tr. & Appeal Bd.) ........... 30

OTHER AUTHORITIES
3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
Trademarks & Unfair
Competition § 18:81 (4th ed. 2008) ........ 22

Practitioner’s Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure § 1207.01(d)(viii) (4" ed. 2008) .. 20

Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of
Confusion in Trademark Law

BOT gc co wc vv anaes 21
Supreme Court Practice (9° ed. 2007) 504 .... 34
RULES
EE og oe ew A Wak NeW wl 31

I I ro ge lire he 18

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Brennan’s, Inc. (the “Company”) has

asserted that there is a split among circuit courts of
appeal and that the “split” is pertinent to the
resolution of this case. Furthermore, the Company
insists that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling affirming the
District Court’s detailed critique of the evidence
presented at the hearing on the Company’s
application for a _ preliminary injunction was
erroneous. However, the “split” cited by the
Company is mythical. In fact, the circuit courts and
district courts have uniformly considered “consent”
agreements in the multi-factor likelihood of
confusion trademark infringement ansiysis. The
courts have consistently considered all the facts and
circumstances involved in the formation, execution
and implementation of these agreements and given
them whatever weight the court deems fit for each
situation. Accordingly, the “split” is fictional and the
Petition should be denied. Moreover, the Company
has exaggerated the significance of the consent
agreements. The District Court did not use the
agreements to support its decision other than in
discussing the “intent to confuse” factor of the
hkelihood of confusion analysis.

The Company has mischaracterized the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling and the District Court’s reliance
upon the agreements at issue in this case. Even if
one assumes for argument’s sake that the two
“consent” agreements introduced into evidence were
licenses, at least one of the agreements contained no
control provisions and therefore it is a “naked”

license. Contrary to the Company’s Petition, the
Circuit Courts have addresses this issue and have
uniformly held that “naked” licenses may result in
trademark owners being estopped from asserting
infringement claims.

Consequently, for these aforementioned reasons
the Company’s Petition should be denied.

I. The Underlying Dispute

The Company is owned equally by Owen (“Pip”)
Brennan, Jr., Theodore (“Ted”) M. Brennan, and
James (“Jimmy”) C. Brennan. In April of 1995,
Respondents Clark Brennan and Blake Brennan
(“Clark and Blake”) were hired as co-general
managers of the restaurant owned by the Company.
Pip Brennan is the father of Clark and Blake
Brennan. Ted and Jimmy Brennan are the brothers
of Pip Brennan and are Clark and Blake’s uncles.
The Company is the owner of the Brennan’s
restaurant. Ted and Jimmy Brennan ousted their
brother, Pip, from the company management. The
three owners/brothers are currently embroiled in two
lawsuits in state and federal courts in New Orleans,
Louisiana over control of the Company. This
trademark infringement lawsuit is a part of Ted and
Jimmy Brennan’s effort to thwart their brother’s
family from operating restaurants in New Orleans
and elsewhere.

No less than six Brennan family restaurants
using the word “Brennan” or “B” are operating in
New Orleans blocks away from the Company’s

pany
“Brennan’s” restaurant:

1. Dickie Brennan’s Palace Café;

2. Dickie Brennan’s Bourbon House;
3. Dickie Brennan’s Steakhouse;

4. Ralph Brennan’s Red Fish Grill;
5. Ralph Brennan’s Bacco: and

6. Mr. B's.

Although this is the first family dispute between
the members of the Company, intra-familial disputes
between other Brennan family factions have been
quite common over the years.

II. The 1979 Settlement Agreement

The first documented family feud arose during
the 1970's between competing Brennan family
restauranteurs. After much negotiation, the feuding
factions entered into a use agreement for the
“Brennan’s” mark so as to avoid any future confusion
between those using the Brennan name (the “1979
Agreement”). In the 1979 Agreement, the Brennan
family was divided into two groups: the Brennan’s,
Inc. (the Company) group, and the Brennan’s, Ltd.
(Commander's Palace) group. The Brennan’s, Ltd.
group included the aunts and uncles of Pip, Ted and
Jimmy. In addition to other restaurants, the
Brennan’s, Ltd. group operated Commanders Palace,
and Mr. B’s restaurants in New Orleans. The 1979
Agreement gave exclusive use of the “Brennan’s”
name to each respective group in certain geographic
areas. Under the terms of the 1979 Agreement,
Brennan’s, Inc. could continue to operate “Brennan’s
of New Orleans,” and Brennan’s, Ltd. was allowed to
continue operation of identical replications of the
New Orleans’ Brennan’s and use the name
“Brennan’s of Houston,” and “Brennan’s of Atlanta.”

Although the Company attempts to label the 1979
Agreement as a “licensing” agreement, a cursory
review of its title and its contents belies the
Company’s moniker. The 1979 agreement title is
“settlement agreement,” not “licensing agreement,”

and the body of the agreement contains detailed
provisions relating to the use of the marks. Clearly,
these provisions were drafted and negotiated to
eliminate customer confusion:

3. EXPANSION

kKkK*

b. Both parties agree that except for the four

existing BRENNAN’S Restaurants... no
Restaurant Operation shall be opened or
operated by either party anywhere under
the namc Brennan or Brennan’s, or in
conjunction with the name Brennan or
Brennan’s .... Both parties further agree
that they... may each open, operate or
sell additional Restaurant Operations
under the surname Brennan provided such
party or purchaser from such party agrees
to and observes all of the following
conditions in regard to each _ such
additional Restaurant Operation.

