# Opposition Brief — Hawkins v. Michigan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 510 U.S. 867

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
SEP -8
No. 93-160 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
———————————
In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1992

ROBERT HAWKINS, PAMELA HAWKINS, RASHAWN
HAWKINS, RODERICKA HAWKINS, RYAN HAWKINS,
and ROBERT HAWKINS, JR.,

Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, ex rel

JOHN D. O'HAIR, Prosecuting Attorney
Respondent

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER IN OPPOSITION

JOHN D. O'HAIR
Prosecuting Attorney

*TIMOTHY A. BAUGHMAN

Chief of Research, Training and Appeals
1441 St. Antoine

Detroit, MI 48226

(313) 224-5792

MARYSUE CZARNECKI
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

*Counsel of Record

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

IS A REMAND REQUIRED WHERE:
PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE ANY
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ISSUE IN STATE
COURTS; THE INSTANT CASE PRESENTS A
DIFFERENT THEORY OF RECOVERY THAN
THAT PRESENTED IN AUSTIN; AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT HAS NOT BEEN HELD
TO APPLY TO THE STATES THROUGH THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT?

2 hla ale Fe

Ease
WERE PETITIONERS DENIED A FAIR
TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED
LACK OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY?

Itt.

IS IT IMPROPER FOR A TRIAL COURT TO
DECLINE TO REVISIT A FRANKS V

DELAWARE ISSUE IN A STATE
FORFEITURE TRIAL WHEN THE PRECISE

ISSUE WAS RAISED AND DECIDED UPON
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FEDERAL
CRIMINAL TRIAL OF ROBERT HAWKINS?

2 pm Ht ial N AIS $y Aha 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of the Question 1
Index of Authorities 3
Statement of the Case S
Reasons For Denying The Writ 18

Relief 34

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE

Ashe v Swenson,
397 US 436; 25 LEd2d 469;
90 SCt 1189 (1970)

Austin v United States,
509 US ; S Ct ;
LEd2d ; 53 CrL 2274 (1993)

Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
Vv Crenshaw, 486 US 71;
100 LEd2d 62; 108 SCt 1645 (1989)

Browning-Ferris v Kelco Disposal,
492 US 257; 106 LEd2d 219;
109 SCt 2909 (1989)

Franks v Delaware,
438 US 154; 57 LEd2d 667;
98 SCt 2674 (1978)

In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420,
194 Mich App 134;
486 NW2d 326 (1992)

Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore,
439 US 322; 58 LEd2a 552;
99 SCt 645 (1979)

People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599;
282 NW2d 411 (1979),
lv den 407 Mich 876 (1980)

People v Turner, 155 Mich App 222;
399 NW2d 477 (1986),
lv den 427 Mich 854 (1986)

People v Ward, 107 Mich App 38;
308 NW2d 664 (1981),
lv den 417 Mich 938 (1983)

PAGE
31

18

20

24

29

28

31

31

34

od

Webb v Webb,

451 US 493; 68 LEd2d 392;
101 SCt 1889 (1981)
STATUTES

Mich Compiled Laws 333.7521

21 United States Code Section 88l

CONSTITUTION

Const. 1963, Art 2, Section 15

20

26

21

20

STATEMENT OF FACTS OF THE CASE

On May 9, 1989, a search warrant
was executed at the residence of ROBERT and
PAMELA HAWKINS. 5/1/90A 26-29. The warrant
was based in part upon information obtained
from a confidential informant named RANDY
ULMER. The police recovered from the
residence over one million dollars in U.S.
currency. Recovered from an end table which
contained a hidden compartment was
approximately one-half million dollars in
U.S. currency. Id. 33-35, 40. The currency
was bundled in approximate $15,000 amounts.
Id. 41-44. This amount was consistent with
the wholesale price of a kilo of cocaine.
5/2/90 165-166. Drug ledgers were found in
the master bedroom which reflected a sale of
approximately sixty-nine kilos of cocaine.
A travel itinerary was also found which
indicated that the HAWKINS were flying to
New York on May 10, 1989 in the morning and

were due to return to the Detroit area later

that same day. 5/2/90 91-94; 187-195;
5/7/90 51-56. Three pieces of luggage full
of the remaining approximately one-half
million dollars in cash were recovered in
the master bedroom. Id. at 186-187. White
residue on one of the $20 bills was visible
to the naked eye of the police officers.
Id. 146-148; 162-164. The substance field
tested positive for cocaine. All of the
currency recovered from the house was fanned
over a clean table and the residue was
collected for chemical analysis which was
found to contain cocaine. 5/1/90A 41-44;

5/3/90 18-31, 85-126.

