# Opinion — Kenyon v. FOWLER

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opinion
- **Published:** January 1, 1910
- **Citation:** 215 U.S. 593

## Text

OCTOBER TERM, 1908.

Syllabus. 212 U.S.

THE EUGENE F. MORAN.

- CERTIFICATES FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT.

Nos. 87, 88. Argued January 22, 25, 1909.—Decided February 23, 1909.

Where two tugs and two scows in tow of one of the tugs are all in fault
for a collision, each of the four vessels is liable for an equal share of
the damages, and the liability is to be so apportioned even if more than
one of the vessels are owned by the same person.

Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110, followed to the effect that a tug having
control of a vessel in tow is solely responsible for damages to the other
vessel caused by the tug alone.

Fiction, not being a satisfactory ground for taking one man’s property
to satisfy another man’s wrong, should not be extended.

The fact that vessels are tied together in a flotilla does not make the
flotilla a unit in proceedings in rem.

In a proceeding in rem where several vessels are found in fault each
bears its share regardless of ownership, and notwithstanding this rule
results in charging one who owns more than one of the vessels with a
larger proportion than he would be charged in a personal suit against
himself and the owners of the other vessels.

When a duty is imposed for the purpose of preventing a certain conse-
quence its breach not leading to that consequence does not make a
defendant liable for the tort of a third person merely because the ob-
servance of the duty might have prevented that tort.

Questions certified in 154 Fed. Rep. 54, answered.

1 Docket titles, No. 87, The Steam Tug “Eugene F. Moran,” Michael
Moran, Claimant, and the Scows “15D” and “18D,” the Henry
Dubois Sons Co., Claimant, v. The New York Central and Hudson River
Railroad Company and the Steam Tug “Charles D. Matthews,” John
D. Daily et al., Claimants; No. 88, The Henry Dubois Sons Company and
the Steam Tug “Eugene F. Moran,” Michael Moran, Claimant, v. the
Steam Tug “Charles E. Matthews,” John D. Daily et al., Claimants.

THE EUGENE F. MORAN.
212 U.S. Argument for the Henry Dubois Sons Company.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. James Emerson Carpenter, with whom Mr. Samuel Park
and Mr. James Keith Symmers were on the brief, for the Henry
Dubois Sons Company:

An equitable solution of the problem would be to treat the
libellant and the respective claimants as the real parties and to
divide the damages equally among the owners of the various
vessels at fault irrespective of the form of the action.

In the alternative the tug and tow should be deemed a single
vessel, and where the tug and tow are jointly in fault the dam-
ages should be divided equally between the tug and tow and a
third vessel also in fault, and as between the tug and its tow
the moiety should be borne by the owners of the tug and tow
respectively in equal parts, subject to the rule laid down in The
Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695.

In the apportionment of damages in admiralty the funda-
mental equitable principle is to equalize the burden among
those who should bear it. The North Star, 106 U.S. 17; Atlee
v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389.

While not possessing the general powers of a court of equity,
yet a court of admiralty decides matters before it upon princi-
ples of equity. United States v. Cornell Stm. Bt. Co., 202 U.S.
184; The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1.

Cases arise, undoubtedly, when both the tow and the tug
are jointly liable for the consequences of a collision; as when
those in charge of the respective vessels jointly participate in
their control and management, and the master or crew of both
vessels are either deficient in skill, omit to take due care or are
guilty of negligence in their navigation. Sturgis v. Boyer, 24
How. 110, 121, 122. See also The Mabey and Cooper, 14 Wall.
204, and The Virginia Ehrman and The Agnese, 97 U.S. 309,
313.

The tug Moran and scows for purposes of navigation with
reference to other vessels are to be regarded as a single vessel.
Transportation Co. v. Philadelphia & Savannah Nav. Co., 22

468 OCTOBER TERM, 1908,
Argument for the Henry Dubois Sons Company. 212 U.S.

How. 461; The Ivanhoe, 7 Ben. 213; S.C., Fed. Cas. No. 7,113;
The Civilta, 103 U.S. 699; The Gladys, 144 Fed. Rep. 653,
655.
There is a joint liability of the tug and tow for their joint
negligence. Where the tug and tow are jointly liable to a third
ship the owners of the latter may sue either or both, but a right
of apportionment lies between a tug and tow. The Atlas, 93
U. 8. 302.

The court will not hold the tug and tow jointly liable unless
there is fault in both. The John Frazer, 21 How. 184; The
Civilta, 103 U.S. 699; The Express, 52 Fed. Rep. 890, 892;
Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110; The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1, 11.

