# Petitioners Brief — Alabama v. Bozeman

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 533 U.S. 146

## Text

Court, US.
s FILED
{AL \
JAN 2¢ 2e0/ WJ JAN 25 2001
No. 00-492 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

¢
STATE OF ALABAMA,

Petitioner,

Vv.
MICHAEL HERMAN BOZEMAN,
Respondent.

¢

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Alabama

*

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

¢

BILL PRYOR
Attorney General of Alabama

SANDRA JEAN STEWART*
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record*

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ALABAMA

11 South Union Street
Montgomery, AL 36130-0152
(334) 242-7300

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does transfer of federal custody to state custody for
one day for purposes of arraignment, and transfer
back to federal custody before the disposition of
outstanding charges, a technical violation of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, require dismissal
of pending charges, even when there is no harm to the
prisoner either alleged or demonstrated?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PUTED oc cccescseicnsecssesiesntasninventheevenenien i
TABLES CP CORT IGT Ee ciccceveesnecescsesvinssntentnicbeahepmens ii
TABLE, OF AUT ae ccucacscosvcsnssicecensdvecsenysncnwarsetn iv
CPTI IIIS TREE ccnccsecintscicanstevsccaputnsyedionsmenananeniniae 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...............ccscssccsceccsves 1
EAT REFUGEE sitinanscisnstsemninnetronieameaionaens 1
STATEERITE OF TERR CATED csscvaxescncrstseicesscsvesapnnsestests 6
A. Relevant Events Occurring Prior to Trial .......... 6

1. Facts On Which The Underlying
COORIVECEIOING ARO TRIO oc sccsicsccssissinctseserseseees 6

2. Facts Surrounding Bozeman’s
Transfers Between Federal Custody and

RO COD cnaseriicshscienkietriateaoaebints 7

3. Facts Concerning Bozeman’s Assertions
That The IAD Had Been Violated............... 10
B. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals......... 15
C. The Supreme Court of Alabama ..................... 15
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................scceceseeeees 17
REOR FA E stsststvsinecnentnaadndtomaaianononnaals 18

A. When Analyzed In The Historical Setting In
Which The IAD Was Passed, Harmless Error
Was Meant To Apply To Violations Of The IAD
That Do Not Affect Substantial Rights............ 18

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page

B. Harmless Error Analysis Is Applicable To The
Evaluation Of Errors Involving Both The
Constitution And Federal Statutes, Like The
BENE GidcckamenouashcaencesadiavoatndesoniitainiiniacstheOanexeeren 21

C. The Purposes Behind The IAD Also Support A
Finding That A Harmless Error Analysis
Should Be Applied To Violations Of The IAD. .29

D. When A Harmless Error Analysis Is Applied To
The Facts Presented In This Case, Dismissal
Of The Indictment Is Not Warranted............... x |

GENIE rikcdeshedsdusiavacissnsnseinctscanevensncsidascosscoceseey 36

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
FEDERAL CASES
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
~ - SFechahyy, 4ST U.G. BAO (1DTS) ...cccsccsscsesescorssceses 21, 26
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).............. 23
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,

SEE Chin Oe HME titahavidatdauininecabanksucnvebbipniiiaes 23, 24
Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 387

RIE Ce iniintn celaecncnidanbstichenumespcinaditnapnenbesinnatis 31
Beck v. Prupis, 120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000)...................... 26
Bob Jones University v. United States,

NE. APi> SPP CED vudesnscsdindannssnedceimncndbives 21, 29, 31
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1999)........ 20, 24
Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986) ............. 34
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985) ............. 18, 30
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989)................. 35
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ...20, 22, 35
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) .....ses-sess+e0004-23
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983) .............. 23
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) ....19, 21, 29, 30
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) .......... 21
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,

I Aree: SEN BUENO icine nshcksbeiua Saabigacsnidnunkuenicna 31-32
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)............ 23

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) ........c.ccceseeees 23

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).......... 34
Kotteakos v. United States,

Se Te FP FED ince vininiicaconessis 20, 22, 23-24, 35
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)............cscececeeees 35
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) .......... -26
Neder v. Slate, SST WB. 1 CGI) vsciccocsescecssvscsssscnssces 23
New York v. Hill, 120 S. Ct. 659 (2000)..................... 28
O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995).................. 19
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) ........ccccceseeeeees ).23
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ................... 33
Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999) ............ 23
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)................608 23, 35

- Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) .......cccceceeeeeeees 26
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) .................608 21, 23
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) ...... 21
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983)................eeeeeee 22
Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371

See GR. IRR Sci dence cn aciqdecnctatinucseuensupiaibaantevndnanbiies 31
United States v. A Parcel of Land,

PE Ch BAS CIPO 4 tndebitinccccgnciinksacnapetesssnsnnsnenedinnd 26
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)............. 32
United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1993)....30
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) .......... 35

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 879 (1992) .......... 31
United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986)....... 4.23, 24
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978)............. 30
United States v. Montalvo-Murllo,

BD MPs FEE. CERO via vrcaniceccnsincerenvsetatsntanpinioniaeion 23 |
United States v. Roy, 771 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985) ...... 31
United States v. Taylor, 173 F.3d 538

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 448 (1999) ........ 31
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) ................csccssssees 26
STATE CASES
Bozeman v. State, CR-96-1611

(Ala. Crim. App. May 8, 1998)(mem.)..................... 15
Ex parte Bozeman, No. 1971759,

2000 WL 429936 (Ala. Apr. 21, 2000).............. 16, 19
FEDERAL STATUTES
ee ies Te RET vnsincsscciuvianionnséciakitenmetivbanaamaaneenanas 1
Be A rs TE AER OR. ksaccnsentaciacsavenseossnanccncuatnatiaaeans 5, 32
ee Se BF NE vdcpvansecnesnsnessatebasketepacupaisestagtacdnasuiond 27
STATE STATUTES
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-61 (1975)............ccosscsccsccscscceees 18

Vii ‘
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
ALA. CODE § § 15-9-80 through 15-9-88 (1975) ...1, 18

STATE RULES

Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate
SERN RS SHE RaUDp PSH SO eR Te SIREN DO EL 5, 19, 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

PIE Ee icin bs idiscntubhitcnipeabdadiartaatimntdiiante 1-2, 18, 29
I HII 5 skd deudiNcnanthana deka necks wpaviapetionds 4, 29, 35
NI I ik as rhcntbciciigea tte ata detainee Aiea 4,29.
1 Wigmore, Evidence § 21 (Tillers rev. 1983)............. 19
Ps, HOE ER tik ps iitsiid berth clea dhe casuelagencbnt 18
\

1
OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals is unpublished. (Pet. App. 15-26.) The
decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is not yet
reported, but can be found at 2000 WL 429936. (Pet.
App. 1-14.)

