# Transcript of Record — Lochner v. New York

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Transcript of Record
- **Published:** January 1, 1905
- **Citation:** 198 U.S. 45

## Text

(19,392,)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1904.

No. 292.

JOSEPH LOCHNER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

IN ERROR TO THE COUNTY COURT OF ONEIDA COUNTY, STATE OF

NEW YORK.
INDEX

Original. Print.

Remittitur from court of appeals ...........--...-22+ sees kak a 1
Appeal book on appeal to court of appeals. ......... ..... <sAk d 2
IRRRMRORE. oo acc ceccccovesacnverccces seeserevesd ses icssatsse 1 2
SNE, sink 5b Gecth dd bDKASS bbb obs ee CReNeSSOSS Shah 2 2
SPE PTT er et TTT TPT te ee 3 3
Order disallowing demurrer ............. AKbon baceutantane es 4 4
Judgment of conviction... .............0--eeeee eee vat senee’s 5 4
Certificate of reasonable doubt .............. peusaa po veusen 6 5
Notice of appeal to appellate division ............ (pabuceeedss 7 5
Stipulation as to record ..... T hkd shy oa badh TAMER SORRAARA SPOS 8 &
Affidavit of no opinion. .......-.....-..4+ eee Sabo naae oak 8 6
Certificate of clerk of appellate division » inshci be keaseebneacad 4 7
Order of affirmance in appellate division...............-..... 10 7
Judgment in appellate division ...........-..... Sbxca Gans eee ll 7
Certificate of clerk of appellate division ................ QUAws 12° 8
Notice of appeal to court of appeals....... kates ey a 12 8
CGonthRodbe WG WOONTE visi. sas scence conte crete ncdcsceseeseunh. 13 9
Opinion of appellate division...... Oddo dene iva sdsdeaeneearvres 14 9
Certificate to appeal book ........... (Ska bx ba cee hn wash eae teen 25 16

Jupp & DerweiLer, Printers, Wasuincton, D. C., January 7, 1905,

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Il INDEX.
Originai, Print
Opinion of court of appeals, Parker, C.J ...........05 cee eeeees : 26 16
Gray, J. (concurring)................ ad 29
Vann, J. (concurring) .............0. 47 31
O’Brien, J. (dissenting). ............. 53 35
Bartlett, J. (dissenting) .............. 66 44
Order for judgment upon remittitur.............2... cece eeeceee i. a 46
EIS SEI ECS Pet Sa ee pee ey eee re | 47
Order allowing writ of error...... athe hte tinea ea ante cae-aan ears 73 48
PEE WINER IOE- GUM, cic cas oa ei cckve cibsecreb abides ese wee 74 49
RTT OU CHTELTT Terie eer eee ee 7

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JOSEPH LOCHNER VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 1

a ; Court of Appeals.

Strate oF New YoOrK, 88:

Pleas in the court of appeals held at the capitol, in the city of Al-
bany,on the 12th day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand nine hundred and four, before the judges of said court.

Witness, the Hon. Alton B. Parker, chief judge, presiding.
W. H. SHANKLAND, Clerk.

Remittitur, January 13th, 1904.
THE PEOPLE, ETC., Resp’d’t,
ag’ st
Josepn Locaner, App’!’nt.

Be it remembered, that on the second day of December, in the
year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two, Joseph Loch-
ner, the appellant in this action, came here into the court of
b appeals, by Lindsley & Mackie, his attorneys, and filed in the
said court a notice of appeal and return thereto from the
judgment of the appellate division of the supreme court in and for
the fourth judicial department. And The People of the State of
New York, the respondent in said action, afterward appeared iv said
court of appeals by Timothy Curtin, district attorney, its attorney.

Which said notice of appeal and the return thereto filed as afore-
said, are hereunto annexed.

Whereupon, the said court of appeals having heard this cause
argued by Messrs. William S. Mackie and Smith M. Lindsley, of
counsel for the appellant, and by Mr. ‘Timothy Curtin, district at-
torney, of counsel for the respondent, and after due deliberation had
thereon, did order and adjudge that the judgment of conviction ap-
pealed from herein be aud the same hereby is affirmed.

And it was also further ordered, that the record aforesaid, and the
proceedings in this court, be remitted to the Oneida county court,
there to be proceeded upon according to law. Therefore, it is con-
sidered that the said judgment conviction be affirmed, as aforesaid.
And hereupon, as well as the notice of appeal and return thereto
aforesaid as the judgment of the court of appeals aforesaid, by them
given in the premises, are by the said court of appeals remitted into
the Oneida county court before the judge thereof, according to the

form of the statute in such case made and provided, to be en-
c forced according to law, and which record now remains in the
said Oneida county court before the judge thereof, &c.
W. H. SHANKLAND,
Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York.

JOSEPH LOCHNER VS.

Court of Appeals, Clerk’s Office.

ALBANY, January 13th, 1904.

I hereby certify that the preceding record contains a correct
transcript of the proceedings in said action in the court of appeals,
with the papers originally filed therein attached thereto.

[sEaL.] W. H. SHANKLAND, Clerk.
d Court of Appeals.
Tue Propte or THE State or New York, Respondent,
v8.
JosePpH Locaner, Appellant. !
Appeal Book.

Timothy Curtin, district attorney for respondent, Rome, N. Y.
Lindsley & Mackie, attorneys for appellant, Utica, N. Y.
Filed April 4, 1904, in Oneida Co. clerk’s office.

1 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Toe Prope oF THE State or New York, sad
spondent, Statement.

vs.
JosepH Locunxr, Appellant.

Defendant was indicted for misdemeanor, second offence, to wit :
violation of article VIII, section 110, of chap. 415, Laws of 1897,
known as the labor law, in requiring and permitting an employee
working for him in his bakery to work more than sixty hours in
one week. Indictment was sent to Oneida county court from the
trial term of the supreme court, held at Rome, N. Y., in October,
1901, at which term defendant interposed demurrer. November
11th, 1901, in Oneida county court, demurrer to indictment argued.
February 3rd, 1902, order disallowing demurrerentered. February
12th, 1902, defendant arraigned in Oneida county court and refused
to plead. Judgment of conviction thereupon entered. County judge
of Oneida county granted certificate of reasonable doubt and defend-
ant served notice of appeal.

2 Supreme Court, Oneida County.

Tue Preopie or THe State oF New YorkK
against Indictment.
JosepH LOCHNER.

The grand jury of the county of Oneida, by this indictment, ac-
cuse Joseph Lochner of thecrime of misdemeanor, second offence,

—

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

3

to wit: with the violation of article VIII, section 110, of chapter
415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor laws of the State of
New York, and the said defendant wrongfully and unlawfully re-

uired and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit,
bread and cake bakery and confectionery establishment, at the city
of Utica, in this county, to work more than sixty hours in one week,
committed as follows:

That the said Joseph Lochner on the 21st day of December, one
thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, after having been duly
arrested upon the complaint of Frank Couverette, charged with
violation of article VIII of the said labor law, in permitting his em-

loyees to work more than sixty hours in one week, plead guilty
to the charge in and at the city court of Utica, a court of competent
jurisdiction, and was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty dollars, or in
default thereof, to stand committed for twenty days in the Oneida
county jail, and the said defendant paid his said fine of twenty doi- &
lars. That the said defendant after such conviction upon his plea
of guilty, wrongfully, unlawfuliy and knowingly, with the intent on
his part to violate the law, permitted and required one Aman
Schmitter, an employee in his employ, to work more than sixty hours
in one week, during the week commencing April 19th and
3 ending April 26th, one thousand nine hundred and one, at
his biscuit, bread and cake bakery and confectionery estab-
lishment situated at numbers 82-84 Soutia street, in the city of Utica,
this county, and thereby committing the crime of misdemeanor,
second offense.

Contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and pro-

vided, and against the peace of the People of the State of New York,

and their dignity.
TIMOTHY CURTIN,
District Attorney of Oneida County.
Endorsed : “ A true bill.”
SAMUEL R. WRIGHT, Foreman.

Supreme Court, Oneida County.

Tue PEopLe oF THE State or New YorK
against Demurrer.
JosePH LocHNER.

The defendant Joseph Lochner, above named, demurs to the in-
dictment presented by the last grand jury on the 22nd day of Octo-
ber, 1901, charging him with the crime of misdemeanor, second of-
fense, to wit: with the violation of article VIII, section 110, of
chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor laws of the
State of New York, on the following grounds:

First. That more than one crime is charged in the indictment,

4 JOSEPH LOCHNER VS.
within the meaning of section 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of the State of New York.
4 Second. That more thau one crime is charged in the indiet-
ment, within the meaning of section 279 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure of the State of New York.
Third. That the facts stated do not constitute a crime.
Wherefore this defendant asks judgment of the court that he be
dismissed and discharged from the said premises specified in said
indictment.
Dated October 30, 1901.

WILLIAM S. MACKIE,
Attorney for Defendant.

Office and postoffice address, 115 Genesee St., Utica, N.Y.

At a term of the county court, held in and for the county of
Oneida, at the court house in the city of Rome, N. Y., November 11,

1901.
Present: Hon. Watson 'T. Dunmore, justice presiding.

Supreme Court, Oneida County.

Order Disallowing

against
g4 Demurrer.

THe PeopLe oF THE Strate or New York
JosePH LOCHNER.
A demurrer to the indictment having been interposed by the de-
fendant through his counsel, William S. Mackie, and
5 After hearing William S. Mackie, attorney for the said de-
fendant, in favor of such demurrer, and Timothy Curtin,
district attorney, in opposition thereto, *
Ordered, that the said demurrer be and the same is hereby over-
ruled and disallowed. Defendant may plead upon the first day of
the February, 1902 term of this court, at 2 o’clock p. m.

Enter
W. T. DUNMORE,
Oneida County Judge.

At a trial term of the county court held at the court house, in the
city of Utica, in and for the county of Oneida, commencing on Mon-
day, the 10th day of February, 1902.

Before Hon. W. T. Dunmore, Oneida county judge, presiding.

Tue PrEorie )
v8.
JosEPH LOCHNER.

Defendant, indicted for the crime of misdemeanor, second offense,
to wit: with the violation of article VIII, section 110, of chap. 415,
of the Laws of 1897, know as the labor laws of the State of New

Judgment of Conviction, etc.

—

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 5

York, and the defendant having refused to plead, and having been
thereupon duly convicted of misdemeanor second offense, is this
12th day of February, 1902, sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to
stand committed until paid, not to exceed 50 days in the Oneida
county jail. Bail allowed in the sum of $50 and bond filed.

6 State oF New gga
Oneida County,

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of said

court kept by me as clerk thereof. Witness the seal of said

[u. s.] court, at the city of Utica, this 20th day of February, 1902.
JOSEPH PORTER, Clerk.

Oneida County Court.

Certificate of Rea-

- sonable Doubt.

Tue PEOPLE OF THE Strate oF New York
JosePH LOCHNER.

The defendant above named, having duly made application in
open court and during the term at which he was convicted, for a
certificate of reasonable doubt as to whether or not the judgment
of this court should stand, and after hearing William S. Mackie,
counsel for said defendant, and Hon. Timcthy Curtin, district at-
torney of Oneida county.

I, the undersigned, county judge of Oneida county, the judge
holding the term at which said defendant was convicted, do hereby
certify, that in my opinion, there is reasonable doubt whether the
judgment of conviction against the defendant above named for the
crime of misdemeanor, second offense, in requiring and permitting
an employee, working for him in his buscuit, bread and cake bakery
and confectionery establishment at Utica, N. Y., to work more than

sixty hours in one week, rendered in the Oneida county
7 court held at Utica, in and for the county of Oneida, N. Y.,
on the 12th day of February, 1902, should stand.

Dated February 12, 1902.
W. T. DUNMORE,
Oneida Co. Judge.

Oneida County Court.

THE PEOPLE oF THE SratE oF New York

v8. } Notice of Appeal.
JosePH LOcHNER.

