# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pardue v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 509 U.S. 925

## Text

No. |

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992

JACK PARDUE,
Petitioner,
Vi
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

VOLUME 1—-PETITION

JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR.
523 West Third Street
Little Rock, AR 72201
(SO1) 371-9131
May 17, 1993 Attorney for Petitioner

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. The decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous
under Jacobson v. United States and Sorrells v. United
States; there is no evidence whatsoever that petitioner was
predisposed to commit the offense prior to the govern
ment’s conduct designed to draw him into its "conspiracy."

II. The conduct of the government in using implied
threats to get petitioner and his grandson to complete the
acts they were indicted for constitutes outrageous govern
ment conduct which violates the due process clause.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The parties to the case below are: this petitioner, Jack
Pardue (983 F.2d 843); his grandson Michel Pardue (983
F.2d 835); and his son David Pardue (983 F.2d 850).

Michel and David Pardue are proceeding in forma
pauperis, and they are filing petitions for certiorari
concurrently herewith.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review ....... cs ere
Parties to the Proceedings Below ............ oe
Ee
I tt el te 4
SS 6
Te a rr 7
Constitutional Provisions Involved ............. 7
Statutory Provisions Involved ........... LOMA TS
RE UO ee ee 8
Reasons for Granting the Writ .............. 14

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO JACOBSON
V. UNITED STATES AND SORRELLS V. UNITED
STATES BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
WHATSOEVER OF PETITIONER’S PREDISPOSITION

Il. THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN USING
IMPLIED THREATS TO GET PETITIONER AND HIS
GRANDSON TO COMPLETE THE ACTS THEY WERE
INDICTED FOR CONSTITUTES OUTRAGEOUS
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT WHICH VIGLATES THE

Ee FS) 18
ee kk nw baka s 21
Se A-1l

(under separate cover)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) ... 18
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,

aan Te, Be ee ae ed ee eas 18
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535

bo” | ens LURK CaP ee oI 1,14,15,17,18
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) ... 16n
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438

43 £3 re oe are einer 20-21,21n
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)... . . . 18
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)... . 14
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435

he 5 eae Oe eee nner i ne 1,14,16n
United States v. Crump, 934 F.2d 947

CPE 55 @ x ik xe Sa wath ee eee 16n
United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853

Co ee SE a eA ee Des see ed 18
United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943

Cas PI a sae ae eae eee cae 16n
United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098

COR Gee ke ee eee ees 17
United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906

Coe Sc ees cits ee ee A ee 17,18,19
United States v. Jack Pardue, 983 F.2d

843 (8th Cir.1993) ....... 2,6,9,9n,15,16,16n,19
United States v. Michel Pardue, 983 F.2d

Sa Se a BE bo i eee ees 2,9n
United States v. David Pardue, 983 F.2d

eee SO EU v6 5 co oo bh ete ew bw 2,9n

United States v. Pardue, 765 F.Supp.
513 (W.D.Ark.1991) .. 6,7,9,10,11,11n,12,12n,19

United States v. Pfeffer, 901 F.2d 654
(8th Cir. 1990)

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973) atte |

United States v. Szycher, 585 ¥.2d 443
(10th Cir. 1978)

United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373
(3d Cir. 1978)

United States v. Whoie, 288 U.S.App.D.C
261, 925 F.2d 1481 (1991) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

hifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

STATUTES AND RULES

18 U.S.C. § 371

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

Pe Ga. Se ee ee

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

16n

18.19

19

20

14-15

7,17,18,18,20

Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment
Cases: The Journey Back, 27 AM.CRIM.L.REV.

Treatment of the Due Process Defense,
19 SETON HALL L.REV. 606 (1989)

19-20

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992

JACK PARDUE,
Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit was rendered on January 4, 1993. It is
published as United States v. Pardue, 983 F.2d 843 (8th
Cir.1993). It is reproduced in the Appendix at A-3.
Petitioner’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc was denied on February 16, 1993.
Appendix at A-16.

The district court’s opinion was decided May 13,
1991, and it is published as United States v. Pardue, 765

F.Supp. 513 (W.D.Ark.1991). It is reproduced in the
Appendix at A-34.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals decided this case on January 4,
1993, and the petition for rehearing was denied on
February 16, 1993.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within
ninety days and is, therefore, timely.