¢
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court
reversing Bozeman’s convictions was entered on April
21, 2000. An application for rehearing was overruled
on June 30, 2000. (Pet. App. 30.) The State filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari on September 28, 2000.
Jurisdiction in this Court exists under 28 U.S.C. §
1257(a).

°
STATUTES INVOLVED

The following provisions of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act, also referred to as the
Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act,
which is codified in Alabama in Sections 15-9-80
through 15-9-88 of the Code of Alabama 1975 (set out
in full at Pet. App. 32-47):

Article I.

The party states find that charges
outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informa-
tions or complaints and difficulties in

2

securing speedy trial of persons already
incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct
programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the
policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of
such charges and determination of the
proper status of any and all detainers
based on untried indictments, informa-
tions or complaints. The party states
also find that proceedings with reference
to such charges and detainers, when
emanating from another jurisdiction,
cannot properly be had in the absence of
cooperative procedures. It is the further
purpose of this agreement to provide
such cooperative procedures.

Article IV.

(a) The appropriate officer of the ju-
risdiction in which an untried indict-
ment, information or complaint is pend-
ing shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer
and who is serving a term of imprison-
ment in any party state made available in
accordance with article V(a) hereof upon
presentation of a written request for
temporary custody or availability to the
appropriate authorities of the state in
which the prisoner is_ incarcerated;
provided, that the court having jurisdic-

3

tion of such indictment, information or
complaint shall have duly approved,
recorded and transmitted the request;
and provided further, that there shall be
a period of 30 days after receipt by the
appropriate authorities before the
request be honored, within which period
the governor of the sending state may
disapprove the request for temporary
custody or availability, either upon his
own motion or upon motion of the
prisoner.

(b) Upon request of the officer’s writ-
ten request as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof, the appropriate authorities having
the prisoner in custody shall furnish the
officer with a certificate stating the term
of commitment under which the prisoner
is being held, the time already served, the
time remaining to be served on the
sentenee, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the
prisoner and any decisions of the state
parole agency relating to the prisoner.
Said authorities simultaneously shall
furnish all other officers and appropriate
courts in the receiving state who have
lodged detainers against the prisoner
with similar certificates and with notices
informing them of the request for custody
or availability and of the reasons there-
for.

(c) In respect of any proceeding made
possible by this article, trial shall be
commenced within 120 days of the

4

arrival of the prisoner in the receiving
state, but for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.

(d) Nothing contained in this article
shall be construed to deprive any pris-
oner of any right which he may have to
contest the legality of his delivery as
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but
such delivery may not be opposed or
denied on the ground that the executive
authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered

such delivery.

(e) If trial is not had on any indict-
ment, information or complaint contem-
plated hereby prior to the prisoner’s
being returned to the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to article V(e)
hereof, such indictment, information or
complaint shall not be of any further
force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.

Article IX.

1. This agreement shall be liberally
construed so as to effectuate its pur-

poses. ...

5
Section 2111 of Title 28 of the United States Code:

On the hearing of any appeal or writ
of certiorari in any case, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.

Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of —
Procedure:

No judgment may be reversed or set
aside, nor new trial granted in any civil
or criminal case on the ground of misdi-
rection of the jury, the giving or refusal of
special charges or the improper admis-
sion or rejection of evidence, nor for error
as to any matter of pleading or proce-
dure, unless in the opinion of the court
to which the appeal is taken or applica-
tion is made, after an examination of the
entire cause, it should appear that the
error complained of has probably injuri-
ously affected the substantial rights of
the parties.

6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of the transfer of custody of
Michael Bozeman between federal authorities and
state authorities in Covington County, Alabama, and
involves the application of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD), to which both the federal government
and the State of Alabama are parties.

A. Relevant Events Occurring Prior To Trial,

1. Facts On Which The Underlying
Convictions Are Based

Michael Herman Bozeman was extremely jealous
when it came to his ex-wife, and he continually
harassed and threatened her. (Record 23-33, 46-49,
51-59, 79-82.) Around midnight, on June 14, 1995,
after drinking almost two quarts of Lord Calvert
whiskey, Bozeman and Jeff Anderson drove around
the City of Opp, Alabama, in Anderson’s van. (Record
126-28.) Bozeman brought with him a .22 caliber rifle
that he had a reputation for keeping in his possession
at all times. ~(Record 25, 129-30.) At Bozeman’s
instruction, Anderson drove by the townhouse of
Bozeman’s former wife, Carmen Yvonne Bozeman.
(Record 132-33.) When they approached the
townhouse, Bozeman stuck his .22 caliber rifle out of
the window and fired shots into the bedroom of the
residence, where his former wife was sleeping. (Record
33-36, 133-40.) Fortunately, Ms. Bozeman was not
hit by the gunfire. (Record 36.)

Bozeman then directed Anderson to drive to the
residence of Bozeman’s former sister-in-law, Linda
Weed. (Record 133-34.) Again, Bozeman stuck the

7

22 rifle out of the van window and opened fire on the
residence. (Record 133-40.) Ms. Weed was not at
home at the time of the shooting. (Record 59-60.)

Bozeman then ordered Anderson to drive to the
home of Melton Williams, a man who had recently
begun dating Bozeman’s former wife. (Record 134,
141.) Bozeman repeatedly shot into the bedroom of
Mr. Williams’s residence, where Mr. Williams was
sleeping, (Record 83-85, 86, 180), and into Mr.
Williams’s vehicles, (Record 85-86, 180). Mr. Williams
was also fortunate that he was not hit by the gunfire.