Take notice, that the defendant above named, appeals to the ap-
pellate division of the supreme court from judgment of conviction
of the crime of misdemeanor, second offense, in requiring and per-

6 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

mitting av employee working for him in his biscuit, bread and cake
and confectionery establishment at Utica, N. Y., to work
more than sixty hours in one week, rendered against him by the
ida county court at a term thereof, held at Utica, in and for the
county of Oneida, on the 12th day of February, 1902.
Dated February 12, 1902.
Yours, etc., WILLIAM 8S. MACKIE,
Attorney for Defendant, 115 Genesee Street, Utica, N. Y.

To the clerk of the county of Oneida and te Hon. Timothy Cur-
tin, district attorney of Oneida county.

8 Oneida County Court.
Tue Peorie or THe Stare or New York
v8.
JoserpH LocHNER.

It is hereby stipulated that the foregoing indictment, demurrer,
order disallowing demurrer, judgment of conviction, certificate of
reasonable doubt, and notice of appeal, are true copies of the origi-
nals aud the whole thereof on file in Oneida county clerk’s office,
and a certification of said papers by the clerk of Oneida county
is hereby waived.

Dated February 26, 1902.

\ Stipulation.

TIMOTHY CURTIN,
District Attorney
WILLIAM 8. MACKIE,
Attorney for Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Tue Preopre or THE State or New York,

Respondent, Affidavit No Opinion.

vs.
Josern Locuyer, Appellant.
Onerpa County, 88:

William S. Mackie, being duly sworn, says that he is the

9 attorney for the defendant and appellant above named ; that
no opinion was given in the court below upon disallowing

the defendant’s demurrer herein, nor upon the judgment of con-

viction.
WILLIAM 8. MACKIE.

Sworn to before me Feb. 24th, 1902.
L. N. SOUTHWORTH,
Notary Public, Oneida Co., N. Y.

‘Tite PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. ?

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department,
erk’s Office, Rochester, N. Y.

I, Newell C. Fulton, clerk of the appellate division of the supreme
court in the fourth judicial department, do hereby certify that the
following is a copy of the order made by the said court upon the
appeal in the above entitled actiou or proceeding, and entered in
my office on the 13th day of May, 1902, and that the original case
or papers upon which said appeal was heard are hereunto annexed.

in witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the said court, at the city of Rochester, this 16th day of May,

. 1902.

[smat.] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

10 At a term of the appellate division of the supreme court,
held in and for the fourth judicial department, atthe city of
Rochester, on the 13th day of May, 1902.

Present: Honorable Peter B. lana: senior associate judge,
residing. Honorable Alfred Spring, Honorable Pardon C. Wil-
iams, Honorable Frank H. Hiscock, Honorable Johu M. Davy, as-

sociate justices.

Tre Psopxe, Respondent,

- Order of Affirmance on Appeal from
JosepH Locuner, Appellant,

Judgment.

The above named defendant and — in this action having
appealed to the appellate division of the supreme court from a judg-
ment of conviction of the county court of Oneida county, and en-
tered in the clerk’s office of the county of Oneida, on the 12th day
of February, 1902, and the said appeal having been 4 Er by Mr.
William S. Mackie, of counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Timothy
Curtin, of counsel for the respondent, and due deliberation having
nit he sat red and adjudged the jud led
It is hereby ordered and adju that the judgment so a
from be, and the same is benker affirmed, aad case remit Ao the
county court of Oneida county, pursuant to section 547 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Opinion by Davy, J., Spring and Hiscock,
JJ., concurring ; McLennan and Williams, JJ., dissenting.
[seat.] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

11 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
Toe ProrpLe OF THE a or New York, Re-
spondent,
eguine | nto
Joszpx Locuner, Appellant.

The above named defendant, Joseph Lochner, having appealed to
the appellate division of the supreme court, fourth department,

§ JosePH LOCHNER v8.

from a judgment of conviction for the crime of misdemeanor, to wit:
“ violation of article VIII, section 110 of chapter 415 of the Laws of
1897, known as the labor laws of the State of New York,” hereto-
fore rendered against him in the Oneida county court, and entered
in the clerk’s offiee of the county of Oneida on the 12th day of Feb-
ruary, 1902, adjudging the defendant guilty of the crime charged
- in the indictment and sentencing him to pay a fine of fifty dollars
and that he stand committed until paid not to exceed fifty days in
the Oneida county jail, and the said spree! having been duly heard
at a term of the appellate division of the supreme court for the
fourth department, and an order of said appellate division havin
been thereafter and on the 13th day of May, 1902, duly made an
entered in the office of the clerk of the said appellate division, order-
ing and adjudging that the judgment of conviction here appealed
from be aftirmed.

Now, on motion of Timothy Curtin, district attorney of Oneida
county, it is hereby adjudged and determined that the judgment
. oe here appealed from be, and the same is hereby, af-

rmed.

[seaL. ] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

12 Supreme Court, ey Division, Fourth Judicial Depart-

ment, Clerk’s Office, Rochester, N. Y.

I, Newell C. Fulton, clerk of the appellate division of the supreme
court, in the fourth judicial department, do hereby certify that the
annexed judgment is a true copy of the original now on file in this
office, and of the whole thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the said court at the city of Rochester, this 3d day of Oc-
tober, 1902.

[SmAL. ] NEWELL C. FULTON, Clerk.

Oneida County Court.
—
Tae Propie or THE State ory New York,
Respondent, | Notice of Appeal to
vs. j Court of Appeals.
JoserH Locuner, Appellant.

GENTLEMEN: Take notice that the defendant, Joseph Lochner,
above named, appeals to the court of appeals from the order of af-
firmance and the judgment of the apuel ate division, fourth depart-
ment, dated May 13, 1902, and entered in Oneida county clerk’s
office October 8th, 1902, affirming the judgment of conviction of the
crime of misdemeanor, to wit: violation of article VIII, section 110
of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor laws of the

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 9

State of New York, in requiring and permitting an employee
18 working for him in his biscuit, bread and cake bakery and con-

fectionery establishment at Utica, N. Y., to work more than
sixty hours in one week, rendered against him by the Oneida county
court, at a term thereof held at Utica, N. Y.,in and for the county
of Oneida, on the 12th day of February, 1902.

Yours, &c., LINDSLEY & MACKIE,

Attorneys for Defendant, 115 Genesee Street,
Utica, N. Y.

Dated November 24, 1902.

.To the clerk of the county of Oneida, and to Hon. Timothy
Curtin, district attorney of Oneida county.

Certificate.

Srate oF New Aaa rae
Oneida County, :

I, George D. Frank, acting clerk of Oneida county, do hereby
certify that the foregoing are true copies of the original judgment
roll on affirmance by the appellate division, and notice of appeal to
the court of appeals on file in Oneida county clerk’s office and of
the whole thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of said county this 1st day of December, 1902.

[u. s.] GEORGE D. FRANK,
Acting Clerk of Oneida County.

14 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
Tar Peopce or THE State oF New York, Respondent,
vs. opinion
JosepH Locuner, Appellant.

Argued at March term, 1902; decided at May term, 1902.

Present : Hon. Peter B. McLennan, senior associate justice presid-

ing. Spring, Williams, Hiscock and Davy, associate justices.
his is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the defendant

in the Oneida county court, for a misdemeanor in violating article
VIII, section 110 of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897 known as the
labor laws.

Timothy Curtin, for respondent.

William S. Mackie, for appellant.

Davy, J.:

The defendant was indicted by the cmp jury of Oneida county
for a oe of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, section 110, en-
—292

10 JoskPH LOCHNER Vs.

titled “An act in relation to labor.” The indictment in substance,

charges that the defendant, on the 2ist day of December, 1899,

committed the crime of misdemeanor, second offense, to wit: with

having violated article VIII, section 110 of chapter 416 of the Laws
of 1897, known as the labor laws of the State of New York,

15 _in permitting an employee working for him in his bakery to
work more than sixty hours in one week.

Section 110 of said act provides that “ No employee shall be re-
quired or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or
confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week,
or more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of
making a shorter work day on the last day of the week ; nor more
hours in any one week than will make an average of ten hours per
day for the number of days during such week in which such em-
ployee shall work.”

The defeudant demurred to the indictment on the ground that
more than one crime is charged in the indictment within the mean-
ing of sections 278 and 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a crime.
The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant when arraigned,
was tried and convicted of misdemeanor, second offense, and was
sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to stand committed until paid,
not exceeding fifty days in the Oneida County jail. The appeal
from the judgment of conviction brings up for review the order
overruling the demurrer.

The indictment follows the language of the statute and the rule
is well settled that an indictment for a statutory misdemeanor, which
charges the facts constituting the crime in the words of the statute
and contains averments as to time, place and person and other cir-
cumstances to identify the particular transaction, is good. People
vs. West (106 N. Y., 293), People vs. King (110 N. Y., 422), People vs.
Welden (111 N. Y., 574).

The learned counsel for the appellant has devoted his argu-
16 ment principally to a discussion of the constitutionality of the
act, and he contends that the statute is an unlawful invasion
of the liberty of the defendant, because it unnecessarily prohibits
him from contracting with others to carry on his business; that it
is in violation of article XIV, section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that no State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the
citizens of the United States, nor deny any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the law, and that it is also a violation
of the following provisions of article I of the constitution of the
State of New York, viz: “No member of this State shall be dis-
franchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to
any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the ge
of his peers,” and “ No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.” wae
The statute authorizes the employment of men to labor in biscuit,

THE PEOPLE OF YHE STATE OF NEW YORK. il

bread or cake bakeries or confectionery establishments not more than
sixty hours in any one week or more than ten hours in any one day.
This section of the statute merely declares that ten hours’ labor

rformed within twenty-four hours shall constitute a day’s work,
and no employé shall be required or permitted to work a greater
number of hours for such employer. The constitutionality of this
act must be determined by the citizen’s right to pursue a lawful em-
ployment. If the restriction is arbitrary and does not pertain to the
welfare and health of the people, it cannot be upheld.

It has been frequently held that it isonly when a case is presented
which shows clearly that a statute when fairly and reasonably con-

strued, is brought in conflict with some provision of the Con-
17 stitution, that the court is justified in pronouncing the law

invalid, (Cooley Const. Lim., 164); and that the courts can-
not inquire whether the legislative enactments are unwise or ex-

dient.

ok State in the exercise of its constitutional power may regulate
the conduct of its citizens toward each other and when necessary
for the public good, the manner in which each shall use his prop-
erty. Munn vs. Ill. (94 U.S., 113), People vs. Budd (117 N. Y., 14).

So in the examination of this case, we start with the rule of law
well settled that nothing but a clear usurpation of power prohibited
by the Constitution will justify the judicial department in pronounc-
ing an act of the legislative department unconstitational and
void.

Sections 111 to 115 of the act in question’ aim to prescribe the
sanitary conditions necessary to be maintained, in order to properly
conduct a bakery and to protect the health of the community, and
the health of those engaged in business of that nature.

The act provides that: “All buildings or rooms occupied as bis-
cuit, bread, pie or cake bakeries shall be drained and plumbed in a
manner conducive to the proper and healthful sanitary condition
thereof, and shall be constructed with air shafts, windows or venti-
lating pipes, sufficient to insure ventilation. The factory inspector
may direct the proper drainage, plumbing and ventilation of such
rooms or buildings. No cellar or basement, not now used for a
bakery shall hereafter be so occupied or used, unless the proprietor
shall comply with the sanitary provisions of said act.”

