# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Union Oil Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment-California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 519 U.S. 1101

## Text

a

ans S

No. 96-
orFict. OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner

V.

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT

CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,
Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TIMOTHY R. THOMAS

MARK SMITH

Law Department

Union Oil Company
of California

Santa Ana, CA 92799

(714) 428-7600

JOHN F. BARG
Counsel of Record
SANFORD SVETCOV
R. CHRISTOPHER LOCKE
Landels Ripley &
Diamond, LLP
350 The Embarcadero
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 512-8700

ANDREW L. FREY
Mayer, Brown & Platt

2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 778-0602

Counsel for Petitioner

96 747 NOV 1 3 19%

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits in federal
court for violations of NPDES permit limitations. 33 U.S.C.
§1365(a)(1). Citizen suits are barred, however, when they
allege violations “with respect to which a State has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a
State law comparable to this subsection, or * * * the State has
issued a final order * * * and the violator has paid a penalty
assessed under * * * such comparable State law.” 33 U.S.C.
§1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) and (iii).

In this case, the State of California, acting through its
Regional Water Quality Control Board, initiated enforcement
proceedings against oil refiners, including Unocal, who were
unable, due to the absence of environmentally acceptable
control technology, to meet the permit limit of 50 ppb for
selenium. Following negotiations, petitioner Unocal and two
other refiners reached a settlement with the Regional Board
under which they paid the State $2 million and, pursuant to
a cease and desist order, undertook extensive and costly
development of selenium control technologies. In exchange,
the Board agreed to defer for four and a half years the date
for compliance with the 50 ppb selenium limit. The
following question is presented:

Whether the Clean Water Act bars a citizen suit
alleging violations that were resolved by a State
administrative order and settlement payment under a
State statutory scheme comparable to the Clean
Water Act, as the First and Eighth Circuits have
held, or whether the bar arises only if the State
agency proceeded under the specific penalty
provision that corresponds to section 309(g) of the
Act, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case.

‘i
LIST OF PARTIES

1. UNOCAL CORPORATION is the parent company
of Union Oil Company of California.

2. UNION EXPLORATION PARTNERS, LTD. is a
partnership involving Union Oil Company of California.

3. 76 PRODUCTS COMPANY is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EEG aa cr a ]
I er ee ]
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ........ ]
samsmpannt: GF THE CASS .........5..... 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 7

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Impermissibly Allows
Citizen Suits To Intrude Upon State Enforcement
Discretion Under The Clean Water Act, Contrary To
This Court’s Decision In Gwalmey ......... 10

B. The Decision Below Violates The Section 309(g) Bar
On Citizen Suits, Offends The Strong Public Policy
Favoring Settlements, And Conflicts With Decisions
Of The First And Eighth Circuits........... 14

1. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
“comparable State law” provision conflicts with
decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits .... 15

2. The Ninth Circuit’s “comparability” rationale is
contrary to the plain language of the Act and is
contrary to the intent of the Act ........ 17

3. The Ninth Circuit decision misconstrues the
“penalty assessed” provision of the statute by
excluding payments made to settle state enforce-
a 19

4. The Ninth Circuit’s decision violates strong
public policy favoring settlements ...... . 23

C. The Issue Presented Is A Recurring One Of National
Ie Cae er Gn ee cS 25

le oe ee 27

en

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

| Page

APPENDIX
A. Opinion of the Court of Appeals ....... la-l7a
B. Opinion of the District Court.......... 18a-65a
C. Order of the Court of Appeals denying

Unocal’s petition for rehearing en banc....... 66a
>. - Ce Ie I 6k ee Ree 68a
E. Final Cease and Desist Order of the

oe ee es ee oe ee 69a-81a

F. Stipulation for Settlement and Dismissal of
Action in State Comst. 2... ccc eee ne 82a-88a

a aT

Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 94S.C. 1041 (1974) ........ 24

Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI
Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
U.S. , 11S 5.Ce 108 9938) ww passim

Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc. v.
Universal Tool & Stamping Co.,

735 F.Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ......... 8
Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S.E.P.A.,
ae Wao $427 (te Cir, 1991)... 2 ws. 19

California Sportfishing v. City of
W. Sacramento, 905 F.Supp. 792
I i RN 8 ea ae a 8

City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.,
Foe is GO I 6 ao be wo ee bcs Seb: 21

Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v.
Remington Arms Co., 777 F.Supp. 173
(D. Conn. 1991); aff'd in part rev’d

in part 989 F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1991) ...... 8
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) ........... Passim

Knee Deep Cattle Co., Inc. v. Bindana
Inv. Co. Ltd., 94 F.3d 514 -

OE eee hon es ve otis 8, 26
Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investments Co.,
904 Supp. 1177 (D. Or. 1995) ......... 26

Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc.,
P98 F.24 1279 (th Cir. 1986) 2... 2

ee

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pages

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers Ass’n,

S55 Um. 3, FO FAR Pere Ue) ce be Soe es 12
Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, Inc. ,

891 F.Supp. 1389 (D. Hawaii 1995) ......... 8
Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Vygen Corp.,

803 F.Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992) .......... 8
North and South Rivers Watershed Assoc. v.

Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) ..... Passim
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,

DE Gas CREED 93 60nd BS MOA SS 18
Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.Supp. 914

EE cela ko Oe wk a 6 Rk 24
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

Se a A A Es TD 6 ks te ke 11
Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. .,

338 F.Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993) .. 1... ew ee 8
Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v.

The Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320

SU EE oe a Ae yk 6 he eee 16
United States v. Cannons ene Corp..,

2 & gi gs | Be reer 25

Washington Public Interest Research Group v.
Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883
ee a. Rv aS ke hae fe Reece 8 8, 16

Williams v. First National Bank,
ane Ue. Soe, mr OA SEL ISI. 6 ec a os 24

ne

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pages
FEDERAL STATUTES
: 28 U.S.C.
eR ahaiac nic ae re 1
| aa ae eee 1, 6
| 33 U.S.C.
| ME gr Ae ea ae 19
SS oo oh ee ey 3
Re gt gg ke a ae ie ll
ss oa cc dl el ons ee 11
ge 18, 23
ies Bre 23
a3 DEX) ae ee a Oe OR ow ees passim
RS os 6 a he Whee ones 25
$1365(a)(1) ve erat Wee ee 5, 11
SUI Sg wo, ccs eas il
40 C.F.R.
SS ita Marae aha be 18
Ree ee 18, 20
DE he are 3
STATE STATUTES
Cal. Water Code
Ree oe ae 8 7, 15, 18, 22
De Se en es ee 18
| er, at ene as ces ne 7
te cr eee ee 5, 13
. Ee ee 7
| NGL < 5, 13
| 2s a pe eee 7
Woe ee 7, 15, 2, 2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pages

SLE 4 eA SOK URE ee eee 11

DET Kh 5 aka ok etn he oh 0n' ta DRESS 23

SUMED KRDO SPE Ree ke eee 22
OTHER SOURCES
Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong. Ist Sess. 64 (1971) . 19
137 Cong.Rec. $5902 (May 15, 1991) .......... 2
BNA, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting

pee gt. err eee ae 8
PURGE SED hw heh oh ek eer 6
fF ee A ee eee re La 6
re ge History of Water Quality Act of 1987
(“Leg. Hist”).

eo SB Oo: ree ee 17

SEGe. Me. GIR TIPO. wo cas ve ties 18, 20, 22

Si ie A. cis 17

ys. C=

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Union Oil Company of California (“Unocal”) respectfully
petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-17a) is
reported at 83 F.3d 1111 (1996). The opinion of the district
court (App., infra, 18a-65a) is reported at 861 F.Supp. 889
(N.D. Cal. 1994),

JURISDICTION

The order of the district court denying petitioner’s motion
to dismiss was certified and accepted for interlocutory appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The decision of the court of
appeals, as amended, was rendered on July 16, 1996. App.,
infra, la. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on August
15, 1996. Id. at 66a-67a. The petition for writ of certiorari is
due November 13, 1996. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g)(6)(A) provides, in relevant part:

* * * any violation -

(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law
comparable to this subsection, or

(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the
State has issued a final order not subject to further
judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty
assessed under this subsection, or such comparable
State law, as the case may be,

2

shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under
subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this
title or section 1365 of this title.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE!

1. Like more than 75,000 other companies and municipali-
ties nationwide, Unocal discharges wastewater under an NPDES
permit: Unocal owns and operates a petroleum refinery near
Rodeo, California. (ER 4) Treated wastewater discharged from
the refinery is subject to the requirements of Unocal’s National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit,
issued and enforced by the California Regional Water Quality
Contro! Board (“Regional Board”) pursuant to the provisions of
the Clean Water Act. (ER 9) There are more than 75,000
active NPDES permits nationwide (http://www.epa.gov:80),
held by businesses, municipalities and other entities. See also
137 Cong.Rec. $5902, $5928 (May 15, 1991).

Discharge of wastewater containing selenium, an element
naturally occurring in crude oil, is regulated by Regional Board
orders issued under the NPDES permit. (ER 9-10) On June 19,
1991, the Regional Board amended the NPDES permits for six
Bay Area refiners, including Unocal. The Board set a “final”
selenium mass emission rate of .85 pounds per day and a
concentration limit of 50 parts per billion (“ppb”) for Unocal’s
wastewater discharge, to be effective December 12, 1993. (ER
375) In the meantime, the Board required Unocal to comply
with an interim limit of 5.6 pounds per day. (ER 376)

' The facts summarized below are not in dispute and are based
on the complaint as well as documents offered by the parties from
State agency proceedings that were judicially noticed by the district
court. (Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 40, 98, 251, 297, 364n.2) On
a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the courts may judicially notice
agency records. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798
F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

3

2. Unocal and other refiners sue the Regional Board in
State court to set aside the selenium discharge limits: On
September 16, 1992, the State Water Resources Control Board
(“State Board”) denied the refiners’ administrative appeal of the
Regional Board order adopting the interim and final selenium
limits. (ER 242 413) On October 16, 1992, the Western States
Petroleum Association (“WSPA”) and all six refiners petitioned
in California state court for a writ of mandate to set aside the
selenium limits. (ER 235) The petition contended that, with
respect to selenium, Section 304(1) of the Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. §1314(1)), does not apply to San Francisco Bay or the
six refineries because the concentrations of selenium in the Bay
do not exceed the “applicable [water quality] standard” for
selenium. (ER 239-245; see ER 64 46-7, 368 410) The applic-
able United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
water quality standard for selenium is 71 ppb in salt water, and
5 ppb in fresh water. 40 C.F.R. §131.36(d)(10). (ER 63 q3)
Ambient concentrations of selenium in San Francisco Bay waters
are consistently below 0.3 ppb, less than one tenth of even the
more stringent fresh water standard. (ER 244 416)

3. The Regional Board initiates an administrative action
to enforce its selenium limits: In July 1993, while the state court
writ proceedings were pending, the Regional Board announced
that it intended to commence an administrative enforcement
action against refiners that failed to meet the 50 ppb final
selenium discharge limit by the December 12, 1993 deadline.
(ER 54, 369 411) In response to the Board’s threatened action,
and with the WSPA litigation pending in state court, Unocal and
two other refiners, Exxon and Shell, entered into negotiations
with the Board. Those negotiations resulted in a Stipulation for
Settlement and Dismissal of Action (“Settlement”) and the
Board’s issuance of a tentative Cease and Desist Order
(“Order”). The Order and Settlement were presented to
Regional Board members on November 9, 1993 and issued for
public comment the following day. (ER 44-53, 54-60, 369-370)

The Order proposed to defer the date for compliance with
the final selenium limit from December 12, 1993, to July 31,

4

1998. (ER 55, 59) In it, the Board explicitly found that
technology did not currently exist to enable the refiners to
achieve compliance with the 50 ppb final limit:

despite extensive research and testing by the six Bay Area
refiners at a cost exceeding $5 million, at present there is
no known technology that is capable of removing selenium
from refinery wastewater in a manner that does not produce
large quantities of hazardous waste.

