# plaintiffs brief — COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE & Cv BOARD OF HEALTH

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** plaintiffs brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1902
- **Citation:** 186 U.S. 380

## Text

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By. Ox Moarenfor Es 9,
—s- Ynited States Supreme Court
Serco M1, (Yoo,

OCTOBER TERM, 1900.
No. &O.
(Ocrossr Term. 1899-—No. 286.)

- COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DE NAVI-

GATION A VAPEUR, Plaintiff in Error,
VERSUS
THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH
Defendants in Error.

OF LOUISIANA, et als.

In Error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Brief in behalf of the Plaintiff in Error.

W. W. HOWE,

W. B. SPENCER,
Of Counsel.

PRINT, 626 NATCHEZ ST., N. O.

1

T. 8, THOMASON,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Ocrosrr Term, 1899.
No. 286.

COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DE NAVIGATION A
VAPEUR, Puarntirr 1n Error,

versus

THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH OF LOUISIANA,
EDMOND SOUCHON, HAMPDEN S. LEWIS anp
CHARLES A. GAUDET, Derenpants in Error.

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This case comes into this Court upon a Writ of Error to
the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The writ is sued out to
Teverse a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, which
maintained an exception of no cause of action filed by the
defendants in error to the original and supplemental peti-
tions of the plaintiff below, plaintiff in error here, and dis-
missed its suit.

An exception of no cause of action, under the practice
prevailing in Louisiana, is the equivalent of a general de-
murrer. It is not disputed that such an exception admits
_ as true all allegations of fact which are well pleaded in the
_ petition.

The original petition of the plaintiff in error tendered
the following case :

_ 1. The plaintiff in error is a corporation existing
under the laws of the French Republic, is a citizen of
‘said Republic, and is domiciled at Marseilles. It is the
owner of a large number of steamships, and especially of
the Steamship “Britannia,” and is engaged in the business
of transporting freight and passengers for hire from vari-
ous Mediterranean ports to various ports in the United
States, and more particularly to the Port of New Orleans.

2. The defendant in error, the State Board of Health,
is a body corporate created by Act No. 192 of the General
Assembly of the State of Louisiana of the year 1898. Said
Board is composed of seven members, and is charged by
' the provisions of said Act with the protection and preserva-
tion of the public health, the duty of promulgating a san-
itary code for the State, the regulation of infectious and
contagious diseases therein, and is vested with power to
prescribe a land and maritime quarantine against places
infected with such diseases. The Board is given power
to sue and capacity to be sued, and is domiciled in the
City of New Orleans.

3. The other defendants in error are members of said
Board, citizens of the State of Louisiana, and residents of
the City of New Orleans.

4. In the early part of September, 1898, the plaintiff in

error caused its Steamship “Britannia” to be cleared from
the ports of Palermo, Sicily, and Marseilles, France, for the
Port of New Orleans. Said Steamship carried one hundred
tons (100) of general merchandise and 408 passengers.
Both freight and passengers were destined for the Port of -
New Orleans. Some of the passengers were citizens of the
United States returning to their homes, and others were
subjects of the King of Italy intending to avail themselves
of the immigration laws of the United States, and to enter
and settle in the State of Louisiana and adjoining States.

5. The said passengers were in all respects and at that
time free from infectious and contagious diseases, and were
so free on the arrival of the said Steamship, on the 29th of
September, 1898, at the Quarantine Station established by
the defendant Board on the Mississippi River below the
City of New Orleans. On that day, in accordance with the
rules of said Board, the said “Britannia” was regularly in-
spected and her freight and passengers examined by the
officers of the Board, and the same being found entirely
free from disease of any kind, the said officers accordingly
issued to the said vessel a clean bill of health.

6. Notwithstanding the issue of this clean bill of health,

and although under the rules established by the defendant
’ Board the “Britannia” should have been permitted at once
to proceed to the Port of New Orleans and there discharge,
and although her cargo and passengers continued free of
Aisease, the said Board, on the 29th of September, 1898, at
a special meeting convened at the City of New Orleans,
whereat the other defendants in error, to-wit: Souchon,
Gaudet and Lewis, were present and voted affirmatively,
passed a resolution prohibiting the said vessel from coming

into the Port of New Orleans. A copy of this resolution
was sent by the said Board to the agents of the plaintiff in
error at New Orleans, The resolution is as follows:

“September 29th, 1898.
__,. “Resolution adopted in special session by the Louisiana
State Board of Health, September 29th, 1898 :
“Resolved, That hereafter, in the case of any town, city
- or parish of Louisiana being declared in quarantine; no
Be nes or bodies of people, immigrants, suldiers or others
shall be allowed to enter said town, city or parish so long

> as said quarantine shall exist, and that the President of the

Board shall enforce this resolution.
G. Farrar Parton, M. D., Sec’ty.”

The letter accompanying the foregoing resolution is as
follows : ;

gr 5s “Louisiana State Board of Health,
September 29th, 1898.
- _- “Messrs. Jas. Sawers & Son,

Ms Agents 8. S. Britannia, New Orleans, La.

.“Gentlemen: Referring to the detention of the S. S.
‘Britannia’ at the Mississippi River Quarantine Station, with
408 Italian immigrants on board, I have to inform you that
under the provisions of the new State Board of Health law,
Section 8, of which I enclose a marked copy, this Board
has adopted a resolution forbidding the landing of any body
of people in any town, city or parish in quarantine. Under
this resolution the immigrants now on board the ‘Britannia’
cannot be landed in any of the following parishes of Lou-
isiana, namely : Orleans, St. Bernard, Jefferson (right bank),
_ St. Tammany, Plaquemines, St. Charles, or St. John. You
will therefore govern yourselves accordingly.

Respectfully,

' Epmonp Sovcnon, M. D.,
President Louisiana State Board of Health.”

Subsequent to the foregoing resolution and notice, the
President of the defendant Board further notified the agents
of the plaintiff in error at New Orleans that if any attempt

was made to land the “Britannia’s”’ passengers at any place
contiguous to the port of New Orleans, in the State of Lou-
isiana, not then quarantined, that quarantine would at once
be established and enforced at such place. The effect of
this action was to prevent the vessel from landing her car-
go or discharging her passengers anywhere in the State of

Louisiana.

7. It is alleged by the petition that the resolution afore-
said, while purporting on its face to be general in character,
_ was, in fact, specially directed toward preventing and pro-
hibiting the landing of the cargo and passengers of the
_ “Britannia,’’ inasmuch as both prior and subsequent to the
er passage of the said resolution, the defendants in error had
permitted large bodies of people coming from the same
port in Sicily, to wit: Palermo, via the port of New York,
to be brought into the City of New Orleans by rail, and that
an illegal and arbitrary discrimination had been made to

the prejudice of the plaintiff in error.

8. It was further alleged that the defendants in error
based their asserted right to thus exclude from the State
-* of Louisiana persons in good health coming from non-in-
fected ports upon the following portion of Section 8 of Act
192 of 1898, to wit:

“The State Board of Health, in its discretion, may prohibit
the introduction into any infected portion of the State of per-
sons acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune, when,
in its judgment, the introduction of such persons would add
to or increase the prevalence of the disease.”

9. The foregoing language was alleged by the petition
to confer no such power on the defendant Board, as was as-
- serted; and if the language cited did purport to confer such
_@ power, then the plaintiff in error averred that the same

6

was in violation of the Constitution of the United States,
and especially of Article 1, paragraph 8, Section 3 thereof,
conferring upon Congress the exclusive power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States.

10. The defendants in error were alleged to be joint
tort-feasors and solidarily liable in the sum of $2,500, the
amount of damages caused by their conduct up to the date
of the filing of the petition.

The plaintiff in error reserved its right to amend and
claim such further damages as might be found to have
been sustained by the illegal and arbitrary conduct of the
defendant. The petition further prayed for an injunction
prohibiting further interference with the landing of the
-Britannia’s cargo and the discharge of her passengers at
the port of New Orleans.

In order to save expense, the proceedings for injunction
are by stipulation omitted from this record. It suffices to
say that the injunction was refused on the face of the
papers.

11. After this deniai, the plaintiff in error filed its sup-
plemental petition. It reiterated the allegations of its origi-
nal petition. It then set forth compliance by the detained
- vessel with all the laws of the United States regulating
commerce with foreign nations, regulating quarantine,
and immigration into the United States; the fact that the
passengers of said vessel came from ports which were not
infected, and were not pretended to be infected with any
infectious or contagious disease ; and the further fact that
the vessel had sailed prior to the declaration by the Board
of the existence of an infectious disease in the City of New

7

Orleans, and that said vessel had no notice of the intended
action of the defendant Board. It further alleged that the il-
legal and arbitrary action of the said defendants in error in
preventing and prohibiting the landing of the Britannia
in the State of Louisiana, compelled the plaintiff in error
to send her for the discharge of her passengers to the port
of Pensacola, which was the nearest available port, and
thence to send her back to New Orleans for the discharge
of her cargo. There was a total delay of over three weeks,
and a resulting damage of something over eleven thousand
dollars, the particulars of which are specified in the
petition.

The conduct of the defendants in error is alleged to be in
violation of various specified laws of the United States and
rules and regulations made in pursuance thereof relating
to immigration from foreign countries into the ports of the
United States; and to be in violation of the existing
treaties between the United States on the one hand, and
the Kingdom of Italy and the Republic of France on the
other.

12. As already stated, the defendants excepted that the
petition and the documents annexed to and made part
thereof, disclosed no cause of action, and the Civil District
Court.so held. The plaintiff in error thereupon appealed
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and there assigned as
error the denial by the lower court of its rights under the
following constitutional provisions, treaties and statutes,
to-wit :

(a) Section 3 of paragraph 8 of Article 1 of the Con-
stitution of the United States.

a Geere. oe
>

8

(6) Section 1 of the 14th Article of Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

(c) The treaties between the United sas and France
and Italy.

(d) The Acts of Congress of August 3, 1882; June 26,
1884; February 26, 1885; March 3, 1891; February 26,
1885; February 23, 1887; March 3, 1875; all regulating
foreign immigration into the United States. (Transcript,
pages 10 and 11).

The judgment of the lower court having in al] respects
_ been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and our
federal: rights hr-!zg been denied (pp. 22-25), this Writ of
Error was takev-.

IL.
In this Court the plaintiff in error has filed the following :

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
(1)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in affirming the

judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Or-
- leans in this cause.
(2)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in sustaining the

peremptory exception of the defendants in this cause.
(3)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in holding that
the plaintiff’s suit was properly dismissed by the Civil Dis-
trict Cour: for the Parish of Orleans.

(4)

The Siepesine Court of Louisiana erred in holding that

the Act of the General Assembly of Louisiana, No. 192 of

9

1898, or any portion thereof, and especially Section 8 of said
act, conferred upon the defendant, the State Board of
Health, the authority to exclude or interfere with legitimate
foreign commerce as claimed by the defendants and as done
by them as set forth in the pleadings in this cause.

(5)

Even if Section 8 of the Act of the General Assembly of
Louisiana, No. 192 of 1898, attempted to confer upon the
said defendant, the State Board of Health, authority to ex-
clude or interfere with legitimate foreign commerce in the
manner stated in the petition and supplemental petition of
the plaintiffs in this cause, and admitted by the peremptory
exception of the defendants herein, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana erred in holding that Section 8 of said Act 192 of
1898, as construed and applied by the defendants in the
premises, was not repugnant to the 8th Section of the Ist
Article of the Constitution of the United States, conferring
on Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations.