It also provides that: “ Every room used for the manufacture of

flour or meal food products shall be at least eight feet in
18 —_ height and shall have, if deemed necessary by the factory in-

spector, an impermeable floor constructed of cement, or of
tiles laid in cement, or an additional flooring of wood properly sat-
urated with linseed oil. The side walls of such rooms shall be
plastered or wainscotted. The faetory inspector may require the
side walls and ceiling to be whitewashed, at least once in three
months. He may also require the wood work of such walls to be
painted. The furniture and utensils shall be so arranged as to be
readily cleansed and not prevent the proper cleaning of any part of

12 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

aroom. The manufactured flour or meal food shall be kept in dry
and airy rooms so arranged that the floors, shelves and all other
facilities for storing the same can be properly cleaned.”

“Every such bakery shall be provided with a proper wash-room
and water-closet or water-closets apart from the bake-room, or rooms
where the manufacture of such food product is conducted, and no
water-closet, earth-closet, privy or ash-pit shall be within or con-
nected directly with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or public
bake-room. Sleeping'places for the persons employed in the bakery
shall be separate from the rooms where flour or meal food products
are manufactured or stored. If the sleeping places are on the same
floor where such products are manufactured, stored or sold, the fac-
tory inspector may inspect and order them put in a proper sanitary
condition.”

Sub-division three of section 384 of the Penal Code provides: “Any

rson who violates or does not comply with the provisions of article
eight of the labor law, relating to bakeries and confectionery estab-
lishments, and employment of labor and the manufacture of flour
or meal food products therein,”—“ is guilty of a misdemeanor, and

upon conviction shall be punished for a first offense by a fine
19 of not less than twenty nor more than one hundred dollars ;

for a second offense by a fine of not less than fifty nor more
than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than thirty
days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, for a third offense by
a “tel of not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by impris-
onment for not more than sixty days, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment.” ,

This brings us to the main question in the case, namely: The na-
ture and extent of the police power of the State.

There is little, if anything, to be said other than the courts have
already said on this subject.

It was remarked by Judge Gray in People vs. Ewer (141 N. Y.,
132), “ That it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the police power
of a State; or, under recent judicial decisions, to say where the con-
stitutional boundaries limiting its exercise are to be fixed.”

- The police power of the State is the power which enables it to pro-
mote the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is very
broad and far-reaching, but it is not without its limitations.

The rule seems to be well settled, that when one devotes his prop-
erty to a use or carries on a business in which the public has an in-
terest, he holds the ae ry and carries on the business subject to
the police power of the State to regulate or control its use, so as to pro-
tect and preserve the public health, the public inorals and the general
safety and welfare of the public. Berthelf vs. O’Reilly (74 N. Y., 515).

The line between a valid exercise of the police power and the in-

vasion of private rights is clearly drawn by Judge Earl in
20 his opinion in matter of application of Jacobs (98 N. Y., 110).
He says: “Generally it is for the legislature to determine
what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health

——

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 13

and secure the public comfort and safety, and while its measures
are calculated, intended, convenient and appropriate to accomplish
these ends, the exercise of its discretion is not subject to review by
the courts. But they must have some relation totheseends. Under
the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and private
property cannot be arbitrarily invaded, and the determination of
the legislature is not final or conclusive. If it passes an act ostensi-
bly for the public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the

roperty of a citizen, or interferes with his personal liberty, then it
is for the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it really relates
to and is convenient and appropriate tv promote the public health.”

It was remarked by Judge O’Brien in People vs. uberg (136
‘N. Y., 415) that: “ If the act and the constitution can be construed
so as to enable both to stand, and each can be given a proper and legit-
imate office to perform, it is the duty of the court to adopt such legis-
lation. The legislature, under the police power, may certainly regu-
late or even prohibit the carrying on of any business in such manner
and in such place as to become dangerous or detrimental to the
health, morals or good order of the community.”

Judge Vann in discussing the statute entitled An act to regulate
barbering on Sunday, People vs. Havnor, (149 N. Y., 204), says:
“ As barbers generally work more Lours each day than most men,
the legislature may have well concluded that legislation was neces-
sary for the protection of their health.” And at page 203, he says:
“It is to the interest of the State to have strong, robust, healthy

citizens, capable of self support, of bearing arms, and of add-
21 ing to the resources of the country. Laws to effect this pur-

pose, by protecting the citizens from overwork and requiring
a general day of rest to restore his strength and preserve his health,
have an obvious connection with the public welfare.”

It was held in People ez rel. Nechamcus vs. Warden, etc. (144
N. Y., 536), that: “The restraint of personal action is justified,
when it manifestly tends to protection of the health and comfort of
the community, and no constitutional guaranty is then violated.”

In Health Department vs. Rector (145 N. Y., 32), the court laid
down the rule that the legislature, in the exercise of its power to
conserve the public health, safety and welfare, may direct that cer-
tain improvements or alterations shall be made in tenant houses at
the owners’ expense, and that suitabie — be supplied to
receive and distribute a supply of water for domestic use. Judge
Peckham, in discussing the constitutionality of the act (page 43),
says: “ Laws and regulations of a police nature, though they may
disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional,
though no provision is made for such disturbances. They do not
appropriate private property for public use, but simply regulate its
use and enjoyment by the owner.” Under the police power, per-
sous and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and

— in order to secure the general comfort and health of the
public.

14 JOSEPH LOCHNKR Vs.

It has been held that the legislature might prohibit railroads
from permitting or requiring workmen who have worked iwenty-
four hours, to go on duty again until they have had eight hours’

rest. The same act also provides that ten hours’ work out of
22 twelve consecutive hours shall constitute a day’s labor.
People vs. Phyfe (136 N. Y., 554).

The State, under its police power, may require every locomotive
engineer to pass an examination before a board of examiners, as to
his skill in operating a locomotive engine, and his general com
tency as an engineer, and also inquire into his character and habits,
and to withhold the license if he be found reckless or intemperate.
It may also enact that every railroad corporation shall not permit
any locomotive engineer in its employ to run a locomotive engine
more than ten consecutive hours in any one day. It may provide
when a locomotive engineer is found to be in a state of intoxication,
that the board be authorized to revoke and cancel his license, and
likewise whenever they shall be satisfied of the unfitness of the en-
gineer. Such legislation would be clearly within the scope and
power of the legislature to protect the lives of passengers and prop-
erty.

i Tiedman’s Lim. Police Power, 181, the author states: “If the
law did not interfere, the feverish, intense desire to acquire wealth—
inciting a relentless rivalry and competition, would ultimately pre-
vent, not only the wage-earner, but likewise the capitalists and the
employers themselves from yielding to the warnings of nature and
oe the instinct of self-preservation by resting periodically from
labor.”

The Utah statute, which limited the hours for labor in all under-
ground mines and smelting works, except in cases of emergency,
when life and property were in imminent danger, to eight hours,
was held to be constitutional by the Utah courts as well as by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the latter taking the position

that the State had a right to limit the hours for labor to
23 those engaged in dangerous or unhealthy employments.
Holden vs. Hardy (169 U. S., 361).

‘ Another common form of statutory regulation of the honrs of
labor, is the provision that workmen on public works shall not be
required to work more than a prescribed number of hours each day.
Where the regulation is applied to employees of the city, county or
State government, who are employed and were paid directly by
these respective governments The safety and health of a large
body of workmen gathered together in one place, a mine, a factory
or workshop, are endangered if proper precautions are not taken “4
the employer against the source of danger, and everywhere we fi
the statutes both varied and numerous, which require employers and
the owners of buildings, which are used as workshops, and the owners
of mines to do certain things which are declared by statute to be nec-
essary for the protection of the workmen. Inspectors are generally
appointed to see that suitable regulations are observed. These regu-

THE PEOPLE OF THE sTATE OF NEW YoR?. 15

lations in the main are all reasonable safe-guards and _ their consti-
tutionality has been rarely questioned.

Many other cases pertaining to this subject might be cited which
confirm the principles we have stated.

If the statute under consideration invades the right of property
and the liberty of the individual, then many of the statutes of this
State that have been held to be constitutional and their enactment
within the police power of the State, are subject to the same criti-
cism.

The statute in question does not restrict the right of the defendant,
to carry on his business or to engage as many persons as he sees fit in

such business, but it simply prohibits him from requiring or
24 compelling his employees to work more than ten hours in

any one day, or more than sixty hours in any one week; in
other words, the statute does not prohibit any right, but regulates if,
and there is a wide difference between regulation and prohibition,
between prescribing the terms by which the right may be enjoyed,
and the denial of that right altogether. The defendant is not de-
prived of any right or privilege, which is not denied to others in a
similar business. The provisions of the statute in question are
directed to all persons engaged in the bakery business. It neither
confers special privileges nor makes unjust discrimination. All who
are engaged in that business are entitled to its benefit and subjected
to its restrictions. It is open to any citizen to engage in that busi-
ness, and the privileges conferred belong equally to all.

It is very important for the health of the community, that bakers
should supply people with wholesome bread and pure food. The
people are interested in the business; it is of so much public inter-
est that the legislature under the police power of the State, may
control the business by any regulation which is necessary to secure
the public health. The regulations instituted by this statute were
for the purpose of protecting the health of the mI bo and giving
vag arson pure and wholesome bread and other articles of food sold
by bakers.

These establishments are compelled to do baking during the night-
time, in order to supply their customers in the morning. It is nec-
essary for them to have their ovens heated day and night, and their
employees are required to work more hours each day than men usu-
ally work who are engaged in other kinds of business. When we

consider the intense heat of the rooms where baking is done,
25 and the flour that floats in the air and is breathed by those

who work in bakeries, there can be but little doubt that pro-
longed labor day and night, subject to these conditions, might pro-
duce a diseased condition of the human system, so that the em-
ployees would not be capable of doing their work well and supply-
ing the public with wholesome food.

The legislature no doubt recognized the fact that proprietors of
these establishments desire to obtain as much labor as possible from
their employees, who from fear of being discharged, are often in-

16 JOSEPH LOCHNER Ys. .

duced to comply with the employer's request to work during both
night and day, and the legislature evidently reached the conclu-
sion that more than teu hours labor each day might be injurious to
the health of the employees.

The rule laid down in People vs. Havnor (supra), shows that the
courts are disposed to uphold a statutory lation enacted for the
safety of the public and to protect the health of the individual em-
— from the dangers threatened by excessive or exhaustive
abor.

We are of the opinion that the act is constitutional, that the judg-
ment of conviction is right and should be affirmed.

All concur, except McLennan and Williams, JJ., who dissent.

Srate or New York, \
Oneida County, Clerk’s Office, .

I, Hermon Clarke, clerk of said county, and of the supreme and
county courts therein, the same being courts of record, do hereby
certify, that I have applied the annexed copy of appeal book of the
case People of the State of New York against Joseph Lochner com-
prising the following papers, to-wit: statement, indictment, demur-
rer, order disallowing demurrer, judgment of conviction, &c., cer-
tificate of reasonable doubt, notice of appeal stipulation, affidavit of
no opinion, order of affirmance on appeal from judgment, judg-
ment, notice of appeal to court of appeals, certificate, opinion, and
remittitur and the endorsements thereupon with the original
thereof, on file in this office, and that the same is a correct tran-
script therefom, and of the whole of said original.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the
seal of said county and courts, at the city of Utica, this 27th day of
May 1904.

[Seal Oneida County, New York.j

HERMON CLARKE, Clerk.
— —, Deputy Clerk.

26 Opinion of Court of Appeals.
Parker, Ch. J.:

Defendant’s conviction is under sub-division 3, section 384/, Penai
Code, which makes a violation of article VIII, chapter 415, Laws
1897,a misdemeanor. The judgment is affirmed by the appellate di-
vision.

Defendant urges as ground for a reversal that article VI1I—which

on its face purports to be, as we shall see later, an exercise of
27 the police power of the State—offends against the first section
of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution.
That section provides that “ No State shall make or enforce any law

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 17

which shall abridge the privil or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to an
rson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It
is also claimed that the statute violates those provisions of the State
constitution which declare that “No member of this State shall be
disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured
to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judg-
ment of his peers” (Const. art. 1, § 1), “nor be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.” (Const. art. 1, § 6.)

