# Appendix — Federal Trade Trade Commission Commission Commission Commission v. Rambus, Inc. (No. 08-694)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_0834%3A02

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2008

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED .

LY an 08-694 NOov24 2008
Ss aes ™

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
PETITIONER
Vv.
RAMBUS INCORPORATED

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

APPENDIX VOLUME 2 OF 2

WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL
General Counsel
DAVID C. SHONKA

DAVID P. WALES JR. Principal Deputy General
Acting Director Counsel
KENNETH L. GLAZER JOHN F. DALY*
Senior Deputy Director Deputy General Counsel
MELANIE SABO for Litigation
Assistant Director WILLIAM E. COHEN
RICHARD B. DAGEN Deputy General Counsel
SUZANNE MICHEL for Policy Studies
PATRICK J. ROACH LESLIE RICE MELMAN
Attorneys MARK S. HEGEDUS
Bureau of Competition Attorneys
Federal Trade Commission Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20580
(202) 326-2244

*Counsel of Record

ELLER EEL DEMISE BN EE LEE ELIE BEALE ALD ELE ANC OSI. Fy DD SEDO Sy. BATTERIE
Wicson-EPES PRINTING CO.,INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

387a
APPENDIX G

** PUBLIC VERSION **

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

Docket No. 9302

In the Matter of RAMBUS INC.,
A CORPORATION

INITIAL DECISION

Before: Stephen J. McGuire
Chief Administrative Law Judge
FEDERAL TRAI £ COMMISSION

February 23, 2004

388a
APPEARANCES FOR THE PARTIES

Counsel Supporting Counsel for Respondent:

the Complaint:

M. SEAN ROYALL
GEOFFREY D. OLIVER
PATRICK J. ROACH

GREGORY P. STONE

STEVEN M. PERRY

PETER A. DETRE

SEAN P. GATES

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
355 South Grand Avenue,
35th Floor

Los Angeles. California 90071

A. DOUGLAS MELAMED
KENNETH A. BAMBERGER
WILMER, CUTLER &
PICKERING LLP

2445 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Of Counsel:

MALCOM L. CATT
ROBERT P. DAVIS
MICHAEL A. FRANCHAK
THEODORE A. GEBHARD
ANDREW HEIMERT
CHARLOTTE MANNING
LISA D. ROSENTHAL
SARAH E. SCHROEDER
JEROME A. SWINDELL
JOHN C. WEBER

CARY E. ZUK

SEAN C. CUNNINGHAM

JOHN M. GUARAGNA

GARY, CARY, WARE &
FREIDENRICH LLP

401 “B” Street, Suite 2000
San Diego, California 92101

BUREAU OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20580

389a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION. ........c:sscessseeeseees 416a"
I. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISS:0N

COMPLAINT .....csccsssessscsssseessessssessseessseen 416a
Il. | RESPONDENT’S ANSWER ........:0:000000-+ A18a
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ..........c.cccccccesseee 419a
IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND........... 420a
V. EVIDENCE........... ei PE eee 421a
VI. SUMMARY OF THE DECISION ............ 423a
PART TWO: FINDINGS OF FACT .........c000000-0 4240
I. DRAM AND THE INVENTIONS OF

DRS. FARMWALD AND HOROWITZ.... 424a
A. DRAM Applications in Computer

RN teense onetaerecie ei eeeee 424a
1, TARR EIEITIOE noc ceccvcesescesevscencecesses 424a
2. The Production of DRAMs............. 426a

a. The DRAM Manufacturing
PN esa eases eee 426a

b. The Various Phases of DRAM
SIOVOTOUIORE ons cvsivescicessiescsesnevee 428a

c. Design Modification During
DRAM Production .................... 430a
B. The Memory Bottleneck Problem ...... 430a

C. Farmwald’s and Horowitz’s Inven-
tions Solve the Memory Bottleneck

* Pagination modified from original to reflect pagination in

Petition Appendix

i].

390a

Problem by Addressing Numerous
BIE Sicoctindl tees Ornaments

Bs SETI FRI os eceainsesciiecrcccensntveves
3. The Memory Interface Protocol ....

RAMBUS: COMPANY DEVELOP-
MENT AND PUBLIC PROMOTION OF
RENE IGE eiccsisvnsiineinpbocisasunsisnavereiaees

A. The Founding of Rambus ...................

1. Securing Venture Capital Fund-
UNE cass acecasamnecasiversonian ase weeneeeeseets

2. Early Business Plan for the
Farmwald/Horowitz Inventions ....

The RDRAM Technology.....................
The 1990 Business Plan .....................

. RDRAM Promotion and Licensing
I dics wincus; actncnnnrnerrss caiman

yO

E. Presentation of the Rambus Inven-
tions to the DRAM Industry ...............

1. Rambus Visits to DRAM
Manufacturers and Systems
RIN scocisciicvessmncennneens

2. Preparation and Description of
the Rambus Inventions Through
Various Technical Publications ....

a. The May 1990 Technical De-
cl iaeasouiaee-oetihinacens

b. The November 1990 Technical
ROTO. sic wssnccanocirctemcsnasasses

434a
436a
437a
438a

439a

439a

442a

443a
445a
448a

449a

45la

45la

39la

c. Siemens Responds With a List
of Questions About Rambus
OD kecseinniwicecitecteptinnen

d. The April 1991 Technical De-
IE iia tincucannerocsxcosdcectoens

. The March 1992 Press Events ...........

. Press Coverage: The March 1992 Mi-
croprocessor Report Article ................

. Rambus’s Disclosure of Inventions
Through Public Documents ................

1. The 1992 Marketing Brochure .....

2. Publications Describing the First
Rambus DIAM .............cccccessessceens

Presentations of the Proprietary
RDRAM Technology and Nondisclo-

SUTO PBT OCRIIG oncsceccns cc cnccecevonasersvenes

. The June 1992 Business Plan .............

. Rambus Patent Applications .............
1. The ‘898 Patent Application .........
es oy 8 nn ee
3. The PCT Application ...............:..--.

4. The ‘898 and PCT Applications
Describe Numerous Inventions ....

a. Description of Access Time
I viscscbeiccsceinnsencincaisninsieiien

b. Description of Block Size .........
Description of Bus Clock ..........

d. Description of Variable Delay
Circuitry With a Feedback
I ex saccientieraiooimnneaamenacns

392a

5. Review of the ‘898 or PCT
Application Should Have Raised
Concerns That Rambus Might Be
Able to Obtain Claims Over the
Four Technologies at Issue ...........

Ill. JEDEC IS A COLLABORATIVE STAN-
DARD SETTING BODY FOR THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ...........

A. Early History of JEDEC .....................
B. The Purpose and Function of JEDEC

SOPOT SHEESH EEE EH EEEHEEHEEEHEEHEEEEHEEEOEHEETHHETHH HEB EEEEE

C. The Organization of JEDEC ..............
1. Member Companies .......................

2. The JEDEC Council, Board of Di-
rectors and Officers .......................

3. The JC 42 Committee ...................
D. The Standard Development Process ..
E. Rambus’s Involvement in JEDEC .....

SOOO TO HET EH EHH HOE EHHHHEO TES EHEHH ETE HE EHEEEHEH HEHEHE EE EEEEE

2. Rambus Representatives Learn
About the EIA/JEDEC Patent
BUNT ; sivssasnceshdebiNedegpinntavandivstantinconse

3. Rambus Continued to Stay
Abreast of JEDEC and SyncLink
II inci. ccih ol cnnradavetonectdevanhenes

IV. EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND ADOP-
TION OF JEDEC DRAM STANDARDS..

A. The Initial SDRAM Standard ............

1. Demand for a New Generation of
SE eta etni iy ean tenn ace

A4A77va

480a
480a

48la
48la
48la

483a
484a
486a
488a

488a

489a

393a
2. Proposal of a Fully Synchronous

Es scidcaienaichdeniecscetaniuabanchciee ihe 494a
3. Inclusion of Programmable CAS
Latency and Burst Length ............ 498a
4. Presentations of Additional Tech-
IIE “eb xicomeoca ica Teaeeettie rk dcnedaiantaain 503a |
a. Low Voltage Swing Signaling . 503a
b. Dual Bank Design .................... 504a
C. Avute-Precharg®e ..........00c:00sc00000 505a

d. Source Synchronous Clocking . 505a

e. Externally Supplied Reference
EEN. aniccticatebcudiencteniates ss 506a

5. Adoption of the SDRAM Standard
ienaminnebaniaeian cadences anea tn 506a

6. Subsequent Proposals: Costs,
CAS Latency and SDRAM Lite .... 508a

B. DDR SDRAM—The Next Generation

I eis Sane ee es 5lla
1. Work Within and Outside of
I oircc een a setstddicsunacnanns eoraaco ised. 5lla
2. Future Synchronous SDRAM Fea-
I ie harcg eee ee 51l4a

a. Presentation of Programmable
CAS Latency and_ Burst

NE silanssrocternacasuscccentvaueseoeees 515a
b. Discussion of PLL/DLL............. 516a
c. Consideration of Dual Edge

RNIN do tcccinticneneicceicuncensicheess 520a

3. Subsequent Proposed Features .... 523a

394a

a. Externally Supplied Reference
WHE sicvicsecnerictashcmeanerenennann

b. Source Synchronous Clocking .

4. Adoption of the DDR SDRAM
TE escexsicsvinientinmenenaglian

5. Features Incorporated into the
URINE, siscccctecieuceeninanan

me. Cpe Bie fcicrcsenamecue
b. Dual Edge Clocking .................

c. Programmable CAS Latency
and Burst Length .....................

C. Interoperability: The Effect of
JEDEC’s Specifications versus
Manufacturers’ Specifications ............

RAMLINK AND SYNCLINK, THE
SYNCLINK CONSORTIUM, INTEL
AND DRAM MANUFACTURERS ..........

A. The IEEE RamLink and SyncLink
Were SIP seivecicncienineiorcenen

1. The IEEE Membership Require-
ments and Lack of Patent Disclo-
sure Obligations ...............

tion,” and he emphasized that “[flragmented
competition undermines all DRAM manufac-
turers.” (RX 1188 at 2, 6; Tabrizi, Tr. 9073).

540. Another industry consultant, Victor de
Dios, also gave a presentation at the June 25,
1998 SLDRAM Executive Summit. (Tabrizi,
Tr. 9071-72). De Dios told the assembled exec-
utives that “many of the problems are industry
problems, not company problems. Competition
will not resolve them.” (RX 1204 at 4 (capi-
talization omitted)).

541. During his presentation at the June
1998 “Executive Summit,” McComas suggested
that the DRAM manufacturers share their
RDRAM production plans to determine
whether there would be a demand-supply
imbalance. (Tabrizi, Tr. 9073-74).

542. In an August 1998 email] to Tabrizi,
McComas sent a draft message to DRAM
manufacturers which stated that “[dJuring the
critical production ramp-up phase of Direct
Rambus, DRAM vendors will need a constant
flow of information to help make wise decisions
and to walk the fine line between a pleasant
shortage and a disastrous over-supply.” (RX
1232 at 1).

543. Tabrizi agreed that a _ shortage of
RDRAM would please DRAM manufacturers
because “[p]rices go up.” (Tabrizi, Tr. 9077).

544. The PC OEMs recognized that for
RDRAM to succeed, output of RDRAM had to
increase. They tried to influence the DRAM
manufacturers to increase RDRAM output.
(RX 1287 at 4 (“Intel and major users have

555a

been trying to influence improve [sic] RDRAM
output”)). As Gross of Compag testified, Intel,
Compaq, and other PC OEMs were trying to
influence DRAM manufacturers to increase
output of RDRAM and to align roadmaps with
Intel’s roadmap. These OEMs wanted an
RDRAM production ramp-up so that they
would have sufficient availability and lower
RDRAM prices. (Gross, Tr. 2318-20).

545. It was important to Intel and to the PC
OEMs that the DRAM vendors increase the
volume of RDRAM because the highest volume
parts have a cost advantag~. (RX 1532 at 1).

546. In response, DRAM manufacturers
agreed to manufacture RDRAM in larger vol-
ume. For example, in 1998, Hyundai com-
mitted to produce 30,000 RDRAM units for
Compaq. (RX 1302 at 6). Similarly, Micron
committed to produce 15,000 RDRAM units for
Compaq. (RX 1302 at 6). Neither company,
however, met these commitments. (Gross, Tr.
2327-29). According to Compaq, the DRAM
manufacturers would not “increase their out-
put at the rate at which we needed to support
our systems.” (Gross, Tr. 2345-46).

547. Tabrizi, in 1998, believed that Intel
would not change course unless RDRAM failed
to obtain market penetration. (Tabrizi, Tr.
9082-83). He admitted that one way to cause
RDRAM to fail to obtain market acceptance
was if the OEMs were convinced that even if
volumes went up, pmces would not fall.
(Tabrizi, Tr. 9083). If the OEMs were con-
vinced of this, they would not adopt RDRAM.
(Tabrizi, Tr. 9083).

556a

548. In the fall of 1998, Hyundai gave
RDRAM price projections to its customers that
were significantly higher than those reflected
in its internal pricing documents. (Tabrizi, Tr.
9085-90; RX 1280; RX 1293A). “Intel was
telling everybody [that RDRAM is] only going

to be a 5 percent premium .... I wanted to
make sure my OEM knows it’s going to cost
them more than 5 percent .. .” (Tabrizi, Tr.
9091-92).

549. A report prepared by an Infineon
engineer about an October 1998 meeting
reportedly attended by Tabrizi, along with
engineers from Micron and Infineon, states
that “[alecording to Farhad Tabrizi, Hyundai
has given Rambus ASP projections for end of
next year of 2 to 3 times of todays SDRAM
prices; they also gave to Intel a production
projection of three times their actual plans =>
They encourage every DRAM manufacturer to
do the same in order to let Intel not generate a
Rambus oversupply.” (RX 2192 at 2). Tabrizi
denied at trial that he had made the
statements attributed to him in the Infineon
trip report. (Tabrizi, Tr. 9097).

550. In January 1999, Desi Rhoden sent a
proposal to all of the major DRAM manu-
facturers regarding the transformation of the
former SyncLink Consortium (by then called
“SLDRAM Inc.”) into a marketing-oriented
organization called Advanced Memory Inc.
(“AMI2"). (RX 1373 at 1-3). Rhoden became the
President and Chief Executive Officer of AMI2.
(Rhoden, Tr. 260, 696-97, 1235). Rhoden stated
that the focus of the new organization would be

557a

to “co-ordinate instead of developing new
technology.” (RX 1373 at 3). He also stated
that “[iJn the DRAM industry, we are clearly
stronger together than we are individually.”
(RX 1373 at 1).

