# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Meyer v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 880

## Text

Supreme Court, U.@
1D FILED

90 286 auc 21 29

No. ___oticé OF THE CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 20.

Charles L. Meyer, Petitioner
V.

The United States of America, Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Charles L. Meyer
Petitioner Pro Se

355 Pinewood Lane

San Antonio, Texas 78216
(210) 828-1913

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Both lower Courts held that the Trial Court Docket
No. 97-379C dismissal based on the 1986 Federal Circuit Hurick
decision represents law of the case doctrine. The Petitioner
argued exceptions to the law of the case doctrine for the issue of a
change in the law.

2. The issue of when does a legal action first accrue.

3. The Petitioner rebutted the Trial Court’s reasons to
dismiss which were cited in its Order to dismiss and were repeated
in the Federal Circuit’s Order to Affirm.

4. Both lower Courts disregarded the Petitioner’s
citation of the U. S. Supreme Court law principle decisions to
support his legal arguments.

5. Courts are required to accept the pleadings of a Pro

Se litigant.

6. The Trial Court made many judicial errors or in the
alternative abuses of discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's legal

action.

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE COURT BELOW

Charles L. Meyer, Petitioner Pro Se.

The United States of America, Respondents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Questions Presented for Review. ............-+.-- i--ii
List of parties to the Proceedings
a eee terete eee ee rer ili
PE II sk ce anc wee Sew New ee ees ot vi--x
TTT eT eee EET ETE 1--3
Stateement OF FUPISMICMIOM. . 2... ieee cece 3
I eek hac ch ein se se kk escvaeseeee 3-4
POPP PTET TELL Ee eee 4--6
Reasons for Granting Writ....................- 6--20
I. Exceptions to the law of
the case doctrine... 1... ccc ccc eees 6--7

II. The issue of when does a
legal action first accrue........-.....-- 8--13

-iv-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)

Il. The Petitioner rebutted
the Trial Court’s reasons
which were cited in its
Order to dismiss and re-
peated in the Federal
Circuit Order to Affirm. ............. 14--17

IV. Both lower Courts disre-
garded the Petitioner’s
citation of U. S. Supreme
Court law principle deci-
sions to support his legal

VI. The Trial Court made many
judicial errors or in the
alternative abuses of dis-
cretion in dismissing the
Plantiff’s legal action. .............. 19--20

APPENDICES

-y-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
Federal Circuit Order filed

eG te Oe ee ee ee or Al--A6
Petition for Rehearing denied by

the Federal Circuit on May 15,

NT Che Seana Ne Cree Nees B1--B2
Judgment as a Mandate May 22, 2000.......... Cl1--C2
Deputy Clerk’s Letter of Notice of

Rejection dated June 1,2000.............. B3--B4
Letter of Federal Circuit Court

Clerk dated June 20, 2000....... eee BS

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adams v. U. S., 42 Fed.C1. 289

ee en neae dl

Allen v. McMurry, 101 S.Ct. 411,
414, 415, 449 U. S. 90, 60

ee et ere rere ree

American Trucking Associations v.
Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2341
2343, 496 U. S. 167, 110 L.Ed.

oo iki cs BV

Aubre v. United States, 40 Fed.C1.

SU 6a in hi

Bay Area La v. Ferbar Corp.
of Cal, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 542,

I io a ine cas

Boeing v. U. S., 31 Fed.C1. 289

bo OR are re See ee ee

Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
334 U. S. 396, 66 S.Ct. 1039,