Located in the house were numerous
safes including a pedestal column with a
safe hidden in the bottom of the column.
5/2/90 175-179. PAMELA HAWKINS also rented

a safe deposit box at a location called the

Depository; the rented safe's dimensions

were approximately four feet in length and

two or three feet in depth. 5/3/90 34-38.

The jewelry recovered from the
master bedroom of the house had an estimated
worth of over $100,000. 5/2/90 195-202;
5/7/90 35-39. The remaining defendant items
were also taken which included a Tiffany,
Bayliner Boat, Rolls Royce, Jeep, Jaguar,
Dodge and Lincoln as well as thousands of

dollars in various bank accounts.

ROBERT HAWKINS worked at Chrysler
Corporation in the Capacity of a factory
worker. PAMELA HAWKINS worked on and off on

a part time basis.

ROBERT HAWKINS was prosecuted in
the federal system with narcotic violations.
The confidential informant, RANDY ULMER,
testified on behalf of the federal

government at the criminal trial. ROBERT

HAWKINS was convicted and sentenced to
approximately thirty years imprisonment.
His conviction has been affirmed in the
federal system. A civil narcotic forfeiture
action was filed at the state level pursuant
to MCLA 333.7521, et seq. ROBERT HAWKINS
and PAMELA HAWKINS testified. Also
testifying on behalf of the government was

the confidential informant, RANDY ULMER.

The forfeiture trial began on May
1, 1990. Testimony was taken on May 2, May
3 The trial was adjourned from that
Thursday to the following Monday, May 7,
1990. Testimony was taken on May 8, 9 and
10. The trial was then continued until May
15, 1990. The trial was then adjourned
until July 16, 1990.

Testimony was presented concerning

the net worth of the HAWKINS. 7/16/90

(eee eee

- 9 -

11-68. The HAWKINS' assets for the listed

years were the following:

179,987 for 1983
207,353 for 1984
799,182 for 1985
$1,475,542 for 1986
$2,140,517 for 1987
$2,277,620 for 1988
$3,450,582 for four
months in 1989, Id.
19-41.

Nin in

Testimony also established the
lavish spending habits of the HAWKINS.
PAMELA HAWKINS had a common practice of
purchasing large money orders under the

$10,000 federal reporting requirement and

depositing them into various banks on a
regular basis. Many luxury items were
purchased including trips, numerous
automobiles, jewelry, real estate,
extravagant parties. 5/9/90 140-160. When
the network was put together by the
accountants, they decided that they would

not include as a factor any normal "cost of

-- 10 -

living" 7/16/90 22-43. There was
insufficient legitimate income to support
the majority of the assets. Id. Between
December 31, 1983 and May 9, 1989, income
from unknown and unexplainable sources was

$2,708,156.00. 7/16/90 22-43.

The Government called as witnesses
ROBERT HAWKINS and PAMELA HAWKINS. The
confidential informant, RANDY ULMER, also
testified.

The defense proffered at the
forfeiture trial was that the money and all
of the assets were the result of income
generated from a lawsuit settlement. PAMELA
HAWKINS claimed that a woman named MARGARET
WILSON came to Mrs. HAWKINS' residence for
purposes of selling an insurance policy.
MARGARET WILSON became irate and assaulted
PAMELA HAWKINS who happened to be in the

very early stages of a pregnancy. PAMELA

- ll =

HAWKINS testified that her doctor told her
the fetus she was carrying was killed and an
abortion was necessary. 5/9/90 172-173.
PAMELA HAWKINS was impeached because of her
conflicting testimony surrounding the
reasons for the abortion. After
impeachment, PAMELA HAWKINS indicated that
the doctor never recommended the abortion.
Prior to her impeachment, PAMELA HAWKINS was
insistent that the doctor informed her the
fetus was dead and that an abortion was
necessary. 5/9/90 172-173; 7/17/90 20-30.
The doctor was produced at the trial but
PAMELA HAWKINS asserted the doctor/patient
privilege. Even though PAMELA HAWKINS
testified concerning her medical examination
and the "seeming" medical conclusion of her
doctor, the trial court did not compel the
doctor to testify at trial. 7/17/90 20-30.
MARGARET WILSON did not testify at the

trial nor did the HAWKINS know where she
lived.