551. In a July 1999 email, Mario Martinez of
Hyundai recommended to Tabrizi and others
at Hyundai that “[w]lith Samsung building
significant amounts of product, we need to
work with them to limit the supply in the
market, otherwise we both will be competing
for market share which will result in an
oversupply. We have to meet with Samsung
and discuss our and their production plan,
TAM analysis and targeted market share.” (RX
1487 at 4; Tabrizi, Tr. 9103).

552. Another Hyundai employee responded
in the same email: “[I] have connection in
samsung, if 1 know, what time you are
available, 1 will try setup meeting with key
persion [sic] in samsung in seoul korea. [A]nd i
will try persuade them. [Al]ctually they also
have same idea for rambus business compare
with you.” (RX 1487 at 4; Tabrizi, Tr. 9104).

553. Tabrizi admitted at trial that he had
told Sang Park, then the President and Chief
Operating Officer of Hyundai, that he wanted
to “kill” Rambus and force RDRAM from the
market. (Tabrizi, Tr. 9105-07). Tabrizi sub-
sequently testified that what he meant by
“killing” Rambus was really just “Rambus
suicide, [with] me watching on the sideline.”
(Tabrizi, Tr. 9109). In his June 2000 email to
Park, Tabrizi stated: “lilf Inte] does not invest
in us, I really want to ask you to let me go back

558a

to my old mode of RDRAM killing. I think we
were very close to achieving our goal until you

said we are absolutely committed to this baby.”
(RX.1661 at 2).

554. Gross of Compaq subsequently testified
that because the price of RDRAM did not
decrease and because Compaq did not believe
that it would decrease in the future, Compaq
decided to abandon its plans and to shift to
DDR. (Gross, Tr. 2339).

555. Similarly, Advanced Micro Devices
(“AMD”) shelved plans to adopt RDRAM be-
cause, based on what they were told by DRAM
manufacturers, it was clear that DDR, not
RDRAM would become a commodity product.
(Polzin, Tr. 4013).

556. By May 2000, the situation had not
improved, and Dell was considering moving
into “a low key Rambus mode.” (RX 1636 at 1).
The Dell “message” was “pretty straight-
forward”:

Dell has booked our products over the last
year around the assumption that RDRAM
prices would decline and close on SDRAM.
This would help us create demand... .
The memory vendors have shown no
desire to drop prices, therefore we are
reevaluating our strategies ... so the
message to them is drop prices or we will
continue to decrease our RDRAM forecasts
and we will architect next generation
systems around DDR... we will give the
memory vendors till the end of May to
reply to our request .. . if they still have

559a

no desire to drop prices, we should push
ahead rearchitecting chipsets around

DDR.
(RX 1636 at 1).

557. RDRAM failed to command significant
market share despite the fact that it was
considered by some to be the “best solution.”
(RX 1762 at 5). As Peter MacWilliams of Intel
put it:

[redacted] (MacWilliams, Tr. 5075 (in

camera)).

558. Subsequently, in a November 26, 2001
email, a Micron manager named Kathy Rad-
ford described the efforts of Infineon and
Samsung to raise DDR prices, and stated that
Micron intended to try to raise its prices to all
of the OEM customers. (RX 1922A at 1).
Radford then reported that “[t]he consensus
from all suppliers is that if Micron makes the
move, all of them will do the same and make it

stick.” (RX 1922A at 1).

559. Prices did, in fact, increase in the
months after Radford’s email. On March 1,
2002, [redacted] (RX 1991 at 1 (in camera)).

6. The DRAM Industry’s Approach to
Addressing RDRAM Problems

560. Intel and Rambus executives discussed
ways to fix Rambus’s relationship with the
DRAM manufacturers. (MacWilliams, Tr.
4871-72). Rambus “seemed to be sensitive to
the fact that they needed to fix” problems
with DRAM manufacturers. (MacWilliams, Tr.
4873).

560a

561. In 1998, Intel continued its work to
make RDRAM a market success by investing
in DRAM companies that developed and
supplied RDRAM. (CX 1006 at 1; CX 2522 at
2-3).

562. Intel did not succeed in mending the
relationship between Rambus and the DRAM
manufacturers. (MacWilliams, Tr. 4874).

7. By 1998 the Rambus-Intel Rela-
tionship Was Deteriorating

563. On April 14, 1998, Rambus CEO
Geoffrey Tate and Chairman William Davidow
met with Pat Gelsinger of Intel to discuss
Intel’s concerns about Rambus. (Farmwald, Tr.
8402; CX 1016 at 1; CX 2109 at 175-76
(Davidow, Dep.)). The basic message of the
meeting was that in the intermediate term
Intel would continue to support RDRAM, but
Intel might support a competing architecture
for the next generation. (CX 1016 at 1-4).

564. After the April 14, 1998 Rambus-Intel
meeting, Tate began strategizing about how to
address Intel’s announcement that it would
compete with Rambus. (CX 1016 at 1-4).

565. On April 15, 1998, Farmwald responded
to Tate’s concerns about Intel’s commitment to
RDRAM emailing: “I’m not even sure we want
to agree to work together on the next gen-

eration memory interface.” (Farmwald, Tr.
8406-07; CX 1021 at 1).

566. On April 16, 1998, Rambus Chairman
William Davidow responded to Farmwald’s
email by urging a more measured approach.

561la

(Farmwald, Tr. 8407; CX 1022 at 1). Davidow
suggested that Rambus “try to negotiate
something” with Intel. (CX 1022 at 2).

8. Technical Problems and Product
Delays With RDRAM

567. During this period, the Camino Chipset,
also called the Intel 820 Chipset, “was the first
chipset that Intel was developing to interface
between their processor and direct Rambus.”
(MacWilliams, Tr. 4853; Tabrizi, Tr. 9166,
9185). The Camino Chipset was intended to
interface exclusively with RDRAM. (Tabrizi,
Tr. 9185-86).

568. In the second half of 1998, Intel
encountered electrical issues with RDRAM.
(RX 1532 at 2; MacWilliams, Tr. 4852-53).
Technical problems with RDRAM forced Intel
to delay the Camino Chipset launch several
times. (MacWilliams, Tr. 4852-53; Tabrizi, Tr.
9185).

569. Similarly, the design and ramp up
phases of DDR SDRAM’s launch experienced
delays and difficulties. (Reczek, Tr. 4349-51
(transition to DDR was a major change, and
Infineon had to implement three major re-
designs before it could achieve acceptable
performance); Shirley, Tr. 4208-09 [redacted]

(in camera)).

570. In April 1999, Intel’s microprocessor
rival, AMD, suspended development work on
its RDRAM product due to continuing bad
news about RDRAM. (CX 2158 at 1-2). Steven
Polzin, of AMD, testified that the information
regarding RDRAM costs and yields came from

562a

what he was hearing from the memory man-
ufacturers. (Polzin, Tr. 4013). In late summer
or fall of 1998, AMD shifted its focus to DDR
because AMD believed Rambus was going to
fail as a commodity part, and that ultimately
even Intel would have to go DDR. (Heye, Tr.
3704-05, 3799).

571. In May 1999, Intel’s customers were
skeptical that the cost and availability issues
with RDRAM could be resolved although some
were waiting to see progress. (CX 2529 at 1;
MacWilliams, Tr. 4884)).

572. In May 1999, Intel considered adding
DDR SDRAM to Intel’s server memory road-
map because it was concerned that RDRAM
would not achieve the cost points in time to be

competitive for the server products. (Mac-
Williams, Tr. 4883-84; CX 2529 at 1).

9. Intel’s Announcement That § It
Would No Longer Support RDRAM

573. By mid-October 1999, Intel’s road map
included SDRAM and DDR SDRAM solutions
as well as RDRAM. (CX 2540 at 1).

574. In late October 1999, Intel told Rambus
that it wanted to have a comprehensive review
of their business relationship. (CX 2887 at 1).

575. Intel announced in its October 26, 1999
letter to Rambus that its chipset roadmap now
included alternatives to RDRAM. (CX 2541 at
2; CX 2887 at 2-3).

576. In June 1999, Intel publicly ceased its
exclusive support of RDRAM and announced
that the Pentium III chipset would support

563a

SDRAM. (Tabrizi, Tr. 9201-03; CX 2338 at 57
(in camera)).

577. This was the first time Intel indicated
that SDRAM could compete with RDRAM as
the interface with Pentium III. (Tabrizi, Tr.
9201-03).

578. In August 1999, Intel confirmed that it
would provide support for SDRAM in the
Pentium III chipset. (Tabrizi, Tr. 9201-03).

579. After Intel announced its support of
SDRAM, Rambus’s percentage of market
penetration dropped because customers could
choose between SDRAM and Rambus’s tech-
nologies. (CX 2338 at 57 (in camera); Tabrizi,
Tr. 9203-08).

580. During 1999 and 2000, Intel revised
downward its estimates for the total available
market for RDRAM multiple times. (CX 2338
at 79 (in camera)).

581. Intel reduced its estimates for the total
available market for RDRAM the second and
third quarters of 2000. (CX 2338 at 79 (in
camera); Tabrizi, Tr. 9193-97).

582. Micron never introduced RDRAM into
the market for commercial sale. (Appleton, Tr.
6371-74).

583. On September 2001, Micron Vice-Pres-
ident Sadler [redacted] (RX 1883 at 1 (in
camera)).

584. As projections for RDRAM declined in
the 1999-2000 time frame, the anticipated
market share shifted to SDRAM and DDR
SDRAM. (Tabrizi, Tr. 9214-15).

564a

585. Samsung, the world’s largest DRAM
producer, began commercialization and full
production of RDRAM. (Appleton, Tr. 6373).

586. In February 2001, nearly a year and
half later, Intel was still announcing that its
memory strategy was to shift from SDRAM to
RDRAM for desktop space. (RX 1762 at 4).
According to Intel’s presentation at the Intel
Developer Forum, Spring 2001, RDRAM was
the best solution, the best technology for
the Intel Pentium 4 Processor Platform, and
“RDRAM Remains the Primary Desktop
Memory Solution.” (RX 1762 at 5). In its
summary, Intel stated, “RDRAM Provides the
Best Pentium 4 Processor Platform Now and in
the Future.” (RX 1762 at 24). According to Pete
MacWilliams of Intel, this statement accur-
ately summarized Intel’s position as of Feb-
ruary 2001. (MacWilliams, Tr. 4935).

EIA/JEDEC PATENT POLICY
A. Good Faith Obligations

587. Complaint Counsel rely on the EIA
Legal Guides, Section C, for their contention
that JEDEC participants were required to act
in good faith. (CCPFF 310 citing CX 204, CX
206).

588. The EIA Legal Guides Section C,
labeled “Basic Rules For Conducting Program,”
states that “[aJll ELA standardization pro-
grams shall be conducted in accordance with
the following rules: (1) They shall be carried on
in good faith under policies and procedures
which will assure fairness and unrestricted

565a

participation; . . .” (CX 204 at 5; CX 202 at 6
(earlier version of same document)).

589. Section C continues by requiring that
participation be extended to all technically
qualified members of the industry and that
programs serve the public interest objectives of
EIA. (CX 204 at 5). The balance of Section C
prohibits collusion and price fixing and limits
representatives to technical personnel without
marketing responsibilities. (CX 204 at 5).

590. The EIA Legal Guides explicitly address
patents in Section B, which states that
“[s])tandards are proposed or adopted by EIA
without regard to whether their proposal or
adoption may in any way involve patents on
articles, materials, or processes.” (CX 205 at 4).

591. Given the context of Section C, es-
pecially when compared with Section B, it is
apparent that the “good faith duty” is not
directed to individual members, but rather is a
general directive to the administrators who
“conduct” the EIA’s standardization activities,
directing them to adopt “policies and proce-
dures which will assure fairness and unre-
stricted participation.” (See CX 204 at 5).

592. Complaint Counsel rely on “An Over-
view of JEDEC Patent Policy” wntten by John
Kelly and dated March 26, 2002 to further
support their contention that a good faith duty
required Respondent to disclose intellectual
property. (CCPFF 310 citing CX 449).

593. This 2002 Overview is not persuasive in
interpreting JEDEC patent policy during the
time period at issue as it was written after the

566a

fact and cites JEDEC Manual 21K, published
after Rambus withdrew from JEDEC. (See CX
449 at 1-2).

594. No contemporaneous documents were
provided by Complaint Counsel to support
their contention that JEDEC members had a
duty of good faith or a duty to comply with the
spirit of the patent policy. (See CCPFF 310-
315).

595. At trial, JEDEC members testified that
there was a good faith duty imposed on mem-
bers of JEDEC. (J. Kelly, Tr. 1841 (“companies
need to participate in the process openly and
honestly and fairly and in good faith and not in
bad faith, because bad faith undermines the
confidence of everyone in the process.”); G.
Kelley, Tr. 2397 (“my mind translated [good
faith] to fair treatment for all members”);
Rhoden, Tr. 305-06 (“The term ‘good faith’ as
used in [the Legal Guides] is that the people

. are coming under the premise that they’re
going to... work toward the benefit of the end
user of the industry itself, and operating in
good faith means that you would expect other
people to do the same thing.”); Sussman, Tr.
1330 (“Good faith, we’re all competitors, we’re
all about ready to dice each other in the
marketplace, but seeing we’re talking about or
about to talk on intellectual property, I trust
you to do something, and I expect that same
set of trust back.”)).

596. Despite their trial testimony, some
JEDEC members, including those in leader-
ship positions, did not always conduct them-
selves in a manner consistent with a duty to

567a

disclose intellectual property or to act in good
faith. (See F. 686-717). For example, G. Kelley,
IBM representative and JC 42.3 Committee
Chair, on multiple occasions, indicated that
IBM would not disclose patents to JEDEC (F.
691-93) and JEDEC Chairman Rhoden failed
to disclose a patent application on which he
was listed as an inventor. (F. 711-17).

597. Viewing the trial testimony in conjunc-
tion with the conduct of JEDEC members and
leaders, there is not sufficient evidence to find
a duty of good faith imposed on participants of
JEDEC. (F. 587-96).