1) One or more first names are always
used in conjunction with the surname
Brennan as the name of the Restaurant
Operation, for example, “Pip, Jimmy
and Ted Brennan’s Restaurant’, “Dick
Brennan's”, “Ella Brennan’s
Restaurant,” ctc.

2) The first name or names are always of
at least equal prominence with the
surname Brennan in regard to size,
color, appearance and_e similar

characteristics in any and all uses of
the surname Brennan so that the name
Brennan does not appear, to be and is
not emphasized nor more prominent
that the first name or names;

3) No name appears in script form;
4) None of the three marks are used;

5) No connection or association is made
between any such “first name/surname”
Restaurant Operation and any of the
four existing Brennan’s Restaurants in
New Orleans, Atlanta, Dallas, and
Houston, nor the cities in which these
restaurants are located, except that
LTD may indicate a connection or
association with Commander’s Palace
Restaurant or Mr. B’s Bistro (The
Quarter Bistreau) in New Orleans.

Record Excerpt at page 71-73, Settlement Agreement
at 3-5.

In addition, the feuding family members attempt
to eliminate confusion about the use of the surname
“Brennan,” and the potential conflicts that might
arise when using the family name on trademarks
and servicemarks:

6. AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT

b. Nothing herein shall prohibit, restrict or
prevent either party to this Agreement
from discreetly using, in any advertising or
menus, the name Brennan or Brennan’s

together with a first name or names to
indicate proprietorship of any non
“Brennan’s Restaurant” owned by that
party, provided that the first name or
names are always placed first and are
always of at least equal prominence with
the surname in regard to size, color,
appearance and similar characteristics,
and further provided that LTD shall not be
required to comply with this provision
insofar as Commander’s Palace Restaurant
is concerned as to any advertising
previously contracted for and, until such
time as new menus are printed for said
restaurant, as to the menus for
Commander’s Palace Restaurant.

Record Excerpt at page 79-80, Settlement Agreement
at 11-12.

Despite the self-serving label given to the 1979
Agreement by the Company in its Petition, the 1979
Agreement, by its very nature and operation, is a
“consent to use” agreement. The parties to the 1979
Agreement desired to avoid confusion in the
marketplace about the operation of family
restaurants, and they agreed as to how the mark was
to be used, what format it would take, and even how
it was to be presented in advertising.

Ill. The 1998 Agreement

In its introductory provisions, the 1998
Agreement confirms its purpose and intent:

8

WHEREAS, Richard Brennan Jr. has
created and currently operates
restaurants in or near the city of New
Orleans, under the name and service
mark DICKIE BRENNAN’S PALACE
CAFE and DICKIE BRENNAN’S
STEAKHOUSE; and

WHEREAS, Richard Brennan Jr.
desires to promote both the
aforementioned restaurants using his
name “Dickie Brennan;” and

WHEREAS, the parties’ are
mutually desirous of avoiding any
confusion of the trade or public as
to the origin, affiliation or
sponsorship of any restaurants
operated by them;

Consent-to-Use Agreement 1, Record Excerpt 106
(emphasis added).

The terms of the 1998 Agreement between yet
another family member operating a restaurant
bearing the Brennan surname are almost identical to
the “use” terms of the 1979 Agreement:

NOW THEREFORE, for good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is’ expressly

acknowledged, the parties hereby
AGREE as follows:

Brennan’s, Inc., shall not object to the
operation by Richard Brennan Jr. of
restaurants under the name and marks

9

DICKIE BRENNAN’S PALACE CAFE
and DICKIE BRENNAN’S
STEAKHOUSE, or under other names
which may be opened in the future, so
long as:

1. The use of BRENNAN’S by Richard
Brennan Jr. shall always be
accompanied by the name DICKIE and
the term BRENNAN’S shall not be of
greater size or prominence than the
name DICKIE, and shall be arranged
so as to present a combined name of
DICKIE BRENNAN’S, as proprietor;

2. The use of DICKIE BRENNAN’S
shall be used in conjunction with the
remaining portions of the names and
marks so as to present a unified name
and mark, such as DICKIE
BRENNAN’S PALACE CAFE and
DICKIE BRENNAN’S STEAKHOUSE,
and the name DICKIE BRENNAN’S
shall not be of greater size or
prominence than the remaining portion
or the restaurant name;

3. The names and service marks of
Richard Brennan identified as being
permitted hereunder shall not appear
in script style; and except as shown on
Exhibit “A” attached hereto; and

4. Noconnection is made, promoted or
suggested between any restaurant
operated by Richard Brennan Jr. and

10

any restaurant operated under a name
or mark owned or licensed by
Brennan’s, Inc., including but not
limited to those identified above. By
way of example but not limitation, use
by Richard Brennan Jr. of terminology
such as “original” or “famous” would
imply such a connection.