(ER 57 49)’ Based on this finding, the tentative Order required
Unocal, Exxon and Shell to undertake a multi-million dollar
project to identify a technology capable of removing selenium in
an environmentally acceptable manner, to carry out pilot studies
of candidate technologies, and to implement a removal technolo-
gy or other control strategy to meet the final limits by the new
1998 compliance date. In the meantime, the refiners were obli-
gated to continue to comply with the interim selenium discharge
limit. (ER 58-59 41-6)’ As the second key feature of the
negotiated disposition, the proposed Order and Settlement
required Unocal, Exxon and Shell to pay $2 million to the State
penalty fund and Selenium Mitigation Fund, in two installments
of $1 million each. Unocal’s share was $780,000. (ER 57 414,
50-51 44)

4. The Regional Board enters into a Settlement and issues
an Order requiring Unocal to make a substantial payment to the
State, develop control technology, and meet a revised compli-
ance schedule: The Regional Board conducted noticed public
hearings on the proposed Order and Settlement on December 15,
1993 and January 19, 1994. Testimony and written comments
were received from respondent Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment (“CBE”) and other members of the public. (ER 113-152)

? The Board also found that the only two existing technologies
that showed “any promise” did not reduce selenium below the final
50 ppb limit “on a consistent basis.” (ER 57 449-10, 369 412)

> It is undisputed that Unocal has consistently complied with the
“interim” selenium limit set by the Board. (ER 292)

5

In response to testimony by a CBE representative suggesting that
the $2 million payment by the refiners was not a penalty (ER
137-138), a member of the Regional Board stated the payments
were “penalties, that’s plain and simple what it is.” (ER 140:5)
No other Board member disagreed.

In its written comments on the proposed Order and Settle-
ment, EPA expressed enthusiastic support: “We support a
settlement of the [state court] lawsuit since it may be the most
effective approach for expediting a reduction in selenium
discharges. The [Regional Board] staff have worked diligently
to resolve selenium issues in San Francisco Bay ... We are also
happy to see the [Board] take enforcement action with the
proposed Cease and Desist Order (CDO) ... According to the
settlement the refineries will pay a $2 million penalty that will
fund: [studies, projects and research].” (ER 253-254, 371 416)

Following the January 19, 1994, public hearing, the Board
adopted the final Order and Settlement. App., infra, 69a-88a.
In accordance with the Order and Settlement, Unocal and the
other refiners dismissed their state court writ petition challenging
the selenium limits, the Board deferred the final selenium limit
until July 1998, and Unocal, Exxon and Shell made the initia]
$1 million payment within 30 days. The remaining $1 million
was paid on January 31, 1995. Unocal timely paid its $780,000
share of the required payments. (ER 68, 79, 95-97)

Although state law (Cal. Water Code §§13320, 13330)
authorized administrative and judicial review of the Regional
Board Order and Settlement, neither CBE nor any other person
sought review by the State Board, or by filing an action in state
court. (ER 371-372 4418-19)

5. The district court refuses to dismiss CBE’s Clean Water
Act citizen suit for the same alleged violations: On March y
1994, CBE filed this Clean Water Act citizen suit under
33 U.S.C. §1365(a)(1), seeking civil penalties and an injunction
for alleged violations of the 50 ppb selenium discharge limit that
had been deferred until 1998 by the Regional Board in accord-
ance with the Order and Settlement. (ER 1-2) (ER 2)

6

Unocal moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), contending that the complaint failed to state a cogniza-
ble legal claim and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
this citizen suit. Because the Regional Board had already
diligently prosecuted an enforcement action against Unocal for
the same violations of the final selenium limits alleged in the
complaint, Unocal argued that CBE’s citizen suit was barred by
section 309 of the Act on the ground that the State’s action had
been taken under “a State law comparable to” section 309(g) and
Unocal had “paid a penalty assessed under * * * such compar-
able State law * * *.” 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6)(iii). (ER 29-23)

The district court denied Unocal’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that the Regional Board’s enforcement action was not
a bar to this citizen suit because (i) the Board’s action was not
taken pursuant to a “provision” of California law comparable to
section 309(g), and (ii) the payment made by Unocal did not
constitute a “penalty” because the Order and Settlement did not
label it as such. App., infra, 42a-60a.

6. Unocal appeals: On Unocal’s application, the district
court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal, finding that
“there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” on the
correctness of its ruling of this potentially case-dispositive issue.
(ER 382) Two circuits had addressed the same issues and
reached conclusions in conflict with the district court’s decision.
North & South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552
(1st Cir. 1991); Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas,
Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, US.

, 115 S.Ct. 1094 (1995). The Ninth Circuit accepted
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). (ER 384)

7. The Ninth Circuit affirms, acknowledging that its
decision conflicts with those of two other circuits: The Ninth
Circuit affirmed (App., infra, 1a), rejecting Unocal’s argument
that its payment of $780,000 to the State was a “penalty” under
a “comparable state law” within the meaning of section
309(g)(6)(A)(iii) of the Act. Instead, the court held that the
payment was not a “penalty” but “a settlement made to avoid an

7

enforcement action by the Regional Board.” App., infra, 9a.‘
It also rejected Unocal’s argument that the “comparable State
law” clause was satisfied because the Regional Board acted
pursuant to a statute (Water Code Section 13301) that was part
of a statutory scheme that included penalty provisions
comparable to section 309(g). Cal. Water Code §§13308,
13323-13328, 13350, 13385. Instead, the court held that to
preclude a citizen suit for the same violations, the comparability
Clause required the Regional Board to act pursuant to the specific
Statutory penalty provision that corresponded to the
administrative penalty provision in section 309(g). App., infra,
10a. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that its view of the comparability clause was in
conflict with decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits in
Scituate and Arkansas Wildlife, each of which had held that the
Clause was satisfied if the State agency action was taken under
a Statutory scheme, comparable to the Act, that contains a
penalty provision like section 309(g). App., infra, 10a.
Unocal’s timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was
denied on August 15, 1996. Jd. at lla. Over CBE’s objection,
the Ninth Circuit granted Unocal’s motion for Stay of mandate
pending certiorari. Jd. at 68a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Petitioner Unocal respectfully petitions this Court to grant
certiorari in this case to resolve recurring and important
questions dividing the circuits as to the proper role of citizen
suits in enforcing the Clean Water Act.