92-L.Ed. 1403 (1948) ................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Cooter v. Gell and Harmax Corp.,
110 S.Ct. 2447, 2456, 496 U. S.
384, 119 L.Ed. 2d 359 (1990)............. 14
Everett Plywood Corp. V. United,
States, 206 C1.Ct. 244, 251
PE Wee ROT CITI Iiss ask ss kode sa scuecs 15
Florida Power & Light Co. V. U. S.,
ee eee EE CAPERS ss cvs seca cbake 4,7
eee, pibsaal CEE eC ECO DE eee ae 14
Friedman v. U. S., 157 Ct.C1. 1,
Poo fe FR Td, 7s cnn ee 11,
12
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519,
520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30
Ramee UE CONS om si SG ik hk hel 9,
18
Heat and Control, Inc. V. Hester
Industries, Inc., 785 F.2d.
1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986).............. 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v.
U. S., 842 F.2d 1573, 1577

i, 8s S| BPProee ee VE ee eeee eerie. 9,11

Hurick v. Lehman, 782 F.2d 984,
7, ek ee ee eae 6, 8,

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives,

Laboratories, Inc., 107 S.Ct.
2182, 2189, 458 U. S. 844, 72

L.Ed. 2d 656 (1982) ..... tee eee eee eeee 20

J.E.T.S. Inc. V. U.S., 838 F.2d
1196, 1199, 1200 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. den., 486 U. S.
1057, 100 L.Ed.2d 926 (1988) ............ 7

Meyer v. U. S.,
Fed.C1. Slip Op. Docket No.

has i odd 6, 16
Fed.C1. Slip Op. Docket No.
DOVMEOIM....«.. <cssebh is vedi 8

Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney
Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765

Re SE ok os ok cs wk 11

ve

~ix-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258,
267, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1220,
eee hose GOO (1993S)... ics cc Kekic cs 10,
11
Siskind v. U. S., 116 C1.Ct. 809
UNG Sc os sea oe yaa el cus eet. wr 16,
17

Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510
SI ME eos AL Sows woe die Su 13

Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jor-

dan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S.
583, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed.

NM i a 18
U.S. v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc, 990
F.2d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1993)............ 9

U. S. v. Commodities Export Co.,
972 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed.
Ree oe 9, 10

Ulmet v. U. S., 17 C1.Ct. 679
Ree 7

-X-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Corp. v. Guenther, 281 U. S.

34, 50 S.Ct. 165, 167 (1980)............

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed.

I a Bs ak oe

ie ee oe he oe re
BU 66 60. CAS ke
BU Ee At OM

2 &O 6908.) ccs ec

Federal Circuit Rules

I os as Se

-xi-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page

Rules of the United States Claims Court

We ee POU t's NOE Vol cx ck acc sceeae 19

LAW DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS

Black’s Law Dictionary Sixth Edition

SUE Re BUONO, oN cenccccccescane 17

SD Sn: MI oe dais Syd aA weak vb banc 17

=e
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term,

Charles L. Meyer, Petitioner Pro Se,
Vv.

The United States of America, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Charles L. Meyer, the Petitioner Pro Se herein,
respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit which was entered as a Mandate in the above-entitled case
on May 22, 2000.

OPINIONS BELOW

mS

The Order of the Federal Circuit filed April 3, 2000
Affirmed the Trial Court Order filed October 26, 1999 which
dismissed the Plantiff's Complaint. The Federal Circuit
incorporated this Trial Court Order into its Order to Affirm. This
Federal Circuit decision is included infra at Appendix A Pages
1--6. The Federal Circuit Order filed May 15, 2000 denied the
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing. This Federal Circuit Order is
included infra at Appendix B Pages 1--2. The Federal Circuit
Published its Order of Judgment as a Mandate on May 22, 2000.
This Federal Circuit Order of Judgment is included infra at
Appendix C Pages 1--2. The Federal Circuit Deputy Clerk’s
Letter Notice of Rejection dated June 1, 2000 rejected the
Appellant’s second Petition for Rehearing. This Federal Circuit
Deputy Clerk’s Letter is included infra at Appendix B Pages 3--4.
The Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider this Deputy Clerk’s
Letter Notice of Rejection on June 8, 2000. The Federal Circuit

