# Amicus Brief — Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co. of California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 1183

## Text

In the Supreme Court of the Bnited States |

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

DAVID W. OGDEN

Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G,. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General
JAMES A. FELDMAN

Assistant to the Solicitor

ALBIN F. DROST
Acting General Counsel

JOHN M. WHEALAN
Solicitor

General
) INCYS ISACS
pte ee BARBARA BIDDLE
Associate Solicitors ys comagpami
United States Patent and y'
Trademark Office Department of Justice
Arlington, VA 22215 Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence in the
record to permit a jury to conclude that respondent’s
patent application satisfies the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112.

2. Whether the courts below correctly construed the
scope of respondent’s patent for purposes of
determining whether, under 35 U.S.C. 102, the patent’s
claims were anticipated by certain specialty aviation
and racing fuels.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement
Discussion
Conclusion
Appendix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co.,
804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
Dell Computer Corp, In re, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) ..............
Driscoll, In re, 562 F.2d 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1977) cecccsccccossosesse.
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822) seoceo..o......
FCC v. Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245 CED kcistbsietta
General Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.,

326 U.S. 242 (1945) ;

McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 160 U.S. 110

(1895) '
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive

Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945)
Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981)
Ruschig, In re, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. RIED inaphdindech ccna
Saunders, In re, 444 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1971) cecccssessssssses..
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech,

Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir., 1991)
Smith, In re, 458 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v.

Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 173 (2000)
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining

Co., 322 U.S. 471 (1944)
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed.

Cir. 1991)

(III)

RNS Wao eae? EO eee ere Eas

S80 §

3, 9, 10

Aral et tt es tee —

IV

Cases—Continued: Page
Wertheim, In re, 541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976) .......... 9, 10, 18
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

395 U.S. 100 (1969) 18

Statutes, regulations and rule:

Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 .... a 9
Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.

106-43, § 4402(b)(1), 113 Stat. 1501 A-560 10
21 U.S.C. 355@) (1988) ....... “ 20
35 U.S.C. 102(b) 4
35 U.S.C. 102(f) 13, 19
35 U.S.C. 112 ... 3, 9, 13, 17, 18
35 U.S.C. 132 12
35 U:S.C. 282 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ....... 10.
37 C.F.R. 1.111 12
40 C.F.R.:

Section 80.41 13

Section 80.45 7” 13

Sup. Ct. R. 10(¢) ... 14

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 00-249
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s
order inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the views of the United States.

STATEMENT

Petitioners, a group of oil refiners, challenge the
validity of United States Patent No. 5,288,393 (the ’393
patent), owned by respondent. The ’393 patent is
directed to reformulated unleaded gasoline intended to
reduce harmful automobile emissions. After the filing
date of the ’393 patent, but before the patent issued, the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) set standards
for gasoline that may be sold in California, which were
formulated following detailed and joint consultations
with various interested entities, including respondent.
After CARB promulgated its standards, respondent
amended its application to include 41 claims, some of
which are similar to the CARB regulatory conditions.

After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment
in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the record

(1)

2

contained substantial evidence to support the jury’s
factual determinations and that the district court had
correctly interpreted the scope of the patent claims.

1. Gasolines are derived from components that are
refined from crude oil. Those components must be
blended so that the resulting gasoline will have proper-
ties that will give satisfactory performance over an
extremely wide range of operating and climatic condi-
tions. C.A. App. 5952. The ’393 patent has to do with ©
producing gasolines with certain combinations of prop-
erties that will reduce automobile tailpipe emissions.
Pet. App. 2a.

2. On December 13, 1990, respondent filed a patent
application for what became the 393 patent. C.A. App.
447. The application asserted an invention date of
March 1990.' At the time of the application, CARB had
begun a process designed to lead to the establishment
of requirements for reformulated gasolines that would
reduce emissions in California. The process involved
close consultation with interested parties, including
refiners such as petitioners and respondent, who shared
technical skills and data with CARB in an effort .to
arrive at standards that would achieve the maximum
reduction in emissions at the lowest cost. Respondent
was one of the firms that participated in the process.