2. Facts Surrounding Bozeman’s
Transfers Between Federal Custody
And State Custody

On June 15, 1995, the day after the shooting
incidents, Bozeman was arrested on a federal charge of
intimidating a witness, and he was placed in the
county jail in Covington County, Alabama, by federal
authorities.! (App. 54-55, 60, 66.) On June 16, 1995,
he was also arrested on federal charges of conspiracy
to possess with the intent to _ distribute
methamphetamine and his custody was transferred to
federal authorities, but he was placed in the county
jail in Montgomery County, Alabama. (App. 23, 62-63;
Record 102.)

In September of 1995, while Bozeman was in
federal custody, he was indicted by a Covington

! The record does not reflect whether these charges were related to
the shooting incidents underlying this case.

8

County Grand Jury for the unlawful possession or
receipt of a controlled substance, all stemming from
conduct that occurred in May of 1995. (Case No. CC-
95-350) (App. 62-64.) Temporary custody of Bozeman
was obtained from the federal authorities by Covington
County authorities in November 1995 for the specific
purpose of arraignment on the state drug charge, and
Bozeman was arraigned and appointed counsel on that
charge. (App. 62-64, 95-98.) After his arraignment
and before disposition of the state drug charge,
Bozeman was returned to the custody of the federal
authorities. (App. 66-67.) In June of 1996, the state
drug charge was dismissed. (App. 66-67.) At no time
before his state drug charge was dismissed did
Bozeman raise any allegations that his transfer from
federal custody to state custody and back to federal
custody violated the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers.

Thereafter, on September 20, 1996, Bozeman was
indicted in Covington County under state law on two
counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied
dwelling, two counts of discharging a firearm into an
unoccupied vehicle, and one count of discharging a
firearm into an unoccupied dwelling. (Case No. 97-16)
(App. 4-9, 61-62.) These charges are the charges
arising from the June 14, 1995, incident in which
Bozeman fired into the homes of his ex-wife, his
former sister-in-law, and his ex-wife’s boyfriend. They
are also the charges that form the basis of the detainer
in this case.

On October 10, 1996, the Covington County
District Attorney requested that a detainer be placed
on Bozeman so that he could be arraigned in
Covington County on the shooting charges. (App. 64,
100-02.) The Covington County District Attorney

9

specifically requested that Bozeman be made available
for his upcoming arraignment on the shooting charges
and requested that all necessary forms be mailed to
her for completion and returned to the proper federal
authorities in sufficient time for the State permissibly
to obtain Bozeman. (App. 100-02.) The federal
authorities in Atlanta responded that a detainer had
been filed on Bozeman pursuant to the District
Attorney’s “October 29, 1996” request. (App. 64-65.)
The record contains a notice to Bozeman of untried
indictments and the right to request disposition of the
charges in the shooting cases pursuant to Article III of
the IAD, which he signed on November 4, 1996, and
which acknowledges his receipt of the notice. (App.
34-36.) _

Because Bozeman had been transferred from the
Atlanta Federal Penitentiary to the federal prison in
Marianna, Florida, the Covington County District
Attorney’s request for a detainer did not reach
Bozeman until January of 1997. (App. 64-66.) On
January 8, 1997, the District Attorney sent a letter
and temporary custody form to the federal prison
authorities in Marianna, Florida. (App. 98-100.) The
letter and form indicated that Bozeman was needed for
arraignment and appointment of counsel in the
shooting case, case number CC-97-16, and that
Bozeman would be picked up on January 15, 1997
and returned to federal authorities one day later, on
January 16, 1997. (App. 98-99.) It was not until
January 23, 1997, however, that temporary custody of
Bozeman was transferred from federal authorities to
Covington County authorities. (App. 56-57, 58, 67.)
The next day, January 24, 1997, Bozeman was
arraigned on the shooting charges and custody of
Bozeman was transferred back to the federal
authorities. (App. 26-31, 67.)

10

3. Facts Concerning Bozeman’s Asser-
tions That The IAD Had Been Violated

On the day he was brought to Covington County for
arraignment, Bozeman filed a pro se motion to dismiss
his indictment in which he asserted as grounds for
dismissal violations of Articles [V(e) and V(e) of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers. (App. 18-25.) In
that motion, Bozeman did not allege that the IAD
would be violated if he were returned to federal
custody before he was tried on the pending charges,
but instead claimed that the IAD had already been
violated when he was transferred in November 1995
for arraignment on the state drug charge. (App. 18-
25.) Bozeman argued that, because the State had
failed to dispose of the shooting charges in 1995 when
he was brought back to Covington County, the IAD
required that the shooting charges be dismissed.
(App. 18-25.) When Bozeman was brought back for
arraignment on the drug charge in November 1995,
however, the shooting indictments had not yet been
returned by the Covington County Grand Jury and, as
to those charges, there were no “untried indictments,
informations or complaints which form[ed] the basis of
[that] detainer or detainers.” See Article V(d) of the
IAD. (App. 4-9, 61-62.)

Bozeman was arraigned on the shooting charges on
January 24, 1997. (App. 26-31.) At that arrai ent,
appointed counsel for Bozeman indicated that) there
were some possible questions about whether the IAD
had been properly followed and he _ requested
permission to further investigate and research that
issue. (App. 27.) At the time of that discussion, there
had been no violation of the IAD as to the pending
charges; specifically, Bozeman had not yet been
returned to federal custody. Neither defense counsel

4 11

nor Bozeman informed. the trial judge at that time that
a return of Bozeman to federal. custody before he was
tried on the pending charges would result in a
violation of the IAD, nor did they object to his return to
federal custody. (App. 27-31.) Instead, counsel for
Bozeman agreed to: file any motions objecting to
violations of the IAD at some later time. (App. 27.)
Bozeman was returned to federal custody that same
day. (App. 26-31, 67.)

Approximately one month later, on February 21,
1997, counsel for Bozeman filed Defendant’s Motion
To Dismiss, requesting that the indictment against
Bozeman charging him with the several shooting
violations be dismissed. (App. :32-36.) In support of
his motion, Bozeman alleged that Article IV(e) of the
IAD required dismissal of the indictment because he
had been brought to Covington County to face the
shooting charges and he had thereafter been returned
to his original place of incarceration prior to being
tried on the shooting charges. (App. 32-33.) In that
motion, Bozeman did not allege that he was prejudiced
in any way by the violation of the IAD. On February
25, 1997, Bozeman filed a Memorandum Brief In
Support Of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, again
alleging violations of the IAD. (App. 37-42.) Bozeman
did not allege any prejudice in that memorandum
either.