Court Clerk letter dated June 20, 2000 rejects the Appellant’s

= %
Motion to Reconsider and states that the his Appeal before the
Federal Circuit is over. This Federal Circuit Court Clerk’s letter
dated June 20, 2000 is included infra at Appendix B Page 5. On
July 14, 2000 Chief Justice William B. Rehnquest granted the
Petitioner’s corrected application for an extension of time to file
this Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the U. S. Supreme Court.
Application Number 00A38 extends the time to file this Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to and including September 12, 2000.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered as a
Mandate on May 22, 2000. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (c).
STATUTE INVOLVED
The first Paragraph of 28 U. S. C. § 2501 reads:
Time for filing suit
Every claim of which the United
States Court of Federal Claims has

jurisdiction shall be barred unless the
petition thereon is filed within six years

-4-
after the claim first accrues.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Plaintiff conditioned his Trial Court legal action on
the second of two injuries to him by the U. S. Government which
occurred on June 3, 1994 (Trial Court Appendix F-3) and filed his
legal action within six years after that date. The Plaintiff's Trial
Court legal action was not available in a previous suit, Florida
Power & Light Co.. Infra, and is based on a change in controlling
law (Trial Court Appendix A-3), Boeing v. U. S., 31 Fed.C1. 289
(1994). The Plaintiff cited American Trucking Associations v.
Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2341, 2343, 496 U. S. 167, 110 L.Ed.2d
149 (1990) for his legal remedy to correct this change in the law.
The U. S. Air Force neat 3, 1994 deleted from its applicable
Air Force Board of Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR)
written directive the second of two criteria which the Plaintiff

used in his original records correction application to this

Correction Board which he submitted to it in 1970 which it denied

a.
on April 5, 1971. The Petitioner’s original records correction
application stated that his Officer Effectiveness Reports (OERs)
between the reporting periods which ended July 31, 1965 through
July 31, 1970 were incorrectly prepared. The applicable written
directives (Trial Court Appendices B-3 and H-1) required the
Reporting Official to prepare each OER correctly. The
Correction Board was required to invalidate each OER when the
records correction Applicant provided that it was incorrectly
prepared. This auitins written directive which the Petitioner
used was dated February 18, 1970. The American Trucking
Associations decision, supra, permits the law to be applied
retroactively to correct any injustice which has occurred because
of a change in the law. Within each Armed Service a written
directive has the effect of being law. This law principle is
specified at United States Fidelity and Guaranty Corp. v.
Guenther, 281 U. S. 34, 50 S.Ct. 165, 167 (1930). The Plaintiff

requested the Trial Court to vacate the two AFBCMR requests

-6-
for reconsideration dated February 5 and April 21, 1997 and
remand to this Correction Board to be reconsidered. The Trial
Court instructions for remand to the AFBCMR would state that
this Correction Board would reaccomplish the Plaintiff's two
requests for reconsideration in accordance with the Air Force
written directives which were in effect at the time the Plaintiff
submitted his original records correction application in 1970.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.

Exceptions to the law of the case doctrine

The Federal Circuit incorporated the Trial Court decision
to dismiss the Plaintiffs legal action filed October 26, 1999 in its
decision to Affirm this decision which was filed on April 3, 2000.
This Trial Court decision which is based on the earlier Trial Court
Docket No. 97-379C decision which cited Hurick, infra, conveys

the perception that the Trial Court Docket No. 97-379C decision

constitutes law of the case doctrine. The Petitioner pleaded

x %
before both lower Courts exceptions to the law of the case
doctrine based on J.E.T.S. Inc. v. U. S., 838 F.2d 1196, 1199,
1200 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. den., 486 U. S. 1057, 100 L.Ed.2d
926 (1988). The Plaintiff's Trial Court Motion to Reconsider
supplemented this averment with the following legal arguments.