Consent-to-Use Agreement 1-2, Record Excerpt 06-
07.

The 1998 agreement also included a telling
strikeout provision. The strikeout confirmed that the
parties intended that Richard Brennan, Jr. (“Dickie”)
would be allowed to file a trademark application for
his use of his surname in the name of his
restaurants:

Richard Brennan Jr. does not and shall
not object to any use or registration ofa

name or mark incorporating the name
BRENNAN by Brennan’s, Inc., and

Consent-to-Use Agreement 2, Record Excerpt 107
(emphasis added; strikeout in original).

Accordingly, the language of the consent
agreement is clear — as long as Dickie followed the
strict rules governing potential confusion regarding

11

the use of the “Brennan” surname, he was free not
only to use the mark in identifying restaurant goods
and services, but also to apply for trademark
registration with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The 1998 Agreement
did not include any quality control provisions and did
not provide any geographic limitations, nor did it
limit Dickie to any number of restaurants. Dickie
currently operates three restaurants using the
“Brennan” name within blocks of the Company’s
restaurant in New Orleans.

IV. Trademark Infringement Claims

In addition to the two “consent” agreements, the
Company has allowed others to use the Brennan
name on restaurants. Many years before this
dispute, the Company registered the servicemark
“Owen Brennan’s.” The Company eventually
received a trademark registration for the mark, and
under a “licensing” agreement with another
company, a restaurant in Memphis, Tennessee began
using the “Owen Brennan’s” mark. On March 29,
2005, at the conclusion of a meeting with all of the
shareholders of the Company, an Assignment of
Service Mark Agreement was executed by Pip
Brennan as President of the Company (“March
Assignment”). Under the terms of the March
Assignment, the ownership of the Owen Brennan’s
mark was conveyed to B.3.G., L.L.C. Clark and
Blake are the sole owners of B.3.G., L.L.C.

In June 2005, Ted and Jimmy Brennan met with
Clark and Blake. The uncles, in no uncertain terms,
expressed disapproval with Clark and Blake’s efforts

12

to expand the use of “Owen Brennan’s” service mark.
Ted and Jimmy made it clear to Clark and Blake
that they would have no ownership position in the
company, that they would receive no further raises,
that there was no possibility of further advancement,
and that expansion was no longer an option. The
source of Ted and Jimmy's dissatisfaction related to
Clark and Blake’s suggestion that Ted and Jimmy
consider selling their interest in the restaurant to
Clark and Blake. Clark and Blake left the June 2005
meeting with a clear understanding that, if they
were dissatisfied with their current situation, they
should leave and find other work.

In June of 2005, Clark and Blake began to explore
their options, which included expansion of the “Owen
Brennan’s” mark, and development of Clark and
Blake’s own restaurant business. However, in late
August of 2005, their plans were delayed when
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and the
surrounding Gulf Coast. Clark’s and Blake’s homes
were completely destroyed. Clark and Blake
relocated their families to Jackson, Mississippi.
During the months following Katrina, Clark and
Blake traveled from their temporary homes in the
Jackson, Mississippi area to New Orleans to help
re-open Brennan's Restaurant. At some point during
the months following Katrina, Clark and Blake
decided to open a new restaurant in the Jackson,
Mississippi area, located 187 miles north of New
Orleans, Louisiana. Later, they decided to open a
similar restaurant in Destin, Florida - - over 250
miles from New Orleans.

13

On March 1, 2006, Clark and Blake gave their
written resignations to the Company. Clark and
Blake first selected the mark “Brennan Brothers” as
the name for their restaurant. Clark and Blake filed
an intent-to-use trademark application for this mark.
The USPTO refused registration of the “Brennan
Brothers” mark. The trademark examiner
eventually based the denial upon the fact that the
proposed mark was “primarily a surname.” After
they received a cease and desist letter from the
Company about the use of the “Brennan Brothers”
mark, Clark and Blake decided to change the name
of their future restaurants.

Clark and Blake next considered using the “Owen
Brennan’s” mark, which was the subject of the March
2005 Assignment. However, Clark and Blake
Brennan made a business decision against the use
the “Owen Brennan’s” mark because it was being
used by a business establishment in Memphis,
Tennessee, and also because Ted and Jimmy
Brennan angrily objected to any additional use of the
mark. In yet another attempt to appease their
demanding uncles, Clark and Blake decided to use -
- “Clark and Blake Brennan’s Royal B” - - as the

name for their new restaurants.

Although they were not parties to the 1979 and
1998 Agreements, Clark and Blake Brennan decided
to use a name that would comply with the use
restrictions contained in these agreements. The
“Clark and Blake Brennan’s Royal B” mark was
accepted for registration by the USPTO, but the
application has since been held in abeyance pending
the outcome of this litigation. The mark, along with

14

its shortened version “Royal B,” are the marks which
Clark and Blake intend to use and are using to
operate their restaurant operations. In response to
Clark and Blake’s decision to use these marks, the
Company filed the District Court action and sought
a preliminary injunction based upon claims of
trademark infringement, unfair competition, federal
anti-dilution law, and Mississippi anti-dilution law.