' During the same time period, respondent was involved in a
joint research program sponsored by the automobile and oil indus-
tries to study how gasoline could be reformulated to reduce
harmful emissions. Trial Tr. 1130-1137. The participants in the
Auto/Oil program signed an agreement permitting each party to
perform independent research and to protect any intellectual
property assets that may arise from the individual research. bid.
At the time the patent application was filed, CARB had already
announced its intention to adopt reformulated gasoline regulations
designed to reduce emissions, although the precise shape of those
regulations was not yet clear. C.A. App. 5113-5131.

3 peas

CARB announced its new regulations in November
1991, which were to be effective in early 1996. At that
time, respondent was prosecuting the patent in the
Patent Office. During the prosecution, respondent filed
numerous information disclosure statements presenting
information for consideration by the examiner, includ-
ing one that informed the examiner of CARB’s Novem-
ber 1991 standards. C.A. App. 5778-5782.

The ’393 patent issued-on February 22, 1994. Pet.
App. 33a. The patent application contained 82 claims.
fd. at 2a. During the prosecution of the patent, all of
the patent’s claims were modified. As issued, the pat-
ent included 155 claims, but respondent disclaimed all
but the 41 at issue in this case. Ibid.

3. In April 1995, petitioners commenced this action
in the district court against respondent for a declara-
tory judgment that the ’393 patent was invalid. Re-
spondent counterclaimed, alleging that petitioners were
infringing the patent. Pet. App. 7a. After a 49-day trial
and 13 days of deliberations, a jury reached a verdict in
favor of respondent. Id. at 7a-8a. Two issues are of
primary importance here.

a. First, 35 U.S.C. 112 provides that

[t]he specification [in the patent application] shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same.

The “written description” component of that require-
ment must “convey with reasonable clarity to those
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or
she was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath Inc.
v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

4

Petitioners asserted that, because the claims of the ’393
patent were substantially revised from those included
in the original patent application, the patent application
failed to supply a “written description” sufficient to
show that respondent was in possession of the claimed
invention as of the filing date of the patent application.
Indeed, a primary argument of petitioners before this
Court is that the claims of the ’393 patent are derived
from the 1991 CARB standards;rather than from the
invention as described in the patent application in 1990.
See, e.g., Pet. 3, 14.

In a special verdict, the jury found that the written
description requirement was satisfied by each of the 41
claims of the 393 patent. Pet. App. 8a. The trial court
denied petitioners’ post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law on that point, finding “that substantial
evidence exists in the record regarding the written de-
scription to support the verdict that [the inventors] had
possession of the claimed subject matter.” Jd. at 54a.

b. Second, 35 U.S.C. 102(b) sets forth an “anticipa-
tion” requirement, which provides that a patent is valid
unless “the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent.” Peti-
tioners argued that the 393 patent was anticipated,
because the compositions that it taught had in fact been
used in aviation and racing fuels long before the ’393
patent application was filed. The district court denied
petitioners’ summary judgment on that point, however,
construing the claims of the patent to extend only to
“unleaded gasoline fuels intended for regular use in
automobiles, 7.e., traditional motor gasoline to be mass-
produced at typical refineries for the general motoring
public.” Pet. App. 47a: The court held that, as so con-

5

strued, there remained a factual issue regarding
“whether the patent merely reveals new properties of a
previous invention * * * or whether it teaches a new
process defined by the properties of the resulting
composition.” Jd. at 46a. That issue was submitted to
the jury, which found that none of the 41 claims was
anticipated by prior art. Jd. at 8a. The district court
denied petitioners’ post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law on the anticipation issue. Jd. at 51a-53a.

4. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pet. App. la-31a.

a. With respect to the written description require-
ment, the court noted that that requirement “does not
require the applicant to describe exactly the subject
matter claimed” and that the “primary consideration is
factual and depends on the nature of the invention and
the amount of knowledge imparted to those skilled in
the art by the disclosure.” Pet. App. 13a. See also id. at
22a (referring to “the fact-sensitive nature of the
written description inquiry”). The court stated that the
393 patent “teaches that changes in the proportions of
different hydrocarbon-containing streams mixed to
produce gasoline with specific properties reduces the
amount of [emissions] from an automobile engine.” Jd.
at 14a. Accordingly, “the patent claims its inventive
products in terms of ranges of chemical properties,
which work in combination with ranges of other chemi-
cal properties to produce a gasoline that reduces
emissions.” Jbid.

The court rejected the argument that “range” claims
of the sort made by the ’393 patent violate the written
description requirement if they do “not describe the
exact chemical component of each combination that falls
within” the patent’s claims, Pet. App. 15a. The court
gave examples of the ways in which limitations in two

6

claims in the ’393 patent were supported by the teach-
ings recited in the patent’s specifications. Jd. at 16a-
17a. The court also explained that the relevant ques-
tion is “whether one of skill in the art could derive the
claimed ranges from the parent’s disclosure,” not
whether “the ranges in applicant’s claims * * * corre-
spond exactly to those disclosed in the parent appli-
cation.” Id. at 22a.

b. With respect to the anticipation argument, the
court of appeals noted that the ’393 patent “claims com-
positions of matter,” and that “(t]he scope of these
composition claims cannot * * * embrace only certain
uses of that composition.” Pet. App. 10a. The court
examined the district court’s construction of the patent,
and it concluded that the district court “refus[ed] to
narrow the scope of the claimed compositions to specific
uses.” Jbid. In particular, the court explained that the
district court “construed the claims to cover only a nar-
row class of fuel compositions, namely only standard
automotive gasoline,” and that the court “correctly ex-
cluded from claim scope a broader class of petroleum
formulations such as aviation fuels or racing fuels.”
Ibid.

The court of appeals found support for the district
court’s construction in the language used in the pre-
amble to each of the claims, which refers to an “un-
leaded gasoline” and one that is “suitable for combus-
tion in an automotive engine” or “in a spark ignition
automotive engine.” Pet. App. 10a. The court also
noted that the specification described the problem
addressed by the patent (“atmospheric pollution * * *
caused by the emission of gaseous pollutants in the
exhaust gases from automobiles”) as one involving ordi-
nary automobiles, and it noted that “ordinary passenger
automobiles” had been used in the tests leading up to

the invention. Jd. at lla. Because “the ’393 patent
covers only standard automotive fuel,” the court agreed
with the district court (and found substantial support
for the jury’s conclusion) that “the aviation and racing
fuels that allegedly invalidate the ’398 claims do not
anticipate because they do not contain each and every
limitation of the claims.” Jd. at 12a. Indeed, even aside
from the limitation to standard automotive fuels, the
court concluded that “the record does not show that the
aviation and racing fuels otherwise have the claimed
characteristics of the particular standard automotive
fuels recited in the ’393 patent.” Ibid. ,

c. Judge Lourie dissented from the majority’s hold-
ing with respect to the written description require-
ment. Pet. App. 24a-3la. He did not address the antici-
pation issue. See id. at 24a.

Judge Lourie stated that the written description
requirement requires “a precise description in the text
of the patent specification of all of the aspects of the
claimed invention.” Pet. App. 25a. He agreed with the
majority “that a patent need not describe the claimed
subject matter in precisely the same terms as used in
the claims,” but “it must still describe the invention
with all its claimed limitations in some manner.” /d. at
26a. With respect to the ’393 patent, Judge Lourie
acknowledged that there “surely is a description of
most of the particular claim limitations of the various
claims,” but he argued that “that is not the same as a
description of a specific composition described by a
particular selection of those characteristics.” Ibid.
Referring to the limitations of one of the ’393 claims,
Judge Lourie noted that “one can * * * find all of the
limitations” in that claim in the specification, but
“{w]hen one has to pick and choose among a wide range
of variables to construct a claim, the subject matter of

8

that claim has not been described as required by the
statute.” Jd. at 28a. In his view, therefore, the major-
ity had “us[ed] enablement reasoning” to find that the
patent application satisfied the distinct requirement
that the specification adequately described the inven-
tion as ultimately claimed. /d. at 24a. He concluded
that “[njo reasonable jury, carefully reading and
examining the patent specification, could conclude
* * * that the patent specification’s descriptions of
individual fuel characteristics or the teachings that
multiple fuel characteristics can be varied in particular
ways constitutes a sufficient written description of the
compositions of any of the claims.” Jd. at 31a.

