# Opinion — The Hamilton

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opinion
- **Published:** January 1, 1907
- **Citation:** 207 U.S. 398

## Text

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THE HAMILTON.!

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT.

No. 71. Argued October 24, 1907.—Decided December 23, 1907.

Until Congress acts on the subject, a State may legislate in regard to the
duties and liabilities of its citizens and corporations while on the high
seas and not within the territory of any other sovereign.

Where a fund is being distributed in a proceeding to limit the liability of
the owners of a vessel, all claims to which the admiralty does not deny
existence must be recognized, whether admiralty liens or not.

The statute of Delaware giving damages for death caused by tort is a valid
exercise of the legislative power of the State, and extends to the case of
a citizen of that State wrongfully killed while on the high seas in a vessel

1 Docket title, Old Dominion Steamship Company, owner of the Steam-
ship Hamilton, v. Gilmore.

ROAST DEPICT LIAR EE OLN AOE MINERAL P SPORT te ee ee neces

THE HAMILTON. 399
207 U.S. Argument for Petitioner.

belonging to a Delaware corporation by the negligence of another vessel
also belonging to a Delaware corporation. A claim against the owner
of one of the vessels in fault can be enforced in a proceeding in admiralty
brought by such owner to limit its liability.

When both vessels in collision are in fault the representatives of a seaman
on one of the vessels, killed without contributory negligence on his part,
may, in a proceeding to limit liability, where an action is given by the
state statute against the owner of the other vessel, recover full damages,
and are not limited to damages recoverable under the maritime law
against the seaman’s own vessel for death or injury caused by negligence
of the master thereof or his fellow servants thereon. Neither the seaman’s
contract with the owners of the vessel he is on, nor the negligence of his
own vessel, nor any provision of the Harter Act affects the claim against
the other vessel.

146 Fed. Rep. 724, affirmed.

Tue facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Harrington Putnam, with whom Mr. Henry E. Mattison
was on the brief, for petitioner:

The Delaware statute does not apply to a claim for death on
the high seas arising from tort, in proceedings in admiralty.

In the relation which springs out of tort, there is no basis
for saying that the parties have impliedly consented to be bound
by the law of any particular State. As a consequence their
rights and liabilities are to be determined by the general prin-
ciples of maritime law as administered in our admiralty courts.
If the Hamilton had belonged in one State, the Saginaw in
another and the deceased in still another State, the law of any
particular State could not more than another have precedence
and a controlling influence. On the contrary, there is no pre-
sumption that the relations of the parties are to be fixed by
the laws of any one State when an injury accrues on the high
seas through a pure marine tort. Rundell v. Compagnie Gén-
érale, 94 Fed. Rep. 366; aff'd 100 Fed. Rep. 655.

The origin of the fiction that a merchant ship may be re-
garded as a floating portion of a country, or, as the doctrine
is sometimes expressed, that it is a continuation or prolonga-
tion of the National territory, is as recent as 1752. Modern
writers treat this fiction as having only a limited application.
Hall on International Law, Oxford, 1904, pp. 249, 250.

400 OCTOBER TERM, 1907.

Argument for Petitioner. 207 U.S.

The doctrine of “territoriality” is rather a limit on rights
of search and protection against aggression than one that con-
fers new rights of action for tort. Walker, Science of Inter-
national Law, pp. 130, 131.

Independent of precedent, it is plain that the liability for
wrongs, and especially for causing death, is to be determined
in admiralty by the court administering the law of the forum.
No State can extend its laws over the ocean. The Federal laws
alone, and the maritime jurisprudence administered by the
Federal courts must decide the liability for wrongs committed
outside of territorial waters.

The doctrine that merchant ships are part of the territory,
if applicable to collisions, would also govern salvage on the
high seas. Such attempts to impose foreign laws have often
been made, but have never been successful in the United States
courts. The Edam, 13 Fed. Rep. 135, 139.

The territorial fiction depends on contracts, because pub-
licists recognize that it is only when the crew are on board that
the doctrine of territoriality applies. Once the contracting
members of the ship’s company leave the vessel the fiction
vanishes. Woolsey, International Law (6th ed.), p. 72.