‘= i2

The parties stipulated to the
source of the funds utilized to purchase
most of the defendant properties as well as
to the time of the purchases and to the
tracing of the funds deposited into the
various bank accounts. The source of the
funds and the funds utilized to purchase the
assets came from the MARGARET WILSON
lawsuit. The entire court file of the
lawsuit was admitted into evidence at the
forfeiture trial. 7/17/90 5-19. The
lawsuit was filed by attorney BRAZELL who
subsequently was the subject of federal
indictments for money laundering. 5/9/90
19-93, 160-178; 5/10/90 20-58, 60-158;
5/15/90 11-69. BRAZELL testified that at
the HAWKINS' request, BRAZELL did not
participate in any settlement negotiations.
Rather, negotiations were the result of two

phone calls between ROBERT HAWKINS and

MARGARET WILSON. 5/9/90 43. MARGARET

‘- 13 -

WILSON was never represented by any
attorney. Id. After two telephone calls,
MARGARET WILSON agreed to pay the sum of two
million dollars in settlement of the
lawsuit. Id. The two million dollar amount
was decided by ROBERT HAWKINS who just came
up with that amount. 5/9/90, 18, 19-93,
160-178; 5/10/90 20-58, 60-158; 5/15/90
11-69.

The two million dollars was paid
in cash and two of the cash payments were
made at BRAZELL'S office. The first payment
of $500,000 was received less than one month
before the second payment of an additional
$640,000. It was unclear when the third
$750,000 payment was received, but that
payment was also in cash. The quantity of
cash was so enormous that it was necessary
to make the payments in large suitcases.

5/10/90 68-69, 89, 100. The money was then

deposited into BRAZELL'S client trust fund

- 14 -

and checks were subsequently written to the

HAWKINS.

BRAZELL represented WILSON in the
formation of numerous dummy corporations.
Each was set up with BRAZELL acting as an
officer of the corporation and as an
authorized check signer. 5/10/90 98-130.
Both BRAZELL and WILSON were the only
authorized check signatories. 5/10/90
98-130. Each of the dummy corporations
utilized a residential address which had no
relationship to the corporation. 7/16/90
3-9. BRAZELL opened numerous bank accounts
for WILSON in the names of WILSON APPLIANCE
& HARDWARE, WILSON LIQUOR & FOOD and DEXTER
WILSON GROCERY. These accounts were opened
within two days of each other and each of
the named accounts were opened at four

different financial institutions. 5/10/90

131-147; 5/15/90 11-29.

- 15 -

Each of these corporate bank
accounts reflected checks written to either
ROBERT HAWKINS or ROBERT AND PAMELA
HAWKINS. No other checks were written on
any of the corporate accounts. Neither
HAWKINS nor Brazell could offer a plausible
explanation as to the additional check
payments which amounted to some $224,000.00,
although ROBERT HAWKINS confirmed his

endorsement on the back of the check.

In addition, Brazell opened an
account in the name of Dallas Land and
Cattle on which he was the only signatory
(5/10/90 130). One check was written from
that account payable to Robert and Pamela
Hawkins in the amount of $750,000.00. The
check was endorsed by the HAWKINS but not
cashed due to insufficient funds (5/9/90
86). Some of the various banks closed the
numerous WILSON accounts. In each case, the

entire remaining balances were deposited

- 16 -

into bank accounts held by the HAWKINS. All
of these payments were in addition to the

alleged lawsuit settlement.

