# Opposition Brief — Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc. (No. 08-313)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2008

## Text

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In The monet ad :
Supreme Court of the Anited States 7

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EUGENIO NAVARRO,

Petitioner,

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BRONEY AUTOMOTIVE REPAIRS, INC.,
4 STEPHEN BRONEY, TILDEN TOTAL
4 CAR CARE CENTER, ANTHONY BROWN,

Respondents. Fi

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Eleventh Circuit Court Of Appeals

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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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HARRY O. BORETH*

GLASSER, BORETH & KLEPPIN
8751 W. Broward Blvd.
Suite 105

Plantation, FL 33324

(954) 424-1933

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*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Although the Eleventh Circuit decided this case
consistent with sixty-five (65) years of jurisprudence
regarding individual coverage under the Fair Labor
Standards from this Court ~ the test for such cover-
age is whether the employee’s activities constitute
participation in the actual movement of persons or
things in interstate commerce, as opposed to “merely
affecting” interstate commerce (e.g., McLeod v.
Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943) (holding that the test
to establish individual coverage under the FLSA is
“not whether the employees activities merely affect or
indirectly relate to commerce but whether they are
actually in or so closely related to the movement of
the commerce as to be a part of it”) and Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (holding
that “Congress in enacting this statute plainly indi-
cated its purpose to leave local business to the protec-
tion of the states” and did not “exercise in this Act the
full scope of the commerce power”)) — should this
Court grant a certiorari petition and enter a ruling
inconsistent with its established precedent, or should
the Court revisit its established precedent in this
area and reverse it (for seemingly no good reason
other than to allow the petitioner to recover under

the FLSA)?

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 29.6

Respondent Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc.
does not have a parent corporation or subsidiary
corporation and there is no publicly held company
that owns 10% or more of its stock. It is a small,
family-owned company owned by Respondent Rom-
ney.

Respondents Stephen Romney and Anthony
Brown live in Broward County, Florida and own and
operate a car repair shop, the Respondent Broney
Automotive Repairs, Inc.

Respondent Tilden Total Car Care Center was
not served in this lawsuit, and is not represented by
counsel representing the other Respondents.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Question Presented ............. a alaibnd bauuiobcaekousnaeeeie i
Corporate Disclosure Statement ...................002 0 li
GEO WE OGIO 6 oooc cnc cckccvcssccccosscocesdevnseseconscnvs iii
Table of Authorities .....................66 END anaes STN
obi a Vacas cptinds vs evunsicvbusedcavrevasssnaesedes 1

PERN TOU NEDO NGO cascode si ccdcnencvenconscewecdacdes cues
Reasons for Granting the Writ ........................0266 12

I. The decision below was decided consis-
tent with established precedent of this
Court and of the Eleventh Circuit, and
therefore the petition should be denied.... 12

SIE PRINS LORIE SEMI GAT PROD NOI Bie MCP OA 27

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CASES
Alonso v. Dolphin Exterminating Co., 2005 WL

1901682 (llth Cir. 2005)................. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054

CR NG MNES Sica cus icivosncsosnududivepnounenwodsueaiadaccedtbanns 13
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S.

See ecg UN AER SRS DPE MIS RR 90 RS COB ccOORE APS INE Rage 6
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders,

Le B96 LOG CLIG Cie. TOGB) ooo. csc ccc ceccs sccesecesseecs 12
Brennan v. Wilson Building, Inc., 478 F.2d

BE CEs Ge, TIT ere ao i cosaa sacsckcalics canoes 4,16,19
Casanova v. Morales, 2007 WL 4874773 (S.D.

1g RRO eMeeno Wasabi d sed te bikb cay nNateaibeomnleee ncaalan teense ohaienscues 8
Dunlop v. Industrial America Corp., 516 F.2d

Me TIES ROPETEE iin -s cchascsbvecundeueigeaclids mededatconveds 20
Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 551 F.Supp.2d 1368

Ses es IEE Siasdssccacanevtsccaheuuve tekwdn wioan dai sscbe yauseceses 18
Junkin v. Emerald Lawn Maintenance and

Landscaping, Inc., 2005 WL 2862079 (M.D.

We RN Bassi on svcaccivivtancsnaceec maboniatbheessouwessaennd 17, 18
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 522

IEE aiciivk gs teens soaker vateapuds eas ee as cnc L. 2. SE
Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Chil-

dren’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282 (M.D.

