# Plaintiffs Brief — McCray v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Plaintiffs Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1904
- **Citation:** 195 U.S. 27

## Text

i OCT ROA
{
OLEOMARGARINE TAX CASES.) >

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Octoper TERM, 1903.

Aucust CLIFF,
Plaintiff in error,
US.
Tue UNitTep Strares.

In error to the District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Illinois.

FREDERICK J, Scuick,
Plaintiff in error,

Vs.

Tue UNITED States.

for the Northern District of Illinois.

WILLiAM BROADWELL,
Plaintif{ in error,

vs.
Tue United STATES.

In error to the District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Illinois.

Leo W. McCray,

Plaintiff in error,
US.

Tue UNITED STATEs.

for the Southern District of Ohio.

No. 614, October
Term, 1902.
No. 221, October
Term, 1903.

No. 615, October
Term, 1902.
No. 222, October
Term, 1903.

No. 616, October
Term, 1902.
No. 223, October
Term, 1903.

No. 301, October
Term, 1993.

d

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR.

Wi.uiAM D. Gutnrir,

MILLER OvuTCALT,
Cuarzes E. Prior,
Francis J. KEARFUL,
DELAvAN B, Core,

Cuarces C, CARNAHAN,
Of counsel.

Washington, October Term, 1903.

TYR Rae tRRaw wRRaa eR neo —

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GEMM O IY TTR IMENT ey

[ 18,842, 18,843, 18,844, 18,952.]
OLEOMARGARINE TAX CASES.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1903.

AUGUST CLIFF,
Plaintiff in error,
vs.
THE UNITED STATES,
In error to the District Court of he United States
for the Northern District of Illinois.

FREDERICK J. SCHICK,
Plaintif] in error,
ts.

THE UNITED Srares,

In error to the District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Illinois.

WILLIAM BROADWELL,
Plaintiff in error,
vs.

THE UNITED S7aTEs,

In error to the District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Illinois.

Lro W. McCray,
Plaintiff in error,

4
THE UNITED STaTEs.

In error to the District Court of the United States

\

No. 614, October
Term, 1902.
No. 221, October
Term, 1903.

No. 615, October
Term, 1902.
No. 222, October
Term, 1903.

No, 616, October
Term, 1902.
No. 223, October
Term, 1903.

No. 301, October
Term, 1903.

for the Southern District of Ohio, ]

_— ee

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR.

STATEMENT OF FACTS,

The aboy

commonly called the «

SR GAIN FIR ASN Tr

e entitled cases draw in question the consti-
tutionality of certain provisions of the ac

ie ee ce ae ee ee

t of Congress
Oleomargarine Act,” and en-

2

titled “An act defining butter, also imposing a tax
upon and regulating the manufacture, sale, importation
and exportation of oleomargarine,” approved August 2,
1886, as supplemented by section 41 of the act of
October 1, 1890, and as amended by the act of May 9,
1902 (24 Stat. 209, c. 840; 26 Stat. 621,c. 1244, § 41; 32
Stat. 193, c. 784), on the ground that they interfere with
the reserved power of the States to regulate their
internal commerce, deprive the individual of liberty
and property without due process of law, and confer
final judicial power upon an administrative officer.
The plaintiffs in error Clef, Schick and Broadwell
were prosecuted by information in the District Court of
the United States for the northern district of Illinois
(Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 425; Lees v. United
States, 150 U. S. 476, 479) for the offense of having pur-
chased or received for sale oleomargarine which had not
been “ stamped according to law ” under section 11 of the
act. In the case of J/Cray, the government instituted
in the District Court of the United States for the
southern district of Ohio a civil suit under the same
section of the act, for the recovery of the penalty therein
provided. Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610.
The title of the amendatory act defines the general
object of the legislation as follows (32 Stat. pt. 1, p. 193):

* An Act to make oleomargarine and other imi-
tation dairy products subject to the laws of any
State, or Territory or the District of Columbia into
which they are transported, and to change the tax
on oleomargarine, and to impose a tax, provide for
the inspection, and regulate the manufacture and
sale of certain dairy products, and to amend an Act
entitled ‘An Act defining butter, also imposing a
tax upon and regulating the manufacture, sale, im-

E77

3

portation, and exportation of oleomargarine,’ ap-
proved August second, eighteen hundred and
eighty-six.”
The act, as amended, consists of 21 sections. Sec-
tion 1 defines butter as follows (24 Stat. 209):

“That for the purposes of this act the word
‘butter’ shall be understood to mean the food
product usually known as_ butter, and which is
made exclusively from milk or cream, or both,
with or without common salt, and w7th or without
additional coloring matter.”

Section 2 defines oleomargarine as follows (24 Stat.
209):
“That for the purposes of this act certain
manufactured substances, certain extracts, and
certain mixtures and compounds, _ inclu-
ding such mixtures and compounds — with
butter, shall be known and designated as
‘oleomargarine, namely: All substances hereto-
fore known as oleomargarine, oleo, oleomargarine-
oil, butterine, lardine, suine, and neutral; all lard
extracts and tallow extracts; and all mixtures and
compounds of tallow, beef-fat, suet, lard, lard-oil,
vegetable-oil, aznotto, and other coloring matter,
intestinal fat, and offal fat, made in imitation or

semblance of butter, or when so made, calculated i

or intended to be sold as butter or for butter.” :
Section 3 imposes special taxes on manufacturers, i
wholesale dealers and retail dealers in oleomargarine, ‘
and section 4 prescribes heavy penalties for their non- :
payment. Section 5 provides for regulation of the §&
business of manufacturing oleomargarine by the Com- 3
missioner of Internal Revenue, places the conduct ~
of such business under “ surveillance of officers and :
agents” of the Commissioner, and requires each manu- :
facturer to give a bond in the penal sum of not less i
than five thousand dollars, which ‘may be increased ;
*

TRO |

from time to time, and additional sureties required at
the discretion of the collector, or under instructions
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.” Sec-
tion 6 provides for the packing, marking, stamp-
ing and branding of oleomargarine by manufacturers, as
prescribed by regulations of the Commissioner with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, and pro-
vides penalties for the enforcement of such regulations.
Section 7 requires the manufacturer of oleomargarine
to affix to each package of the article sold or offered
for sale the usual internal revenue label containing a
caution not to use the same package or the same label
thereon again.

Section 8, as amended by section 3 of the act of May
9, 1902, imposes the tax in question in the following
language (32 Stat. pt. 1, p. 194):

“That upon oleomargarine which shall be man-
ufactured and sold, or removed for consumption or
use, there shall be assessed and collected a tax of
ten cents per pound, to be paid by the manufac-
turer thereof; and any fractional part of a pound
in a package shall be taxed as a pound: Provided,
When oleomargarine ts free from artificial colora-
tion that causes tt to look like butter of any

shade of yellow said tax shall be one-fourth of one
cent per pound.”

Section 9 provides for assessment of taxes on oleo-
margarine which has been sold or removed for sale
“without the use of the proper stamps.” Section 10
imposes a tax of fifteen cents per pound upon imported
oleomargarine in addition to the duty. Section 11 pre-
scribes the penalty judicially imposed in the cases at bar,
as follows (24 Stat. 211):

“That every person who knowingly purchases
or receives for sale any oleomargarine which has

——

5

not been branded or stamped according to law
shall be liable to a penalty of fifty dollars for each
such offense.”

Section 12 imposes a penalty for purchasing or re-
ceiving for sale any oleomargarine from any manufac-
turer who has not paid the special tax. Section 13
provides for the destruction of stamps on empty pack-
ages. Section 14 provides for the employment of
chemists and microscopists by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, for decision by said Commissioner
as to whether any oleomargarine is deleterious to
health, for an appeal from such decision to a board
“composed of the Surgeon-General of the Army, the
Surgeon-General of the Navy, and the Commissioner
of Agriculture.” whose decision shall be final, and also
confers power on the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue as follows (24 Stat. 212):

“And such Commissioner is authorized to de-
cide what substances, extracts, mixtures, or com-
pounds which may be submitted for his inspection
in contested cases are to be taxed under this act;
and Ais decision tn matters of taxation under this
act shall be final.”

Section 15 provides for forfeiture to the United
States of all oleomargarine found to be deleterious to
health, or not stamped or marked as provided by the
act. and also forbids the removal or defacing of
stamps on packages of oleomargarine. Section
16 provides for removal of oleomargarine for ex-
port without tax. Section 17 punishes any manu-
facturer who “ defrauds, or attempts to defraud, the
United States of the tax on the oleomargarine produced
by him, or any part thereof,” with forfeiture of his fac-
tory, manufacturing apparatus and all oleomargarine

—

‘
6

and raw material found on the premises, and by fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars and imprison-
ment for not more than three years. Section 18 pun-
ishes by a penalty of one thousand dollars, and for-
feiture of all oleomargarine owned by the offender if he 4
be a manufacturer, all failures to comply with the act not
otherwise punished. Section 19 provides “ that all fines,
penalties and forfeitures imposed by this act may be re-
covered in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Section
20 provides “that the Commissioner of Internal Rey-
enue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, may make all needful regulations for the carrying
into effect of this act.” Section 21 of the original act
provides for its going into effect ninety days after its .
passage, and the act, as amended (under the last section «
of the act of May 9, 1902), went into effect on July 1,
1902.

On the trial of each case, it was contended by the
defendant that, in so far as this act imposes a tax of

ten cents per pound on oleomargarine containing
“artificial coloration that causes it to look like butter of
any shade of yellow,” it was in contravention of the
Constitution of the United States and the amendments
thereto, because it constituted an invasion of the powers
reserved to the several States and deprived him and the
oleomargarine manufacturers and dealers in the United
States of liberty and property without due process of |
law. In the CZ and A/c Cray cases it was contended also
that the act was unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue “to decide
what substances, extracts, mixtures, or compounds
which may be submitted for his inspection in con-

Seo7—X—

tested cases are to be taxed under this act,” and pro-
vides “ that his decision in matters of taxation under
this act shall be final,” on the ground that it dele-
gates to an inferior administrative officer the power
finally to determine an essentially judicial ques-
tion. Notwithstanding these contentions, judgment
was rendered in favor of the government imposing the
statutory penalty of fifty dollars in each case (Cliff
record, pp. 22-24; Schick record, pp. 19-21; Broadwell
record, pp. 19-21; AdcCray record, pp. 5-7). There-
upon, the cases were brought direct to this court
by writ of error under authority of section 5 of
the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, as involving the
construction or application of the Constitution of
the United States and also as cases in which the
constitutionality of a law of the United States was
drawn in question. 26 Stat. 827, ¢. 5173 Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458, 466; Fairbank v. United
States, 181 U.S. 283, 284.

In the Cif case, the Government showed that the
defendant was a general grocer and retail dealer in

oleomargarine in Chicago; that on December 22, 1902,

he had in his possession a ten pound package of oleo-
margarine of a color resembling June butter and bearing 4
a tax-paid stamp at the rate of one-fourth of one cent
per pound; that the article was composed of oleo

oil, neutral lard, cotton-seed oil, milk, common salt and :

palm oil; that the color of June butter was imparted
to it by the palm oil it contained; that the oleomarga-
rine had been manufactured in the month of Decem-
ber, 1902, by Wm. J. Moxley, Incorporated, factory
No. 5, at the corner of Clinton and Randolph Streets,

= Efi 2 Es err tre se
sal LATA NEES LEPTIN SA NS BOM HS

8

in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois: that the pack -
age was put up, marked, stamped and branded in every
respect in accordance with the acts of Congress relating
to oleomargarine and the regulations of the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Commissioner. of Internal *
Revenue except that it bore only a tax-paid stamp of

i

one-fourth of one cent per pound, and that the defend- 3
ant admitted to the collector at that time that he pur- ;
chased and received from the Moxley Company the oleo- :
margarine in question for the purpose of sale as oleo- ‘
margarine, knowing its character and ingredients and i
the amount of tax paid thereon (C?#f record, p. 8). :
Inthe Sch7ck case substantially the same showing Was ;
made, except that it appeared that the package of oleo-
margarine involved in that case admittedly contained :
‘artificial coloration,” namely, Wells-Richardson’s Im- :
proved Butter Color, and that the package bore only a ;

tax-paid stamp at the rate of two cents per pound ( Schick
record, p. 8).