(6)

That even if Section 8 of the Act of the General Assem-
bly of Louisiana, No. 192 of 1898, did attempt to confer
upon the defendant, the State Board of Health, the right
and authority to exclude or interfere with the subjects and
citizens of foreign governments seeking to enter the
State of Louisiana in the manner conceded by the

_ pleadings in this cause, the Supreme Court of Lou-

isiana erred in holding that said Section 8 of
said Act No. 192 of 1898, as construed and applied
by the defendants, was not .in conflict with the treaties be-
tween the United States, on the one part, and the Repub-

10

lic of France and the Kingdom of Italy, on the other parts,

guaranteeing certain rights, privileges and immunities to

the subjects and citizens of said foreign countrjes, the said

treaties being as follows: The treaty with Italy of Febru-

ary 26, 1871, proclaimed November 23d, 1871, Article 1,

and the treaty with France of April 30, 1803, Article 8.
(7)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in sustaining the
peremptory exception of defendants and in dismissing the
suit of plaintiffs in this, that Section 8 of the Act of the
General Assembly of Louisiana, No. 192 of 1898, as relied
upon and applied by the defendants and as construed and
applied ty the Court, contravenes the 14th Article of
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Sec-
tion 1, by depriving the plaintiff of its liberty and prop-
erty without due process of law and denying to it the equal
protection of the laws.

(8)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in holding that
Section 8 of the Act of the General Assembly of Louisiana,
No. 192 of 1898, relied upon by the defendants and applied
by them, and as construed and applied by the Court, did
not contravene the Acts of the Congress of the United
States regulating foreign immigration into the United
States, which Acts are as follows:

March 3, 1875, Chap. 141.

August 3, 1882, Chap. 376.

June 26, 1884, Chap. 121.

February 26, 1885, Chap. 164.

March 23, 1887, Chap. 120.

March 3, 1891, Chap. 551.

iL

And for these and other errors apparent on the face of
the record, plaintiff in error prays that the final judgment
of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in this cause be re-
versed and this cause remanded to that Court, with in-
structions to reverse the judgment of the Court of first in-
stance, and to remand the cause to that Court to be further
proceeded with according to law, and for such other and
further judgment and decree as may be proper in the
premises.

Il.
ae These assignments will be grouped and discussed in this
___ brief ander the following points :

STATEMENT OF POINTS.

First. The. statute drawn in question, on its face and
as construed and applied, is void for the reason that it is in
violation of Article I, Section 3, Paragraph 8, of the Consti-
ee tution of the United States, inasmuch as it vests authority
& in the State Board of Health, in its discretion, to interfere
* with, or prohibit interstate and foreign commerce.

Second. The statute is void for inasmuch as it is in con-
flict with Section 1 of the fourteenth Article of Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives
the plaintiff of its liberty and property without due process
of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the law.

Third. ~ The statute, as construed and applied, is void for
the reason that it is in conflict with treaties between the
United States on the one part and the Kingdom of Italy
and the Republic of France on the other parts, guarantee-
ing certain rights, privileges and immunities to the sub-
jects and citizens of said countries.

12

- Fourth. The statute, as construed and applied, is void,
because it is in conflict with the laws of the United States
relating to foreign immigration into the United States.

IV.

FIRST POINT.

_. The statute drawn in question, on its face and as con-
_ stuted and applied, is void for the reason that it is in conflict
with Article 1, Section 3, Paragraph 8, of the Constitution of
the United States, inasmuch as it vests the State Board of
Health, in its discretion, with power to interfere with, or
prohibit interstate and foreign commerce.

Cases of this character have so often been before this
Court, that the general rules by which the case at bar is
to be determined may be said to be definitely fixed and
settled. It suffices, then, in our opinion, to briefly sum-
marize them. We accordingly submit that the following
propositions are well settled by the decisions of this Court :

First. The power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce is exclusively vested in Congress, and this
power extends moreover to all necessary instruments of
ecommerce.

Second. By commerce is meant not merely barter and
traffic in merchandise, but also exchange of commodities,
navigation, the transportation of passengers and the inter-
course of people with each other.

Third. The power to regulate commerce is one which
affects many subjects, varied and quite unlike in their
natures. Some are in their nature of national importance,
and subject of uniform regulation, while. others are of
minor importance, and require regulation of an infinite

- asubject confided exclusively to the National Government,

13

variety to suit each local condition. As to such subjects
as are national in character, and as are susceptible of one
uniform system or plan of regulation, they may be justly
said to belong to that class over which Congress has exclu-
sive jurisdiction, and concerning which the States are not
permitted to legislate in any respect. As to those that are
of minor or local significance, which require to be provided’
for by such divers rules as the various localities may re-
quire, and which may be considered rather of importance
to the locality than to the nation at large, the
several States are permitted to legislate in the absencé
of legislation thereon by Congress; but, even then,
when Congress does legislate upon such subjects, the State
legislation is excluded and rendered inoperative in so far
as it may interfere or conflict with the legislation of Con-
gress.

Fourth. Commerce with foreign countries is in its na-
ture national, and the States have no power to regulate or
interfere with same, even in the absence of legislation by
Congress, for the absence of regulation by the National
Government is to be construed, not as a permission to the
States to regulate the same, but as indicating an intention
by Congress that such commerce be free of restrictions.

Fifth. In delegating to the National Government the
exclusive power to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce, the several States did not surrender to it their
sovereign power to be exercised for the preservation of the
health, safety and morals of its citizens.

Sizth. But whatever may be the nature or extent of
this sovereign or police power, it cannot be exercised over

14

- nor can the State in its exercise, for any purpose whatever,
encroach upon powers granted to the general Government,
or upon rights granted or secured by the supreme law of
the land. Where, therefore, a statute of a State, enacted
in pursuance cf such police power, invades the domain
of legislation belonging exclusively to Congress, or en-
eroaches upon powers granted to the general Govern-
‘ment, or impairs rights secured by the supreme law of the
land, it is to that extent void.

In the light of these'well established principles we shall
now consider this Louisiana statute as interpreted and ap-
plied by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

The powers conferred by this statute upon the Board of
Health are of the broadest and most unlimited character.
It rests with that Board to say what one or more of many
hundreds of contagious and infectious diseases exist; to
what extent a disease must exist to render a territory in-

oe - fected ; what part or portion of territory is infected ; what

kind or class of persons would, in its judgment, add to or
_inerease the prevalence of that disease by their introduc-
_tion into the State. In other words, it vests absolute juris-
diction and authority in this Board to declare ton-inter-
course between any part, or the whole of, the State of
Lovisiana, and any or all the other States and foreign
countries. It vests it with authority to absolutely prohibit

-. interstate and international commerce to such an extent:

and for such a length of time as a majority of these seven
- men may determine.

In effect, the result of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana was to declare that the State of Louisi-
ana had the power to vest authority in the State Board of

NY

15

Health, in its discretion, to prohibit the introduction into
any part of the State, which they may have decided was in-
fected with a contagious or infectious disease, any and

ae all persons, even though they might be perfectly healthy,
eS oreven immune to the prevailing disease, whenever they
Fr should declare that in their judgment the introduction of
a such persons would add to, or increase the prevalence of.

the disease. This part of the law, it is clear, is directed to
the exclusion of healthy persons seeking to enter the
State. The other sectious of the law give the power to in-
tercept or prevent the entrance of diseased persons. And,
as in this case it is admitted that the “Britannia’s” pas-
sengers were healthy, and had not come from any place
where any infectious or contagious disease was prevalent,
the bald question is presented, whether the State of Louis-
iana, in the exercise of its police power, can prohibit per-
bea sons coming from foreign countries from entering its terri-
ae tory, upon the theory that, though healthy and otherwise
aS not objectionable, yet, in the opinion of certain officials,
they may contract a prevailing disease of some kind, and
thereby tend to spread it among the people residing there.

It is in this respect, we say, that the statute, so construed
and applied, is vicious and encroaches upon the powers
vested in the National Government.

While so far as the consideration of the question in hand
is concerned, it may be admitied that the grant of the au-
thority aforesaid may in all respects be a beneficent and
proper one for the protection of the health of citizens of
Luuisiana, nevertheless, its exercise is not unrestricted, but
finds its limitation when it reaches or touches subjects
confided to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and be-

16

yond that point, it is inoperative, and must give way to the
paramount authority of the National Government.

It is the exercise of this sovereign power by the several
States that has given occasion to this Court to be often
called upon to define and declare the limits of the State
and Federal power, and more especially has the exercise
of that power in relation to commerce been a frequent
cause of appeal to this Court.

It becomes, therefore, necessary to consider and deter-
mine, with reference to interstate and international com-
merce, the legitimate scope and the limitations of the po-
lice power of the States. .

There can be no question, from any aspect, that the po-
lice power can be exercised for the suppression of crime,
disease and pauperism, and that as an incident to the ex-
ercise of that power to that end, the State may rightfully
exclude from its borders criminals, paupers, or persons or
goods affected with infectious or contagious diseases. Of
necessity, if this power of exclusion is to be effective,
there must be an opportunity to investigate and inspect
not only the persons and things about to enter its
borders, but also the vehicles of commerce used to
transport thera. And as a necessary result of this
power of investigation and inspection, the State has the
right to stop at its borders both interstate and inter-
national commerce a reasonable length of time to enable
it to ascertain whether the persons and things, subjects
thereof, are in fact in anywise affected with disease likely
to prove dangerous to its citizens. And on the discovery
of the existence of such disease in such persons or property,
it may either exclude same, if likely to be of a permanent

ak dein yd?

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Shes
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17

character, or may detain same in quarantine, and use such
means as may be necessary to suppress same, if the disease
is likely to be of a temporary kind. In the same way, if
there be just grounds to suspect that such persons or prop-
erty have been exposed to any infectious or contagious dis-
ease, such persons or things may be detained a reasonable.
length of time in order to ascertain whether they are in
fact infected, but no longer. Such quarantine and inspec-
tion laws, however, are in no just sense regulations of com-
merce ; they may in a measure delay or affect it, but when
legally exercised, do not regulate, or impose such burdens
upon commerce as to amount to regulation within the
meaning of the Constitution.

The detection and suppression or exclusion of criminals,
paupers, and persons and things infected with disease is
the basis and sole justification of the enforcement of quar-
antine and inspection laws, and when enacted for this pur-
pose and limited to this extent, they are upheld as a valid
exercise of the police power of the State. Whenever, and
to the extent that they go beyond this, they amount to an
interference with commerce, and invade the domain of the

National Government, and are void, for the State can never

in the exercise of any of its reserved powers interfere
with the powers confered upon Congress in the control and
regulation of legitimate interstate and international
commerce.

Turning now to the decisions of this Court, it will be

found that the basis upon which it has upheld the exclu-
sion, inspection and quarantine laws of various States, is.

that criminals, diseased persons and things, and paupers,
are not legitimate subjects of commerce. They may be at-

18

tendant evils, but are not legitimate subjects of traffic and
transportation, and, therefore, in their exclusion or deten-
tion, the State is not interfering with legitimate commerce,
which is the only kind entitled to the protection of the
Constitution.

In the License Cases, 5 How., at pages 576, 577, Mr.
Chief Justice Taney said :

« It has ind¢ed been suggested that if a State deems the
traffic in ardent spirits to be injurious to its. citizens and
calculated to introduce immorality, vice and pauperism
-jnto the State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit its
importation notwithstanding the laws of Congress; and
that a State may do this upon the same principle that it
may resist and prevent the introduction of disease, pesti-
lence or pauperism from abroad. But. it must be
remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism
are not subjects of commerce, although sometimes among
its attendant evils: Tifey,dre not things to be regulated
and trafficked in but to be prevented as far as human fore-
sight or human means can guard against them. But
spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be
subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore
subjects of exchange, barter, and traffic like any other
commodity in which a right of property exists. And Con-
gress, under its general power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, may prescribe what articles of merchandise
shall be admitted and what excluded; and may therefore
admit, or not, as it shall deem best, the importation of
ardent spirits. And inasmuch as the laws of Congress
authorize their importation, no State has a right to pro-
hibit their introduction.”