Where both tug and tow are held jointly liable the damages
are to be divided between them subject to the rule laid down in
the case of The Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695.

Where both tug and tow and a third ship are to blame for a
collision between the tug or tow and a third ship the tug and
the tow will be considered as one vessel and contribute together
one-half, the remaining half to be borne by the third vessel.
The Englishman, L. R. 1894, P. D. 239; The Komuk, 120 Fed.
Rep. 841; The Merrill C. Hart, 162 Fed. Rep. 371; The Fred.
W. Chase (D.C. D. of 8. C. 1887), 31 Fed. Rep. 91.

See also, as bearing on the questions involved: The Komuk,
120 Fed. Rep. 841; The Niobe, 13 P. D. 55; 1891, App. Cas.
401; The Brothers, 2 Biss. 104; The Nettie L. Tice, 110 Fed.
Rep. 461; The Express, 44 Fed. Rep. 392; S. C., 46 Fed. Rep.
860; S.C., 52 Fed. Rep. 890; The Peshtigo, 25 Fed. Rep. 488;
The Lyndhurst, 92 Fed.-Rep. 681; The Anerly, 58 Fed. Rep.
794; The W.G. Mason, 142 Fed. Rep. 913-918; The James
Berwind, 44 Fed. Rep. 693, 697.

A tug and tow, guilty of a common fault, should be con-
demned to bear jointly one-half the damages due to collision
with a third vessel also in fault, since the tug and tow for the
purposes of navigation are deemed in law to be a single vessel
under steam and subject to all the responsibilities of such a
vessel under the rules. See The Civilia, 103 U.S. 701; Sturgis

THE EUGENE F. MORAN.
212 U.S. Argument for N. Y. Central and Hudson River R. R. Co.

v. Boyer, 24 How. 110; The Mabey, 14 Wall. 204; The Vir-
ginia Ehrman, 97 U. S. 309, 313; L. P. Dayton, 120 U.S.
337.

The answer to the third question should be that the damages
be equally divided between the two flotillas, and the half as-
sessed on the south-bound flotilla be charged half against the
Moran and half against the two scows, the scows having a com-
mon owner.

Mr. Archibald G. Thacher and Mr. Frederick M. Brown for
New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company:

A tug and her tows should be regarded as a navigable unit,
responsible to the extent of the total value uf the unit to inno-
cent third parties; the rights of the owners of the component
parts to be adjusted between themselves.

Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110, which holds the contrary,
should be reconsidered by this court in the light of other deci-
sions. The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14; The Brig Malek Adtel,
2 How. 210; Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How. 182;
The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467, 468; The China, 7 Wall. 53,
68; Homer Ramsdell v. Compagnie Générale Trans. 182 U S.
406, 413, 414.

Liability in rem may be wholly unrelated to liability in per-
sonam. Although the United States is not subject to suit its
property may be liable in rem for its share of a general average
sacrifice of a private vessel where’execution of the process does
not interfere with the Government’s possession. United States
v. Wilder, 3 Sumner, 308; approved in United States v. Cornell,
202 U.S. 190. So alse of the liability of government property in
rem for salvage, although no suit would lie against the sovereign
in personam. The Davis, 10 Wall. 15,22. See also The Siren,
7 Wall. 152, 162; Workman v. The Mayor, 179 U.S. 552, 568;
The Arturo, 6 Fed. Rep. 308.

The damages sustained by the New York Central car float
should be made good to the extent of three-sixths by the Mat-
thews, one-sixth by the Moran and one-sixth each by scows

470 OCTOBER TERM, 1908.

Argument for Claimant of the Tug Matthews. 212 U.S.

15D and 18D. The Northern Belle, 9 Wall. 526, 528, 529;
The Keokuk, 9 Wall. 517, 519.

Mr. Harrington Putnam, with whom Mr. Charles C. Burling-
ham was on the brief, for claimant of the tug Moran:

There is in England no authority for a division in thirds, and
in this country the decisions to that effect do not appear to have
been carefully considered. Marsden on Collisions (5th ed.),
125. The following cases discussed: The Peshtigo, 25 Fed. Rep.
488; The Brothers, 2 Biss. 104; The Maling, 110 Fed. Rep.
227; The Lyndhurst, 92 Fed. Rep. 681; Scow No. 6 H, 108 Fed.
Rep. 429; The Nettie L. Tice, 110 Fed. Rep. 461.