DISCUSSION

Further review is not warranted. With respect to
the written description requirement, the jury’s conclu-
sion that the patent application demonstrated that,
prior to the CARB process, respondent was in posses-
sion of the invention that was ultimately claimed was
highly dependent on the specific, and highly technical,
facts of this case. With respect to the proper construc-
tion of the 393 patent, both lower courts agreed that, in
light of the specific terms of the patent specification and
claims, the patent should be construed not to cover
specialty aviation and racing fuels that may otherwise
have anticipated the claimed invention. In our view,
although both of those issues present close questions,
they involve only the meaning of the particular dis-
closures in the specifications of the ’393 patent and the
correct construction of that patent’s claims. The ulti-
mate importance of the ’393 patent is not yet entirely
clear. Even if it is as significant as petitioners fear,
however, this Court’s review is not warranted to ad-
dress relatively narrow issues regarding the particular
terms of a particular patent.

9

We share petitioners’ and amici’s concern about
possible misuse of the regulatory process by a patent
applicant. Moreover, it is important that protections
afforded to competitors and to the public against
inequitable conduct by patent holders be enforced. We
do not believe, however, that the court of appeals
decided any legal issue or altered settled legal princi-
ples in a way that would likely encourage misuse or
inequitable conduct by patent holders in the future.

l. a. The written description requirement of 35
U.S.C. 112 is intended to ensure that the inventor had
possession, as of the filing date of the application relied
on, of the specific subject matter later claimed. See,
e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d at 1563-1564;
In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976). It
thereby guards against overreaching by the inventor,
“by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail
that his future claims can be determined to be encom-
passed within his original creation.” Rengo Co. v.
Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (8d Cir.) (quoted in
Vas-Cath, 985 F.2d at 1561), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055
(1981). The written description requirement of Section
112 is distinct from the “enablement” requirement of
the same Section, which requires the description to be
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
invention. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-
434 (1822) (decided under the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11,
1 Stat. 318, which did not require presenting claims to
an invention); see also Universal Oil Products Co. v.
Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).

Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the
court below described the question whether a written
description is sufficient as highly fact-specific. The
majority referred to “the often cited rule that written
description questions are intensely factual, and should

10

be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, without the ap-
plication of wooden rules.” Pet. App. 21a; see also id. at
22a (“Because of the fact-sensitive nature of the written
description inquiry, this court has often warned against
misapplication of precedents in this area.”). The dis-
senting judge similarly noted the “case-by-case analy-
sis” that must be applied to questions regarding the
adequacy of the written description in a patent, and he
acknowledged “that the written description require-
ment is a question of fact concerning which we owe con-
siderable deference.” Jd. at 30a. See also Vas-Cath, 935
F.2d at 1562 (“The primary consideration is factual.”);
In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1250 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“the
precedential value of cases in this area is extremely
limited”); Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263 (“[(b]jroadly
articulated rules are particularly inappropriate in this
area”); In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389, 1895 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(“Precisely how close the description must come to com-
ply with § 112 must be left to case-by-case develop-.
ment.”).

b. The substance of the written description issue
turns on whether there was sufficient evidence sup-
porting the jury’s conclusion that the 41 claims of the
"393 patent represent merely a narrowing of the origi-
nally claimed invention, as opposed to a new invention
that would not be entitled to the filing date of the
original application. Pet. App. 18a-2la.° The invention
underlying the ’393 patent is asserted to have been

° Once a patent issues, it is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. 282 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998), as amended by Patent Term Guarantee Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4402(b)(1), 113 Stat. 1501A-560.
Accordingly, the burden is on the challenger (petitioners here) to
prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Carella v.
Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138 (Fed. Cir.
1986).