Nh INE Rei sdipicndk caknsncihuN veda saincuusluidcceiionmbinmmauan 14, 15
Marshall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122

CI I BIE Secinncs ddneinaceacuen uueesanreees 5, 15, 23, 24

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F.Supp. 1329 (M.D.
BME TD ci ciccnchsccavedsshvahsmacteeibarsanthacasuuoninucs 20, 21, 22
McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d
RN AEB U Re MONG RD Paknk yi oecesactencscsviribidacechacessianvseres 11
McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943)......... passim
Mitchell v. Lublin McGaughy & Assocs., 358
EG OH AIR asks svuuusaineudes\eedulcesekedhevecvececneceseidecones 14
Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc.,
533 F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008).............. passim
Rivera v. Heights Landscaping, Inc., 2004 WL
BAe CSc Fake ME ioecsiicasecscensecenccecesdecorcevcossensces 19
Russell v. Continental Restaurant, Inc., 430
FSup0.20 S21 CO. Mid. 2ZOOG) ........0...c0sccscceseneseseesers 19
Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc. 448 F.3d
I Oe BORE Ny I oes on sc aceccdcssaramevcnnbowect passim
Tilbury v. Mitchell, 123 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. La.
seek shi ck gus Lb cabs biatsbndileaidscawivds Sonldionil 15, 26, 27
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564
RM eect toy el ssh caihanens waktwsdaneankgacaiiigaion passim
Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317
oes cals sc susadanasennnrssenecunes 14
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
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1

INTRODUCTION

q Petitioner has presented no “compelling reason”
‘ for his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to be granted

(“Petition”). See Sup. Ct. R. 10. Specifically, Petitioner
fails to demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion in this case (“Opinion”) is in conflict with a
decision of this Court, and Petitioner makes no ar-
gument that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is in
conflict with a decision of another Court of Appeals or
that the Eleventh Circuit decided an important
federal question that has not been settled by this
Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a-c). While the Petition does
argue that the Opinion is in conflict with a prior
decision of this Court, it is not. See, e.g., McLeod uv.
Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1943); Walling v. 4
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1943); :
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 522, 523 (1942).
McLeod, Jacksonville Paper Co., and Kirschbaum Co.
are a triumvirate of cases that require the conclusion
that the Petition is in fact frivolous. f

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The “Question Presented” section of the Petition
suggests that the Opinion’s holding uses the wrong
test for individual coverage, as the Petition claims
that the Opinion, in concluding individual coverage
was not applicable to Petitioner, wrongly “con-
clude[ed] that petitioners [sic} activities merely
affected and did not sufficiently affect interstate ,
commerce” under the FLSA, as if that is not the 4
correct legal standard. In the Petition’s “Relevant
Provisions Involved” section, it quotes the language

2

from 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) which states that individ-
ual coverage exists for employees who are “engaged in
commerce”. ’

The Petition’s arguments that the Opinion does
not cite the correct legal standard are entirely mis-
placed (and are misleading) because this Court has
previously interpreted the “engaged in commerce”
language from § 207(a)(1) to mean that employees
that are entitled to invoke individual coverage may
do so if their work is “in the ‘channels of interstate
commerce, Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317
U.S. 564, 63 S. Ct. 332, 335, 87 L.Ed. 460, as distin-
guished from those who[se work] merely affected that
commerce.” McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-
94 (1943) (interpreting the phrase “engaged in com-
merce” to such extent as to be a veritable treatise
concerning that phrase contained in § 207(a)(1)).
Indeed, Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S.
564, 570-71 (1943) (quoting Kirschbaum Co. v. Wall-
ing, 316 U.S. 522, 523 (1942)), holds that the FLSA
does not apply “to business or transactions ‘affecting

commerce’”. This Court in McLeod framed the test as
follows:

The test under this present act, to determine
whether an employee is engaged in com-
merce, is not whether the employee’s activi-
ties affect or indirectly relate to interstate
commerce but whether they are actually in
or so closely related to the movement of the
commerce as to be a part of it.

3

McLeod, 319 U.S. at 497. Thus, the Opinion in this
case directly followed the language from controlling
precedent from this Court. The McLeod case is the
exact case that the district court relied on in this
case. Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 533
F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing McLeod, 319
U.S. at 491). The Opinion cites from Thorne v. All
Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 (11tl
Cir. 2006), which cites the same standard and relies
on the McLeod case for that standard; thus, the
Opinion appropriately relies on controlling precedent
of this Court. Petitioner does not argue his work was
in the channels of commerce, nor could he.

In McLeod, this Court noted that the definition of
goods contained in § 203(i) specifically “does not
include goods after their delivery into the actual
physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof
other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor
thereof.” McLeod, 319 U.S. at 494. Thus, the Court
held that therefore “handlers of goods for a whole-
saler who moves them interstate on order or to meet
the needs of specified customers are all in commerce,
while those employees who handle goods after acqui-
sition by a merchant for general local disposition are
not.” Id. at 494. This law is nothing new to the Peti-
tioner, as it was relied upon by the district court in
this case. Navarro, 533 F.Supp.2d at 1223 (citing
McLeod, 319 U.S. at 491). Thus, it is not clear why
this Petition was ever filed in the first instance, since
the goods in this case handled by Petitioner were
obtained from retailers.