In Leisy vs. Hardin, 135 U. 8. at p. 113, Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller, referring with apprebation to the decision rendered
by Mr. Justice Matthews in Bowman vs. Railway, 125 U. 8.
465, says:

“Articles in such a condition as tend to spread disease

19

are not merchantable, are not legitimate subjects of trade
and commerce, and the self-protecting power of each State,
therefore, may be rightfully exercised against their intro-
duction, and such exercise of power cannot be considered a
regulation of commerce prohibited by the Constitution ; and
the observations of Mr. Justice Catron in the License Cases,
5 How. 504, 599, are quoted tw the effect that what does not
belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police
power of the State. but that which does belong to commerce
is within the jurisdiction of the United States ; and to extend
the police power over subjects of commerce would be to
make commerce subordinate to that power; and would en-
able the State to bring within the police power ‘any article
of consumption that a State may wish to exclude, whether it
belong to that which was drunk, or to food and clothing;
and with nearly equal claims to propriety, as malt liquors
and the products of fruits other than grapes stand on no
higher ground than the light wines of this and other coun-
tries excluded by the effect of the law as it now stands.
And it would be only another step to regulate real or sup-
posed extravagance in food or clothing.’ ”

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Re Rahrer, 140 U. 8. at p. 557,
quoting the License Cases, p. 599, says:

“The law and the decision apply equally to foreign and
domestic spirits, as they must do on the principle assumed
in support of the law. The assumption is that the police
power was not touched by the Constitution but left to the
States as the Constitution found it. This is admitted; and
whenever a thing from character or condition is of a de-
scription to be regulated by the power in the State, then the
regulation may be made by the State and Congress cannot
interfere. But this must always depend upon facts sub-
ject to legal ascertainment, so that the injured may have
redress. And the fact must find its support in this,
whether the prohibited article belongs to and is subject to
be regulated as a part of foreign commerce or of commerce
among the States. Iffrom its nature it does not belong to
commerce, or if its condition from putrescence or other cause

20

is such when it is about to erter the State that it no longer
belongs to commerce, or in othe~ words is not a commercial
article, then the State power may exclude its introduction.
And as an incident to this power, the State may use means
to ascertain the fact, and here is the limit between the sov-
ereign power of the State and the Federal power; that is
to say, that which does not belong to commerce is within
the jurisdiction of the police power of the State; and that
which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of
the United States. And to this limit must all the general
views come that were suggested in the reasoning of the
court in the cases of Gibbons vs. Ogden ; Brown vs. Mary-
land ; and New York vs. Miln.”

But it is quite different with property the subject of
daily commercial transactions, as well as with persons not
affected with disease or tainted with crime; they are le-
gitimate subjects of interstate and foreign commerce, and
their transportation and travel from State to State and
from foreign countries are under the protection of the
Constitution and cannot be restrained save by Congress
itself.

In Leisy vs. Hardin, 135 U. 8. at p. 125, where the ques-
tion was whether, it being the public policy of the State of
Iowa to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors within the border of that State, it could prohibit
the transportation into its borders from another State, and
the sale there in the original package, of such intoxicating
liquors, this Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, said :

“Whatever our individual. views may be as to the
deleterious or dangerous qualities of particular articles, we
cannot held that any articles which Congress recognizes as
subjects of interstate commerce are not such, or that what-
ever are thus recognized can be contrulled by any State
laws amounting to regulations while they retain their
character, although at the same time, if directly dangerous

21

in themselves, the State may take appropriate measures to
guard against injury before it obtains complete jurisdiction
over them. To concede toa State the power to exclude,
directly or indirectly, articles so situated without Con-
gressional permission, is to concede to a majority of the
people of a State represented in the State Legislature the
power to regulate commercial intercourse between the
States by determining what shall be its subjects, when that
power was distinctly ~ »nted to be exercised by the people
of the United States re esented in Congress, and its pos-
session by the latter was considered essential to that more
perfect union which the Constitution was adopted to
create.”’

Mr. Justice Matthews, in Bowman vs. Ry. Co., 125 U. 8.
at p. 489, said, in reference to a statute of Iowa having as
its purpose the prohibition of importatior of spiritous
liquors into the State, as follows:

“It has never been regarded as within the legitimate
scope of inspection laws to prohibit trade in respect to any
known article of commerce, irrespective of its condition
and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and
the injurious consequences of its use or abuse.

“For similar reasons, the statute of [owa under éonsider-
ation cannot be regarded as a regulation of quarantine or
a sanitary provision for the purpose of protecting the phy-
sical health of the community, or a law to prevent the in-
troduction into the State of disease, contagious, infectious
or otherwise. Doubtless, the States have the power to pro-
vide by law suitable measures to prevent the introduction
into the States of articles of trade which on account of their
existing condition would bring in and spread disease, pesti-
lence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected
with the germs of yellow fever or the virus of small pox, or
cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or de-
cayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit
for human use or consumption. Such articles are not
merchantable; they are not legitimate subjects of trade
and commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsi-

The learned Justice then quotes with approval the ob-
servations of Mr. Justice Catron in the License Cases, supra.
He then proceeds (p. 498) as follows :

“The section of the statute of Iowa, the validity of which
is drawn in question in this case, does not fall within our
enumeration of the legitimate exertions of the police
power. It is not an exercise of the jurisdiction of the

over persons and property within the limits of other
States. It seeks to prohibit and stop their passage and
into its own limits, and is designed as a regu-
lation for the conduct of. commerce before the merchandise
is brought to its border. It is not one of those local regu-
lations designed to aid and facilitate commerce; it is not
‘an inspection law to secure the duc quality and measure
of a commodity; it is a law to regulate or restrict
the sale of an article deemed injurious to the health and
morals of the community; it is not a regulation confined
te the purely internal and domestic commerce of the
State; it is not a restriction which only operates upon

after it has become mingled with, and forms part
Se ee ee ane on Rate. It is, on the
other hand, a regulation directly affecting interstate com-
merce in an essential and vital point. If authorized in the
present instance upon the grounds and motives of the
policy which has dictated it, the very reacon would justify
any and every other State regulation of interstate com-
merce upon any grounds and reasons which might prompt
im particular cases their adoption. It is, therefore, a regu-
lation of that character which constitutes an unauthorized

_

=
-
So
Be
os
S

23

interference with the power given to Congress over the
subject.””

In Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U. 8. 313, the Court had
occasion to consider a statute of Minnesota, requiring that
cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for human
food shall be inspected in that State before being slaugh-
tered, and held same to be unconstitutional, as in effec:
prohibiting the importation into that State of all fresh
beef, mutton or pork, although ‘entirely sound, healthy and
fit for human food. Mr. Justice Harland, in delivering
the opinion of the Court (p. 328), said : .

“But a law. providing for the inspection of ani-
mals whose meats are designed for human food
cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police
powers of the State, if the inspection prescribed is of such
a character or is burdened with such conditions as will pre-
vent altogether the introduction into the State of sound
meats, the products of animals slaughtered in other States.
It is one thing for a State to exclude from its iimits cattle,
sheep, or swine actually diseased, or meats that, by reason
of their condition, or the condition of the animals from
which they are taken, are unfit for human food, and punish
ali sales of such animals or of such meats within its limits.
It is quite a different thing for a State to declare, as did
Minnesota by the necessary operation of its statute, that
fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb, or pork, articles that are
used in every part of this country to support human life,
shall not be sold at all for human food within its limits,
unless the animals from which such meats are taken are
inspected in that State, or as is practically said, unless the
animal is slaughtered in that State.”

A case similar in principle to the one at bar came before
this Court in Railway vs. Husen, 95 U. 8. 465. In that
ease, there was drawn in question the constitationality of
a statute of Missouri, which provided for the exclusion from

24

Missouri of all cattle coming from Texas during certain
months of the year, it being contended that such cattle were
liable to be infected with a dangerous infectious disease
known as Texas fever. The Court held the statute void for
the reason that it made no distinction between healthy cat-
tle and unhealthy cattle coming from Texas. It held that
while it would have been competent for the State of Mis-
souri, in the exercise of its police power, to pass quarantine
and inspection laws for the purpose of detecting such of
the cattle as were diseased, and to exclude such as were so
infected, it was a violation of the commerce clause pf
the Federal Constitution to prohibit the introduction of
healthy cattle from that State into Missouri, and that the
statute in effect authorized such exclusion, and was there-
fore void.
An interesting case, involving the right of a State to im-
pose conditions upon the entrance into its borders of per-
sons from other States or foreign countries, was decided by
the Supreme Court of Maine in the case of City of Bangor
vs. n this case, there was drawn in ques-
tion the validity of a statute of that State, which provided
that any carrier, which brought into the State a person not
having a settlement therein, must remove him from the
State upon request of the proper officers, if he fell into dis-
tress within one year, or should be liable for his support.
The defendant had brought from New York into that State
on his steamship 56 Italian laborers, who within a year be-
came paupers, and suit was brought to recover the expense
of their support by the City. The statute, as applied, was
declared by the Supreme Court of Maine to be a regulation

25

of interstate commerce and void. In the course of its
opinion, the Court said :

“ But it is claimed that this is the exercise of the police
power of the State. That the State in the exercise of its
police power may indirectly to some extent affect com-
merce between foreign countries and the United States or
between the States, may be conceded. But what the po-
lice power of the State embraces and how far it extends
does not appear to have been definitely determined. It
may exercise it to require quarantine or inspection before
landing persons brought from abroad. It may exercise it
to prevent the landing of passengers infected with conta-
gious disease. It may exercise it over the landing of con-
vieted felons from abroad. It may exercise it over persons
who have been subjected to contagious diseases, so as to be
liable to be infected with it and communicate it to others,
and thereby endanger the health of the community. But
it cannot exercise it to prevent commerce, nor can it exer-
cise it over the carrying or landing of persons who are not
at the time they are brought into the State in a condition
to be dangerous to the public. I+ cannot exercise it over

' persons who are free from contagion, who have not been

subjected to any danger of contagious disease, on the
ground that they may become dangerous in that. respect

_ within a year or any other fixed period of time after the
landing.”

A case almost exactly parallel to the case at bar arose in

California, and was decided by the Supreme Court of that

State in State vs. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. The
statute drawn in question in that case vested in certain
officers the exclusion from the Siate of persons that were
affected with disease, or that were criminals, or that were
liable to become a public charge. The statute was framed

_ in such broad language that the Court found that it au-

thorized the exclusion of healthy persons not of that descrip-
tion. It was one of the many statutes framed with the in-

tention of excluding Chinese and other aliens, whose pres-
ence it was admitted was detrimental to the welfare and the
morals of the citizens of the State. In the course of an able
opinion, the Court said :

“But whilst conceding the authority of the State to enact
police and sanitary regulations for preserving the health
and morals of the people, counsel insists that it is neither
one or the other so far as it operates upon persons who at
the time of landing are neither paupers, vagabonds, or
criminals, or affected with any mental or bodily infirmity,
but on the contrary are perfectly sound in body and mind
and in every way fitted to earn a support. It is said the”
police and sanitary regulations can have no just application
to persons of this description, and that it is an abuse of terms
to say that they are proper subjects for such regulations

> because possibly they may at some future day become

paupers, vagabonds, or criminals, or sick, infirm, or other-
wise disabled. This view of the question appears to me to

* be unanswerable. It is a misnomer to call that a police

regulation, in the sense in which that term is here applied, .
in so far as it operates upon persons of good morals and.
upright character, and who are no more likely than the
average of mankind to become paupers, vagabonds, or
criminals; and it is equally a misnomer to term that a
sanitary regulation which applies only to persons in good
health and sound mind, and who are not more liable than
other persons hereafter to become a public charge from
sickness or infirmity. The power to make police and sani-

. tary regulations, prescribing the terms on Which certain

classes of persons shall be admitted into this State, neces-
sarily includes the power to exclude them altogether, if
they fail to comply with the prescribed conditions. If a
criminal from a penal colony should be required to pay
$100 upon his entrance into this State, he might be excluded
altogether if he refused to pay the required sum; or a
pauper from a foreign almshouse might be refused permis-
sion to land in this State on any terms, or might be re-
ceived on any terms the State might prescribe. These

27

would be merely police regulations in the proper and
just sense of that term. But if the State, under pretense

‘ of police or health regulations, should enact that no person

should hereafter enter this State unless he would first pay
a sum of money, or give a bond with sureties for his future

behavior, or conditional that he would not become
« public charge during his sojourn in this State, this could
in no just sense be termed a police or sanitary regulation,
in so far as it would be applicable to persons of good-char-
acter and morals, and who were sound in body and mind.
If the State could exercise such a power as this under the
pretense of preserving the public health and morals, it is
obvious that it might destroy the entire passenger
traffic between this State and foreign countries, and
even with our sister States. It might for the same reason
prohibit the importation of all merchandise from foreign
countries for fear that it might be infected with some secret
cause of disease, which in the future might possibly en-
danger the health of the community. ‘Whilst the Legisla-
ture may exercise a wide discretion as to the proper sub-

’ jects of police and sanitary regulations, and as to the proper

mode of preserving health and morals of the com-

‘munity by means of these regulations, it cannot under

color of this power enact laws which in no _proxi-
mate degree are germane to the subject. I am, therefore,
of the opinion that a statute which obstructs the entrance
into the State of persons who are neither paupers, vagabonds,
nor criminals, or in anywise unsound or infirm in body or
mind, is not a valid exercise of the police power of the
State in any just sense of the word.”