ll

predicated upon the discovery that there are a number
of properties of gasoline that were previously thought
to have affected performance, but that the ’393 patent
teaches have predictable effects on emissions as well.
As the court explained, the “patent teaches one of
ordinary skill” that reducing certain specific properties
of gasoline progressively reduces carbon monoxide and
hydrocarbons, while reducing other properties pro-
gressively reduces carbon monoxide and nitrogen
oxides, “and so forth with several other relationships.”
Id. at 15a. The patent then “claims ranges for these
properties that provide cleaner gasoline emissions.”
Ibid. Although the claimed ranges of properties do not
inform refiners of the precise chemical makeup of the
resulting gasoline mixtures, the court of appeals con-
cluded that “the patentee in this case taught the
desired characteristics of the final automotive fuels,
realizing that those of skill in this art know that those
characteristics define the claimed products.” Jd. at 20a-
21a.

Petitioners argue that the written description was
inadequate, however, because the 41 claims of the
patent as issued differ from the claims in the original
application. In particular, petitioners argue that
respondent’s application simply included “long lists of
gasoline properties that in many respects simply
corresponded to then-existing legal requirements” for
gasoline, that the claims then were amended in a way
that “resemble[d]” the CARB requirements, and that
“(t]hose amendments contradicted the teachings of
[respondent’s] patent application.” Pet. 15.° Of course,

3 Petitioners repeatedly quote the word “resemble” in arguing
that respondent “participated with the rest of the oil industry in
CARB’s decision-making process, waited for CARB to make its
regulatory decisions, and then scrapped all of the original claims

u

12

modification of the claims of a patent during prosecu-
tion is an accepted practice, for a variety of reasons.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 132; 37 C.F.R. 1.111. As petitioners
(and the dissenting judge) see it, however, the ’393
application merely defined a large number of gasoline
mixtures (a whole forest of “unmarked trees,” in the
commonly used metaphor adapted from In re Ruschig,
379 F.2d 990, 994-995 (C.C.P.A. 1967)), in the hope that
some of them might turn out to be genuinely useful (2.e.,
the “blaze marks” in the Ruschig metaphor that are a
“help in finding one’s way through the woods,” ibid.).
As it turned out the useful ones “resembled” those that
emerged from the CARB process.

Regardless of which view is correct regarding the
adequacy of the written description in the ’393 patent,
the issue does not warrant review by this Court. The
Federal Circuit did not purport to eliminate or weaken
the requirement that the written description in a
patent application must describe the invention as .
ultimately embodied in the claims of the issued patent.
Nor did it purport to hold that a laundry list of claimed
combinations that do not point specifically to the claims
of the issued patent would constitute a sufficient

and substituted amended claims to ‘resemble’ the CARB regula-
tions.” Pet. 14; see also Pet. 2, 3, 4, 7, 15, 18. If, as the courts below
held, respondent had a patentable invention at the time of the ’393
patent application, the fact that respondent later narrowed the
claims of that invention to focus on its most useful commercial
applications would not render the 393 patent invalid. In any
event, although petitioners do not provide the record citation for
the term “resemble,” a review of the passage on which they appar-
ently rely indicates that it is ambiguous as to whether the claims
were narrowed for the purpose of resembling the CARB regula-
tions or whether they were narrowed in a way that simply had that
effect. We have provided the relevant excerpt from the testimony
in an Appendix to this Brief.

13

written description. The Federal Circuit’s decision
thus leaves in place the important safeguards in patent
law that petitioners emphasize. See Pet. 16.*

In these circumstances, review by this Court would
simply provide another opportunity to review the appli-
cation of the settled legal principles, on which peti-
tioners and the court of appeals largely agree, to the
particular facts of this case. As noted above, the ques-
tion whether a written description is sufficient is excep-
tionally closely tied to the particular circumstances of
each case. Further review of that issue, therefore, is
particularly unlikely to assist in developing generally
applicable legal principles in this area. The ’393 patent
may well be an important one, although it is impossible
to know with certainty the extent to which refiners will
find ways to produce non-infringing reformulated
gasoline that complies with the CARB—or other—
standards.’ But the validity of the ’393 patent is not in

