# Respondents Brief — United States v. G. Falk & Brother

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1907
- **Citation:** 204 U.S. 143

## Text

No.

fn the Supreme Court of the United Spat sorreme

FILE

OCTOBER TERM, 1905.

pare APR 23 19
THE UNITED STATES, JAM 3
Petitioner,
as

G. FALK & BROTHER,

Responde nts.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS ON APPLICATION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

CIRCUIT.

Epwakp 8S. Hatcn,
J. Sruart TOMPKINS,
Counsel for the Respondents.

APPEAL PRINTING COMPANY, 14-16 VESEY ST., NEW YORK

~—

Antbe Supreme Court of the United States.

Tue UNITED STATES,
Petitioner, |
'
\
if

against

G. FaLk & Bro.,

Respondents. |

)

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPOND-
ENTS.

Statement.

The merchandise which is the subject of this pe-
tition is leaf tobacco in bales. It was imported
from Rotterdam on the Steamship Ryndam, and was
entered at New York on June 2, 1902. The total
importation consisted of thirty-one bales, num-
hered 2239 to 2269, inclusive. According to the
consular invoice, which isa sworn document and
presumptively correct, the gross weight of the
thirty-one bales, at the time they left Rotterdam,
was 2473.6 kilos. At the rate of 2.2046 pounds to
the kilo this equals 5453.0781 pounds. According
to the government weigher’s return, which is like-

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2

wise presumptively correct as to weight, the
thirty one bales, at the time of landing, weighed
5,520 pounds. So that the bales in question had
gained, on the voyage of importation, 66.9219
pounds,

(Note. lt has always been found impracticable
to print the invoice and entries in these custom
‘ases, as Will be obvious from an inspection, al-
though it has always been agreed on both sides

that they are a part of the record. The United

States Attorney called upon the Collector for their
production for use in the Courts below in this
case, and we have accordingly called upon the
Collector to file them in the office of the Clerk of
this Court, for inspection, if necessary.)

The record in this case covers bales numbered
2248, 2244 and 2263 of the above importation.
According to the Goverment weigher’s return
these bales weighed 178, 179 and 181 pounds re-
spectively at the time of landing. These bales
were withdrawn from bonded warehouse about
one year after importation, and weighed at that
time eight pounds less than at time of entry.

The question, therefore, presented in this case
is one whether the moisture which such tobacco ab-
sorbs on the voyage of importation, and which
disappears again, while it is in the custody of the
government, and before it is detivered over to the
importer to enter into the body of the merchandise
of the country for consumption, is dutiable at the
rate of $1.85 to the pound.

It is submitted that the statement made by the
learned Soliciter General about the importance of
this question by reason of possible loss of revenue
is speculative, and wholly unwarranted by the
record or experience, For example: In February,

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3

1903, the United States Cireuit Court held
that silk ribbons were properly dutiable at 50%
ad valorem instead of at 60% ad valorem, the rate
‘neretofore imposed.

This decision (which according to Government
reasoning in the case at bar, should have resulted
in reduced revenue), instead of leading to a loss of
revenue, caused an increase of $318,227.47 in
revenue from silk ribbon importations for the year
immediately following the decision.

So also the 20 per cent. reduction in duties ou
goods from Cuba caused the inaportation of $52, -
922,306 worth of dutiable merchandise in 1905, the
first full fiseal year after the Reciprocity Treaty
between the United States and Cuba went into ef-
fect: whereas, in 1908, the last full fiscal year
previous to the operation of the treaty, only $5, -
827,983 worth of dutiable merchandise from Cuba
was imported. In other words, although there
was a 20 per cent. reduction in duties, the value
of dutiable merchandise imported from Cuba in.
creased approximately $23,000,000 during the
above period (see Commerce and Navigation of the
United States, 1905, p. 21 and p. 33).

Clearly it would have been fallacious for the
(iovernment to have estimated at the beginning of
the 20 per cent. Cuban Treaty duty reduction
that the revenue to be derived from imports from
Cuba for the sueceeding years would be lessened
20 per cent. So also in the present case we con-
tend that the abolition of duty collections on
water, not inherently or commercially a part of
the taxable subject, tobacec, will not necessarily
cause any loss of revenue, but is more likely to
result in larger tobacco importations and increased
revenue.