The rule of the admiralty as to the apportionment of damages
in case of mutual fault is not a rule of absolute justice, but
one cf practical utility. The only clear working rule is that
where a vessel has contributed to a collision by her own fault,
her owner cannot recover more than one-half of his damages.

There is nothing necessarily inconsistent between the case of
Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110, and The China, 7 Wall. 53.
See The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468; Workman v. New York
City, 179 U. 8. 552; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424; The
Clarita and The Clara, 23 Wall. 1; The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695,
697; The Max Morris, 137 U. §. 1.

As to the law in England and in Germany, see The English-
man and The Australia, L. R. (1894) Prob. Div. 239; The
Unterweser 12, tug Blitz and 8.8. Envoy, Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Civilsachen, 14 Feb., 1903, LIV, p.13. Also
in the Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung, 1903, Part I, 285, see Ap-
pendix.

Mr. William S. Montgomery, with whom Mr. George H.
Emerson was on the brief, for claimant of the tug Matthews:

The District Court correctly apportioned the damages to the
carfloat equally among the four vessels sued.

In admiralty the number of owners or the number of agents
or servants of owners who are involved in a fault contributing to

THE EUGENE F. MORAN. 471

212 U.S. Argument for Claimant of the Tug Matthews.

a collision should have no effect upon the apportionment of the
damages. In actions in rem what the admiralty looks to is the
res and decrees the payment of damages against the offending
thing and not against the owner.

Nor does admiralty consider the number or gravity of the
faults of each vessel.

The only logical method of apportioning the damages, where
the rule of comparative damage does not obtain, is that adopted
by the District Court in apportioning the damages to the car-
flcat—i.e., to apportion the damages among the offending ves-
sels without any consideration whatever being given to owner-
ship or the number of servants or agents of owners. The W.G.
Mason, 142 Fed. Rep. 913; The Juniata, 93 U. S. 340; The
China, 7 Wall. 53, and The Barnstable, 181 U. 8. 464, distin-
guished from Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110.

The correct rule of apportionment is te consider only the
offending res before the court. If there are three offending res,
then the damages should be divided into thirds. If there are
four offending res, then the damages should be divided into
fourths; and so on, no matter what may be the number of
guilty res.

This, of course, may work an apparent hardship if more than
one of the offending res belongs to the same owner; but then
that owner has had more than one offending thing which has
contributed to the damage, and the damage might have been
less, or might not have happened at all, had not each of his ves-
sels been guilty of fault.

The moment any consideration of ownership or of a common
or similar fault is allowed to enter into the apportionment of
the damages, infinite difficulties will arise. Hughes on Admi-

ralty (1st ed.), 277; The North Star, 106 U. 8. 17.

- In this case there were four offending res before the court—
the two scows, and the two tugs. The scows because neither of
them had lights; the Moran because she did not see that the
scows had lights, and also in other respects; and the Matthews
because she kept on at full speed after the Moran did not an-

Ty
472 OCTOBER TERM, 1908.
Opinion of the Court. 212 U 3.

swer her sigral. Had any one of-them not been in fault, the
- collision might not have happened.

All having contributed, and all the offending res having been
before the court, the District Judge <livided the damages in
the enly logical and sensible way. The Brothers, 2 Biss. 104;
The Peshtigo, 25 Fed. Rep. 488; The Doris Eckhoff, 41 Fed.
Rep. 156; The Lyndhurst, 92 Fed. Rep. 681; The Nettie L. Tice,
110 Fed. Rep. 461; The Maling, 110 Fed. Rep. 227; The S. A.
McCaulley, 116 Fed. Rep. 107.

The damages in the second case were also correctly appor-
tioned.

In the second case the Henry Dubois Sons Company, owner
of the scow 15 D, sued the tugs Matthews and Moran for the
damages sustained by that scow. The parties before the court
were then the Henry Dubois Sons Company, libellant, and the
tugs Matthews and Moran.

The scow 18 D was not brought in by petition, but it clearly
appeared from the proof that that scow was owned by the
Henry Dubois Sons Company.

The District Judge, having found ail four vessels at fault, di-
rected that the libellant recover one-half of its damages, the
recovery to be borne equally by each of the tugs.

This division was correct. The Mariska, 107 Fed. Rep. 989;
Erie Railroad Co. v. Erie Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220.

