# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jordan v. Kenton County Board of Education

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 519 U.S. 1142

## Text

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Pa

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96 891 DE is arc - " » the Gelay the entire scope of which was not

. ow can laches be applied when goverrment officials did not
have “clean hands” when they with-neld information and misinformed the
veteran Albert Jordan?

6. How can the U.S. attorney Louis DeFalaise not be held

accountable when he deliberately prevented Albert Jordan from filing a

pro-se action in U.S. District Court by misrepresenting the truth in

1983?

7. How can the courts properly dismiss Albert Jordan's claim for
disability benefits on the grounds that application was not made in a
timely manner when the Retirement System refused to accept one so that
it could later deny him benefits on that basis?

8. How can Albert Jordan receive a fair hearing when fact-finding
through Discovery was not permitted probably so that the true workings
of the Department of Labor and other agencies be revealed as their
underhanded methods would come to light?

9. How can a veteran get a fair hearing when the employer and the
retirement system are permitted to misrepresent the facts, and the
courts are eager to accept their false version of the truth?

10. How can the legal system itself not be held partially
responsible for the delay when private attorneys distorted the truth and
added to delay when they are paid by the hour?

11. How can the courts find that Albert Jordan caused an
inordinate delay when the truth is Albert Jordan went to the goverrment
in 1983 and has continuously sought to get relief while the Kenton Board

of Education, the Retirement System, and the goverrment delayed?

meee

Albert Jordan wr
pro se

Ce a

——

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CASE NUMBER 95-6569

ALBERT W. JORDAN APPELLANT
DISABLED VETERAN

vs.
KENTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION —

AND APPELLEES

KENTUCKY TEACHER'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM

ON APPEAL FROM THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON DISTRICT

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Comes now the appellant, Albert W. Jordan, requesting a rehearing
en banc. in the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court's decision no comment or
discussion addressed the issues brought forth by the appellant.

in particular, the Appeals Court could explain the fairness of
requiring the veteran to submit an application for disability retirement
when the teacher's retirement system steadfastly refused to accept one
in a timely manner. This is in effect requiring the impossible, after
the fact.

Furthermore, the en banc panel could explain the fairness of
requiring the veteran to provide evidence of his continuous effort to
seek justice in this matter when the federal goverrment in al! its
various forms has refused to cooperate by submitting its records or by
compelling hostile witnesses to testify under oath. How can the
appellant document his case when there was no Discovery or powers of

subpoena?
Basically the System sets up the veteran for a default by keeping

him in the dark by disinformation or misinformation or no information.

When asked specific information relevant to a reemployment rights claim,

the administrators “dummy up.” Coincidentally no administrators in the

federal goverrment seem to know of any veteran whose situation is even

remotely similar to mine because my situation ( which involves a veteran
who cannot get his employer and retirement plan to provide benefits) is
so very rare. Common sense would say that out of the millions of
veterans that been discharged, surely many of them encountered some
resistance in obtaining reemployment rights. No one in the goverrment
has complied with my many requests for information on this subject.
Apparently by the appellate court's decision to prevent full publication
of my case it intends to suppress my testimony so that veterans who
follow me will not benefit fram reading about Albert Jordan's
experience. it is obvious that regardless of what is proven, the
goverrment would find some basis for denial, no matter how far it would
have to stretch.

Therefore this appellant honorably requests the Court to publish
the full text of these proceedings in order for the truth to be told
about how veterans are treated. This case has nothing to do with
justice or fairness; rather it is about whip-sawing and distorting and
repressing the facts so that the government can blame the victim.

Possibly you can convince yourselves and each other and the public

that this was a fair hearing, but | shall never be convinced. Even if

there is a settlement in my favor, | believe it will be too little, too

late, and it will come only after many years of the worst imaginable

mental anguish.

Respectfully submitted,

CMs FU) Qe bern

Albert W. Jordan

CERTIFICATION

+4

| hereby certify that | have, this } ee day of September, 1996

mailed a copy of the foregoing to:

James M. Baker, Esq.
479 Versailles Road
Frankfort, KY 40601

and

Donald J. Ruberg

209-C Thomas More Park
P.O. Box 1741]
Covington, KY 41017-0411

\ QAbetW Nae,

Albert W. Jordan
5855 S. Herringer cae
Alexandria, KY 41001

606-635-1337

No. 95-6569 APPENDIX ® -g

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED

OCT 25 1996

LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
ALBERT W. JORDAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ORDER

KENTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

BEFORE: SILER, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been
circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this court,
and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the
petition for rehearing has been referred to the original panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues
raised ‘in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case.

Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

ema. yun re

Leonard Green, Clerk VE

APPEXDIZ Cet <i Ehi. DISTRICT of KENTUCKY

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT eT 11 1995
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT COVINGTON AT COVINGTON
CLERK, U5. cus uTMER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-202 S. OISTRICT CouRT
ALBERT W. JORDAN PLAINTIFF
vs.
KENTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND
KENTUCKY TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM DEFENDANT
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the court on defendants’ motions to
dismiss (docs. # 14 and #19). For the reasons set forth below, the
Kenton County Board of Ecusation is entitled to summary judgment,

and Kentucky Teachers’ Re-irement System’s motion to dismiss must
be granted.

Plaintiff, Albert W. Jordan, was employed by the Kenton County
Board of Education as 4 teacher and football coach at Scott High
School beginning in August, 1978. In February, 1982, Plaintiff
resigned his position at Scott High School in order to enter the
military. Plaintiff was injured on June 17, 1982, while
participating in activities in the Navy. Plaintiff was honorably
discharged from the Navy after the injury.

Plaintiff applied for his former job as a teacher with the
Kenton County Board of Education. Kenton County rehired Plaintiff,
and he began work on September 2, 1982. Plaintiff objected to the
work load as well as his assignment claiming that his disability
required an easier work load and that he was net reinstated to the
same position. Plaintiff claims that he was harassed by staff at

Scott High School based on his disability as evidenced by the fact

3S)

UG. Uae? |

that he was frequently observed in the classroom by other faculty
members. Kenton County discharged Plaintiff in June, 1963.

As a teacher in Kentucky, Plaintiff was a member of the
Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System (*KTRS"). KTRS provides
benefits and pensions to disabled or retired teachers in the
Commonwealth.

When Plaintiff resigned from Kenton County to enter the
military on March 2, 1982, he had 3.69 years of service credit with
KTRS. Plaintiff terminated his relationship with KTRS at this time
and received a refund of his retirement distributions on April 12
1982. After Plaintiff was returned to his position with Kenton
County, he reinstated his 3.69 years of service with KTRS
Plaintiff purchased a .31 year of service credit for his military
service and for the balance of the school year 1981-1982 on June
27, 1983. Plaintiff obtained five years of service on June 30
1983, his last day of service for Kenton County.

After Plaintiff was discharged from Scott High School and
denied benefits from KTRS, he sought relief from the United States
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On August 15, 1988, the Departmen
Education determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief. I
addition, Plaintiff was denied disability benefits by KTRS on a
number of occasions dating back to May 2, 1983.

KENTON COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As implied above, Kenton County’s motion to dismiss will be
considered as a motion for summary judgment because it relies on
2

GGUS

the affidavit of Neil Stiegelmeyer. Rule 12(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if material outside the
pleadings are presented and not excluded by the Court, the motion
is to be treated as 4 motion for summary judgment as described in
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Kenton County argues that Plaintiff is barred by the equitable
doctrine of laches because Plaintiff failed to bring suit until 13
years after the cause of action arose. Kenton County argues that
13 years constitutes inexcusable delay which has prejudiced Kenton
County. For the reasons set forth below, Kenton County’s argument
is well taken.

In v ee ij y , 712 F.2d 1047 (6th Cir.
1983), the plaintiff sued his employer under the Veterans
Preference Act for reinstatement to his position after leave for
military service. The Sixth Circuit stated that the Veterans
Preference Act was analogous to the Veterans Reemployment Act in
that Congress did not provide a statute of limitations for either
statute. In the Veterans Reemployment Act, specifically, Congress
stated that "no state statute of limitations shall apply to any
proceeding under this chapter." 38 U.S.C. § 2022.

To prevail on 4 laches defense, 4 defendant must prove: (1)
the plaintiff's delay in bringing the suit is inexcusable; and (2)

the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Wells v. United States
Steel & Carnecie Pension Func. Inc. 950 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1992).