B. Open Standards

598. The goal of JEDEC is to develop open
standards. (CX 419; Rhoden, Tr. 301, 536; J.
Kelly, Tr. 1776-78, 1782, 1787).

599. Open standards may, and often do,
include patented features or technologies. The
EIA Legal Guides, which governed JEDEC,
provide that “[s]tandards are proposed or
adopted by EIA without regard to whether
their proposal or adoption may in any way
involve patents on articles, materials, or proc-
esses.” (See CX 204 at 4; CX 206 at 6; J. Kelly,
Tr. 1829-30).

600. JEDEC Chairman Rhoden testified that
“open standards inside of JEDEC essentially
means that we want to set up a mechanism
where everyone can participate that wants to,
and in the end, the end product is then avail-
able to everybody in the world. So, open par-
ticipation, open accessability, if you will.”

(Rhoden, Tr. 300-01).

568a

601. JEDEC does not include known pa-
tented material in JEDEC standards without
written assurances from the owner of the
intellectual property that it will grant li-
censes on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
(“RAND”) terms to all applicants. (CX 203A at
11; CX 208 at 19; JX 54 at 9; CX 2191 at 8; see
also F.1536-81).

602. JEDEC does not determine what is a
reasonable royalty rate because JEDEC does
not “have the expertise to be able to determine
what’s commercially reasonable in the context
of any industry, no less semiconductors. . .
That expertise resides in the industry. So,
that’s why in the first instance we leave it to
the parties themselves to work out what’s
reasonable.” (J. Kelly, Tr. 1882-83; see also CX
2089 at 174-75 (Meyer, Infineon Trial Tr.)).

603. Determination of a reasonable royalty
rate is left to negotiation and market forces or
the courts. (CX 2089 at 174-75 (Meyer, Infin-
eon Trial Tr.); J. Kelly, Tr. 1882-83, 2073-74).

604. Hans Wiggers, a JEDEC representative
from Hewlett-Packard in the early to mid-
1990's, testified that it was his understanding
that the JEDEC patent policy was that, as long
as a company licensed its patents after they
issued on RAND terms to all interested par-
ties, the company had no obligation to disclose
its intellectual property. (Wiggers, Tr. 10591).

605. In 1996, in its correspondence to the
Commission regarding the Dell case, EIA rec-
ognized that by “allowing standards based on
patents, American consumers are assured of

569a

standards that reflect the latest innovation
and high technology the great technical minds
of this country can deliver. . . . [T]here is a
positive and pro-competitive benefit to incorpo-
rating intellectual property in standards.” (RX
669 at 2-3). —

C. Manuals
1. JEP 21-H

606. JEDEC Manual of Organization and
Procedure 21-H (“JEP 21-H”), dated July 1988,
which was still in effect when Rambus joined
JEDEC in 1992, contains the following legend:
“Electronic Industries Association. Engineer-
ing Department.” (CX 205 at 1).

607. JEP 21-H includes in Appendix D a
non-liability disclaimer to be incorporated into
JEDEC standards. This disclaimer states that
“JEDEC standards are adopted without regard
to whether or not their adoption may involve
patents on articles, materials or processes. By
such action JEDEC does not assume any lha-
bility to any patent owner, nor does it assume
any obligation whatever to parties adopting

the Standards.” (CX 205 at 20). -

608. JEP 21-H states that “[alll meetings of
the JEDEC Solid State Products Engineering
Council and its associated Committees, Sub-
committees, Task Groups and other units shall
be conducted within the current edition of EIA
Legal Guides adopted by the EIA Board of
Governors and incorporated herein by refer-
ence.” (CX 205 at 14).

570a

609. The 21-H Manual does not provide any
guidance regarding intellectual property nghts
or an obligation to disclose patents, patent

applications, or the intent to file patent appli-
cations. (See CX 205).

2. JEP 21-I

610. JEDEC Manual of Organization and
Procedure 21-I] (“JEP 21-1”), dated October
1993, contains the following legend: “Electronic
Industries Association. Engineering Depart-

ment” and displays the trademarks of both
JEDEC and EIA. (CX 208 at 1).

611. Section 9.1, JEP 21-I states: “[alJll
meetings of the JEDEC Solid State Products
Engineering Council and its associated com-
mittees, subcommittees, task groups and other
units shall be conducted within the current
edition of EIA legal guides adopted by the EIA
Board of Governors and incorporated herein by
reference.” (CX 208 at 18).

612. Section 9.3, JEP 21-I discusses the use
of patented products in EIA Standards as
follows:

EIA and JEDEC standards’ and
nonproduct registrations (e.g., package
outline drawings) that require the use of
patented items should be considered with
great care. While there is no restriction
against drafting a proposed standard in
terms that include the use of patented
item’ if technical reasons justify the
inclusion, committees should ensure that
nc program of standardization shal] refer
to a product on which there is a known

571la

patent unless all the relevant technical
information covered by the patent is
known to the formulating committee[,]
subcommittee, or working group. If the
committee determined that the standard
requires the use of patented items, then
the committee chairperson must receive a
written assurance from the _ organ-
ization holding rights to such patents that
a license will be made available without
compensation to applicants desiring to
implement the standard, or written
assurance that a license will be made
available to all applicants under
reasonable terms and conditions that are
demonstrably free of any _ unfair
discrimination. Additionally, when a
known patented item is referred to in an
EIA/JEDEC standard, a cautionary note,
as outlined in this document, shall appear

in the EIA/JEDEC standard (see 9.3.1.).

All correspondence between the patent
holder and the formulatir, committee,
subcommittee, or working group, including
a copy of the written assurance from the
patent holder discussed above, shall be
transmitted to the EIA Engineering
Department and the EIA General Counsel
at the earliest possible time and, in any
case, before the standard is otherwise
ready for subcommittee or committee
ballot circulatic .. (See the Style Manual,
EP-7-A, 3.4 for the required language in
an EIA Standard that cites a product with
a known patent.)

572a

[FN 1]: For the purpose of this policy, the
word “patented” also included items and
processes for which a patent has been
applied and may be pending.

(CX 208 at 19).

613. Section 9.3 of JEP 21-I describes the
requirements of incorporating known patented
products in EIA/JEDEC standards — namely,
that all technical information should be known
and RAND assurances obtained. (CX 208 at
19).

614. Although this section, through a foot-
note, defines “patented” to include pending
patents, the section also expressly recognizes

that it only applies to “known patents.” (CX
208 at 19).

615. This section does not impose an obli-
gation to disclose intellectual property. Rather,
it explains the procedure and information
necessary for including a known patent into a
standard. (CX 208 at 19).

616. Section 9.3.1, JEP 21-I states:

9.3.1 Committee Responsibility Concerning
Intellectual Property

The Chairperson of any JEDEC
committee, subcommittee, or working
group must cali to the attention of all
those present the requirements contained
in the EIA Legal Guides, and call
attention to the _ obligation of all
participants to inform the meeting of any
knowledge they may have of any patents,
or pending patents, that might be involved

573a

in the work they are’ undertaking.
Appendix E (Legal Guidelines Summary)
provides copies of viewgraphs that should
be used at the beginning of the meeting to
satisfy this requirement. Additionally, all
participants must be asked to read the
statement on the back of each EIA Sign-in/
Attendance Roster.

(CX 208 at 19).

617. Section 9.3.1 of JEP 21-I is ambiguous
because it refers to the EIA Legal Guides
immediately before and immediately after
mentioning an “obligation co inform the meet-
ing of . . . patents, or pending patents.” (CX
208 at 19). The EIA Legal Guides to which this
section refers, however, do not support such an
obligation. (See CX 208 at 26-29; CX 204).

618. To satisfy the requirement to call
attention to the obligation to disclose patents
and patent applications, section 9.3.1 refers to
Appendix E and the EIA sign-in/attendance
roster. (CX 208 at 19).

619. Appendix E, JEP 21-I explains that
“(t}he following material may be made into
viewgraphs that can be shown at JEDEC meet-
ings to summarize EIA legal guidelines cover-
ing the areas of improper activities and pro-
grams, patents, and copyright protection. More
detailed information in each area is available
from the EIA Legal Office.” (CX 208 at 26).

620. Appendix E, JEP 21-I includes the fol-
lowing procedure for incorporating patented
technology in standards:

574a
EIA/JEDEC PATENT POLICY SUMMARY

Standards that call for use of a patented
item or process may not be considered by a
JEDEC committee unless all of the
relevant technical information covered by
the patent or pending patent is known to
the committee, subcommittee, or working
group. In_ addition, the committee
Chairperson must have received written
notice from the patent holder or applicant
that one of the following conditions
prevails:

* A license shall be made available
without charge to applicants desiring
to utilize the patent for the purpose of
implementing the standards(s),

or

* A license shall be made available to
applicants under reasonable terms
and conditions that are demonstrably
free of any unfair discrimination.

In either case, the terms and conditions of
the license must be submitted to the EIA
General Counsel for review.

An appropriate footnote shall be included
in the standard identifying the patented
item and describing the conditions under
which the patent holder will grant a
license.

(CX 208 at 27).

621. Appendix E of JEP 21-I, which de-
scribes itself as an “ETA/JEDEC Patent Policy
Summary,” indicates that “a patented item or

575a

process may not be considered . . . unless all of
the relevant technical information covered by
the patent or pending patent is known” and
that RAND assurances must be obtained. (CX
208 at 27). This statement does not impose a
duty to disclose upon members. Rather, it ex-
plains the procedure to follow in utilizing
known patented items consistent with the re-
quirements of section 9.3.

622. Appendix E does not distinguish be-
tween EIA and JEDEC patent policies; it is .
labeled the “EIA/JEDEC patent policy.” (CX
208 at 27).

623. Appendix F, JEP 21-I states:

Fl. PATENT POLICY APPLICATION
GUIDELINES

The following points’ describe’ the
application of the JEDEC patent policy:

* Committee discussion of pending or
existing patents is a _ permissible
activity and is encouraged when the
committee feels that the patented
item or process represents the best
technical basis for a standard.

* Discussion of a pending or existing
patent does not’ constitute an
acknowledgment of the validity of the
patent, because validity is based on
prior art and determination of who
first made the invention or applied for
the patent. The committee’s concern is
with technical merits and whether the

576a

technical proposal is a sound basis for
standardization.

* By its terms, the EIA Patent Policy
applies with equal force to situations
involving: 1) the discovery of patents
that may be required for use of a
standard subsequent to its adoption,
and 2) the initial issuance of a patent
after the adoption of a standard. Once
disclosure is made, the holder is
obligated to provide the same
assurances to EIA as are required in
situations where patents exist or are
known prior to approval of a proposed
standard.

Thus, if notice is given of a patent that
may be required for use of an already
approved EIA Standard, a standards
developer may wish to make it clear to
other standards-making participants
that the JEDEC procedures require
the patent holder to provide the
assurances contained in the Patent
Policy or suffer the withdrawal of
EIA’s approval of the standard as an
EIA Standard and, ultimately, as an
American National Standard.

(CX 208 at 29).

624. Appendix F of JEP 21-I recognizes that
(1) discussion of intellectual property issues is
allowed, (2) a disclaimer that such discussions
do not constitute an acknowledgment of the
validity of the paterts, and (3) the policy ap-
plies to (a) the discovery of patents after a

577a

standard is adopted and (b) the issuance of a
patent after the standard is issued. This
section makes clear that EIA will pursue the
same procedure in these situations as if the
patent were known during the standardization
procedure. Finally, this section provides the
penalty for failure to provide RAND assur-
ances: that the standard may be withdrawn.
(CX 208 at 29).

625. At the September 1993 JC 42.3 meet-
ing, the committee chairman showed a view-
graph containing proposed language from an
appendix to the not-yet-published JEP 21-I
manual. This viewgraph was expressly marked
“DRAFT” and contained a footnote stating that
the “material is a proposed revision” that “has
not been approved by JEDEC.” (JX 17 at 12).
Although this draft did refer to a “patent or
pending patent,” it did not mention an obli-
gation to disclose intellectual property, nor did
it instruct the chairperson to call attention to
such an obligation. (JX 17 at 12).

626. The committee chairman also showed a
different draft of the 21-I Manual at the
December 1992 JEDEC JC 42.3 meeting sim-
ilarly marked as a draft. (Crisp, Tr. 2983-88;
see JX 14 at 3, 25).

627. It is not clear that JEP 21-I was ever
formally adopted by JEDEC. John Kelly, EIA
Legal Counsel, testified that JEP 21-I needed a
final stamp of approval from EIA’s EDEC and
that he did not know whether JEP 21-I ever
received that approval. (J. Kelly, Tr. 2104-05).

578a

628. Complaint Counsel did not provide
sufficient evidence to find that JEP 21-I re-
ceived the approval from EDEC necessary for
JEP 21-I to become the controlling manual.

629. Rambus did not receive a copy of 21-I
until the summer of 1995. (Crisp, Tr. 3475).

630. JEDEC did not maintain a log of who
received copies of manuals and it was not the
practice of JEDEC to mail all documents as
they were revised. (CX 317 at 1; Grossmeier,

Tr. 10944-45).

631. Although JEP 21-I refers to an
obligation to disclose intellectual property, it
does not provide a basis for the obligation, or a
discussion of the extent of the obligation.
Moreover, it is facially inconsistent with the
EIA sections to which it refers. (See CX 208
at 19).

632. JEP 21-I is ambiguous and can not be
construed to impose a clear obligation to dis-
close intellectual property. (See CX 208).

3. EIA Legal Guides

633. The EIA Legal Guides include a non-
liability disclaimer that “[s]tandards are pro-
posed or adopted by EIA without regard to
whether their proposal or adoption may in any
way involve patents on articles, materials, or
processes. By such action, EIA does not as-
sume any liability to any patent owner, nor
does it assume any obligation whatever to par-
ties adopting EIA standards.” (CX 204 at 4).

634. The EIA Legal Guides do not contain
any specific reference to any disclosure obli-

579a

gation in connection with a member’s intel-
lectual property. (See CX 204).

4. EP-3-F and EP-7-A

635. The October 1981 EIA manual known
as “EP-3-F” provides the following procedure
for using patented items in standards:

8.3 Reference to Patented Products In
EIA Standards

Requirements in EIA Standards which call
for the use of patented items should be
avoided. No program of standardization
shall refer to a produc. on which there is a
known patent unless ali the technical in-
formation covered by the patent is known
to the Formulating committee, sub-
comittee, or working’ group. The
Committee Chairman must have also
received a written expression from the
patent holder that he is willing to license
applicants under reasonable terms and
conditions that are demonstrably free
of any unfair discrimination. Additionally,
when a known patented item is referred to
in an EJA Standard, a Caution Notice, as
outlined in the Style Manual, EP-7, shall
appear in the EIA Standard.