Statutes providing for the survivorship of rights of action,
and recovery in case of loss of life, have been enacted in vary-
ing forms, not only by the States of the Union, but also by
foreign countries, with which the United States has intimate
relations—especially by England and the Canadian provinces.
The system of law on the continent of Europe in some form
also gives a recovery for loss of life. Yet in no case have the
courts of Great Britain or the United States regarded the law
of the flag upon the high seas as authorizing such a recovery
in the admiralty courts. Even in Canada the admiralty has
no jurisdiction for loss of life. Monaghan v. Horn, 7 Du Val
(Supreme Court, Canada), 409.

The same rule was reached in England (notwithstanding
Lord Campbell’s Act) that admiralty has no jurisdiction for
loss of life. The Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 59 (1884).

THE HAMILTON.

207 U S. Argument for Respondents.

in the admiralty
courts of the United States, will be governed by the law of the

Cases of tort arising upon the high seas,

eral maritime law as administered in

forum, which is the gen
these courts. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24; The Belgenland, 114

U. 8. 355; The Brantjord City, 29 Fed. Rep. 373.
Next to the natural justice of its principles, the highest value
of maritime law consists in its uniformity and general accept-

ance. We are not dealing with municipal law nor with gen-
eral commercial law not maritime, both of which are prescribed
and administered concurrently by the state and Federal legis-
latures and courts, but we have to deal with that which relates
exclusively to the maritime law and the admiralty jurisdiction.
That law is not subject to the change or modification of state
legislatures.

Indeed, one of the controlling reasons for conferring on the
general government the exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty
and maritime causes was to secure the great benefits which
must inevitably result from uniformity in the maritime law.

A State cannot, therefore, destroy the symmetry of that law

by creating maritime rights or conferring jurisdiction in any

particular upon an admiralty court. The Manhasset, 18 Fed.

Rep. 918, 923; Welsh v. The North Cambria, 40 Fed. Rep. 655,

656; The Lyndhurst, 48 Fed. Rep. 839, 841; Workman v. The
Mayor &c., 179 U. S. 552, 558.

The surviving members of the crew of the Saginaw cannot
maintain their claim for its full face, but the Hamilton remains
answerable for only half of all such losses. The Osceola, 189
U. 8. 158, 175; The City of New York, 25 Fed. Rep. 151; The
Queen, 40 Fed. Rep. 694; Stahl v. The Niagara, 77 Fed. Rep.

329, 336.
Mr. J. Parker Kirlin and Mr. George Whitefield Betts, with
whom Mr. John M. Woolsey and Mr. Howard M. Long were

on the brief, for respondents:
Since Congress has not legislate
ject, the statute of the State of Delaware, as

VOL. ccvi1—26

d with reference to the sub-
a sovereign State,

402 OCTOBER TERM, 1907.
Opinion of the Court. 207 U.S.

allowing damages for death is binding and effective on its
vessels when on the high seas. The Lottowanna, 21 Wall. 558,
580; The Glide, 167 U.S. 606; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236;
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Steamboat Co. v.
Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99.

The Hamilton and Saginaw, for the purposes of this pro-
ceeding, were parts of the territory of the State of Delaware,
and subject to its laws. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572;
Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; The Lamington, 87 Fed. Rep. 752.

There has been no negligence shown on the part of the mem-
bers of the crew of the Saginaw. It was proper, therefore, to
allow the full amount of their claims. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302;
The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240, 243, 260. See also The
Juniata, 93 U.S. 337; The North Star, 106.U. S. 17, 22; The
Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 549; The New York, 175 U. S.
187; Ex parte Union Steamboat Co., 178 U. S. 317; The Cone-
maugh, 189 U.S. 363.