To the same effect, see Scott vs. Donald, 165 U. 8. 58; In
re Schollenberger, 171 U. 8. 1; Henderson vs. Mayor, 92 U.
8. 259.

In the case at bar, it is not pretended that these persons
were infected with any disease that was liable to be com-

‘municated to the community, or that they were paupers or

criminals, but on the contrary each and all of them had ad-

BRE ace ne

“Sd

a

mittedly come from a healthy port, had remained in good
health on the voyage, and when inspected and examined
by the officers of the defendant Board at the quarantine
station, had been given certificates of good health. In the
resolution thereafter directing their exclusion (Trans. pp.
17-18) there is even no intimation or claim that they were
not immunes from the disease said to be prevalent, or that

’ they for any reason were more likely than other persons to
be afflicted after their arrival, but. the action seems to be

based solely upon the number of them. Under this reso-
tion, they might all have entered the State singly, but not
as a body. But admitting for the sake of the argument
that the physicians constituting the Board really believed,
for any reason, that these persons, if permitted to land,
would be likely to become infected by the disease alleged
to exist in the State, and thus possibly cause a spread of
the disease, nevertheless that would not have justified
their exclusion. Being perfectly healthy, they were

legitimate subjects of transportation, and under the

protection of the Constitution, the plaintiff had the

Tight to bring and disembark them there, free

of all restraints except such as the National Gov-

_ ernment may have prescribed. The State was bound

to permit them to enter, and could not justly have exclud-
ed them upon the theory that possibly at some future
time their presence might prove injurious to its citizens.
The State’s remedy was not in excluding them, but in en-
forcing, after they ceased being subjects of international
commerce, and had become subject to its jurisdiction, such
sanitary rules and regulations in regard tv them as seemed
best. The fact that the State did not see fit to undertake

v4

29

this task, or that it could or would not enforce its sanitary
laws after the landing of these people is no defense for at-
tempting to deny them rights secured under the supreme
law of the land. If the State or its officers believe that a
person, whose character is such that his right to enter its
borders is guaranteed by the Constitution, will, for any
reason, thereafter become dangerous to public health,
morals or order by a disregard of its police or sanitary
laws, such tendency could be readily checked by a proper
enforcement of its laws. To permit the exclusion of any
person then unobjectionable, upon the ground that, in the
opinion or judgment of some official or officials, he might
possibly contract at some future day some disease and
thereby spread it among the community, or that he would
become vicious and thereafter injure public morals or af-
fect the public safety, would open the door to all sorts of
oppression.

In the case of Ah Fong, 3 Sawyer, 144 (1 Fed. Cases
213), decided on Circuit by Mr. Justice Field, and
subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in Chy Lung
vs. Freeman, 92 U. 8. 275, a statute of California, directed
to the exclusion of Chinese from that State, was passed
upon. It was contended in support of the validity of the
law that the Chinese were of such low moral character, op-
posed to our system of government, unwilling to adapt
themselves to our laws, criminals by nature, and generally
dangerous to the public health and morals of our citizens,
that the State, therefore, in the exercise of its police
power, had the right to exclude such persons from its
borders. But the learned Justice said :

“But the extent of the power of the State to exclude a

,

30

foreigner from its territory is limited by the right in which
it has its origin, the right of self-defense. Whatever out-
side of the legitimate exercise of this right affects the inter-
course of foreigners with our people, their immigration to
this country and residence therein is exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the general government, and is not sub-
ject to State control or interference. To that government
the treaty-making power is confided; also, the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes in-
tercourse with them as well as traffic; also the power to

prescribe the conditions of migration or importation of

persons, and rules of naturalization; whilst the States are

forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confedera-
tion with other nations.

“I am aware that the right of the State to exclude from
its limits any persons whom it may deem dangerous or in-
jurious to the interests and welfare of its citizens has been
asserted by eminent judges of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Mr. Chief Justice Taney maintained the
existence of this right in his dissenting opinion in the
Passenger Cases, and asserted that the power had been
recognized in previous decisions of the Court. The lan-
guage of the opinion in the case of the City of New York
vs. Miin, 11 Pet. (36 U. 8.) 141, would seem to sustain this
doctrine. But neither in the Passenger Cases nor in the
case of the Oity of New York vs. Miln, did the decision of
the Court require any consideration of the power of ex-
clusion, which the State possessed ; and all that was said
by the eminent judges in those cases upon that subject was
argumentative and not necessary and authoritative.

“But independent of this consideration, we cannot shut
our eyes to the fact that much which was formerly said
upon the power of the State in this respect, grew out of
the necessity which the Southern States; in which the in-
stitution of slavery existed, felt of excluding free negroes
from their limits. As in some States negroes were citizens,
the right to exclude them from the slave States could only
be maintained by the assertion of a power to exclude all
persons whom they might deem dangerous or injurious to

31

their interests. But at this day no such power would be
asserted, or, if asserted, allowed, in any Federal court. And
the most serious consequences affecting the relations of the
nation with other countries might, and undoubtedly would,
follow from any attempt at its exercise. Its maintenance
would enable any State to involve the nation in’ war, how-
ever disposed to peace the people at large might be.
“Where the evil apprehended by the State from the
ingress of foreigners is, that such foreigners will disregard
the laws of the State, and thus be injurious to its peace, the
remedy lies in the more vigorous enforcement of the laws,
not in the exclusion of the parties. Gambling is consid-
/. ered by most States to be injurious to the morals of their
people, and is made a public offense. It would hardly be
considered as a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the States to prevent a foreigner who had been a gambler
in his own country from landing in ours. If, after land-
ing, he pursues his former occupation, fine him, and if he
persists in it imprison him, and the evil will be remedied.
In some States the manufacture and sale of spirituous and
intoxicating liquors are forbidden and punished as a mis-
demeanor. If the foreigner coming to our shore is a man-
ufacturer or dealer in such liquors, it would be deemed an
illegitimate exercise of the police power to exclude him, on
account of his calling, from the State. The remedy against
any apprehended manufacture and sale would lie in such
case in the enforcement of the penal laws of the State. So
if lewd women, or lewd men, even if the latter be of that
baser sort, who, when Paul preached at Thessalonica, set
all the city in an uproar (Acts xvii, verse 5), land on our
shores, the remedy against any subsequent lewd conduct
on their part must be found in good laws or good muni-
cipal regulations and a vigorous police. It is evident that
if the possible violation of the laws of the State by an im-
migrant, or the supposed immorality. of his past life or
profession, where that immorality has not already resulted
in a conviction for a felony, is to determine his right to
land and to reside in the State, or to pass through other
and interior States, a door will be open to all sorts of op-

32.

pression. The doctrine now asserted by counsel for the

‘commissioner of immigration, if maintained, would cer-

tainly be invoked, and at no distant day, when other par-
ties besides low and despised Chinese women, are the sub-
jects of its application, and would then be seen to be a
grievous departure from principle.”

If the construction of this statute by the Supreme Court

_ of Louisiana is correct, then the power to act as they did

was surely vested by the State in the Board of Health.
This statute is a most remarkable one, and certainly, if

- yalid, a most unusual extension of the police power. As

we have seen, by its terms, the State Board of Health has
the jurisdiction and power to declare: (1) what are in-
fectious or contagious diseases ; (2) what shall constitute
infection ; (3) what extent of territory is infected ; (4) what
extent of territory shall be quarantined or closed to inter-
course; (5) what shall be the duration of such non-inter-
course; and (6) what persons may or may not be permitted
to enter such infected territory.

Being a special tribunal for the determination of these
questions, and being vested with absolute discretion, their
findings would not be subject to review,

Nishi Mura vs. United States, 142 U. 8. 660.

Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat. 21. .

Philadelphia vs. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 458.

In re Oteiza, 136 U. 8. 330.

' Hellon vs. Merritt, 110 U. 8. 97.

Benson vs. McMahon, 127 U. 8. 457.

How many contagious or infectious diseases there are,
we are unable to say, but they vary in virulence from bu-
bonic plague to-measles and mumps and grippe. To each
of these extensive classes of diseases, certain classes of

33

people are more susceptible than others. Some one or more
of these diseases are always prevalent in different commu-
nities in this State. So that under the authority given this
Board by the State, it could declare that the whole or any
part of the State was infected with one or more such
- diseases, and that in its opinion the introduction of persons
from places above certain degrees of latitude would tend to
spread the disease, and thereupon prevent intercourse with
all States or countries beyond that parallel. To illustrate
further. Your Honors are, no doubt, aware that ‘it is
claimed that there never has been any yellow fever in Texas
for a great many years, due to its excellent quarantine sys-
tem, so that it is plain the people of Texas are not im-
munes; whereas, there have been frequent occurrences of
fever of late in Louisiana and Mississippi, in fact by some
it is claimed that the disease is endemic in this State, so
that most of the people in the latter States are immunes.
On the occurrence of the fever in New Orleans, the
Board of Health could promply declare it infected,
and state that in its judgment none but im-
munes should be allowed to enter the city. As
the citizens of Texas are not immunes, and the cit-
izens of Mississippi are, an embargo is placed on the
former while intercourse is unrestricted as to the latter. If,
therefore, it became the policy of Louisiana to cease inter-
course with any State, it would have in its Board of Health
a ready and powerful mechanism with which to accomplish
that end.

It is well known that of late years Italian immigration
has been exceedingly heavy into Louisiana. By many
Italians are considered an undesirable class of citizens. Lf

34

at any time public sentiment becarre strong in that belief

_so that it became the policy of the State to stop that immigra-
’ tion, just as it became the policy of California in reference
to Chinese, it would be an easy matter to put an end to it
through the action of the Board of Health in declaring that
verious infectious and contagious diseases existed, and that
tue presence of these unacclimated foreigners would tend to
spread them in the community. Small-pox is a disease to
which negroes are particularly susceptible. It prevails to-day
among them throughout the State, and under its alleged |
powers, this Board could prohibit anyone of negro blood
from entering the State on the theory it would be “adding
fuel to the flame.”