(CX 203A at 11).

636. The 1990 EIA manual known as “EP-
7-A” provides information about obtaining

RAND assurances:
3.4 Patented Items or Processes

Avoid requirements in EIA standards that
call for the exclusive use of a patented

580a

item or process. No- program [of]
standardization shall refer to a patented
item or process unless all of the technical
information covered by the patent is
known to the formulating committee or
working group, and the committee
chairman has received a written expres-
sion from the patent holder that one of the
following conditions prevails:

(1) a license shall be made available with-
out charge to applicants desiring to utilize
the patent for the purpose of implement-
ing the standard, or

(2) a license shall be made available to ap-
plicants under reasonable terms and con-
ditions that are demonstrably free of any
unfair discrimination.

.. . An appropriate footnote shall be in-
cluded in the standard identifying the pa-
tented item and describing the conditions
under which the patent holder will grant a
license (see 6.5.2).

(JX 54 at 9-10).

637. The EP-3-F manual and the EP-7-A
manual, which were in effect when Rambus
joined JEDEC, both contain a requirement
that no standard shall refer to a product on
which there is a known patent unless all the
technical information covered by the patent is

known to the committee or working group. (CX
203A at 11-12; JX 54 at 9).

638. The EP-3-F manual and the EP-7-A
manual make no explicit reference to an obli-

581la

gation on the part of ELA members or others to
disclose patents or patent applications. (See J.
Kelly, Tr. 1824-25, 1905-06, 2082-83; CX 203A;
JX 54).

5. ANSI Patent Policy

639. The ANSI Patent Policy Guidelines
were attached to the May 1992 JC 42.3

meeting minutes and were circulated to JC
42.3 members in 1994. (CX 34 at 19).

640. J. Kelly circulated the ANSI Guidelines
to JC 42.3 members in 1994 because he
“thought they provided insight into the proper
interpretation of the EIA and JEDEC patent
policy.” (J. Kelly, Tr. 1950).

641. J. Kelly was a member of the ANSI
patent policy working group from 1990 until
2002 and was personally involved in the dis-
cussions and deliberations leading to the final
approval of the ANSI guidelines. (J. Kelly, Tr.
1950-51).

642. At the time that the ANSI Guidelines
were circulated to JC 42.3 members in 1994,
the language of the EIA patent policy and the

ANSI patent policy was essentially identical.
(J. Kelly, Tr. 2077-78).

643. The ANSI patent policy guidelines “seek
to encourage the early disclosure and identi-
fication of patents that may relate to standards
under development.” (RX 1712 at 6).

644. The ANSI patent policy guidelines spe-
cify that “it is desirable to encourage disclosure
of as much information as possible concerning
the patent, including the identity of the patent

582a

holder, the patent’s number, and information
regarding precisely how it may relate to the
standard being develuped.” (RX 1712 at 8).

645. The ANSI patent policy guidelines in-
dicate that “a standards developer may wish to
encourage participants to disclose the exis-
tence of pending U.S. patent applications re-
lating to a standard under development. Of
course, in such a situation the extent of any
disclosure may be more circumscribed due to
the possible need for confidentiality and uncer-
tainty as to whether an application will ma-
ture into a patent and what its claimed scope
will ultimately be.” (RX 1712 at 8).

D. Committee Forms
1. Membership Application

646. The application completed by Rambus
upon joining JEDEC does not impose an obli-
gation on members to disclose intellectual
property. (CX 601 at 1-2). Indeed, there is no
mention of intellectual property in the appli-
cation. (CX 601 at 1-2).

647. Complaint Counsel did not present
sufficient evidence to support their allegation
(Complaint J 15) that the JEDEC membership
application included an obligation to abide by
JEDEC’s rules. (See CX 601).

2. Meeting Attendance Roster (Sign-
In Sheet)

648. Participants at each JEDFC meeting
were required to record their names on the
sign-in sheet or meeting attendance roster.

(CX 306; CX 3136 at 135).

583a

649. Sign-in/attendance rosters were not
considered an “official form” because they
“vary from division to division and almost
year-to-year.” (CX 317 at 1).

650. The sign-in/attendance roster states in
relevant part: “Subjects involving patentable
or patented items shall conform to EIA Policy
(reverse side). Consult the ELA General Coun-
sel about any doubtful question.” (CX 306 at 1).

651. The sign-in/attendance roster states on
the reverse side:

REFERENCE TO PATENTED PRODUCTS
IN EIA STANDARDS

Requirements in EIA Standards that call
for the use of patented items should be
considered with great care. While there is
no objection in principie to drafting a
proposed standard in terms that include
the use of a patented item, if it is
considered that technical reasons justify
this approach, Committee Chairmen
should ensure that no _ program of
standardization shall refer to a product on
which there is a known patent unless all
relevant and_- reasonably necessary
technical information covered by the
patent is known to the formulating
committee, subcommittee, or working
group. The Committee Chairmen must
have also received a written assurance
from the patent holder that a license will
be made available without compensation
to the applicants desiring to utilize the
license for the purpose of implementing

584a

the standard; or a written assurance that
a license will be made available to
applicants under reasonable terms and
conditions that are demonstrably free of
any unfair discrimination.

Additionally, when a known patent item is
referred to in an EIA Standard, a Caution
Notice, as outlined in the Style Manual,
EP-7, shall appear in the EIA Standard.

All correspondence between the patent
holder and the formulating committee,
subcommittee, or working group, including
a copy of the written assurance from the
patent holder mentioned above, shall be
transmitted to the EIA Engineering
Department and the EIA General Counsel
at the earliest possible time, but no later
than the point when the EJA Standard
Proposal is ready for Committee ballot.
(See the Style Manual for EIA
Publications, EP-7, Section 3.4 _ for
required language in an EIA Standard
that cites a known patented product).

(CX 306 at 2).

652. The sign-in/attendance roster was
modified to include the term “patentable” in
the early 1990’s around the time of the Wang
litigation. (J. Kelly, Tr. 1934-35). For discus-
sion of the Wang litigation, see infra F. 689-90.

653. The reference to “patentable or pa-
tented items” on the front page of the sign-
in/attendance roster is ambiguous because it
refers to the EIA guides. The EIA Guides

which appear on the reverse side, however,

585a

apply only to issued patents. (CX 306 (EIA
Legal Guides use the terms: “patented items,”
“known patent,” “technical information covered
by the patent,” and “patent holder’”)).

3. Committee Ballots

654. The committee ballots used by JEDEC
to record votes on standardization proposals
contained a variety of voting options, including
an option which read: “I do not approve the
content of the [ballot topic]. Attached are my
detailed reason(s) for this disapproval. (We
need your reason(s) in order to understand
your view on this matter.) MANDATORY.” (CX
252A at 2).

655. The committee ballots also stated: “If
anyone receiving this ballot is aware of patents
involving this ballot, please alert the Commit-
tee accordingly during your voting response.”

(CX 252A at 2).

656. When this language regarding patents
was first added to the committee ballots, a
JEDEC member asked during a JEDEC meet-
ing about the purpose of the new language.
The minutes of the JC 42.1 meeting held on
September 13, 1989 state that:

Council discussed pateiit issue at their
June meting [sic] at the request of JC-
42.3. The result was not to change EIA
legal requirements as_ outlined = in
document EP-7, but to add some wording
on JEDEC ballot voting sheets about
informing the Committee if any patent
covers the balloted material.

586a

TI was concerned that Committee
members could be held liable if they didn’t
inform Committee members correctly on
patent matters. Committee responded that
the question was added on ballot voting
sheets for information only and was not
going to be checked to see who said what.

(CX 3 at 6).

657. Sussman explained the options on
ballots as follows:

Yeah, I can approve the ballot. I can not
approve the ballot. I can abstain on the
ballot. I can approve it with comments.
And the bottom one is saying that
regardless of what I do, ignoring any of the
above things, I can also point out that I
know of or I believe there might be a
patent that could read on the — on this
concept, on this ballot.

(Sussman, Tr. 1391).

658. It is clear from the plain language of the
committee ballot that a no vote mandates an
explanation, while patent disclosure is only
requested on a voluntary basis. (See CX 252
at 2).

4. Members’ Manual

659. The introduction to the “JC 42 Mem-
bers’ Manual,” dated September 1994, states
that “[t]his manual was compiled to assist new
(and established) members in achieving full
effectivenes [sic] in the standards making
process.” (RX 507 at 2).

587a

660. The members’ manual was a document
created by Jim Townsend, JC 42 Chairman,
and does not display the JEDEC or EIA trade-
marks or otherwise purport to be an official
EIA publication. (RX 507).

661. The members’ manual was not ap-
proved by the JEDEC Council and the meeting
minutes indicate that “[slome of this material
is not approved by JEDEC ... It should be
clear that this manual is not a publication of
JEDEC because it has not been balloted by
Committee or Council.” (JX 31 at 4).

662. The members’ manual patent policy
section states: “Committees adhere rigidly to
the EIA patent policy as given in EIA pub-
lication EP-7-A, August 1990, Pars.3.4 & 3.5
and in EIA Publication EP-3-F, October 1981,
Par 8.3 which require intellectual property
disclosure and discussion if proposed stand-
ards are affected.” (RX 507 at 15).

663. The members’ manual states that “[{al]ll
first presentations must be accompanied by
written handouts for all companies present
giving complete details of the material being
presented. In addition, the presenter must
reveal any known or expected patents, within

his company, on the material presented.” (RX
507 at 15).

664. The members’ manual is ambiguous
because it states that the committee “adheres
rigidly to the EIA patent policy” which it de-
scribes as requiring intellectual property dis-
closure. (RX 507 at 15). However, the EIA pa-
tent policy to which it refers does not require

588a

disclosure of intellectual property. (See F. 633-
38).

665. The members’ manual is also ambig-
uous because the patent policy section suggests
a requirement of intellectual property disclo-
sure without indicating who is required to
disclose, while the “First Presentation” section
limits disclosure to those making presenta-
tions. (See,.RX 507 at 15).

5. Patent Tracking List

666. A patent tracking list, which was a
compilation of patents and patent applications
of which Townsend had been made aware
through the course of the work inside JEDEC,
was maintained by Chairman Townsend.
(Rhoden, Tr. 325; Sussman, Tr. 1355).

667. Townsend “began the patent tracking
list .. . in May of 1991.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2407).
The patent tracking list had multiple purposes,
including record-keeping, a reminder to other
participants of the patent issues that were on,
and as an educational tool for those who were
newcomers to the committee. (G. Kelley, Tr.
2407-08).

668. The patent tracking list was an in-
formal, incomplete list of patents and patent
applications disclosed to the JC 42.3 commit-
tee. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2408). Rhoden explained
that it “was Mr. Townsend’s personal list, and
I’m not sure that everything was included in
it.” (Rhoden, Tr. 334-35).

669. The cover sheet accompanying the pa-
tent tracking list included the term “patent-
able matters” which JEDEC Chairman Rhoden

589a

testified he understood to mean “anything that
would be in the patent process. Essentially if
you believe that you have ownership of a
particular topic or a particular item, then that
is what he’s referring to. Patentable, whether a
patent had actually been applied for or not.”
(Rhoden, Tr. 336).

E. Contemporaneous Correspondence
1. The McGhee Memorandum

670. ETSI is the European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute. As indicated in
the EIA letter to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion commenting on the Dell consent order,
ETSI undertook efforts “to force compulsory
licensing on an extraterritorial basis.” (RX 669

at 3).

671. On March 29, 1994, JEDEC Secretary
Ken McGhee sent a memorandum to JC 42
Chairman Jim Townsend regarding the “ETSI
Policy within JEDEC” that stated that
JEDEC’s legal counsel had said that:

{H]e didn’t think it was a good idea to re-
quire people at JEDEC — standards
meetings to sign a document assuring
anything about their company’s patent
nights for the following reasons:

(1) It would have a chilling effect at future
meetings

(2) A general assurance wouldn’t be worth
that much anyway

(3) It needs to come from a VP or higher
within the company — engineers can’t sign
such documents

590a

(4) It would need to be done at each meet-
ing slowing down the business at hand.

(RX 486 at 1).

2. Correspondence Regarding’ the
Dell Consent Agreement

672. The Commission issued a complaint and
entered into a consent agreement with Dell
Computer Corporation (“Dell”) which prohib-
ited Dell from enforcing its patent rights
against computer manufacturers using the VL-
bus. The Commission placed upon the public
record the executed consent decree with a re-
quest for public comments. In re Dell Computer
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 619 (May 1996).

673. In January 1996, a letter was submitted
to the FTC on behalf of EIA and its unin-
corporated divisions and departments (includ-
ing JEDEC), as well as on behalf of the
Telecommunications Industries Association
(“TIA”), in response to the Dell action. EIA
General Counsel J. Kelly’s name and title
appear in the signature block. (RX 669 at 5; J.
Kelly, Tr. 2092-93).

674. The EIA’s January 1996 comment letter
to the Commission states in relevant part:

Both EIA and TIA encourage the early,
voluntary disclosure of patents that relate
to the standards in work. Committee and
subcommittee chairs ask during the
meetings whether any parties are aware of
any patents that relate to the
contributions under discussion. When
potential patents are disclosed, EIA and

59la

TIA staff contact the patent holders to
ensure that essential patents will be
licensed in accordance with the EIA, TIA
and ANSI IPR policies.

(RX 669 at 3).

675. The EIA’s January 1996 comment letter
to the FTC clarifies that the “EIA, TIA and
ANSI IPR policies relate to essential patents”
and that “even if knowledge of a patent comes
later in time due to the pending status of the
patent while the standard was being created,
the important issue is the license availability
to all parties on reasonable, non-discrimina-
tory terms.” (RX 669 at 3, 4).

676. In July 1996, the FTC, in a letter signed
by FTC Secretary Donald Clark, responded to
the EIA’s January 1996 letter. The FTC’s
letter states in relevant part that: “EIA and
TIA, following ANSI procedures, encourage the
early, voluntary disclosure of patents, but do
not require a certification by participating
companies regarding potentially conflicting pa-
tent interests.” (RX 740 at 1).

677. The FTC’s statement distinguishing the
EIA’s patent policy from the policy at issue in
the Dell matter, and the FTC’s explanation
that the differences in the two patent policies
meant that the “expectations of participants in
the two standard-setting processes differ,”
indicate that FTC Secretary Clark interpreted
the ELA’s January 1996 letter to mean that the
EIA encouraged, but did not require, the dis-
closure by members of intellectual property

interests. (RX 740 at 2; see RX 669 at 2).