The Company demanded extraordinary injunctive
relief from the District Court for “trademark
infringement,” and requested an order blocking the
use of the mark “Clark and Blake Brennan’s Royal
B” in Jackson, Mississippi, Destin, Florida, and
elsewhere. After an extensive evidentiary hearing on
the application for preliminary injunction, the
District Court denied the requested injunctive relief
because the Company failed to establish the essential
prerequisites needed to issue a_ preliminary
injunction.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
finding that the Company’s trademark infringement
claims will fail because, among other things, it failed
to establish a likelihood of customer confusion. In
addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s ruling that the Company failed to establish
a substantiai threat of immediate and irreparable
harm. In fact, the record is totally void of any
testimony about the threat of irreparable loss if
Clark and Blake arc allowed to operate a restaurant
with the name of “Clark and Blake Brennan’s Royal
B.” Moreover, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s holding that the balancing of harms test
favors Clark and Blake. Clark and Blake provided

15

overwhelming evidence of the harm they would
potentially suffer if the court issued a preliminary
injunction. In contrast, other than sheer conjecture,
the Company introduced no evidence of the harm it
would suffer if the request for an injunction was
denied. Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s finding that the use by Clark and
Blake of their surname in a restaurant name does
not disserve the public interest.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
denial of the application for preliminary injunction
and adopted the lower courts extensive ruling on the
likelihood of confusion factors. In discussing the
‘“antent” factor of multi-factor likelihood of confusion
analysis, the District Court mentioned the 1979 and
1998 Agreements and concluded they were “consent-
to-use” agreements:

The court is not persuaded that defendants
selected the mark “Clark and Blake Brennan’s
Royal B” for the purpose of creating confusion.
These defendants simply wanted to use their
own names on their own restaurants, and
undertook to do so in a way they thought (or
at least hoped) would satisfy plaintiff's
objections to their use of the Brennan name.
In so doing, defendants relied on earlier
agreements between Brennan’s, Inc. and other
members of the Brennan family prescribing
allowable use of the “Brennan’s” mark,
including a 1979 agreement with Owen
Brennan, Sr.’s brothers and sisters and their
heirs, and a 1998 agreement with Dickie
Brennan. The stated purpose of those

16

consent-to-use agreements was to
delineate acceptable uses of the mark
toward the goal of avoiding confusion of
the trade or _ public,” and both
agreements provided that the other
Brennan family members could use the
Brennan name so long as they adhered to
certain defined criteria...

Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan, 512 F. Supp. 2d 568-69
(S.D. Miss. 2006), aff'd, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16890
(5 Cir. 2008) (footnotes omitted). In footnote 13,
the District Court discussed the “consent to use”
defense raised by Clark and Blake, but did not rule
on this defense:

Defendants have argued that plaintiff is
foreclosed from asserting a claim for
infringement because their mark complies
with the requirements of the 1979 and 1998
agreements. In Brennan’s, Inc. [Dickie
Brennan lawsuit], the Fifth Circuit declined to
decide whether a stranger could rely on a
consent-to-use agreement, stating:

We point out that the defendants do not
raise the theory, adopted by some
courts but not by others, that a
stranger to a consent-to-use agreement
can use the agreement against the
mark-holder as an admission that
certain uses do not create confusion,
though other courts reject such a
theory. See 2 McCarthy § 18:81. In
terms of the facts of this case, the

i Oo ee

17

argument would be that the plaintiffs’
consent to let Dickie use certain names
could be turned against the plaintiffs if
they brought an infringement case
against other parties for similar
conduct, on the theory that even
strangers to the consent-to-use
agreement could use the plaintiffs’
contract with Dickie as an admission
that such uses do not _ produce
confusion. Since the defendants have
not raised this particular theory in
their brief in defense of either the
companies or Richard Sr., we
accordingly express no opinion on
whether such a theory is a viable
defense in an infringement suit.
Brennan ’s, Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co.
Inc., 376 F.3d at 369 n. 7.

Brennan ’s, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d at 569, n. 13.

The Fifth Circuit — without discussing the use
agreements — affirmed the lower courts ruling that
the Company had failed to establish a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the District Court and the Fifth Circuit did
not base their decisions upon the consent agreements
at issue in this appeal — except as to deciding the
intent to confuse factor in favor of Clark and Blake.

18

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The decisions below do not conflict with a decision
of this Court or any Court of Appeals, and they do
not implicate a federal question that has not been
decided by this Court. Accordingly, the Company has
not carried its burden of demonstrating “compelling
reasons” for the Petition to be granted. See Sup. Ct.
R. 10.

I. The District Court’s Ruling and Fifth
Circuit’s Affirmation Has Been
Mischaracterized by the Petitioner.

In the Petition, the Company attempts to create
an issue where none exists. In fact, the language
used by the Company in its Petition is telling:

The Fifth Circuit’s affirmation of the District
Court’s ruling seems to establish a
precedent within the Fifth Circuit that the
use of the license agreement and the consent-

to-use agreement by Brennan's Inc. has
weakened its “BRENNANS” trademark.