The first cases in which the 14th amendment is discussed by the
United States Supreme Court are the Slaughter House cases (83 U. S.
36), wherein is challenged the Louisiana statute authorizing the re-
moval of noxious slaughter houses from the more densely populated
part of New Orleans, and their location where they could least affect
the health and comfort of the people, and to that end granting a
corporation exclusive right for 25 years to maintain slaughter houses
within 3 parishes, containing between 200,000 and 300,000 people,
and including New Orleans. ‘This is held to be a police regulation
for the health and comfort of the people, and, therefore, within the
power of the State legislature, and not affected by the 14th amend-
ment, which the court says is not intended to interfere with the ex-
ercise of police power by the States.

In Barbier v. Connolly (113 U. S. 27) the Supreme Court has
before it a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting work in public
laundries within defined territory from 10 p. m. to 6 a. m., claimed
to be repugnant to the 14th amendment. The: court rules that the
ordinance is well within the police power, and in the course of the
opinion says: “ Neither the amendment—broad and comprehensive
as it is—nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with

the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to
28 prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,

education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as
to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add
to its wealth and prosperity ” (p. 31).

There are many interesting cases in the United States Supreme
Court sustaining statutes of different States which iu terms seem re-
pugnant to the 14th amendment, but which that court declares to be
within the police power of the States. Among them are statutes de-
claring a railroad company liable for damages to an employee al-
though caused by another employee pe . S. 205); fixing the
damages at double the value of stock killed, when due to the neglect
of a railroad company to maintain fences (129 U.S. 26); requirin
locomotive engineers to be licensed, and providing that the railroa
company employing them pay the fees of examination (128 U. S.
96); requiring cars to be heated otherwise than by stoves on rail-
roads over 50 miles in length (165 U. S. 628); providing for imme-
diate payment of wages by railroad companies to discharged em-
dies U.S. 404); prohibiting options to sell grain (184 U. S.

—292

18 josePH LocHNER v8.

wh providing for inspection of mines at expense of owners (185
U. 8. 203), and one declaring void all contracts for sales of stocks on
margins (187 U.S. 606). - j
I shall call special attention to but one other case, namely, Holden
v. Hardy (169 U. 8. 366). In that case the court reviews at length
many of the cases arising under the 14th amendment, beginning
with the Slaughter House cases. The case involves a Utah statute
providing that “the period of employment of workingmen in all
underground mines or workings shall be eight hours per day, ex-
cept in cases of emergency where life or ig, hh is in imminent
danger.” Violationis madea misdemeanor. The conviction of one
Holden under that statute is affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. It is —. by defendant in that case that the statute has
no relation to the health or safety of the public or the persons af-
fected, or if so, only in a very remote degree, while its direet
29 ~=and principal effect is to interfere with the rights and liber-
ties of the contracting oe that the right to contract con-
tains three essential and indispensable elements, guaranteed and
protected by the United States Constitution, namely, “the right of
the employer and employee to agree upon (1) the character of the
service to be performed, (2) the amount to be paid for such service,
and (3) the number of hours per day during which the service is to
continue;” that the destruction or abridgment of one element is a
destruction or abridgment of the whole of said right to contract ;
that the statute abridges the “ privileges and immunities” in that
it deprives the employer and the employee of perfect freedom and
liberty to pursue unmolested a lawful vocation in a lawful manner ;
that the rights of the employer and employee in that direction were
unlimited before the adoption of the 14th amendment and that
since its adoption it is beyond the power of any State to make any
laws abridging or destroying such rights. This latter contentioo—
which if sustained would practically prevent ali further develop-
ment of the police power on the part of the States—is overborne by
the court. Many cases passed upon by the court since the adoption
of the 14th amendment are cited furnishing illustrations tending to
justify the boast of the devotees of the common law, that by the ap-
plication of established legal principles the law has been, and will
continue to be developed from time to time so as to meet the ever-
changing conditions of our widely diversified and rapidly develop-
ing business interests. ‘The court quotes from Mr. Justice Matthews
in Hurtado v California (110 U. S. 516, 530): “ This flexibility and
capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excel-
lence of the common law. * * * The Constitution of the United
States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen,
who inherited the traditions of English law and history; but it
was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a
people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of
many tongues. * * * ‘There is nothing in Magna Charta,
rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NRW YORK. 19

law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and
30 ofevery age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the
common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of
justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been
exhausted. On the contrary, we shall expect that the new and
various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and
shape it into new and not less useful forms.” The court illustrates by
forceful examples the necessity of recognizing in legal decisions the
change of conditions. After calling attention to the fact that in the
early history of the country there was no occasion for any special
protection of a particular class, as we were almost purely an agricul-
tural country, it instances coal mining and the manufacture of iron.
‘When these industries began in Pennsylvania as early as 1716 they
were carried on in such a limited way,and by such primitive methods,
that no special laws were deemed necessary to protect operatives ;
but since that time they have assumed such vast proportions in that
and other States, and developed so many dangers to the safety and
life of those engaged in them, that laws to meet such exigencies have
become necessary. It calls attention to many protective statutes
enacted in many different States providing for fire escapes in hotels,
theatres, factories and other large buildings; inspection of boilers;
appliances to obviate the dangers incident to railroad and steam-
boat transportation ; the protection of dangerous machinery against
accidental contact; the shoring up of ventilation shafts; means for
signaling in mines for fresh air; the elimination as far as possible
of dangerous gases, and safe means of hoisting and lowering em-
ployees in mines. It is said that statutes providing such safeguards
“have been repeatedly enforced by the courts of the several States ;
their validity assumed, and, so far as we are informed, they
have been uniformly held to be coastitutional ” (169 U. S. 366, 394),
which, of course, means that the courts of the several States making
these decisions hold that such statutes do not deprive citizens of any
of the rights or privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, nor de-
prive them of property without due process of law, for every

31 State constitution contains such a provision or its equivalent.
Of such illustrations the court further says (p. 387): “hey

are mentioned only for the purpose of calling attention to the
probability that other changes of no less importance may be made
in the future, and that while the cardinal principles of justice are
immutable, the methods by which justice is administered are sub-
ject to constant fluctuation, and that the Constitution of the United
States, which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible and ex-
ceedingly difficult of amendment, should not be so construed as to
deprive the States of the power to so amend their laws as to make
them conform to the wishes of the citizens as they may deem best
for the public welfare without bringing them into conflict with the
supreme law of the land.” This broad-minded view—which is char-
acteristic of the development of the law by this great court since
the adoption of the 14th amendment—should, and doubtless will

20 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

be followed by the courts of the several States whenever called upoa
to determine whether statutes offend against the provisions of State
coustitutions similar or equivalent to the provisions of the 14th
amendment. The cases cited, and the reasoning of the court, to
which but brief reference is here made, demonstrate that this statute
does not offend against the 14th amendment, and it necessarily fol-
lows that it is not repugnant to equivalent provisions in our State
constitution.

This eourt throughout all its history has maintained the same
position as that taken by the United States Supreme Court. Many
authorities could be cited in support of that assertion, but none
need be for they areall in one direction.

The impossibility of setting the bounds of the police power has
up to this time prevented any court from attempting it, and the
reason for it is well stated ‘by Judge Gray in People v. Ewer (141
N. Y., 129, 132). He says: “ It is difficult, if not impossible, to de-
fine the police power of a State; or, under recent judicial decisions,
to say where the constitutional boundaries limiting its exercise are
to be fixed. It is a power essential to be conceded to the State in

the interest and for the welfare of its citizens. We may say
32 _ of it that when its operation is in the direction of so regulat-

ing the use of private property, or of so restraining personal
action, as manifestly to secure, or to tend to the comfort, prosperity,
or protection of the community, no constitutional guaranty is vio-
lated, and the legislative authority is not transcended.” In that
case the constitutionality of section 292, Penal Code, is questioned.
That section makes it a misdemeanor to exhibit as a dancer a female
child under 14 years of age. The court denies that the statute
violates our constitution because it deprives the mother, the person
arrested, of the rights and privileges secured to her by the consti-
tution.

In People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden, etc. (144 N. Y. 529) the
constitutionality of chapter 602, Laws 1892, is challenged. The act
provides for examination and registration of master plumbers, and
makes it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in that trade with-
out such registration. This court holds the statute to be within the
police power of the ee and, therefore, not repugnant to the
constitution. Judge Gray says in the opinion (p. 535): “ There has
been much discussion upon the subject of what is a valid exercise
of the police power of the State through legislative enactment and
there is little to be added to what this and other courts have said.
The police power extends to the protection of persons and of prop-
erty within the State. In order to secure that protection, they may
be subjected to restraints and burdens by legislative acts. If the
act isa valid and reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State, then it must be submitted to, as a measure designed for the
protection of the public and to secure it against some danger, real
or anticipated, from a state of things which modifications in our
social or commercial life have brought about. The natural right

THE PROPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 21

to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is not an absolate right.
It must yield whenever the concession is demanded by the welfare,
health or prosperity of the State. The individual must sacrifice his
rticular interest or desires if the sacrifice is a necessary one in
order that organized society asa whole shall be benefited. That is
a fundamental condition of the State, and which, in the end,
33 accomplishes by reaction a general good, from which the in-
dividual must also benefit.”

In Health Department v. Rector, ete. (145 N. Y. 32) the court eon-
siders a provision of the New York consolidation act requiring that
tenement houses already erected shall be furnished by the owners
with water, “ whenever they shall be directed so to do by the board

‘of health,” “in sufficient quantity at one or more places on each
floor, occupied or intended to be occupied by one or more families.”
The health department served a notice requiring defendant to sup-

ly water, as commanded by the statute, in buildings owned by it.
fendant refused to do so, and an action was brought by the health
department to compel compliance. Defendant contends in that case
that the statute violates that provision of the State constitution
which declares that no member of this State shall “ be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.” This court
holds that the statute does not offend against the constitution, but
that it is a valid exercise of the police power; that the legislature,
by virtue of that power, can direct that improvements or altera-
tions shall be made in existing houses at the owners’ expense when
it clearly appears that it tends in some plain and appreciable man-
ner to guard and protect the public; and that a compensation need
not be made to the owner in such case, the effect of the act being
not to appropriate — property, but simply to regulate its use
and enjoyment by the owner. Judge Peckham, writing the opinion
of the court, says (p. 43): “ Laws and regulations of a police nature,
though they may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are
not unconstitutional, though no provision is made for compensation
for such disturbances. ‘They do not appropriate private property
for public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the
owner.”

People v. Havnor (149 N. Y. 195) is a case}as near the border
line perhaps as any to be found in this State—certainly ve
much nearer to it than the case under consideration. te
exhaustively considers the authorities in this State bearing

upon the police power. The case involves the consti-

34 _tutionality of what is known as the Sunday barber law, which

makes it a misdemeanor for any person to carry on the busi-
ness or work of a barber on the first day of the week except in the
city of New York and the village of Saratoga, where such business
or work may be carried on until one o’clock in the afternoon of that
day. The statute is held to be constitutional, because a valid exer-
cise of the police power. The opinion is written by Judge Vann.

After a careful examination of the authorities he presents the under-

**

JOSEPH LOCHNER V8.

22 |
1 uestion in this way (p. 201): “ The vital question, therefi
cop Bee the real snpcint the statute under consideration bene
reasonable connection with the public health, welfare or safety.”
After stating that the object of the act is to require the observance
of Sunday, not as a holy day, but as a day of rest and recreation, he
proceeds—with argument buttressed by authority in this State and
in other jurisdictions—to answer the question in the affirmative. In
the course of the argument he says (p. 203): “According to the com-
mon judgment of civilized men, public economy requires, for sani-
tary reasous, a day of general rest from labor, and the day naturally
selected is that regarded as sacred by the greatest number of the
citizens, as this causes the least inconvenience through interference
with business. It is to the interest of the State to have strong, robust,
healthy citizens, capable of self-support, of bearing arms, and of add-
ing to the resources of the country. Laws to effect this purpose,
by protecting the citizen from overwork and requiring a general
day of rest to restore his strength and preserve his health, have an
obvious connection with the public welfare. * * * The statute
under discussion tends to effect this result, because it requires
sons engaged in a kind of business that takes many hourseach ts
to refrain from carrying it on during one day in seven. This af-
fords an opportunity, recurring at regular intervals, for rest, needed
both by the employer and the employed, and the latter, at least, may
not bave the power to observe a day of rest without the aid of legisla-

tion. * * * As barbers generally work more hours each
35 day than most men, the legislature may well have concluded
we that legislation was necessary for the protection of their

ealth.”