592a

678. On July 10, 1996, JEDEC Secretary
Kenneth McGhee sent a memorandum to
Jim Townsend, addressed to “JEDEC Council
Members and Alternates,” regarding the FTC’s
Final Consent Order in the Dell case, which
stated in part that: “the FTC emphasized that
it was not intending to signal a general duty to
search for patents when a company engages in
standards setting (ANSI and EIA do however,
encourage early, voluntary disclosure of any
known essential patents.)” (RX 742 at 1).

679. These letters clearly state JEDEC’s
patent policy was limited to encouraging early,

voluntary disclosure of any known essential
patents. (RX 669; RX 742).

3. Correspondence Regarding Micron
Disclosure

680. On January 28, 2000, Micron drafted a
written disclosure of a patent application relat-
ing to a proposed standard under consideration
in the JC 42.4 subcommittee. (RX 1559 ai 2).

681. On February 1, 2000, JEDEC Secretary
McGhee sent an email to members of the
subcommittee stating, “I would like to point
out that this letter is well intentioned, but
lacks a patent number, so it does not complete
the requirements for JEDEC patent policy. If,
however, a follow-up letter is issued after the
patent is issued, then it would comply with
JEDEC’s patent policy.” (RX 1559 at 1).

682. Upon receiving McGhee’s email that
Micron had not complied with the patent policy
because Micron’s disclosure did not include a
patent number term, Terry Walther of Micron

593a

caused the matter. to be placed on the agenda
for the next JEDEC board meeting. (RX 1568
at 25).

683. The minutes of the February 2000
meeting of the JEDEC Board of Directors
state:

D. Disclosure on Patents Pending

Mr. Walther noted that Micron had sent a
letter indicating they have _ patents
pending on items that may affect com-
mittee standards. The issue was whether
companies should make public that a
patent is pending. The BoD discussed it
and noted they encourage companies to
make this kind of disclosures even though
they were not required by JEDEC by laws.

(RX 1570 at 13).

684. In an email written a few days after the
February 2000 board meeting, JEDEC Secre-
tary Ken McGhee, who had been present at the
meeting (RX 1570 at 2), reported to a JEDEC
subcommittee that the JEDEC Board had
discussed Micron’s “patent pending” disclosure.
Secretary McGhee stated that:

The JEDEC patent policy concerns items
that are known to be patented that are in-
cluded in JEDEC standards. Disclosure of
patents is a very big issue for Committee
members and cannot be required of
members at meetings. However, if a
company gives early disclosure on a patent
they are working on, it definitely gives a
lot of assurance to the Committee

594a

members regarding development of any
standards affecting it.

Therefore, in Micron’s letter, by giving
early disclosure, they have gone one step
beyond the patent policy and _ have
complied with the spirit of the law.
JEDEC encourages this type of activity
from any member.

(RX 1585 at 1).

685. Disclosure of patent applications, or
pending patents, was “not required” by JEDEC
in 2000 even though disclosure was “encour-
aged.” (RX 1570 at 13). The “spirit of the law”
is to disclose patent applications even though
disclosure “cannot be required of members.”
(RX 1585 at 1).

F. Conduct of Parties in JEDEC
1. SEEQ Issue

686. A company named SEEQ proposed a
JEDEC standard called silicon signature.
(Sussman, Tr. 1338). SEEQ owned two patents
related to the technology, but disclosed and
offered to license only cane. (Sussman, Tr. 1338-
39 (SEEQ “was telling us about silicon signa-
ture and offering it as a royalty-free license to
anyone who wanted it, hoping that just as soon
as we standardized this, the second patent,
which would be die trace, which he had not
said anything about, but because it was almost
identical, would be insisted upon by the cus-
tomers, and [SEEQ] could put a tax on us.”)).

687. Upon learning of SEEQ’s second patent,
the committee was willing to standardize the

595a

SEEQ technology, provided that SEEQ agreed
to reasonable licensing terms. (CX 3 at 4).

688. When the committee learned that the
second patent was not included in the patent
release, JEDEC chose to standardize on a dif-
ferent technology. (Sussman, Tr. 1338-39).

2. WANG Litigation

689. The Wang litigation involved allega-
tions of a failure to disclosure a patent appli-
cation on the part of a company that had
promoted its technology for standardization.
(CX 711 at 188). Wang was “part of the
committee, they had helped set a standard,
and then they went out and enforced their
patents against everybody in the industry who
used a SIMM module.” (Williams, Tr. 787).

690. Wang failed to disclose a patent relating
to memory modules and later attempted to
enforce the patent against the industry which
“ended up in a rather lengthy litigation,
crossed multiple houses and cost the industry
millions of dollars before the patent was found
to be invalid.” (Sussman, Tr. 1338; see also
Landgraf, Tr. 1697-98; JX 20 at 4).

3. IBM’s Patent Position

691. The minutes of the March 1993 meeting
of JC 42.3 state in part that “IBM noted that
their view has been to ignore [the] patent
disclosure rule because their attorneys have
advised them that if they do then a listing may
be construed as complete.” (JX 15 at 6).

692. In an August 1993 memo to JEDEC
leaders entitled “BGA Patent/License Rights,”

596a

IBM JEDEC representative (and JEDEC 42.3
subcommittee chair) Gordon Kelley stated
that:

IBM Intellectual Property Law attorney’s
[sic] have informed me that we will not use
JEDEC as a forum for discussing this sub-
ject. It is the responsibility of the producer
to evaluate the subject and to workout the
proper use of rights. So, I can not confirm
or deny any IPL rights.

(RX 420 at 2).

693. The December 1993 JEDEC 42.3 min-
utes state in part that “[a]s a side issue, IBM
noted that in the future they will not come to
the Committee with a list of applicable patents
on standards proposals. It is up to the user of
the standard to discover which patents apply.”

(JX 18 at 8).

694. Between December 1993 and December
1995 (Rambus’s last meeting), no IBM patent
or patent application was added to the “patent
tracking list” maintained by JC 42 Chairman
Jim Townsend. (See JX 18 at 14-21; JX 19 at
17-23; JX 20 at 15-18; JX 21 at 14-18; JX 22 at
12-17; JX 25 at 18-26; JX 26 at 15-24; JX 27 at
20-25; JX 28 at 12-23).

695. Regarding IBM, Cray representative
Grossmeier testified that “IBM said they didn’t
feel they had the resources to review their
entire patent portfolio every time a proposal
was made to see if there was anything in there
that was applicable. So, they would not dis-
close any patents that they had that were
related to the standard.” (Grossmeier, Tr.

597a

10956; His opinion was that “I think they all
understood the policy. I think they just elected
not to practice it.” (Grossmeier, Tr. 10956-57).

696. A Hewlett-Packard representative to
JEDEC, Hans Wiggers, testified that he had
attended a JEDEC meeting where IBM repre-
sentative and Committee Chair Gordon Kelley
said:

Look, I cannot. disclose -- my company
would not let me disclose all the patents
that IBM is working on because, you
know, I just can’t do that. The only thing
we will do is we will follow the JEDEC
guidelines and — or rules on whatever and
we will make them available.

(Wiggers, Tr. 10592-93).

697. This is consistent with Gordon Kelley’s
testimony. G. Kelley testified that he did not
disclose IBM patents relating to “toggle mode”
in 1990 in part because IBM was “prepared to
meet the requirements of the JEDEC commit-
tee” to license the patents on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2715-
16).

698. Complaint Counsel did not present
sufficient evidence from which to find that
IBM was ever sanctioned for announciag its
refusal to disclose the company’s intellectual
property.

4. Hewlett Packard’s Patent Position

699. Hewlett Packard’s representative, Wig-
gers, testified that when JC 42.3 Chair G.
Kelley stated his position at the JEDEC meet-

598a

ing regarding IBM’s nondisclosure of patent
applications, Wiggers told the meeting attend-
ees that HP took the same position. (Wiggers,
Tr. 10593-94).

700. Complaint Counsel did not present
sufficient evidence from which to find that
Hewlett-Packard was ever sanctioned for an-
nouncing its refusal to disclose the company’s
intellectual property.

5. Texas Instruments’ QUAD CAS

Issue

701. On March 9, 1994, Texas Instruments
presented a letter to JEDEC regarding ambig-
uities in the JEDEC patent policy. This letter
began “Texas Instruments believes that the JC
42.3 Committee on RAM Memories should
review and clarify its interpretation of the
JEDEC Patent Policy.” The letter further
states that “TI is concerned that the commit-
tee, or at least some of its members, have
interpreted the scope of the JEDEC Patent
Policy in a manner that is not only incorrect
but unworkable as well. The resulting contu-
sion has made it impossible for TI and other
members to determine the appropriate course
of conduct.” (CX 352 at 1).

702. A memorandum to JC 42 committee
members dated May 12, 1994 says that TI’s
request for clarification of the patent policy
was referred to EIA’s legal counsel J. Kelly for
response. The memorandum attached a copy of
J. Kelly’s response. (CX 355 at 1).

703. John Kelly’s response indicates that
“[w]ritten assurances must be provided by the

599a

patent holder when it appears to the com-
mittee that the candidate standard may
require the use of a patented invention.” (CA
355 at 2 (emphasis in original)).

704. The meeting minutes indicate that at
the close of a discussion on patents at the
March 1994 Committee meeting, the commit-
tee felt the patent policy was clear and that
discussion would be closed on the subject. (JX
19 at 4-5; Kellogg, Tr. 5028-30).

705. Gordon Kelley indicated: “I believe that
the litigation between Micron and Texas In-
struments was resolved, a1.d I believe that the
ballots that were on hold were removed from
hold and the ballots that were in recision were
reconstituted.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2483). In addi-
tion, he stated that Texas Instruments
“apologized for their representative who had
not disclosed — I personally know that they
removed him from the committee, he did not
come back, and they settled their dispute with
Micron and as far as the committee was con-

cerned, the issue was at this point resolved.”
(G. Kelley, Tr. 2485).

706. Cray representative Grossmeier
testified that “some members agreed that [TI]
didn’t need to [disclose] and otherjs] felt that
they were in violation of the JEDEC policy by
not [disclosing].” (Grossmeier, Tr. 10955).

707. This is clear evidence that by 1994, the
patent policy was ambiguous. Indeed, in 1994
Texas Instruments explicitly recognized the
“confusion” created when some members of
the committee “interpreted the scope of the

600a

JEDEC Patent Policy in a manner that is not
only incorrect but unworkable as well.” (CX
352 at 1).

6. Micron’s Presentation on Burst

EDO

708. Brett Williams, of Micron, put together
a presentation on Burst EDO that was pre-
sented at a January 1995 JEDEC DRAM task
group meeting. (JX 23 at 68-77; Williams, Tr.
825-26). Williams was present at the meet-
ing and was aware that Micron’s Burst EDO
patent application, on which he was a named
inventor, was not on the patent tracking list.
(JX 23 at 1; Williams, Tr. 963-64). Never-
theless, Williams did not disclose the pending
patent application on Burst EDO in connection
with that presentation and vote. (Williams, Tr.
936-37; see RX 585 at 3-4).

709. It was not until April 1996 that
Micron’s Burst EDO patent application was
disclosed to JEDEC when Micron offered to
license the patents under reasonable terms
and conditions, demonstrably free of any un-
fair discrimination, if the patents were issued
and were required for use of the standard. (CX
364; Williams, Tr. 937).

710. At trial, Williams was questioned about
the potential perception of his actions:

Q: Okay, So once the patent issued in June
of ‘96, if somebody had gone back and
looked at that patent, they would have
seen — by just looking at the patent, they
would have seen, well, Micron cited as
prior art early JEDEC meetings, and

601la

Micron applied for the patent in December
‘94, after some of the early meetings and
before — right before the January ‘95
presentation that you and Mr. Fusco
attended, and the patent issued in June of
‘96, and Micron made the disclosure to
JEDEC in April of ‘96. That’s the facts
they would have seen.

A: Yes.

Q: And to your knowledge, nobody seeing
those facts, no JEDEC member, came to
Micron and said, you guys acted in a way
inconsistent with the JEDEC policy, did
they? |

A: I’m not sure if anybody talked to Micron
about that or not. Nobody talked to me
about it.

(Williams, Tr. 941-42.)

7. Hyundai and Mitsubishi’s
Presentation on SLDRAM

711. On May 24, 1995, Hyundai and Mit-
subishi made presentations at a meeting of the
JC 42.3 subcommittee regarding a type of
DRAM known as SLDRAM. (JX 26 at 10-11;
Rhoden, Tr. 469-71). The minutes note that
“(t]he proposal was brought to JEDEC for a
pinout standard.” (JX 26 at 10). The Mitsu-
bishi presentation showed the pinout for an
SLDRAM. (JX 26 at 111; Rhoden, Tr. 471).

712. At a JEDEC meeting on December 9-10,
1997, the SLDRAM pinout standard ballot was
approved by the JC 42.3 subcommittee. (JX 41
at 22, 24; RX 1114 at 1; Rhoden, Tr. 1206-08).

602a

713. United States Patent No. 6,442,644 (the
‘644 patent) issued on August 27, 2002. (RX
2086 at 1). Among the inventors named on the
patent were JEDEC representatives Hans
Wiggers of Hewlett-Packard, Kevin Ryan and
Terry Lee of Micron, and JEDEC Chairman
Desi Rhoden, formerly of VLSI. (RX 2086 at 1).

714. Rhoden testified that claim 3 of the
patent claims the SLDRAM pinout that had
been standardized by JEDEC. (RX 2086 at 41;
Rhoden, Tr. 1211).

715. The ‘644 patent claims priority to a
number of provisional applications, including
provisional application 60/069,092 which was
filed on December 10, 1997, the very same
day that the JEDEC meeting approving the
SLDRAM patent was being held. (RX 2086 at
1; RX 2099-43).

716. Wiggers, Ryan and Rhoden were all
present at the December 1997 JC 42.3 sub-
committee meeting where the SLDRAM pinout
standard was balloted and approved. (JX 41 at
2). They were each involved in or affiliated
with the “SLDRAM Consortium” or SLDRAM
Inc., which subsequently became AMI2, and
was assigned the ‘644 patent. (RX 870 at 1;
Rhoden, Tr. 696-97, 1235; RX 2086 at 1).