4 Petitioners state (Pet. 16) that the court of appeals’ decision
was an “evisceration of the long-standing doctrine under § 112 that
stood as the only bulwark against gaming of the regulatory and
patent regimes.” We agree that Section 112 states important
requirements that protect the public against patent monopolies
that are unjustified by the purposes of patent law. We do not
agree, however, that Section 112 is particularly directed toward
“gaming of the regulatory and patent regimes,” or that it is the
“only bulwark” against such conduct. Other requirements of
patent law, such as the requirement that the patentee himself be
the inventor, see 35 U.S.C. 102(f), similarly serve to protect the
public against such “gaming,” as well as against other evils that
would be attendant on unjustified grants of patent rights.

5 On February 16, 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency
published regulations for reformulated gasoline designed to reduce
emissions in designated areas throughout the country, 40 C.F.R.
80.41, as well as regulations for determining compliance using an
emissions model that calculates performance by looking at the
levels of several components of gasoline. 40 C.F.R. 80.45. EPA

14

itself “an important federal question” that “has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court.” Sup. Ct. R.
10(e).°

2. For similar reasons, further review is not war-
ranted with respect to the anticipation issue. As the
parties recognize, that issue turns on the construction
of the patent claims in this case. If the claims of the
’393 patent apply to all fuels that are capable of being
used in internal combustion engines, then they may
well have been anticipated by the references to racing
and aviation fuels that long predated the patent
application here. On the other hand, if the claims of the
’393 patent are limited to “a narrow class of fuel com-
positions, namely only standard automotive gasoline,”
Pet. App. 10a, then the references to racing and avia-
tion fuels would not be invalidating.

The courts below relied on a number of features pre-
sent in the patent application to find that the term “[aJn
unleaded gasoline fuel suitable for combustion in an
automotive engine” (or “in a spark ignition automotive
engine”), Pet. App. 10a, point clearly to a composition of
matter that is distinct from the kinds of compositions
that are used in aviation or racing fuel. The district
court recognized that “‘suitable for combustion in an
automotive engine’ can be stretched to include any fuel

developed its regulations after the CARB process had begun.
Petitioners assert (Pet. 9) that respondent “will doubtless argue”
that reformulated gasolines that comply with EPA’s regulations
“infringe[{] [respondent’s] patents” that followed the ’393 patent.

6 Amici States (Br. 3) state that respondent has obtained four
patents similar to the ’393 patent, and that “the potential is there
for [respondent] to control the entire Nation’s gasoline market.”
We take no position on the validity or significance of those patents.
We note, however, that Congress could require a patentholder in
that situation to license its patent at just and reasonable rates.
See FCC v. Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245, 253-254 (1987).

15

that could be burned.” Id. at 41a. But both courts
found “extensive support,” id. at lla, for a narrower
construction in the patent application’s description of
the automobile emissions problem addressed by their
invention, its comparisons of the claimed gasolines to
“typical gasoline fuel,” its description of the benefits to
be obtained from use of the claimed gasolines, and its
use of ordinary passenger automobiles in testing the
claimed fuel. See id. at 1la-12a, 36a-39a.

Petitioners argue (Pet. 19-26) that the patent may -
not fairly be read to include the limitation to standard
automotive fuels adopted by the court of appeals. They
argue that the key phrase in the claims describes a fuel
“suitable for combustion” in an automobile, and that the
clear meaning of that phrase would include aviation and
racing fuels that can be—and sometimes are—used ina
standard automobile engine. Although the court of
appeals disagreed with petitioners on that point, the
court adopted the key legal principles relied upon by
petitioners. For example, petitioners rely (Pet. i) on
the principles that a court may not “include elements
not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim
and avoid a defence of anticipation,” McCarty v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895), and that “lilt is
not invention to perceive that the product which others
had discovered” could be used in ways not previously
perceived, General Elec. Co. v. Jewei Incandescent
Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 249 (1945). There was, how-
ever, no disagreement about those principles here. The
court of appeals agreed that claims could not be altered
by construction, stating that the “constuction of claims
is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim
language[{] in order to understand and explain, but not
to change, the scope of the claims.” Pet. App. 10a (quot-
ing Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech,

16

Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Moreover,
the court expressly held that “(t]he scope of these
composition claims cannot * * * embrace only certain
uses of that composition,” thus recognizing that merely
finding an obvious new use for an existing product is
not an invention. Pet. App. 10a.’