The pertinency and controlling force of that argument to the ques-
tion under consideration here will be manifest when we come to an
examination of the statute.

No authorities can be found in this court which conflict with the
cases to which I have called attention. Rodgers’ case (166 N. Y. 1)
is cited in opposition, but why [ cannot see. The police power is
not even considered in that case. The defense to that portion of the
statute which is condemned as unconstitutional because it requires
a stipulation in all contracts with the State and meant 2st that
the contractor shall “ pay the prevailing rate of wages at least,” being
rested on the ground (1) that the State as proprietor can do what an
individual proprietor can do, namely, insist upon any reasonable
provision in a contract as a condition for doing the work ; (2) that
the State is proprietor not ouly as to contracts for work for the bene-
fit of the entire State, but also as to contracts for work authorized by
it for the various subdivisions of the State made for convenience of
administration ; (3) that hence it violates no provision of the con-
stitution.

Having shown by an examination of a few of the leading authori-
ties relating to the police power that the decisions of this court are
in harmony with those of the United States Supreme Court, and —

tite PeopLe o# Tite sTATE OF NEW YoRE. 93

having specially brought out some of the argument in those decis-
ions for the purpose of presenting something of the vast scope of
that power, we come next to the question, In what spirit should the
court approach the consideration of a statute said on the one hand to
offend against the constitution, and on the other to be a proper ex-
ercise of the police power ?

The courts are frequently confronted with the temptation to substi-
tute their judgment for that of the legislature. A given statute,
though plainly within the legislative power, seems so repugnant to
a sound public policy as to strongly tempt the court to set aside the
statute, instead of waiting, as the spirit of our institutions require,
until the people can compel their representatives to repeal the ob-
: noxious statute.

36 In the early history of this country eminent writers gave

expression to the fear that the power of the courts to set aside
the enactments of the representatives chosen to legislate for the peo-
ple would in the end prove a weak point in our governmental sys-
tem, because of the difficulty of keeping the exercise of such great
power within its legitimate bounds. So far in our judicial history
it must be said that the courts have in the main been conservative
in passing upon legislation attacked as uticonstitutional, but occa-
sionally, and especially when a case is one on the border line, it is
quite possible that the judgment of the court that the legislation is
unwise may operate to carry the decision to the wrong side of that
border line. Certain it is that the courts have greatly extended
their jurisdiction over many administrative acts that were originally
supposed not to present cases for the court to pass upon, and in that
way the courts have come to play a very important part in State and
municipal administration. Some expression of our views on that
subject is given in Matter of Guden {171 N. Y. 529, 535).

Now when considering the mental attitude with which the court
should begin an examination of this question, it is well to have in
mind not only the great breadth and scope of the police power, and
the legislative control over it as expressed in some of the opinions
from which we quote supra, but it is also well to have in mind some
of the expressions of this court as to the way in which the court
should approach the consideration of such a question as this, involy--
ing the constitutionality of a statute.

Judge Andrews says, in People v. King (110 N. Y. 418, 428): “ By
means of this power the legislature exercises a supervision over
matters affecting the common weal. * * * It may be exerted
whenever necessary to secure the peace, good order, health, morals
aud general welfare of the community, and the propriety of its exer-
cise within constitutioual limits is purely a matter of legislative discre-

tion with which courts cannot interfere.”
37 Judge Gray says, in Nechameus’ case ( ): “ The courts
should always assume that the legislature intended by its en-
actments to promote those ends [public health, comfort and safety ],
_ and if the act admits of two constructions, that should be given to

JOSEPH LOCHNER vs.

it which sustains it and makes it manele in furtherance of the
interests.” (144 N, Y. 529, 536.)

“ Whether the legislation is wise is not for us to consider. The
motives actuating and the inducements held out to the legislature -
are not the .subject of inguiry by the courts, which are bound to
assume that the law making y acted with a desire to promote
the public good. Its enactments must stand, ? grange always that
Searles not sueteavene: he anes _ ee of constitu-

i is always one of powe: ing else. t in applyi
the test the courts must bear in mind that it is their duty to alent the
force of law to an act of the legislature whenever it can be fairly so
construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the constitution.”
(Bohmer v. Haffen, 161 N. Y. 390, 399.)

Where there “ is room for two constructions, both equally obvious
and reasonable, the court must, in deference to the legislature of the
State, assume that it did not overlook the provisions of the coustitu-
tion, and designed the act * * * to take effect. Our duty,
therefore, is to adopt the construction which, without doing violence
to the fair meaning of the words used, brings the statute into har-
mony with the provisions of the constitution.” (Supervisors ».
Brodger, 112 U. 8. 261, 268; People ex rel. Burrows v. Supervisors
of Orange Co., 17 N. Y. 236, 241; People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson,
55 N. Y. 50, 54; Matter of Gilbert El. Ry. Co., 70 N. Y. 361, 367
Matter of N. Y. & L. I. Bridge Co. v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 540, 551.)

The court is inclined to so construe the statute as to validate it.
People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 387, 394; People ez rel,

inkler v. Terry, 108 N. Y.1,7; Matter of N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70

N. Y. 327, 342; People ex rel. Killeen v. Angle, 109 N. Y.
38 564, 567; Rogers +. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N. Y
178, 181; he ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 484.)

“ Every actof the legislature must be presumed to be in harmony
with the fundamental law until the contrary is clearly made to ap-
pear.” (People ez rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 569, 577.)

“Before an act of the legislature can be declared void as repug-
nant to the constitution, the conflict must be manifest.” (Matter of
Stilwell, 189 N. Y. 337, 341.)

“If the act and the constitution can be so construed as to enable
both to stand, and each can be given a proper and legitimate office
to perform, it is the duty of the court to adopt such construction.”
(People v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y. 410, 415.)

The statute under consideration in that case is held to be within
the — power, as is the statute considered in the following case.

“ It is not necessary to the validity of a penal statute that the legis-
lature should declare on the face of the statute the eee urpose
for which it was enacted.” (People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 297.)

Having considered the authorities bearing upon the subject of the
exercise of pte power at greater le than could be justified
were it not for the different view that obtains in this court as to the
authority of the legislature to pass the statute in question, aud

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 5

having glanced at a few authorities indicating the frame of mind in
which the court should approach the consideration of the question of
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature—we come to the con-
sideration of the statute in question, aided by the principles estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court and the courts of this:
State, to which reference has been made.

I quote the whole statute, notwithstanding its length, in order
that it may be at once determined upon its mere reading whether the
ae aga of the legislature was to subserve, in some measure, the
public good under the police power of the State.

39 “Articte VIII.
“ BAKERIES AND CONFECTIONERY EsTABLISHMENTS.

“§ 110. Hours of labor in bakeries and confectionery establishments.—
Noemployee shall be required or permitted to work in a biscuit,
bread or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty
hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day un-
less for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day
_of the week; nor more hours in any one week than will make an
average of ten hours per day for the number of days during such
week in which such employee shall work.

“§ 111. Drainage and plumbing of buildings and rooms occupied by
bakeries—All buildings or rooms occupied as biscuit, bread, pie or
cake bakeries, shall be drained and plumbed ina manner conducive
to the proper and healthful sanitary condition thereof, and shall be
constructed with air shafts, windows or ventilating pipes, sufficient to
insure ventilation. The factory inspector may direct the proper
drainage, plumbing and ventilation of such rooms or bui =
No cellar or basement, not now used for a bakery shall hereafter
so occupied or used, unless the proprietor shall comply with the sani-
tary provisions of this article.

“§ 112. Requirements as to rooms, furniture, utensils and manufact-
ured products—Every room used for the manufacture of flour or
meal food products shall be at least eight feet in height and shall
have, if deemed necessary by the factory inspector, an impermeable
floor constructed of cement, or of tiles laid in cement, or an additional
flooring of wood properly saturated with linseed oil. The side walls
of sach rooms shall be plastered or wainscoted. The factory in-
spector may — the side walls and ceiling to be whitewashed,
at least once in three months. He may also require the wood work
of such walls to be painted. The furniture and utensils shall be so
ee as to be readily cleansed and not prevent the proper clean-
ing of any partof the room. The manufactured flour or meal food

products shall be kept in dry and airy rooms so arranged that
40 the floors, shelves and other facilities for storing the same can
be ise so ~ gage No domestic animals, except cats, shall

il
Bee
area

4 Soar Locititke. ¥s.

be allowed to remain in a‘room used as a biscuit, bread, pie or cake’ |
bakery or any room in such bakery where flour or meal products
are stored.

“$113. Wash rooms and closes; sleeping places.—Evory such
bakery shall be provided with a proper wash-room and water-closet
or water-closets apart from the bake-room, or rooms where the man-

ufacture of such food uct is conducted, and no water-closet,
~ earth-closet, privy or it shall be within or connected directly
with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or public restaurant.

“ No person shall sleep in a room occupied as a bake-room. Sleep-
ing places for the persons employed in the bakery shall be separate
from the rooms where flour or meal food products are manufactured
or stored. If the sleeping places are on the the same floor where such
products are manuf , stored or sold, the factory inspector may
inspect and order them put in a proper sanitary condition.

§ 114. Inspection of bakeries. —The factory inspector shall cause
all bakeries to be inspected. If it be found upon such inspection
that the bakeries so inspected are constructed and conducted in com-
pliance with the provisions of this chapter, the factory inspector
at issue a certificate to the persons owning or conducting such

eries.

“§ 115. Notice requiring alterations.—If, in the opinion of the fac-
tory inspector, altevations are required in or upon premises occupied
ma used as bakeries, in order to comply with the provisions of this
article, a written notice shall be served by him upon the owner, agent
or lessee of such premises, either personally or by mail, requiri
such alterations to be made within sixty days after such service, ie
such alterations shall be made accordingly.”

That the public generally are interested in having bakers’ and
confectioners’ establishments cleanly and wholesome in this day of
appreciation of, and apprehension on account of, microbes, which

cause disease and death, is paren? question. Not many years
Al ago the baking was largely done in the family; but now in

a large peronatage of the houses in cities and villages the
baker is relied on to a large extent to furnish bread, biscuits, cake
and pie, as well as confectionery, while over many cou roads
the bakers’ wagons go twice a week or more to supply the farmers
and inhabitants of small settlements with their wares. Indeed it .
can be safely said that the family of to-day is more dependent upon
the baker for the necessaries of life than upon any other source of
supply. That being so it is within the police power of the legisla-
ture to so regulate the conduct of that business us to best promote
and protect the health of the people. And to that end the legisla-
ture undertakes to provide—by a statute which bears on its face
evidence of a1: intelligent draftsman acquainted with the dangers
of unsanitary conditions in such yor prammpediac ts joe: drain-
age and plumbing of the building and rooms occupied for such pur-
pose.