In determining whether laches acts to bar an action, the Court

should consider "the length of the delay, the reasons therefor, how

the delay affected the defendant, and the overall fairness of
‘ permitting the assertion of the claim." Stevens, 712 F.2d at 1056.
There is no fixed time period for determining whether laches
operates to bar a claim. Stevens, 712 F.2d at 1056. The Court
must look at the circumstances of the case and determine what is
equitable. However, comparison with a statute of limitations may
be a guide or an element for the Court to consider in determining
whether barring the claim is the equitable result. Goodman v.
McDonnell] Douglas Corp.., 606 F.2d 800 (8th Cir 1979). Whether
laches should be applied is lef to the discretion of the district
judge. Exlangerv. Berkemever, 207 F.2d 832, 840 (6th Cir. 1953).
There are several cases which address the issue of laches as

it applies to the Veterans Reemployment Act and the Selective
Training and Service Act, its predecessor. Delays of the following
lengths of time have been considered unreasonable or inexcusable:
nine years (Ligenfelter v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc.,
691 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1982) and Gruca v. U.S. Stee] Corp., 495

F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1982)); nine years after discharge and six years
after discharge was upgraded to honorable (Farries v.
Standyne/Chicago Division, 832 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1987)); seventeen
years (Carmalt_v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.., 302 F.2d 589

(3rd Cir. 1962)).

To the contrary, the delay was not unreasonable where the
plaintiff diligently sought relief from the Department of Labor
within two years of accrual of the action and filed a complaint

within five years. wars v. U.S. ee) rp., $94 F.Supp. 180

ju. UU

(N.D. Ind. 1984). Similarly, delays of two and a half years and
four years were not considered unreasonable. Lemmon v. Santa Cruz,
686 F.Supp. 797 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ; Milacone v. Long Island R.R.Co.,
$82 F.Supp. 973 (S.D.N.¥. 1983).

In Blake v. Columbus, 605 F.Supp. 567 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the
Court held that, under the Veterans Reemployment Act, the
plaintiff’s delay was unreasonable. The Court stated as follows:

The Court believes the period from April 1968 through

July 1971 during which plainctifs was actively negotiating

with defendant to resolve the dispute concerning his

employment status, to be reasonable delay. In addition,

that period of time from December 1975 through September

1976, during which plaintiff was engaged in discussion

with the department concerning his status in “active”

versus "continuous" service is also excusable delay.

Similarly, the pericc between 1981 to 1983 during which

the United States Attorney’s office was attempting to

negotiate a settlement between the parties is not charged

to the plaintiff ..- - However, when coupled with the

subsequent five-year period from 1976 through 1981 in

which the plaintiff sat on his rights, the entire delay
becomes unreasonable.

Id. at 570 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) .

Based on the authorities set forth above, Plaintiff's 13-year
delay in bringing this action was unreasonable. Even though he
proceeded initially before the Department of Labor, that agency
issued its decision in 1988. The Plaintiff waited an additional
five years prior to filing this action. Because Plaintiff “sat on
his rights" for five years after the Department of Labor issued its
decision, Plaintiff's delay is unreasonable.

To prevail on a laches defense, the defendant must prove that

it has been prejudiced by the delay. tev v Va)
Aush., 712 F.2d 1047 (6th Cir. 1982). To establish the recuired
5

UG. ALL

ee

prejudice, Kenton County offers the affidavit of Neil Stiegelmeyer
(doc. #15). This affidavit identifies specific witnesses that are
no longer available and describes specific records that are no
longer in the necessary files. For example, various staff members
are no longer employed by Kenton County; one witness is now
deceased, while another lives in Texas; records in Plaintiff's
personnel file have been limited since the cause of action accrued;
and many notes and documents concerning this matter have been
discarded.

For these reasons, Kenton County has established that it has
been prejudiced by Plaincitt’s delay in bringing this claim.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s cleim is barred by the equitable doctrine of
laches, and Kenton County’s motion for summary judgment must be
granted.

KTRS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

KTRS argues that Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be
dismissed because Plaintiff failed to conform with the procedures
for collection of disability benefits set forth in K.R.S.
161.661(1). K.R.S. 161.661(1), as it read in June, 1983, provides
as follows:

(1) Amy member who has completed five (5) years of

accredited service in the public schools of Kentucky

after July 1, 1941, may retire for disability and be
granted a disability allowance if found to be eligible as
provided below. Application for disability must be made

within one (1) year of the last contributing service in
Kentucky, and the disability must have ececurred during

the most recent period of employment in a position
covered by the teachers’ retirement system and subsequent
to the completion of five (5) years of teaching service

in Kentucky.