The Petition further argues that “Petitioners [sic]
regular job duties, involved the pick-up and delivery
of auto-parts [sic] from various auto parts suppliers
that were manufactured outside the state of Florida.
[Petitioner] also regularly installed those auto-parts
[sic] into [Respondent’s] customers’ vehicles who
where [sic] the ultimate consumers.” (Pet. at 2). The
point-heading in the “reasons for granting the Peti-
tion” section of the Petition argues that “the inter-
state journey of goods does not cease to flow in
commerce until the goods have reached their final
destination and therefore all individuals who handle
these goods during flow [sic] through commerce are
individually covered”. (Pet. at 3).

These two arguments are contrary to prior Su-
preme Court precedent, as stated above, because
goods are no longer in the stream of commerce for
purposes of individual coverage under the FLSA once
the goods wind up in the hands of the local retailer.
The ultimate consumer is the Respondent because it
bought the auto parts from a loca) retailer, because
this Court has previously held that goods lose their
interstate status and are “at rest” by the time the
retailer receives them. McLeod, 319 U.S. at 494
(acknowledging so); Brennan v. Wilson Building, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973) (interpreting the
holding of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S.
564, 568 (1943) to be as follows: “the Court ruled that
the interstate journey of the goods did not end, and
the goods thus did not cease to flow in commerce,
until they reached their final destination — the retail

stores”). Accordingly, contrary to the Petitioner’s
arguments, precedent going back sixty-five (65) years
holds that goods that once may have had an inter-
state nature lose that status by the time the local
retailer receives them. /d.; Navarro v. Broney Auto-
motive Repairs, Inc., 5383 F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (citing McLeod, 319 U.S. at 491).

The Petitioner’s next argument is that “any
regular contact with commerce, even if it is small,
will result in an employee being covered by the FLSA.
No de minimis rule applies.” (Pet. at 6) (citing Mar-
shall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th
Cir. 1979)). That is contrary to this Court’s prior
precedent, as this Court has specifically held before
that individual coverage is applicable only “[i]f a
substantial part of an employee’s activities related to
goods whose movement [was] in the channels of
interstate commerce....” Walling v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943). Recently, this
“substantial part” language has been interpreted by
the courts and the Department of Labor to mean that
an employee seeking to invoke individual coverage
must regularly and recurrently be engaged in inter-
state commerce. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc.,
448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 776.23(d)(2) & .24).

The Petitioner’s next argument is that the FLSA
is a remedial statute that is to be construed broadly.
It is not clear if the FLSA qualifies as a remedial
statute, as it was enacted during the depths of the
great depression to give incentive to employers to

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spread work around to reduce the unemployment
rate. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446,
460 (1948) (finding that the FLSA was enacted “to
spread employment through inducing employers to
shorten hours [for existing workers] because of the
pressure of the extra costs [-— the payment of over-
time — which would require the employer to hire
additional workers].”). To the extent that the individ-
ual coverage should be construed broadly, it is only to
be construed broadly within the test enunciated by
this Court as identified herein. Apparently, the Peti-
tioner is seeking this Court to reverse sixty-five (65)
years of settled law on this issue, and create a whole
new jurisprudential test in pursuance of a general
axiom that the Court shoulc construe the statute
broadly. The Court should, obviously, reject that
invitation, because to entertain it would flummox
businesses in their attempts to comply with the
FLSA, by changing settled law in such a manner.

The Petitioner sets forth that in Walling v. Jack-
sonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 567 (1943), this
Court stated that “[i]t is clear that the purpose of the
Act was to extend federal control in this field
throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of
interstate commerce.” The Court should note that the
Jacksonville Paper Co. is referring to the actual
channels of commerce; which are not at issue here, as
Petitioner did not work in one. That case also held
that Congress did not intend to use its full commerce
clause power for employees who were neither working
in the channels of interstate commerce nor working

7

with an instrumentality of commerce, but rather
Congress “plainly indicated its purpose to leave local
business to the protection of the states” and that
“Congress did not exercise in this Act the full scope of
the commerce power.” Id. at 570. The McLeod deci-
sion, as stated above, discusses this concept further,
and also holds that Congress did not exercise its full
commerce power in enacting the statute. That is why
the test for individual coverage requires an employee
seeking to invoke it to show that his or her activities
did more than just “affect” commerce.

°

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a Complaint in
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, bringing one substantive count for
overtime, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seg. (R1). Later, an Amended
Complaint was filed. (R20). Discovery ensued, and
the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or in the Alternative,
Request to Convert into Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, when it became clear that no jurisdiction
existed in the case. (R27). Shortly thereafter, the
Defendants moved to stay the case, because it was
evident that there was no subject matter jurisdiction.
(R30). The Court granted the Motion for Stay, (R37),
but despite the stay, the Petitioner filed his own
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as to jurisdic-
tion. (R38). Petitioner’s counsel filed a similar motion

8

for summary judgment in another case, Casanova uv.
Morales, 2007 WL 4874773 *1 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 3,
2007), aff'd, ___ F.3d __, 2008 WL 94756 (11th Cir.
2008), which was denied by the same district court
judge that decided this case and affirmed by the
Eleventh Circuit. The district court converted the
motion into a summary judgment motion, and pro-
vided the Petitioner with additional time to respond,
after the motion was fully briefed, but the Petitioner
failed to submit any additional evidence or argument.
(R50n.4).