Mr. Justice Hotes delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases come here on certificates setting forth in nearly
the same terms the facts of a collision. They both are proceed-
ings in rem. In the first the New York Central and Hudson
River Railway Company, as owners of a car-float that was dam-
aged, libels the steam tug Charles D. Matthews, the steam tug
Eugene F. Moran, and the scows 15 D and 18 D. In the second,
the Henry Dubois Sons Company, as owner of the two scows,
libels the two steam tugs. The statement of facts, slightly
abridged, is as follows: At about half past seven, in the evening
of February 1, 1905, the railroad company’s car-float was pro-

THE EUGENE F, MORAN.

212 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

ceeding up the Hudson River in tow of the tug Matthews, the
navigation of the two being conducted solely by the master of
the tug. They met the tug Moran, which was towing two mud
scows down the river, scow 15D, immediately behind the
Moran, on a hawser, and behind 15 D scow 18 D on another
hawser. A collision took place between the car-float and 15 D.
Neither 15 D nor 18 D had the required lights. There was an
employé of the owner in charge of each scow, and it was their
duty as well as the duty of the master of the Moran to have the
lights put up. The Moran was guilty of other faults also, so
that the tug and the scows all three wrongfully contributed to
the damage done to the float. The tug Matthews also was to
blame, but the car-float was not, unless, contrary to Sturgis v.
Boyer, 24 How. 110, answerable for the faults of the Matthews,
which her owner had hired to move her from place to place in
the harbor. The cases in the District Court are reported in 143
Fed. Rep. 187; in the Circuit Court of Appeals, in 154 Fed.
Rep. 41, and 83 C. C. A. 153.

The question certified in the first case is, “In what proportion
shall the damages sustained by the car-float be assessed upon
the offending vessels?”’ In the second the same question is put
concerning the damages sustained by the libellant, the owner
of the two scows. In the latter case neither the car-float nor
the scow 18 D are made parties or brought in. The District
Judge divided the liability for damages to the float equally
among the four vessels in fault, and on the same principle
charged one-quarter of the damage suffered by scow 15 D to
that scow and one-quarter to each of the other three, thus leav-
ing the libellant to bear one-half and dividing the other half
between the two tugs. Counsel for the two tugs agree that this
result was right, although it is argued for the Moran that the
true ground for it in the second case is the rule that when a ves-
sel has contributed to a collision by her own fault her owner
cannot recover more than one-half of the damages.

For the Henry Dubois Sons Comvany, which as owner of the
two scows was required to pay one-half the total amount due

474 OCTOBER TERM, 1908.

Opinion of the Court. 212 U.S.

to the float, it is contended that the court should look to the
owners after they have appeared, and should divide the dam-
ages on the ordinary principles of personal liability into thirds,
or else regard the Moran and the two scows as one vessel, jointly
liable for one-half, each owner to bear a qv arter as between
themselves. There is a faint suggestion that in the last appor-
tionment regard might be had to the degree of fault.

The New York Central Railroad gets all its damages in any
view, unless Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110, should be overruled.
In that case it was held that a tug having control of a vessel in
tow was solely responsible to a lighter upset by the vessel
through the fault of the tug alone. (For the opinion of Judge
Betts below see note to The Express, 46 Fed. Rep. 864.) We
see no reason why the decision should not stand. No doubt the
fiction that a vessel may be a wrongdoer and may be held, al-
though the owners are not personally responsible on principles
of agency or otherwise, is carried further here than in England.
The China, 7 Wall. 53; The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467, 468;
Homer-Ramsdell Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie Générale
Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, 413, 414. See The Blackheath,
195 U.S. 361, 366. Possibly the survival of the fiction has been
helped by the convenient security that it furnishes, just as no
doubt the responsibility of a master for a servant’s torts, that
he has done his best to prevent, has been helped by the feeling
that it was desirable to have some one who was able to pay.
See Williamson v. Price, 4 Martin, N.S. 399, 401; Williams v.
Jones, 3 H. & C. 256, 263. But after all a fiction is not a satis-
factory ground for taking one man’s property to satisfy another
man’s wrong, and it should not be extended. There is a practi-
cal line and a difference in degree between the case where the
harm is done by the mismanagement of the offending vessel
and that where it is done by the mismanagement of another
vessel to which the immediate but innocent instrument of harm
is attached. See The Clarita and The Clara, 23 Wall. 1; The
Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U. S. 695, 697; The Atlas, 93
U. 8. 302, 318.