Gr \i3n

K.R.S. 161.661(1). The requirements of this statute may be
summarized as follows: (1) an application for benefits must be made
within one year of the last service performed in Kentucky; (2)
disability must have occurred within the most recent period of
employment; and (3) the teacher must have completed five years of
service prior to becoming disabled. K.R.S. 161.661(1).

Although no Kentucky court has addressed the issue at bar, the
Kentucky Attorney General has issued an opinion addressing a
similar issue. OAG 79-49 (Jan. 22, 1979). In that case, the
plaintiff, who was terminated from his teaching position in June,
1976, brought a civil action challenging his termination. Nearly
two years later, the court determined that his claim was without
merit. The plaintiff first sought disability payments in 1978,
after the judicial proceedings terminated. The Attorney General
stated that the plaintiff could not recover benefits because he
failed to apply for the benefits within the one year statutory
period, stating:

[T]he clear language of the statute [161.661] can not

[sic] be circumvented. It would appear that [the

plaintiff] consciously chose not to comply with the

Statute, and instead proceeded with his attempt to regain

employment. I cannot see any room in the statute to
ignore the one year time limitation requirement.

id.

In the case at bar, KTRS determined that Plaintiff’s last day
of service in Kentucky was June 30, 1983. Under K.R.S. 161.661(1),
Plaintiff was required to file an application with KTRS by June 30,
1984. Plaintiff failed to meet the one year limitation period;

therefore, his claim is barred.

CG USu

c-7

. : Cc~-o

Plaintiff does not argue that he complied with the one year
limitation requirement of the statute. Instead, he argues that he
failed to meet the one year deadline because KTRS refused to
provide him with an application in a4 timely manner. Plaintiff

; asserts that KTRS should be estopped from asserting the time
limitation requirement based on its misconduct.

Based on the Kentucky Attorney General opinion discussed
above, any alleged misconduct or other delay in providing an
application does not dispel the “clear language of the statute."
It is obvious that Plaintiff was aware that he had to file an
application with KTRS, but he failed to do so within the statutory
period. Accordingly, his claim for benefits is barred.

Therefore, the Court being advised, it is hereby ordered as
follows:

1. Kenton County Board of Education’s motion to dismiss
(doc. # 14), which the court considered as a motion for summary
judgment, is granted; and

2. KTRS’ motion to dismiss is granted. A separate judgment

will be entered concurrently herewith.

This _| | at day of October, 1995.

Wb hom 0. gl2bhoran

WILLIAM O. BERTELSMAN, CHIEF JUDGE

QG 009%

LAIN TI MO NAITO SO ENE A A A ON
eT

? ; EASTERN DISTRICT of KEY TUCKy
FIiLEr
Pcie UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
. EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY v-i 14 1995

AT COVINGTON

AT COVINGTON
LESLIE G. WHITMER

CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-202 CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
ALBERT W. JORDAN PLAINTIFF
vs.

KENTON COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, ET AL DEFENDANTS

Pursuant to the Order and Opinion entered concurrently
herewith, and the court being advised,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the complaint and amended
complaint be, and they are, hereby dismissed, with prejudice, and
stricken from the docket of this court, at the cost of the
plaintiff.

This 11th day of October, 1995.

A Mom © S50 ALY wen

WILLIAM O. BERTELSMAN, CHIEF JUDGE

7) |

APPENDix p

EASTERN DISTRICT of KENTUCKY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NOV 2 21995
AT COVINGTON

AT COVINGTON
LESLIE G. WHITMER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-202 CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT CouRT
ALBERT W. JORDAN PLAINTIFP
, ORDER
KENTON COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, ET AL DEFENDANTS

This matter is before the court on the motion of plaintiff for
reconsideration of this court’s Judgment entered herein, and for
reasons stated in this court’s Opinion and Order, entered
concurrently with the Judgment, the court being advised,

IT IS ORDERED that said motion for reconsideration (Doc. #26)

be, and it is, hereby denied.

This ZaA day of November, 1995.