Mr. Justice Hours delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding for the limitation of liability of the steam-
ship Hamilton in respect of a collision on the high seas with
the steamship Saginaw, in which the Saginaw was sunk and
her chief mate and some of her crew and passengers were
drowned. It is found, and not disputed, that both vessels were
to blame. Both vessels belonged to corporations of the State.
of Delaware. A statute of that State, after enacting that
actions for injuries to the person shall not abate by reason of
the plaintiff’s death, provides that “whenever death shall be
occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit be
brought by the party injured to recover damages during his
or her life, the widow or widower of any such deceased person,
or if there be no widow or widower, the personal representa-
tives may maintain an action for and recover damages for the
death and loss thus occasioned.” Act of January 26, 1866,
chap. 31, p. 28, vol. 13, Part 1, Delaware Laws, as amended

THE HAMILTON,

207 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

by act of March 9, 1901, chap. 210, p. 500, vol. 22, Delaware
Laws. On the strength of this statute the representatives of
a passenger and of three of the crew filed claims, and the claims
were allowed by the District Court (see 134 Fed. Rep. 95; 139
Fed. Rep. 906), and afterwards by the Circuit Court of Appeals;
146 Fed. Rep. 724; 77 C. C. A. 150. A certiorari was granted
by this court to settle the question, as stated by the petitioner,
whether the Delaware statute applies to a claim for death on
the high seas, arising purely from tort, in proceedings in ad-
miralty. Incidentally the right of representatives of the crew
of the Saginaw to recover their claims in full against the Ham-
ilton also has been discussed.

Apart from the subordination of the State of Delaware to
the Constitution of the United States there is no doubt that it
would have had power to make its statute applicable to this
case. When so applied, the statute governs the reciprocal lia-
bilities of two corporations, existing only by virtue of the laws
of Delaware, and permanently within its jurisdiction, for the
consequenes of conduct set in motion by them there, operating
outside the ve.titory of the State, it is true, but within no other
territorial jurisdiction. If confined to corporations, the State
would have power to enforce its law to the extent of their
property in every case. Buf the same authority would exist
as to citizens domiciled within the State, even when personally
on the high seas, and not only could be enforced by the State
in case of their return, which their domicil by its very meaning
promised, but in proper cases would be recognized in other
jurisdictions by the courts of other States. In short, the bare
fact of the parties being outside the territory in a place belong-
ing to no other sovereign would not limit the authority of the
State, as accepted by civilized theory. No one doubts the
power of England or France to govern their own ships upon the
high seas.

The first question, then, is narrowed to whether there is
anything in the structure of the National Government and
under the Constitution of the United States that takes away

404 OCTOBER TERM, 1907.
Opinion of the Court. 207 U.S.

or qualifies the authority that otherwise Delaware would pos-
sess—a question that seems to have been considered doubt-
ful in Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. 8.
527, 558. It has two branches: First, whether the state law
is valid for any purpose, and, next, whether, if valid, it will
be applied in the admiralty. We will take them up in order.

The power of Congress to legislate upon the subject has been
derived both from the power to regulate commerce and from
the clause in the Constitution extending the judicial power to
“all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Art. 3,
§2; 130 U. S. 557. The doubt in this case arises as to the
power of the States where Congress has remained silent.

That doubt, however, cannot be serious. The grant of ad-
miralty jurisdiction, followed and construed by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, “saving to suitors in all cases the right of a com-
mon law remedy where the common law is competent to give
it,” Rev. Stats. § 563, cl. 8, leaves open the common law juris-
diction of the state courts over torts committed at sea. This,
we believe, always has been admitted. Martin v. Hunter, 1
Wheat. 304, 337; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 571; Leon v.
Galceran, 11 Wall. 185; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S.
240, 262. And as the state courts in their decisions would fol-
low their own notions about the law and might change them
from time to time, it would be strange if the State might not
make changes by its other mouthpiece, the legislature. The
same argument that deduces the legislative power of Congress
from the jurisdiction of the National courts, tends to establish
the legislative power of the State where Congress has not acted.
Accordingly, it has been held that a statute giving damages
for death caused by a tort might be enforced in a state court,
although the tort was committed at sea. American Steam-
boat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522. So far as the objection to the
state law is founded on the admiralty clause in the Constitu-
tion, it would seem not to matter whether the accident hap-
pened near shore or in mid-ocean, notwithstanding some
expressions of doubt, The same conclusion was reached in Mc-

THE HAMILTON. 405
207 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

Donald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546, where the death occurred on
the high seas. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, reinforces Chase’s
case, and answers any argument based on the power of Congress
over commerce, as to which we hardly need refer also to Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall.
236; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. 8. 572, and Hemer Ramsdell
Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie Générale Transatlantique,
182 U. S. 406, concerning state pilotage laws.