In the Broadwell case the same showing as in the
Schick case was made, except that the package of oleo-
margarine bore no stamp and no’tax had been paid on
it (Broadwell record, p. 8).

The operation and effect of the act were shown by
undisputed evidence offered and adduced on behalf of
the defendant in each case, as follows:

Oleomargarine is designed to be used as a substitute
for butter and to that end is colored as butter is
colored. There is substantially no difference between
yellow oleomargarine and yellow butter. They are

eee Ye ee

:

identical as to the chemical elements of each, except
only a slight ditference in proportion. They each con-

ee ree et 7 I RSE EEL SS FMR OT . t OTR

9

tain olein, stearin, palmatin, butyrin and coloring matter.

MDNR I AT OT

The first three elements olein, stearin and palmatin,
are the principal components, are exactly the same in
oleomargarine and butter, and constitute more than
go per cent. of the finished product in both cases.
The amount of butyrin varies slightly, being about six
per cent. in good butter, and somewhat less in oleomar-
garine, depending upon the amount of milk, cream or
butter used in its manufacture, as butyrin is found only in
milk, cream or butter. The amount of coloring matter in
butter varies at different periods and according to the con-
dition and food of the cows. It is universally colored
throughout the year to a uniform shade of yellow, but
requires more color in the winter, when it is white, than
in the spring, when it has some natural color, especially
if the cows have been fed on green grass or clover.
There is nothing, however, in these slight differences
which renders butter more wholesome or digestible
than oleomargarine as an article of food, and
the coloring matter used in both cases is harmless.
Yellow oleomargarine and yellow butter are used for
the same identical purpose, and compete with each
other in the market. The reason for coloring these
products is the same in both cases: because the
consumers demand it. A necessary element of the
marketability of each is a certain shade of yellow which
must be imparted to the product before it can be sold.
There is no market either for uncolored oleomargarine
or uncolored butter, except, in the case of oleomar-
garine, as a su) stitute for lard, and, in the case of butter,
a small quantity of sweet unsalted butter is sold to sup-
ply the Jewish settlements. It costs less to produce

———

oleomargarine than it does to produce butter, and to this
extent, oleomargarine successfully competes with and
tends to cheapen butter; but this difference in cost

10

is not great enough to enable the colored oleomargarine

to be sold after paying the tax of ten cents per pound

except occasionally when the price of butter is abnor- |

mally high (Cf record, pp. 8-21; Schick record, pp. |

8-19; Broadwell record, pp. 8-19).
Prior to July 1, 1902, when the act of May 9, 1902,

went into effect, the business of producing and selling
yellow oleomargarine had been able to compete with the
yellow butter industry to a very considerable extent. It
was shown that the Moxley plant, at which the packages
involved in these cases were manufactured, had been
in operation since 1884, supplying the trade in various.
parts of the United States with yellow oleomar-
garine designed to be used as a_ substitute for
butter, and had grown to a capacity of between three
and four million pounds per month. Prior to July 1,
1902, the entire output of this factory was all artificially
colored as butter is colored. Thereafter, it could not
be manufactured and sold at a profit after paying the tax
of ten cents per pound, and for the first five months none
of the colored article was produced or sold. In Decem-
ber, 1902, owing to the abnormally high price of butter,
the Moxley Company was enabled to sell 37,594 pounds
of colored oleomargarine, as compared with an output of
about 2,000,000 pounds per month prior to July 1; but
when butter fell again to its normal price, oleomargarine
bearing the tax of ten cents per pound was practically
unable to compete with it. The uncolored product,
so far as could be ascertained, was sold for cook-

_—

— 7

1]

ing purposes, but only in comparatively small and
uncertain quantities, because the relative cost of
production was such that oleomargarine could
not ordinarily compete with lard, although more
desirable than lard for cooking purposes (iff f
record, pp. 18-20). Amundsen, a retail dealer —
in Chicago, who obtained his supplies from this factory, :
had worked up a business among the laboring classes of b
Chicago amounting to sales of 2,600 pounds per week. :
The customers ‘‘ knew that it was oleomargarine and not t
butter and they bought it because it was cheaper than ‘
butter” (#6. p.17). But when the ten cent tax wastobe =|
paid it was cheaper to buy butter, and they would not z
have the uncolored article. As a consequence, to quote ;
the witness, ‘every customer I had quit” (z4.). There- ;
after. he supplied a part of the trade with butter for '
table use, selling white oleomargarine only for cooking 2
purposes (26. pp. 16-17). Izard, a restaurant proprietor is
in Chicago, furnished yellow oleomargarine almost ex-
clusively to his patrons, who had no objection to it so
long as it had the proper color. After July 1, 1902, he :
could not use it because it was white and the addition of
ten cents per pound to the price of colored oleomar-

garine resulted in the use by him of colored butter

almost exclusively. The uncolored oleomargarine he é

:

; could use only for cooking in place of lard (2. pp. C
17-18).

at Vibra |

In the Cliff and McCray cases, where the package
was tax-paid at the rate of one-fourth of one cent
per pound, there was an additional question as to
whether the package contained ‘artificial’ coloration
within the meaning of section 8 of the act by reason of

pg LIEDER NY YING,

aa SRS |

12

the admixture of palm oil or colored butter. Upon this
issue also the facts were undisputed. In the C7f case,
the government showed that the article was of the color
of June butter, and that this color was imparted to
it by the admixture of palm oil in its manufacture
(Ciiff record, p. 8). The defendant showed by compe-
tent testimony that palm oil is a vegetable oil derived
from the fruit of a certain kind of palm which grows
in East Africa, that it is a digestible and edible
oil, containing all the chemical constituents of butter,
except butyrin, that it is used by the natives of
the country where it is produced as an article of
food, that it is reddish-yellow in appearance and a
very small proportion of it is sufficient to produce
what is considered a desirable color in oleomargarine,
that there is little, if any, difference between the
taste of oleomargarine made in this way and the
taste of butter, that it is quite as digestible as
butter and is very cheap, that the oleomargarine
thus produced is substantially the same product as
good butter, and that the nature of palm oil is such
that, by the process of refining, its intense color may be
partially eliminated, thus rendering its use in consider-
able quantities desirable in the manufacture of oleomar-
garine apart from its yellow color (7. pp. 10-13). These
facts being wholly undisputed, the conviction was
based on the assumption that the question thus pre-
sented had been foreclosed by the final decision of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who had ruled that
palm oil in oleomargarine does constitute ‘artificial ’
coloration (74. pp. 9, 10), and had instructed the prose-
cuting witness, a Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue,

7 serpseeow

13

that its use would subject the product to the tax of ten
cents per pound (76. p. 8).
In the McCray case the government alleged in its

hy Ot

complaint that the defendant had purchased for sale
as a retail dealer a package of oleomargarine con-
taining “coloring matter that caused it to look like
butter of a certain shade of yellow,” and bearing

a tax-paid stamp at the rate of only one- -fourth of one
cent per pound (A/cCray record, p. 2). These allega-
tions were admitted by the defendant, who averred
by way of defense that the coloring matter contained
in the article was that contained in the creamery
butter used by the manufacturer of the oleomargarine
as one of its elementary and necessary ingredients,
according to a formula used in the course of business, —
which creamery butter contained Wells-Richardson’s :
improved butter color, a harmless substance, universally
used in the United States in the manufacture of butter,
for the purpose of imparting a deep yellow color,
that said creamery butter was purchased in the open
market for said purpose, that no additional or other
coloring matter of any kind whatsoever was used or
introduced into said oleomargarine, that said oleomarga-
rine contained nothing but oleo oil, neutral lard, cream-
ery butter, milk, cream and common salt, and was whole-
some and nutritious and free from any deleterious or in-
jurious ingredient; that said package had been “ packed,
marked, stamped, branded and labeled, in compliance
with all the provisions of said acts and with all the
regulations thereunder prescribed by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury,”
that “the cost of manufacture of the wholesome and

14

nutritious oleomargarine like that contained in said
package is such that it cannot be sold in competition
with butter if the tax of ten cents per pound be imposed
and paid,” and that there is little demand in the United
States for either uncolored butter or uncolored oleo-
margarine (zd. pp. 3-5). These facts were admitted by
the demurrer of the government which the court sus-
tained (zd. pp. 6, 7).

The historical facts concerning oleomargarine will
be found in Encyc. Brit., vol. 17, p. 760; Century
Dict. & Cyc., vol. 5, p. 4101; Oleomargarine Regula-
tions, U.S. Int. Rev., June, 1902, pp. 11-15; “ The
Oleomargarine Bill” (Gov. Print., 1901), resumé pp.
815-885; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 382-383;
People v. Arensberg, 105 N.Y. 123, 129-132; People ex
rel. Moxley v. Pease, 30 Chicago Leg. News, No. 34;
Ex parte Scott, 66 Fed. Rep. 45, 48; Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 8-12; In re Brundage, 96
Fed. Rep. 963, 965.

Shortly after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871,
the French government decided that it was of the
utmost importance that some cheap and wholesome sub-
stitute for butter should be discovered for the relief of
the poor in the great cities and manufacturing centers
who were unable to obtain butter. To that end a prize
was offered to scientists, and the result was the invention
of oleomargarine by M. Mege-Mouries (Encyc. Prit.,
Vol. 17, p.760). This invention was immediately recog-
nized and hailed as a boon to humanity, and soon sprang
into use all over the world. It was at first made by
treating pure beef fat byacertain process. Afterwards,
in order to make the product more wholesome and

ae

15

digestible as well as more palatable, various modifications
in the process were from time to time introduced. The
present method is to take selected fat of the steer, re-
duce it to oil, which is called ‘oleo oil,’ and then mix i
and work this oleo oil with natural lard, milk,cream and”
butter. Oleomargarine furnishes a very valuable by-
product of the slaughter houses and packing establish-
ments, and the effect has been to utilize what had before
gone to waste, to increase the value of beef cattle and to

“ASPET

decrease the price of butter. It has practically no com-
mercial use or value, except as a cheap and wholesome

substitute for butter and as such it necessarily competes
with butter. If it is not allowed to be used as a
substitute for or to compete with butter, the discovery
is of no practical utility to mankind.

The commercial character of oleomargarine is de-
scribed by Mr. Justice Peckham in the case of Schollen-
berger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 8-12. The growth

are abies i ae PADRE LLG

and extent of the use of oleomargarine in every
civilized country is part of the common history of the
times. The official records of the United States govern-
ment show that the output during the twelve months
ending June 30, 1900, amounted to 107,045,028 pounds,
an average of 8,920,419 pounds per month, and that
the revenue collections from oleomargarine in 1900
were $2,543,785.! On the other hand, the same records
show the yearly sales of butter to have been 1,492,699,-

Eee

ROS APOE

143 pounds;? so that the production of oleomargarine

.:

was only about seven per cent. of the amount of butter |
manufactured. As oleomargarine was invented and is E
Senate Doc. 168, 57th Cong., Ist session. e

a4

> Twelfth Census. 1900, vol. IX, Manufactures, pt. III, p. 517.

£5 ees

16

used commercially almost wholly as a_ substitute
for butter and in competition with butter, it is
desirable that its flavor and color should be similar to
the flavor and color of butter, and hence the necessity
for the use of flavoring and coloring matter, being the
same as that used to color and flavor butter. Oleo-
margarine is colored yellow for exactly the same reason
that butter is colored, namely, to meet the taste and
demand of the public.

In 1886 Congress determined to tax oleomargarine
and regulate its manufacture. The act of August 2,
1886, contained a definition of oleomargarine and of
butter which recognized the use of coloring matter as an
element in the manufacture of both articles. It treated
all oleomargarine, no matter how colored, as one article
for the purposes of taxation. The tax then imposed
was at the rate of two cents per pound, and between
November 1, 1886, and the close of the year 1901
more than $21,000,000 had been paid as_ taxes
under this law. The act of Congress of May 9,
1902, does not change these definitions, but oleo-
margarine is classified according to color, and that “ free
from artificial coloration that causes it to look like but-
ter of any shade of yellow” is taxed at one-fourth of
one cent per pound, while that containing “artificial
coloration that causes it to look like butter of any shade
of yellow,” is taxed at ten cents per pound, or forty
times as much.