In this case the State Courts, as well as the other State
authorities, were misled by a metaphor. Their general
idea was that there was illness in New Orleans and that
the importation of healthy people froma healthy foreign
port “would add fuel to the flame.’’ Inspired by this
figure of rhetoric, they concluded that the police power of
the State of Louisiana would justify the interference with
international commerce, as shown by this record. It seems
to us that such reasoning is dangerous and fallacious. If
pushed to its logical extent it easily leads to the reductio ad
absurdum. We will all agree that the police power extends
to the protection of the morals as well as the health of the
community which is within the sphere of its jurisdiction.
Now, there can be no doubt that a certain amount of vice
is found in the City of New Orleans. We do not claim a
larger share than Chicago, for example, in proportion to
our population, but everyone will admit that there is a
large amount of immorality in our City, and that the police

35

power of the State and of the municipality may be exer-
cised to reduce and if possible to extirpate vice and crime
and disorder. But, suppose the State of Louisiana, through
its legislative, executive and judicial departments, should
declare that, in order to effect this worthy object, it was
necessary to forbid the transportation of any more passen-
gers from any European port to our City. Let us further
suppose a European city of a highly moral character con-
cerning which nothing could be said against the principles
or habits of its people; and let us suppose a steamship
coming to New Orleans from that highly moral foreign
port with a number of passengers of excellent moral char-
acter. Let us further suppose this steamship was stopped
at the mouth of the Mississippi and gravely told by the
State authorities that the advent of the passengers she was
carrying “would add fuel to the flame ;” that as soon as
these virtuous people should be landed in our City they
would become demoralized, they would enter upon a career
of wild dissipation and debauchery; and that, therefore,
the local authorities had a perfect right to put a stop to
international commerce of this kind.

It might be further supposed that the authorities at New
Orleans under the same conditions might arrest and send
away a party of theological students coming by steamship
from New York, and thus interfere with interstate trans-
portation of passengers, upon the pretext that the guileless
youths might become demoralized by the frivolities of our
City and add fuel to the fame of vice which is constantly
burning in our slums. Is it not thus plain that we arrive
at the reductio ad absurdum?

Passenger Cases, 7 How., at page 407.

It is no answer to say that this statute operates equally
upon all persons, resident as well as non-resident (Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan in Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S. 326, citing
Robbins vs. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; State
Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232), or that the Board will not
abuse the wide authority given them by the statute. It is
a conclusive presumption that when authority is conferred

‘it will be exercised to its full limit: it was conferred for no

other parpose than to be exercised at the discretion of the
Beard. It is idle to szy that officials clothed with this
arbitrary and unrestricted authority will not abuse it, or
that the material interests of the State will prevent it being
used oppressively. In the language of Mr_Justice Field in
Gloucester vs. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. at pages 205-6:
“Those engaged in foreign and interstate commerce are
ee en Sedation: fo thee
> - ma ¥ on
power of Congress to prevent any interference A oe the State

It is a canon of construction in testing the constitatics-
ality of a statute that its natural and reasonable effect
should be regarded (Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U. S. 279:
Railway vs. Husen, 95 U. S. 465), and so tested the effect of
this statute is to west three of a board of seven physi-
cians with unrestrained power and discretion to determine
how, when and where, citizens of other States, and foreigners,
untainted by disease or crime, may enter the State of Lou-
isiana. Is attempts to give them an authority which can
only be exercised by Congress.

The statute in question in this case is in many respects
similar to the one considered in Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92

37

U.S. 275. In that case the statute authorized the Commis-
sioner of Immigration te satisfy himself whether or not any
passenger, who should arrive from any foreign port, was
insane, deaf, dumb, blind, a convicted criminal, or a lewd
or debauched woman, etc., and any persons found to belong
to these classes should be excluded, unless a bond be given
by the master of the ship to secure their support or good
behavior, eve. The Court declared it a most extraordinary
statute (p. 277), placing, as it did, the power in the hands
of the Commissioner to prevent en(irely vessels engaged in
a foreign trade from carrying passengers, by enabling him
simply to declare a ship’s passengers to be of the prohibited
classes, and thereupon to require the master to give bonds
for them all. This statute did not in terms authorize the
Commissioner to exclude such persons as he might decide
to belong to the prohibited classes, as the statute in this
case does, but the power to impose conditions on admission
implies a power to exclude, and the Court found no diffi-
culty in that such statute vested the officer with power to
interfere with foreign commerce, and held it void.

How much more forcibly the reasoning of the Court in
that case applies to the facts in the instant one, when the
power of exclusion of healthy persons coming from healthy
countries is expressly conferred?

Vv.
SECORD POINT.

That portion of Section 8 of Act 192 of the General As-
sembly of Louisiana of 1898, relied on by the defendants in
error, is void on its face, and void as construed by the Su-
Preme Court of Louisiana, and as applied by the said defend-

38

ants in error herein. On its face it contains a grant of power
that is illegal; and as construed and applied it is operated to
deprive the plaintiff in error of its liberty and property with-
out due process of law and to deny it the equal protection of
the laws in contravention of Section 1 of the 14th Article of
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

We may first properly dispose of certain preliminary
questions before discussing the merits of the foregoing
proposition.

(a) There can be no doubt as to the power of this Court
to entertain and decide the issue whether the rights of the
plaintiff in error under the 14th Amendment had been
invadee or infringed. In the Assignment of Errors filed
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana before hearing and de~
cision, it was insisted that the judgment of the lower court
had denied the rights of the plaintiff in error under the
said Amendment ; and the merits of this contention the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana considered and denied, saying
that the contention was “utterly untenable.’ (Record, page
25). Oxley Stave Co. vs. Butler County, 166 U. 8., pages
. 648 and 656, and authorities cited; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.
vs. Chicago, 164 U. S. 454-457; Manell vs. Newbold, 18 How.
511. .

(6) There is equally little doubt that the plaintiff in
error is a person within the meaning and scope of the 14th
Amendment.

“It is now settled that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the
deprivation of property without due process of law as well
as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”
ton Turnpike Co. vs. Sanford, 164 U. 3. 578-592; Santa
Clara Co. vs. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U. 3. 394.

39

- “The rights and securities granted to persons by that in-
strument cannot be disregarded in respect to those arti-
ficial entities, called corporations, any more than they are
in respect to the individuals, who are the equitable owners
of the property belonging to such corporations. A State
has no more power to deny to corporations the equal pro-
tection of the laws than it has to the individual citizen.”
Santa Fe Ry. Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. 8. 150 and 154; Allgeyer
vs. La., 165 U. 8.578; Pembina Mining Co. vs. Penn, 119
U. 8. 110, 119. c

(c) It is further settled that the word person includes
an alien and that the amendment entitles him to protec-
tion of liberty and property. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356; Re Hoover, 30 Federal Reporter, 51; Re Tiburcio
Parrott, 1 Federal Reporter, 481, 497; U. 8. vs. Wong Dep
~ Ken, 57 Fed. Rep. 206; Ah Kow vs. Nunan, 5 Sawyer, 552;
Ah Fong, 3 Sawyer, 154, 157.

(d) It, therefore, follows that the plaintiff in error is
person within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
visions.

(e) It is further clear that the plaintiff in error is not
‘only within that category of the amendment which forbids
any State to “deprige any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law ;” but also within that cat-
egory which forbids any State to “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Act 149 of the General Assembly of Louisiana of 1890
(Appendix B)} provides that all corporations domiciled
outside of the State, except mercantile corporations, shall
file with the Secretary of State a declaration of domicile,
and shall designate an agent upon whom service of legal
process shall be made ; and that service of process on such
agent shall suffice to bring the corporation into court.

It appears from the petitions in this case and the excep-
tion. admits that the plaintiff in error is doing a non-
mercantile business in the State of Louisiana, and that
Sawers & Sons are, for the purposes of its business, its
agents in the City of New Orleans. It is a fact, and the
Court will presume, that the plaintiff in error has complied
with the statute above mentioned, and that it is pursuing
its said business under the license, and with the permission
of the State; and therefore no suggestion can lie that the
plaintiff in error is not “within the jurisdiction” of the
State of Louisiana so as to be entitled to the equal protec-
tion of its laws.

(f) The right of the plaintiff in error to freely enter the
Port of New Orleans with its ships, and to lawfully trade
there free of damaging and arbitrary interference by the
State of Louisiana or any agency thereof, is granted alike
by the Constitution, the treaty of the United States with
France and the legislation of Congress. U. 8. Revised
Statutes, Secs. 1977 and 709.

This right is property under every definition of that
term, and its deprivation or curtailment constitutes a
taking of property and an infringement of liberty.

“The 14th Amendment * * * undoubtedly intended
that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or
liberty, or the arbitrary spoliation of property, but that
equal protection and security should be given to all under
like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and
civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to
pursue their: happiness and to acquire and enjoy property ;
that they should have like access to the Courts of the
Country for the protection of their persons and property,

the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement
of contracts ; that noimpediment should be interposed to the

41

.

pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits
of others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens
should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the
same a and condition.” Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.
8.27, 31.

“The main guarantee of private rights against unjust
legislation is found in that memorable clause of the Bill of
Rights, that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process oflaw. This guaranty is not
construed in any narrow or technical sense. The right to
life may be invaded without its destruction. One may be
deprived of his liberty in a constitutional sense without
putting his body in confinement. Property may be taken
without manual interference therewith, or its physical de-
struction.” Bertholf vs. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, Tiedeman
Lims. Police Power, Sec. 3.

The deprivation and taking are admitted, and the sole
question is, whether such deprivation and taking were
lawful.

(g) We need not go far afield to seek either the history
and reasons which preceded and led to the adoption of the
provision which we attack, or the extent of the power in-
tended to beconferred thereby. The former is conveniently
afforded, and the latter defined in strict harmony with the
legislative intention, by the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana. Speaking of the Board, defendant in error

here, and the power conferred by Section 8 of Act 192 of

1898, the Court says:

“Tt is very clear that the General Assembly intended to
grant additional powers to the Board, and this very power
was, beyond question, one of them.

“During the fall of 1897, and during the existence of an
epidemic, a vessel arrived in the Mississippi River with
immigrants aboard, under conditions similar to those under
which the Britannia reached the same stream in 1898.

“The excited public discussion at the time as to the
right of the State Board under the then existing law to
prevent the landing of the immigrants, and as to its duty
in the premises, was so extended as to authorize us to take
judicial notice of the fact, and in our opiniow the clause
in the present Act, which covers that precise matter, was

_inserted therein for the express purpose of placing the
particular question outside of the circumstances of con-
troversy.

“For a number of years past, immigrants had been
coming into New Orleans in the autumn from Italy.

“There was a probability, when the General Assembly
met in 1898, that the epidemic of 1897 might be repeated
and a great probability that immigrants would seek to
enter as they had done the year before, to the great danger,
not only of the people of Louisiana, but of the immigrants
themselves.

“Tndependently of this, there was great danger to be ap-
prehended from the increasing intercourse between New
Orleans and the West India Islands in consequence of
a war with Spain.

“It was to ward off these dangers that this particular
provision was inserted in the Act of 1898.”

This language contains the gist of the matter. The State
Board of Health is to have power, and unlimited power, to
prohibit the entrance into or through the State of Louis-
iana of any person or bodies of persons whatsoever on the
theory that the entrance or passage of such«persons would
be (to use the phrase of the Supreme Court of Louisiana)
the addition of new “fuel to the flame” of any disease,
previously declared by the Board to exist and to be of the
character designated as infectious or contagious.

Italian immigration in the fall of the year, however law-
ful under the existing treaties, is to be the especial object
of prevention and was the especial object of prevention in
the case at bar.

43

- We think it demonstrable both by reason and authority
that this grant of power is void on its face. And if it is
void, the defendants are liable, for they have never pretended
to act under-any other.

By the provisions of Act 192 of 1898, the State Board of.
Health is given the power to declare the existence of in-

fectious or contagious diseases in any portion of the State, .

and then to declare the same in quarantine. What diseases

shall be considered infectious or contagious, and to what *

extent a particular disease must prevail to warrant action
on the part of the Board, are matters necessarily and
properly left to the discretion of the Board itself. The
‘exercise of this discretion to the extent above indicated
could not, and would not be reviewed by any tribunal. If
measles, in the opinion of the Board, was an infectious
and contagious disease, it is not likely that any court
would undertake to say that it was not.