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4

We respectfully predict that home interests will
be benefited by the increased importations of the
crude product, and the consequent encouragement
and expansion of the American cigar manufactur-
ing industry.

The Solicitor General at page 3 of his brief gives
‘serious loss of revenue’ and “the conflicting
views of the tribunals below as to the law’’ as the
two reasons why ‘‘a review by this Court seems
specially important.’’

For the reasons above stated, we submit that
there will be no loss of revenue. And as to the
alleged conflicting decisions, we need only say
that the ‘‘conflict’’ is not between any tworulings
of different Circuit Courts of Appeal, but merely
between the unanimous decision herein of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and of the Circuit Court of the Southern District
of New York.

This is not one of those conflicts of decisions
which this Court has stated justifies review.

In Forsyth vs. Hammond, 166 U. 8., 506, 514
Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for this Court
said:

‘We reaffirm in this case the propositions
heretofore announced, to wit, that the power
of this Court in certiorari extends to every
case pending in the Circuit Courts of Appeal,
and may be exercised at any time during
such pendency, provided the case is one which
but for this provision of the statute would be
finally determined in that Court. And further,
that while this power is co-extensive with all
possible necessities and sufficient to secure to
this Court a final control over the litigation
in all the Courts of Appeal, it is a power
which will be sparingly exercised, and only
when the circumstances of the case satisfy us

5

that the importance of the question involved,
the necessity of avoiding conflict between tivo
or more Courts of Appeal, or between Courts
of Appeal and the Courts of a State, or some
matter affecting the interests of this nation in
its internal or external relations, demands
such exercise.”’

It is further stated in the brief forthe petitioner
that there are 8,252 protests on tobacco now pend-
ing before the Board of General Appraisers, but it
is tobe borne in mind that protests under this
topic are filed both at the time of entry an ‘ the
time of withdrawal. In the present case for ex-
ample, there were thirty-one bales entered upon
which a protest was filed at the time of entry, and
another each time that a bale or more was with-
drawn, so that this one importation of thirty-one
bales involves seventeen protests, and the 8,252
protests which usually would represent that many
importations does not on the present issue repre-
sent by a great number so many importations as
the statement contained in the petition would in-
dicate without further explanation.

ARGUMENT.
Z.

The principle of law which the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals applied to the
facts in this suit is clear, has long
been settled and aquiesced in by the
Treasury Department, and would
seem to need no reiteration by this
Court.

The principle which the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals applied to the present case, was announced

6

by this Court in Seeherger vs. Wright & Lawther
Co., 157 U. 8., 183.

In that case the merchandise was flaxseed
which was dutiable at twenty cents per bushel of
fifty pounds. The proof in the case showed that
the seed contained dust, composed of clay, sand
and gravel to an average of four per cent. The
collector refused to allow for the four per cent. of
dust in computing the dutiable number of bushels
at 50 pounds to the bushel. This Court held that
an allowance should be made for such average
four per cent. of dust, and that ‘‘twenty cents
per bushel of fifty-six pounds’? meant ‘56 pounds
of clean seed, or at least seed freed from any
‘accidental’ impurities, such as the clay, sand
and gravel in question.

Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of
this Court, said:

‘“*We think the Court below was correct in
assuming that the tlaxseed in question, which
is made dutiable by the Act of 1883 at ‘twenty
cents per bushel of fifty-six pounds’, less the
tare, means fifty-six poundsof clean seed, orat
least seed freed from any accidental impurities,
such as the clay, sand and gravel in question.
If this seed had been washed or otherwise
cleansed of these impurities, it certainly will
not be contended tiat they would be subject
to an increased duty, by means of such cleans-
ing, or that a bushel of 56 pounds ofsuch seed
would be anything more or less than a stat-
utory bushel. Soif, without such cleansing
the amount of such impurities can be fixed at
a certain percentage, as the findings in this
case assume, we see no objection to the allow-
ance being made, though the seed ba not in
fact cleansed”’ (157 U.S., p. 186).