Given the agreement on the general nature of the
rules governing the construction of patent claims, this
case simply presents the question whether the courts
below erred in construing the particular terms of the
’393 patent. In our view, reasonable minds could differ
on that question. But it is difficult to imagine a case in
which the construction of the claims of a particular
patent would present an issue sufficiently important to
warrant this Court’s attention. In any event, as we
explained above, although the ’393 patent may turn out
to be a very important one, its precise ‘effect on the
gasoline market remains uncertain, and it is not of suffi-
cient general importance to warrant this Court’s -
review.

3. Petitioners argue (Pet. 15) that respondent en-
gaged in “gaming of the regulatory * * * process” by
filing a broad patent application, participating in the
CARB regulatory process without disclosing its patent
application, and then modifying the claims in the
application to more closely resemble the requirements
that CARB adopted. We share the concern expressed
by petitioners and amici that a party could attempt to
employ the patent laws to take unfair advantage of an

7 Petitioners assert (Pet. 25) that the court of appeals “nar-
row[ed] [the] patent claims to avoid invalidity.” The court’s con-
struction of the patent, however, was not based on a desire “to
avoid invalidity,” but on the court’s perception that its construction
was “confirm[ed]” by the claim language and found “extensive sup-
port in the specification.” Pet. App. 10a-11a.

17

open regulatory process. The federal and state govern-
ments have come increasingly to explore possibilities
for developing rules through open and voluntary con-
sensual processes involving all affected parties. Mem-
bers of a regulated industry may well be reluctant to
bring their own technical knowledge and policy views
to such a public forum if they fear that their competi-
tors will use the shared information about technologies
and regulatory strategies to craft overly broad patents.
Thus, the threats posed by “gaming” the regulatory
process could operate as a serious disincentive to indus-:
tries to participate in the kinds of alternative rule-
making strategies that are clearly in the public interest.
Although we share the concerns of petitioners and
amici, we do not think that the narrow legal questions
presented in the petition for certiorari present an
appropriate vehicle to address those concerns. Peti-
tioners rely solely on the “written description” require-
ment in 35 U.S.C. 112 to address what they view to
have been respondent’s “gaming.” But the “written
description” requirement does not vary depending on
whether a governmental entity ultimately determines
that practicing the patented invention is a useful (or
even the only) way to satisfy a legal requirement. The
fact that an invention is particularly useful in satisfying
a government clean air or other standard certainly does
not lessen the value of the invention to society or the
patent protection that it should be afforded. Thus, if
respondent “had possession” of the claims of the ’393
patent as of the December 1990 filing date of the patent
application, as the courts below held, the subsequent
adoption of regulations would not have any effect on the

18

sufficiency of the written description for patentability
purposes."

That is not to say that there are no mechanisms
available to address “gaming” of a regulatory system.
It has long been accepted that misuse of a patent or
inequitable conduct before the Patent Office can render
a patent unenforceable. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 185-141 (1969)
(patent misuse); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.
Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (in-
equitable conduct); see also Pet. App. 22a-23a (rejecting
petitioners’ argument that respondent engaged in
“inequitable conduct”). Petitioners, however, do not
present a claim of patent misuse, which in any event
typically involves the exploitation of patent protection
by the patentee. Petitioners do not argue that the
“patent misuse” doctrine should be expanded to include
the conduct they allege in this case, nor do they outline
the contours of liability under such a doctrine or the