In response to the Defendants’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, contrary to the testimony in Peti-
‘tioner’s deposition (and argued in the Petition),
Petitioner submitted an affidavit in which he averred
that he picked up parts from local retail auto parts
stores (in his deposition he stated that all he did was
install the parts and clean the shop on occasion).
(R44). The Court denied the Petitioner’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, but granted the Re-
spondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, based on
the clear binding precedent of Thorne v. All Restora-
tion Inc., 448 F.3d 1261 (llth Cir. 2006), McLeod v.
Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943), and other cases.
(R50). Thereafter, the district court entered a Final
Judgment in Defendants’ favor. (R51). Petitioner’s
Appeal followed (R52), and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Navarro uv.
Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 2008 WL 2315869
(11th Cir., June 6, 2008).

i

9

The facts of this case are largely set forth in the
published opinion Navarro v. Broney Automotive
Repair, Inc., 533 F.Supp.2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The
corporate Defendant is an automobile repair shop.
(R27-4). The business was created in October, 1999.
(R27-4). It is a mom-and-pop shop owned by Defen-
dants Stephen Romney ard Anthony Brown. (R27-4).
Petitioner began working for the Respondents in
September, 2004, and continued working there
through April 9, 2007. (R27-4). Petitioner was hired
as a “helper”. (R27-4). Petitioner testified that when
he was hired, he understood that his duties were to
help work on the cars in any way that he might be
asked, such as to exchange en alternator, starter
motor, radiator, or transmission. (R27-4). Petitioner
basically fixed and replaced parts. (R27-4). Romney
described Petitioner’s job duties similarly, and testi-
fied Petitioner performed oil changes, brake pad
changes, took parts off, and put parts back on,
“[bjasic stuff, very basic.” (R27-4).

Petitioner testified in his deposition that he did
not order parts for the business or have any direct
dealings with customers. (R27-4). Specifically, Peti-
tioner never received any payments from the custom-
ers or in any way dealt with credit cards. (R27-4). If
Petitioner worked on a vehicle, and his work required
that a new or replacement part be ordered, Petitioner
would tell Defendant Bromney, and Bromney would
order the part. (R27-4).

Romney orders his parts from Bennett Auto
Supply, a local auto parts supplier located at Dixie

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highway in Fort Lauderdale. (R27-4). Romney also
orders some parts from other automotive retailers,
such as Auto Zone, Pines (Auto Parts), and some local
dealerships. (R27-4). The parts were always delivered
to Romney’s shop by the auto parts suppliers, typi-
cally within one hour after the order was placed.
(R27-5). Petitioner testified very clearly that he
worked on the cars in any manner that was asked of
him by Mr. Romney and/or Mr. Brown, and he specifi-
cally identified replacing alternators, starter engines,
radiator, and transmissions. (R36-2). Petitioner
testified that sometimes he would diagnose what was
wrong with the cars, but that he did not deal with
front office paperwork, did not deal with the custom-

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’ ers, did not order parts, and did not deal with cus-

tomers. (R36-2). After listing these duties (and non-
duties), Petitioner plainly testified that there were no
other tasks that he performed, as follows:

Q: Other than the job duties that we dis-
cussed, are there any other job duties
other than, basically, removing parts or
replacing parts on the vehicles? Any-
thing else that I’m missing that you did
on a daily basis?

A: When there was nothing to do just to
clean the area.

7 * Y

Q: Any other job duties at Broney that we
naven’t mentioned already that you did
other than the cleaning up when there

ll

was slow times, and the fixing and re-
placing of parts?

A: No.

(R36-2). Nevertheless, despite this clear description of
his job duties, Petitioner submitted an affidavit in
opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment listing other job duties. In his affidavit,
Petitioner claims that he went and picked up parts
from local auto parts stores. (R35; Aff. of Navarro
q 9). The district court, believing that picking up the
auto parts has no bearing on whether the Petitioner
can invoke individual coverage, accepted the testi-
mony, and assumed for purposes of its opinion that
the Petitioner picked up parts from the local retailers
that the Defendants had purchased, despite a consid-
erable body of precedent that parties are not sup-
posed to submit affidavits inconsistent with their
previously given deposition testimony to thwart
summary judgment. McCormick v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff cannot dispute that the corporate De-
fendant only earned $277,278 in the tax year October
1, 2005 to September 30, 2006. (R27-4). Additionally,
from 2004 — 2007, Plaintiff cannot rebut that the
corporate Defendant’s gross revenue was under
$500,000 annually. (R27-4). In fact, from the last two
quarters of 2003 to the present, the corporate Defen-
dant has never had a quarter in which gross revenue
exceeded $125,000, and never had four consecutive
quarters in which gross revenue exceeded $500,000