* Although it is true that the Regional Board and Unocal reached
a settlement, the Regional Board characterized its Order as an
“enforcement action.” (ER 158) Moreover, EPA’s comment on
the proposed order applauded the Regional Board’s “enforcement
action.” (ER 253)

> In addition to this case, the following is a non-exhaustive list
of cases that have addressed section 309(g) of the Act, to (1) limit
citizen suits: Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at 381; Scituate, 949 F.2d

8

There are currently more than 75,000 NPDES permits in
existence, and there have been hundreds of citizen suits seeking
judicial enforcement of such permits or of the discharge limita-
tions of the Clean Water Act itself.° Many of those citizen
suits, like the one at issue here, involve situations in which there
is a pending or completed administrative enforcement proceed-
ing. The proper interpretation of Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the
Clean Water Act, the provision barring citizen suits in certain
circumstances in which there has been prior regulatory action
involving the same alleged violations, is thus a matter of vast
practical importance.

The question affects not only businesses, municipalities,
environmental regulators, and would-be citizen plaintiffs, but
also the federal courts. Under the narrow interpretation given
by the Ninth Circuit in this case to the provision barring certain
citizen suits, there is a real danger that the federal courts will be
called upon to displace state and federal environmental regulato-
ry agencies as primary enforcers of the Clean Water Act.

at 556; Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.Supp. 914 (D. Ore. 1993);
Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co.,
777 F.Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1991); aff'd in part rev’d in part 989
F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1991); California Sportfishing v. City of W.
Sacramento, 905 F.Supp. 792 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Sierra Club v.
Colorado Refining Co., 838 F.Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993); or (2)
allow citizen suits: Knee Deep Cattle Co., Inc. v. Bindana Inv. Co.
Lid., 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996); Washington Public Interest
Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.
1993); Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, Inc. , 891 F.Supp.
1389 (D. Hawaii 1995); Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc. v.
Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F.Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind.
1990); Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Vygen Corp., 803
F.Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992).

° In 1988, a survey of 1,209 citizens suits revealed that 882 had
been filed under the Clean Water Act. BNA, Environmental
Citizen Suits: Confronting The Corporation (1988).

9

The principal underpinning of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is
its conclusion that the “comparable State law” provision of
Section 309(g)(6)(A) requires not merely that the state law under
which the regulators have proceeded be generally comparable to
the enforcement provisions of the Clean Water Act, but that they
have proceeded specifically under a provision identical to
Section 309(g). This ruling is in direct and acknowledged
conflict with decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits (North &
South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st
Cir. 1992); Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29
F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, _U.S. Meare i Tse
1094 (1995)), which apply the bar to citizen suits so long as the
state regulatory proceeding has been conducted under a generally
comparable scheme that contains a penalty provision analogous
to Section 309, even if the enforcement action does not happen
to have been brought directly under the Section 309 analog.

In addition, the court below misconstrued the “penalty
assessed” requirement by treating the very substantial monetary
payment made to the State on account of the selenium discharges
as purely a settlement payment but not a penalty. This ruling
also conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s Arkansas Wildlife
decision, which recognized that the citizen suit preclusion should
apply when “a compromise was reached.” 29 F.3d at 380.

Finally, as we discuss below, the Ninth Circuit’s allowance
of citizei. suits when state regulators have diligently proceeded
with and consummated enforcement proceedings subverts the
primacy that the Clean Water Act seeks to give to administrative
enforcement efforts and is in substantial tension with the prior
decision of this Court in Gwalmey of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), as well as with decisions
of lower courts. Review by this Court is needed in order to
clarify the uncertainties that now surround the availability of the
citizen suit to trump state enforcement efforts.

10

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Impermissibly Allows
Citizen Suits To Intrude Upon State Enforcement
Discretion Under The Clean Water Act, Contrary
To This Court’s Decision In Gwaltney

In 1987, this Court held that the role of a Clean Water Act
citizen suit was “to supplement rather than to supplant govern-
mental action.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61, 108 S.Ct. at 383.
In rejecting a contention that a citizen suit could be brought for
wholly past violatiois, this Court offered an example that
appears plainly inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit decision here:

Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act
could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the
citizen suit. This danger is best illustrated by an example.
Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the
Act and issued a compliance order under § 309(a). Suppose
further that the Administrator agreed not to assess or
otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that the
violator take some extreme corrective action, such as to
install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that
it otherwise would not be obligated to take. Jf citizens
could file suit, months or years later, in order to seek the
civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forego, then
the Administrator’s discretion to enforce the Act in the
public interest would be curtailed considerably. The same
might be said of the discretion of state enforcement authori-
ties. Respondents’ interpretation of the scope of the citizen
suit would change the nature of the citizens’ role from
interstitial to potentially intrusive. We cannot agree that
Congress intended such a result.

Id. at 61, 108 S.Ct. at 383 (emphasis added).

Congress indeed did not intend such a result. In fact, soon
after the Gwalmey decision, Congress further narrowed the
interstitial role’ of citizen suits by enacting the provision at

” The enforcement authority of the EPA and the states is broader
than that of a citizen under the Act. As this Court made clear in

1]

issue here, section 309(g)(6), which bars such suits when the
Administrator of EPA or the state regulator had initiated or
concluded administrative enforcement proceedings. Specifically,
this provision bars a citizen suit when (i) the Administrator has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative
penalty action, (ii) a State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an administrative action under a state law compara-
ble to Clean Water Act section 309(g), or (iii) the Administrator
or the State has issued “a final order not subject to further
judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty [under §
309(g)] or such comparable State law. ”*

In this case, the State of California, acting through its
Regional Water Quality Control Board, commenced an adminis-
trative enforcement action in 1993, alleging violations of new
final NPDES permit limits for selenium discharges. Following
negotiations with Unocal and other dischargers and noticed
public hearings, the Board issued a final Order pursuant to a
Settlement under which Unocal and two other oil refiners were
required to pay $2 million, undertake multi-million dollar
research efforts to develop selenium control technology, and
achieve compliance with the final selenium limits by July 1998,
all while maintaining compliance with interim selenium limits.°

Gwaltney, the government may seek penalties for both wholly past
violations and for ongoing violations of the Act pursuant to sections
309(d) and (g), but a citizen suit is limited under section 505(a) to
ongoing violations only. 33 U.S.C. $§ 1319(d), (g), 1365(a)(1);
Gwaliney, 484 U.S. at 56-59; 108 S.Ct. at 381-382; see Cal. Water
Code § 13385(a).

* Prior to 1987, a citizen suit was barred only by an EPA or
State action diligently prosecuted in court. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)-
(1)(B); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517 (9th
Cir. 1987).