The Plaintiff cited Ulmet v. U. S., 17 Cl.Ct. 679 (1989) which

stated that under the law of the case doctrine, decision on issues
of law made at one phase of litigation becomes binding predent to
be followed in successive stages of same case. This Motion to

Reconsider also cited Adams y. U. S., 42 Fed. Cl. 463 (1998)

which states that previous decisions in this Trial Court, although
persuasive and helpful, do ait constitute binding precedent for
other decisions in this Trial Court. The Plaintiff's Trial Court
Motion to reconsider also cited Florida Power & Light Co. v. U.
S., 41 Fed.Cl.477 (1998) for the doctrine of stare decisis which

compels lower courts to follow the decisions of higher courts on

questions of law.

-8-
Il.
The issue of when does a legal action first accrue.

The Docket No. 99-CV-895 Trial Court dismissed the
Plaintiffs Complaint based on the previous Docket No. 97-379C
Trial Court dismissal which was based on Hurick v. Lehman, 782
F.2d 984, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Hurick held that a serviceman
has six years after his date of discharge from the Armed Service to
file a legal action to legally question his discharge. This Trial
Court held that the Plaintiff's Complaint was untimely filed since
he waited more than six years after the date of his discharge as an
Officer from the Air Force Reserve in August, 1971. The
important issued of the Hurick decision is that its law principle
States “a legal action accrues”. The Plaintiff conditioned his legal
action on the second of two injuries to him which occurred on
June 3, 1994 and filed his legal action before this Trial Court on

October 26, 1999 pursuant to the first Paragraph of 28 U. S.C. §

2501. The Plaintiff based his Trial Court on the following legal

9.
arguments. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. U-S., 842 F.2d
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) for the issue of when does a claim
against the U. S. Government “first accrues”. “[4, 5] It is
generally stated that a claim ‘first accrues’ when all events have
occurred which fix the alleged liability of the defendant and entitle
the plaintiff to initiate an action. . . .” The Petitioner cited
before lower Courts this same averment with the citation of U. S.
v. Cocoa Be rkau, Inc., 990 F.2d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and U. S. v.
Commodities Export Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cit. 1982)
which were stated in general terms. Both lower Courts
disregarded this averment since the Petitioner did not state a
citation with quotation marks. The Petitioner cited Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652
(1972) for this law principle. The pleadings of a Pro Se litigant
are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by Attorneys. For this Petition the Petitioner offers the actual

U.S. v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc. Court decision. "[3, 4] The law is

-10-

well settled that, as a general rule, a claim does not accrue until all
events necessary to fix the liability of a defendant have occurred.”
(Footnote 2 omitted.). . . United States v. Commodities Export
Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (‘[A] cause of action
accrues when all events necessary to state a claim have occurred.)
iS he Therefore, the Plaintiff could not file this Trial Court legal
action until after the U. S. Government committed its second
injury to him on June 3, 1994.

The Plaintiff supplemented this issue of when does a legal

action first accure before the Trial Court by citing Bay Area

Laundry vy. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 542, 546, 549
(1997). "[1, 2]. . . A limitations period ordinarily does not begin
to run (i. e., accrue) until the plaintiff has a 'complete and present

cause of action.'. - .

[5]. . .acause of action does not become complete until

the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. See Reiter v. Cooper,

St.
507 U. S. 258, 267, 113, S.Ct. 1213, 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d 604
(1993)... ."

A coordinate issue to the arguments presented supra for
the defense of limitations was made before both lower Courts.
The Trial Court relied on the 1986 Federal Circuit Hurick
decision. The Plaintiff relied on the 1985 Federal Circuit
Hopeland Band of Pomo Indians decision. The Petitioner cited

before both lower Courts Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg.
Co., 864 F.2d 751, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988). "[2-3]. . . Where
there is a direct conflict (i. e., between different Federal Circuit
decisions), the precedent decision is the first. . . ." The
Plaintiff's citation of the Hopland Band of Pomo Indians decision
is one year earlier than the Court's reliance on the Hurick decision.
The Plaintiff's Trial Court Motion to reconsider cited
Friedman y. U. S., 157 Ct.CL 1, 310 F.2d 381, 385 (1982) which