THE EUGENE F. MORAN. 475
212 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

The fact that the vessels composing each flotilla were bound
together is not sufficient ground for treating each flotilla as a
unit. This follows pretty closely from the considerations that
we have urged. -If the attachment of the car-float to the Mat-
thews did not make the car-float responsible to 15 D, or affect
the extent or principles of its recovery for damage to itself,
there seems to be no reason why a similar attachment should
affect the distribution of liability among the vessels that were
in fault. Their faults were several. The failure of one scow to
show a light was distinct in fact and as a cause from the failure
of the others to do the same thing, and from the faults of navi-
gation of the Moran. In this case, at least, the attachment
ought to have no more effect in diminishing liability for the
guilty than in creating it for those free from blame. See The
Express, 44 Fed. Rep. 392; S. C., 46 Rep. Fed. 860; S. C., 52
Fed. Rep. 89; Lyndhurst, 92 Fed. Rep. 681; Maling, 110 Fed.
Rep. 227; 8. C., S. A. McCaulley, 116 Fed. Rep. 107; Nettie L.
Tice, 110 Fed. Rep. 461.

On the other hand, although not to be regarded as a unit
simply because they were tied together, the offenders severally
are subject to a lien by the established principles of the pro-
ceeding in rem. It is said, truly enough, that if each scow has
to pay a quarter, the amount with which the owners will be
charged will be greater than in a personal suit where the owners
all are solvent and pay each his share. But without invoking
on the other side the characteristic vicissitudes of personal suits
in tort, we may say that there is no injustice. Although even
the admiralty does not attempt to go far in the quantification
of damages, it is not an unreasonable supposition that on an
average the owner of two vessels, each concurring in a wrong-
ful result, will contribute twice as much toward producing it
as if he had owned only one. If the second scow had been
owned by another it would have had to pay its share. It is con-
trary to the theory of these proceedings to allow ownership to
affect the case. We are of opinion that the District Court was
right in dividing the damages equally among the guilty vessels

476 OCTOBER TERM, 1908.
Opinion of the Court. 212 U.8.

in the first suit. There is nothing stated sufficient to reopen the
question, if there is one, as to changing the apportionment
when there are different degrees of blame. The Atlas, 93 U.S.
302; The Max Morris, 137 U.S.1. The fact that 18 D is not
a party to the second suit does not matter, so far as the question
of partially exonerating those before the court is concerned.

We have discussed the question on the assumptions upon
which it is presented, but there is one point that seems to us to
deserve further consideration from the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The only fault on the part of 18 D, that is set out in the state-
ment, is the absence of a light, and it is said that “therefore” it
was party to a common fault. We doubt whether the conclu-
sion follows from the premises. When a duty is imposed for
the purpose of preventing a certain consequence, a breach of it
that does not lead to that consequence does not make a defend-
ant liable for the tort of a third person merely because the ob-
servance of the duty might have prevented that tort. See Gorris
v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125; Ward v. Hobbs, 4 App. Cas. 13, 33.
The question arises, therefore, whether the duty to give warn-
ing by a light was imposed upon 18 D for any other purpose
than to prevent collision with itself. If not, then as the boats
are dealt with as individuals and not as parts of a single whole,
we do not see how the absence of a light on 18 D can be said to
have contributed to the loss. Pilot Rule 11, under the act of
June 7, 1897, c. 4, §2, 30 Stat. 96, 102, requiring the light, is
quoted in The Komuk, 120 Fed. Rep. 841, 842. A duty of wider
scope has been thought to exist in a somewhat different case.
The Lyndhurst, 92 Fed. Rep. 681, 682.

On the second question also, subject to the doubt just sug-
gested, it appears to us that the course of the District Judge was
right in principle as well as in result. As observed in The Mal-
ing, 110 Fed. Rep. 227, the quantum of liability ought not to be
affected by the position of the party concerned as co-defendant
or plaintiff, and the rule of equal division among the guilty ves-
sels has prevailed, in some cases, at least, as well when one of
them was the libellant 2s when they were all on the same side.

BAGLEY v. GENERAL FIRE EXTINGUISHER CO. 477

212 U.S. Counsel for Parties.

The Brothers, 2 Biss. 104. See S. C., on appeal, Fed. Cas.
No. 9322; Peshtigo, 25 Fed. Rep. 488.
We answer the question in the first case, No. 87: Equally.
We answer the question in the second case: Equally, the
offending vessel or vessels of the libellant bearing their propor-
tion of the loss.

Po AON i OTE, AMOR at ARE

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