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12

annually. (R27-4). These facts made the Petitioner
concede below that there was no enterprise coverage,
see Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 533
F.Supp.2d 1223, 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that
“Navarro concedes that he cannot prove enterprise
coverage because Broney Automotive’s gross income
during the relevant period is less than $500,000”), but
Petitioner improperly suggests in a footnote that
there may be enterprise coverage. (Pet. at 3 n.1).
Petitioner’s concession of this point below makes that
issue not appealable. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala.
v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1354 (llth Cir. 1998)

(holding that points waived below are not appeal-
able).

a
od

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW WAS DECIDED
CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PRE-
CEDENT OF THIS COURT AND OF THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, AND THEREFORE
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED.

Section 207(a) of the FLSA provides, in relevant
part:

Except as otherwise provided in this section,
no employer shall employ any of his employ-
ees who in any workweek is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, for a workweek longer

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13

than forty hours unless such employee re-
ceives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate
not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed.

29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). This Court has expressly held
that the “engaged in commerce” term in § 207(a)(1)
means that to invoke individual coverage an em-
ployee must show more than that they merely affect
interstate commerce, but rather must show that they
significantly affect it, that is, actually be involved in
it. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1943)
(interpreting the phrase “engaged in commerce” to
such extent as to be a veritable treatise concerning
that phrase contained in § 207(a)(1)). The McLeod
case, which was decided shortly after Walling uv.
Jacksonville Paper Co., requires the conclusion that
certiorari should not be granted by this Court, as
there is nothing for it to decide

Nevertheless, Respondents will address several
arguments made by the Petitioner. Simply put, the
FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime at a rate
of one and one-half the employee’s regular rate for all
time worked over 40 hours in a week. These FLSA
overtime provisions apply in two circumstances: (1)
where an employee is engaged in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce — individual cover-
age; or (2) where an employee works for an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce — enterprise coverage. Ares v. Manuel Diaz

Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 2003).

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14

“The burden of proof lies on employees to establish
that they were engaged in interstate commerce, or in
the production of goods, and that such production was
for interstate commerce.” Kitchings v. Florida United
Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282,
1292 n.25 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing D.A. Schulte, Inc.,
v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121 (1946) and Warren-
Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 90
(1942)).

Under the first type of FLSA coverage — “individ-
ual coverage” — an employee is entitled to time-and-a-
half overtime pay as long as he or she is “engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce.” See 29 U.S.C. § 207. To determine whether an
employee performed such work, a court must focus its
inquiry on the activities of the employee and not on
the business of the employer. See Mitchell v. Lublin
McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959); see
also Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d
1264, 1267-68 (1lth Cir. 2006). In Thorne, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that it was “the intent of Congress
to regulate only activities constituting interstate
commerce, not activities merely affecting commerce”,
and thus an employee must be “engaged in com-
merce”, which means he must be “directly participat-
ing in the actual movement of persons or things in
interstate commerce”. Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266.
Further, in addition to the requirement that the
individual must be directly participating in the actual
movement of persons or things in interstate com-
merce, “[fJor an employee to be engaged in commerce,

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‘a substantial part of the employee’s work must be
related to interstate commerce.” Kitchings, 393
F.Supp.2d at 1293 n.26 (quoting Boekemeier v. Fourth
Universalist Soc’y in City of New York, 86 F.Supp.2d
280, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) and (citing Walling uv.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 572 (1943)).

The second type of FLSA coverage — “enterprise
coverage” — does not apply, because, as stated above,
the lack of enterprise coverage has been conceded by
the Petitioner.

The Petitioner lodges the following arguments
concerning why the Opinion should be reversed: 1)
the unpublished Alonso’ case, which does not contain
a facts section; 2) the term “engaged in commerce”
should be given a broad, liberal construction”; 3) the
Marshall case requires the conclusion that no de
minimis rule applies; 4) the Petitioner fails to distin-
guish the Thorne or McLeod cases, but argues in
contravention to them that the ultimate consumers of
the retail goods were the Defendants’ customers and
not the Defendants, and the Petitioner handled and
picked up goods that were previously in interstate
commerce; and 5) cases from the Tenth Circuit and
Eastern District of Arkansas, and the former Fifth
Circuit’s Tilbury’ case require reversal. The Peti-
tioner’s arguments, none of which has any merit, will
be discussed in turn.

' Alonso v. Dolphin Exterminating Co., 2005 WL 1901682
(11th Cir. 2005).