THE PEOPLE OF THE staT# OF NEW YORK. 27

Is there room to doubt that the sole purpose of the legislature
in prohibiting the use of cellars for bakeries unless the occupant
first complies with the sanitary provisions of this article is to protect
the public from the use of the food made dangerous Be germs
that thrive in darkness and uncleanness? Is it ible that any
one can question that the sole purpose of the legislature is the safe-
guarding of the public health when it provides for floors, ceili
and sidewalls of such material as that they may be readily clea ;
compels the keeping of flour or meal products in a and xf
rooms, 80 arranged that the storing facilities can be properly cl f
and prohibits the keeping of domestic animals within such rooms?
And will any one question the motive which induced the prohibi-

‘tion of a “ water-closet, earth-closet, privy orasphit * * * within
or connected directly with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or
public restaurant”? If not, why should any one question the object
of the legislature in providing in the same article and as a part of
the scheme that “no rh shall be required or permitted to
work” in such an establishment “ more than sixty hours in any one

week,” an average of ten hours for each working day. It is

42 but reasonable to assume from this statute as a whole that

the legislature had in mind that the health and cleanliness of
the workers, as well as the cleanliness of the work-tooms, was of the
utmost importance, and that a man is more likely to be careful and
cleanly when well, and not overworked, than when exhausted by
fatigue, which makes for careless and slovenly habits, and tends to
dirt and disease.

If there is opportunity—and who can doubt it—for this view,
then the legislatare had the power to enact as it did, and the courts
are bound to sustain its action as justified by the police power, as
we see from the authorities re to earlier in this opinion.

I hear but one ment advanced for the purpose of convincing
the mind that the object of this statute is not to protect the public,
aod that argament is that article VIII is to be found in the labor
law. Therefore, it is said it is a labor law, not a health law.

The question presented by that argument is, Does the label or the
body of the statute prevail? Does calling a statute names deprive
it of its intended and real character? If a statute relating princi-
pally to banking happens, in the course of codification, to be in-
corporated as an article in the general corporation law, does it cease
to operate on the banking business? I submit without argument
that the questions answer themselves.

Assuming, however, for the purpose of argument only, that the
label is of such substantial importance that it may be as

inst the obvious meaning of the statute, then I say that article

ITI bears its own title, which is: “ Bakeries and confectionery estab-
lishments.” All that is contained in that article relates to bakeries
and confectionery establishments and theit conduct, and to no other

sabject whatever. Therefore, it is fully, appropriately and harmoni-
y entitled.

28 JOSEPH LOCHNER Vs.

Again, inasmuch as it is obvious, as we have seen, from a mere
reading of the statute, that the legislative purpose is to benefit the
blic, we must assume—even if the object of the legislature
43 _ in limiting the hours of work of employees is not to protect
the health of the general public, who takes the wares made
by such employees—that the legislature intends to protect the
health of the employees in such establishments; that, for some
reason sufficient to it, it has reached the conclusion that in work
of this character men ought not to be employed more than an
average of ten hours a day. Now that being so—and certainly no
more restricted view of that statute can be taken by those who
would destroy it—we find that the action of the legislature is within
the police power not only under the authorities of the United States,
but of this State, and of this court.
ial attention has meeey been called to Holden’s case (169
U.S. 366). A Utah statute making it a misdemeanor to employ a
man more than 8 hours per day in “ underground mines or work-
ings ” is sustained, and a conviction thereunder upheld, by the
United States Supreme Court, on the ground that it is within the
police power of the State to pass such a statute. That interesting
case—to which I have made extended reference supra—is in point
and controlling so far as the 14th amendment is concerned, and
should be controlling in this court so far as equivalent provisions
of our State constitution are concerned.

It must also be held, under the authority of Havnor’s case (supra)
—even though it may be assumed from the reading of the statute
that the object of the legislature is to protect employees in such es-
tablishments from working more than ten hours a day—that it is
within the police power, and, therefore, not repugnant to the State
constitution. The statute which that case passes upon makes it a
misdemeanor to carry on the business of a barber on the first day
of the week, and a judgment of conviction under that law is
affirmed in this court because “The statute under consideration has
a reasonable connection with the public health, welfare or safety.”
Certainly if this court could so hold in that case it must so hold in
this, even under the construction of the statute which those would

ive to it who are affected by the fact that article VIII, chapter 32,

neral Laws, is grouped with 12 other articles, the compilatiun

being known as the labor law, instead of being in the

44 domestic law, with articles entitled, Flour and meal, Beef

and pork, or in the public health law with articles such as
Adulteration, Practice of medicine or the like.

Again many medical authorities classify workers in bakers’ or con-
fectioners’ establishments with potters, stone cutters, file grinders
and other workers whose occupation necessitates the inhalation of
dust particles, and hence predisposes its members to cousumption.
The published medical opinions and vital statistics bearing upon
that subject standing alone fully justify the section under review as
one to protect the health of the employees in such establishments,

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORE. 29

and it is the duty of this court to assume that the section was framed
not only in the light of, but also with full appreciation of the force
of the medical authority bearing upon the subject—authority which
reasonably challenges the attention, and stimulates the helpfulness
of the philanthropist.
The conclusion necessarily follows, therefore, from an examination
‘of the statute in the light of the authorities cited, that the purpose
of article VIII, and every part of it, including the provision in ques-
tion, is to benefit the public; that it has a just an reasonable rela-
tion to the public welfare, and hence is within the police power pos-
sessed by the legislature. But if, in violation of the duty of the court
as stated in Brodger’s case (supra)—which is “ to adopt the constr uc-
‘tion which, without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words
used, brings the statute into harmony with the provisious of the
Constitution ”—we award to the title of a general law such potency
as causes it to overcome both the title and the provisions of an article
therein, thus making the provision a labor law, we are still required
to hold that it is within the police power.
The judgment should be affirmed.

Gray, J.:

I shall concur with the chief judge; whose opinion I regard as
carefully expressed and convincing in its reasoning. The

45 question for us is, in the first place, whether, notwithstanding
its embodiment in the labor law, we may treat the statutory
provision, in question, as a health law and, in the next place, if we
may do so, whether its enactment is a reasonable exercise of the po-
lice power of the State, which the courts should give effect to. I am
of the opinion that its being placed in the labor law furnishes no
adequate reason for limiting its reading and construction by those
considerations, which appertain to laws passed, strictly, in the in-
terest of labor; if, from its association with other provisions, in pari
materia, a different and independent purpose is disclosed. To de-
prive a health law of its intended operation, because it is not found
in the statute book under that, or a kindred, title, would be, in my
opinion, to apply an unreasonable and an unsatisfactory test of its
validity. If the court concludes that the intent of an enactment in
some valid exercise of the police power is to regulate some particular
trade, or occupation, then, clearly, it should be quite immaterial
under what heading it appears to be classified in the statutes. It
would not do to nullify the will of the people upon so technical and
narrow a consideration. Therefore, I think we may proceed, beyond
that ground, to the determination of the question whether, if a
health law, the 110th section of this article VIII was reasonable
and, therefore, a valid exercise of the police power. If it stood
alone, unaccompanied and Baal i ig by cognate provisions,
I should incline to the view that the enactment was unconsti-
tutional. It might, justly, be held to fall within that class of legis-
lation, which has received judicial condemnation ; because, as a reg-

30 JOSEPH LOCHNER Ys.

ulation of the hours of the employed, its object would appear to be
for their protection against the exaction of a disproportionate amount
of work for the wages paid. That would be to infringe upon the ©
liberty of contract. But I think we must read the section in connec-
tion with those sections which immediately follow, and then it ig
that we find it to be made certain that the object of the legislative
enactment had relation to the conservation of the public health,
We perceive that the legislature is dealing with the workings
of a business conducted upon a scale, calling for the employ-
46 ment of more or less laborers, and which is affected by a
public interest, in the sense that the food product may, sensi-
03 Bip srg for its healthfulness upon the observance of sanitary
rules and precautions. Such precautionary regulations may in-
volve, as well, the establishment of proper conditions to insure the
maintenance of the normal vitality of the workman, as the whole-
someness of the general environment. We must presume that the
legislative body was animated by a reasonable intention to
the public welfare and if the courts can give effect to it, because
tending to guard the public health, they should, unhesitatingly, do
80. a i will not be allowed, arbitrarily, to interfere with the
personal liberty of the citizen, under the specious guise of an ex-
ercise of the police power, and therefore it is, that our courts may
supervise, as a judicial question, a determination of the legislature
to exercise the a power in restraint of some trade, or calling.
It is true that the tendency has been growing in the direction of
an excess of paternalism in government and that the courts of this
and of other States have, rather, hastened to uphold legislative in-
terference with the pursuits of citizens, upon any plausible pretext
of its being in furtherance: of the general welfare. The Federal
Supreme Court has, in the broadest terms, recognized the power of
the individual States to exercise a police power of internal regu-
lation; when the object is to promote by reasonable laws the pub-
lic safety, health and comfort. To the legislative body is conceded
the power to govern men and the affairs of men, through the es-
tablishment of such rules and regulations as may be conducive to
the public betterment, because — to the protection of the
lives, health and comfort of persons and the protection of property,
and that concession has been, in my opinion, at times, more broadly
made in the decisions of the courts, than the conservative spirit of
our democratic form of government will justify. But that the legis-
lature has, and should have, the broadest authority to exercise a po-
lice — of internal regulation, in the direction of protect-
47 ing the peace, the safety and the health of the community I
fully concede. In this law, which restricts the working hours
of employés in bakery and confectionery establishments, I think we
may, fairly, perceive a statutory regulation, reasonably promotive of
the public health, because compelling the master of such an estab-
lishment to conduct it in a manner, the least capable of affecting his
product prejudicially. We may, not unreasonably, assume that an

‘at PropLit of dt staré oF Nw Yor. $1

employé may work too long for his health under the conditions, and
that an impaired vitality and the possible devel t of organic
diseases may be the result. If, to obviate the le consequences
to the consumer of the food manufactured, the legislature deter-
mines to interfere, by limiting, among other regulations, the hours
of the workman, I do not think we should hold the interference to
be without reason.

Vann, J.:
_ I concur in the result reached by the chief judge, for the follow-

ing reasons:

ihe power of the legislature to pass what it may consider “ health
laws” is not unlimited, but is bounded by the duty of the courts to
determine whether the act has a fair, just and reasonable relation
to the general welfare. (Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 108; People
v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389,401 ; People v. Haynor, 149 N. Y.-195, 200.)

As was said by the court in the Gillson case: “ Under an exercise
of the police power the enactment must have some relation to the
comfort, the safety, or the welfare of society, and it must not be in
conflict with the constitution. The law will not allow the rights of
property to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for
the protection of health, when it is manifest that such is not the
object and purpose of the regulation. * * * It is generally
for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed
to protect the public health and serve the public comfort and safety
and if its measures are calculated, intended, convenient or appro-
priate to accomplish such ends, the exercise of- its discretion is not
the subject uf judicial review.”

We have before us simply that part of the labor law which

48 regulates the hours of labor in eries and confectionery

establishments by limiting them to not exceeding sixty per

week and ten per day, “ unless for the ) purpose of making a shorter
work day on the last day of the week.

The draftsman of this statute apparently used as a model “The
bakehouse regulation act” L grey by the English Parliament in
1863, but he went far beyond that pattern in limiting the hours of
labor, for the New York statute applies to all employees in bakeries,
while the English act makes no regulation of hours per day or week,
but simply prohibits the employment of persons under eighteen

ears of age between nine at night and fivein the morning. (26-27

ictoria, cap. 40.) Both acts contain similar provisions to secure
cleanliness and ventilation of the rooms used to carry on the busi-
ness as well as the separation of sleeping apartments therefrom, none
of which are now called in question.

I do not think the regulation in question can be sustained, unless
we are able to say from common knowledge that working in a bakery
and candy factory is an unhealthy employment. If such an occu-
pation is unhealthy the legislature had the 7 to prohibit em-
ployers from requiring or permitting»their employees to spend more

$a JosEPH LOCHNER Ys.

than a specified number of hours per day or week in the work, be-
cause such a command would be in the interest of tue public health
and barack Sew the general welfare. Asin the Jacobs case we
took judicial notice of the nature and qualities of tobacco (p. 113),
80 in this case we may take judicial notice of the effect of very fine
icles of flour and sugar when inhaled into the lungs from the
eated atmosphere of manufactories of bread and candy. Neces-
sarily in considering the subject we may resort to such sources of
information as were open to the legislature.