* Unocal has consistently and completely complied with the
Regional Board’s Order, having paid its share of the $2 million that
was ordered, pursued selenium control technology projects, and

12

The State’s administrative enforcement of the Clean Water
Act makes citizen enforcement both unnecessary and inappropri-
ate. Citizen enforcement is unnecessary because the Board had
already taken diligent enforcement action for the selenium
violations now alleged in the citizen suit. Citizen enforcement
is inappropriate because, as this Court contemplated in
Gwaltney, the government accomplished exactly what it intended
by initiating enforcement — it recovered money from the
dischargers, obtained commitments to develop a viable selenium
control technology, and established a schedule for compliance
with final selenium limits.

The citizen plaintiffs contend, however, that Unocal is
currently in violation of the final selenium limits, which the
Board deferred to July 1998 by the Order and Settlement. The
Ninth Circuit’s authorization of the citizen suit despite state
administrative enforcement has thus created the untenable result
that Unocal now has two selenium limits: (1) the interim 5.6
pounds per day limit that the Board Order required Unocal to
meet until July 1998, and (2) the deferred .85 pounds per day
(and 50 ppb) final limit. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that
this final limit can be a basis for a citizen suit now, before the
compliance date set by the Regional Board.

Moreover, the citizen suit seeks an award of civil penal-
ties — payable to the government’® — even though the State

consistently achieved 100 percent compliance with the mandated
interim selenium limits. (ER 95-97, 292)

'© The Clean Water Act did not create a private right of action
for citizens. The citizen suit may be brought for penalties payable
only to the government, not for damages to the citizen or citizen
group. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2621 (1981).
Where the government has either accepted an amount in
compromise, or agreed to forego civil penalties altogether, a
subsequent citizen suit undermines the enforcement discretion of the
Administrator or the State. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61.

en ie tilt i al

SRE Dee ad, el POL 8 Se CR

cee ES AI ee Ce Ge le Ot

13

has already settled its civil penalty claims with the dischargers,
has collected $2 million, and has imposed significant and costly
compliance obligations.

If allowed to stand, the Ninth Circuit decision would create
the following Clean Water Act enforcement anomalies:

¢ Congress intended that the government have broad
enforcement authority and that citizen suits perform a
narrow “interstitial” role. In this case, neither the
EPA Administrator nor the state agency can enforce
final selenium limits until July 1998; yet the Ninth
Circuit has allowed a citizen suit to seek injunctive
relief to enforce those deferred final limits now.

¢ The State decided to resolve its civil penalty claims for
$2 million, plus selenium treatment technology projects
not otherwise required of the dischargers, and a final
selenium compliance schedule. EPA applauded the
State’s enforcement action, including the “penalty.”
Yet, the Ninth Circuit has allowed a citizen suit to seek
civil penalties payable to the government in an amount
greater than the government accepted as appropriate. '!

The result of the Ninth Circuit opinion is an expansion of
citizen suit enforcement beyond the supplemental role created by
Congress and described by this Court in Gwalmey, which role
was narrowed further by Congress in 1987. Under the Ninth
Circuit opinion, a citizen suit may be brought to seek penalties

" In the California Regional Board proceedings, CBE urged the
government to require /arger penalty payments from the discharg-
ers. (ER 137-138) California law afforded CBE a right of
administrative review of the Regional Board’s order by the State
Water Resources Control Board, and judicial review by the
California courts. Cal. Water Code §§13320, 13330. CBE chose
not to pursue any review of the Order under applicable state law,
including review of the amount that the dischargers were required
to pay. The Order became "final" for purposes of section 309(g)
after 30 days. Id.

is

the government has chosen to forego, and to seek injunctive
relief contrary to the terms of the State’s own compliance order,
regardless of how diligent and thorough the State’s enforcement
action has been.

B. The Decision Below Violates The Section 309(g) Bar
On Citizen Suits, Offends The Strong Public Policy
Favoring Settlements, And Conflicts With Decisions
Of The First And Eighth Circuits.

The Ninth Circuit held that “the fairest characterization of
the payment at issue is that it was, indeed, a settlement made to
avoid an enforcement action by the Regional Board” and “not a
penalty but, instead, the price of avoiding the stigma of a formal
enforcement action.” App., infra, 8a.'*

The Ninth Circuit’s unprecedented distinction between
payment of a civil penalty after a formally adjudicated, publicly
contested enforcement action and payment of a settlement
amount to resolve civil penalty liability after formal public
comment and hearings (1) is contrary to decisions of the First
and Eighth Circuits interpreting the “comparable State law”
provision of the Act, (2) is based on a narrow view of the
“comparable State law” provision that is at odds with the
language and intent of the Act, (3) misconstrues the “penalty
assessed” provision of the Act by excluding payments made to
settle state enforcement actions, and (4) undermines the strong
national policy favoring settlement rather than protracted
litigation of disputes.

% The Ninth Circuit wrote: “UNOCAL itself insisted on
characterizing the financial transfer as a ‘payment’ and not a
‘penalty’ at the time of the state action settlement.” App., infra,
8a. This not a fair characterization of the record. At the
December 15, 1993 administrative hearing before the Regional
Board, Unocal’s counsel said, “ * * * I think, for all practical
purposes, it is, in fact, a penalty. It’s viewed by EPA as a penalty
in its letter. I think the Board considers it a penalty.” (ER 150:15-
18)

15

1. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
“comparable State law” provision conflicts with
decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that California Water Code
section 13385, the State penalty provision, is comparable to
section 309(g). App., infra, 9a. But it concluded that Unocal’s
$780,000 payment was not assessed or paid under section
13385, and was instead the product of a settlement embodied in
the Cease and Desist Order issued under Water Code section
13301. Because section 13301 was cited by the Regional Board
(id. at 77a-78a) and because that specific section of the Water
Code does not contain a penalty provision, the Ninth Circuit
held that Unocal’s payment was not assessed under a law
comparable to section 309(g). App., infra, lla. The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged, however, that its view of comparability
was in conflict with that of the First and Eighth Circuits. Jbid.