So inthe present case the sworn consular in-

7

voice, coupled with the United States weigher’s
return at the time of landing, shows that the 31
bales covered by the invoice acquired an acci-
dental and temporary amount of moisture on the
voyage of importation to the extent of 66 pounds.

The principle of the Seeberger case is much more
clearly applicable to the present case for the rea-
son that the importer proves by actual weight the
amount of moisture which is absorbed and evap-
orates again before he gets his goods, whereas in
the Seeberger case an average percentage only was
shown, and the importer was delivered the gross
weight of the flaxseed imported; but in the pres-
ent case the added weight was only temporary, it
was not present before the goods were shipped, nor
was it present when they were withdrawn
from bond. The water was an_ extraneous
substance, which disappeared before the to-
bacco became incorporated with the gen-
eral mass of property in the United States.

In other words, the water on which duty was
here levied, did not constitute a part of the tax-
able subject or article of commerce, wrapper to-
bacco, originally, nor did it constitute a part of
the wrapper tobacco, which went into consumption
in the domestic markets.

The only paragraph under which duty can be
imposed on this merchandise is Paragraph 213 of
the Tariff Act of 1897, which, so far as pertinent
reads:

“Wrapper tobacco * * * if unstemmed,
‘One dollar and eighty-five cents per pound.”

Clearly Congress did not intend to provide in
Paragraph 213 for a duty of $1.85 per pound
on “water? which did not go into consumption

“

8

when it provided for a duty of $1.85 per
pound on ‘‘wrapper tobacco.”’’ We respectfully
submit that even if it was within the constitu-
tional power of Congress, it certainly was not the
purpose of Congress to tax either air or water at
any such exorbitant rate.

II.

The difference between the entered
and withdrawal weights. of the
bales in this case, did not repre-
sent a loss of the merchandise.

Section 2983 of the United States Revised Stat-
utes reads as follows:

‘In no case shall there be any abatement of
the duties or allowance made for any injury,
damage, deterioration, loss or leakage sus-
tained by any merchandise, while deposited in
any public or private bonded warehouse.’’

It would seem to be a matter of common sense
perception, rather than a matter of argument, that
an accidental amount of moisture temporarily
present in the bales at the end of a long sea voy-
age, does not, when it disappears again, constitute
a “‘loss’’ of the merchandise.

The Circuit Court of Appeals found no difficulty
in reaching a unanimous conclusion that such
evaporation was not a loss of the tobacco. That is
the real question in this case, and the numerous
statutes, which the learned counsel for the peti-
tioner seeks to construe, become immaterial, unless
they show an intent on the part of the Congress to
tax the moisture in question. No attempt is
made, in the brief for the petitioner, to spell out

such an intent. On the contrary, an intent wholly
irrelevant to this issue is sought to be shown, and
the statutes therefore are not pertinent.

iil.

The collector should have re-
weighed the goods on withdrawal
to correct his error in including a
non-taxable subject in his weights
at the time of entry.

The duty of $1.85 per pound on wrapper tobacco
under the statute is only an unconditional and
fixed duty as to tobacco entered for immediate
consumption. That provision of the law is quali-
fied by the provision which permits goods to be
placed in bond.

When goods are placed in bond the time within
which the duty becomes a fixed certainty does
not expire until the date of that withdrawal, be-
cause if the duty increased for instance between
its entry and its withdrawal from bond then $1.85
per pound does not apply as against the Goverment,
and if the amount is not fixed against both the
Government and the importer, then the amount is
not finally fixed at $1.85 a pound for goods in
bond until withdrawal.

Mosle vs. Bidwell (C C. A), 130 Fed.
Rep., 334.

If the law were altered while goods are in bond,
changing the manner of computation of duty, so
that they would have to be re-weighed for the
benefit of the Government, (for example, if the
law were changed to make the weight of immedi-
ate coverings of tobacco dutiable, as is the

10

ease of confectionery under Paragraph 212 of
the Tariff Act,) then the weigher’s return can only
be final as to goods that are entered for consump-
tion, and not placed in bond, and if the weigher’s
return is not final as against the Government,
neither can it be said to be final as against the im-
porter.