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that:

. . . [NJor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law:
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 371 provides, in pertinent part:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one of more of such per-
sons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy
shall be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) provides as follows:

Whoever travels in or causes another (including
the intended victim) to travel in interstate or foreign
commerce, or uses or causes another (including the
intended victim) to use the mail or any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent that a
murder be committed in violation of the laws of any
State or the United States as consideration for the
receipt or, or as consideration for a promise or
agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than ten years, or both; and if personal injury
results, shall be fined nor more than $20,000 and
imprisoned for nor more than twenty years, or both;
and if death results, shall be subject to imprisonment
for any term of years or for life, or shall be fined not
more than $50,000, or both.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a murder for hire conspiracy case. The
defense is entrapment and outrageous governmental con-
duct. The petitioner (Jack Pardue) and his co-defendants
son (David Pardue) and grandson (Michel Pardue) were
convicted after a week long trial of conspiracy and
interstate transportation for murder for hire (18 U.S.C. §§
371 & 1958(a)).' The district court vacated the convic-

' Petitioner and his grandson Michel were convicted of one

count of interstate transportation to commit murder for hire, and
they were acquitted of one count. David Pardue, petitioner’s
son and Michel’s father, was convicted of both counts.

8

tions as to Jack and Michel on Rule 29 motions for judg
ment of acquittal and denied the motion as to David on
May 13, 1991. United States v. Pardue, 765 F.Supp. 513
(W.D.Ark.1991) (reprinted in Appendix at A-34). Jack's
role was that of the concerned grandfather trying to get his
grandson out of a bad situation that the Government
sucked his grandson into.

The government appealed. On January 4, 1993, the
Eighth Circuit reversed, reinstating the convictions of
Jack’ and Michel’ and affirming as to David.* As to
Jack, the panel divided 2-1 with former Chief Judge Lay
dissenting that Jack was entrapped as a matter of law.
United States v. Jack Pardue, 983 F.2d 843, 848 (8th
Cir.1993) (Lay, J., dissenting). On February 16, 1993,
the panel denied each of the defendants’ petitions for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en_ banc.
(Appendix at A-16) The facts as stated in the district
court’s opinion are substantialiy uncontradicted. The issue
arises from application of the law to those uncontradicted
facts.

A.

This case begins in April 1990 with plotting by one
Gary Garrett, a professional agent provocateur, snitch, and

* United States v. Jack Pardue, 983 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1993)
(reprinted in Appendix at A-3).

’ United States v. Michel Pardue, 983 F.2d 935 (8th Cir
1993) (reprinted in Appendix at A-17).

* United States v. David Pardue, 983 F.2d 850 (8th Cir
1993). This opinion is not reprinted in the Appendix. It is
reprinted in David Pardue’s petition for certiorari

9

prison inmate "who might be the most reprehensible char-
acter ever to testify before this court." United States v.
Pardue, 765 F.Supp. 513, 515 (W.D.Ark. 1991) (Appen-
dix at A-37) Garrett has a talent for using law enforce-
ment agencies (not just individual agents) to get things for
himself. He helped manufacture this crime and used the
Pardues in an effort to get his freedom. Jd. at 526 (Ap-
pendix at A-61).

David Pardue was mad at Bob Harrington. Harring-
ton and he went on a crime spree together. He was in-
volved with David in a robbery of a Wal-Mart store in
Benton County, Arkansas in April 1987, but Harrington
turned state’s evidence and walked free. David ultimately
was convicted of this robbery after a jury trial, and he was
in prison, sentenced to five years. While there, he talked
about Harrington, and he indicated a desire to have Har-
rington killed. Jd. at 515 (Appendix at A-37). Inside
prison, he talked with Garrett, and Garrett seized the
moment realizing that David Pardue was his ticket out.
Not content with trying to deliver just David, Garrett
plotted how to bring down three generations of the Pardue
family. /d. He talked with David Pardue to learn what he
could about David's crime, the locale where it happened,
and the players in the conviction. /d. at 516 (Appendix at
A-38)

David was also charged with perjury in connection
with his "defense" in the robbery case. He was set for
trial on July 8, 1990. Harrington was to testify against
him in that trial, too. Thus, David had a July 8th deadline
for Harrington. David, however, pled guilty to perjury
without putting the plan to "Whack" Harrington in motion.