The discussion in this brief will proceed upon the face
of the act of Congress in question and its undisputed
practical operation and effect, which is to prohibit
the sale of yellow oleomargarine. No quotations will

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~ eat ORR ee CRIM

17

be made from the debates in which the real purpose
of the enactment may have been declared by indi-
vidual members, because counsel are apprehensive that
such debates are not admissible. Anowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41,72. Under the decisions, the question is most
perplexing. The court frequently does refer to these
debates for information, and yet has often declared that
they are not admissible to show purpose or motive or to
determine the intention of particular legislation. The true
rule appears to be that debates may be referred to in
order to show the occasion for the legislation and the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, but not in
order to ascertain the individual motives or purposes of
its promoters or to control the meaning of the language
used. As, in the present cases, reference to the de-
bates would involve a showing of individual motives
and purposes calculated, as it might be charged, to ex-
cite prejudice and sympathy, which counsel are not
satisfied constitute proper elements in the strictly legal
judgment which the court is required to render, they
will not be referred to in argument, It is enough to say
that the supposed “ exigencies which led to the passage
of the act” and “ the reasons for fixing the duty at this
amount” may be ascertained by examining the de-
bates.!__ If the court shall reach the conclusion that it will
consult these evidences of legislative intent and purpose,
the references in the margin may be of convenience.?

"American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474; Ad-
dridge v. Williams, 3 Wow. 9, 24; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 459;
Platt y. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 64. See also Holy 7rinit
Church v, United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463; The Delaware, 161 U.S.
459, 472; Dunlap v. United States, 173 U.S. 65, 75. United States v.
Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 318, 360.

* Congressional Record, 57th Cong., Ist sess., vol. 35, part 2, pp. 1251
et Seg., 1299, 1310, 1544; part 3, pp. 3192, 3195, 3196, 3246, 3270-3274,
3280, 3322, 3452, 3458, 3466, 3467, 3499-3514, 3556, 3595-3597.

RNY ETE IN EN ESRI TG PION OEP Ry AEE TH EN

18

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

Error in refusing to hold that the provisions of the
act of Congress of August 2, 1886, as amended by the
act of Congress of May 9, 1902, were in contravention
of the Constitution of the United States andthe amend- .
ments thereto, in that—

(1) They constitute an encroachment upon and inter-
ference with the powers reserved to the several
States;

(2) They deprive the plaintiffs in error of liberty and
property without due process of law;

(3) They invest an administrative officer with the
power finally to determine essentially judicial ques-
tions.

Error in striking out and refusing to consider proper
evidence offered and received on behalf of the defend-
ants below in the first three cases, tending to prove:

(1) That oleomargarine is a substitute for and com-
petes with butter, that the market demand for and
commercial value of both butter and oleomargarine re-
quire that they shall havea certain shade of yellow during
all seasons of the year, and that there is practically no
market either for uncolored butter or uncolored oleo-
margarine;

(2) That the cost of production of oleomargarine is
such that, after payment of a tax of ten cents per pound
thereon, it cannot be sold.

The questions presented under these assignments of
error may be classified for the purposes of argument
under the following heads, viz.:

—————,

19

Il. The power of Congress to levy excise taxes on manufac-
tures (pp. 19-28).

IL The internal commerce of the States and the exercise
of the taxing power by Congress (pp. 28-52).

Ill. The restrictions upon the taxing power contained in
the Fifth Amendment (pp. 52-70).

IV. The provision of section 14 of the act conferring
judicial power upon the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (pp. 70-75).

V. Effect of the invalid amendment upon the original act
(pp. 75-76).

I.

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO LEVY EXCISE TAXES ON MANUFAC-
TURES.

The Constitution of the United States grants to
Congress (Art. I, sec. 8) “the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of
the United States,” and directs that capitation and other
direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census or
enumeration, and that duties, imposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States. Sub-
ject to these two directions, which are not strictly
limitations of power but rules prescribing the mode in
which the power shall be exercised,! the only express
limitation in the Constitution, as originally adopted, was
that no “tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any State.”?

An examination of the debates in the various conven-
tions to which the Constitution was submitted for ratifi-
cation and of the writings of that time will show that the
subject of federal taxation and the danger of oppression
from its exercise was discussed as much as any other fea-

2 Chief Ju stice Chase in Veasve Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, at p. 541.
* Art. 1 Sec. 9 Purrtent v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 290.

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ture, and that some of the States apprehended particular
injury from the power to levy excises on manufactures
and commodities. It was particularly objected by the
opponents of the Constitution that Congress was given
power to pass any law which it thought necessary and
proper in aid of the powers granted to it. The answer
of Hamilton in the Federalist was that Congress could
not by its mere declaration make that necessary and
proper to the execution of its powers which, in its
essence, was not necessary and proper. His language
was (Ford's ed. No. 78, p. 521):

“If it be said that the legislative body are
themselves the cojistitutional judges of their own
powers, and that the construction they put upon
them is conclusive upon the other departments, it
may be answered that this cannot be the natural
presumption, where it is not to be collected from
any particular provisions in the Constitution.
It is not otherwise to be supposed that the
Constitution could intend to enable the repre-
sentatives of the people to substitute their will to
that of their constituents. It is far more rational to
suppose that the courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and
the legislature, in order, among other things,
to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority. The interpretation of the laws is
a proper and a peculiar province of the courts. The
Constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by
the judges, as the fundamental law. _ It, there-
fore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as
well as the meaning of any particular act proceed-
ing from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between
the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in
other words, the constitution ought to be preferred
to the statute; the intention of the people to the
intention of their agents.”

—————

21

Notwithstanding this assurance, destined as it was
to become an elemental feature of our constitutional
jurisprudence,’ it is well known that the consent of the
people in the necessary number of States was secured
only upon the pledge that amendments recognizing the
reserved powers of the States and protecting the indi-
vidual against the abuse of the powers granted to the
national government would be forthwith submitted.

Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, :
7 Pet. 243, 250. In pursuance of this pledge, the first :
Congress (1 Stat. 97; Rev. Stat. p. 28, note) proposed
the first ten articles of amendment to the Consti- :
tution, “in order,” as recited in the preamble of
the resolution, “ to prevent misconstruction or abuse :
of its powers” and for the purpose of adding ** declara-
tory and restrictive clauses.” Of these restrictive
clauses, the Fifth Article provides that “ no person shall

be deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law,” and the Tenth Article provides x
that “the powers not delegated to the United States ;
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, g
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” ;
These amendments are clearly to be regarded of equal :

force and validity with the provisions of the Constitution
itself. As Mr. Justice Shiras, speaking for the court in the
recent case of Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 543, 544 said:
“The Constitution of the United States, with
the several amendments thereof, must be regarded
as one instrument, all of whose provisions are to

be deemed of equal validity. . . .

, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 176-179; AfcCulloch v. State of
Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, 421, 423; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603,
614,615; Smyth vy. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527: Matter of Application
of Facobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 112.

I a aS cia eI aS i Ss ce a PUSPATI

thy OF 8 : : - Ores st

22

It is one of the important functions of this
court to so interpret the various provisions and
limitations contained in the organic law of the
Union that each and all of them shall be respected
and observed.”

But whether the Fifth and Tenth Amendments con-
stitute limitations upon the taxing power of Congress
has never yet been expressly adjudged. The wise rule
of our system of jurisprudence which confines adjudi-
cations by the courts to actual cases as they arise from

time to time, has made the growth of American constitu-
tional law extremely slow, and novel exercises of govern-
mental power are constantly presented which require a
renewed exposition of fundamental principles and a re-
examination of the distribution of governmental powers
contained in the Constitution.! For centuries, the
principles of the common law have been growing by
slow steps to maturity and symmetry, evolving rules of
private justice as between man and man, and it is,
therefore, hardly astonishing that the growth of consti-
tutional jurisprudence also should be by slow and cau-
tious steps in the application to individual cases of
the eternal principles of public justice embodied in the
Constitution which protect personal liberty and_prop-
erty against the abuse of the powers of government.
Although the Constitution has been in operation for one
hundred and fourteen years, this court has not yet ad-
judged whether there are any qualifications of the power
of Congress to levy taxes other than the rules of ap-
portionment and geographical uniformity, except in
so far as the instrumentalities of the state govern-
ments are concerned.? Indeed, it was not until

' Lel itp Vv. Port ef Mobile, 127 A. oh 639, 648.
* The Collector Vv. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124; United States v. Railroad
Company, 17 Wall. 322, 327; Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 4

aie

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23

May. 1900, in the case of Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U. S. 41, 92, that the true meaning of the provision
“yniform throughout the United States” was def-
initely settled to be geographical uniformity.’ In
the later case of Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371,
377, Mr. Justice Shiras stated in the opinion of the
court, referring to a federal statute, that “ the consti-
tutional right against unjust taxation is given for the
protection of private property,” but did not discuss
what provision of the Constitution secured that right.?
And still later, in the case of Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S.
608, 622, we find Mr. Justice Brewer stating that the
rule of geographical uniformity was the only limitation
imposed upon Congress by the framers of the Constitu-
tion and the people who adopted it in respect of the
power to lay excise taxes. Yet, it cannot be supposed
that this language was intended to recognize the
existence of an unrestrained taxing power, in view
of the dissent of the learned Justice in A‘owlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 110.

From the statement of facts, it appears that the inquiry
in each of the cases at bar is confined to the validity
of the act of Congress of May 9, 1902, in so far as
it operates upon the internal commerce of the States of
Illinois and Ohio. ‘The oleomargarine in question was
manufactured and sold in Illinois and Ohio by residents
of those States and the transaction was confined to

U.S.151,178; Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 162; /a-
come Tax Cases, 157 U.S. 429, 584; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115,
117; Ambrosini vy. Untted States, 187 U.S. 1,7; Snyder v. Bettman, 199
U.S. 249, 253-

'See, however, Mr. Justice Field’s discussion of the provision in
Income Tax Cases, 157 U.S. 429, at p. 592 ef seg.

2 See also Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 51.

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the internal commerce of each State. It is, of course,
settled that Congress was not delegated any power
whatever to regulate the internal commerce of the
States, and that the regulation of such commerce
was expressly reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment. Giddons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194, 203;
License Cases, 5 How. 504, 574, 599; Passenger Cases, 7
How. 283, 400; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 470-471;
United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, 44; ‘Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 96-97; United States v. E. C
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,12, 13. That the police power
never was surrendered by the States is also a proposition
that need not be argued. It is “conceded in all the cases.”
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S.
650, 661; seealso Juve Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545.554, 556;
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472; United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11, 13; Connolly
v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 558. Andthe
act now before the court, if grounded upon the attempt
to regulate the manufacture of dairy products and oleo-
margarine and their sale in the internal commerce of the
States, would be clearly beyond the powers of Congress
and unconstitutional. Uzited States v. Dewitt. Wall. 41,
45; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 320; Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 96; Covington, &e.,
Bridge Co.v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 210; United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12, 13; United
States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. Rep. 424, 432.

The provisions of this act, so far as they affect the
internal commerce of a State, can, therefore, only be
sustained under the power of Congress to tax and to
employ necessary and proper means for carrying that

at Tees

E_

25

power into execution. It follows that the exact ques-
tion presented in the cases at bar is whether Congress
may prohibit the internal manufactures of the States
by means of a prohibitive tax.