In Arkansas Wildlife, the Eighth Circuit considered whether
section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii)'® of the Act barred a citizen suit
alleging violations embraced within a State administrative
settlement and consent order that provided for a compliance
schedule and $2,500 in negotiated penalties. The citizen suit
plaintiff argued that the administrative order was issued under a
provision of State law that was not comparable to section 309(g).
The Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument, holding that the
State administrative order precluded a citizen suit for the same
violations that had been settled because the State had taken
diligent enforcement action under a State law scheme that was
comparable to section 309(g). Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at
381-382. It observed that “the states are afforded some latitude
in selecting the specific mechanisms of their enforcement
program.” Jd. at 380. The court accordingly held that
“comparability” is satisfied when the state’s “overall regulatory

'° This case concerns section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii), not section
309(g)(6)(A)(ii), addressed in the First and Eighth Circuit cases.
However, the plain language and structure of the statute shows that
the “comparability” inquiry is the same under both subsections.

16

scheme” under which the agency acted: (1) “contains
comparable penalty provisions,” (2) has “the same overall
enforcement goals,” and (3) provides citizens “a meaningful
opportunity to participate” in the decision-making process so as
to safeguard their interests. Jd. at 381.

Similarly, the First Circuit in Scituate rejected the plaintiff's
argument in that case that to be “comparable” to section 309(g)
and thereby preclude a citizen suit, it is necessary that “the
precise statutory section under which the State issued its
Administrative Order contains penalty provisions comparable to
the Federal Act.” Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556. The First Circuit
reasoned instead that “comparability” under subsection (A)(ii)
was Satisfied when the overall state statutory scheme contained
a penalty provision comparable to the Act and the State agency
was diligently prosecuting an enforcement action under that
scheme. From that premise, the First Circuit held that a citizen
suit was barred whether or not the state agency actually imposed
a “penalty.” Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-557; accord Supporters
to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. The Heritage Group, 973 F.2d
1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Scituate with approval in a
RCRA citizens suit). The First Circuit further reasoned that
because Congress amended the Act for the express purpose of
precluding duplicative citizen suits after a state agency has
already taken enforcement action, deference to diligent state
administrative action is required whether or not the penalty
provision is employed in any particular case. Scituate, 949 F.2d
at 556.'*

* The Ninth Circuit rejected Scituate by relying on its earlier
decision in Pendleton, 11 F.3d at 885. App., infra, 11a. In fact,
Pendleton is not controlling here because it did not address citizen
suit preclusion by State enforcement action. Rather, Pendleton
addressed very different language in subsection (A)(i) precluding
citizen suits when EPA prosecutes an action “under this
subsection.” Pendleton, 11 F.3d at 886. “Comparability” was not
an issue in Pendleton.

;
.
4
5

17

Unocal’s case is far more compelling not only because the
Board acted pursuant to a California statutory scheme that the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged contains a “comparable” penalty
provision but also required Unocal to pay $780,000, commit to
a multi-million dollar research and development effort to
implement an environmentally-acceptable selenium control
technology, and agree to achieve compliance with the final
selenium limit by July 1998 and to comply with the interim
selenium limit until that date. (ER 68)

2. The Ninth Circuit’s “comparability” rationale
is not required by the plain language of the Act
and is contrary to the intent of the Act.

None of the three reasons cited by the Ninth Circuit to
support its narrow view of “comparability” withstands analysis.

First, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s grudging view, it is
not clear that requiring State agency reliance on the precise
provision in State law authorizing administrative penalties “is the
plainest reading” of the words “comparable State law.” App.,
infra, 12a. Congress explicitly stated that comparable means
“similar” or “analogous,” not identical. 1 Legislative History
of Water Quality Act of 1987, at 367 (“Leg. Hist.”).

In fact, an earlier version of the 1987 legislation contained
a provision requiring the State agency to be “diligently pursuing
assessment of a civil penalty under section 309(g) of this Act.”
2 Leg. Hist. 1103, 1174 (1987). That more specific provision
was deleted and the more general “comparable State law”
language was enacted instead. As the concurring opinion in
Scituate aptly reasoned, requiring the State agency to recite
precisely the State law penalty provision which was the source
of its action would “Balkanize” the intended uniform application
of the Act by having comparability turn on semantics rather than
substance. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 559 (concurring opinion).

Second, the Ninth Circuit found comparability lacking
because settlements might not be subject to public notice, com-
ment and assessment procedures applicable to penalties to ensure
the amount is of sufficient “magnitude.” App., infra, 12a. The

' 18

hypothetical concern about the need for public scrutiny is not
supported by the law or the record of this case. The California
statutory scheme governing the Order and Settlement, consistent
with the federal regulations, requires public scrutiny that
matches the requirements of the federal statute, specifically
including notice, public comment and a public hearing. Cal.
Water Code §§13301, 13302; 40 CFR §123.27(d)(2)(iii). CBE
actively participated in all aspects of this public review process,
including two public hearings. (ER 43-60, 113-159) Both
Scituate and Arkansas Wildlife held that to be comparable, the
review proceedings under the state statutory scheme need not be
identical to federal law, but only must ensure a similar level of
public participation. That standard was plainly exceeded in this
case.

Similarly, the “amount” or “magnitude” of the payment
does not determine whether the settlement was a penalty; these
words do not appear in section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii). In fact, a
proposal to require that the amount of “the State imposed
penalty is appropriate” was deleted from the 1987 amendments
of the Act. Compare, 2 Leg. Hist. 828 and 1162 (1987). That
deletion indicates that no such requirement exists. Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300-301
(1983).

In any event, the amount paid by Unocal, $780,000, not
only far exceeded the $2,500 penalty upheld by the Eighth
Circuit in Arkansas Wildlife, but is five times the $125,000
maximum penalty that EPA could have imposed under the
federal statute. 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(2)(B). Thus, by any
standard, the amount paid by Unocal is plainly “comparable” to
any penalty authorized by the federal statute. If EPA believed
that the Settlement was inadequate, it could have filed its own
penalty action. 40 CFR §123.27(c). Instead, EPA blessed the
Settlement, including the “penalty” paid. (ER 253-254)

Third, the Ninth Circuit thought it would be “anomalous”
to conclude that State agency enforcement actions “would more
broadly preclude citizen suits” than EPA enforcement actions.
App., infra, 12a. In fact, the language and structure of the Act

19

does provide for broader preclusion based on State agency
actions. Section 1251(b) expressly states: “[i]t is the policy of
the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. §1251(b) (emphasis added).
And the Ninth Circuit has elsewhere recognized that section
1251(b) expresses the intent of the Act to “afford states as much
control as possible over implementation and enforcement of
pollution controls.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S.E.P.A., 942
F.2d 1427, 1433 (9th Cir. 1991).