Petition at 13 (emphasis added). However, the Fifth
Circuit’s affirmation does not even mention the
agreements that the Company attempts to place in
issue on this appeal. The “seems to establish”
language used by the Company confirms that the
issue attempted to be raised is simply a figment of a
very creative and manipulative imagination. In fact,
the consent agreements are only mentioned by
District Court in an innocuous footnote. See
Brennan’s, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d at 569 n. 13.
Furthermore, after concluding that both the 1979

19

and 1998 agreements were “consent-to-use”
agreements, the District Court used the agreements
to sort out one of the factors of confusion — “intent of
the parties to cause confusion.” Contrary to the
claims of thé Company, the District Court did not
hold that tKe existence of the agreements resulted in
an admission against interest by the Company nor
an affirmative defense for Clark and Blake, nor cid
it rule that the Company acquiesced in the use of the
mark by entering in to the agreements with third
parties, nor was there any ruling that the Company
was estopped in asserting its infringement action
because of the existence of these agreement.
Therefore, the issue raised in the Petition is in fact,
not an issue at all. Accordingly, the Court should
deny the Company’s Petition.

I. The Split in Circuit Court Decisions is
Mythical.

In addition to creating a ruling that does not
exist, the Company has also manufactured a “split”
in circuit court decisions. While it is true that some
courts have allowed consent agreements to serve as
complete defense to trademark infringement and
opposition actions, courts on a regular and consistent
basis, review the agreements at issue, and based
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, use
the language contained in the agreements, and the
stated intent of the contracting parties, in the
likelihood of confusion analysis.

20

A. Consent Agreements — Defined

Consent-to-use’ agreements have been defined as
those agreements whereby an owner of a mark
consents to the use of the same or similar mark by
another in a defined format, market, or territory.
When such an agreement exists, the consent is a
factor to be considered in the likelihood of confusion
analysis.

The USPTO Trademark Examiners Manual
defines consent agreements as follows:

The term “consent agreement” generally refers
to an agreement in which a party (e.g., a prior
registrant) consents to the use and/or
registration of a mark by another party (e.g.,
an applicant for registration of the same mark
or a similar mark), or in which each party
consents to the use and/or registration of
the same mark or a similar mark by the
other party.

Praciitioner’s Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure § 1207.01(d)(viii) (4 ed. 2007) (emphasis
addeda).

'Tn this brief in opposition and the decisions cited
herein, the term “consent agreement” and “consent-to-use”
agreement are used interchangeably. Arguably, consent-to-use
agreements define agreements where the parties consent to
ongoing or future use in the marketplace of the same or similar
marks, and consent agreements are broader in nature and in
addition to including consent-to-use agreements and consent-to-
register agreements.

21

Here, without question, the agreements at issue
are consent agreements. In fact, the District Court
held that the “stated purpose of those consent-to-use
agreements was to delineate acceptable uses of the
mark toward a goal of avoiding confusion of the trade
or public... .” Brennan’s, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d at
568. The agreements describe in detail the format
for use of the mark and how and where it is to used,
in an effort to limit, or eliminate, marketplace
confusion over the use of the family surname
Brennan by family members operating restaurants.
Surely, both the 1979 and 1998 rpreomonts operate
as consent agreements.

B. Consent Agreements - Usage

Consent agreements are relevant in the confusion
analysis because they may dilute the strength of the
mark and make confusion unlikely. Scholars have
discussed how much weight can be given to consent
agreements in trademark infringement and
opposition actions:

That a third party uses a mark under a
settlement, consent or other agreement with
the complainant is again not technically a
legal defense which may be relied upon by the
defendant without privity. However, such an
agreement, if admissible, may be evidence in
the nature of an admission against interest by
the complainant that confusion is unlikely in
the case at hand, if the circumstances are
comparable and the usage substantial.

Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion in
Trademark Law § 3:6.3 (2008) (footnotes omitted).

22

A consent to a defined format, market or
territory at least implicitly admits that the
permitted use is noninfringing. In a future
infringement suit against a nonparty to the
consent, such a third party may point to the
consent as an admission by plaintiff that a
defined usage is noninfringing. Defendant
will then argue that its own use is within the
defined field permitted by the consent. The
defense is similar to an estoppel in that
defendant argues that plaintiffis precluded by
the consent agreement from claiming that
defendant's usage is an infringement.

3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks &
Unfair Competition § 18:81 (4th ed. 2008).

The rationale in using consent agreements in
considering whether confusion is likely to exist is
succinctly stated in Jn Application of E.I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1363 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (emphasis added):

[W]hen those most familiar with use in the
marketplace and most interested in
precluding confusion enter agreements
designed to avoid it, the scales of evidence are
clearly tilted. It is at least difficult to
maintain a_ subjective view that
confusion will occur when those directly
concerned say it won't. A mere assumption
that confusion is likely will rarely prevail
against uncontroverted evidence from those on
the firing line that it is not.