B.

This case ends with the machinations of the FBI and

10

the Benton County, Arkansas, authorities, particularly FBI
Agent Gary Danzer, a 21-year veteran who played the role
of the "hitman" in this case "well, so well, that the court
believes that he exceeded the bounds of permissible police
conduct." Jd. at 527 (Appendix at A-63). Danzer had
Jack and Michel Pardue convinced that he was a cold-
blooded killer who would "whack" anyone for the right
price, paid in advance, of course. Jd. at 518. 519
(Appendix at A-43, A-46). He also made it absolutely
clear that he had to answer to another person who would
not be happy if he were not paid for the murder.°

Danzer was pushing, and the Pardues were unable to
extricate themselves from Danzer’s, Garrett’s, and the
FBI’s scheme. They did the only thing that they could do,
they stalled Danzer by telling him that they did not have
the money. Michel agreed to meet with Danzer, effective-
ly to get him off his back, but he made it clear that there
would be no money for him and they were not going to do
what Danzer was trying to get them to do. /d. at 519 (Ap-
pendix at A-43). Michel met with Danzer and put him
off, and Danzer said to call him back if the Pardues’
minds change. Jd. at 519-20 (Appendix at A-46--A-47).
Danzer made it clear that he may not be available later.
and that further inquiries should be through Garrett in

> Id. at 519 (Appendix at A-45):

Toward the end of the conversation, still insisting that they
meet that evening to view the money, Danzer explained his
need to see the money by saying, "If I get somebody up
here to, to help me then they’re gonna want to kill me
about the time I don’t be able to come across with, do you
understand what I’m saying? I got expenses and
responsibilities."

1]

prison. Jd. at 528-29 (Appendix at A-68).

All is well. Danzer is gone, and there is no contact
with the Pardues. In the meantime, the FBI is not content
to let this go away.° There is a planning session at the
FBI Office in Fayetteville, Arkansas where the federal and
State authorities try to figure out how to breathe new life
into this dead "conspiracy." The FBI manufactures some
letters about the alleged contract killer and sends them.
One was sent July 31, 1990. Jd. at 529 (Appendix at A-
68).

On September 16, 1990, about two months after dis-
appearing, Danzer suddenly reappears on the telephone
and tells Michel that David has authorized the murder.
Michel tells Danzer not to call him. /d. at 521 (Appendix
at A-50). On September 20th, Danzer calls back to state
tell Michel that the murder happened and that he needs his
money. /d.

Thus, as a part of the FBI plan, the professional
"hitman" who made it crystal ciear that he did not work on
credit, claimed to have done the murders and expected his
money. The FBI decided at this meeting to gain by
intimidation what guile failed to produce for it. Michel
and Jack were now scared that they had to come through
with the money for this "killer" who has other, tougher
guys to answer to, and they mailed the money to a post
office box designated by Danzer.

i

Thus, we have a crime that was generated in the mind

° Garrett is also concerned about his own deal. He writes a
letter on July 11, 1990 to the state prosecutor imploring them to
deliver on their promise to him. /d. at 529 (Appendix at A-68).

12

of Gary Garrett, maybe with David Pardue. Garrett sold
his plan to the FBI and Benton County, Arkansas
authorities in exchange for his freedom. He worked David
Pardue in prison, while Danzer worked Michel Pardue in
Fayetteville. Jack Pardue was trying to get Michel out
without getting themselves hurt. When Michel Pardue did
not come along as he was supposed to, and the "conspir-
acy" that the government had going was dead because the
Michel and Jack would not go along with the scheme to
kill the Harringtons, the government devised a scheme to
regenerate its dead conspiracy. Since the Pardues would
not pay the money to kill the Harringtons voluntarily, the
government decided to fake the killing and make the
Pardues pay the money out of fear for their own safety,
which they did.