0

WILLIAM O. BERTELSMAN, CHIEF JUDGE

FACTSHEET ®

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR EMPLOYER SUPPORT OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT
REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

(This Fact Sheet Does Not Address Training Duty)

1. Question: If I left my civilian job to go on active duty in support of a military operation,
will I have the right to get my job back?

Answer: Yes, if you meet the five eligibility requirements under the reemployment law:

1. The job you left must be “other than temporary.” Jobs with federal, state or city/county governments
and private employers are protected.

2. You must have left the job for the purpose of entering active duty.

3. You must serve satisfactorily and be released from active duty.

4. If you were on active duty under the authority of 672 (d), you have 90 days to request reemployment.
Members activated under 673 (b), are advised to apply within 31 days. Jn all cases, you should contact your
employer as soon as possible after release from active duty.

5. Your total amount of active duty (other than training duty) since going to work for your current
employer cannot exceed four years, unless extended by the period of time the President authorizes the call-
up of Reserve units/individuals, or if you cannot obtain orders relieving you from active duty.

2. Question: When I am released from active duty, what do I have to do to get my job back?

Answer: After your release from active duty and within 90/31 days (see Answer 1, part 4 above), go
to your place of employment and tell someone in authority:

1. | used to work here.

2. I left my job to enter active military service.

3. [have been released from active duty under honorable conditions and I want my job back. (Take your
DD-214 or DD-220 Discharge Certificate if you receive one, because it shows the dates and character of
your military service.)

3. Question: Do I lose my reemployment rights if I volunteered for active duty?

Answer: No. Your job is protected as long as you receive orders to perform active duty, whether your
service is voluntary or involuntary.

NCESGR

1555 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 200

Arlington, Virginia 22209-2405

(800) 336-4590

{Autovon) 226-1400

(703) 696-1400 €—9409

APPENDIX E p.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR emer SUPPORT OF THE GUARD € RESERVE

4. Question: Do I have to tell my employer when I am going and when I will return?

Answer: No. It is a good idea to give your employer as much information as you can about the length
of your absence when you are ordered to active duty, but sometimes this is impossible. NOTE: If you are
ordered to active duty for training or inactive duty training, however, you must request a leave of absence.

5. Question: Will I have to wait to get my job back?

Answer: No. Your employer should reemploy you when you apply, but sometimes it can take as long
as two weeks for your employer to make the necessary arrangements.

6. Question: What kind of job am I entitled to upon reemployment?

Answer: You are entitled to the job you left or a similar job, with the same seniority, status and rate
of pay you would have had if you had stayed on the job instead of going on active duty. If you would have
been promoted during your absence, you may be entitled to the promotion. If you would have been laid
off, the position/status you return to may be in layoff.

7. Question: Does my employer have to pay me or provide health insurance or other benefits while
I’m on active duty?

Answer: Some employers provide limited paid military leave or make up the difference between
regular and military pay. Most employers have no obligation to provide pay or benefits unless they provide
them to other employees on leave or furlough. The IRS advises that an employer's COBRA obligation to
continue health coverage is the same for Reservists as for other employees (IRS Notice 90-58). Public Law
102-12, signed March 18,1991, stipulates that Reserve Component members and their qualifying
dependents are entitled to immediate reinstatement of company-sponsored health insurance upon return
from military duty. Waiting periods and “pre-existing conditions” exclusions are prohibited. This
protection is effective retroactive to August 1, 1990.

“8. Question: If I apply for reemployment, what’s to keep my employer from reemploying me and
then finding an excuse to get rid of me later?

Answer: The law gives you a period of protection against discharge without cause. If you are fired
during that period, your employer will have to prove that other employees are fired for the same kind of
reason, and that you actually did what the employer accused you of doing. The special period may be six
months or one year, depending upon the legal authority for your active duty.

7 Question: Where can members of the National Guard and Reserve get more information about
their job rights or get help if they feel these rights have been denied?

Answer: For information or assistance on their job rights, Reservists may contact the National
Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) toll-free at (800) 336-4590 or for
the nearest office of Veterans’ Employment and Training Service, United States Department of Labor, call

(800) 442-2838.