The power of Congress to exclude any commodity
from interstate commerce or to lay a prohibitive ex-
cise tax upon articles transported between States in
order indirectly to accomplish that end, need not now
be discussed. It will be time enough to consider the
subject when a case actually involving that momentous
question shall arise, for it would be difficult to suggest
one of a graver character or the decision of which would
be more far-reaching. Nevertheless, we may remark,
in the language of Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the
opinion of the court in the recent Lottery Case, 188
U.S. at pp. 362-363:

“ The power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the States, although plenary, cannot be
deemed arbitrary, since it is subject to such limita-
tions or restrictions as are prescribed by the Con-
stitution. This power, therefore, may not be
exercised so as to infringe rights secured or pro-
tected by that instrument. It would not be diff-
cult to imagine legislation that would be justly liable
to such an objection as that stated, and be hostile
to the objects for the accomplishment of which
Congress was invested with the general power
to regulate commerce among the several States.”

RG LAE ELE ALE LIE ONO, ARISTON

PEO EIT

Nor, as to foreign commerce, is there any need to chal-
lenge or doubt the unlimited power of Congress to
exclude or prohibit, and, as a means to that end,

to lay prohibitive duties. Its authority to do so 2
does not rest upon the taxing power, for even if the e
national government had no power to tax, its power bs

os

26

to regulate foreign commerce and international rela-
tions would be broad enough to support prohibitory
duties on imports. No one has ever doubted that
a governmental power to regulate international trade
included the power to tax it as a means of regulation.
The American colonies did not deny the authority of
the British Parliament to tax them as a regulation of
commerce. The War of the Revolution was precipitated
because Parliament sought to use this power for another
object, namely, the raising of revenue as such.!

It may, therefore, be conceded that Congress, under
the plenary power to regulate our relations with foreign
countries, can exclude commodities of any nature
whatsoever, and levy prohibitive taxes or protective
duties to accomplish that object. The power of Con-
gress—the legislative power of a sovereign nation—
to exclude foreign persons or commodities in_ its
judgment and discretion need not be challenged in the
slightest degree. But no one would scriously suggest
that any class of American citizens could be excluded
or deported under the same power which enables Con-
gress to exclude or deport aliens. United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 653. When we say
that Congress may exclude or deport foreigners or their
products or publications from the United States, or
pass a non-intercourse law, or place an embargo upon
foreign ships or manufactures, we are but recognizing
the ancient doctrine of international law that an alien
and an alien's property come into the territory of a
sovereign nation only by its sufferance, and may be

' Gibbons v. Ugden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199, 202.

a

27

excluded at its will.!. And whether the exclusion be for

the purpose of self-defense, or as an incident to the
regulation of imports or commerce, or otherwise,
the right to exclude or deport or prohibit is as much
the sovereign’s prerogative as the power to make
treaties giving to foreigners the privilege of abiding or
of bringing or selling their goods or publications within
the sovereign’s domain. That this attribute of sover-
eignty has been surrendered by and does not belong to
the States cannot for a moment be doubted, for the
States are expressly forbidden to enter into any form
of treaty.”

In Cooley on Taxation, the distinguished author well
says (at pp. 11, 12, 13):

“In the laying of taxes, one purpose had in view
may be to encourage one branch of industry or
trade, though at the expense of others; as where a
tax is laid upon certain fabrics received from abroad
by the exchanges of commerce for the sake of
encouraging the domestic producer of similar
articles, on whose industry the tax operates as a
bounty. Such a burden, however, may be so
heavy that the market will not warrant its being
paid, and in such case, instead of producing reve-
nue, it merely precludes importation. But a law
which, under the name of taxation, has for its
purpose only to embarrass and, perhaps, to
destroy a certain branch of commerce, if en-
acted by a State, would look to the general
police power for its justification; and, if enacted
by the general government, would seem more
properly to derive its force from the authority con-
ferred upon the government to regulate commerce,

' Nishimura Ekiuy. United States, 142 U.S. 651,659; Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 707, 712; United States v. Brigantine

“ William,’ 2 Hall's Am. Law Journal, 255; Gzbdons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton,
I, 191, 192.

? Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.

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28

and the intercourse with foreign countries, than to
an authority conferred for revenue purposes, which
such a law would not aim or tend to sub-
serve. . . . As no one will pay the tax
who does not expect to be reimbursed the
expense from the profits of sales, it is ob-
vious that the heavier the tax the fewer can
afford to pay it, and it may be made so heavy that
no one can afford to pay it, and then it becomes
prohibitory. A tax laid for the double purpose of
regulation and revenue must be grounded in both
the police and the taxing power; buf the grant of
a power to tax would not authorize the imposition of
a burden in its nature and purpose prohibitory.”

II.

THE INTERNAL COMMERCE OF THE STATES AND THE EXERCISE OF
THE TAXING POWER BY CONGRESS.

In the cases at bar, the court is called upon to con-
sider what purports on its face to be a tax law, but
which, it is contended, constitutes the imposition of a
burden in its nature and purpose prohibitory of the
internal commerce of the States in a recognized article
of commerce. '

There can be no reasonable doubt that any statute
of Congress which purported on its face to prohibit
internal commerce in oleomargarine would be declared
by this court to be unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it sought to accomplish an object not en-
trusted to Congress and invaded the powers reserved
to the States.2 It is now to be determined whether
Congress may nevertheless accomplish this forbidden
object and thereby under the form of a tax law, do indi-
rectly what it could not do directly.

1 Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 8.
2 United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, 43-45; Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U. S. 82, 96; United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-13.

29

If the object of the act be legitimate taxation, the
excise in question is concededly within the constitu-
tional powers of Congress; but if, under the pretext of
laying an excise on manufactures, the object sought
-to be accomplished is to prohibit or destroy the manu-
factures and internal commerce of the States, then it is
submitted that the legislation is not legitimate taxation
at all and is beyond the authority delegated to Con-
gress and conflicts with the powers expressly reserved
to the States.

Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 421, 423, among other things said:

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ag PARANA ENE

“ Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
and which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitu-
tional. . . - Should Congress, in the execu-
tion of its powers, adopt measures which are pro-
hibited by the Constitution; or should Congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted &
to the government, it would become the painful 3
duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such
a decision come before it, to say that such an act
was not the law of the land.”

MOE SOR EATERS DOE 9 ik

The settled doctrine of this court is that whatever may
be the motive or pretext or guise of a statute, or in
whatever language it may have been framed, its pur-
pose and its validity must be determined by its natural
and reasonable effect to be ascertained from the prac-
tical operation of its provisions.

Thus, in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 VU. S. E
259, 268, Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the unanimous fe
opinion of the court, among other things, said: i

|

SUE PONTE TS ANA LTE RS

hi a ale oo te

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30

“In whatever languaye a statute may be framed,
its purpose must be determined by its natural and
reasonable effect; and if it is apparent that the
object of this statute, as judged by that criterion, is
to compel the owners of vessels to pay a sum of
money for every passenger brought by them from
a foreign shore, and landed at the port of New
York, it is as much a tax on passengers if collected
from them, or a tax on the vessel or owners for the
exercise of the right of landing their passengers in
that city, as was the statute held void in the Pas-
senger cases. To require a heavy and almost im-
possible condition to the exercise of this right, ‘
with the alternative of payment of a small sum of
money, is, in effect, to demand payment of that
sum,

ed ai

pa

Mr. Justice Miller in Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S.
455. 462, again referred to this point in the following
language: >

In all cases of this kind it has been repeatedly
held that, when the question is raised whether the
State statute is a just exercise of State power or is
intended by roundabout means to invade the :
domain of Federal authority, this court will look ’
into the operation and effect of the statute to dis-
cern its purpose. See /Zenderson v. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.
S. 275; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577."

In construing a state statute applicable to oleomar-

garine, Mr. Justice Peckham in Col/‘ns v. New Hamp-
shire, 171 U.S. 30, 33,34, speaking for the court, said: 4
* The direct and necessary result of a statute

must be taken into consideration when deciding as

to its validity, even if that result is not in so many
words either enacted or distinctly provided for. In
whatever language a statute may be framed, its
purpose must be determined by its natural and
reasonable eticct. Henderson vy. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259; Morgan's Steamship Co. v. (

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31

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Loutstana, 118 U.S. 455, at 462. Although under
the wording of this statute the importer is per-
mitted to sell oleomargarine freely and to any ex-
tent, provided he colors it pink, yet the permission
to sell, when accompanied by the imposition of a
condition which, if complied with, will effectually
prevent any sale, amounts in law to a prohibition.”

Indeed, as Mr. Justice Harlan said, in Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661:

“The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor
are they to be misled by mere pretences. They
are at liberty—indeed, are under a solemn duty—
to look at the substance of things, whenever they
enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has
transcended the limits of its authority.”

And Mr. Justice Brewer in Fazrbank v. United States,
181 U. S. 283, 294, 295. 300, speaking of the decision
in Woodruff v. Parham, & Wall. 123, used the fol-
lowing language:

‘In other words, that decision affirms the great
principle that what cannot be done directly because
of constitutional restrictions cannot be accomplished
indirectly by legislation which accomplishes the
same result. . . . The form in which the
burden is imposed cannot vary the substance. . . .
Constitutional provisions, whether operating by
way of grant or limitation, are to be enforced ac-
cording to their letter and_ spirit, and cannot be
evaded by any legislation which, though not in
terms trespassing on the letter, yet in substance
and effect destroy the grant or limitation.”

In Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S.
688, 698, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said, speaking of
taxation:

“ The substance and not the shadow determines
the validity of the exercise of the power.”

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And again in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429, 581:

“ If it be true that by varying the form the sub-
stance may be changed, it is not easy to see that
anything would remain of the limitations of the
Constitution. . . . But constitutional —provi-
sions cannot be thus evaded. It is the substance
and not the form which controls, as has indeed
been established by repeated decisions of this
court.”

In Zhomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 283, Mr. Justice
Shiras, speaking of the acts of a territorial legislature
under authority of Congress, said :

* When, as may sometimes happen, the legisla-
ture transcends its functions and enacts, in the guise
of a tax law,a law whereby the property of the
citizen is confiscated, or taken for private purposes,
the judiciary has the right and duty to interpose.”

Mr. Justice McKenna, in Swth v. St. Louts and
Southwestern Ry. Co.. 181 U.S. 248, 257, said:
“Any pretense or masquerade will be disre-

garded, and the true purpose of a statute ascer-
tained.”

It must, therefore, be presumed that the purpose which
Congress had in view in the statute of 1902 was to ac-
complish that which follows as the natural and reason-
able effect of its enactment, and that if the tax now in
question operates as a prohibition of the manufacture
and sale of an article of commerce, the legislation is an
invasion of the powers reserved to the States, and secks
to accomplish an object beyond the powers granted to
Congress.

It is not, of course, disputed that Congress for
national purposes may tax the manufactures of a
State whether constituting internal or interstate

’ | -A@) v7

33

commerce, and that both the national and state gov-
ernments can lay excise taxes upon the same
articles. Conflict may thus arise; and as commodities
can only bear a certain amount of taxation, varying ac-
cording to the nature of the article, the exercise of the
taxing power by one government may indirectly affect
the collection of taxes by the other, The mere fact
that Congress taxed a given article, ¢. g., liquors, would
not. of course, limit or affect the power of the States
either to tax or to prohibit its manufacture so far as
concerned internal commerce; ! and conversely the
fact that a State taxed its manufactures would
not limit or affect the power of Congress — to
tax the same commodities. In the case at bar,
there is, however, no conflict of taxing powers, for
neither the State of Illinois nor the State of Ohio
taxes the manufacture of oleomargarine other than indi-
reetly by means of general property taxes.

In its final analysis, then, the court is asked to deter-
mine the validity of the present law according to its
natural and reasonable effect which * amounts in law toa
prohibition” ; in other words, to determine by its practical
operation whether it is a tax law at all, or merely an at-
tempt to prohibit internal commerce under the guise or
pretext of a tax law. There is no rule of consti-
tutional law and no. consideration of public policy
which will prevent this court from deciding ac-
cording to substance and not to form, simply because a
civen enactment purports to be an exercise of the tax-
ing power. The indisputable law of the Constitution is

' License Tax Cases, § Wall. 462, 470; Pervear Vv. The Comme rwealth,
5 Wall. 475, 479

34

that Congress may not interfere with or regulate the
internal commerce or affairs ofa State, and the court will
enforce that rule according to its letter and its spirit.
The Tenth Amendment imperatively forbids any such
interfering regulation as much as if the Constitution
declared in so many words that Congress should not in-
terfere with internal commerce. It surely cannot be
maintained as a rule of our constitutional law that what
Congress may not do directly it may nevertheless do
indirectly under the pretext of an exercise of the taxing
power. As Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said in the /ncome
Tax cases, supra (157 U. S. 429, 581):

“It is the substance and not the form which
controls, as has indeed been established by re-
peated decisions of this court.”