23

The Federal Circuit has held that conser '
agreements should be accorded great weight and has
chastised the USPTO for substituting its judgment
for the reasoning of the real parties in interest.
Amalgamated Bank v. Amalgamated Trust & Sav.
Bank, 842 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

At the very least, the courts allow the
introduction of consent-to-use agreements to be
considered as one of the factors in the multi-factor
confusion analysis. As discussed in more detail in
the following section, because consent agreements
come in a wide variety of forms, the weight given to
consent agreements depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.

C. The Federal Circuit Considers
Consent Agreements in its Likelihood
of Confusion Determination.

The Company would have this Court believe that
parties in the Federal Circuit defending trademark
infringement and opposition actions, cannot
introduce consent agreements to defend or support
their claims. However, the predecessor court to the
Federal Circuit, the Court of Cusioms and Patent
Appeals, has held that third parties may introduce
such agreements to support their claims of absence
of confusion.

In Swedish Beer Export Co. Aktiebolag v. Canada
Dry Corp., 469 F.2d 1096., 1097 (C.C.P.A. 1972), the
trademark ow: er of SKOL for beer opposed the
registration of SKOLA for soft drinks. The appellate
court held that when a party to a consent-to-use
agreement seeks to oppose a third party registration

24

of a similar mark, the terms of the consent are
evidence of the lack of likely confusion. Jd. The
appellate court opined “[t]he acquiescence of a
registrant, in a concurrent use of another for a
similar mark on different goods in the belief he will
not be injured is evidence that there is little
likelihood of confusion.” Jd. Thus, it is clear that the
Federal Circuit and its predecessor court consider
the “consent-to-use” agreements as evidence to be
considered along with all of the other facts and
circumstances in deciding whether there is a
hkelihood of confusion. See also In re Superior
Outdoor Display, Inc., 478 F.2d 1388 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(consent agreement which asserted ten years of
concurrent use without confusion and_ such
marketplace divergence between the goods rendered
confusion unlikely).

The Company cites Jn re Majestic Distilling Co.,
Inc., 315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and CBS, Inc. v.
Morrew, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 U.S.P.Q. 198 (Fed. Cir.
1983) as authority for the alleged “split” in circuit
courts. However, each of these Federal Circuit cases
can be distinguished.

In the Majestic case, the Federal Circuit
determined based upon the facts and circumstances
of that particular case there was no presumption or
an admission of lack of confusion. Majestic, 315 F.3d
at 1311. The Majestic court distinguished the
consent agreement at issue in that case from others
used by courts to confirm lack of confusion. The
Majestic court held that because the consent
agreement contained express disclaimers and
limitations on the use of the mark on products, it

295

could not presume no confusion. Jd. at 1318. Here,
there are no disclaimers or other limitations on the
use of the “Brennan’s” mark. In fact, the 1998
agreement allows Dickie Brennan to use the mark
however and where ever he chooses, just so long as
he abides by the format for usage (e.g. no script
writing, first name is included in the use of the mark
and displayed with equal prominence as the surname
Brennan). Accordingly, the Majestic decision has no
application to the facts and circumstances presented
in the Company’s Petition.

Similarly, in the CBS decision, the Federal
Circuit found that because there was no evidence
that the non-litigant to the consent agreement ever
filed or even considered filing for a trademark, the
consent agreement did not carry much weight. CBS,
708 F.2d at 1582. The CBS court put much credence
in the fact that no application for a trademark was
made. The CBS court noted that registration “gives
the registrant a set of nationwide rights and
statutory presumptions which differ in kind from
those based upon a mere consent to concurrent use of
a trade name in an isolated geographic location.” Jd.
Here, the non-litigant party (Dickie Brennan) to the
1998 Consent Agreement, submitted a trademark
application with the USPTO. The terms of the 1998
Agreement contemplated that he was within his
contractual rights to do so. Unlike the restrictions
contained in the CBS consent agreement, there was
no geographic or other limitations placed upon
Dickie’s right to use the mark. Dickie was granted
unlimited rights to create, register and apply for the
agrecd upon version of the “Brennan’s” mark and use

26

it anywhere as long as it met the format contained
within the agreement. The Federal Circuit’s CBS
decision is therefore also easily distinguished.

An accurate summary of how the Federal Circuit
considers consent agreements is found in Jn re
N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The
N.A.D., Inc. court held that a consent given by a
competitor well acquainted with relevant business
practices, when taken together with all of the other
facts was sufficient to overturn the USPTO board
and the Examining Attorney finding of a likelihood
of confusion. ‘The Federal Circuit opined:

Consents come in different forms and under
circumstances in infinite variety. They are,
however, but one factor to be taken into
account with all of the other relevant
circumstances bearing on the likelihood of
confusion referred to in § 2(d). Dynamics
Research Corp. v. Langenau Mfg. Co., 704
F.2d 1575, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (likelihood of confusion depends upon all
the facts, or overall facts, of the case). The
board spent much of its opinion analyzing and
dissecting the marks in arriving at its opinion
that they are “confusingly similar,” and then
finding it “axiomatic that confusion is likely
when confusingly similar marks are used to
identify closely related goods and services.”
We have never found anything axiomatic
about the application of § 2(d) to fact
situations, especially when consent
agreements are involved. All aspects of the

27

fact situation must be appraised and the
situation judged as a whole.