So far, the statute is unobjectionable. But having first
exercised its discretion in declaring the existence and nature
of some disease and having declared “a portion of the
State’’ to be infected with such disease, what limit is there
upon the power of the Board? We submit there is none.

It cannot be denied that the phrase, “persons acclimated,
unacclimated or said to be immune,” is exhaustive. There
is no human being who is not embraced by it; prince,
pauper, citizen, alien, healthy, diseased, old, young, from
whatever spot on the globe, seeking entrance into Louisiana
under whatever circumstances and for whatever purpose,
each, any or all may be met with the Board’s prohibition
of entrance. It is not the mere residence of a healthy
person in some narrowly defined infected locality that may

be thus prohibited. It is his “introduction” into an unde-
fined infected locality for whatever purpose, whether as a
traveler desiring mere passage, or a trader the mere time
to transact his business and depart. Again, this introduc-
‘tion is made to depend in nowise upon the likelihood of
danger. If the Board has declared the City of New Orleans
_to be infected .by reason of the existence of five cases of
yellow fever in the lower portion of the City, a passenger
from Europe may not disembark ten miles away in the
upper portion for the purpose of taking a train to Wash-
ington or Kansas City. He is paternally considered “fresh
fuel’’ and not allowed to risk himself. On the same
theory, if a tenement on the outskirts of the City should
take fire, the delivery of a fifty pound package of gun-
powder in another portion five miles away may be for-
bidden. The danger is no more remote in the one case
than in the other.

And why, after all, may not a healthy person who desires
to do so, take his chances of contracting a disease some of
which prevails in a locality of large dimensions? What
injustice is done to the rest of the community?

_ Surely, no more than is done every day in the course of
nature by the birth of children in that locality. These
children are “fresh fuel’’ and peculiarly liable to add to the
“flame ;’’ and yet the wildest germicide would not dream of
proposing to isolate them or take them away from their
parents. Every citizen of Louisiana who returned from West,
East, or North, from Boston, Chicago, Paris, or Hong Kong,
and came to New Orleans in the fall of 1898, was “fresh
fuel.” Every train that entered the city in that fall brought
“fresh fuel.’’ It is not pretended, and the contrary is

45

alleged, that this “fresh fuel’? was stopped by the Board
of Health, defendants in error here. Its failure to do this
subjected the plaintiff in error to a gross and oppressive
discrimination. But the question now in hand is, could
the entry of all this “fresh fuel” have been lawfully pre-
vented?

The proposition of the defendants in error really comes
to this: that instead. of being limited to the isolation of
those persons who are found to have or are suspected of
having disease, they have and should have the power to
isolate thé rest of the healthy world from any territory over
or in which they may allow such cases of disease to remain
scattered. :

Instead of setting apart any ten or fifty patients that
may be discovered with fever in New Orleans in a special
portion of the City or elsewhere—in other words, instead
of prescribing reasonable regulations governing intercourse
with disease actually discovered—the ten or fifty cases
are to remain wherever the stricken persons may be, and
everyone else, no matter what his health, is to be excluded
from all portions of the City because perchance someone
may contract the disease. and then pass it on to a citizen
who has been daily exposed to the same or greater danger,
according to his discretion, his state of health, whether he
has met this person or that, been here or there—according
to an infinite number of circumstances.

-To sum up, the Board has an uncontrolled power and an
unreviewable discretion to pronounce at any time, and pro-
long for any period the existence of any disease, ane *~
stamp it with thecharacter of infectious or contagious ; it may
declare and determine at will the extent of the territory in

46

which such disease exists at any time without limitation and
without respect to the facts; it may select any person or
persons whatsoever as likely to increase the prevalence of
the disease, and prohibit his or their entrance without re-
gard to the health of those persons, or the health of the
places from which they come, or the likelihood or unlikeli-
hood of their being diseased, and it may then deny to the
person or persons so selected any entrance into, or passage
through, the portions of the State previously declared to be
infected.

This is power absolute, imperial, transcending all law.
It will not do to say that the condition precedent to the
exercise of the power of the Board is the existence of an
infectious or contagious disease in some portion of the
State. The creation of this condition precedent to the ex-
ercise of its power of exclusion depends wholly on the will
of the Board itself. It may say to-day that an infectious
disease exists in a certain locality, and thereupon exercise
against A its power of exclusion, and to-morrow it may say
that the disease no longer exists in that locality, and there-
upon permit B to enter. How little the Board would
hesitate in the future to create and declare this condition
in order to give room for any desired action on its part
may be judged by the facts of the present case.

Subsequent to the passage of the resolution attached to
the original petition of the plaintiff in error and the notice
thereof, the agents of said plaintiff in error at New Orleans
were notified that if they attempted to land the Britannia’s
passengers at any place in the State of Louisiana, quaran-
tine would at once be established and enforced there. It
was hot pretended, and it was not a fact, that the whole

47

State was infected ; but the Board desired to exclude im-
migration from Italy in the fall of 1898. The power to ex-
clude had been given it, and it exercised that power to the
fullest and most oppressive extent. It made no difference
that the end to be attained was to be attained by the dec-
laration of a non-existent fact. The statute put this in the
power of the Board, and it used its power.

It is well settled in this Court that the effect of a State
statute may be considered in testing its constitutionality,
and “if deductions from the face of the ordinance as to its
necessary tendency and ultimate actual operation” (Mr. Jus-
tice Matthews, in Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. &., ‘at page
373), results in a conclusion of unconstitutionality, then it
seems such unconstitutionality may be declared. Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 118 U. 8. 356; Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U. 8.
279; Henderson vs. Mayor, 92 U. 8. 268; City of Baltimore

vs. Radecke, 49 Md. 217.

* The necessary tendency and ultimate actual operation”
of the statute at bar, quite apart from the facts of this
case, are easy to detect. The State of Louisiana has cre-
ated in its State Board of Health a machinery perfectly
adapted to set at naught the Constitution, laws and treat-
ies of the United States, and to put at the mercy of indi-
vidual caprice the most sacred rights of the individual.
Under the guise of police regulation, the State, through
- this Board, may dictate a separate commercial policy and
may regulate immigration into its borders at pleasure.
The Board may discriminate against the ships or subjects
- of any State or Kingdom, or against the ships of any cor-
poration or individual. It may say to 100 British subjects :
_ An epidemic of grippe prevails in the Port of New Orleans.

You shall not come in. It may say this to one British
subject and allow 99 others to enter. It may create, at
will, oceasions for the exclusion of all British subjects,
whatsoever, and have no such occasion when the entrance
of French subjects is at issue. Jt may select any person
or any steamship or railway line for ruin and any other
for enrichment. There ic nota conceivable right that may
not be infringed, invaded or destroyed by such a power.
It is not enough to say that the evil use of the power
granted is improbable. No one is bound to trust that
an illegal power will be legally and moderately used.
Gloucester Ferry Co. vs. Penn, 114 U. 8. 205; Hen-
derson vs. Mayor, 92 U. 8. 268. Power granted must
be presumed to be granted for use, and what instance
can be pointed to where arbitrary power was slow
to exert itself? The history of civil liberty is the history
of mankind’s attempts to so limit and define power by
written laws, charters, and constitutions, that every man
may know what rights he has and what duties he owes.
If arbitrary power be given, it.is not law, for “law is the
definition and limitation of power” (Mr. Justice Matthews,
in Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. 8., at page 370); and if the
power so given be exercised, there is no due process of law,
neither is there equal protection of the laws afforded, for
there can be no equality of operation in a law which fur-
nishes no rule of action save such as may reside in the will
of the individual charged with its execution.

If the “necessary tendency and ultimate actual opera-
tion” of the statute here attacked be such as we have
argued, no citation, or certainly no extended citation, of
authority can be necessary to demonstrate its entire in-

49

validity. The case at bar cannot be distinguished from
the cases of Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U. 8. 277, and Hen-
derson vs. Mayor, 92 U. 8. 259.

We, therefore, submit that that portion of the statute
under which the defendants in error acted is void on its
face, and is void as construed by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana ; and that, as applied by the defendants in error,
it has subjected the plaintiff in error to an arbitrary taking,
and invasion of its rights, and an oppressive discrimina-
tion, and has deprived it of the rights secured to it by the
14th Article of Amendment.

VI.
THIRD POINT.

The statute as applied and construed is void, for the
reason that it is in conflict with treaties between the United
States on the one part and the Republic of France and the
Kingdom of Italy on the other parts, guaranteeing certain
rights, privileges and immunities to the citizens and subjects
of said countries.

Article VIII of the treaty between the United States and
France, concluded April 30, 1803 (see “Official Compila-
tious of Treaties in Force, 1899,” page 177), whereby the
Territory of Louisiana was ceded to the United States,
provides :

“In future and forever after the expiration of the twelve
years, the ships of France shall be treated upon the footing
of the most favored nation in the ports above mentioned”

(that is to say, the ports in the ceded territory, including
the port of New Orleans).

Articles I, II, III and IV of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of

es.

Italy, concluded February 26, 1871 (Off. Comp., pages 310,
311), provide as follows:

“Article I. There shall be between the territories of the
high contracting parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce
and navigation.

“Italian citizens in the United States and citizens of the
United States in Italy shall mutually have liberty to enter
with their ships and cargoes all the ports of the United
States and Italy respectively which may be open to foreign
commerce.

“They shall also have liberty to sojourn and reside in all
ports whatsoever of said Territories. They shall enjoy
respectively within the States and possessions of either
party the same rights, privileges, favors, immunities and
exemptions for their commerce and navigation as the
natives of the country wherein they reside without paying
other or higher duties or charges than are paid by the
natives on condition of their submitting to the laws and
ordinances there prevailing.

“War vessels of the two countries shall receive in their
respective ports the treatment of those of the most favored
nation.

“Article II. The citizens of each of the high contracting
parties shall have liberty to travel in the States and Terri-
tories of the other; to carry on trade, wholesale and retail ;
to hire and occupy houses and warehouses; to employ
agents of their choice; and generally to do anything inci-
dent to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as the
natives of the country submit themselves to the laws there
established.

“Article III. The citizens of each of the high con-
tracting parties shall receive in the States and Territories
of the other the most constant protection and security for
their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect
the same rights and privileges as are, or shall be, granted
to the natives upon their submitting themselves to the con-
ditions imposed upon the natives.

“They shall, however, be exempt in their respective Ter-

51

ritories from compulsory military service, either on land or
sea, in the regular forces or in the national guard or in the
militia.

“They shall likewise be exempt from any judicial or
municipal office, and from any contribution whatever, in
kind or in money, to be levied in compensation for personal
service.

“Article IV. The citizens of neither of the contracting
parties shall be liable in the States and Territories of the
other to any embargo; nor shall they be detained with
their vessels, cargoes, merchandise, or effects for any mili-
tary expedition nor for any public or private purpose what-
ever, without allowing to those interested a sufficient in-
demnification previously agreed upon when possible.”

Article I of the treaty of commerce and navigation
between the United States and Great Britain, concluded
July 5, 1815 (Off. Comp., page 216), provides as follows :

“Article 1. There shall be between the Territories of
the United States of America and all the Territories of her
Britannick Majesty in Europe a reciprocal liberty of com-
merce. The inhabitants of the two countries respectively
shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their
ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers in the
Territories aforesaid in which other persons are permitted
to come; to enter the same and to remain and reside in
any port of said Territories respectively ; also to hire and
occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce, and generally the merchants and traders of each
nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection
and security for their commerce ; but subject always to the
lows and statutes of the two countries respectively.”