On February 27, 1997, Bozeman was again
released from federal custody to the custody of
Covington County officials, this time for a trial on the
shooting charges. (App. 57, 67-68, 86-87.) Before the
trial began, the court held an in-chambers discussion
regarding Bozeman’s motions to dismiss on the
grounds that the IAD had been violated. (App. 45-47.)
Again, Bozeman failed to allege that he had been

12

prejudiced in any way by his previous one-day
transfer. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss
at that time so that the trial could proceed, but it
reserved to Bozeman the right to put on testimony and
evidence in support of his motions after the completion
of the trial and specifically reserved to him the right to
raise the issue by post-trial motion. (App. 45-47.) —

Bozeman’s trial proceeded on February 27, 1997,
well within 120 days of Bozeman’s first arrival in
Covington County for arraignment on the pending
shooting charges on January 24, 1997. The jury
convicted Bozeman on all five counts of the indictment
on February 28, 1997. (App. 114-15: Record 192-93.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ordered
that Bozeman remain in the custody of Covington
County officials until the questions raised on the IAD
were resolved and until sentencing was completed.
(App. 48-49.) .

On March 12, 1997, a hearing was held on
Bozeman’'s motions to dismiss his indictment based on
alleged violations of the IAD. (App. 53-84.) At that
hearing, Bozeman did not present any testimony or
make any argument that he was harmed in any way
by the one-day transfer from federal custody to
Covington County custody and back to federal
custody. (App. 53-84.)

On April 25, 1997, Bozeman filed a Renewal Of
Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss in which he again
asserted violations of the IAD. (App. 109-10.) In this
motion, Bozeman added to his prior arguments
concerning the IAD an assertion that Article V(e) was
being violated by the failure to return him to federal
custody ‘at the earliest possible time consonant with
the purposes of the agreement.” In this motion,

13

Bozeman argued that the failure to return him to
federal custody was prejudicing him because, by
failing to return him, “the State is interfering with the
rehabilitation which would be taking place if
Defendant were in a federal penitentiary. This is
clearly contrary to the spirit of IAD.” (App. 110.) This
was the first time that Bozeman had alleged any
prejudice from a violation of the IAD, and this
allegation had nothing to do with his prior one-day
transfer of custody.

On May 16, 1997, the Covington County Circuit
Court judge denied Bozeman’s motions to dismiss the
indictment in a written order. (Pet. App. 27-29.) The
judge found that the only issue before him was
whether Article IV of the IAD had been violated. (Pet.
App. 27.) Finding that the goals of the IAD had been
met and that Bozeman had failed to demonstrate any
prejudice, the trial judge denied the motions to
dismiss. (Pet. App. 28-29.) Specifically, the trial judge
found, in pertinent part:

It seems to me that defendant was
brought to Covington County on both the
above mentioned occasions to attend to
short pre-trial matters, not anticipated to
require his extended presence. It made
much sense to bring him into the county
briefly to see to those matters, and
thereupon return him to the surround-
ings to which he was accustomed. That
course appears to have been conservative
of defendant’s interest in maintaining
any course of rehabilitation available to
him in federal prison. He certainly would
not receive much rehabilitation in a
county jail.

14

To paraphrase another court, at the
hearing of this matter there was a failure
of proof that the short transfers to
Covington County interfered with defen-
dant’s participation in any rehabilitative
program, or that he was denied, threat-
ened with the denial of, or feared losing
any privileges because of this state
charge, and no dismissal is appropriate.
The transfers involved in this case appear
to be wholly consistent with the goal of
the IAD to expedite the prosecution of
state charges without interfering with
any rehabilitative programs of the federal
government... .

(App. 28-29.)

Bozeman was sentenced on May 2\, 1997 to five
concurrent ten-year sentences,those_sentences to run
consecutively to the federal sentence that Bozeman
was then serving. “(App. 116-19.) Also on May 21,
1997, Bozeman. filed a Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding The Verdict Or In The Alternative For
New Trial, in which he again asserted violations of the
IAD by his failure to be tried on the shooting charges
before being returned to the custody of federal officials.
(App. 11-12.) It was in this post-trial, post-decision
motion that Bozeman, for the first time, alleged
prejudice from his one-day transfer. (App. 111-12.)
Bozeman made thé conclusive allegation that the one-
day transfer denied him the opportunity adequately to
consult with counsel prior to trial. (App. 111-12.)

15
B. The Alabayaa Court of Criminal Appeals

Bozeman timely appealed to the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals. Among the issues raised in his brief
was the argument that his January 1997 one-day
transfer from federal officials to state officials and back
to federal officials, without disposing of the pending
indictment, violated the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers. Noting that the transfer of Bozeman in this
case did not interfere with the purposes of the IAD and
that Bozeman had asserted no prejudice from the
transfers until his appeal, and even then only
perfunctorily so, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected Bozeman’s argument and affirmed
Bozeman’s convictions. Bozeman v. State, CR-96-
1611, mem. op. at 4, 6 (Ala. Crim. App. May 8, 1998)
(Pet. App. 19, 21-22, 26). Bozeman’s application for
rehearing in that court was overruled on June 19,
1998. (Pet. App. 31.)

C. The Supreme Court of Alabama

Bozeman applied to the Alabama Supreme Court
for certiorari, which it granted on February 19, 1999.
In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Bozeman’s sole
issue was his argument that there had been a violation
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers requiring
dismissal of his indictment. On April 21, 2000, the
Alabama Supreme Court, in a per curiam, 5 to 3
decision, reversed Bozeman’s convictions, holding that
the violation of the IAD required dismissal of
Bozeman’s indictment. Ex parte Bozeman, No.
1971759, 2000 WL 429936 (Ala. Apr. 21, 2000). (Pet.
App. 1-10.) In doing so, the Alabama Supreme Court
refused to consider the State’s argument that Bozeman
had not demonstrated any harm from the technical

16

violation of Article [V(e) of the IAD. Jd. at 8. The Court
also held that its conclusion was “consistent with the
purpose of the Act to protect a _ prisoner’s
constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial,” but in
no way explained how the one-day technical violation
of the IAD impacted, affected, or even implicated
Bozeman’s right to a fair or speedy trial. Jd. at 8.