The jurisdiction commonly expressed in the formula that a
vessel at sea is regarded as part of the territory of the State,
was held, upon much consideration, to belong to Massachusetts,
so far as to give preference to a judicial assignment in insol-
vency of such a vessel over an attachment levied immediately
upon her arrival at New York, in Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610.
That decision was regarded as necessitating the conclusion
reached in McDonald v. Mallory, supra. Other instances of
state regulation are mentioned in The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed.
Rep. 98, 106; but without further recapitulation of the au-
thorities, we are of opinion that the statute is valid. See
Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 563. We should add,
what has been assumed thus far, as it had to be assumed in
order to raise the question discussed, that we construe the
statute as intended to govern all cases which it is competent
to govern, or at least not to be confined to deaths occasioned
on land. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546. If it touches
any case at sea, it controls this. See The Belgenland, 114 U.S.
355, 370. Whether it is to be taken to offer a similar liability
of Delaware owners to foreign subjects, Mulhall v. Fallon, 176
Massachusetts, 266, need not be determined now.

We pass to the other branch of the first question: whether
the state law, being valid, will be applied in the admiralty.
Being valid, it created an obligatio, a personal liability of the
owner of the Hamilton to the claimants. Slater v. Mexican
National R. R. Co., 194 U. 8. 120, 126. This, of course, the
admiralty would not disregard, but would respect the right
when brought before it in any legitimate way. Ex parte Mc-

OCTOBER TERM, 1907.

Opinion of the Court. 207 U.S.

Niel, 13 Wall. 236, 243. It might not give a proceeding in rem,
since the statute does not purport to create a lien, It might
give a proceeding in personam. The Corsair, 145 U. 8. 335, 347.
If it gave the latter, the result would not be, as suggested, to
create different laws for different districts. The liability would
be recognized in all, Nor would there be produced any lamen-
table lack of uniformity. Courts constantly enforce rights
arising from and depending upon other laws than those gov-
erning the local transactions of the jurisdiction in which they
sit. But we are not concerned with these considerations. In
this case the statutes of the United States have enabled the
owner to transfer its liability to a fund and to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the admiralty, and it has done so. That fund
is being distributed. In such circumstances all claims to which
the admiralty does not deny existence must be recognized,
whether admiralty liens or not. This is not only a general
principle, Andrews v. Wall, 3 How. 568, 573; The J. E. Rumbell,
148 U.S. 1, 15; Admiralty Rule, 43; Cargo Ex Galam, 2 Moore
P. C. (N. 8.) 216, 236, but is the result of the statute, which
provides for, as well as limits the liability, and allows it to be
proved against the fund. The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240,
260. See Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 563.

The second question concerns the right of the representatives
of the crew to recover their claims in full. There is a faint sug-
gestion that the mate of the Saginaw was negligent, but on
this point we shall not go behind the findings below. The main
objection is that the statute allows a recovery beyond the
maintenance and support which were declared in The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158, 175, to be the limit of a seaman’s rights against
his own vessel when injured by the negligence of the master
or a fellow-servant on his ship. But the question here regards
the liability of the Hamilton, another vessel. The contract be-
tween the seaman and the owners of the Saginaw does not affect
the case. Erie R. R. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 204 U. 8.
220, 226. Neither does the Harter Act, even if its terms could
be extended to personal injuries and loss of life. The Chatta-

HE HAMILTON. 407

207 U.S. Statement of the Case.

hoochee, 173 U.S. 540. Neither does the negligence of the Sagi-
naw. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302.

We are of opinion that all the claimants are entitled to the
full benefits of a statute “granting the right to relief where
otherwise it could not be administered by a maritime court.”
Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 63.

Decree affirmed.

---

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