Id. at 999.

Similarly, in Bongrain Int'l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice
de France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1484-85 (Fed. Cir.
1987), the Federal Circuit reversed a finding by the
Board that confusion was likely between similar
marks for nonidentical goods despite the parties’
presentation to the Board of a detailed consent
agreement. The Federal Circuit criticized the Board
for having “essentially synthesized its own case for
likelihood of confusion... .” The Bongrain court
concluded that the Board “appears effectively to have
ignored the views and conduct of the parties merely
because it harbored a different view from the parties
on likelihood of confusion” and that, “on the basis of
the situation as a whole and in light, at least, of all
13 of the DuPont factors’ upon which Bongrain relied
before the board and here,” it was constrained to find
no likelihood of confusion to exist. Jd. at 1485.

Clearly, the Federal Circuit does not ban the use
of consent-to-use agreements in the multi-factor
likelihood of confusion analysis; instead, it can be
fairly said that the Federal Circuit embraces consent
agreements and allows them to be considered along
with all of the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the alleged confusingly similar mark.
Because the Federal Circuit was the only circuit
court cited by the Company in support of its “split” in
jurisdictions, the Petition must fail because the
“split” simply does not exist.

28

D. Other Circuit Courts, District Courts
and Trademark Board Decisions Allow
Consent Agreements to Be Considered
in the Determination of the
Likelihood of Confusion Factors.

The Federal Circuit rulings are consistent with
all of the other circuit courts that have considered
the “consent-to-use” agreement. California Fruit
Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d
971(7th Cir. 1947) (where A and B by contract
consent and agree that there will be no confusion by
use of the same mark on closely related food
products, they cannot claim that there will be
confusion from defendant’s use of the mark on other
food); Freedom Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
432 F.3d 463 (8rd Cir. 2005) (plaintiffs consent
agreement and arguments to the PTO constituted
either judicial estoppel, an admission, waiver or
“simply hoisting [plaintiff] on its own petard”);
Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93, 96 (2d
Cir. 1953) (court found a recitation contained in the
consent agreement that there was no confusion to be
an “admission,” which could be invoked even by a
person not a party to the consent agreement).

In addition to appellate court jurisprudence,
countless district court cases support Clark and
Blake’s position that consent-to-use agreements are
relevant in the likelihood of confusion determination.
Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 81 F. Supp. 114,
120 (D. Pa. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 175 F.2d
795 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847, 94 L.
Ed. 518, 70 S. Ct. 88, 83 U.S.P.Q. 543 (1949)
(Campbell Soup and Carnation consented to each

29

other’s use of a red and white banded label and
joined against Armour which used a red and white
label on canned meats - - the court held that the
plaintiffs engaged in “very dubious reasoning” to
argue that there would be public confusion caused by
Armour’s slightly different red and white label);
American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
112 F. Supp. 848 (D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 680,
101 U.S.P.Q. 133 (2d Cir. 1954) (id.); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 112,
223 U.S.P.Q. 1000 (2d Cir. 1984) (agreements
whether they be considered licenses or consents to
use have a substantial impact in the likelihood of
confusion analysis); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally
Accessories, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
1649 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (consent-to-use agreements with
third parties restrict the scope of the mark and limits
a parties ability to assert infringement); Peyrat v. L.
N. Renault & Sons, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N_Y.
1965) (consent agreement made 14 years previously
settling litigation is a factor to be considered);
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F.
Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 580 F.2d 44
(2d Cir. 1978) (no likelihood of confusion when
plaintiff had previously executed a _ consent
agreement with a third party settling a dispute that
allowed use of the mark for shoes); American Fid. &
Liberty Ins. Co. v. American Fid. Group, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13863, 44-45 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2000)
(“If an owner of a mark consents to the use of the
same or a similar mark by another in a defined
format, market, or territory, that consent is a factor
to be considered as to the eristence of a likelihood of

30

confusion in an infringement claim against a third
party for the same or a similar use, but is not
conclusive”).*

The only district court decision cited in support of
the Company’s Petition is Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414,
423 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In the Playboy decision,
the district court discussed in a footnote that

* In addition the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
has adopted a similar analysis. Jn re The Biltmore Company
A/K/A Biltmore Estate, 2002 WL 471795 (Trademark Tr. &
App. Bd.)(a consent agreement between the registrants and
applicant's mark is significantly different in sound, appearance,
and meaning from the cited registrations and confirms finding
that registrations can co-exist without a likelihood of
confusion); In re Pacific Life Insur. Co., 2004 WL 1090645
(Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.) (Board reversed refusal by
Examining Attorney and discussed the application of consent
agreement in the likelihood of confusion analysis). But see,
Andersen Corp. v. Therm-O-Shield International, Inc., 1985 WL
72080 (Trademark Tr. & Appeal Bd.) (consent agreements for
use of sufficiently dissimilar products cannot be used in
estoppel defense); University of Southern California v.
University of South Carolina, 2008 WL 3333839 (Trademark Tr.
& Appeal Bd.) (use of the trademark “SC” by Spellman College,
although some evidence in Carolina’s favor, is not entitled to
significant probative value in the Board’s likelihood of confusion
determination); DC Comics v. Pan American Grain Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 2005 WL 2093233 (Trademark Tr. & Appeal Bd.) (decision
cited by the Company in Petition)(agreement was not clear as to
the specific marks and goods covered and therefore could not
serve as a presumption or an admission that another’s use of
the mark is not likely to cause confusion).