The legislative history of the Act likewise makes clear the
primacy of State agency enforcement and that such primacy is
grounded in federalism: “The Committee again, however, notes
that the authority of the federal government should be used
judiciously by the Administrator in those cases [that] deserve
federal action because of their national character, scope or
seriousness. The Committee intends the great volume of
enforcement actions be brought by the State.” Sen. Rep. No.
92-414, 92d Cong. Ist Sess., p. 64 (1971).

Citing this Congressional history, this Court concluded that
citizen suits are proper only when State agencies fail to exercise
their enforcement responsibility. Gwalmey, 484 U.S. at 60. In
this case, the Regional Board took vigorous enforcement action,
so the duplicative citizen suit seeking to have the federal courts
second-guess that action is unnecessary and should be barred.

3. The Ninth Circuit decision misconstrues the
“penalty assessed” provision of the statute by
excluding payments made to settle state enforce-
ment actions.

Section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii) of the Act provides that a citizen
Suit is barred when “the State has issued a final order not subject
to further judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty
assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State law, as
the case may be * * *.” 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6}{A)(iii).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision draws an unwarranted and
unnecessary distinction between civil penalties imposed follow-

20

ing an adjudicated enforcement proceeding and amounts paid in
settlement to resolve the state’s civil penalty claims in adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings. The Regional Board did take
administrative enforcement action against Unocal (App., infra,
69a-81a), and it settled that enforcement action following an
open public process that included notice, public comment, and
hearings in which CBE actively participated. (ER 43-60, 113-
152, 153-159, 253-255). The settlement required, among other
things, substantial payments by Unocal and others to resolve the
State’s civil penalty claims.

For purposes of the citizen suit bar, it should make no
difference whether Unocal paid something formally denominated
a “penalty” following administrative adjudication, or whether
Unocal paid to settle the civil penalty claims asserted by the
state. Congress intended to encourage, not discourage, settle-
ment of penalty actions as a means of funding environmental
protection projects and thus furthering the goals of the Act. 2
Leg. Hist. 828. EPA regulations interpreting the Act likewise
provide for “settlement of a State enforcement action” following
notice and public comment on the proposed settlement. 40
C.F.R. §123.27(d)(2)(iii).

In direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
observed that “it would be unreasonable and inappropriate to
find failure to diligently prosecute simply because [the discharg-
ers] prevailed in some fashion or because a compromise was
reached.” Arkansas Wildlife, 29 F.3d at 380. The court
rejected an argument that the State had negotiated and accepted
"insignificant amounts of civil penalties" in comparison to the
maximum penalties that could have been assessed. Jd. Thus,
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning recognizes that a payment in
settlement qualifies as a “penalty assessed” under the statute.

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit constructed an artificial
distinction between a “penalty” resulting from a “formal
enforcement action” by the State and a settlement paid to the
State to resolve civil “penalty” liability. App., infra, 9a. Both
should be viewed as a “penalty assessed” for purposes of the
citizen suit bar in_ section 309(g). 33.—Ss«€U«S..C.

;
E |
i
;
i

ce SRI) PURER 20

21

§1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). However, under the Ninth Circuit’s view,
a settlement would apparently never constitute “a penalty
assessed” under the Act, even if the word “penalty” were used
to describe a payment made by a discharger to resolve its
potential penalty liability.’

In fact, the Ninth Circuit opinion fails to mention that the
EPA and the Regional Board did consider the settlement
payment to be a “penalty.” EPA stated: “We are also happy
to see the RWQCB take enforcement action with the proposed
Cease and Desist Order * * *. According to the settlement, the
refineries will pay a $2 million penalty that will fund * * *
consultants to oversee the treatment technology research.”
(ER 253-54, emphasis added)'® Similarly, a Regional Board
member stated at one of the two public hearings: “It is penal-
ties, that’s plain and simple what it is.” (ER 140:5, emphasis
added) No other Board member disagreed.

Apart from the stated beliefs of the two agencies charged
with enforcement of the Act, Unocal’s $780,000 payment was
a penalty in substance and as a matter of law. There is nothing
else it could have been; no other civil payment is contemplated
by State law or the Act. Indeed, ten percent of the payment was
specifically earmarked for deposit in the account designated for

'S Although the payment was not labelled a “penalty” in the
Settlement (App., infra, 84a-85a) this Court has recognized that the
“label” used is not controlling; it is the “substance” of the action
that is relevant. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489,
492-493 (1958). In fact, the specific section of state law that the
Ninth Circuit and CBE agree is a “comparable” penalty provision,
Water Code section 13385, does not use the label “penalty” but
rather the term “civil liability.”

‘© After filing its citizen suit, CBE asked EPA to “clarify” its
position. EPA responded: “Although the comment letter describes
the payment of money by the refineries as a ‘penalty,’ this term
was not used with any intention of describing the preclusive effect
of that payment under section 309(g)(6).” (ER 299)

22

civil penalties by State law. App., infra, 84a-85a. Cal. Water
Code §13385(i). The remainder of the payment went to a new
State Selenium Mitigation Fund, consistent with the intent of
Congress that “settlements of fines and penalties” be “used to
fund research, development and other related projects which
further the goals of the Act.” 2 Leg. Hist. 828 (1987).

The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the $780,000 payment
was not a “penalty” because, in considering its enforcement
options, the Regional Board declined to invoke its administrative
penalty authority under Water Code section 13385. App., infra,
7a. Instead, the Board invoked the cease and desist order
provision, Water Code section 13301, stating: “the Regional
Board has determined that the most appropriate course of action
is settlement of the litigation and issuance of a cease and desist
order.” App., infra, 77a-78a.

The flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is that there was
no need for the Regional Board to invoke the state penalty
statute because the refiners, including Unocal, had already
agreed to settle their penalty liability with a $2 million payment.
The Board cited section 13301 because that statute provided
legal authority for issuing the cease and desist order and
undertaking the remainder of the settlement: (1) requiring the
refiners to study, develop, and implement selenium control
technology, and (2) deferring compliance with the final selenium
limit to 1998. App., infra, 78a-80a. See Cal. Water Code
§13301 (empowering Board to issue cease and desist orders
requiring “appropriate remedial or preventive action” and
directing the discharger to “comply in accordance with a time
schedule set by the Board”).