Vital statistics show that those vocations which require persons to
remain for long periods of time in a confined and heated atmosphere
filled with some foreign substance, which is inhaled into the lungs,
are injurious to health and tend to shorten life. Bakers and con-
fectioners, who, during working hours, constantly breathe air filled

with the finest dust from flour and sugar, have a tendency to
49 consumption, the most terrible scourge known to modern
civilization and resulting in more deaths than any other dis-
ease. (1 People’s Cyc. 479; Mulhall’s Dict. Statistics, 193 and 683.)

Thus in the article on phthisis in volume 18 of the last edition of
the weed ea) Britannica it is said: “ Occupations which neces-
sitate the inhalation of irritating particles, as in the case of stone
masons, needle ape workers in minerals, in cotton, flour, straw,
&c., are especially hurtful, chiefly from the mechanical effects upon
the delicate pulmonary tissues of the matter inhaled. No less prej-
udicial are occupations carried on in a heated and close atmosphe*e,
as is often the case with compositors, goldbeaters, semp-tresses, etc.”

So in Alden’s Encyclopedia, vol. 9, title Consumption, the follow-
ing occurs: “ Often the workshops of tailors, printers, bakers and
other businesses carried on in close, ill-ventilated apartments by large
numbers of working people are nurseries of cousumption.”

We quote from a few more out of many authorities to the same
effect. “It is certain that much might be done to improve the pub-
lic health in this respect by more attention on the part of employers
of labor to the comfort and habits of those who are, in more senses
than one, their ‘ hands’ and the sources of their prosperity. A cer-
tain kind of improvement has, indeed, been already effected by the
San abt living of the working classes during the last twenty years.
Still it is well known and proved by careful inquiries that the work-
shops of tailors, printers, bakers and other businesses carried on- in
close, ill-ventilated apartments, by large numbers of workmen are,
in a very aggravated sense, nurseries of consumption. * * *
The cutters and needle-grinders of Sheffield appear to owe their
notoriously short lives to consumption brought on by the inhalation
of metallic particles in the close and stifling atmosphere of their
workshops. * * * . Even admitting, therefore, that the causes of
consumption may be in part practically irremovable, there seems

no reason to doubt that very much might be done to dimin-
50 ish its prevalence, as well as to arrest its course when already
formed, by due attention to the comfort of the laboring popu-

lation, both in their dwellings and in the pursuit of their occupa-
tions.” (4 International Cyclopedia, 286.)

“ Particular occupations predi (to consumption), weed
such as occasion constant inhalation of small particles.” (2 John-
son ata re8 488.) :

“Thus tailors, seamstresses and similar workers are especially

prone to the disease. More especially is this true of occupations
whose performance necessitates the inhalation of dust particles.
as é ve dust particles rae otal aga of the ame pe so
which line the air passages and y inducing chronic :
which, in turn, are liable to lead to consumption.” (3 Chambers
Encyclopedia, 438.)
- “The bacillus of tuberculosis finds, indeed, the most favorable
conditions for its existence in the squalor of congested slums, in the
foul atmosphere of dusty workshops, in close courts, alleys, etc.”
(70 Fortnightly Review, 308.)

“A very large number of the most efficient workmen employed
in quarries, metal works, cotton and wool manufactories, print trades
ant many other occupations exposing them to bad air and dust fall
victims to this infection.” (194 Edinburgh Review, 444.)

“Since statistics still show that the mortality from phthisis in
_ people who follow certain trades is much greater than in others,
there can be no doubt of the casual relationship between occupation
and pulmonary disease and of dust being the causa causans. * * *
In 1866 it was demonstrated that * * * two kinds of occu
tion had long been recognized as hurtful, viz.: 1, those that give
rise to — ~ chemical pe of eos es vi ust,
grit or flu i iffused throug e atmosphere; 2, those in
which the suaraitesi are —— to abrupt changes of temperature.”
(The Lancet, vol. 165, p. 1345.)

“ Living in a close atmosphere and in a high temperature, bakers
are subject to lung diseases, more especially phthisis.” (5 Reference

Handbook of Medical Science, 276.)
51 “ Those engaged in carding of cotton and workers in flax,
hemp, tobacco and flour, and chaff cutters suffer in the same
manner, but to a less degree than such as are compelled to inhale
more decidedly irritating particles.” (Fowler & Godlee’s Diseases
of the Lungs, 272.)

“ Dusty occupations, as in the case of millers, bakers, knife-grind-
ers, stone-masons, and the like, are fraught with special dangers to
vulnerable persons.” (5 Allbutt’s System of Medicine, 229.)

“The inhalation of impure air in occupations associated with a
very dusty atmosphere renders the lungs less capable of resisting
infection.” (Osler’s Practice of Medicine, 269.)

“ Dusty occupations make people prone to disease. The statistics
of Berlin as to street-cleaners, cabmen, coal workers and miners
show this.” (35 Journal Am. Med. Assn. 1028.) “The question as
to what business had best be carried on * tuberculosis patients is
pent = be mbler, * * * The butchers, he thinks, generally

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. $3

ing.

siekly sinell much like that of heated bones, superad to the

steam and other fumes. There are, in brief, many incidents in the
occupation of baking which reduce vital energy, predispose

52 _— to lung affections and shorten life.” (Arlige Diseases of Oc-
cupations, 255.)

The occupations of ropemakers, carpetmakers, bakers, etc., “ being
essentially dust-producing processes, they one and all induce a
workers excessive reste from pulmonary affections. Althoogh
the mortality of these worke
is considerably below that of metal workers, nevertheless it is in
every case inordinately high, exceeding the mortality of agricultur-
ists by proportions varying from 77 to 120 per cent.” (Latham’s

ister-General’s Report, 148.)

ecording to the data presented by Dr. C. Moeller in his work
on Hygiene of the Baker Industry (p. 295): “of bakers dying
between the ages of 45 and 65, twenty-five per cent. died from
chronic bronchitis or related diseases.” He points out “the per-
sistency of the flour dust and starchy particles in the bronchial
tubes, and even in the lungs” by oe a medical cecil to
the effect “that even two and a half weeks after leaving the employ-
ment, starchy particles and other evidences of flour cust had bee
found in the expectoration of bakers examined.”

According to the tables of comparative mortality in the Federal
census of 1900, the number of deaths among bakers and confec-
tioners was three and two-tenths per cent. greater than the average
of general industrial occupations. These tables are somewhat
favorable to bakers between the ages of 15 and 44, but are unfavor-
able to them between the ages of 45 and over, the average being as
stated above. (See, also, 1 Parke’s Manual of Practical Hygiene,
133; 62 Medical Record, 334; Medical Examiner and Practi oner,
Nov. 1902, tit. Occupations; id. July, 1901, tit. Occupation as
affecting the death rate.)

The heaviest death rate in wos falls to cabdrivers, ee

rinters, tailors and bakers. (Mulhall’s Dictionary of i
95.) Statisties relating to thirty-nine trades in England

rs from — and other lang d

bakers
ife. (Id.

MA ibtle she cesiiadity those who breathe air filled with 3

minute particles of flour is than among those who work in.
stone, metal or clay, still it seems to be demonstrated that it is

ter than in avocations y. The dustladen air in a

er’s or confectioner’s establishment is more benign and less liable
to irritate than particles of stone or metal, hence, while bakers are
classified with potters, stone masons, file grinders, ¢tc., still they are
regarded as less liable to pulmonary disease than other members of
the class. The evidence while not uniform leads to the conclusion
that the occupation of a baker or confectioner is unhealthy and
tends to result in diseases of the riage’ | organs. As statutes
are valid which provide that women or children shall not be em-
ployed in any manufacturing establishment more than a certain
number of hours in a single day, so I think an act is valid which
provides that in an employment which the legislature deems, and
which is in fact, to some extent detrimental to health, no person,
regardless of age or sex, shall be permitted or uired to labor
more than a certain number of hours per day or week. Such legi
lation, under such circumstances, isa health law and is a valid
exercise of the police power.

I vote for ce.

O’Brien, J. (dissenting):

The defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor under one of the
subdivisions of section 384 of the Penal Code, in that he violated
erticle eight, section 110, chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as
the labor law. The indictment cha that on the twenty-first
day of December, 1899, he was arrested upon the com laint of one

of his employees for violating the law in permitting the employee
to work in a bakery more than sixty hours in one week; that he
was convicted in the city court and fined twenty dollars, or in
default thereof stand committed to the county jai! for twenty days,

and that he paid the fine ; that after such conviction the defend-
54 ~—_ ant “ wrongfully, uulawfally and knowingly, with intent on

his part to violate the law, permitted and required” another em-
ployee named to work more than sixty hours in one week during
the week commencing April 19th an ending April 26th, 1901, in
the defendant's biscuit, bread and cake bakery and confectionery
establishment, thereby committing a misdemeanor as a second
offense, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and
an and against the peace of the people of the State of New

ork and their dignity.

The defendant demurred to the indictment on two grounds: (1)
That more than one crime was charged; and (2) thet the facts

committed to the county jail onl: “the fine was paid, not to

sion by ad court and from this jadgment the defendant _
ied to this court, and the appeal brings up for review all
ns raised by the demurrer to the indictment.

comply with * * * the provisions of article eight
labor law, relating to bakeries and confectionery establish-
ments, the employment of labor and the manufacture of flour or
meal food products therein * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be punished for a first offense by a fine
of not less than twenty nor more than one hundred dollars; fora
second offense by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than two hun-
dred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or
by both such fine and imprisonment; for a third offense by a fine
of not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment
for not more than sixty days, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment.
55 It will be seen that this section of the Penal Code does not
specify the acts or omissions which are made crimes, nor does
it in any appropriate terms define the crime at all, but refers for that
rpose to another law. When we turn to article eight of the labor
aw, referred to above, we find that it contains six separate sections,
commanding certain things and prohibiting certain things. The
ticular section which the indictment charges to have been vio-
ated by the defendant is the first section of the article, or section
110, and that reads as follows: “No employee shall be required or
permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confection-
ery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more
than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a
shorter work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in
any one week than will make an average of ten hours per day for
the number of days during such week in which such employee shall
work.” While this section of the labor law does forbid certain
things, no penalty whatever is attached to a violation, and, there-
fore, in order to get a definition of the particular crime charged in
the indictment we must examine two general statutes upon different
subjects ; that is to say, we must read the Penal Code for tho penalty
or the punishment, and we must read the labor law in order to as-
certain the particular act or omission which constitutes the crime.
One of the grounds of the demarrer is that the indictment charges
two crimes. It will be seen that two things or two acts or omissions
have been forbidden by the statute; it forbids the master from either

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. $7

permitting or requiring the servant to work more than the time
specified in the statute. Assuming for the present that the statute
is valid, it makes it a crime for the master to permit the servant to
work over the statutory time; and it also makes it a crime for him
to require or compel the servant to so work. The two acts or omis-
sions inhibited by the statute are essentially different in nature and
character. It is one thing to permit the servant to work ; it is quite
another thing to compel or require it. Permitting him to
56 work more than the ten hours might be intentional or invol-
untary. Compelling or requiring him to work would be a
deliberate act on the part of the master in violation of the statute.
‘In the one case the punishment might very well be nominal ; in the
other case it would necessarily have to be substantial, and, hence, it
would seem that two acts or omissions so essentially different in na-
ture and character and each constituting a crime in itself could rot
properly be united in the same charge, and in this view the objec-
tion that more than one crime is stated in the indictment is good.
But the objection was also made that the acts or omissions stated
in the indictment do not constitute a crime, and this objection raises
the question as to the validity of the statute and is of much more
importance than the form or substance of the indictment. It will
be seen from an examination of the law that there is no prohibition
agaiust the act of the servant himself in working longer than the
statutory time. He may work as many hours as he likes during the
day and he violates no law and commits no offense whatever. So
the broad question is whether a statute which makes it a crime for
the master to permit his servant to do what the servant has a perfect
right to do can bea valid law. No restrictions are im upon
the servant with respect to the hours of labor or otherwise. As al-
ready remarked, he has a perfect right to work as many hours in a
day or week as he may want to, but the master must see to it, at the
ril of committing a crime, that his servants are driven out of the
uilding the moment the clock registers the requisite ten hours, and
that, too, without regard to the conditions and circumstances affect-
ing the business or the interests of the master. It is acrime for the
master to require or permit his servant to work over the statutory
time, no matter how willing or even desirous the servant may be to
earn extra compensation for overwork. The master is forbidden to
contract with his servant for longer hours and extra pay, no matter
what inay be the wants or necessities of the business, or the judg-
ment or will of the servant with respect to such a contract. fe
57 _— is obviously one of those paternal laws, enacted doubtless with
the best intentions, but which in its operation must inevitably
= enmity and strife between master and servant. They are not
eft free to make their own bargains in their own way, but their
mutual interests are governed by statute.
The sweeping character of the legislation in question may be il-
lustrated by a reference to the last section of the article of the labor
law referred to in the indictment; that is to say, tosection 115. It is

sted as follows: “If, in the opinion of

i ; me : ’ guid ,

shall be

f,

have such a sweeping effect or confer such arbitrary powers upon a
ministerial officer that affected the liberty and the property of the
individual.