The State filed an application for rehearing
emphasizing that the technical violation of the IAD did
not require dismissal of the indictment because the
purposes of the Act had not been defeated and that the
court had erred in failing to apply a harmless error
analysis to the issue. On June 30, 2000, the court
rejected the State’s rehearing application.

¢

17
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is an
interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the
United States Constitution and it is, therefore, subject
to federal interpretation and federal law. Although
Bozeman was tried in an Alabama court on Alabama
charges and he appealed to the Alabama Supreme
Court, the supreme court did not apply its harmless
error rule because state law was allegedly preempted
by federal law. Unfortunately, the supreme court
erred by failing to apply the harmless error rule as a
matter of federal law.

When Alabama enacted the IAD, the harmless error
rule was firmly established as a part of federal law: it
existed at common law, had been enacted as a federal
statute, held applicable to most constitutional errors,
held applicable to statutory violations, and held
applicable on collateral review of convictions. In case
after case, this Court has asserted a preference for
application of the harmless error rule. It is against
this backdrop that the Court must decide if harmless
error applies to violations of the IAD.

Both case law from this Court and federal statutory
law mandate that any error be reviewed to determine
whether the error resulted in prejudice, whether that
error is a constitutional error or a violation of a
statute. The purposes behind the IAD also support a
determination that harmless error applies to a
violation of its provisions. In this case, where no harm
contemplated by the IAD occurred from the technical
one-day violation of Article [V(e) of the IAD, and where
dismissal of the indictment would result in a windfall
not contemplated by the Agreement, this Court should
find that dismissal of the indictment was not

18

mandated in this case. The Alabama Supreme Court
refused to apply the harmless error rule; its judgment
should be reversed and Bozeman’s_ shooting
convictions should be reinstated.

¢
ARGUMENT

A. When Analyzed in the Historical Setting in
Which the IAD Was Passed, Harmless Error Was
Meant to Apply to Violations of the IAD That Do
Not Affect Substantial Rights.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is an
agreement between 48 states, including the State of
Alabama, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and the federal government. Carchman
v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). “The [IAD] was
drafted in 1956 by the Council of State Governments,”
id., and was adopted in 1978 by the State of Alabama,
where it is now codified at sections 15-9-80 through
15-9-88 of the Code of Alabama 1975. (Pet. App. 32-
47) The overriding purpose of the IAD is to encourage
the expeditious and orderly disposition of untried
indictments and to encourage the determination of the
proper status of any and all detainers based on such
charges, in order to eliminate uncertainties that
obstruct programs designed to treat and rehabilitate
prisoners. See Article I of the IAD. Alabama joined
the IAD to meet the concerns expressed in the
Agreement. 1978 Ala. Acts 590.

Michael Bozeman was tried in an Alabama circuit
court in February of 1997 and convicted of crimes in
violation of Alabama statute, specifically section 13A-
11-61 of the Code of Alabama 1975. (App. 4-7, 114—

19

15.) He appealed those state convictions to the
Alabama appellate courts where, ordinarily, those
courts would apply the state harmless error rule to
identified errors before determining reversal was
necessary. See Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of
Appellate Procedure (“No judgment may be reversed or
set aside, nor new trial granted in any civil or criminal
case ... for error as to any matter of pleading or
procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which
the appeal is taken or application is made, after an
examination of the entire cause, it should appear that
the error complained of has probably injuriously
affected substantial rights of the parties.”). In this
case, however, the Alabama Supreme Court,
recognizing that the IAD was a federal law subject to
federal construction, did not apply the harmless error
rule of Rule 45 because the court felt that that state
law was preempted by federal law in this context. See
Ex parte Bozeman, No. 1971759, 2000 WL429936, at
*2 (Ala. Apr. 21, 2000). (Pet. App. 6) In fact, this
Court has specifically held that, because the IAD “was
intended to be a grant of consent under the Compact
Clause, and because the subject matter of the Act is
an appropriate subject for congressional legislation,

the Detainer Agreement is a _ congressionally
sanctioned interstate compact the interpretation of
which presents a federal question.” Cuyler v. Adams,
449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981) (footnote omitted).

When the IAD was developed and enacted, the
harmless error rule was deeply entrenched in federal
jurisprudence. The idea that errors that did not affect
the verdict should not result in reversal of convictions
existed at common law. See generally 1 Wigmore,
Evidence § 21 (Tillers rev. 1983); see also, O’Neal v.
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995) (referring to the
“original common-law harmless-error” rule). In 1919,

20

Congress enacted the first federal harmless error
statute, the predecessor to section 2111 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, in response to widespread
criticism that some appellate courts were reversing
cases based on mere technical errors that did not
affect the substantial rights of the parties, leading to
inconsistent results in cases. Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 757-62 (1946). In Kotteakos,
the Court, assessing the federal harmless error statute
and its application, held that it applied to more than
mere technical errors and specifically applied to
resolution of issues involving violations of federal
statutes. 328 U.S. at 757-62. Thereafter, in Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court developed
a harmless error rule to apply to constitutional errors,
finding that, even though section 2111 was not meant
to and did not apply to constitutional issues, harmless
error analysis was the rule rather than the exception
and should apply to constitutional errors. A harmless
error rule was also developed to apply on collateral
proceedings. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993). In case after case, this Court has asserted a
preference for application of harmless error analysis to
errors that do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.

Moreover, all 50 states have harmless error rules,
see, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 22, including
Alabama, Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P., demonstrating that
the States as well as this Court have a preference for
application of the rule to errors that do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.

The IAD was passed against this long history of a
preference for the application of the rule of harmless
error. This Court must now determine whether, in
enacting the IAD, Congress intended the rule not to

Re»

LPs NOP ORI ETA Sy PAD
i ne

21

apply to its provisions. See, Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (look to
historical backdrop concerning award of attorneys’
fees to determine whether Congress intended award of
attorneys’ fees where statute silent on matter);
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)
(same); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983) (look to historical background concerning
charitable purpose tax exemption). The only sensible
and reasonable interpretation is that harmless error
does apply to the IAD.