delineates the difference between the original event which

occurred and a second event by a Federal Agency which occurred

“<
at a subsequent date which causes a legal action to accrue.
ici Sa incall amy reba agil Stitt
expounded the law for the deliberations by an administrative
agency for non-disability retirement legal actions. Friedman
stated: "[4-7]. . . the court has applied another principle in a
different type of case. That second principle governs situations
where the Congress has deliberately given an administrative body
the function of deciding all or part of the claimant's entitlement,
i.e., where Congress has interposed an administrative tribunal
between the claimant and the court. In those instances the claim
does not accrue until the executive body has acted (if seasonably
asked to act). So also where Congress has insisted that a special
demand be made or a special application filed. . . . -but once the
court has decided that the case falls into the former class (i.e.,
Cases other than disability retirement cases) it has ruled that the

claim accrues, not when the events occurred but when the agency

has rendered its determination.

iD.

Like the ‘continuing claim’ theory, the second principle fits
with general limitations law which recognized that in appropriate
cases conditions precedent to the accrual of a cause of action can
be established by statute, contract, or common law, and that
where such a condition precedent has been created the claim does
not ripen until the condition is fulfilled. . . .". The Petitioner for
this Petition cites Supreme Court Rule 10. (a) for reference. The
Tenth Circuit has decided a case on the same law principle but for
a different subject matter. The Petitioner was unable to find any
other U. S. Court of Appeals decision for this same law principle.
The Petitioner cites Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.
1986). A former soldier's action charging that the Army
Discharge Review Board and the Army Board for Correction of
Military Records unlawfully refused to upgrade his dishonorable
discharge accrued at the time of ABCMR decision not at time of
discharge, and thus, action brought within six years of ABCMR

decision was timely. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401 (a).

-14-

Il.
The Petitioner rebutted the Trial Court's reasons which were
cited in its Order to dismiss and repeated in the
Federal Circuit's Order to Affirm. ~-

The Petitioner pleaded the following cited Court decisions
before both lower Courts to rebut the legal argument that Res
Judicata applies to his dismissed Trial Court legal action. The
Petitioner cited Cooter v. Gell and Harmax Corp., 110 S.Ct.
2447, 2456, 496 U.S. 384, 119 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). "[15-17]. .
. ‘[D]ismissal. . . without prejudice’ is a dismissal that does not
‘operat[e] as an adjudication upon merits.' and thus does not have
a res judicata effect'. . ." A litigant may file a successor legal
action to a legal action which was dismissed for procedural error
provided the appropriate statute of limitations has not been

exceeded. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. U. S., 41 Fed.C1.

477, 484(1988). "[12-13] A second suit will not be precluded if

0%.

it asserts a cause of action that was not yet available when a
decision was rendered in a previous suit, even though that cause
of action may arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions that give rise to the first suit. See Everett Plywood
Corp. v. United States, 206 Cl.Ct. 244, 251, 512 F.2d 1087
(1975). . . ." Allen v. McMurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 415, 449
U.S. 90, 60 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) addresses a related law principle
to res judicata. "[1-4] The Federal courts have traditionally
adhered to the related doctrine of res judicata and collateral
estoppel... .

[5S]. . . But one general limitations the Court has
repeatedly recognized is that the concept of collateral estoppel
cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is
asserted did not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate that
issue in the earlier case. . . ."

The Plaintiff did not plead the tolling of the statute of

limitations before the Trial Court. The Trial Court's citation of

-16-

Aubre v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 371 (1998) is not germane to
the Trial Court legal action. Aubre was a medical disability

retirement legal action. See Aubre synopsis, Ibid. at Pages
372--373. The Plaintiff's legal action is a non-disability retirement
by reason of years of completion of service.