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16

The Alonso Case is Not Applicable,
and Was Overruled by Thorne

Petitioner has relied on Alonso v. Dolphin Exter-
minating Co., 2005 WL 1901682, *1 (11th Cir. 2005),
but that decision is not supportive of individual
coverage in the circumstances presented by. this case.
Alonso contains no discussion of the facts, much less
any analysis of them, whatsoever, but merely holds
that a “laborer transporting fumigation materials and
chemicals, which had traveled in interstate commerce
to defendants’ customers within the state”, presented
an issue of fact preventing summary judgment on the
question of whether the plaintiff was engaged in
interstate commerce.’ The Middle District of Florida’s

* The Alonso opinion, in pertinent part, states as follows, in
holding the plaintiff was:

‘engaged in commerce’ through his duties as a
laborer transporting fumigation materials and
chemicals, which had traveled in interstate
commerce to defendants’ customers within the
state. Although these duties required no trans-
portation outside the state of Florida, the mate-
rials and chemicals, which had traveled in
interstate commerce, continued to flow in inter-
state commerce until they reached Dolphin Ex-
terminating Company’s customers. See [Brennan
uv. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th
Cir.1973)] at 1095 (holding elevator operators [to
be] ‘engaged in commerce’ because the goods they
transported continue to flow in interstate com-
merce until delivered to the tenants of the build-
ing).

Alonso v. Dolphin Exterminating Co., 2005 WL 1901682 (1ith

Cir. 2005).

17

decision in Junkin* explains the problems with
Alonso, concerning relying on it to argue that it
applies to a case where retail goods are handled. The
plaintiff in Junkin worked for a lawn maintenance
company and his work required him to transport
herbicides and fertilizers manufactured or shipped
out of state. Junkin, 2005 WL 2862079 at *1. The
court found that there was no enterprise coverage
because the employer’s annual volume of business did
not exceed $500,000, id. at *3, and there was no
individual coverage because the mere act of trans-
porting goods that previously found themselves in the
flow of interstate commerce does not mean that an
employee engaged in commerce or produced goods or
services for commerce. The court noted that
“[bJrought to its logical end, such a theory would
mean that an employee who, in the course of his
duties, simply moves an item (which originated in
another state) from one place to another within the
same property ... has ‘engaged in commerce’ by
‘transporting’ that item. Such a theory cannot stand,
as it would, in essence, nullify the ‘interstate’ re-
yuirement and ultimately render the Commerce
Clause meaningless.” Id. at *4. As for the persuasive-
ness or lack thereof of the Alonso decision, it was
deemed not persuasive because of its failure to pro-
vide a factual background and because, “[a]s an
unpublished opinion, under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-
2, Alonso is not binding precedent and is, at best,

* Junkin v. Emerald Lawn Maintenance and Landscaping,
Inc., 2008 WL 2862079 (M.D. Fla. 2005).

18

persuasive authority.’ However, given the fact that
the court there relied on undisclosed facts in the
record, the Court does not find them to be persuasive
here.” Id. at *4 n.6.

Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent
decision in Thorne explaining that activities do not
constitute “engaging in commerce” simply because
the employer purchased goods which had previously
moved in interstate commerce, Thorne, 448 F.3d at
1268, completely eclipses the applicability of the
reasoning used by the court in Alonso. Thorne’s
determination that, “[wJhen goods reach the customer
for whom they were intended, the interstate journey
ends and employees engaged in any further intrastate

* Under Local Rule 36-2, the Eleventh Circuit makes clear
that “[ulnpublished opinions are not considered binding prece-
dent.” lith Cir. R. 36-2. The Eleventh Circuit clarifies that
“[a]lthough unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive
authority, they are not considered binding precedent. Reliance
on unpublished opinions is not favored by the court.” 11th Cir. R.
36-2, 1.0.P.-6 (emphasis added). The Local Rules further explain
that “[t}he court may cite [unpublished opinions} where they are
specifically relevant to determine whether the predicates for res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or double jeopardy exist in the case,
to ascertain the law of the case, or to establish the procedural
history or facts of the case.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2, I.0.P.-7. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit contemplates the limited use of its unpublished
opinions for specific cases, but clearly frowns upon reliance on
unpublished opinions when they are not “specifically relevant”
to a particular case. The Defendants request that the Court find
that the Alonso opinion is not binding and that it is not persua-
sive authority, since it has been superseded by Thorne. See
Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 551 F.Supp.2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(acknowledging Thorne supersedes Alonso).

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movement of the goods are not covered under the
[FLSA]”, id. at 1267 (emphasis in original), cannot be
reconciled with the reported Alonso decision; the
Thorne court clearly distinguished and rejected
Alonso, to the extent it purports to hold if an em-
ployee merely handles goods that at one time traveled
interstate that employee is entitled to invoke individ-
ual coverage. See also Russell v. Continental Restau-
rant, Inc., 4830 F.Supp.2d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2006)
(granting motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and citing Thorne for the proposition that
there is no individual coverage for employees “who
handle goods after an employer acquires the goods for
local disposition”). Even before Thorne, other courts
had reached the same conclusion. Brennan v. Wilson
Building, Inc., 478 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1972)
(citing Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at
567) (noting that the Jacksonville Paper “Court ruled
that the interstate journey of the goods did not end,
and the goods thus did not cease to flow in commerce
until they reached their final destination — the retail
stores”); Rivera v. Heights Landscaping, Inc., 2004
WL 434214 *4 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that “‘mere
use, physical touching, or consumption of goods’ that
have traveled in interstate commerce is not enough
{to establish individual coverage]” and “Plaintiffs
cannot establish individual coverage merely by show-
ing that in the course of their work they used rakes,
fertilizers, or other goods that originated out of
state”). Importantly, Thorne relied on McLeod for its
holding.