B. Harmless Error Analysis Is Applicable To The
Evaluation Of Errors Involving Both The
Constitution And Federal Statutes, Like The
IAD.

As noted, in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442
(1981), this Court held that the IAD is subject to
federal interpretation. Because the IAD is subject to
federal interpretation and federal law, those cases
addressing the issue of harmless error involving the
Constitution and federal statutes control. The
Supreme Court of Alabama, therefore, erred when it
failed to apply a rule of harmless error in this case.

“The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the
principie that the central purpose of a criminal trial is
to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt
or innocence, ... and promotes public respect for the
criminal process by focusing on the underlying
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually
inevitable presence of immaterial error.” Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (internal
citation omitted); accord, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
577 (1986). Harmless error rules recognize the

22

necessity for preserving society’s interest in the
administration of criminal justice and the general rule
that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered.
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1983) (citing
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981)).

In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946),
this Court noted the purpose behind the federal
harmless error rule: “to substitute judgment for
automatic application of rules; to preserve review as a
check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness
in trials, but at the same time to make the process
perform that function without giving men fairly
convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly
rigid and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially
in relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a
printed record.” Id. at 759-60 (emphasis added). The
Court continued that the federal harmless error rule
came down to “a very plain admonition: ‘Do not be
technical, where technicality does not really hurt the
party whose rights in the triai and in its outcome the
technicality affects.’” Id. at 760.

In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), this
Court held that the harmless error rule applies not
only to statutory violations, like those in Kotteakos,
but it also applies to federal constitutional errors.
Noting that none of the state federal harmless error
rules nor the federal harmless error rule distinguished
between federai constitutional errors and statutory
errors, the Court concluded that there were some
constitutional errors which could be so unimportant
and insignificant that they could be deemed harmless,
not requiring automatic reversal of the conviction. Id.
at 22. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that
the harmless error rules of the various states and the
federal rule served a very useful purpose in that they

23

blocked setting aside convictions for small errors that
had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of
the trial. Jd. This Court has recognized and applied
the harmless error rule in myriad circumstances
involving constitutional error. See, e.g., Neder v. State,
527 U.S. 1 (1999) (where jury instructions failed to
submit materiality issue, an element of the offense, to
jury for consideration); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279 (1991) (introduction at trial of coerced confession);
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (erroneous jury
instruction on standard to be applied in determining
whether material obscene); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570
(1986) (Sandstrom error); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460
U.S. 73 (1983) (Sandstrom error); Hopper v. Evans, 456
U.S. 605 (1982) (failure to give lesser included offense
jury instruction in capital case); United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) (denial of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel); Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714 (1975) (compulsory _ self-incrimination);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (denial of right
to counsel at preliminary hearing); Harrington uv.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (Bruton error).

In addition to applying the harmless error rule in
the very important area of constitutional analysis, this
Court has also applied the harmless error rule to
issues involving violations of federal statutes. See, e.g.,
Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27-29 (1999)
(violation of Rule 32(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S.
711, 716-22 (1990) (violation of Rule 6 of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. §§6002,
6003); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.
250, 255-56 (1988) (violation of Bail Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)); United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438 (1986) (violation of Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure); Kotteakos v. United

24

States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (violations of federal
statutes concerning indictments and conspiracies).

In United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986), this
Court noted that, since Chapman uv. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967), it had made it consistently clear that
“St is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the
trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are
harmless, including most constitutional violations.’”
474 U.S. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finding that “the argument for applying harmless-
error analysis is even stronger” in situations involving
violations of statutes which “are not themselves of
constitutional magnitude,” the Court held that a
violation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure did not require reversal under the facts of
that case. 474 U.S. at 446. The Court went on to note
that “[i]t is difficult to see any logic in the argument
that although the harmless-error rule may be
applicable to constitutional violations, it should not be
applied to violations of mere procedural rules.” Id. at
446 n. 9. This Court also noted the lack of logic in an
argument that harmless error analysis can be applied
to constitutional error but not to violations of statutes
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
256 (1988), where it held: “It would be inappropriate
to devise a rule permitting federal courts to deal more
sternly with nonconstitutional harmless errors than
with constitutional errors that are likewise harmless.”

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), this
Court answered the question of whether harmless
error applies to collateral proceedings under section
2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code, despite
Congress’s failure to address the matter in the habeas
corpus statute, in the affirmative. The Court, noting
that the habeas corpus statute was silent on the

25

application of the harmless error rule or the specific
standard of harmless error review required, 507 U.S.
at 631, and that it was generally reluctant to draw
inferences where Congress had failed to act, 507 U.S.
at 632, nonetheless fashioned a harmless error rule to
apply on collateral review. In reaching its conclusion,
the Court held:

In the absence of any express statu-
tory guidance from Congress, it remains
for this Court to determine what harm-
less-error standard applies on collateral
review of petitioner’s ... claim. We have
filled the gaps of the habeas corpus
statute with respect to other matters, ...
and find it necessary to do so here. As
always, in defining the scope of the writ,
we look first to the considerations un-
derlying our habeas jurisprudence, and
then determine whether the proposed
rule would advance or inhibit these
considerations by weighing the marginal
costs and benefits of its application on
collateral review.

Id. at 633 (internal citations omitted).

Just as the habeas corpus statute was silent on the
issue of whether harmless error applied to its
provisions, the IAD is silent on that issue. Even
though the IAD is silent on this issue, however, this
Court should, as it did in Brecht, find that the
harmless error rule applies because application of the
harmless error rule to the IAD would best advance the
purposes of the IAD, the costs to the prisoner would be
nil, and the benefits to society great.