It is contended in behalf of the defendant that the law under
which he was convicted violates section one of article fourteen of the
Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any State from
making or enforcing any law which shall deny toany person within ~
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, and those provisions

of the constitution of this State which enact that no member
58 of this State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the

ights or privileges, secured to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land and the judgment of his peers, nor be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. (Const. art.
1, §§ 1,6.) The _ ~% law of the a do -“ ne an act —
legislature passed for the very purpose of working the wrong.
coulen is that no person shall be deprived of any of the rights or

privileges secured to him by the constitution, unless the matter’
sLall be adjudged against him upon a trial had according to law.
It cannot be done by mere oe. (Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill,

140; White v. White, 5 Barb. 474; People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 198;
Wynebamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; People ez rel. Warren v. Beck,
144 N. Y. 237; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1; People
v. Orange County Road Const. Co., 175 N. Y. 84.) The doctrine of
these cases condemus the legislation in question as an invasion of
the rights, liberties and property of the citizen. The three cases
last cited grew out of the same law that is violated in the case at
bar, or similar laws, and they eannot be distinguished from it in
principle.
The labor law excludes from its regulations and restrictions all
— engaged in farm work or domestic service (art. 1, § 3) and,
ence, a very large proportion of the people of the State who labor
for a living are not affected by it at all. Why this large class of

nit PROPLE OF Tam state OF xEW vont. oe

- wage earners who toil for a livelihood are excluded from the bene-
fits of the statute, and those who employ them exem from its bur-
dens and restrictions, it is difficult to conceivs. farmers and
__ that large class of people both in the city and in the country who

case is based is aimed at a very small class of persons, namely, those
who conduct “a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionery

bakeries. The law does not even apply to bakers in the small towns
and villages who do their own seek. It applies only to bakers who
find it necessary to employ labor, and they alone are subjected to
criminal prosecution in case they permit the servant to work more
than ten hours in a day, even though the servant is willing and is
given extra compensation. The baker is forbidden, under the
penalty of fine and imprisonment, to contract or agree with his
servant upon the hours of labor in such way as would be mutuall
beneficial, but his business is practically regulated by statute. If
for any reason he suffers or permits his servant to work an addi-
tional half-hour beyond the statutory time his liberty and his prop-
erty are put at the mercy of the servant, who may procure him to
be arrested and imprisoned. It does not appear from the record in
this case, or in any other way, that there is anything in the business
or vocation of a baker that would authorize the legislature to impose
such criminal penalties upon him for permitting his servant to work
more than ten hours in the day, or to restrict his freedom of con-
tract, which is a right enjoyed by all other employers of labor.
The guaranties of the constitution may be invaded without any
physical interference with the person or property of the citizen. He
is deprived of his property within the meaning of the constitution
when arbitrary and unnecessary restrictions are imposed upon his
conduct of any lawful business, and when he is deprived of the right
to make contracts for the transaction thereof. Liberty, in its broad
sense, means the right, not only of freedom from actual restraint of
the person, but the right of such use of his faculties in all lawful
ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any
lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. Ail
laws, therefore, which impair or trammel those ri hts or restrict
his freedom of action, or his choice of methods in the trans-
action of his lawful business, are infringements u his
fundamental right of liberty, and are void. (Mattero Jacobs,
98 N. Y. 98.) They cannot and should not escape the scrutiny of

the courts merely because they are made to assume, by argument or
otherwise, the guise of police regulations. SS

‘The statute in question deprives the defendant of the equal pro-
tection of the law, since it enacts that certain acts or omissions on
his part ‘ing the conduct of his business and his relations to
his own servants are crimes and punished criminally, which, as to
all the rest of the community not within the terms of this law, are
entirely innocent. The very small fraction of the community who |
happen to conduct bakeries, or confectionery establishments, are
prohibited, under pain of fine and imprisonment, from Fabs agesanes
the conduct of their own business by contracts or mu agree-
ments with their employees, whereas all the rest of the community
who find it necessary to employ labor in private business may do
so. Class legislation of this character which discriminates in favor
of one person and against another is forbidden by the Constitution
of the United States, if not by the constitution of the State; and so
it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States and by
this court. (Gulf, C. & 8. F R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. 8. 150; Cotting
v. Kansas City S. Y. Co., 183 U.S. 79; Connolly v. U.S. P. Co., 184
U.S. 540; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co., 175 N. Y. 87,
90.) It is, I think, quite obvious that the legislation in question is,
upon its face, in conflict with the constitutional guaranties referred
to, unless it can be brought within the scope of the police powér.
That is the only ground upon which the statute is defended by the
learned district attorney. He contends that it isa health law a
for the purpose of protecting the public health, or at least the health
of those persons employed in bakeries. The argument is that the
defendant was forbidden by the statute to permit his workmen to
work more than ten hours in a day, to the end that his customers

might have wholesome bread, biscuit and confectionery,
61 whereas if they were permitted to work ten and a half hours

in the day the product of the bakery would be unwholesome
or dangerous to health. What possible relation or connection the
number of hours that the workmen are permitted to work in the
bakery has, or can have, to the healthful quality of the bread made
there is quite impossible to conceive. The baker in the small towns,
or even in the large towns, who does his own work and does not
employ labor, may work day or night without fear of molestation,
since no one thought it necessary to protect the public against his
unwholesome product. It has already been observed that the law
does not impose any penalties or restrictions upon the workman
himself for working too much, and if the purpose was to protect his
health against his own avarice, or his own misdirected energy, it is
quite remarkable that it did not at least forbid him from working
more than ten hours in a day.

The contention that the defendant was convicted for violating a
health law is, at best I think, but a mere disguise that is not suffi-
cient to save the statute from condemnation. There is nothing on the
face of the law nor in its manifest operation to show that it has any

THE PEOPLE OF THE staTE OF NEW YorRE.

relation to the public health. It is no
of a general statute known as the
it was not intrusted to any of the health a
inspector, which shows what its real scope and was.
factory inspector is not the officer with the enforcement of
health laws. The legislature classified it as a labor law, and it is
that and nothing else. ich encroach upon the personal or
ey rights of the citizen, as guaranteed by the Constitution, are
rally defended Sreecrioel ea bat they are police regalations
t the courts have prescribed a test by means of which their true
character and purpose may be known. The rule is that the court
must be able to say judicially that the statute in question is a health
law, and has some appropriate relation to the promotion or
protection of health. It will not be deceived or misled by mere
names or pretenses. The cases are numerous in which the
62 courts have,condemned statutes as invasions of the rights se-
cured to the citizen by the Constitution, though enacted or
sought to be upheld under the guise of health laws or other police
regulations. They all arrive at the same result, and that is that the
legislature may not under the guise of a statute to protect against
some wrong, real or imaginary, arbitrarily strike down private
rights and invade personal freedom or confiscate private property.
The police power must be exercised within its ge ome sphere and
by appropriate methods. (Matter of Jacobs, supra ; People v. Marx, 29
N. Y. 377; People v. Arensberg, 103 N. Y. 388; People v. Gillson, 109
N. Y. 389; Colon v. Lisk, 158 N. Y. 188; People ez rel. Rodgers v.
‘Coler, 166 N. Y.1; ie v. Buffalo Fish Co., 164 N. Y. 101, 104;
People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y.1.) It will not do to say that the legis-
lature in enacting the statute in question may have thought that it
was a health law, or had some relation to health. The action of the
legislature, or its views or reasons for the passage of the law, does
not conclude the courts, but they must determine for themselves
whether in any given case the legislation which is claimed to be an
exercise of the police power is meen! what it is claimed to be.
Every labor law, however stringent and arbitrary, could just as well
be upheld upon the ground that it is a health law ; but in all the dis-
cussions that have stm had in the courts for many years concern-
ing the validity of legislation of this character, there are to be found
but very few cases where it was even claimed that the statute was
enacted for the purpose of preserving or promoting health, or that it
had any relation whatever to that subject. When it is manifest, as
it is in this case, that the law has no relation whatever to the sub-
ject of health, and that its real object and purpose was to regulate
the hours of labor between master and servant in a business which is
private and not dangerous to morals, or to health, freedom to con-
tract with each other, defining their mutual obligations, cannot be
prohibited without violating the fundamental law.
The defendant was charged in the indictment with the violation

6—292

of a statute may be good that requires and prescribes sanitary -
lations binding upon the landlord who owns and lets asnbeat
houses in cities, but this would not save another section of the stat-
ute that prescribes the maximum rent that he may demand and re-
ceive from his tenants. It is even quite possible that a law might
be held that enjoins upon farmers or persons employing
mestic help the mee of preserving their health against infectious
diseases by reasonable and proper safeguards, such as ventilation of
the rooms where they sleep and the like, but this would not save a
separate section of the law prescribing the compensation that the
master is required to pay to the servant. So that the section of the
labor law with which we are now concerned can borrow no strength
from its association with other sections of the statute that may be
good. The single section of the labor law that we are now dealing -
with must stand or fall upon its own intrinsic character and can re-
ceive no support from the company in which it is found. If that
section had also provided that every employee of a bakery would
be guilty of a misdemeanor if he neglected or refused to faithfully
serve his master for ten full hours in each day no one I appre-
hend would then claim that it was a health law. And yet every

argument and every authority cited in defense of the section
64 in its present form would be just as good then as they are now.
The section would then be just as much of a health law as it
is now. :

It cannot be repeated too often that if the single section of the
law with which we are now concerned and which is the sole basis of
the criminal charge in this case, stood alone, the argument that it is
a health law and within the police power would not have even a color
of reason or authority to support it. But what the learned district
attorney urges upon us is that since the section is found in the article
associated with other sections prescribing sanitary regulations, we
must assume that the legislators for some unexpressed reason suffi-
cient to them, reached the conclusion that a baker ought not to be

rmitted or required to work on an average of more than ten hours
in aday. Ofcourse this reasoning is without force and does not
meet the difficulty. The question is not what the unexpressed reason

THE PEOPLE OF THE STAT OF NEW YORK. 48

is that moved the lawmakers, so long as it is impossible for any
court to discover that reason or any reason to bring the enactment
within the — the police power. It is always open to the courts
to inquire and determine whether a statute is in fact fairly within
the police power. That principle is found imbedded in all the cases
on that — If it were otherwise and the real view of the legisla-
ture is made the dominant idea, then the court would be deprived of
all power to declare any law void provided the legislature called it
an exercise of the police power, or some one contended that it was
supposed to be such upon some theory that the 2 age interes

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_0667%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