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20

Where an employer is the “ultimate consumer” of
the goods that have moved in interstate commerce,
the journey of those goods through interstate com-
merce is at an end. The relevant statutory language
of the FLSA is as follows:

(i) “Goods” means goods (including ships
and marine equipment), wares, products,
commodities, merchandise, or articles or sub-
jects of commerce of any character, or any
part or ingredient thereof, but does not in-
clude goods after their delivery into the ac-
tual physical possession of the ultimate
consumer thereof other than a_ producer,
manufacturer, or processor thereof.

29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (emphasis added). In a case on
point, a defendant-employer was found to be the
“ultimate consumer” of “the gas and other petroleum
products, tires and mechanical parts used in operat-
ing and maintaining defendants’ trucks and other
machines ... which renders [the employees using
those materials and products] excepted from [individ-
ual] coverage.” Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F.Supp.
1329, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The Whitehead court
based its decision on Dunlop v. Industrial America
Corp., 516 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1975), finding that “the
use of such products by the defendants’ employees in
the course of its business makes the defendants the
‘ultimate consumers’ of such goods within the mean-
ing of Section 3(i) and renders them excepted from
coverage under Section 3(s) on this ground.” White-
head, 463 F.Supp. at 1341. In this case, Petitioner

21

did not pass on (for sale) any oil filters, oil, air filters,
and the like to customers of the Respondents. Rather,
just as in Whitehead, these materials ended their
journey through interstate commerce once they
reached the Respondents’ supplier’s place of business
(the retailers, such as Bennett Auto). For the reasons
addressed herein, the Respondents request that the
Court hold that the Petitioner has not met his burden
to establish individual coverage, and not grant certio-
rari.

“Engaged in Commerce”
Is Somewhat Limited

Under individual coverage jurisprudence, “com-
merce” and “interstate commerce” are narrower terms
of art than in other areas of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence. As this Court has clarified, in enacting the
FLSA, Congress did not intend to exercise the full
extent of its constitutional regulatory powers, and
clearly intended to exempt local businesses:

[W]e cannot be unmindful that Congress in
enacting this statute plainly indicated its
purpose to leave local business to the protec-
tion of the states. [citations omitted]. More-
over as we stated in Kirschbaum Co. uv.
Walling [citations omitted], Congress did not
exercise in this Act the full scope of the com-
merce power.

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 571
(1943). Further, because the FLSA manifests the
“concern of Congress to avoid undue displacement of

22

state regulation of activities of a dominantly local
character ... [t]he focus of coverage became ‘com-
merce’, not in the broadest constitutional sense, but
in the limited sense of Section 3(b) of [the FLSA, 29
U.S.C. § 203(b)]: ‘trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several
States....’” Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F.Supp.
1329, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (citing Mitchell v. H. B.
Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, 315 (1960)). Further, the
following language from this Court shows why work-
ers like the Petitioner who handle goods purchased
from a retailer are not “engaged in commerce”, and

thus are not entitled to invoke individual coverage
under the FLSA:

liIn the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C.A. s 201 et seg., Congress did not in-
tend that the regulation of hours and wages
should extend to the furthest reaches of fed-
eral authority. ... So handlers of goods for a
wholesaler who moves them interstate on
order or to meet the needs of specified cus-
tomers are in commerce, while those employ-
ees who handle goods after acquisition by a
merchant for general local disposition are
not.

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493 (1943). The
corporate Defendant is a purely local, one-location,
mom-and-pop auto repair shop with annual gross
sales of less than $500,000. This is exactly the sort of
local business Congress, in enacting the FLSA, in-

tended to leave to the regulation of the several states.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 571.

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23

The Marshall Case is Inapposite

The Petitioner relies on Marshall v. Victoria
Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1979). That case
is not applicable, because the employees were in-
volved in regular and recurrent transportation of
individuals engaged in interstate travel, as follows:

The evidence before the district court clearly
established that transporting persons mak-
ing international journeys was a regular, re-
curring, and substantial part of the work of
defendants’ employees in the operation of all
of their routes. Because their work was en-
twined with a continuous stream of interna-
tional travel, they were engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.