The treaty of commerce and navigation between the
Kingdom of Greece and the United States, concluded Dec.
22,1837 (Otf. Comp. p. 268), provides for reciprocal free-
dom of trade and intercourse, and the Article XV (p. 273)
provides as follows :

— ae

52

“Article XV. It is agreed that vessels arriving directly
from the United States of America at a port within the
dominion of His Majesty the King of Greece, or from the
Kingdom of Greece at a port of the United States of Amer.
ica, and provided with a bill of health granted by an officer
having competent power to that effect at the port whencts
such vessel shall have sailed; setting forth that no malig. “
nant or contagious diseases prevailed in that port, shall de
subjected to no other quarantine than such as may be nee.
essary for the visit of the health officer uf the port where
such vessel shall have arrived, after which said vessels
shall be allowed immediately to enter and unload their
cargoes—Provided always that there shall be on board no
person who, during the voyage, shall have been attacked
with any malignant or contagious disease ; that such vessel
shall not, during the passage, have communicated with any
vessel liable itself to undergo quarantine; and that the
country whence they came shall not at that time be so far
infected or suspected that, before their arrival, an ordin-
ance had been issued in consequence of which all vessels
coming from that country should be considered as sus-
pected and consequently subject to quarantine.”’

Article XVI of the treaty of commerce and naviga-
tion between the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway and
the United States, concluded July 4, 1827 (Off. Comp.
616), contains a provision couched in exactly similar
language.

The treaties above quoted are in no proper sense reci-
procity treaties, and as the treaty with France quoted above
contains the most favored nation clause, each and every
one of the stipulations quoted above from the treaties of
the United States with Italy, Great Britain, Greece, and
Sweden-Norway become a part of the treaty between the
United States and the Republic of France, and the citizens
of France are entitled to all the privileges and immunities

53

thereby granted to the same extent as though same were
specifically granted in terms by the French treaty.

The right was thus conferred, under the circumstances
mentioned in the treaties with Greece and with Sweden-
Norway, upon French citizens to come with their vessels
to any port in the United States and to discharge the same
“with no other quarantine than such as may be necessary
for the visit of the health officer of the port where such
vessels shall have arrived.’’ The benefit of these treaty
stipulations to the orderly and expeditious transaction of
commercial affairs, without, however, adding to the risk to
the public health, is so evident that it was but natural that
Congress should have enacted general legislation along the
same lines. And, in fact, it might justly be said that the
legislation of Congress, to which we are about to refer, was
but legislation to make effective the treaty obligations
assumed by the United States in its conventions, for by
reason of the fact that most, if not all, of the treaties of
this country contain the most favored nation clause, the
stipulations in the treaties with Greece and Sweden-Norway
became of universal application in the relations of the
United States with other nations.

Thus we find that by an Act approved February 15, 1893
(27 Statutes at Large, 449), entitled “An Act granting addi-
tional quarantine powers and imposing additional duties
upon the Marine Hospital Service,” it is by the first section
declared unlawful for any merchant ship, or other vessel,
from any foreign port or place to enter any port of the
United States, except in accordance with the provisions of

‘that act and with such rules and regulations of State and

54

municipal health authorities as may be made in pursuance
of or consistent with that act.

By section 2 of that act it is provided “that any vessel,
at any foreign port, clearing for any port or place in the
United States, shall be required to obtain from the consul,
vice-consul, or other consular officer of the United States,
at the port of departure, or from the medical officer where
such officer has been detailed by the President for that
purpose, a bill of health in duplicate in the form prescribed
by the Secretary of the Treasury, setting forth the sanitary
history and condition of the vessel and that it has in ail
respects complied with the rules and regulations in such
eases prescribed for securing the best sanitary condition of
said vessel with its cargo, passengers, and crew; and said
consular or medical officer is required before granting such
duplicate bill of health to be satisfied that the matters and
things therein stated are true. * * *”

Heavy penalties are imposed by the same section upon
any vessel sailing for the United States without this con-
sular bill of health.

By Section 5 it is provided, ““* * * and it shall not
be lawful for any vessel to enter said port to discharge its
cargo or land its passengers except upon a certificate of the
health officer at such quarantine station certifying that
said rules and regulations have in all respects been ob-
served and complied with as well on his part as on the
part of said vessel and its master in respect to the same
and to its cargo, passengers and crew; and the master of
every such vessel shall produce and deliver to the Collector
of Customs at said port of entry, together with the other
papers of the vessel, the said bills of health required to be
obtained at the port of departure and the certificate herein
required to be obtained from the health officer at the port
of entry; and that the bills of health herein prescribed shall
be considered as part of the ship’s papers, and when duly cer-
tified to by the proper consular officer or other officer of the
United States over his aforesaid signature and seal shall be

vo

accepted as evidence of the statement therein contained ia
anv court of the United States.”

Pursuant to the directions of this statute, the Secretary
of the Treasury has made elaborate rules and regulations
covering the inspection of all vessels with cargo and pas-
‘sengers clearing at a foreign port for a port in the United
States; providing for complete reports by consular officers
concerning the health of the port from which the vessel is
about to sail, the condition of crew, passengers, etc., and
prescribing minute regulations for the preservation of the
good sanitary condition of the ship and cargo and health
of the crew and passengers while at sea. We append to
this brief the regulations of the Treasury Department
covering the bills of health whieh such vessels must obtain
from the consular agents before sailing, as Appendix
me. ?

In addition to these regulations, when any of the pas-
sengers of the ship are immigrants, by Section 2 of Act
approved March 3, 1893, entitled “An act to facilitate the
enforcement of the immigration and contract labor laws of
the United States” (27 Statutes at Large, 569), it is pro-
vided that the immigrants shall be listed in convenient
groups and no one list or manifest shall contain more than
thirty mames. To each immigrant or head of a family
shall be given a ticket on which shall be written his name,
a number or letter designating the list, and his number on
the list for convenience of identification on arrival. Each
list or manifest shall be verified by the signature and the
oath or affirmation of the master or commanding officer, or
of the officer first or second below him in command, taken
before the United States Consul or Consular Agent at the

56

port of departure before the sailing of the vessel, to the
effect that he has made a personal examination of each
and all of the passengers named therein, and that he has
caused the surgeon of said vessel sailing therewith to
make a physical examination of each of said passengers,
and that from his personal inspection, and the report of
said surgeon, he believes that no one of said passengers js
an idiot or insane person, or a pauper, or likely to become
a public charge, or suffering from a loathsome or danger.
ous contagious disease, or a person who has been convicted
of felony, or of infamous crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude, or under a contract or agreement, express
or implied, to perform labor in the United States; and
that also, according to the best of his knowledge and belief,
the information in said list or manifest concerning each of
said passengers named therein is correct and true.

The third Section of the same act provides that the
surgeon sailing with the vessel shall also sign and make
oath to said lists or manifests, stating his professional
experience and qualifications as a physician and surgeon,
and that he has made a personal examination of each pas-
senger on said lists, and that, according to the best of his
knowledge and belief, the statements contained therein are
true.

It is plain from an examination of these provisions that
a compliance with the requirements of this legislation and
the regulations of the Treasury Department made in pur-
suance thereof satisfies the conditions expressed in the
treaties above referred to with Greece and Sweden-Norway
and entitles the ship owner to enter and discharge his ship
without any other quarantine or detention than such as

5

7

may be necessary to permit the health officer to make an
examination.

The plaintiff in error specifically alleges in its supple-
mental and amended petition (Trans. pages 6 and 7) com-
pliance with these laws and regulations, and was, therefore,
entitled, after its vessel, cargo, crew and passengers had
been inspected by the health officers of the defendant
Board and found free of infectious or contagious diseases,
to proceed to New Orleans and there discharge her cargo
and passengers ; and in excluding the Britannia after such
inspection had disclosed compliance with said laws and
reguiations, after the health officer at the Quarantine Sta-
tion had given her a clean bill of health, the defendants in
error deprived the plaintiff in error of privileges and im-
munities secured to it by and under the treaty with France.

It follows, then, that as the Constitution, and the laws
and treaties made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme
law of the land, this statute which the Supreme Court of
Louisiana holds is a valid exercise of legislative power and
vests the State Board of Health with authority to act as
they did in this case, must be void, unless for some reason
the treatv-making power of the Government exceeded its
limitations,

We cannot conceive, however, in what respect it has
done so in concluding the treaties referred to above. The
power to make treaties is conferred by the Constitution
upon the general Government without any express limita-
tions or restrictions whatever. Impliedly, however, it is
restricted to securing those objects for which the Govern-
ment and the Constitution were created, and it cannot be

ee

58

exercised so as to destroy any of the powers otherwise
granted or secured by that instrument.

It might not be so exercised, perhaps, as to deprive the
several States of the right of preserving the health and
morals of its citizens by excluding convicted felons,
paupers, and diseased persons and things from their bor-
ders, but beyond this exception in relation to the ingress
and egress and the status of foreigner: in this country, we
know of no limitation upon the treaty-making power con-
ferred by the Constitution.

Mr. Justice Field, in the case of Ho Ah Kow vs. Nunan, 5
Sawyer, 552, had occasion to pass upon the validity of cer-
tain articles of the Constitution of California and statutes
made in pursuance thereof having as their object the ex-
clusion of Chinese. In passing upon the validity of these
statutes and in discussing the extent and scope of the
treaty-making power, the learned Justice said :

“To that government belongs exclusively the treaty.
making power, and the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well as
traffic, and with the exceptions presently mentioned, the
power to prescribe the conditions of immigration or im-
portation of persons. The State in these particulars, with
those exceptions, is powerless, and nothing is gained by
the attempted assertion of a control which can never be
admitted. The State may exclude from its limits paupers,
and convicts of other countries, persons incurably diseased,
and others likely to become a burden upon its resources.
It may, perhaps, also exclude persons whose presence would
be dangerous to its established government. Whatever is
done by way of exclusion beyond this must come from the
general Government. That Government alone can de-
termine what aliens shall be permitted to land within the

59

United States, and upon what conditions they shall be per-
mitted toremain. * * *”

See Baker vs. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566.

In re Parrott, 1 Fed. 481, by Sawyer & Hoffman, J. J.

Nishi Mura vs. United Slates, 142 U. 8. 651.

Head Money Cases, 112 U. 8. 580.

In re Ah Fong, 3 Sawyer, 144 (Justice Field).

Under the Constitution of the United States, no State
has a right to enter ingo any treaty or convention with
any foreign nation, and the power to make treaties and to
hoid relations with foreign nations is exclusively vested in
the Federal Government. As the right of visitation and
intercourse by foreigners with this country is within the
jurisdiction of the treaty-making power, it follows that the
power to fix the conditions upon which foreigners may
visit or reside in the United States is vested in the Federal
Government; and it follows that whenever the Federal
Government in the exercise of its treaty-making power has
entered into a convention with any foreign nation fixing
the status of the subjects of such nation in the United
States and regulating the conditions when and under which
they may enter the United States, such treaty becomes
obligatory upon all of the States, and it is not within the
power of any of them to deny such persons the rights and
privileges which such treaty confers upon them. The only
limitation we believe to which such rights and privileges
so conferred might be subject is the power of the State to
protect itself against criminals, paupers, and diseased
persons, though it may even be doubted whether the recog-
nized police power of the State could even in such a case
prevail. But in this case, it is not necessary to consider

60

the result of such a conflict, as admittedly, these persons
were not of the character mentioned, nor were in their
nature any more dangerous to the health and safety of the
community than any other class of people. The order and
the law excluding them would have applied equally as wel]
to a body of the healthiest and most respectable citizens of
any State of the Union or of any foreign nation. It would
have applied to any foreign ambassador and his official
and personal suite, or to a visiting prince or sovereign just
as clearly as to these immigrants.

To permit the exercise of such a power by the State of
Louisiana would be to authorize it to nullify every treaty
of commerce and navigation made by the general govern-
ment; to involve it in difficulties which might lead to war
or to the suspension of intercourse with foreign nations;
and would authorize it to pass laws whose enforcement
would render the general government liable to just reclam-
ations which it must answer, while the State, for whose
acts it was thus so responsible, would not suffer in any
respect whatsoever.