With that, the jury convicted them even though there
was no evidence of predisposition to commit the crime.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO JACOBSON
V. UNITED STATES AND SORRELLS V. UNITED STATES
BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF
PETITIONER’S PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT THE
CRIME.

A

The decision below is contrary to Jacobson v. United
States, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (1992) (which was decided nine
months before the decision below’) and Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Jacobson, this Court said,
112 S.Ct. at 1540-41:

In their zeal to enforce the law, however,
Government agents may not originate a= criminal
design, implant in an innocent person's mind _ the
disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce
commission of the crime so that the Government may
prosecute. Sorrells, supra, 287 U.S., at 442, 53
S.Ct., at 212; Sherman, supra, 356 U.S., at 372, 78
S.Ct., at 820. Where the Government has induced an
individual to break the law and the defense of entrap-
ment is at issue, as it was in this case, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defend
ant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to
first being approached by Government Agents. United

The case was argued below about five weeks after
Jacobson was argued in this Court, and it was decided nine
months after. The effect of Jacobson was discussed at oral
argument.

14

States v. Whoie, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 263-264,
925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (1991). (footnote omitted)

Here, the record is singularly devoid of any evidence that
Jack Pardue was predisposed to commit any criminal
offense prior to the “creative activity” of Danzer and
Garrett. As the Court said in Jacobson, 112 S.Ct. at
1541 n. 2:

The sole issue is whether the Government carried its
burden of proving that petitioner was predisposed to
violate the law before the Government intervened
The dissent is mistaken in claiming that this ts an
innovation in entrapment law and in suggesting that
the Government's conduct prior to the moment of soli
citation is irrelevant. See post, at 1544-1545. The
Court rejected these arguments five decades ago in
Sorrells, when the Court wrote that the Government
may not punish an individual "for an alleged offense
which is the product of the creative activity of its own
officials” 2. Indeed, the proposition that the
accused must be predisposed prior to contact with law
enforcement officers is so firmly established that the
Government conceded the point at oral argument
(emphasis in original)

The Court of Appeals makes no mention of Jack Par
due’s predisposition. Instead, it talks of what the jury
could have concluded that Michel and David might have
done to enlist Jack in the plan. 983 F.2d at 847. It never
discusses the fact that this all began because of the
Government’s planning and conduct. The very fact that
the Court of Appeals relied to find "some evidence” to
support a conviction of Jack occurred after Michel and

15

Jack had extricated Michel from Danzer’s plan. Jd.* The
Court of Appeals stated that the evidence was in conflict.
In some metaphysical way, all evidence in every case
is in conflict. That does not change the undisputed facts
which point to only one conclusion. Here, there is no
conflict on the material fact that there is no evidence of
predisposition of Michel Pardue prior to Danzer’s
approaching Michel at the Varner Unit parking lot. And,
Jack did not even know about it until the next day after
Danzer had plied him with the tales of how Danzer was a
professional killer there to do David Pardue’s bidding.
This is a "crime" that would not have occurred but for
the creative, insistent, and threatening efforts of FBI Agent
Danzer. Neither Jack nor Michel was predisposed to

°

The tendered defenses of entrapment and coercion
were likewise factual issues for the jury to resolve. Be-
cause the evidence was in conflict, it was for the jury to
decide if Jack did what he did because he was predisposed
to and willingly did so, or whether he did so because he
was entrapped or out of fear for his and his family’s lives.
Where the facts as to entrapment are disputed, the issue
must ordinarily be submitted to the jury. Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932);
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62, 108 S.Ct. 883,
886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Crump, 934
F.2d 947, 956 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Pfeffer,
901 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Leroux,
738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.1984). Because the evidence in this
case pointed to more than one reasonable conclusion, the
district court was in error when it determined that Jack had
been entrapped as a matter of law by the undercover agent.

16

commit the crime, and the evidence in this case does not
even suggest the contrary.

B. se 38

In this connection, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is contrary to United States v. McLernon, 746
F.2d 1098, 1111-12 (6th Cir.1984). Resolving all doubts
in the evidence in favor of the Government, there still is
no evidence of predisposition. —

See

The facts of this case give the Court a clear fact
Situation to apply the holding of Jacobson to situations
where the Government was not just enticing the petitioner
into committing its crime; here it used implied threats to
make petitioner to do the very act it indicted him for.