The Trial Court erred by stating that in Docket No.
97-379C the Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
statute of limitations before the Trail Court. The Plaintiff
specified the conditioning of that legal action on the second of
two injuries to him by the U. S. Government in a subsequent
pleading to his Complaint. The Plaintiff's legal research did not
find this Court decision until the vesiene of 1999. The Plaintiffs
‘Complaint cited Siskind v. U.S., 116 CLCt. 809 (1950). This
Court decision states that the U. S. Court of Claims may consider
only the allegations contained in the petition (i. e., the Plaintiffs

Complaint). This arcane Trial Court practice is not well known to

all litigants. The Petitioner pleaded for a different averment

=i?
before both lower Courts the citation of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) which states:
". . . a discriminatory application of a statute or reguiation is
nonetheless unlawful." The Petitioner applies this Court decision

}
}
|
|

to the Trial Court's practice which is based on the Siskin decision,

supra, as follows. The terms which relate to the Siskin practice,
Black's Law Dictionary sixth edition Page 1286 and rule, Ibid.,
Page 1331, are synonymous. Therefore, the Petitioner avers that

based on the Yick Wo decision the Trial Court Siskin practice is

discriminatory and it should be overturned by this Court.
IV.

Both lower Courts disregarded the Petitioner's citation of

U.S. Supreme Court law principle decisions to support

his legal arguments.

The Petitioner cited 18 different U. S. Supreme Court
decisions in presenting his averments before both lower Courts. |
Both lower Courts disregarded these Petitioner's pleadings which

were based on U. S. Supreme Court decisions. The Petitioner

“3
pleaded separately before both lower Courts the citation of Briggs

v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U. S. 396, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed.
1403 (1948) and Thurs

Ltd., 460 U.S. 583, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed. 2d 260 (1983) for
the law principle that once the U. S. Supreme Court decides a law
principle that law principle Court decision is controlling on all
inferior Courts. Both lower Courts disregarded the Petitioner's
averment where he pleaded each applicable Supreme Court law
principle before these lower Courts. The Petitioner avers that the
lower Courts judicial proceedings are a departure from accepted
Jurisprudence proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's
supervisory power to correct these Judicial errors or in the
alternative abuses of discretion.

¥.

Courts are required to accept the pleadings of a Pro Se
litigant.

The Petitioner proceeded Pro Se before both lower Courts

and cited Haines v. Kerner, supra, for this law principle. The

-19-
pleadings of a Pro Se litigant are held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by Attorneys. The Petitioner avers
that he argued the law correctly before both lower Courts. The
Petitioner's perception is that both lower Courts disregarded the
legal arguments made by a civil action Pro Se litigant who is not
represented by Counsel. In response to this perception the
Appellant's second Petition for Rehearing cited 28 U.S. C. § 1654
Appearance personally or by counsel.

In all courts of the United States the parties may

plead and conduct their own cases personally or

by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,

respectfully, are permitted to manage and

conduct causes therein.
See Claims Court Rule 81. (d) (8) and Federal Circuit Rule 47.3
(a).

VI.

The Trial Court made many judicial errors or in the
alternative abuses of discretion in dismissing the
Plaintiff's legal action.

-20-

The Plaintiffs Trial Court Motion to reconsider stated the
Trial Court erred in its many instances of judicial errors or in the
alternative many instances of abuses of discretion. The Plaintiff
cited in his Trial Court Motion to Reconsider many Court
decisions for this alternatively stated averment. For the sake of
brevity the Petitioner cites only one Court decision for each of
these two legal arguments. For judicial error the Plaintiff cited
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 107 S.Ct.
2182, 2189, 458 U.S. 844, 72 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982). For abuse of
discretion the Plaintiff cited Heat and Control, Inc. v. Hester

Industries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

CONCLUSION
The Petitioner requests that this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari be considered by the next session of the U. S. Supreme
Court which is scheduled to convene in October 2000. All cases

which were selected for oral argument during this fiscal year of

the U. S. Supreme Court have previously been heard.