The alleged WILSON lawsuit filed
by BRAZELL on behalf of the HAWKINS was
admitted into evidence. 7/17/90 5-19. The
case was put on the no progress docket and
dismissed. 7/17/90 5-19. A consent
judgment was thereafter signed by the
parties but not by the judge. Id. That
document reflected a settlement amount of
$750,000.00. Id. The HAWKINS testified,
however, that they received over two million
dollars which was given to them primarily in
the form of cash which was allegedly brought
to Brazell's office by MARGARET WILSON.
5/9/90 18, 160-178; 5/10/90 20-58, 60-158;
5/15/90 11-69.

The money was kept either in the

HAWKINS' house, until they went out of town

- 17 =

at which time the money was put into the
trunk of one of their cars, and/or in
various financial institutions. 5/9/90
18-93, 160-178; 5/10/90 20-58, 60-158;
5/15/90 11-69.

The trial court ordered the
defendant items forfeit and additionally
found that the lawsuit was fraudul ent and

BRAZELL's testimony to be beyond

comprehension. 7/23/90 21; 8/24/90 20.

~ 18 -

REASONS FOR DENYING WRIT

:; REMAND IS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE:
PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE ANY
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ISSUE IN STATE
COURTS; THE INSTANT CASE PRESENTS A
DIFFERENT THEORY OF RECOVERY THAN
THAT PRESENTED IN AUSTIN; AND THE

Petitioner asks this Court to
remand this case for further consideration
in light of this Court's ruling in Austin v

United States, 509 U.S. ; BS. Ce.

; L.Ed.2d * 53 CrL 2274 (1993).

Respondent maintains that a remand is not
proper under the circumstances. First,
Petitioner failed to raise any Eighth
Amendment issue in the courts below.
Respondent further maintains that a remand
is not required because the instant case

presents a different theory of recovery

under the narcotic forfeiture statute than

the recovery theory presented in Austin.
Finally, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition

- 19 =

on excessive fines has not been found to
apply to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.

In its appeal to the Michigan
Court of Appeals and to the Michigan Supreme
Court, Petitioner did not raise any state or
federal Eighth Amendment challenges to the
scope of the trial court's order of
forfeiture; thus, no Eighth Amendment
Challenge based upon the federal
Constitution was passed upon in state court.
It is clear that any generic reference to a
Claimed constitutional violation is not
sufficient to preserve a constitutional
claim based upon an unidentified

constitutional provision.

At the minimum . . . there should
be no doubt from the record that a
Claim under a federal statute or
the Federal Constitution was
presented in the state courts and
that those courts were apprised of
the nature or substance of the
federal claim at the time and in

leer ane tice aie einai

- 20 =

the manner reguired by the state
law. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v
Crenshaw, 486 US 71; 100 LEd2d 62,
72; 108 SCt 1645 (1989), citing

Webb v Webb, 451 US 493, 501, 68 L
Ed 2d 392, 101 S Ct 1889 (1981).

The Crenshaw Court also cautioned
that accepting an Eighth Amendment claim
that was not raised in the state courts
becomes especially problematic when the

state Constitution contains its own

Excessive Fines Clause. Crenshaw, 100 L Ed
2d, supra at 72. Michigan's Constitution

reflects in pertinent part the following:
"Excessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed...."
Const. 1963, Art 2, Section 15. Petitioner
admits that the excessive fines argument was
not raised below. Therefore, this Court

need not consider it.

This Court also need not remand

this case as a result of the Austin decision

because the facts of Austin are inapposite

- 21 -

to the facts of the instant case. In that
case, Austin brought two ounces of cocaine
from the mobile home to a body shop in order
to consummate a prearranged sale to another
individual. The sale was accomplished and a
search warrant was executed at the body shop
and mobile home the following day. As a
result of that warrant, small amounts of
marijuana, cocaine, a weapon, drug
paraphernalia and approximately $4,700 in
cash was recovered. Austin pled guilty to
one count of possessing cocaine with intent
to distribute in the state court. A federal
forfeiture Complaint was filed pursuant to
21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) which sets
forth that conveyances and real property
shall be forfeit if it is used to facilitate
a narcotic transaction. The government
sought forfeiture of the mobile home and
the business which was granted by the trial

court.