8 The fact that respondent’s disclosure was broader than the
41 claims now at-issue is similarly of no moment if the 41 allowed
claims are sufficiently described in the specification. See
Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263 (“That what appellants claim as paten-
table to them is Jess than what they describe as their invention is
not conclusive if their specification also reasonably describes that
which they do claim. Inventions are constantly made which curn
out not to be patentable, and applicants frequently discover during
the course of prosecution that only a part of what they invented
and originally claimed is patentable.”); In re Saunders, 444 F.2d
599, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (recognizing right of applicant initially
claiming broad genus “to retreat to an otherwise patentable
species” by narrowing claims during prosecution). Therefore, even
if respondent’s claims were amended to “resemble” the CARB
regulations, as long as the amended claims are sufficiently de-
scribed in the originally filed specification, the reason for amend-
ment is not a fact that will affect the patentability analysis under
35 U.S.C. 112.

19

legal consequences that would flow from a finding that
it occurred. Nor do petitioners argue before this Court
that fraud was committed on the Patent Office itself.

Another potentially relevant means to challenge a
patent would be the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 102(f)
that a patent is invalid if the patentee “did not himself
invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” The
district court, however, rejected petitioners’ derivation
argument under Section 102(f) in this case, finding that
“{njo competent evidence was introduced in support of
th{e) argument” that respondent “had copied the inven-
tion from CARB.” Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Indeed,
the district court sanctioned petitioners in part for their
failure to make good on their commitment to the court
to produce evidence on that point. Ibid. Petitioners did
not preserve that issue on appeal and have not pre-
sented it in their petition for certiorari.

Similarly, other government agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission, may impose non-patent
remedies against parties who make affirmative misrep-
resentations to a public or private regulatory body
involved in setting industry standards. See Jn re Deil
Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) (sanctioning firm
for making an affirmative misrepresentation to a non-
profit association that it had no intellectual property
that would be affected by an upcoming industry stan-
dard, while concealing its issued patent whose claims
covered portions of the industry standard). Those
remedies too are not at issue in this case.’

® Petitioners rely (Pet. 14) on SmithKline Beecham Consumer
Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 173 (2000), for the proposition that a copy-
right that covers a matter required by regulation—labels on medi-
cine—supports their contention that the issuance of regulations by

20

What is at issue in this case are essentially fact-
specific questions concerning the application of settled
legal standards in patent law to the particular terms of
what may be a very significant patent. This case does
not present a suitable vehicle for this Court to address
the larger problems surrounding the intersection of the
patent and regulatory processes that petitioners and
amici seek to raise.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General
DAVID W. OGDEN
ALBIN F. DROST Assistant Attorney General
Acting General Counsel LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
JOHN M. WHEALAN Deputy Solicitor General
Solicitor JAMES A. FELDMAN
LINDA MONCYS ISACSON Assistani to the Solicitor
MARK NAGUMO General
Associate Solicitors »
United States Patent and Pap ae neg
Trademark Office Attorneys

JANUARY 2001

CARB has a bearing upon the validity of the ’393 patent. Smith-
Kline, however, concerned whether a federal statute concerning
generic drugs (21 U.S.C. 355(j) (1988)) had the effect of creating an
exception in the copyright law for labels on generic drugs. This
case involves the patent laws, not the copyright laws, and there is
no issue in this case concerning the possible effect of another
federal statute on the patent protection that should be afforded

respondent.

APPENDIX

The following testimony of Dr. Peter J. Jessup is
reprinted from C.A. App. 562-563:

Q: BY MR. KEKER:

After the CARB regulations, and that is the
California Air Resources Board regulations, came out in
November of 1991, were the claims that still remained
in your patent changed completely to copy the RVP,

the T50 and the olefin numbers of the Air Resources
Board regulations?

MR.CIRESI: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: That was the same question.
MR.KEKER: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: _ All right. Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Some of our claims were
narrowed. Some of our claims were broader than the
CARB regulations. Some of them were narrowed at
various times to resemble the CARB regulations, but
they were never copied from the CARB regulations.

That’s rather a strange thing to say.

Q: Were the numbers that you used in the claims
for RVP and T50 and olefins taken from the numbers
that the Air Resources Board used in their regulations?

A: No, we never did that.

(la)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_1771%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.