6—3409

U.S. Department c. Labor
Program Highlights

APPENDIX E p. 3

7

Fact Sheet No. OASVET 90-10

‘-REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR RETURNING VETERANS -

Under the Veterans’ Reemployment
Rights (VRR) law, a person who leaves
a civilian job in order to enter active
duty in the Armed Forces, voluntarily or
involuntarily, is entitled to return to his
civilian job after his discharge or release
from active duty if he or she meets the
five basic eligibility criteria of the VRR
law:

1. He or she must hold an “other than
temporary” civilian job. (The job need
not be "permanent.")

2. He or she must leave the civilian job
for the purpose of going on active duty.

3. He or she must not remain on active
duty longer than four years, unless the
period beyond four years (up to an
additional year) is "at the request and
for the convenience of the Federal
Government."

4. He or she must be discharged or
released from active duty “under
honorable conditions."

$. He or she must apply for
reemployment with the pre-service
employer or successor in interest within

90 days after separation from active
duty.

A person meeting these criteria is
entitled to reinstatement within a
reasonable time to a position of like
seniority, status, and pay. Additionally,
a returning veteran may be entitled to a
better job than the one he or she left.
In its first case construing the VRR law,
the Supreme Court stated, "[The
returning veteran] does not step back on
the seniority escalator at the point he
stepped off. He steps back on at the
precise point he would have occupied
had he kept his position continuously
during [his military service].". This
explanation, which is known as the
"escalator principle," was later expressly
ratified by Congress. Benefits generally
found to be based on sepiority, i.e.,
length of service, are pensions, pay
increases, missed promotions and missed
transfers. Additionally a veteran who
returns from the service to a different
employer in the same industry covered
by the same multi-employer pension
plan remains covered by that plan and is
entitled to military service pension
credit.

This is one of a series of fact sheets highlignting U.S. Department of Labor programs. tt is intended as a general Cescription onty
and does not carry tne force of legal opinion.

Although the "“escalato. normally goes
Up Or remains in place, there are times
when it goes down. If the employer can
establish that the veteran would have
been downgraded if he had remained
continuously employed, he will be
entitled to reemployment in the lower
job. If the employer can establish that
the veteran would have been laid off in
accordance with seniority, he may be
entitled to "reinstatement" into a layoff
Position, with recall rights. If the
employer can establish that the veteran’s
pre-service employment relationship
would have been severed altogether, the
veteran may be entitled to no job at all,
but he might be entitled to severance
pay. The whole point of the VRR law is
to place the returning veteran in the job
he or she would have attained if he or
sneé had remained continuously
employed instead of going on active
duty. Upon ta

may no ed without cause for

a period of one year.

The VRR law applies to persons who are
inducted (drafted) into the Armed
Forces, to persons who volunteer
directly for active duty, and to Reservists
and members of the National Guard who
are called to active duty voluntarily or
involuntarily. In addition to performing
active duty, reservists and members of
the National Guard also perform initial

APPENDIX E p. 4

active duty training, active duty for
training, and inactive duty training.
nights for

Reemployment Persons

‘performing these kinds of duty is

When a person leaves a civilian job in
order to perform active duty, he or she
is not required to request a leave of
absence or even to noufy the employer
that military service is the reason the
Person is leaving the civilian job,
although such a person should be
encouraged to provide the employer as
much information as possible. However,
a Reservist or member of the National
Guard must request a leave of absence
when he or she leaves the Civilian job to
perform active duty for training or
inactive duty training.

The VRR law is enforced by the
Department of Labor, Veterans’
Employment and Training Service.
Attached is a list of the addresses and
telephone numbers of offices to contact.
If you have any further questions, or if
you desire assistance securing your
reemployment rights, if any, you should
contact the osfice closest to yout

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

ALBERT JORDAN - PETITIONER
DISABLED VETERAN

vs.

KENTON COUNTY OF KENTUCKY-~ RESPONDENT(S)
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL

PROOF OF SERVICE

Alber# UW. Jordan

-P , do swear or declare that
on this date, November 25 , 1996, as required by
Supreme Court Rule 29 | have served the enclosed MOTION FOR
A LEAVE TO PROCEED AS A VETERAN,PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that
party's counsel, and on every other person required to be
served, by depositing an envelope containing the above
documents in the United States mail properly addressed to
each of them and with first-class postage prepaid.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

James M. Baker, Esq. Donald J. Ruberg

479 Versailles Road 209-C Thomas More Park
P.O. Box 17411

Frankfort, KY 40601 Covington, KY 41017-0411

| declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct.

Executed on November 25 », 19.96. -

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_1903%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.