- 22 -

The facts of the instant case are
inapposite because the government sought
forfeiture of items which were purchased
with narcotic proceeds. At trial there was
a stipulation of the tracing of the money
allegedly obtained from the WILSON lawsuit
which was used to purchase almost all of the
various defendant items. The defense
proffered that the source of the funds used
to purchase these items and the funds which
were contained in the various bank accounts
constituted the settlement from the lawsuit.
These facts are Gistinctly different than
those presented in Austin. Respondent
prevailed at trial in establishing that
these funds were garnered from narcotic
trafficking. Without the drug money,
Petitioners would not have been in
possession of the over one million dollars
found in their residence. The drug talley

sheets supported Respondent's theory as well

‘- 23 -

as the theory that the money which was found
in the suitcases were to be taken to New
York in payment for the sold cocaine. There
was visible cocaine residue on the money and
additional cocaine residue was recovered for
chemical analysis. The trial court found,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that

Respondent had met the requisite burden.

A "proceeds" forfeiture is
conceptually different from a facilitating
theory. By definition, proceeds do not
constitute an excessive fine since the
narcotic dealers are in possession of items
purchased with illgotten money. "Proceeds"
are traceable entirely to criminal activity.
Removing criminal proceeds from a culpable
owner is no different than taking bank
robber proceeds from a bank robber. The
culpable owner is put into the precise

position he or she would be in if no crime

had been committed. Therefore, a remand as

- 24 =-

a result of Austin is not required because
the forfeiture in the instant case was based
primarily on a "proceeds" theory rather than
a "facilitation" theory. Property forfeit
because they constitute narcotic proceeds
are significantly different than property
forfeit because it was used to facilitate a

narcotic transaction.

Finally, in order for Austin to be
applicable when the forfeiture is based upon
a state statute, several antecedent
questions have to be answered. Austin
reviewed a federal forfeiture statute. This
Court has not held that the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ow ~ S Vv ° j , 492 US
257, 106 L Ed 2a 219, 239 fn.22, 109 § ct
2909 (1989). Any remand, then , would be

premature because the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment at the state level has not

yet been determined.

"* 25 -

II. THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT DENIED A

This Court should not grant the
petition on this basis. Petitioners made
this clain through numerous vehicles
including the following: pretrial motions
before the trial judge; pretrial review of
the trial judge's denials before the Chief
judge of the Circuit Court; mid-trial
motions; appeals to the Michigan Court of
Appeals; application for appeal before the
Michigan Supreme Court. All of the

Petitioners' requests were denied.

Petitioner's primary claim rests
upon an alleged Showing of an "indirect
financial interest" by virtue of a letter
sent by the trial judge. With this
argument, the Petitioner is stretching the

statutory proscription against a pecuniary

interest in the outcome of the case. The

“= 26 -

Court of Appeals summarily dismissed
Petitioner's claim by noting that an
ambition to fight the war on drugs does not
translate into the inability of the court to
decide a case fairly. Michigan's narcotic
forfeiture statute, MCL 333.7524a; MSA
14.15(7524a) also required the court to keep

records.

Moreover, Petitioner's suggestion
that a trial judge is unable to be impartial
because of a reference to the "scourge of
drugs" is absurd. Most people are against
drugs. This is not a new concept. To
accept Petitioner's logic would result in
the automatic exclusion of every judge who
once found a defendant guilty. The letter
does not establish actual bias or

prejudgment as required by Michigan court

rule and case law.

‘- 27 -

The Court of Appeals properly
noted that a careful review of the entire
record, rather than a selective review,
reveals that Petitioners were not denied a

fair trial. The court properly noted:

After carefully reviewing the
entire record in this case, we
conclude that reversal is not
warranted on this basis. ze
appears that throughout the trial
the atmosphere was rather tense as
a result of the bickering between
counsel and between claimants'!
counsel and the trial court. it
appears to us that claimants'
counsel provoked the trial court
with their comments and conduct in
general. In addition to being
disrespectful to the court in many
instances, Claimants' counsel
resorted to attacking a prosecutor
by apparently stating that her
conduct ‘typified the basest kind
of projection as described in
psychiatric literature.' This ‘ype
of conduct was uncalled for. 7 e
trial judge also appeared to be
agitated by the tactics of
Claimants' counsel, such as what
appeared in the judge's eyes to be
attempts to create appellate
parachutes and reliance on what
Clearly appears to be a fraudulent
lawsuit as an explanation for some
of claimants' extensive assets. As
a result, the judge was apparently
becoming frustrated and was losing

|

‘= 28 =

his patience. In re Forfeiture of
$1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 154;
486 NW2d 326 (1992).