The fulfilment of the most sacred treaty obligations of
this government to the nations of the world would be sub-
ject to the discretion and judgment of three physicians, a
quorum of this Board. Such an assertion of power can
never be admitted.

VII.
FOURTH POINT.

This Statute as applied is void for the reason that it is in
conflict with the laws of the United States relating to foreign
immigration into the United States.

By Acts approved March 3, 1875, Chap. 141; August 3,

_— iD«e

61

1882, Chap. 376; June 26, 1884, Chap. 121; Feb. 26. 1885,
Chap. 164; March 28, 1887, Chap. 120; and March 3, 1891,
Chap. 551; and the regulations of the Treasury Depart-
ment made in pursuance thereof, the national government
has minutely provided the terms and conditions upon
which, and regulated the manner in which, immigrants
may enter the United States, and this legislation fully
covers the entire field of the subject confided exclusively to
the national government. By the Act approved March 3,
1891, Congress has provided for the exclusion of all
paupers, criminais, and diseased or afflicted persons, or
others who would probably prove undesirable citizens,
from the United States, and from the fact that it imposes no
restrictions on persons not of such character, but, on the
contrary, by naturalization laws, has actually encouraged
them to enter the United States and become citizens, it is
perfectly manifest that it is the desire of the national gov-
ernment that such persons should freely and unrestrictedly
enter the country; and we submit that any legislation by
a State which vests any Board with power to exclude such
persons as the immigrants brought to the port of New
Orleans by the Steamship Britannia, was and is in contra-
vention of these Statutes.

Vir.

In conclusion, we submit that the section of the act com-
plained of is unconstitutional; it is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection ; it
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.

Norton vs. Shelby Co., 118 U. 8. 425 at 442.

62

The case stands, in such event, as if the members of the
Board had acted without sanction of law, and they must
respond for the damages occasioned by their illegal acts,

Beer vs. Board of Health et als., 35 La. An. 1132.

Whatever may be the effect of a judgment against the
Board, which is an agency created by the State, with power
to sue and be sued, a judgment is enforceable by the or-
dinary process against the individuals comprising it, who
wronged the plaintiff in error. As an injunction, as well
as damages, was asked for, the Board was a necessary party
to the suit.

We submit there was error in the judgment below, and

the decree of the Supreme Court of Louisiana should be
reversed, with directions to reverse the judgment of the Civil
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Division C, and to
overrule the exception of no cause of action filed by the
defendants, and remand the case for further proceedings.
W. W. HOWE,
W. B. SPENCER,
Of Counsel for Plaintiff in Error.

APPENDIX.

e¢ Aa?
Extract from Act 192 of 1898 of the General Assembly of
Louisiana.

Section 8. Be it further enacted, etc., That in the event
that any case shall be reported to, or come to the knowl-
edge of any local board, which is either deemed to be a
case of contagious or infectious disease, or suspected of so
being, the local board shall immediately isolate the same
and communicate the fact by the most expeditious means
at hand to the State Board of Health, together with the
information as to what steps have been taken by the local
board to isolate and care for the same, and shall from time
to time communicate the progress of the case and disease
to the State Board of Health. On receipt of such informa-
tion by the said State Board of Health, the President of
said Board shall, if he deem the emergency sufficient and
necessary, send expert physicians to be selected by him to
examine and diagnose the disease, and if on such examina-
tion and diagnosis the experts shall declare the case to be
one of obnoxious or infectious nature, liable to spread, or to
become dangerous to the general public health of the State,
the State Board of Health or its President shall instruct
the health officer of the Board of Health of the parish, city
or town, as to what additional steps, if any, shall be taken
to isolate the case, and prevent the spread of the contagion
or infection therefrom and shall require that the local
health officers shall immediately conform thereto, and put
the same in operation. In the event that said local au-
thorities shall fail to do so in a manner satisfactory to the
State Board or its President, the State Board or its Presi-
dent shall take charge of the case and manage the same,
through its own officers or employes.

——

ll

All expenses, costs and charges incurred in the manage.
ment, control and supervision in such cases shall be borne
and paid by the parish, town or city in which the case
may be, and on the failure of the parish or municipality to
reimburse the State Board the amount of its expenditures
incurred in such cases, the State Board of Health shall
have the right to proceed by writ of mandamus in any
court of competent jurisdiction to compel the payment of
the same.

In case that any parish, town or city, or any portion
thereof, shall become infected with any contagious or jn.
fectious disease, to such an extent as to threaten the spread
of such disease to the other portions of the State, the State
Board of Health shall issue its proclamation declaring the
facts and ordering it in quarantine, and shall order the
local boards of health in other parishes, town and cities, to
quarantine against said locality, and shall establish and
promulgate the rules and regulations, terms and conditions
on which intercourse with said infected locality shall be
permitted, and shall issue to the other local sanitary au-
thorities instructions as to the measures adopted in quar-
antining against persons, goods, or other property coming
from said infected localities, and these rules and regula-
tions, terms and conditions shall be observed and obeyed
by all other health authorities, provided that should any
other of the non-infected portion of the State desire to add
to the regulations and rules, terms and conditions already
imposed by the State Board, they do so. on approval of the
State Board of Health. The State Board of Health may, in
its discretion, prohibit the introduction into any infected
portion of the State, persons acclimated, unacclimated or
said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of
such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the
disease. The State Board of Health shall render to the
local boards of health all the assistance in their power and
which the condition of their finances will permit.

ii

e6 B bb]
Act No. 149 of the General Assembly of Louisiana for 1890.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
the State of Louisiana, That it shall be the duty of all cor-
porations, domiciled out of the State, doing business in the
State, excepting mercantile corporations, to file in the office
of the Secretary of State a declaration of the place or local-
ity of its domicile, together with the name of its agent or
officer in the State representing said corporation upon
whom service of process can be made.

Section 2. Be it further enacted, ete., Whenever any
such corporation shall do any business of any nature what-
soever in this State, without having complied with the re-
quirements of section one of this act, it may be sued upon
any cause of action in the parish where the right or cause
of action arose, and service of process may be made upon
the person or persons, firm or company, acting or transact-
ing such business for such corporation, and each person or
persons, company or firm shall be deemed the agent of
said corporation upon whom service can be made.

66 Cc 99
Quarantine Regulations to be Observed at Foreign Ports and
at Sea.
ARTICLE I.—Bixts oF HEALTH.
Par. 1. Masters of vessels departing from any foreign
port for a port in the United States must obtain a bill of
health in duplicate signed by the proper officer or officers

of the United States as provided for by law, except as pro-
vided for in par. 5.

The following form is prescribed :
Par. 2. Bill of health:

NSC a a ea eae aa

lV

Form No. 193la.
UNITED STATES BILL OF HEALTH.

Name of vessel, Nationality, ——. Rig, <nu
Master, Tonnage, gross; net, Iron or wood.
Number of compartments for cargo, ; for steerage
passengers, ; for crew,

Name of medical officer,

Number of officers, ‘

Number of members of officers’ families,

Number of crew, including petty officers,

Number of passengers, cabin,

Number of passengers, steerage, .

Number of persons on board, all told, ——.

Port of departure,

Where last from, z

Number of cases of sickness and character, during last

voyage, ‘
Vessel engaged in trade, and plies between — —
and ‘

Sanitary condition of vessel
Nature, sanitary history, and condition of cargo, —~.,
Source and wholesomeness of water supply,
Source and wholesomeness of food supply,
Sanitary history and health of officers and crew, ——.
Sanitary history and health of passengers, cabin, ——.
Sanitary history and health of passengers, steerage, ——.
Sanitary history and condition of their effects,
Prevailing diseases at port and vicinity,
Location of vessel while discharging and loading—open
bay or wharf,
Number of cases and deaths from the fullowing-named
diseases during the past two weeks:

Disease. No. of cases. No. of deaths.
I is Sas akc dew wee ——_
Mmiatie CROITS. ... ... oc cc cucn —
Cholera nostras or cholerine ... ——
NNO 2455s wads waeuh execu cd See
NUE ik vi sccewkakvcues. —_——
NEN Cane dk evkiccx eg views —

MERU RELoNaa eee ieean riot —-

4

Number of cases of sickness and character of same while
vessel was in this port. :
Any conditions affecting the public health existing in
the port of departure or vicinity to be here stated,
I certify that the vessel has complied with the rules and
regulations made under the Act of February 15, 1893, and
that the vessel leaves this port bound for , U.S.
of America, via
Given under my hand and seal this day of , 190
(Signature of consular officer) »

Par. 3. Vessels clearing from a foreign port for any
port in the United States, and entering or calling at inter-
mediate ports, must procure at all said ports a supple-
mental bill of health as provided in Article 1. If a quar-
antinable disease has appeared on board the vessel after
leaving the original port of departure, or other circum-
stances presumably render the vessel infected, the supple-
mental bill of health should be withheld until such sani-
tary measures have been taken as are necessary.

The following form is prescribed :

Par. 4.—
SUPPLEMENTAL BILL oF HEALTH.
Port oF
Vessel . bound from to , U.S.A.
Sanitary condition of port, :

State diseases prevailing at port and in surrounding
country,

Number of cases and the deaths from the following-
named diseases during the past two weeks:

Remarks.
Diseases. eases eath (Any condition affecting the public health ex-
' e “% isting in the port to be cated here.)

be een Mme eas
Asiatic cholera or

Gholerine......sJees ey eee
SEP EG Ered lee wenn
iy pp eERES OPE eee ee
PORNO. nis eeuseadiaeoetalcasssiuan
MP BIOOYs inc sae chdnenchalssnane eae

“=

vi

Number and sanitary condition of passengers and crew landed
at this port.
Cabin, No.—. Sanitary condition and history, —~,
Steerage, No—. Sanitary condition and history, —,
Crew, No.—. Sanitary condition and history, —~.
Sanitary condition of effects,
Note.—If disembarked on account of sickness state dis.
ease,

Number and sanitary condition of passengers and crew taken
on at this port, and sanitary condition of effects.

Cabin, No—. Sanitary condition and history, —~,

Steerage, No—. Sanitary condition and history, ——.,
Crew, No.—. Sanitary condition and history,
Sanitary condition of effects,

Sanitary history of vessel since leaving last port.
(Cancel Form A, B, or C, as the case requires.)
Form.
A.—To the best of my knowledge )
and belief—

(Form A will be used at intermediate : a
ports where the vessel does not no quarantinable dis

enter and clear.) ease has _ appeared
f aboard since leay-
B.—I have satisfied myself that— ing

(Form B will be used at interme iate
ports where the vessel enters and
clears.)

C.—Since leaving the following quarantinable disease
has appeared on board , and I certify that the neces-
sary Sanitary measures have been taken.

I certify also that with reference to the passengers, effects,
and cargo taken on at this port, the vessel has complied
with the rules and regulations made under the Act of Feb-
ruary 15, 1893.

Given under my hand and seal this ——day of —— 190

(Signature of consular officer) ;

_

vii

Par. 5. Under the Act of Congress approved August
18, 1894, vessels plying between Canadian ports on the St.
Croix River, the St. Lawrence River, the Niagara River,
the Detroit River, the St. Clair River, and the St. Marys
River, and adjacent ports of the United States on the same
waters ; also vessels plying between Canadian ports on the
following-named lakes, viz., Ontario, Erie, St. Clair, Huron,
Superior, Rainy Lake, Lake of the Woods, Lake Cham-
plain, and ports in the United States; also vessels plying
between Mexican ports on the Rio Grande River and adja-
cent ports in the United States, are exempt from the pro-
vision of section 2 of the act granting additional quaran-
tine powers and imposing additional duties upon the
Marine-Hospital Service, approved February 15, 1893,
which requires vessels clearing from a foreign port for a
port in the U

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386019_0102%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