But, it will be said, the concession of the power to tax
brings the case within the rule that the extent of the
exercise of the taxing power cannot be controlled by the
courts. This argument, however, begs the whole
question. The point to be decided is whether or not
this is a tax law or a regulation of the internal
commerce of the States. If it be a legitimate tax
law, it is constitutional. If the nominal exercise of
the taxing power be a mere pretext “for the accom-
plishment of objects not entrusted to the government,”
then it is not constitutional, and it is the province of this
court to so declare. It may be often difficult to draw
a line between a tax law and an attempt to regulate or
prohibit under the guise or pretext of a tax; but yet it
is not always impracticable, for the validity of many en-
actments, state and national, may depend upon degree.

The amount of a tax or license fee or regulation of rates

35

frequently forms the basis of judicial action and de-
termines the validity of legislation. The court has
found no insuperable difficulty in determining the dif-
ference between a tax and a reasonable fee cover-
ing expenses to protect the government against fraud, !
between a tax on exports and a mere stamp duty on a
document,?. between a tax anda penalty,* between a
tax and a covert regulation of interstate commerce,* be-
tween a legitimate regulation of rates and a regulation
which is confiscatory.* The amount of the tax imposed
ina given case has often been considered by this court in
determining whether a particular statute was valid as a
means to accomplish a constitutional object, or invalid as
a pretext to accomplish an object forbidden by the Con-
stitution. The instance of a license tax upon persons
or corporations engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce is a commonone. In such a case, the only
object which may constitutionally be accomplished by
a State is compensation for reasonable governmental
inspection or supervision. If the amount of the tax
be materially in excess of what is necessary
for that object, there is an indication of a purpose
to regulate foreign or interstate commerce; and it
is therefore necessary for the court to draw the
line in each case according to the amount and adjudge
what amount will constitute taxation for a proper pur-
pose and what amount will constitute a regulation
of commerce. Aélantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia,

' Pace v. Burgess, Collector, 92 U. S. 372, 374, 375:

2 Fairbank v. Untted States, 181 U.S. 283, 290.

* Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S, 605, 611.

§ Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162.
5 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527.

t
*
¥
3

Py ees

Ce EO Sher AG So? * he Le eM JOE PAA L Oo 12 on a
IM OER SLANE NE ESI ENG RAO Set Hg Me

36

190 U. S. 160, 164. While a State may impose
a license fee upon foreign corporations engaged in
interstate commerce and indirectly tax their fran-
chises,1 it cannot for a moment be doubted that,
if the State should impose a prohibitory tax, it
would be unconstitutional and that the question
of constitutionality in such a case would depend entirely
upon degree. If, for example, a State should impose a
property tax upon an express company,” the effect of
which was practical prohibition, no doubt the court would
hold that it was not a legitimate tax at all, but a round-
about way of prohibiting indirectly what the State could
not prohibit directly, namely, interstate commerce,
So, whenever it is claimed that the amount of
a state inspection charge upon articles of foreign or
interstate commerce is so much in excess of what is
reasonably necessary to accomplish that object as
to evince a purpose to interfere by taxation
with foreign or interstate commerce, the court
must. decide when the amount in the par-
ticular case becomes unconstitutional. /atapsco Guano
Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U.S. 345. 351 ef teg. citing
cascs. The same principle applies in those cases
where the amount of compensation for the use of prop-
erty affected by a public interest is drawn in question as
being confiscation in the suise of police regulation.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S.

\Varne v. Grand Trunk Ry Co., 142 U. S. 217, 228; Fuecklen v.
Shelly County, 145 U.S. 1, 235 Postal Telegraph Cable Cov. Adams,
155 U. S$. 688,697; Adlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S.
160, 163, citing cases.

2 Adams Express Company Vv. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194,220; Adams Express
Company v. Kentucky, V66 U.S. 171, 180: Adams Express Company V-
Ohio, 166 U.S. 185, 221.

37

238. 250, and Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards
Co., 183 U. S. 79, 85, citing cases.

At the last term, in Helwig Vv. United States, 188
U. S. 605, 611, Mr. Justice Peckham said:

oat MPL CRO -

cea’

“Whether called a ‘further sum” or an ‘ addi-
tional duty,’ or by some other name, the amount
imposed was so large in proportion to the value of
the merchandise imported as to show beyond doubt
that it was a sum imposed not in fact, as a duty
upon an imported article, but as a penalty and
nothing else.”

sete

So, with regard to the tax in question, the amount
of the tax is so large in proportion to the value of
the merchandise as to show beyond doubt that it was
a sum imposed, not in fact as an excise for revenue,
but as a prohibition, and nothing else.

Let us take, for the purpose of concrete illustration,
the case of oleomargarine. It has been held that a
State, under the power to regulate its internal com-
merce, could prohibit the manufacture and sale of oleo-
margarine (/owell v. vansylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686;
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. 5. 461, 467,and Capi-
tal City Dairy Cov. Ohio. 183 U.S. 238, 246), but that
it could not prohibit the sale of oleomargarine manu-
factured in other States and offered for sale in the
course of interstate comimerce. Schollenberger v. Penn-
sylvania, 171 U. S. 1,21, 25. Is it conceivable that
nevertheless, a State, could indirectly do what this
court has said it could not directly do, that is, prac-
tically prohibit interstate commerce in oleomarga-
rine by taxing it to death? Surely this court
would not entertain an argument attempting to
uphold such legislation upon the ground that on

88

its face it was impartial and applied alike to internal
and interstate commerce and that the power to
tax involved the power to destroy.}

Ifa State should impose a tax upon a commercial
commodity as property? and the effect of such a tax, as
to articles brought from other States, was to destroy all
Opportunity to sell the commodity, it cannot be doubted
that the law would be declared unconstitutional as
interfering with interstate commerce even though the
same amount of tax should be laid on domestic man-
ufactures as Property, and even though such atax would
only apply after the ‘original package’ of importation
had been broken and -the contents exposed for sale.?
There would be prima facie no discrimination in the
law; on its face it would apply impartially to home
and foreign manufactures alike. Nevertheless, such a
tax law would be held unconstitutional; for, if allowed
to operate, it could as effectually bar the products and
manufactures of other States as if the law directly
enacted that such articles should not be sold.4 The
products of one or more States could thus, by taxation,
be excluded from any State. Fortunately, “such efforts
have been heretofore rendered fruitless by the supervis-

: Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 131, 140; Brown v. Houston,
114 U. S. 622, 634. Of course, where the State may prohibit as a pc ice
regulation, different considerations are presented, as discussed by Juage
Cooley ia the quotation fron his work on Taxation, supra, pp. 27, 28,

* Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 131, 140; //znson y. Lott, 8 Wall.
148, 152; Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 632, 634; Postal Lelegraph
Cable Co. v. Adans, 155 U.S. 688, 697; American Refrigerator Tran-
stt Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70, 74; Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179
U. S. 445, 453.

3 May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 508.
Leloup vy. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 647; Brennan y. Titusville,
153 U.S. 289, 303.

39

ing action of this court.”1_ In the supposed case, it would
undoubtedly be held that, in whatever language the
statute was framed, its purpose must be determined by
its natural and reasonable effect. The court would brush
aside the form and the pretext, and hold that the
tax in its practical effect was prohibitory, that the pur-
pose of the legislation was legally to be determined by
such prohibitory effect, and that prohibition was beyond
the constitutional power of a State.”

In the case of such a property tax levied by a State,
would it not be relevant to show that the amount of the
tax was such as to prevent sales, and that consequently
it was not strictly a tax law at all but a regulation of
interstate commerce? It would undoubtedly be held
that in whatever language the statute was framed, its
purpose must be determined by its natural and reason-
able effect.

On the other hand, if the tax was not prohibitive

but a proportional and reasonable charge for the

maintenance of the state government, levied upon all
similar property’, entirely different considerations would
be presented, and it would then be for the courts to
determine whether such a law was in its purpose, opera-
tion or effect a proper and reasonable tax law which did
not unduly interfere with the power of Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce.? In such a case, too, would it
not be relevant to show that the amount of the tax was
such as not to operate as a_ practical prohibition of

l Crldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 633.

2 American Fert. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, No. Car., 43 Fed. Rep.
699, 613, cited in Patapico Git m0 Ca. v. North Carolia, 171 U.S. 345,
347.

* Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 697.

67

40

sales in competition with the products of the taxing
State? Or, if it were in the guise of an inspection or
license fee, would it not be relevant to show that it was
not large enough to operate as a prohibition or penalty ?!
Are not these all cases of degree and does not the ex-
tent and effect of the tax determine its constitutionality ?
Nor does the fact that the act of Congress applies
also to interstate commerce affect the question,
for it is the settled law of this court that
the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce does not uphold any act which operates
directly upon internal comimerce and invades the
domain of the States. The very point was involved in
the 7rade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S.82, 95, 96, where, de-
livering the unanimous opinion of the court, Mr. Justice
Miller said:
* When, therefore, Congress undertakes to enact
a law, which can only be valid as a regulation of
commerce, it is reasonable to expect to find on the
face of the law, or from its essential nature, that it
is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations,
or among the several States, or with the Indian
tribes. ff not so limited, it is in excess of the
power of Congress. If its main purpose be to
establish a regulation applicable to all trade, to
commerce at all points, especially if it be apparent
that it is designed to govern the commerce wholly
between citizens of the same State, it is obviously
the exercise of a power not confided to Congress.”
The principal argument in support of the law has
heretofore been based upon the famous phrase “ that
the power to tax involves the power to destroy,” in
) Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 425, 429; IVelton vy. State of Abis-
rurd, 91 U.S. 275, 278: People v. Compagnie Gen. Transatiantigue, 107
U.S. 5). 60; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69,73; Wallin v. Mich-
agan, 110 U.S. 446, 401; Emert v. A/éssour?, 156 U.S. 296, 311.

——, 26768

41

support of which is cited the decision of this court in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
We know of no dictum in any decision that has

PES SOM

been more misconstrued than the statement of Chief
Justice Marshall in J/cCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 431, that “the power to tax involves the power
to destroy,” nor of one whose misapplication is more
illustrative of the dangers which lurk in a brilliant epi-
gram. Since that decision, there has been no arbi-
trary or unjust exaction under the guise or pretext of
taxation but that it is said to be sanctioned by this
dictum. It has done immeasurable harm, for it has
been held up before legislatures as placing in
their hands unrestrained power to exercise tyranny in
the form of law. “How oft the sight of means to do
ill deeds makes ill deeds done.”! The great Chief
Justice never meant to say that the taxing power
could be arbitrarily exercised to the extent to which
his language has been perverted, or that it could be used
as a pretext to accomplish a forbidden object. He would
have repudiated such a proposition as monstrous and
against all justice and reason. Far from meaning
to say that the power of taxation could be used as
a mere pretext for accomplishing objects not entrusted
to the government, at page 423 of the same opinion,
he distinctly pointed out that Congress could not do so.
He never meant that under the power of taxation, either
of the federal or the state governments, any class of
persons or business could properly be selected for de-
struction. He was speaking of a discriminating state

' King John, IV, 2. See‘ The Oleomargarine Bill” (Gov. Print, 1901),
p. 857.

42

tax imposed upon an instrumentality of the national gov-
ernment. He did not mean that, under the pretense of
taxation, Congress could invade any State and destroy
one of its industries solely for the purpose of bene-
fitting another competing industry. He was speak-
ing of a legitimate tax law. Had the occasien arisen
in his time, who can doubt that he would have
limited this now famous dictum to the facts of
that case? Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399.
Doubtless he would have held that the Constitution
will not admit of the exertion of any power of gov-
ernment, be it the taxing power or any other, which, in
its last analysis, is appropriate and calculated only to
interfere with the internal concerns of the States and to
accomplish the destruction of private property and the
deprivation of the right to pursue a useful calling with-
out due process of law.