Bi.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of
Certiorari will be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

Charles L. Meyer
Petitioner Pro Se
355 Pinewood Lane

San Antonio, Texas 78216

(210) 828-1913

22.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the eighteenth day of August, 2000 40 copies of the
Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the dismissed Docket
No. 00-5035 from the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was placed in the United States Mail, Certified, Return
receipt requested, and served upon the following listed individual
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule Number 29.2.
Mr. William K. Suter ~
Court Clerk
U. S. Supreme Court
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20543
On the eighteenth day of August, 2000 one copy of the
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the dismissed
Docket No. 00-5035 from the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was placed in the regular United States Mail and

served pursuant to Supreme Court Rule Number 29.4.

Solicitor General of the United States
Room 5614, Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20530-0001

93.
Charles L. Meyer

Petitioner Pro Se

A-1
NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6,
this order is not citable as precedent.
It is a public order.

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit

00-5035
CHARLES L. MEYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
ON MOTION

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, PLAGER and LINN, Circuit

Judges. PLAGER, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
The United States moves for summary affirmance of the
October 27, 1999 judgment of the Court of Federal Claims

dismissing Charles L. Meyer's complaint. Meyer opposes.

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On October 26, 1999 Meyer filed a complaint in the Court
of Federal Claims seeking review of two decisions of the Air
Force Board of Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR)
denying Meyer's requests for Correction of his Officer
Effectiveness Reports (OER) that he received between August 1,
1965 and July 31, 1969. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed
the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the
statute of limitations:

[Meyer] alleges that he separated from
the United States Air Force in 1971, reenlisted
in 1972, and ultimately retired in 1975. The
complaint states that [Meyer] claimed that the
OER's had been improperly prepared, causing
him to be passed over twice for promotion.
The AFBCMR denied [Meyer] first application
for correction in 1971. [Meyer] filed a claim
in the district court, challenging the AFBCMR's
denial, which was dismissed. See Meyer v._
Seamans, affd, 478 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1973).
This was only the beginning of a series of cases
instituted by [Meyer] regarding the same claim.
In 1975, [Meyer] filed a similar claim in the
Court of Claims, which was also dismissed.
See Meyer v. United States, 212 Ct.cl. 537
(1976). [Meyer] subsequently sought two
reconsiderations with the AFBCMR, which

A-3

was denied on February 5 and April 21, 1997.
[Meyer] sought review of the AFBCMR
determinations twice more in this court,
which dismissed [Meyer's] claims as barred
by the six-year statute of limitations, see
Meyer v. United States, No. 97-379C,

slip op. (Fed. CL, Nov. 13, 1997), aff'd,

No. 98-5082, slip op. (Fed. Cir., October

13, 1998); 28 U.S.C. 2501 (1994), and

on res judicata grounds, see Meyer v. United
States, No. 99-114C, slip op. (Fed. Cl. Mar.
12, 1999).

Upon close examination of [Meyer's]
complaint in the instance case, this court also
finds that [Meyer's] complaint is barred by the
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2501, and the
doctrine of res judicata.

[Meyer] asserts that the AFBCMR's
decisions denying his requests for correction
constitute a second injury, which restarts the
statute of limitations period. It is well settled
law, however, that requests for reconsideration
which were not filed within a short time after
the initial decision doe not toll the statute of
limitations. See Aubre v. United States, 40
Fed. Cl. 371 (1998).

In addition, [Meyer] avers that res_
judicata is inapplicable where the party has
not had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate."
However, [Meyer] had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the statute of limitations

A-4

before the court in Meyer v. United States,
No. 97-379C, slip op. (Fed. Cl. Nov. 13, 1997).

Accordingly, this court lacks

jurisdiction and [Meyer's] complaint is

dismissed.

Meyer filed a motion for reconsideration. In denying the motion,
the Court of Federal Claims noted that Meyer had filed three
actions concerning the same matter and warned that restrictions
on Meyer's access to courts "may be appropriate in the future."
Meyer appealed to this court.

The United States moves for summary affirmance of a
case "is approrpriate, inter alia when the position of one party is
so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial question
regarding the outcome of the appeal exists." Joshua v. United
States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (summarily affirming
the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of a complaint). The
United States argues that summary affirmance is appropriate
because res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations

clearly preclude Meyer from relitigating his claims. Meyer argues

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that the arguments of the United States "are a conscious attempt
to obfuscate the merits of this Formal Appeal."