The facts in the present case show that it is not
final, because at the time of withdrawal the col-
lector did deduct from the weigher’s return the
actual and schedule tare. If he deducts the
weight of the coverings from the weigher’s return
at the time of withdrawal, he should also deduct
for the accidental moisture, which is no more du-
tiable than the coverings are. The collector hav-
ing refused to re-weigh the goods to ascertain the
amount of such moisture, and having insisted upon
collecting duty on it at that time, the Circuit
Court of Appeals held a cause of action arose
against him, and protest was properly lodged at
that time.

In Lawder vs. Stone, 187 U. S., 281, this Court
held that a portion of a cargo of pineapples which
had been reduced to slush, and which, therefore,
ceased to be goods, wares and merchandise, was
not dutiable, in spite of the provision of the law
that no allowance should be made for ‘‘damage,”’
unless itamounted to ten per cent. of the quantity
imported. This Court further held that the pro-
vision with respect to damage had no application
to the case inasmuch asthe slush was not damaged
goods, but not goods atall, and although the Govern-
ment Examiner’s return showed acertain number of
pineapples imported, including an estimated num
ber which he found by counting the tops in the
slush, that the importer had aright to prove that

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11

euch return was incorrect in fact, and that a cer-
tain number of pineapples returned by the exam-
iner had, in fact, been reduced to slush. In the
present case the Government Weigher has returned
a certain amount of accidental moisture for duty,
and since such moisture is not goods, wares and
merchandise, any more than the slush was in the
pineapple case, the importer is entitled to show
the amount of such accidental moisture returned
by the Government Weigher for duty, although
that fact cannot be ascertained until withdrawal.

IV.

Points in reply to the brief for the
petitioner.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals did
not decide that the weight of imported tobacco at
the time of its withdrawal in itself alone deter-
mined the amount of duties payable thereon, but
that the cause of action does not arise until the
withdrawal, for the reason that it is not known
until then what is the actual amount of accidental
moisture which is contained in the imported
tobacco.

If the principles of law involved in the facts in
this case are identical with the principles applied
to the facts in the case of the dust in flaxseed,
the numerous statutes which the counsel for the
government sets forth in its petition would seem
to be immaterial and irrelevant, for it might be
granted that they all have the meaning for which
he contends, and still this accidental moisture
would not be dutiable any more than the acci-

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12

dental dust in the flaxseed was. This Court said
: in that case that fifty pounds per bushel meant
fifty pounds of clean seed. It may equally be
said, in this case, that a pound of tobaoco means
the tobacco free from moisture acquired on the
voyage of importation.

It is stated in the brief for the petitioner herein
that ‘‘the amount of dutyis one thing, the rate an-
other, as if the same ‘‘rate’’ could be ‘‘collected’’
if the amount remained aconstant, and the weight
varied where the elements of rate are the unit of
value and the unit of weight. Rate means ratio
or proportion, so that $1.85 per pound means at
the ratio of $1.85 to the pound. In the present
case duties were collected on the tobacco con-
tuined in the three bales in question at the rate
of $1.87, approximately, to the pound.

cifhsn Dats ntadilie sini Sti sith Baise

We admit the truth of the proposition of law
stated in the heading to Point IIL of the brief for
the petitioner, that the tobacco was dutiable upon
its weight at ‘‘withdrawal’’ according to the facts
of this case. No doubt the learned Solicitor Gen-
eral has had occasion to state the proposition so
frequently in that form in the past that force of
habit has rendered him blind to the fact that he
is on the other side of the case for the moment.

It is further stated in the petition that:

‘In this case a certain amount of tobacco
went into warehouse which weighed less when
it came out. What became of the difference?
It (the difference) was lost. * * * It cer-
tainly disappeared. And if it disappeared, no
matter by what means, it must be lost.”

ha

The fallacy of the above argument lies in the
promise that “‘a certain amount of fobacco went
into wareh ‘se.”’ Asa matter of fact a certain
amount of tobacco, plus a certain amount of acci-
dental moisture, went into warehouse; it is the
moisture, coustituting the difference, that has dis-

appeared.