Even though it be true, in a proper sense, that
the power to tax involves the power to destroy, it
is no less true, by the reasoning of the opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland (at p. 423), that this power to
destroy, in the hands of Congress, must not be exerted
to accomplish objects not assigned to it by the Con-
stitution. It must operate in harmony with the con-
stitutional scheme. On the other hand, this same power
to destroy in the hands of a State (which is the sense in
which it was discussed by Marshall, is justifiable by the
inherent power of government originally and always re-
siding in the States, provided only it be not forbidden
by the Constitution. In short, though the destruction
of the oleomargarine industry by a repressive state tax
might be supported under the police power by all those

as 2676

43

familiar arguments which have been advanced in this
court during the past sixteen years,! a similar repressive
tax by Congress must be supported, if at all, on other
grounds. Cooley on Taxation, p. 12, 13.

The suggestion in A/cCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 435, that Congress might tax a state instrumental-
ity with more reason than a State could tax an instru-

2
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2
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ae
reg

mentality of the Nation, cannot be cited as sustaining an
unlimited taxing power in Congress, inasmuch as it has
long since been established that Congress has no power
to tax the instrumentalities of a State (Szyder v. Bett-
man, 190 U.S. 249, 253), unless it be necessary and
proper to carry into execution some power given
to Congress other than the power of taxation.

In Berney v. Tax Collector, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 654, 674,
Harper, J., said, in speaking ofa state tax upon stock
of the United States Bank, and after discussing Mar-
shall’s dictum that the power to tax involves the power
to destroy:

“Tt will be perceived, that in my opinion the
question is, whether the imposition in question
is, 2x good! faith, a tax, or whether, under the
eulse of a’ tax, a penalty was intended to be
inflicted, with a view to the suppression of
the bank. Such a distinction was made in
the case of Zhe State v. Allen, 2 MC.
5s. where a tax, as it was called. of $10,000,
was imposed on the act of selling lottery
tickets. And this court held, that, although called
a tax, it was in fact a penalty, having no reference
to property; and that it violated the provision of
our constitution, that ‘no freeman of this State
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his

Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678; Capital City Dairy Co. Vv.
Ohio, 183 U.S. 238.

44

freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of
his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or the law of the land.’

lam aware, that it has been objected to this
method of construction, that it is liable to too
great uncertainty, and gives to the courts a dan-
gerous latitude of construction, in determining on
the ¢xlextion of the legislature. When will you
say that the law becomes unconstitutional? When
the tax is raised to five, or ten, or fifty per cent. ?
By what rule shall government be conducted ?
Or when can the legislature be assured that
its laws will have effect? In general, perhaps,
it is desirable, that rules of law should be
technical and artificial; being thus — suscepti-
ble of greater precision: but this is not always
practicable, and I fear that we may some-
times run into the most dangerous errors, in
searching after this precise, technical, artificial
rule. In sucha case as this, it is not possible to
have one, unless, by adopting such artificial reason-
ing as I have referred to in the beginning, we
pervert the constitution to. purposes, for which it,
most notoriously, was never intended, and change
the whole character of our institutions.”

|
|
:
|
|
|

IIE FBI EAB EAE Ne

The Veazie Bank case is not authority for an un-
limited and arbitrary power to tax. On the contrary
Chief Justice Chase said (p. 541) that—

“There are, indeed, certain virtual limitations,
arising from the principles of the Constitution itself.
It would undoubtedly be au abuse of the power if
so exercised as to impair the separate existence
and independent self-government of the States, er
ef excretsed for ends tnconsistent with the limited
grants of power in the Constitution.”

The tax in that case was sustained upon the ground
that Congress, in the exercise of undisputed authority
to regulate the currency, could adopt any means

suitable for that purpose, and that a prohibitive tax con-

pape ae

45

stituted an appropriate means.’ If the statute had
declared on its face that it was intended to prohibit
issues of currency by state banks, the act would have
been constitutional. The cxd was legitimate and pro-
hibitory means were appropriate. — If there had been no
power in Congress to regulate the currency, it cannot
be doubted that the tax then imposed would have been
regarded as seeking to accomplish an object not
entrusted to Congress and “exercised for ends incon-
sistent with the limited grants of power ” to the federal
government and the powers expressly reserved to the
States.

That the Iesre Bank decision does not rest upon the
proposition that the power to tax involves the power to
destroy the currency of state banks has been repeatedly
recognized by this court.

Phus, at the same term, Mr. Justice Miller, who con-
curred in the opinion of the court in the Veazie Bank
case, said in his dissenting opinion in //epburn v.
Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 636:

“In the Learie Bank vy. Fenno, decided at the
present term, this court held, after full consider-
ation, that it was the privilege of Congress to
furnish to the country the currency to be used
by it in the transaction of business, whether this
was done by means of coin, of the notes of the
United States, or of banks created by Congress.
And that as a means of making this power of
Congress efficient, that body could make this cur-
rency exclusive by taxing out of existence any
currency authorized by the States.”

The precise question decided in the Veazve Bank case

aiose again ten years later in National Bank v. United

' See, however, the language used at p. 548.

46

States, 101 U. S. 1, and the language employed in
deciding it shows clearly the scope of the princi-
ple involved. Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opin-
ion of the court, said (pp. 5. 6):

“We think this case comes directly within the
principles settled in Veaste Bank v. Fenno, (8 Wall.
533), where it was distinctly held that the tax im-
posed by that section on national and State banks
for paying out the notes of individuals or State
banks used for circulation was not unconstitutional.
The reason is thus stated by Mr. Chief Justice
Chase: ‘Having thus, in the exercise of undis-
puted constitutional powers, undertaken to provide
acurrency for the whole country, it cannot be
questioned that Cengress may con stitutionally se-
cure the benefit of it to the people by appro-
priate legislation. To this end Congress
has denied the quality of legal iender to
foreign coins, and has provided by law against
the imposition of counter!cit and base coin on the
community. To the same end Congress may re-
strain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as
at y of any notes not issued under its authority.
Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a
Soul ay ind ul ‘form currency for the country must
be a . . the tax thus laid is not on the
obiivati rut_On its use In a particular way. As
suas the United States, a State municipality has
no right to put its notes in circulation as money.
It may execute its obligations, but cannot, against
the will of Congress, make them money. The tax
is on the notes paid out, that is, made use of as a
circulatine medium. Such a use is against the
policy of the United States. Therefore the banker
who helps to keep up the use by paying them out
that is, employing them as the equivalent of money
in discharging his obligations, is taxed for what he

>
’

does. fhe daxation was no doubt intended to de-
stioy the use; but thatoas has just been seen, Con-

Le APY hed the power lo do.’

676

47

The true scope of the principle of the Veazve Bank
case is perhaps most clearly apparent from its applica-
tion in the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 596, de-
cided in 1884. It is there held that an otherwise un-
constitutional exercise of the taxing power may be
upheld where the object accomplished is one committed
to Congress by the Constitution ; and the Veazve Bank
case is relied on as the leading authority. Mr. Justice
Miller, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:

“If this is an expedient regulation of commerce
by Congress, and the end to be attained is one
falling within that power, the act is not void, be-
cause, within a loose and more extended sense
than was used in the Constitution, it is called a
tax. In the case of Veasie Bank v. Fenno, 8
Wall. 533. 549, the enormous tax of eight
[ten] per cent. per annum on the circulation
of State banks, which was designed, and did have
the effect, to drive all such circulation out of
existence, was upheld because it was a means
properly adopted by Congress lo protect the cur-
rency which it had created, namely, the leval-tender
notes and the notes of the national banks. / was
not subject, therefore, to the rules which would
invalidate an ordinary tax pure and siniple.

We are clearly of opinion that, in the ex-
ercise of its power to regulate immigration, and in
the very act of exercising that power, it was com-
petent for Congress to impose this contribution
on the ship owner engaged in that business.”

The ratio decidendi of the cases upon this point is
summed up by Mr. Justice Miller in Loaw Association

v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663. namely,

“Given a purpose or object for which taxation
may be lawfully used, and the extent of its exercise
is in iis very nature unlimited.”

And the tax involved in that case was condemned be-

cause the object of the statute was found to be the

rf
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encouragement and benetit of certain private industries.
To the same effect, see /urkersburg v. Brown, 106
U.S. 487, 500; Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. 1, 6; The
State ex rel.v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kan. 418, 427;
Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 461; Alead v. Acton,
139 Mass. 341, 344: Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me.
124, 128, 138; Sugar Co. v. Auditor General, 124 Mich.
674,678; State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 357; Wersmer v.
Village of Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91, 100; Bertholf v.
O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 515: Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147, 168; Burroughs on Taxa-
tion, pp. 6, 506.

Answering the argument that the power to tax in-
volves the power to destroy, Mr. Justice Harlan, de-
livering the dissenting opinion in Fazrbank v. United
States, 181 U.S. 283, 318, used the following language:

“It is said that the power to tax is the power to
destroy, and that if Congress can impose a stamp
tax of ten cents upon the vellum, parchment or
paper on which is written a bill of lading for arti-
cles to be exported from a state, it could as well
impose a duty of five thousand dollars and thereby
indirectly tax the articles intended for export.
That conclusion would by no means follow. A
stamp duty has now, and has had for centuries,
a well defined meaning. It has always been
distinguished from an ordinary tax meas-
ured by the value or kind of property taxed.
If Congress, in) respect of a bill of lading
for articles to be exported, had imposed a
tax of five thousand dollars for and in respect
of the vellum, parchment or paper upon which
such bill was written, the courts, looking beyond
form and considering substance, might well have
held that such an act was contrary to the settled
theory of stamp tax laws, and that the purpose and
necessary operation of such legislation was, in

. “* oo te he on — r Sha SP PSE ROP RG PAS eal 94 be
So7TC~“_ .

49

violation of the Constitution, to tax the articles
specified in such bill and not to impose simply a
stamp duty. Here, the small duty imposed, with-
out reference to the kind, quantity or value of the
articles exported, renders it certain that when
Congress imposed such duty specifically on the
vellum, parchment or paper upon which the bill
of lading was written or printed, it meant what it
so plainly said; and no ground exists to impute a
purpose by indirection to tax the articles ex-

ported.”

If, therefore, “ the courts, looking beyond form and
considering substance ” in the cases at bar, shall be per-
suaded that the purpose and necessary operation of this
legislation be to accomplish an end or object not en-
trusted to this government, the legislation may and
should be declared unconstitutional. J/cCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423. In other words, given
a case in which Congress has authority to prohibit, as
in the case of foreign commerce or the currency, and
it may accomplish that object by prohibitory taxation.
If, however, Congress has not the power to prohibit as
a legitimate end or object, it may not do so indirectly
under the pretext of exercising the taxing power.

li may be argued that the prohibition of yellow
oleomargarine is necessary and proper to facilitate the
collection of the tax on other oleomargarine, and to pre-
vent fraud in sales of articles taxed by the government;
but the argument that the prohibitive tax of ten cents
per pound was laid to facilitate the collection of the tax
of one-quarter of one cent on other colors of oleomarga-
rine cannot uphold the law. Such a purpose is too
remote and uncertain. In United States v. Dewitt,
g Wall. 41, 44, the question was as to the va-
lidity of section 29 of the Internal Revenue Act of

50

March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 484), which made it a misde-
meanor to mix forsale or to sell or offer for sale
naphtha and illuminating oils, inflammable at less than a
designated temperature. It was held that the act could
have no constitutional operation within state limits be-
cause it was a mere police regulation relating exclu-
sively to internal trade of the States. Chief Justice
Chase, delivering the opinion of the court and referring
to the want of jurisdiction in Congress to interfere with
the internal commerce of the States, said (p. 45):

“This has been so frequently declared by this
court, results so obviously from the terms of the
Constitution, and.has been so fully explained and
supported on former occasions, that we think it un-
necessary to enter again upon the discussion.”