717. The minutes of the meeting do not
indicate that any of the three disclused the ‘092
provisional application, (see JX 41 at 22, 24),
even though Rhoden testified at trial that even
non-member guest scientists or engineers from
foreign countries were “absolutely” obligated to
disclose patents and patent applications that

603a

were related in some general way to a sub-
ject being discussed at JEDEC. (Rhoden, Tr.
624-25).

G. Trial Testimony
1.A Policy in Transition

718. The evidence suggests an unsuccessful
attempt by some members of JEDEC to rede-
fine the patent policy after SEEQ and Wang.
(See CX 46 at 9). Complaint Counsel, however,
did not produce evidence sufficient to find an
announced, formal change in policy.

719. Some members of the committee treated
the spirit of the policy as the actual policy.
Williams testified that between late 1991 to
1993, “[i]Jt was discussed how to revise the
wording to ensure that the patent policy was
clear so that new members, when they came on
board, would know exactly the spirit of the
patent policy.” (Williams, Tr. 791).

2. Creation of Ambiguity and Confu-
sion Regarding the Policy

720. IBM’s representative Mark Kellogg
disclosed, at least twice, an intention on the
part of IBM to file a patent application related
to a product or feature under consideration for
standardization at JEDEC. At his deposition,
Kellogg testified that he did not believe the
disclosure was required under the JEDEC
patent policy. He contradicted this testimony
at trial:

A: I would appreciate a chance to clarify
because there’s a written policy, there was
an in-process modified policy, there is an

604a

expected policy, there are — there are — so
in answer to your question, this refers to
the written policy at the time in this
document.

Q: In the deposition?

A: And I do apologize for differing inter-
pretations of policy.

Q: When I asked you in the deposition
whether you believed your disclosure was
required under the JEDEC patent policy,
what JEDEC patent policy were you refer-
encing when you answered no?

A: The written policy at the time.

Q: Were there more than one JEDEC
patent policy that related to the
obligations to dis-
close intent to file patent applications?

A: I believe so.

(Kellogg, Tr. 5306-07).

721. Cray representative Grossmeier was
unclear on JEDEC’s patent disclosure rules, as
evidenced by his trial testimony that in the
1991-96 time frame “[iJt was not real clear on
the definition of what patents should be dis-
closed. Clearly if the sponsor presented infor-
mation that they were developing and patent-
ing, they would disclose it, but other parties, it
was pretty vague.” (Grossmeier, Tr. 10947 (em-
phasis added)).

722. Intel representative Sam Calvin testi-
fied that:

There was — and I don’t know when it
occurred or how early it occurred, but
there was a concern about not only

605a

patents, but applications for patents. And
I’m then real foggy on this, because I knew
it was an issue, but when exactly it went
from an issue to understanding that to be
JEDEC policy is unclear-in my mind.

(Calvin, Tr. 1006).

723. The JEDEC patent policy was not clear.
(Kellogg, 5306 (“there’s a written policy, there
was an in-process modified policy, there is an
expected policy”); Grossmeier, Tr. 10947 (pa-
tent policy was “not real clear... . it was
pretty vague”); Calvin, Tr. 1006 (descnbing
patent policy as “unclear”)). This lack of clarity
stemmed from an unsuccessful attempt, by
some, to redefine the patent policy.

3. Unsuccessful Efforts to Expand the
Patent Policy

724. The February 1991 minutes from the
42.5 subcommittee meeting note that “Town-
send made a presentation on patent issues in
general and made some suggestions as to what

could be done in the future to avoid these
problems.” (CX 13 at 4).

725. Attached to the meeting minutes were
handwritten notes. These notes include a sec-
tion labeled “Expectations of Participants”
which includes as the only expectation regard-
ing disclosure that “[flull disclosure of sponsors
regarding restrictions on intellectual property
at conceptual phase of draft standard.” (CX 13
at 31 (emphasis added)).

606a

726. The notes include a section labeled
“Possible Solutions on Intellectual Property”
which includes the following suggestions:

Require each member and alternate, each
year, to sign an affadavit that they will
disclose all knowledge of patents affecting
a draft ballot.

Requiring a legal statement from the
sponsoring company’s Intellectual
Property counsel to be attached to an
approved ballot when submitted to Council
for final approval.

Expulsion from JEDEC of a company who
attempts to achieve commercial advantage
from standardization if they have not
disclosed at the beginning their patent
position, intention, and royalty objectives
on a draft ‘patent.’

Censure by the supplier community of any
such company.

Establish equivalent standards to provide
royalty-free alternatives to the industry.

(CX 13 at 32).

727. In a March 11, 1991 letter copied to
John Kelly, John Kinn, Vice President of
Engineering at JEDEC, in response to a letter
from Jim Townsend regarding JEDEC’s patent
policy, indicated that “|t]he basic documents
containing our policy on patents are: EP-3, EP-
7, The JEDEC Manual JEP-21-H, and the EIA
Legal Guide.” (CX 317).

728. Kinn attached a draft revision of the
ANSI policy, indicating that it was “arrived at

607a

following two years of discussion among legal
representatives, from Standard developers and
users. Many individuals feel they do not go far
enough — others feel they go too far — a classic
case of our inability to harmonize conflicting
opinions in areas outside those that must obey
the laws of physics.” (CX 317 at 1).

729. Kinn noted a discussion from the pre-
vious council meeting although “no definitive
conclusions were reached other than to await
the results of the ANSI work.” (CX 317 at 1).
Kinn stated “I agree this issue should be con-
tinually reviewed at Council level until we
arrive at the best possible policy given mod-
ern circumstances and technology. Perhaps
JEDEC should sponsor a special workshop .. .
and perhaps achieve a consensus on future
directions for our policy.” (CX 317 at 2).

730. Meeting minutes from the May 9, 1991
JC 42.3 meeting indicate, regarding intellec-
tual preperty, that:

Toshiba noted that some of the procedure
documents have been issued a long time
ago but because of high Committee
turnover many reps don’t know what the
policies are. Toshiba recommended that at
each meeting a showing be made to
explain what the intellectual property
policies are. Toshiba would also like to
have a note on each ballot before it goes to
Council from the company lawyer. It was a
Council issue, but Toshiba wanted the
Committee to deal with it.

608a
(JX 5 at 3).

731. G. Kelley, JC 42.3 Chair, testified that
“Jim Townsend had suggested that we begin to
include patent applications in the concept of a
patent and that was brought to the committee
in May of 1991 and the vote was taken to agree
that the committee would work tio that new
definition of patents,” although there is no
evidence of such a vote in the May 1991
minutes. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2691; see JX 5).

732. JEDEC Council Minutes from May 18-
19, 1992 state that a “discussion was held
concerning patent policy. The Secretary out-
lined the genesis for changes and the fact that
a new set of policy statements and guidelines
have been written that will be circulated to
Council for review and comment.” (CX 35 at 9).

733. “Consensus was expressed that more
strength is needed in our policy, however
under existing laws, it seemed difficult to do.
This item will be discussed further in the
revision of 21-H,” according to the minutes of
the January 19-20, 1993 JEDEC Council
meeting. (CX 46 at 9).

734. Some members wanted to redefine the
patent policy to include patent applications
and the intent to file patent applications.
“Consensus was expressed that more strength
is needed in our policy” was understood by JC
42.3 Chair G. Kelley to mean “the more
strength concept to be the inclusion of patent
applications and material that might become
patents to the concept of patent requirements

609a

within the previous document.” (G. Kelley, Tr.
2421).

735. Existing EIA policy, which controlled
JEDEC policy, did not permit such an
expansive definition. “However, under existing
laws, it seemed difficult to do” was interpreted
by JC 42.3 Chair G. Kelley as follows: “[iJn my
understanding, the difficulty was that the EIA
Legal Guides did not include the patent
application and material that might become
patents concept, and the question before coun-
cil was could we expand the definition under
JEDEC Council control vithout endangering
our position under the EIA control.” (G. Kelley,
Tr. 2422).

736. This helps explain why the possible
solutions on intellectual property were never
implemented. (See CX 138 at 32).

737. Instead of explicitly and formally
changing the JFDEC policy from the EIA
policy, the Council unsuccessfully attempted to
redefine the word “patent.” JC 42.3 Chair G.
Kelley stated that “{aJt the JEDEC council,
which was struggling with the change in
wording of the JEDEC policy, we discussed the
conflict between the EIA wording of their
patent policy and the change that we were
making, which was patents and patent appli-
cations, and we believed as a group that the
concept of patents includes patent applica-
tions, that the concept of patents is a concept
which says avoid patents or material that
could become patents, and if you can't avoid
them, then you must deal with the RAND
requirements.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2696).

- 610a

738. This attempted redefinition of the policy
marked a departure both from established
JEDEC policy and from EIA patent policy and

caused confusion by creating ambiguity in the
policy. (See F. 606-38, 718-47).

739. Toshiba representative and JEDEC JC
42 Chairman Jim Townsend led the unsuccess-
ful attempt to redefine JEDEC’s patent policy.
Townsend was described as “a general with a
flagpole patent” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2401-02), as
“very sensitized by the WANG case” (Sussman,
Tr. 1353), and as someone on “a personal
crusade.” (CX 2079 at 38 (Karp Micron Dep.)).
Townsend and the rest of the board wanted to
ensure that Wang never happened again, so
that “the industry was not held hostage again.”
(Williams, Tr. 786-87).

4. Changes in Policy Language
a. EIA Patent Policy

740. Between 1991 and 1996, JEDEC “was
an activity within the EIJA engineering
department” (J. Kelly, Tr. 2075) aiso described
as “until early 2000, JEDEC was part of the
EIA corporate structure.” (J. Kelly, Tr. 1915)
“If there was a conflict, the broader rules of
EIA would govern.” (J. Kelly, Tr. 1916). J.
Kelly testified that in the event of a conflict,
any JEDEC manual would be subordinate to
the EIA manuals. (J. Kelly, Tr. 1915-6).

741. Gordon Kelley, who was the chair of the
JEDEC Council and of the JC 42.3 subcom-
mittee during much of the relevant time,
testified that he understood there to be a basic
conflict between the JEDEC and EIA manuals,

6lla

for the EIA manuals intended the word
“patents” to mean simply “patents,” while the
JEDEC manual (at least by 1993) allegedly
intended the word “patents” to mean “patents
and patent applications.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2686-
87; 2695-97). Up until late 1996, G. Kelley
understood that EIA’s definition of “patent”
had not changed. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2697).

742. This contradicted testimony by EIA
General Counsel John Kelly that EIA rules
and JEDEC rules concerning disclosure and
licensing of patents were consistent. (J. Kelly,
Tr. 1915-16, 1919-20). J. Kelly testified that he
believes that EIA’s interpretation has always
been that the term “patents” as used within
EIA and JEDEC includes patent applications.
(J. Kelly, Tr. 1887).

743. JEDEC manuals regarding the patent
policy consistently refer the reader to the EIA
Legal Guides and both JEP 21-H and JEP 21-I
state that EIA Legal Guides are controlling.
Nothing in the EIA Guides indicates that
patents refers to anything other than issued
patents. (F. 633-38).

b. Changes Found in JEP 21-I

744. Both Gordon Kelley and John Kelly
testified that the textual change in the 21-I
manual to include a reference to pending
patents “was a restatement of the patent
policy, and it in no way varied the policy
itself.” (J. Kelly, Tr. 1925; see also G. Kelley,
Tr. 2415-16).

745. However, G. Kelley contradicted his
own testimony regarding whether 21-I repre-

612a

sented a change in policy, stating that in
January of 1992, “[t]he council was dealing
with this revision of 21-I, and some major
changes were going to be taking place in the
committees as a result of this revision.” He
indicated that the changes included “the
inclusion of patent applications in the wording
of the patent section.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2411). G.
Kelley later explained that the expanded
wording “did not change the substance of the
practice that we had been performing to this
point, it just brought this document up to date
to that practice.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2423). Later he
explained, “[wle were including the words in
this document which added the requirement of
disclosing patent applications to the document
as we had been practicing in JC-42 for several
years at this point.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2431).

746. G. Kelley explained this contradiction
as based on the ambiguous definition of the
word “patent.” When initially asked about his
understanding in 1993 of the EIA patent policy
as it related to patent applications, G. Kelley
stated: “[t]he reason Im struggling is that I
understood after the beginning of 1991 that
the concept of patent included material that
might become published patents and that
changing the document [ie 21-I} to include
patent applications was just a clarification but
not a change in the policy, whether it was
JEDEC, EIA or ANSI.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2679).
He explained “what happened with me is my
definition of ‘patents’ changed... . [T]he patent
policy in the JEDEC manuals, EIA manuals
and ANSI manuals only specified ‘patents,’
which in my mind before 1991 meant issued

613a

patents. However, beginning in early 1991, it
was very clear on the committee that the
committee considered the issue of patents to be
issued patents as well as material that might
become issued patents.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2694-
95).

747. According to JEDEC Chairman Rhoden,
the footnote in JEP 21-I which states that “the
word ‘patented’ also includes items and
processes for which a patent has been applied
and may be pending” was “added to further
emphasize for anyone reading the document
and to myself the word ‘»atent’ has always
applied to all things within the patent process
inside of JEDEC, and that’s the explanation
that has always been given by myself inside of
JEDEC committees, and the footnote was
added to add — make sure that everyone under-
stood the word ‘patent’ involved everything
within the patent process.” (Rhoden, Tr. 316-
17).

5. Conflicts in the Trial Testimony

748. The ELA/JEDEC patent policy cannot be
based upon a common understanding of the
policy, as the conflicts in the trial testimony
show that there was no common _ under-
standing. JEDEC meinbers testified not only to
different understandings of the policy, but
some witnesses’ testimony was not credible

and even contradicted their own prior testi-
mony. (See F. 749-65).

614a

a. Trial Testimony Conflicts Re-
garding Whether the Patent
Policy Applied to Patent Appli-
cations and Intentions to File
Patent Applications

749. There was conflicting testimony from
JEDEC members regarding whether the
patent policy applied to patent applications
and intentions to file patent applications. One
opinion that was expressed was that the word
patents includes patent applications. (Calvin,
Tr. 1006-07; J. Kelly, Tr. 1886-88, 1896-97;
Landgraf, Tr. 1695-96; Lee, Tr. 6595-96;
Williams, Tr. 771, 909-11).