We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Federal
Claims in dismissing Meyer's complaint. We also note that this is
Meyer's third appeal to this court concerning the same claim.
Thus, because no substantial question exists regarding the
outcome of the instant appeal, the court summarily affirms the
judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The United States' motion for sumaffirmance is

granted.
(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.

FOR THE COURT
APR _-3 2000 /S/S. Jay Plager __
Date /T/S. J. Plager

Circuit Judge

A-6

cc: Charles L. Meyer
John C. Einstman, Esq.

s13 Filed
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT

APR - 3 2000
JAN HORBALY
CLERK

B-1

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit

00-5035
CHARLES L. MEYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

A petition for rehearing en banc having been filed by the
APPELLANT, and the matter having first been referred as a

petition for rehearing to the motions panel, and thereafter

petition for rehearing en_banc having been referred to the circuit

judges who are in regular active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc be, and

the same hereby is, DENIED.

The mandate of the court will issue on May 22, 2000.

FOR THE COURT

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/S/ Jan Horbaly
\ /T/ Jan Horbaly
Clerk

Dated: May 15, 2000
Filed
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT

cc: CHARLES L. MEYER
JOHN C. EINSTMAN MAY 15, 2000

JAN HORBALY
CLERK

MEYER V. US, 00-5035
(CFC - 99-CV-895)

FSEKKSEKSSESSSSTEESSEKAEKEESESSETEKEAERS

° Note: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, *
” this order is not citable as precedent. *
° It is a public record. .

FSEREKSEKSSSESEARSESEKEAERSEAEKESETAEEEERE

ee

B-3

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
717 MADISON PLACE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20439

JAN HORBALY ; TELEPHONE: 633-6550
CLERK AREA CODE 202
June 1, 2000

RE: MEYER V. US
Appeal No. 00-5035

NOTICE OF REJECTION
CHARLES L. MEYER'S recently-submitted combined
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc does
not comply with:
[X] Timeliness (Fed. R. App. P. 40)
[ ] Length (Fed. Cir. R. 35)
[X] Statement (Fed. Cir. R. 35 (b))

[ ] Addendum (Fed. Cir. R. 35)

[X] Other Repetiti sions §
rehearing are not authorized.

The Clerk has been instructed by the Court to reject for
filing any paper not in compliance with the Rules of Practice.
Accordingly, the original combined petition for rehearing and

B-4

suggestion for rehearing en banc is returned herewith. The copies
will be held in room 401 for retrieval until June 15, 2000.

Very truly yours,
Jan Horbaly, Clerk
By:
JUN 1 2000 /S/
Date /T/ Deputy Clerk
(NOTE: This signature
is illegible.)

Enclosure

CHARLES L. MEYER
JOHN C. EINSTMAN

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
717 MADISON PLACE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20439

JAN HORBALY TELEPHONE: 633-6550
CLERK AREA CODE 202
JUN 20, 2000
Charles L. Meyer
355 Pinewood Lane

San Antonio, Texas 78216

RE: Meyer v. United States, 00-5035
Dear Mr. Meyer:

This letter is in reference to your motion to reconsider the
court's June 1, 2000 notice of rejection of your second combined
“petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. As
the notice of rejection indicated, the court does not permit
repetitive petitions for rehearing. Therefore, your appeal in this
court is over.

Very truly yours,

/S/ Jan Horbaly
/T/ Jan Horbaly

JH/Ih
cc: John C. Einstman, Esq.

C-1

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit

00-5035
CHARLES L. MEYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
Claims in 99-CV-895, Judge Nancy B. Firestone.

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED

ENTERED BY ORDER OF
THE COURT

DATED: April 3, 2000
/S/ Jan Horbaly
/T/ Jan Horbaly
Clerk
ISSUED AS A MANDATE: May 22, 2000

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_1804%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.