It was, however, urged in that case on behalf of the
government that the prohibition of the sale of illumina-
ting oil, inflammable at less than a certain tempera-
ture, was in aid and support of the internal revenue
tax imposed on other illuminating oils. In answer to
this suggestion, Chief Justice Chase, among other
things, said (p. 44):

“If the prohibition, therefore, has any relation
to taxation at all, it is merely that of increasing the
production and sale of other oils, and, conse-
quently, the revenue derived from them, by ex-
cluding from the market the particular kind
described. This consequence is too remote and
too uncertain to warrant us in saying that the pro-
hibition is an appropriate and plaimly adapted
means for carrying into execution the power of
laying and collecting taxes.”

A further conclusive answer to this conteiition is that
there is no demand for uncolored oleomargarine, except

as a substitute for lard, and as such, a true construction

17 ED ET re

51

PSP AOS

of the act does not permit any tax to be laid upon it.
The act taxes oleomargarine under one of two express ;
conditions and not otherwise, that is when “ made in
imitation or semblance of butter,” or,‘* when so made,
calculated or intended to be sold as butter or for butter”
(Section 2). It is plain that oleomargarine manu-
factured in the usual way is not in imitation or semblance
of butter, unless it is colored yellow, because it is
pure white, or almost pure white, in appearance, whilst
practically all butter which goes on the market is uni-
formly colored a high shade of yellow throughout the
year. It is no less plain that oleomargarine so made
is not calculated or intended to be sold as or for butter,
and not even as a substitute for butter, because it can
be sold only as a substitute for lard. A product which
does not look like butter, and which can be sold only
as a substitute for lard, is not oleomargarine within the
definition of the act for the purpose of tax-
ation. This is the construction placed on_ the
act by Attorney-General Garland in his letter of Octo-
ber 18, 1886, to the Secretary of the Treasury (18 Op.
Atty.-Gen. 489). This opinion was accepted as final
and has ever since been acted on by the Treasury De-
partment (Oleomargarine regulations, June, 1902, p. 12);
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has specifi-
cally decided, under the authority vested in him by
section 14 of the act, that oleomargarine designed only
as a substitute for lard is not subject to any tax, although
it has a shade of yellow color (Treasury Decisions,
Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 36).

52

Ill.

THE RESTRICTIONS UPON THE TAXING POWER CONTAINED IN THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT.

As we have already seen, the first ten amendments
to the Constitution of the United States were adopted as
limitations upon the powers delegated to Congress “in
order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers ”
by means of “declaratory and restrictive clauses.”
It has never been determined whether the provisions of
the Fifth Amendment prevent the abuse of the taxing
power by means of arbitrary and discriminating taxes,
the effect of which would be to deprive an individual
or a selected class of liberty and property without due
process of law.

So far as is disclosed by a careful perusal of the de-
bates in the constitutional conventions at the time the
Constitution was ratified. as well as of the debates in
Congress when the first ten amendments were pro-
posed, it does not appear that the provision requiring
‘due process of law’ contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment was mentioned as_ protecting the individual
against arbitrary or discriminating taxation. The
import of the words may or may not have been
assumed to apply to taxation as well as to all
other powers in the exercise or abuse of which the
rights of the individual might come in conilict with the
powers of government. The same thing may also be
said of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment shortly after the close of the
Civil War, and yet it is established beyond question

that the requirement of ‘due process of law’ in the

‘ | ez

53

later amendment clearly applies to the taxing power of
the States.

There is, however, no principle of constitutional t
construction which would permit the court to say é
that because the question of arbitrary or discrimina- :
ting taxes was not in the minds of those who é
framed and adopted these amendments, “in order to f
prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers ” by the

national government, the Fifth Amendment should not
be applied to an abuse of the taxing power as well as
of any other power. The taxing power was the most im-
portant and far-reaching of the powers conferred; it was
the one the absence of which above all others had ren-
Jered the government under the Articles of Con-
federation impotent and imbecil; it was the one
most liable to abuse; it was the one around and about
which waged the contest for ratification of the Constitu-
tion, and it was the one which of all powers could ob-
viously “as readily be employed against one class of
‘ndividuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the
one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to
the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses
for which the power may be exercised.”!

But even if it could be shown that the abuse of the
taxing power was not in the minds of the peo-
ple at the time these amendments were adopted and
that the framers perceived and apprehended no dan-
cer from the abuse of that power, this fact would not
tend to limit the scope of the amendments if the case
now presented be fairly within their spirit and letter.
As was said by Chief Justice Marshall in the famous

' poan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wail. 655, 664.

54

case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 5:8,

644

.
.

“It is more than possible that the preservation
of rights of this description was not particularly in
the view of the framers of the constitution, when
the clause under consideration was introduced into
that instrument. It is probable that interferences
of more frequent recurrence, to which the tempta-
tion was stronger, and of which the mischief was
more extensive, constituted the great motive for
Imposing this mestniotion ort ahe state fev isfatures,
But although a particular and a rare ease may not,
in itself, he of sufficient magnitude to induce a
rule, yet it, must be governed by the rule, when
established, unless some plain and strong reason
for excluding it can be given. It is not enough to
say that this particular case was not in the mind of
the Convention, when the article was framed, nor of
the American people when it was adopted. It is
recessary to go farther, and to say that, had this
particular case been suggested, the language would
have been so varied as to exclude it. or it would
have been made a special exception. The case
being within the words of the rule must be within
its operation likewise, unless there he something
in the literal construction so obviously absurd or
mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of
the instrument as to justify those who expound the
constitution in making it an exception.

On what safe and intelligible ground can this
exception stand? There is no expression in the
constitution, no sentiment delivered by its contem-
porancous expounders, which would justify us in
making it. In the absence of all authority of this
kind, is there in the nature and reason of the case
itself, that which would sustain a construction of
the constitution not warranted by its words? Are
contracts of this description of a character to excite
so little interest, that we must exclude them from
the provisions of the constitution, as being unwor-
thy of the attention of those who framed the in-
strument? Or does public policy so imperiously

"a , D G
55

demand their remaining exposed to legislative al-
teration, as to compel us, or rather permit us to
say, that these words, which were introduced to
give stability to contracts, and which in their plain
import comprehend this contract, must yet be so
construed, as to exclude it ?”!

eR ERAT TN

wy orge

Applying to the federal taxing power the doctrine thus
lucidly stated, we may say that there is no reasonable
ground which would justify the conclusion that if the
abuse of the taxing power, by means of arbitrary, un-
equal and discriminating tax laws, had been in the minds
of the framers of the Fifth Amendment, they would
have varied its lanyuage so as to make it broader and
more comprehensive. No one will seriously ad-
vance the proposition that public policy or the
safety or perpetuity of the national government
demand that Congress should have the power to
impose arbitrary or prohibitive taxes upon in-
ternal industries. It would be repugnant to the very
theory upon which these ‘restrictive clauses’ were
drafted, and in conflict with the purpose sought to be
accomplished by them, to now hold that there is in
them no efficacy to restrict the most important power
granted to Congress by the Constitution, the one most
liable to abuse, and the one which at all times would
most reach and affect the individual.

Indeed, it may be respectfully submitted that if it be
now held that the requirement of ‘due process of law’
in the Constitution of the United States imposes no
prohibition or limitation upon the taxing power of Con-
ress, then the result must be that this amendment, in-

' See also Slawghter- House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 72; La parte Vire
giaia, WOU. S. 339. 347, 301; lolden vy. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 382, 385;
United States v. Woug Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676.

56

tended to constitute part of a bill of rights protecting
the people in their individual liberties as against the
majority wielding the power of government, must now
be construed as if it read :

‘No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law,
except it be in the form of taxation; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation, except 7x cases of taxation.”

But, aside from these considerations, it is confidently
submitted that had the first Congress deliberated at
length upon the choice of a provision which would be
most effective to prevent an abuse of the taxing power,
it would have been difficult to select one more ap-
propriate than that of ‘due process of law,’ or language
which it was more natural for the descendants of Engfish-
men to have selected for that purpose. It embodied
then, as now, one of those maxims of constitutional law
“which are the monuments showing the victorious pro-
gress of the race in securing to men the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so
that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts bill
of rights, the government of the commonwealth * may be
a government of laws and not of men’?

The phrase ‘due process of law’ or its equivalent
‘the law of the land’ antedated the establishment of
our political institutions, and was endeared to our
fathers by antiquity and tradition, as well as by the
noblest historical associations. It represented the
broadest and most far-reaching guaranty of personal

" County of Santa Clara vy. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385,

399; affirmed 118 U.S. 394, 417, 422.
* Vick Wov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370.

__ ——— fe PR HLS RS OT

57

and property rights. There are no words in our language
which signify or mean more in respect of the rights and
liberties of the individual than either of these phrases.
It is not deemed necessary, however interesting it would
be, to trace the historical origin of the term ‘due process
of law’ and the development of its meaning and scope,
except to say that its first appearance in any of the
great constitutional documents was probably in the Pe-
tition of Right in the third year of the reign of Charles
I, and that it has ever since been regarded as having
and importing exactly the same meaning as the words

‘the lawof the land’ in Magna Charta.!
No statement of the general meaning of these equi-

valent phrases is more often quoted than that from Mr.
Webster's argument in the famous Dartmouth College
case (4 Wheat. at p. 581), viz.:

“ The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold
his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under
the protection of the general rules which govern
society. Everything which may pass under the
form of an enactment, is not, therefore, to be con-
sideved the law of the land.”

The statement of Mr. Justice Story, in his work on
the Constitution (5th edition, section 1945), is perhaps
the most accurate, viz.:

‘Due process of law in each particular case
means such an exertion of the powers of vovern-
ment as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the pro
tection of individual rights as those maxims pre-
scribe for the class of cases to which the one
being dealt with belongs.”

Hurtado v, California, 110 U.S. §86, 521, 527, 543.

58

Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations,
in speaking of this phrase, uses the following language
(Sixth ed., p. 433):

“ While every man has a right to require that
his own controversies shall be judged by the same
rules which are applied in the controversies of his
neighbors, the whole community is also entitled,
at all times, to demand the protection of the
ancient principles which shield private rights
against arbitrary interference, even though such
interference may be under a rule impartial in its
operation. It is not the partial nature of the rule,
so much as its arbitrary and unusual character,
that condemns it as unknown to the law of the
land.”

The first exposition of these phrases by this court will
be found in the case of Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
4 Wheat. 235. 244, where Mr. Justice Johnson, among
other things, said:

« As to the words from Magna Charta, incorpo-
rated into the constitution of Maryland, after vol-

umes spoken and written with a view to their ex-
position, the good sense of mankind has at leneth
settled down to this: that dhey cere tnlended fo
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distr: h-
ulive justice.
This statement as to the meaning and scope of the
famous phrase has been repeatedly quoted with approval
P | yq VI
by this court, as will be seen by reference to the follow-
ing cases: United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
354; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 5275
Caldwell v. Texas. 137 U.S. 692. 697: Scolt v. Me-
Neal, 154 U.S. 34. 45; Zaylor and Marshall v. Beck-
ham, 178 U.S. 548, 592.

EPROM I EF IONE

" » _— ee “ Prt RE, RETR A RTT ae APY 6a DOT
~ .

»
Ao

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Géozza v. Tiernan, 148
U. S. 657, 662, said, speaking for the court:

“And due process of law within the meaning of
the amendment is secured if the laws operate on
all alike, and do not subject the individual to an
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”

See also Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382;
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 283; Norwood v. Baker,
172 U.S. 269, 279.