Finally, Petitioner claims that
there is a "conflict" with this Court's
decisions and those of the lower federal
courts. The cases cited by Petitioner,
however, fail to support their claim. The

Petitioners were not denied a fair trial on

this basis.

- 29 -
IIt. IT IS PROPER FOR A TRIAL COURT TO

ISSUE WAS RAISED AND DECIDED UPON
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FEDERAL
CRIMINAL TRIAL OF ROBERT HAWKINS.
ROBERT HAWKINS was charged
criminally in the Federal court systen.
PAMELA HAWKINS was not charged with any
crimes. The narcotic forfeiture action was
filed under the state narcotic forfeiture

law.

At the federal criminal trial,
ROBERT HAWKINS raised an issue under Franks
v_ Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L
Ed 2d 667 (1978). The affiant, Jerome
Sharpe, on the search warrant testified
extensively at the federal criminal trial.
The affiant's information was based in part
On information from a confidential
informant. That confidential informant,

Randy Ulmer, testified at the federal

- 30 -

criminal trial and was cross examined at
length by the defense. At the close of the
government's case, the defense requested
that the items recovered from the residence
Of ROBERT HAWKINS be suppressed and relied
upon Franks. The federal trial court denied
the request after having heard all of the

testimony.

Similarly, the Franks issue was
raised within the context of the state
forfeiture civil lawsuit. Once again, the
HAWKINS requested that the search warrant be
suppressed on the basis that the affidavit
contained deliberately false statements or
statements made in reckless disregard for
the truth, a violation under Franks v
Delaware, supra. Michigan has adopted

federal law when similar claims are brought

at the state level. People v Turner, 155
Mich App 222, 227; 399 NW2d 477 (1986), lv

den 427 Mich 854 (1986); People vy

Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599; 282 NW2d 411
(1979), lv den 407 Mich 876 (1980); People v
Ward, 107 Mich App 38; 308 NW2d 664 (1981),
lv den 417 Mich 938 (1983).

The Michigan Court of Appeals
properly ruled that collateral estoppel
precluded the relitigation of the Franks
issue. The doctrine of collateral estoppel
has long been employed throughout the
judicial system and applies to criminal
cases as well as civil matters. Ashe _ v
Swenson, 397 US 436; 90 SCt 1189; 25 LEd2a
469 (1970). Application of this principle
requires several findings. First, the same
ultimate issues underlying the first action

must be involved in the second action.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 439 US 322; 58

LEd2d 552; 99 SCt 645 (1979). The issue
raised in the federal court was identical to

the issue raised in the forfeiture trial.

"= 32 -

Secondly, there must be "mutuality" of
parties. Parklane, 58 LEd2d at 560. The
respective litigants in the second lawsuit
were parties or privy to a party to the
first lawsuit. The interests of ROBERT
HAWKINS in the first lawsuit were adequate
to protect the interests of his wife and
children. Because of the spousal
relationship, ROBERT HAWKINS' interests were
so closely aligned with PAMELA HAWKINS'
interests as to be her virtual

representative.

Most importantly, even though the
trial court in the instant action declined
to revisit the Franks issue in the civil
forfeiture action, the underlying
allegations proffered by Petitioners, that
is, that there were deliberate false
statements by both the affiant and the
confidential informant, were presented as an

affirmative equitable defense. Both the

aot aes) Whe Ral ARs iat ae eam?

;
i

- 33 -

affiant and the confidential informant were
questioned at length during the forfeiture

trial regarding their statements set out in

the search warrant. Thus, the precise issue

was nevertheless presented, argued and

rejected once again by a trial court. On

this basis there was no error.

- 34 -

RELIEF

WHEREFORE,

Respondent respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court deny the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Dated:

August 27,

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN D. O'HAIR
oe Prosecutor

TIMOTHY A. BAUGHMAN
Chief of Research,
Training and Appeals
1441 St. Antoine
Room 1212

Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 224 5777

MARYSUE CZARNECKI
Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney

1993.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_1224%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.