750. Another opinion was that the policy
extended to include an intent to file a patent
application. For example, JC 42.3 Chair G.
Kelley testified that when JC 42 Chairman
Townsend used the term “patents,” “I under-
stood him to mean an issued patent that was
available from the patent office, patent appli-
cations that were being worked on. with the
patent office, and items that were probably
going to become patents.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2406-
07).

751. JEDEC Chairman Rhoden testified that
in his “understanding of the policy, the term
‘patent’ applies to the patent process, anything
in that patent process.” (Rhoden, Tr. 636-38).
Rhoden was unable to cite a JEDEC or EIA
manual that expressly stated that disclosure
had to be made of an intention to file a patent
application, explaining that “I have seen in
those manuals the wording that would say that
it is a requirement for patents, and then it

615a

would be my interpretation of that that —
operating in the committee and in the guise of
standardization that that would be covered
and would be included.” (Rhoden, Tr. 639-40).

752. ‘Moreover, there was testimony that
presenters were required to disclose intel-
lectual property before they advocated a par-
ticular technology which implies that non-
presenting members were not under the same
obligation. (See McGrath, Tr. 9273-74). For
example, Intel representative Calvin testified.

The reason I alluded to two different
periods, and I can’t te. you specific dates,
is that I was aware initially that there was
a policy that any applicable patents that
might have effect on standard or
development should be disclosed. I was
also aware during that early period, and I
don’t know whether it was ‘92 or ‘93, but I
was aware that the primary obligation was
upon the presenting advocate of the
standard, but that the secondary
obligation, or almost to the same extent, I
shouldn’t say almost, it was to the same
extent, was to anyone within the body that
knew of patents that might have effect
upon the standard.

(Calvin, Tr. 1004.)

b. Trial Testimony Conflicts Re-
garding Whether Members
Should Disclose Actual Claims
or Whether a Patent Number
Was Sufficient

753. There was a conflict in the trial
testimony regarding what should be disclosed

616a

under the policy. For example, one view was
that the patent policy required a participant to
disclose sufficient information to put the
committee on notice as to the nature of the
relationship between the proposed standard
and the intellectual property that might relate
to the proposed standard. (J. Kelly, Tr. 1870-
71; Calvin, Tr. 1010-12; Rhoden, Tr. 627;
Williams, Tr. 771-72, 774-75, 793-94).

754. In contrast, other JEDEC members,
including Board Chairman Desi Rhoden,
testified that it would be sufficient for a
member simply to state that it “might have IP
relating” to its presentation. (Rhoden, Tr.
1304-05).

755. JC 42.3 Chair G. Kelley testified at trial
to a disclosure obligation in direct contra-
diction to his own prior testimony. At the
hearing, he testified that upon disclosure, a
company must “describe the claims of the
patent, probably paraphrased, sometimes
handed out as a handout the published patent
but more often paraphrased so that the
committee understood why the issues of that
patent material applied to the discussion in
JEDEC” and specifically stated that disclosure
of a patent number alone was not enough. (G.
Kelley, Tr. 2697-98). However, when asked, in
reference to his own prior testimony in a
Micron transcript, “[djid you testify that you
believed the giving of the patent number would
be enough and that that would give you the
information that you needed to go back and
research the details on the patent?” he

617a

responded “(t]he patent number would be
enough.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2700).

ec. Trial Testimony Conflicts Re-
garding Whether More Than Es-
sential Patents Were Included
in the Policy

756. There was conflicting testimony regard-
ing what should trigger disclosure. For exam-
ple, JC 42.3 Chair and IBM representative
Gordon Kelley testified that disclosure was
triggered by a patent claim that “reads on or
applies” to the standard, meaning that “if you
exercise the design or production of the
component that was being standardized [it]
would require use of the patent.” (G. Kelley,
Tr. 2706-07).

757. Another IBM JEDEC representative,
Mark Kellogg, testified that his understanding
was that “you have to disclose intellectual
property that reads on the standard.” (Kellogg,
Tr. 5311). Kellogg also stated that “[s]ome-
times we disclose intellectual property that
doesn’t [read on the standard] and one would
question why. It adds confusion.” (Kellogg, Tr.
5311).

758. Another opinion was that the EILA/
JEDEC patent policy extended to patents and
patent applications that “might be involved” in
the standards under development. (CX 208A at
19 (“obligation of all participants to inform the
meeting of any knowledge they may have of
any patents, or pending patents, that might be
involved in the work they are undertaking”);
G. Kelley, Tr. 2705 (“there were many work
items that occurred on the committee that did

618a

not become standards . . . My definition says
that any claim that might apply to the work of
the committee it was required to disclose.”);
Landgraf, Tr. 1693-94 (disclose patents or
applications “that would potentially be impact-
ing the standard or proposed standard.”); Lee,
Tr. 6595-96; Rhoden, Tr. 307; Sussman, Tr.
1346 (participants must disclose where there is
a “gray” area); CX 2057 at 203-04 (Meyer,
Dep.) (disclosed patent when “sufficiently
close” to work of JEDEC); Williams, Tr. 910-11
(if “there would be a reasonable possibility that
the patent was going to be associated with the
work of JEDEC, that you ought to say, hey,
I've got something I’m patenting here or
there’s something that you’re talking about
that I’ve got some IP on.”)).

759. Yet another opinion was that the policy
applies “if the intellectual property has any
relevance to the work that’s going on, it might
be involved — we’re not asking the people that
are disclosing to actually try to do a deter-
mination of whether it applies or doesn’t apply.
We're saying if it’s related, in the same general
area,...” (Rhoden, Tr. 322-23).

760. This conflict in trial testimony high-
lights the ambiguity of the JEDEC policy.
(F. 718-39).

d. Trial Testimony Conflicts Regard-
ing the Timing of Disclosure

761. Consistent with the EIA patent policy
which encourages disclosure of essential
patents, early disclosure was encouraged at
JEDEC. (J. Kelly, Tr. 1955-56; Williams, Tr.
772; 910-11).

619a

762. Some members understood this to mean
that disclosure was expected “[ilf there is any
suggestion that the committee’s work should
move in a certain direction.” (Williams, Tr.
1984).

763. Another opinion was that any obligation
that may have existed was not triggered until
the time that a proposal was balloted for
approval. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2707). JC 42.3 Chair
G. Kelley testified “(t]he policy at JEDEC was
that the disclosure should occur as soon as
possible in the discussion of the material and
certainly by the time it was balloted.” (G.
Kelley, Tr. 2702; see also CX 2057 at 211
(Meyer, Dep.) (testimony by Siemens JEDEC
representative Willi Meyer that although it
was “good practice” to notify the committee
before balloting, “the ballot was considered the
deadline when it should have been done’”)).

764. Cray representative Grossmeier, al-
though he testified that “if a patent holder has
a patent that in any way was applicable to a
proposed standard, they were to disclose that
at the time of balloting within the committee,”
pointed out that “[t]here’s probably thousands
of patents that are applicable to every device
that’s built, basically semiconductor technology
patents that undoubtably are being duplicated
by other companies. You can’t disclose every ~
I mean, there would be lists of thousands of
patents on every standard.” (Grossmeier, Tr.
10945, 10956).

765. Yet another opinion was that disclosure
was not tied to any procedural formality in the

620a

JEDEC process. (J. Kelly, Tr. 1983-85; Rhoden,
Tr. 488-89).

H. The Scope of the EILA/JEDEC Patent
Policy

1. Disclosures Were Encouraged and
Voluntary

766. The controlling EIA manuals do not
refer to or impose a mandatory obligation to
disclose intellectual property. (See CX 204 at 4;
CX 203A at 11; JX 54 at 9-10; see supra F. 633-
38).

767. JEDEC manuals also do not impose any
rmandatory disclosure duty. JEP 21-H, in effect
when Rambus joined JEDEC, states that
“JEDEC standards are adopted without regard
to whether or not their adoption may involve
patents” and does not provide any further
guidance regarding intellectual property. (CX
205 at 20; see supra F. 606-32). JEP 21-] reiers
to, but does not impose, an obligation to
disclose intellectual property. (CX 208 at 19,
26; see supra F.. 610-32).

768. The committee forms including the
membership application, sign-in/attendance
roster, committee ballot, members’ manual,
and patent tracking list do not refer to or
impose an obligation to disclose intellectual
property, although the committee ballot re
quests those aware of patents involved in the
ballot to “please” alert the committee. (CX 601
at 1-2; CX 306 at 1-2; CX 252A at 2; RX 507 at
15; see supra 646-69).

769. The contemporaneous correspondence
also shows that disclosure was voluntary. (RX

621a

669 at 3 (EIA, on behalf of JEDEC, told the
FTC in a January 22, 1996 letter that it
“encouragels| the early, voluntary disclosure of
patents that relate to the standards in work.”);
RX 742 at 1 (statement in JEDEC Secretary’s
7/10/96 memorandum to JEDEC Council mem-
bers that the EIA “encourage[s] early volun-
tary disclosure of any known essential pa-
tents”); RX 1585 at 1 (statement in JEDEC
Secretary’s 2/11/00 email that “[dJjisclosure of
patents is a very big issue for Committee
members and cannot be required of members
at meetings”)).

770. Moreover, there is no evidence that any
JEDEC member objected when Gordon Kelley
of IBM and Hans Wiggers of Hewlett-Packard
announced at JEDEC meetings that they
would not be disclosing any intellectual prop-
erty from their companies. (JX 15 at 6; RX 420
at 2; JX 18 at 8; Wiggers, Tr. 10592-94; see
supra F. 691-700).

771. Complaint Counsel did not provide
sufficient evidence from which to find that the
ELA/JJEDEC patent policy in effect while
Rambus was a member did anything more
than encourage the disclosure of patents
essential to the standards at balloting.

2. Patent Applications or Intentions To
File Patent Applications Were Not
Covered by the Policy

772. The controlling ELA manuals refer to
“patents,” “known patents,” and “patented item
or process,” but never refer to patent ap-
plications. (See, e.g., CX 204 at 4; CX 203A at

622a

11; JX 54 at 9-10; see supra F. 633-38). In
addition, there was testimony from G. Kelley
that EIA’s definition of the word “patent” did

not include patent applications. (G. Kelley, Tr.
2686-87; 2695-97).

773. The contemporaneous documents show
that the JEDEC patent policy encouraged the
disclosure of patents, not patent applications
or intentions to file patent applications. The
minutes of the February 2000 meeting of the
JEDEC Board of Directors state that dis-
closure of patent applications is “not required
under JEDEC bylaws.” (RX 1570 at 13). A few
days after the meeting, JEDEC Secretary Ken
McGhee explained to the members of JEDEC
42.4 that the disclosure of patent applications
went “one step beyond” the policy and that
even disclosure of patents could not be re-
quired: “Disclosure of patents is a very big
issue for Committee members and cannot be
required of members at meetings.” (RX 1582
at 1).

774. The most that she record evidence can
be understood to support is an argument that
presenters were expected to disclose patent
applications that related to technologies they
were asking that JEDEC standardize. (RX 507
at 15; McGrath, Tr. 9273-74).

3. Members Were Encouraged To
Disclose Patents That Were Essential
To Practice the Standard

775. Disclosure was only encouraged of
patents that were “essential” to a standard,
i.e., those patents that were necessary for the

623a

manufacture or use of a product that complied
with the standard. (CX 203A at 11 (standards
that “call for the use of patented items); JX 54
at 9 (standards “that call for the exclusive use
of a patented item or process”); CX 208 at
19 (standards that “require the use of pa-
tented items”); RX 742 at 1 (“known essential
patents”)).

776. Hewlett-Packard representative Thomas
Landgraf testified that he understood the
patent policy to involve disclosure if “the
standard required someone else’s idea to be
used . . . in order for it to operate.” (Landgraf,
Tr. 1695).

777. JC 42.3 Chair and IBM representative
Gordon Kelley testified that the disclosure
duty was triggered by a patent claim that
“reads on or applies” to the standard, meaning
that “if you exercise the design or production of
the component that was being standardized [it]

would require use of the patent.” (G. Kelley,
Tr. 2706-07).

778. Another IBM JEDEC representative,
Mark Kellogg, testified that his understanding
was that “you have to disclose intellectual
property that reads on the standard.” (Kellogg,
Tr. 5311). Kellogg also stated that “[s]ome-
times we disclose intellectual property that
doesn’t [read on the standard} and one would

question why. It adds confusion.” (Kellogg, Tr.
5311).

4. There Was No Duty To Search for
Intellectual Property Issues

779. It was undisputed at trial that JEDEC

representatives had no obligation to do any

624a

investigation, research or inquiry of their own
company or its lawyers regarding possible
intellectual property interests relating to
JEDEC work. (Rhoden, Tr. 623-24; G. Kelley,
Tr. 2451, 2700-01; J. Kelly, Tr. 1966-68; CX
2057 at 189, 193 (Meyer, Dep.); see also RX
1712 at 8 (no duty to search under ANSI
Guidelines)).

5. The Policy was Limited To Partici-
pants With Actual Knowledge

780. The patent policy applied only to people
with “actual knowledge.” (Rhoden, Tr. 623-24).
JEDEC Board Chairman Desi Rhoden testified
that the disclosure obligations under the
JEDEC patent policy were “triggered by the
actual knowledge of the people that were
involved, and that would not be just the
representative at the meeting, but all of the
people that would have been involved in...
The knowledge of the people that are involved
in the process.” (Rhoden, Tr. 624; J. Kelly,
Tr. 1970).

781. Rambus’s JEDEC representative,
Richard Crisp, testified that during the time
that Rambus was a JEDEC member, he: (1)
had not seen any Rambus patent application
with claims over an SDRAM that used any of
the four features at issue here; and (2) did not
know one way or the other whether Rambus’s
pending patent applications covered JEDEC-
compliant SDRAMs using any of those
features. (Crisp, Tr. 3540-43; 3461-66).

625a

6. The Patent Policy Did Not Apply Af-
ter a Company Withdrew From
JEDEC

782. After a company left JEDEC it had no
obligations under the patent policy. (See G.
Kelley, Tr. 2700-01).

7. If Disclosure Was Made, It Was En-
couraged No Later Than the Time of
Balloting

783. Consistent with EIA patent policy to
encourage early disclosure of relevant patents,

early disclosure was encouraged at JEDEC. (J.
Kelly, Tr. 1955-56; Williams, Tr. 772, 910-11).