26

Moreover, in construing the IAD, this Court must
do so against this historical backdrop establishing a
preference for the application of harmless error. In
case after case, this Court has emphasized that, in
construing statutes that are silent as to the
application of firmly rooted legal principles, the statute
must be interpreted in a way that is most consistent
with those established principles. See, e.g., Beck v.
Prupis, 120 S.Ct. 1608, 1615-17 (2000) (RICO
interpreted against backdrop of “well-established
common-law civil conspiracy principles”); United
States v. A Parcel of Land, 507 U.S. 111, 127-29
(1993) (forfeiture provisions of Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act interpreted against
backdrop of common law forfeiture rules); Wyatt v.
Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992) (whether qualified
immunity available defense for private defendant in
§1983 action determined against backdrop of common
law tort immunity); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.
103, 108-19 (1990) (construing term “falsely made” in
18 U.S.C. §2314 against backdrop of common law
definition); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (construing whether party
entitled to attorneys’ fees under Mineral Land Leasing
Act or National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
against backdrop of common law right to attorneys’
fees). There is nothing in the IAD to indicate that the
drafters of that legislation meant to change the
established precedent concerning harmless error.
Construing the IAD against this backdrop, harmless
error should apply to its provisions.

Other opinions from the Court bolster the
conclusion that harmless error applies to the IAD. In
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994), a majority of this
Court held that a violation of the 120-day rule of
Article IV(c) of the IAD is not cognizable in a federal

27

habeas corpus action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
where the petitioner neither objected at the time his
trial date was set, nor suffered any prejudice as a
result of the commencement of his trial beyond the
120 days set in the rule. The IAD provides that
violation of the 120-day rule, like violation of the anti-
shuffling provision at issue here, requires dismissal of
the indictment with prejudice. Referring to the
statutory violation in that case as an “unwitting
judicial slip,” Justice Ginsburg found that the violation
in that case “ranke[d] with the nonconstitutional
lapses we have held not cognizable in a postconviction
proceeding.” 512 U.S. at 349. Moreover, Justice
Scalia, in his concurring opinion, also rejected the
availability of habeas review for violation of Article IV(c)
of the IAD. Addressing the issue of whether habeas
review should be available to the procedural violation
in that case, Justice Scalia wrote:

The class of procedural rights that are
not guaranteed by the Constitution
(which includes the Due Process Clause),
but that nonetheless are inherently
necessary to avoid a ‘complete miscar-
riage of justice,’ or numbered among ‘the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure,’
is no doubt a small one, if it is indeed not
a null set. The guarantee of trial within
120 days of interjurisdictional transfer
unless good cause is shown — a provi-
sion with no application to prisoners
involved with only a single jurisdiction or
incarcerated in one of two States that do
not participate in the voluntary IAD
compact — simply cannot be among that
select class of statutory rights.

28

If there was ever a technical rule, the
IAD’s 120-day limit is one.

Id. at 357-58.

Much like the 120-day rule of Article IV(c), the anti-
shuffling provision of Article IV(e) is a technical rule.
And just as habeas should not be available to review
such a violation because it is a mere procedural rule,
the harmless error rule should be available to review a
claim of error under that provision.

In New York v. Hill, 120 S. Ct. 659 (2000), this
Court addressed the issue of whether a prisoner could
waive violation of the 180-day provision of Article III(a)
of the IAD by merely complying with a trial date set
beyond the 180-day period and found that he could.
In rejecting Hill’s argument, this Court noted that no
provision of the IAD specifically addressed the issue of
waiver, id. at 663, but it nonetheless found that waiver
applied because of the general rule that presumes the
availability of waiver. Likewise, while no provision of
the IAD specifically addresses the issue of harmless
error, the general rule that presumes that harmless
error analysis of a given error is appropriate should
apply in the instance case.

Based on this Court’s long precedent, harmless
error analysis should be applied to violations of the
IAD. The failure of the Alabama Supreme Court to
follow this precedent constitutes reversible error.

oo OMe PCS a

29

C. The Purposes Behind The IAD Also Support A
Finding That A Harmless Error Analysis Should
Be Applied To Violations Of The IAD.

Article IV(e) of the IAD provides that an indictment
should be dismissed, with prejudice, if a prisoner is
returned to a sending state before resolution of
pending charges. The literal language of this provision
seems to preclude application of harmless error to it,
but in fact does not. This provision must be read in
conjunction with other provisions of the IAD;
specifically, it must be read in conjunction with those
provisions that outline the purposes for which the IAD
exists. See Article IX of the IAD (“This agreement shall
be liberally construed so as to effectuate its
purposes.”). See also, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,
449-50 (1981) (Court looked to “the purpose of the
Detainer Agreement, as reflected in the structure of
the Agreement, its language, and its legislative
history,” to determine whether IAD had been violated);
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
986 (1983) (court should go beyond literal language of
statute if reliance on language defeats purposes of
statute). Read as a whole, the Agreement itself also
supports application of the harmless error rule.

Unlike many statutes, the reasons for the IAD and
the purposes behind it are clearly stated within the
legislation. Article I of the IAD states that the
Agreement was based on a finding that “charges
outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on
untried indictments, informations or complaints and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already
incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce
uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and _ rehabilitation.” “Accordingly, its
purpose is to encourage the expeditious disposition of

30

such charges and to provide cooperative procedures -
among member States to facilitate such disposition.”
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).

In United States v. Mauro, this Court further
elaborated on the purposes behind the IAD, noting
that the problems resulting in adoption of the IAD
included the serious disadvantages prisoners under
detainer were subjected to, including more onerous
conditions of incarceration, precluding their
participation in work assignments, activities, and
rehabilitation programs, and creating uncertainties
about the length of their sentences. Jd. at 359-60.
The Court concluded that “[t]he adverse effects of
detainers that prompted the drafting and enactment of
the Agreement are thus for the most part the
consequence of the lengthy duration of detainers.
Because a detainer remains lodged against a prisoner
without any action being taken on it, he is denied
certain privileges within the prison, and rehabilitation
efforts may be frustrated.” Jd. at 360. See also,
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719-20, 729-30
(1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1981).