Reference is made to the loss of liquor by evap-
ovation, but the distinction between such a loss,
and that in the present case, is obvious, for in the
case of the evaporation of liquor there is a loss of
the thing in itself. Im the present case there is
not a loss of the tobacco.

It is stated no allowance was claimed at entry.
The importers on this question have protested uni-
formly both at the time of entry and withdrawal.
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals shows
that they regarded a protest at the time of entry
premature, because no cause of action arose against
the Collector until he refused to make allowance for
the accidental moisture at the time of withdrawal.
This is a matter of practice and does not affect the
merits of the question.

The learned Solicitor-General cites Robertson vs.
Bradbury, 132 U. 8., 500, for the proposition that
no allowance for ordinary moisture, nor for evapor-
ation or shrinkage upon the voyage of importation
should be made. In that case the goods were sub-
ject to an ad valorem duty. In the case at bar the
duty is specific.

“When the duty was specific on this article

(sugar), being at a certain rate per pound, be-
fore the Act of 1846, it could, of course, ex.

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14

tend to no larger number of pounds than was
actually entered.”

Marriott cs. Brune, ad al., 9 How., 619,
Gl,
Lavwder vs. Stone, 187 UL S, 281.

The learned Solicitor General cites the case of
Jarnshaw vs. Cadwalader, 146 U.S. 247, as con-
trolling in thisease, In that ease the moisture found
in the iron ore in question constituted an inherent
part of it, and it was bought and sold in that con-
dition to merchants. And this Court held, in
effect, that indetermining the dutiable weight of
iron ore no deduction should be made on account
of moisture and that it would be improper to
ascertain the number of datiable tons after first
expelling the moisture by heating the ore to 212
degrees Fahrenheit, because iron ore as known to
the commerce of the United States was the ore in
its natural state in respect to moisture. The
moisture in the ore case was an incident. The
moisture in the present case is an accident. In the
present case it was not the subject of a commercial
transaction. It was neither bonght, sold, nor de-
livered.

A different case and one governed by Hrashaw
vs. Cadwalader, supra, would be made if after en-
try and before withdrawal the importer had, and
took advantage of, the opportunity to drive off all
moisture and create an abnormal! dryness in the to-
ba co. As a matter of fact, the sponge-like alsorb-
entcharacter of tobacco, and the fact that just before
it is weighed at entry it has been through ocean
transportation, gives to the Government an advan-
tage quite as considerable and quite as inequitable
us the importer sought to obtain in Ernshaw' s

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15

case; in the one case the importer sought to pro-

duce an abnormal and uncommereial dryness and
| minimum of weight to decrease duties, and in the
other the Government seeks to take advantage of
| an accidental and unavoidable but abnormal and
uncommercial amount of moisture and maximum
of weight to increase duties.

The bonded warehouse in New York is not an
unusually dry place, it has the temperature and
other climatic conditions that obtain in the places
where this tobacco is manufactured and where it is
consumed. The decrease in weight that comes to
the tobacco while in such warehouse is but the
normal elimi vation of a quantity of water that
but for the ocean of tran sportation would nol hare
been there at all—that was not there when the ex-
porter began the exportation and is not there when
the importer receives and uses the importation.

If the flaxseed in the Seeberger case had been
stored in bonded warehouse, and, in the process of
handling, the dust had sifted out of the bags,
which would have been a case precisely analogous
to the present, we do not think this Court
would have decided that case differently if the
importer in that case had proved the actual
amount of dust eliminated by weighing
at the time of withdrawal, rather than
claimed an average percentage at the time of en-
try. It would seem as if the Government counsel
should have acquiesced in the claim of the im-
porter in the present case, in view of its eminent
fairness toward the Government, inasmuch as the
importer only asked to be allowed for such mois-
ture as he showed by actual weight at the time of
withdrawa! had disappeared, and which the Con-
sular invoice showed he never bought.

16

Vv.

The unanimous decision of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in the present
case was right, and should receive
the approbation of this Court by the
denial of the present application.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD 8. HATCH,
J. STUART TOMPKINS,
Counsel for the Respondents.
Dated New York, April 20th, 1906.

(9416)

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