784. The committee ballot was considered
the deadline for disclosure. (G. Kelley, Tr.
2707; Grossmeier, Tr. 10945). JC 42.3 Chair G.
Kelley testified “[t]he policy at JEDEC was
that the disclosure should occur as soon as
possible in the discussion of the material and
certainly by the time it was balloted.” (G. Kel-
ley, Tr. 2702; CX 2057 .at 211 (Meyer, Dep.)
(testimony by Siemens JEDEC representative
Willi Meyer that although it was “good prac-
tice” to notify the committee before balloting,
“the ballot was considered the deadline when it
should have been done”)).

785. This is consistent with the patent
tracking list which asked the committee chair
to “resolve patent status prior to (choose one),”
followed by a list of events, from presentation
to balloting. (CX 34 at 7; CX 711 at 169; JX 27
at 7-8; JX 28 at 15-18).

VII.

626a

JEDEC 42.3 COMMITTEE MEMBERS
WERE NOT MISLED BY RAMBUS ON IS-
SUES RELATING TO RAMBUS INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY

A. JEDEC Committee Leaders and Mem-
bers Were Fully Aware of Rambus’s
Patents With Respect To Features Be-
ing Considered for Incorporation into

JEDEC Standards

1. Crisp Did Not Mislead JEDEC At
the May 1992 Committee Meeting
Regarding Rambus’s Intent To
Seek Patent Rights Over Certain
SDRAM Features

a. IBM and Siemens

786. In the spring of 1992, IBM and Siemens
(whose former semiconductor division is now
called Infineon Technologies) weie cooperating
on a joint venture to develop and produce a
new DRAM design. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2532; CX
2088 at 277-78, 310 (Meyer, Infineon Trial
Tr.)).

787. Both the Siemens JEDEC represen-
tative, Willi Meyer, and the IBM JEDEC
representative, Gordon Kelley, were involved
in the Siemens/IBM DRAM development ef-
forts in the spring of 1992. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2620-
21). The efforts included a consideration of the
Ramv.~s technology. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2627).

788. In March 1992, G. Kelley prepared a
memorandum regarding Rambus. (RX 240 at
1). G. Kelley’s March 19, 1992 memorandum
refefs to “unique (and probably patented)
Rambus protocol” and “special Microprocessor

627a
and DRAM interface (other than industry
standard).” (RX 240 at 1). G. Kelley's memo-
randum also states that he had asked an IBM

in-house lawyer “to get me a copy of Rambus
patents.” (RX 240 at 1).

789. On April 23, 1992, G. Kelley attended a
presentation at IBM by Rambus founder Mike

Farmwald and Rambus executive David
Mooring. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2631; RX 273 at 1).

790. According to handwritten notes of the
April 23, 1992 Rambus/IBM meeting a Rambus
representative stated at the meeting that
Rambus intended to obtain “license fee +
royalties from IC company.” (CX 2355 at 1).
The notes also state that Rambus “want[s] to
set industry std.” (CX 2355 at 1).

791. In April 1992, Gordon Kelley prepared a
“Rambus Assessment” along with two other
IBM employees, Dr. Beilstein and Michael
Clinton. (RX 279 at 1). The “Rambus As-
sessment” is dated April 24, 1992, the day
after Kelley had attended the presentation by
Rambus. (RX 279 at 1; G. Kelley, Tr. at 2635).

792. The April 1992 “Rambus Assessment”
that G. Kelley co-authored refers to “Unique
Rambus Features/Attributes.” (RX 279 at 1).
The “Rambus Assessment” also states that
“Intel is Rambus licensee” and notes a
“potential future Intel memory strategy to
marry . . . 586/686 processor with Rambus
protocol to corner PC/notebook market with
state of the art performance.” (RX 279 at 4).

793. The “Rambus Assessment” states that
“Rambus can work technically” and notes “the

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risk is whether it becomes a standard for the
low end — bulk of DRAM bit volume — and that
it provides a simple low end solution for
anyone to get into the PC business.” (RX 279
at 8).

794. The “Rambus Assessment” states that
“lilf Rambus fails to become standard, then it
is business as usual for BTV [the acronym for
IBM’s Burlington, Vermont operations] and
the SDRAM has a significant chance of being
standard.” (RX 279 at 7).

795. It is apparent from G. Kelley’s March
and April 1992 analyses of Rambus that he
was aware of Rambus technology, and its

prospects for success in the spring of 1992. (See
RX 279; RX 273; RX 240).

796. One week after G. Kelley finalized the
April 24, 1992 “Rambus Assessment,” he
participated in a conference call with Siemens
JEDEC representative Willi Meyer. The call
included a discussion of Rambus. (RX 286A
at 1).

797. Meyer prepared an April 30, 1992
memorandum reflecting the conference call
which states in part: “Rambus: Visited key in-
house IBM users. IBM is still keeping its eye
on RAMBUS. RAMBUS has announced a claim
against Samsung for USD 10 million due to the
similarity of the SDRAM with the RAMBUS
storage device architecture. For that reason,
IBM is seriously considering to preemptively
obtain a license as soon as possible (at an
introductory price).” (RX 286A at 2; CX 2088 at
317-19 (Meyer, Infineon Trial Tr.)).

629a

798. Meyer testified that during the con-
ference call, Gordon Kelley had _ provided
the Rambus-related information contained in
Meyer’s April 30, 1992 memorandum. (RX
286A; CX 2088 at 317-19 (Meyer, Infineon
Trial Tr.)).

799. Siemens executive Martin Peisl sim-
ilarly testified that the information regarding
Rambus that is contained in Meyer’s April 30,
1992 memorandum “seems to be information
coming from IBM or Gordon Kelley.” (Peis}, Tr.
4517).

800. G. Kelley and Meyer were both aware,
as of April 30, 1992, of a possibility that
Rambus might assert some intellectual prop-
erty claims “due to the similarity of the
SDRAM with the RAMBUS storage device
architecture.” (RX 286A at 2).

801. An April 16, 1992 IBM memorandum
referenced the fact that an-in house lawyer, J.
Walter, had been asked to review and com-
ment upon Rambus related intellectual prop-
erty issues. (RX 272 at 2).

802. Meyer also wrote a separate memo-
randum dated April 30, 1992 that stated in
part that “{t]he original idea behind the
SDRAM is based on the basic principle of a
simple pulse input (IBM toggle pin) and the
complex RAMBUS structure.” (RX 285A at 5).
This memorandum also demonstrates Meyer’s
awareness of similarities between the SDRAM
device and the “RAMBUS structure.” (See RX
285A at 5).

630a

803. On May 6, 1992, Meyer prepared a
chart showing the “Pros” and “Cons” of “Sync
DRAM,” “Rambus DRAM,” and “Cached
DRAM.” (RX 289 at 1).

804. In his May 6, 1992 “Pros” and “Cons”
chart, Meyer stated that the “2-bank”
synchronous DRAM “may fall under Rambus
patents.” (RX 289 at 1). Meyer testified that he
did not think Rambus had patents at the time
covering 2-bank synchronous DRAM but that
there was the potential it could obtain such
patents. (CX 2089 at 44 (Meyer, Infineon Trial
Tr.)).

805. Meyer testified that at the time, he
thought there was a potential that Rambus
would obtain patents covering two-bank
features that may be included in SDRAMs. (CX
2089 at 44 (Meyer, Infineon Trial Tr.)).

806. Meyer also testified that in 1992, “we
were absolutely sure that Rambus was trying
to get patents.” (CX 2088 at 75 (Meyer,
Infineon Trial Tr.)).

b. The May 1992 JC 42.3 Meeting

807. On May 7, 1992, Meyer and G. Kelley
attended a JC 42.3 subcommittee meeting in
New Orleans, Louisiana. (CX 34).

808. The May 1992 meeting was Richard
Crisp’s first formal JC 42.3 subcommittee
meeting as Rambus’s JEDEC representative,
(CX 34 at 1; Crisp, Tr. 2929), although he had
attended a JC 42.3 task group meeting on
April 9 and 10, 1992. (Crisp, Tr. 3009-10).

63la

809. At the meeting, Gordon Kelley asked
Crisp if he would like to comment on whether
Rambus had patents or potential patents
covering two bank design. Crisp declined to
comment. (CX €73 at 1; CX 2089 at 136-37
(Meyer, Infineon ‘lrial Tr.)).

810. Howard Sussman of NEC commented to
the group that he had seen a copy of a
Rambus’s foreign patent application. (CX 2092
at 128 (Crisp, Infineon Trial Tr.)). According to
Crisp, the essence of the comment was that
Sussman had obtained a copy of the appli-
cation from the foreign patent office, had read
it and concluded that it should not be a
concern for the JEDEC standardization effort
because, according to Sussman, “many, many
claims .. . are anticipated by prior art.” (CX

73 at 1).

811. The witnesses who testified about the
May 1992 exchange between G. Kelley and
Crisp were Kelley, Crisp, Siemens represen-
tative Willi Meyer, IBM representative Mark
Kellogg and Intel representative Samuel
Calvin. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2662; Crisp, Tr. 3066;
Kellogg, Tr. 5055-56; Calvin, Tr. 1066-69; CX
2089 at 169, 136 (Meyer, Infineon Trial Tr.)).

812. Calvin, the Intel representative,
testified that he recalls that at the JEDEC
meeting, Crisp was asked if he cared to
comment about whether Rambus had patents
or intellectual property that covered a par-
ticular subject. (Calvin, Tr. 1068-69). Calvin
recalls that Crisp declined to comment.
(Calvin, Tr. 1068-70).

632a

813. Meyer, who was Siemens’s primary
JEDEC representative between 1992 and
1996, testified that at the May 1992 meeting,
he asked G. Kelley to ask Crisp “whether [he]
would like to comment” about whether Ram-
bus had patents relating to the use of two
banks in a DRAM. (CX 2089 at 133-34 (Meyer,
Infineon Trial Tr.); CX 2057 at 66 (Meyer,
Infineon Dep.)).

814. Meyer testified that “[t]he way how
Kelley formulated the question was: Do you
want to give a comment on this?” (CX 2088 at
136, 164 (Meyer, Infineon Trial Tr.)). Meyer
testified that Crisp “just shook his head.” (CX
2088 at 136, 164 (Meyer, Infineon Trial Tr.)).

815. Meyer’s trip report of the May 1992
meeting states in part: “Siemens and Philips
concerned about patent situation with regard
to Rambus and Motorola. No comments given.”

(RX 297 at 5).

816. Crisp sent an email on May 6, 1992 that
described his exchange with Kelley in this
manner: “Siemens expressed concern over
potential Rambus Patents covering designs.
Gordon Kelley of IBM asked me if we would
comment which I declined.” (CX 673 at 1).

817. Gordon Kelley testified that Siemens
representative Willi Meyer had raised an
“issue of concern with Rambus and Rambus
patents” at the May 1992 meeting. (G. Kelley,
Tr. 2662). Kelley recalls that Meyer had asked
Crisp if he knew whether Rambus “had
patentable material on the concept of the
synchronous DRAM.” (G. Kelley, Tr. 2543).

633a

Kelley recalls that Crisp declined to comment
in response to that question. (G. Kelley, Tr.
2662).

818. G. Kelley testified that he could not
recall whether he had said anything at the
May 1992 JEDEC meeting about possible
Rambus patent claims. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2544).

819. G. Kelley also testified that a “no
comment” from a JEDEC member in response
to a question about intellectual property is
“unusual” and “surprising” and “is notification
to the committee that there should be a
concern... .” (G. Kelley, T:. 2579).

820. IBM representative Mark Kellogg
prepared contemporaneous handwritten notes
at the May 1992 JEDEC meeting that refer to
the concerns Meyer had raised. (RX 290 at 3).
Kellogg’s notes state: “Siemens: Kernel of chip
similar to Rambus. Patent concerns? (No
Rambus comments).” (RX 290 at 3).

821. Kellogg testified that when he used the
phrase “kernel of the chip” in his notes, he was
referring to Meyer’s concern that “the funda-
mental architecture of the SDRAM device” was
“similar to Rambus.” (Kellogg, Tr. 5324).

822.Kellogg testified that he took his notes
at the May 1992 meeting in part to act as “a
log of events” and “also to initiate action on my
part or the part of others.” He said that this
discussion “would have been a flag, which is
why I wrote it down.” (Kellogg, Tr. 5322),

823. Kellogg testified that he considered the
discussion a “flag” because JEDEC members

634a

were “describing possible intellectual property
concerns which may affect our decision process
for synchronous DRAM.” He testified that
“Itlhat is a concern” and that “[t]he lack of
response by Rambus is also a concern.” (Kel-
logg, Tr. 5323).

824. The chairman of the meeting, Gordon
Kelley, testified that prior to the May 1992
meeting Crisp had spoken to him about the
possibility: of Rambus scheduling a_ presen-
tation concerning DRAM design. (G. Kelley, Tr.
2553). G. Kelley also testified that he had
refused to allow Rambus to present its
technology for standardization at JEDEC on
this and another occasion, even though he had
never barred any other member company from
presenting its technology. (G. Kelley, Tr. 2649-
58).

825. G. Kelley had a clear conflict of interest;
he made and enforced his unilateral decision to
bar Rambus from presenting its technology two
weeks after he wrote in an internal company
document that his company’s interests were
threatened by the Rambus technology and
were best served if Rambus “fails to become
standard.” (RX 279 at 7). He did not disclose
this conflict to Crisp or to anyone else. (G.
Kelley, Tr. 2656-57).

c. PCT Application

826. A “PCT” application is an international
patent application filed pursuant to the Patent
Cooperation Treaty. (CX 1454 at 1). Rambus
had filed a PCT application on April 16, 1991
that was identical in all material respects to

635a

the ‘898 application it had filed at the same
time in the U.S. (Fliesler, Tr. 8811; see CX
1451; CX 1454).

827. Pursuant to the procedures governing
applications filed under the Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty, Rambus’s PCT application became
publicly available as of October 31, 1991. (CX
1454 at 1; First Set of Stipulations, Stip. 8).

828. NEC’s Sussman testified that he did
not find anything in the PCT application
that “related to the work ongoing at JEDEC.”
(Sussman, Tr. 1445).

d. After the May 1992 JC-42.3
Meeting

829. Roughly one week after the May 1992
meeting, Siemens’s JEDEC representative
Willi Meyer also reported that: “Siemens and
Philips: concerned about patent situation with
regard to RAMBUS and MOTOROLA. No
comments given. Motorola patents have
priority over RAMBUS’. RAMBUS patents
filed but pending.” (RX 297 at 5).

830. In June 1992, G. Kelley gave a
presentation about Rambus to a group of about
30 engineers. Half of

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_0834%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