In enacting the IAD, the member States included a
clear statement of the purposes behind the IAD and
included a clear statement that the Agreement was to
be liberally construed to effectuate those purposes.
Many of the federal appellate courts addressing this
issue have found that the purposes of the IAD would
not be served by dismissal of an indictment because of
a technical violation of Article IV(e) of the Agreement
and they have held dismissal was not warranted under
such circumstances. United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d
25, 27-28 (ist Cir. 1993) (finding the purposes of the
IAD were not violated by two brief, same-day transfers
and dismissal of indictment therefore was not

31

required); United States v. Roy, 771 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d
Cir. 1985) (one-day interruption of state prison
confinement by transfer to federal custody for motion
hearing posed no threat to prisoner’s rehabilitation
sufficient to require dismissal of indictment under
IAD); Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 374-75
(Sth Cir. 1981) (“A brief removal of a prisoner to the
receiving jurisdiction and his prompt return to the
sending jurisdiction after arraignment and prior to
trial is consonant with the intention of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers.”); United States v. Taylor, 173
F.3d 538 (6th Cir.) (finding that purposes of IAD not
violated by six brief, same-day transfers and dismissal
of indictment not, therefore, required), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 448 (1999); United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d
628, 635-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (stressing that the IAD
should be construed to effectuate its overall intent,
dismissal of indictment not warranted despite one-day
transfer), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); Baxter v.
United States, 966 F.2d 387, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1992)
(returned to custody the same day, no violation of IAD
because no violation of purposes of IAD); United States
v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir.) (one-
day transfer not violation of IAD because no evidence
that purposes of IAD not met), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
879 (1992). In rejecting the prisoners arguments in
those cases, the federal appellate courts held that,
despite the technical violation of the statute and the
literal language of the relevant provisions, the
Agreement was not violated because of the purposes
behind the IAD. In doing so, those courts relied on the
“well-established canon of statutory construction that
a court should go beyond the literal language of a
statute if reliance on that language would defeat the
plain purpose of the statute ....” Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983);
see also, Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U.S.

32

103, 110 (1983); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
337-38 (1950).

In the case before this Court, no tenable claim can
be made that the purposes behind the IAD were
violated. Bozeman has not established any plausible
or cognizable prejudice from his one-day transfer. He
has not alleged that his right to a speedy trial was
denied. Nor could he: Bozeman was tried well within
the 120-day period provided in Article IV(c) of the
Agreement. Moreover, he has not alleged. that the one-
day transfer led to any denial of participation in a
federal rehabilitation program, any denial of privileges
he would have otherwise received, or it affected his
sentence in any way. The purposes behind the IAD
simply would not be vindicated by dismissing
Bozeman’s indictment.

Nor, critically, did Congress exempt the IAD from
application of the harmless error. Had _ the
participants in the IAD intended the harmless error
rule, customarily applicable to most constitutional
errors and errors violating statutes and rules, not
apply, surely they would have said so in the statute.
Otherwise, “[o]Jn the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. §
2111 (emphasis added). In this case, no substantial
right of Bozeman’s was affected. Therefore, the
harmless error rule applies.

33

D. When A Harmless Error Analysis Is Applied To
The Facts Presented In This Case, Dismissal Of
The Indictment Is Not Warranted.

“Mere ‘technical errors’ which do not ‘affect the
substantial rights of the parties’ are not sufficient to
set aside a jury verdict in an appellate court.” Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943). In this case,
any error in transferring custody of Bozeman for one
day from federal custody to state custody and back to
federal custody was, at most, a technical violation of
Article [V(e) of the IAD. Dismissal of his indictment
was not, therefore, warranted.

In this case, Bozeman failed to present any
evidence that he was harmed by the brief one-day
transfer that occurred in this case. He failed to
demonstrate that any of the purposes behind the IAD
were frustrated by his one-day transfer; specifically, he
failed to show that his right to a speedy trial was
frustrated, that he was denied any rehabilitation to
which he was entitled, or that his sentence was
negatively affected in any way.

The prosecutor in this case, shortly after the
indictment was returned on September 20, 1996,
sought to have Bozeman returned to Covington
County, Alabama from federal custody so that he
could be tried on the outstanding charges. (App. 64,
100-02) He was brought back to Covington County for
arraignment and was arraigned and returned to
federal custody the next day. (App. 26-31, 56-58, 67)
Despite his obvious knowledge of the provisions of the
IAD, including the anti-shuffling provisions (App. 18-
25), Bozeman did not inform the trial judge that, if he
were returned to federal custody before trial, his rights
under the IAD would be violated, and he did not object

34

to his return to federal custody when he was returned
(App. 26-31). Moreover, he specifically agreed to have
the IAD issues that he had already raised resolved at a
future time. (App. 27) It was approximately one
month later, just before he was returned to Covington
County for trial, that Bozeman first objected to his
temporary transfer, and even then he failed to allege
that he had been prejudiced by the transfer. (App. 32-
36, 37-42) Bozeman was then tried on February 27-
28, 1997, within 34 days of his initial transfer to
Alabama.

Not only did Bozeman fail to allege any harm from
his temporary one-day transfer, he appeared to
acquiesce in it. In the light of these facts and the
specific purposes behind the IAD, Bozeman should not
be granted the windfall that dismissal of the
indictment would grant him in this case. “This Court
has frequently articulated the ‘great principle of public
policy, applicable to all governments alike, which
forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced
by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose
care they are confided.’” Brock v. Pierce County, 476
U.S. 253, 260 (1986) (citing United States v. Nashville,
C. & St. L.R. Co., 118 U.S. 120 (1886)). “ ‘Reversal for
error regardless of its effect on the judgment,
encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and
bestirs the public to ridicule it.’” Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997) (internal citation
omitted). Considering the character of the proceeding
at stake here — a criminal trial involving convictions
for violent felony offenses — and the relation of the
error asserted to that proceeding — a mere technical,
procedural violation not resulting in any harm to
Bozeman — this Court should weigh the balance in
favor of the State of Alabama and against Bozeman,
finding that any error in the violation of Article IV(e) of

35

the IAD in this case was harmless error. Kotteakos uv.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946).

Finally, while this Court does not generally apply a
harmless error analysis in the first instance, see, e.g.,
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1989);
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987); Moore uv.
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977), it has done so, see,
e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509-12
(1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-26
(1967), and should do so in this case. The Alabama
Supreme Court was asked to do the analysis, but
chose not to do so. This Court should, therefore,
address the harmless error argument advanced by the
State of Alabama in this case and should find that the
technical violation of Article IV(e) in this case was
harmless error.

36
CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama
should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

BILL PRYOR
Attorney General of Alabama

SANDRA JEAN STEWART
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ALABAMA

11 South Union Street
Montgomery, AL 36130-0152
(334) 242-7300

January 25, 2001

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_1335%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.