Id. at 1125. The court in Thorne made clear that
employees who purchase goods at a retail store (even
if the goods traveled interstate) are not engaged in
commerce for purposes of individual coverage (unlike
the employees in Victoria Transp. Co.), as follows:

When goods reach the customer for whom
they were intended, the interstate journey
ends and employees engaged in any further
intra state [sic] movement of the goods are
not covered under the Act. McLeod, 319 U.S.
at 493, 63 S. Ct. 1248. Courts distinguish be-
tween merchants who bring commerce across
state lines for sale and the ultimate con-
sumer, who merely purchases goods that
previously moved in interstate commerce for
intrastate use. Therefore, a customer who
purchases an item from Home Depot is not

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24

engaged in commerce even if Home Depot
previously purchased it from out-of-state
workers.

Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1267. This slams the door on any
argument by the Petitioner that he was engaged in
interstate commerce for purposes of individual cover-
age. Even if he purchased the items, he still would
not be entitled to individual coverage. As the district
court explained:

As the Supreme Court has stated, Con-
gress did not intend to exercise the full scope
of its power under the Commerce Clause in
[enacting] the FLSA. See Walling v. Jackson-
ville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570-71, 63
S. Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943). Therefore, to
establish individual coverage, [the plaintiff],
must show that he was engaged in ‘the ac-
tual movement of persons or things in inter-
state commerce.’ See Thorne, 448 F.3d at
1266.

Navarro, 533 F.Supp.2d at 1223. Accordingly, nothing
in Victoria Transp. Co. requires the conclusion that
reversal is warranted.

The Thorne Case is Not Distinguishable

One of the Petitioner’s arguments is that in his
affidavit he indicates he picked up materials at least
once per week at various retail stores. The Petitioner
described how these stores were Bennett Auto, Ad-
vance Auto, and similar retailers. Jd. The Plaintiff’s
argument has been rejected by this Court and the

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25

courts of appeals, as set forth above. The court in
Thorne made clear that even employees who purchase
goods at a retail store (even if the goods traveled
interstate) are not engaged in commerce for purposes
of individual coverage, as follows:

When goods reach the customer for whom
they were intended, the interstate journey
ends and employees engaged in any further
intra state [sic] movement of the goods are
not covered under the Act. McLeod, 319 U.S.
at 493, 63 S. Ct. 1248. Courts distinguish be-
tween merchants who bring commerce across
state lines for sale and the ultimate con-
sumer, who merely purchases goods that
previously moved in interstate commerce for
intrastate use. Therefore, a customer who
purchases an item from Home Depot is not
engaged in commerce even if Home Depot
previously purchased it from out-of-state
workers.

Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1267. This slams the door on any
argument by the Petitioner that he was engaged in
interstate commerce for purposes of individual cover-
age. Even if he purchased the items (which he did
not), he still would not be entitled to invoke individ-
ual coverage. As stated above, the courts have held
that the ultimate consumer of the retail goods is the
individual who purchases them, and not the individ-
ual who happens to own a car or home into which
those goods are installed.

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26

The Cases from Other Circuits
and Tilbury Are Not Controlling

On page 8, the Petitioner cites to a case from the
Tenth Circuit and a case from the Eastern District of
Arkansas. Those cases de not eclipse the clear line of
cases from this Court which set forth the pertinent
rubrics concerning individual coverage. The foregoing
requires denial of the Petition.

Further, the Petitioner relies on Tilbury from the
former Fifth Circuit, but that case does not help him
for several reasons. First, the Tilbury decision notes
that workers who unpacked shipments of meat were
not engaged in commerce, because “the shipments
had completed their interstate journey when they
came to rest on defendant’s storage room floor”.
Tilbury v. Mitchell, 123 F.Supp. 109, 112 (W.D. La.
1954). Second, the group of employees who the Court
found were subject to the FLSA, were butchers and
boners who regularly and necessarily in the course of
their employment handled or otherwise worked upon
these meats which then were immediately placed in
interstate commerce, and thus the court held that the
employees were “engaged in the production of goods
for commerce”, which is not an argument that the
Petitioner has espoused in this Petition — the Peti-
tioner has argued that he was “engaged in com-
merce”, but not that he was engaged in the
production of goods for commerce, and so any such
argument to the contrary has been waived by the
Petitioner. Jd.

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27

‘Concerning the Petitioner’s argument that the de
minimis rule applies, that rule, as explained in
Tilbury, is that even if the percentage of the em-
ployer’s business dedicated to the production of goods
for commerce is very small (seemingly “de minimis”),
it is not de minimis for purposes of individual cover-
age, meaning that as long as workers were regularly
and recurrently engaged in the production of goods
for commerce, the court was not going to hold that
such employees were not entitled to individual cover-
age under the theory that the employer’s overall
involvement in the production of goods for commerce
(because of the nature of its business) was otherwise
very low. Id. at 112-13. The Tilbury decision does not
require that the Petition be granted.

,
Vv

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of
certiorari should not be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

*HARRY O. BORETH

GLASSER, BORETH & KLEPPIN
8751 W. Broward Blvd., #105
Plantation, Florida 33324
(954) 424-1933

*Counsel of Record

September, 2008

* gs ee ee a Corea rt SOO re (ors
LESLIE Ce NO Dee edo LOE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_0665%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