31

settlement agreements giving consent to use a mark
to another party are not admissible under Rule 408
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Here, there was no
contemporaneous Rule 408 objection and therefore
this authority is casily distinguished.

Other district court decisions not cited by the
Company support its claim, but are likewise easily
distinguished. Patsy's Italian Restaurant, Inc. v.
Banas, 508 F. Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(evidence of the terms of an oral consent agreement
contradictory and enforcement is prohibited by the
statute of frauds); McNeil Laboratories, Inc. v.
American Home Products Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804 (D.
N.J. 1976) (permissions to use suffix “nol” granted to
small manufacturers of no great importance in
considering the “likelihood of confusion” factors.
because of the much more significant market position
of American Home Products in relation to the small
pharmaceutical manufacturer).

E. Summary

Accordingly, there is no “split” in circuit courts.
The “split” is nothing more than a jurisprudential
smokescreen. The Court should therefore deny the
Company’s Petition.

32

III. Contrary to the Company’s Baseless
Statement in its Petition, the Fifth
Circuit’s Affirmation of the District
Court’s Decision Does Not Result ina
Departure from Established
Precedence.

Contrary to the Company’s statement of the law
of trademark licensing, not all licensing strengthens
a trademark. In fact, some hcenses serve to weaken
one’s trademark resulting in the courts refusing to
allow a party to prosecute infringement actions.

While it is true that the courts allow for licensing
coupled with quality control, it also true that
“naked” licensing is considered tantamount to
abandonment of a trademark and can be used
against a party in the threshold question of whether
a party is estopped from asserting rights to a
trademark. Insufficient controls signal involuntary
trademark abandonment and erode a party’s right to
claim trademark infringement or confusion. As
explained in Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960
F.2d 486, 489 (5"" Cir. 1992):

A trademark owner may grant a license and
remain protected provided quality control of
the goods and services sold under the
trademark by the licensee is maintained.
Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932
F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.1991), cert. granted in part,
502 U.S. 1071, 112 S.Ct. 964, 117 L.Ed.2d 130
(1992); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air
Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.1962). Without

33

adequate control of the licensee, a court may
find that the trademark owner has abandoned
the trademark, in which case the owner would
be estopped from asserting rights to the
trademark. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th
Cir.1977); Sheila's Shine Products, Inc. v.
Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114 (5th
Cir.1973).

Here, the Company mischaracterizes the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion by claiming “that the Fifth Circuit
classified all uses of the ‘BRENNAN’S’ mark under
both the 1979 License Agreement and the 1998
Agreement as third party uses instead of uses
sanctioned by Brennan’s Inc. by one of the
agreements.” Petition at 30. To the contrary, the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion makes no mention of licenses.
Furthermore, even if one assumes arguendo that the
Iifth Circuit somehow found the agreements to be
licenses — which Clark and Blake deny — the 1998
agreement is nothing more than a naked license
without the requisite quality controls needed to
ensure quality. Therefore the Company should be
estopped from raising trademark infringement
claims. For these additional reasons, the Court
should deny the Company’s Petition.

TV. Even If a Circuit Court Conflict
Exists, this Case Is a Poor Vehicle for
Resolving It.

Lower courts have produced adequate steps in
analyzing evidence relating to customer confusion in
trademark infringement actions. Even assuming

34

arguendo that a split exists, this case does not
provide the Court with an adequate vehicle to
address the split because the Company loses no
matter how the law is interpreted. The end result is
the same — the Company has not established the
likelihood of customer confusion and thus is not
entitled to a preliminary injunction. In addition, if
there is a split in circuits, it has existed since 1988,
the date of the CBS decision cited by the Company,
and in the last quarter century there has not been
widespread confusion or lack of uniformity in the
federal system with regard trademark infringement
cases and application of the likelihood of confusion
factors. Finally, the facts are so one-sided that this
case would be decided in favor of Clark and Blake no
matter how the alleged conflict is resolved. For this
additional reason the case is a poor vehicle to resolve
a circuit conflict. Gressman, Geller et al., Supreme
Court Practice (9° ed. 2007) 504. If this Court
wishes to address a conflict among circuits’
application of consent agreements, it should wait for
a meaningful case. This case does not present the
compelling reasons required under Supreme Court
Rule 10 for the grant of certiorari. For these
additional reasons, the Court should deny the
Company’s Petition.

35

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny
the Company’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen J. Carmody

Counsel of Record

BRUNINI GRANTHAM GROWER &
HEWES PLLC

The Pinnacle Building, Suite 100
190 East Capitol Street

Post Office Drawer 119

Jackson, Mississippi 39205
Telephone: 601-948-3101
Facsimile: 601-960-6902

Attorneys for Respondents,
Bert Clark Brennan and Blake W.

Brennan

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_0878%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.