The court has never attempted to define the provision
‘due process of law,’ with precision and probably never
will, any more than it would attempt to define the word
‘justice’ in the preamble to the Constitution; but
nevertheless the phrase has constantly been recognized
as embodying tundamental principles of right and
justice which protect the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of any power of government. As Mr. Justice
Brown said in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389:

* This court has never attempted to define with
precision the words ‘due process of law,’ nor is it
necessary to do so in this case. It is sufficient to
say that there are certain immutable principles
of justice which inhere in the very idea of free gov-
ernment which no member of the Union may dis-
regard.”

it is true that the cases in this court applying to taxa-
tion the constitutional guaranty of ‘due process of law’
arose under the Fourteenth Amendment and related
to state laws; but, after the most careful study and
reflection, no reason can be perceived why the very
same provision in the Constitution should have one
meaning when applied to the state governments and
a narrower meaning and more limited scope when
applied to the national government. Sitxking-Fund

Re FRR ETRE AP OEE

60

Cases, 99 U.S. 700,718. Logically, if there could be in

reason and justice any difference, it should be against
the national government, which is indisputably one of
limited and enumerated powers. Cooley on Taxa-
tion, p. 12. The only sound principle must be that the
provision is the same in both cases as applied to the
taxing power (Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in French
v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 355).

If it appeared that the State in a given case could
not, under the police power, prohibit or destroy com-
merce in a particular commodity, and was simply
exercising the taxing power, it is submitted that a tax
upon a commodity, waich amounted to practical confis-
cation or prohibition of its manufacture and sale, would
clearly deprive the individual of property and liberty
without due process of law within the meaning Of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the /owell case as well as
in the /lVum/ey case it was recognized that a statute
under the police power which prevented all sales in a
legitimate article of commerce would not be valid.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685; Lumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 467.

Mr. Justice Harlan, in the opinion.of the court in the

Lottery Case (at p. 363) recognized that, in the exercise
of the power to regulate commerce among the several
States, Congress could not act arbitrarily, but was |
‘ subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution |
upon the exercise of the powers granted, and there is
no reason to suppose that the learned justice did not
mean to refer particularly to the most comprehensive
and far-reaching of all limitations embodied in the con-

stitutional guaranty of ‘due process of law. In /vter-

61

state Commerce Comm. vy. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 479,
the learned justice also said: “It is scarcely necessary
to say that the power given to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce does not carry with it any power
to destroy or impair those guaranties.” The very same
reasoning must apply to the exercise of the taxing

power.

Assuming, for the reasons above stated, that the re-

strictive clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the
exercise of the taxing power, then its prohibition or
limitation should be enforced in its spirit and to its
entirety as fully as if it were part of the very article
conferring the taxing power. Prout v. Starr, 188
U. S. 537, 543. As Mr. Justice Brewer said in the
case of Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283,
288:

“We are not here confronted with a question of
the extent of the powers of Congress but one of
the limitations imposed by the Constitution on its
action, and it seems to us clear that the same rule
and spirit of construction must also be recognized.
If powers granted are to be taken as broadly
granted and as carrying with them authority to
pass those acts which may be reasonably necessary
to carry them into full execution; in other words,
¢ the Constitution in its grant of powers is to be
so construed that Congress shall be able to carry
into full effect the powers graated, it is equally
imperative that where prohibition or limitation is
placed upon the power of Congress, that prohibition
or limitation should be enforced in its spirit and
to its entirety. It would be a strange rule of con-
struction that language granting powers is to be
liberally construed and that language of restriction
is to be narrowly and technically construed. Es-
pecially is this true when in respect to grants of
powers there is as heretofore noticed the help

ic ads i te eee |

found in the last clause oi the eighth section, and
no such helping clause in respect to prohibitions
and limitations. The true spirit of constitutional
interpretation in both directions is to give full,
liberal construction to the language, aiming ever
to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose.”

The act of Congress of May 9, 1902, purports to
levy what is strictly and technically an excise upon
the manufacture and sale of an article of food.
fatton v. Brady, Executrix, 184 U. S. 608, 618.
An excise is generally included in the term ¢ax which,
‘in its most enlarged sense, embraces all the regular
impositions made by government upon the person,
property, privileges, eccupations, and enjoyments of
the people for the purpose of raising public revenue.

Taxes are distinguished from arbitrary levies
in ihat they are laid according to some rule which appor-
tions the burden between the subjects thereof. An
exaction which is made without regard to any rule of
apportionment is therefore not a tax, and is not within
the constitutional authority of the government.”!
Chief Justice Marshall defined taxation’ to be “the
simple operation of taking small proportions from
a perpetually accumulating mass, susceptible of almost
infinite division.”2) What would he have said of an
alleged tax which took all ?

There is undoubtedly a difference between a land or
property tax and an excise upon a business or upon the
manufacture and sale of a commodity. An excise may
be upon the article, or its value, or its quality, or its
quantity, or its weight: but however the amount be de-
termined, whether by specific or ad valorem taxes or

' Cooley's Pr. Const. Law, Third ed., p. 56.
* Gibbons \. Oy den, 9 Wheat. 1, 199.

ee

Sy

ee Pe eae a CeanaltaT O8 = TD
26776

63

duties, or both methods, although it need not be inher-
ently equal, it must operate alike on all persons within the
class selected or who exercise the same privilege.

The most satisfactory definition of an excise is to be
found in the Massachusetts reports. It is true that the
Massachusetts constitution requires excises to be
‘reasonable,’ but the following definition is not therefore
-yithout general application. A leading case is that of
Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268, 274, 279
where Bigelow, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Judicial
Court, said:

« An excise, on the other hand, is of a different
character. It is based on no rule of apportionment
or equality whatever. It is a fixed, absolute and
direct charge laid on merchandise, products or
commodities, without any regard to the amount
of property belonging to those on whom it may
fall, or to any supposed relation between money
expended for a public object and a special benefit
occasioned to those by whom the charge is to be
paid. . . . It only remains for us to consider
whether the assessments laid on the defendants can
he supported as a valid exercise of the power to
impose excises. . . . In the first place, it is
erossly unequal, and does not operate alike on
all persons whose property is made subject to it.
It was declared by this court in Portland v. Apthorp.
ubi supra,’ that * Taxes of this sort must undoubt-
edly be equal’; that is, must operate alike on all
persons who exercise a particular employ:nent or
enjoy the same privilege or commodity. The same
doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of Com-
monwealth v. People's Savings Bank, ubi supra.”
The reason is obvious. In the language of the
court. an unequal excise would be ‘contrary to
the principles of justice. That the excise in ques-

‘12 Mass. 252, 255.
75 Allen, 431.

64

tion operates unequally in this sense cannot be
doubted.”

This definitior. of an excise was cited by the Attorney-
General of the United States (Hon. Charles Devens) in
the opinion furnished to Congress for its guidance
(15 Op. Attys.-Gen., p. 219), adding that such an excise
“may be increased or diminished by the extent to which
the privilege is exercised.”

Assuming that an excise must operate alike on all
persons whose property or business selected for tax-
ation is substantially the same in character, and that an
arbitrary and discriminating excise would be * contrary
to the principles of justice’ and would not constitute
‘due process of law,’ it remains to consider whether
the excise now before the court is arbitrary and dis-
criminating as contended by the plaintiffs in error.

The act of Congress purports to lay an excise tax
upon oleomargarine. Congress, of course, knew, as its
very definition discloses, that oleomargarine was a sub-
stitute for butter and that this quality and essence
alone gave it commercial value or utility. The act im-
poses a tax of ten cents per pound upon ycllow oleo-
margarine, which is shown to be prohibitive, and under
the authorities above discussed such prohibitive opera-
tion must be presumed to have been the purpose of
Congress. For all legitimate purposes of taxation, olco-
margarine, whether colored or uncolored, is practically
the same thing, and there are no inherent difter-
ences between them which would warrant their
separation into two distinct classes. In the nature
of things, reasoning solely according to the rules

which should govern the imposition of taxes, white

SS ore re sane .
26777)
t
oleomargarine ought not to be taxed one-quarter of a :
cent a pound and yellow oleomargarine forty times as
much, and, in the absence of some ulterior motive, such
discrimination would never have been attempted. No
conceivable reason. can be suggested for the discrimina-
tion based alone upon the yellow color, other than that
it competes with another and wxtaxed article of com-
merce, namely, butter. On the very face of the act, it is
declared that this discrimination of nearly four thousand
per cent. in the amount of the tax imposed is made
solely because oleomargarine in its commercial form
looks like butter. Such legislation, it is submitted, is
just as arbitrary and indefensible as if Congress were
to endeavor to lay a capitation tax upon men of red
hair, and it were to be argued in support of such a law
that it was constitutional because apportioned.
It cannot be denied that the tax on yellow oleomar-
garine in the case at bar is an extraordinary piece
of legislation, unusual in our system of government,
and of a kind heretofore happily rare. On its face,
it imposes an enormous and disproportional penalty
upon the mere fact of coloring a wholesome and nutri-
tious article of food, whilst another competing food
product, practically the same substance produced in a
different way, is left untaxed. The proof shows that in
its practical operation the necessary effect of the
discrimination is the destruction of an industry con-
ducted within the jurisdiction of a State, by which
the plaintifis in error and thousands of others are
deprived of a means of livelihood in a legitimate
trade.

When we say that the federal tax on oleomar-

i

Fis Lo Peo,
“TEM er ee

66

garine is arbitrary, we do not mean to say that
Congress was actuated by no reason in making the
discrimination. \e concede that it had a reason and
sought to accomplish a definite object, namely, to pre-
vent the manufacture and sale of yellow oleomargarine
because it looks like and competes with colored butter;
but what we do mean to assert is that it was actuated by
no reason which, under the Constitution of the United
States, it could properly entertain, for in respect of in-
ternal commerce it has no police power whatever. A
commodity cannot be taxed at a prohibitive rate simply
because it necessarily resembles and competes with
another. Such a reason furnishes no legitimate basis
for the object sought to be accomplished. Even under
the police power, a State could not prohibit an article
harmless in itself merely because it looked like another
with which it competes: it could only do so in order to
prevent fraud.

Now, the power to tax undoubtedly involves
the power to classify for purposes of taxation;
but due process of law requires that classiii-
cation shall be something more than mere arbitrary
selection. What test then is to be applied for the
determination of whether there has been legitimate
classification or a mere arbitrary selection? What-
ever else may be done, it must surely be that
discrimination calculated only to deprive one
class of persons of their occupations or property
for no other purpose than to benefit another class
of persons who are their business competitors is, legally
speaking, a mere arbitrary selection. ‘Thus, in the

cases at bar, we find a tax of ten cents per pound upon

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67

oleomargarine solely because it looks like and competes
with butter, which is exempted from any tax. The
tax depends solely upon the article being a sub-
stitute for an untaxed commodity. What difference
then exists between these two articles to justify this
discrimination? In their chemical composition there is
substantially no difference and they are used for the
same identical purpose. They compete directly in the
market, but a necessary element of the marketability
of cach product is a certain shade of yellow which
must be imparted before it can be sold. The cost of
production is such that yellow oleomargarine cannot
be sold in competition with colored butter if the ten cent
tax be paid. Since uncolored oleomargarine cannot be
sold or compete with colored butter, the result is the
prohibition of the manufacture and sale of all oleo-
margarine in competition with butter. Therefore, the
mere fact of necessary resemblance is made to support
the accomplishment of but one object, namely,
the suppression of the oleomargarine industry for the
beneht of the butter industry. No such power was en-
trusted to Congress by the Constitution. It is not
legitimate classification, but mere arbitrary selection
which deprives of liberty and property one body of in-
dividuals for the benefit of another. As Mr. Justice
Harlan said of a state statute in Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 563:
* Such a statute is not a legitimate exertion of
the power of classification, rests upon no reason-
able basis, is purely arbitrary, and plainly denies

the equal protection of the laws to those against
whom it discriminates.”

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What Mr. Justice Brewer said in Gulf, Colorado &
Santa Fe R'y v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154, is equally
applicable to the Fifth Amendment, viz.:

“While good faith and 2 knowledge of existing
conditions on the part of a legislature is to be pre-
sumed, yet to carry that presumption to the extent
of always holding that there must be some undis-
closed and unknown reason for subjecting certain
individuals or corporations to hostile and discrimi-
nating legislation is to make the protecting clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment a mere rope of
sand, in no manner restraining state action. a oh
The State may not say that all white men shall be
subjected to the payment of the attorney's fees of
parties successfully suing them and all black men
not. It may not say that all men beyond a certain
age shall be alone thus subjected, or all men _pos-
sessed of a certain wealth. These a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_0521%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