Il. THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN USING
IMPLIED THREATS TO GET PETITIONER AND HIS
GRANDSON TO COMPLETE THE ACTS THEY WERE
INDICTED FOR CONSTITUTES OUTRAGEOUS GOVERN-
MENT CONDUCT WHICH VIOLATES THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE.

A.

In United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th
Cir.1992), the Tenth Circuit explained the outrageous
conduct defense:

The defense of outrageous conduct is distinct trom the

defense of entrapment in that the entrapment defense
looks to the state of mind of the defendant to

17

determine whether he was predisposed to commit the
crime for which he is prosecuted. See Jacobson v.
United States, --- U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 118
L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). The outrageous conduct de-
fense, in contrast, looks at the government’s behavior.
See United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 858 (10th
Cir. 1984).

The outrageous conduct defense was first enunci-
ated in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93
S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). "[W]e may some
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of law enforcement agencies is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction. . . ." Id. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1643
(citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct.
205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)). Several years later, in
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct.
1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), a majority of the Jus-
tices left open the possibility that an outrageous
conduct defense based on the Due Process Clause
might be invoke successfully even if the entrapment
defense is unavailable because of predisposition. /d.
at 495, 96 S.Ct. at 1653 (Powell, J., with Blackmun,
J., concurring); id. at 496-97, 96 S.Ct. at 1653
(Brennan, J., with Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing).

Notwithstanding the lack of a clear holding on
outrageous conduct by the Supreme Court, must of the
circuits, including this one, have recognized the
viability of the outrageous conduct defense.

Outrageous governmental conduct is a question of law not
to be submitted to the jury. /d. at 909 & n.3.

18

The scope of this legal defense, however, has not been
"defined . . . with any degree of precision." It revolves
around the totality of the circumstances of any particular
case with "reference to ‘"‘the universal sense of justice.’"’
Id. at 910 (citing Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
246 (1960))).

B.

The district court found that the actions of the
government were outrageous in twice pulling Michel and
Jack Pardue into this "conspiracy" when the expressly
were trying to get out. 765 F.Supp. at 531 (Appendix at
A-73). The Court of Appeals disagreed in two paragraphs
stating only that the defendant’s burden on such an issue is
"quite high," and that these defendants did not meet it.
983 F.2d at 847-48 (Appendix at A-10) It simply stated
that the government "did not implant the criminal design in
any of the Pardues." Jd. at 848 (Appendix at A-10).

To the contrary, the government was solely respon-
sible for Jack Pardue having anything to do with this
"conspiracy." At the least, this case gives the Court the
opportunity to delineate the circumstances where Jack
Pardue was the victim of outrageous governmental conduct
but Michel was not.

The Government created Danzer as a convincing
"hitman" with people to answer to who might even kill
him. The Government used this clear implied threat
against Jack and Michel to get them to do what they
wanted so they could indictment. Compare United States
v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir.1978) (evidence
of implied threat did not measure up; defendant was
"impressed" with government agent and tried to be friends
with him). See also Marcus, The Due Process Defense in

19

Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back, 27 AM.CRIM.L.
REV. 457 (1990).

oe
On this score, the decision below is contrary to United
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.1978). See Marino,

Outrageous Conduct: The Third Circuit's Treatment of the
Due Process Defense, 19 SETON HALL L.REV. 606 (1989).

D.

The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the
question of whether implied threats violates "fundamental
fairness" or the "universal sense of justice" or is otherwise
"intolerable" under the Due Process Clause. In the eye of
the beholder of what the Government is doing, he cannot
do anything but go along. Our Government should not be
permitted to charge and then convict a person whom it has
drawn into and then made stay in its conspiracy by its own
implied threats.

Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the government’s pur-
poses are beneficent. .. . The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.

Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the sarne
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In
a government of laws, existence of the government
will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scru-
pulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipre-

20

sent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for the law; it invites every man to become a law until
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means--to declare that the government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction. of a private
criminal--would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set
its face.”

CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR
523 West Third Street

Little Rock, Arkansas 7220]
May 17, 1993 (501) 371-9131

’ Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 485
(1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

21

—

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_0906%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.