The Order issued by the Regional Board and the Settlement
were fully consistent with the Clean Water Act and this Court’s
interpretation of the Act in Gwalmney. This Court held that state
and federal authorities have discretion “not to assess or other-
wise seek civil penalties on the condition that the violator take
some extreme corrective action.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61,
108, S.Ct.~at 383. In this case, Unocal was ordered to under-
take groundbreaking selenium control technology, an expensive

~

23

project (App., infra, 72a-73a), because the Board recognized
that no such technology existed. Jd. at 72a-76a. The Board
also collected $2 million as part of the settlement..’

In sum, a payment “assessed” by the State should be
considered a penalty for purposes of section 309(g) of the Act
whether it is the result of a formal administrative adjudication
proceeding or a negotiated settlement. A penalty that is the
product of a settlement of an administrative enforcement
proceeding by a state agency is no less a product of the enforce-
ment authority that gives rise to the citizen suit bar than a
penalty paid following adjudication of the State’s administrative
claims. Congress drew no distinction between adjudicated
penalties and penalties paid in settlement, and the courts should
not do so either.

4. The Ninth Circuit’s decision violates strong
public policy favoring settlements.

The Ninth Circuit held that a discharger who settles an
administrative penalty action brought by the government does so
at the peril of confronting a subsequent citizen suit for the same
claims that were settled.

Carried.to its logical conclusion, the Ninth Circuit decision
will dissuade NPDES dischargers from settling Clean Water Act

'” The Ninth Circuit mistakenly accepted the assertion of the
United States, as amicus curiae, that the Board’s failure to invoke
the state penalty statute allowed Unocal to avoid review of the
amount of the penalty pursuant to the penalty assessment factors in
the state statute, Water Code section 13385(e), analogous to those
in section 1319(g)(3) of the Act. App., infra, 8a-9a. In fact, there
can be no plausible claim that the penalty was inadequate. The
Board was presumably aware of the assessment factors, but it was
not required to address them expressly because the amount was
determined by settlement, not by a contested enforcement
proceeding. Indeed, the amount collected from Unocal, $780,000,
far exceeded the $125,000 maximum penalty EPA can assess even
using the statutory factors. 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(2)(B).

24

administrative claims brought by federal or state agencies. As
courts have recognized, “It is doubtful that an alleged violator
would fully cooperate with [the State agency] to resolve [certain
violations] if they lacked assurance that the same violation would
not be the subject of a citizens suit in federal court at some later
time.” Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.Supp. 914, 918 (D.Or. 1993).
Instead of focusing their resources on negotiated environmental
research and corrective action, dischargers would have to engage
in protracted and expensive litigation.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit decision deters the very kind of
dispute resolution the law should encourage: an arm’s-length,
good-faith settlement between the agency and the regulated
party, arrived at on threat of formal action, but resolved with
concessions by both sides before formal adversary proceedings
became necessary. Settlement allows the parties to focus their
resources on developing technology to improve water quality
rather than on litigation. Such agreements, especially when
subject to public scrutiny and blessed by EPA, must be upheld
not undermined.

Under the Ninth Circuit’s narrow view of the Act, such
timely, negotiated resolutions of enforcement actions will be
insufficient to preclude unnecessary, duplicative citizen suits,
even when the agency has given the public and EPA ample
opportunity for scrutiny and comment and State law affords the
right to judicial review of the agency action. Nothing in the Act
justifies the Ninth Circuit’s counter-productive conclusion.

Such an outcome not only cannot be what Congress
intended but also violates this nations’s strong public policy
favoring the settlement of disputes to avoid protracted and
wasteful litigation. This Court has consistently recognized that
settlement of disputes is strongly favored and should be encour-
aged to preserve scarce judicial resources and ease crowded
court dockets. E.g., Williams v. First National Bank, 216 U.S.
582, 595, 30 S.Ct. 441, 445 (1910); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1017 (1974).

As this Court recognized in Gwalmey, duplicative and
unnecessary citizen suits that simply replicate diligent state

a =

25

administrative enforcement actions that have been resolved by
settlement undermine important national environmental policies.
484 U.S. at 60-61. Without the authority to enter into a settle-
ment that bars a citizen suit, the state loses a crucial weapon in
its arsenal for achieving the Act’s water quality goals, directing
its effort at environmental corrective action rather than litigation,
with its attendant costs and delay. The policy favoring
settlement “has particular force” where an agency “has pulled
the laboring oar” to reach agreement that will “promote early
completion of cleanup activities.” United States v. Cannons
Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1990).

The Ninth Circuit’s holding that a settlement payment
cannot be a penalty subverts the structure of the Act and invites
pointless litigation. In the Ninth Circuit, a permittee now must
fight rather than settle in order to avoid a citizen Suit. Such a
result is contrary to public policy and this Court’s decision in
Gwaltney.

In sum, this Court should grant certiorari to resolve the
nationally significant issues created by the Ninth Circuit’s
narrow view of both the “penalty assessed” provision and the
“comparabie State law” requirement. The Ninth Circuit’s
approach should be rejected in favor of the better founded
decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits precluding citizen suits
when state regulatory action leads to a settlement, and finding
comparability based on the overall Statutory scheme under which
the State agency acted.

C. The Issue Presented Is A Recurring One Of National
Significance.

Under the Clean Water Act, every discharger of wastewater
to the waters of the United States must have an NPDES permit.
33 U.S.C. §1342. There are more than 75,000 active NPDES
permits nationally. All such dischargers must deal either with
a State agency or EPA on compliance issues every time a permit
Standard is arguably exceeded. Under the Ninth Circuit
decision, even if the agency and the discharger agree on a
compliance or enforcement solution, the discharger may be

26

subject to a costly citizen suit second-guessing and potentially
undermining the agency determination.

For example, based on the decision in this case, another
Ninth Circuit panel recently held that a citizen suit is not barred
under section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) even though the State agency had
initiated an enforcement action, but then settled with the
discharger for (1) payment of a $1,400 penalty, (2) a stipulated
order requiring a sewage treatment plant upgrade at a cost of
$175,000 to $200,000, and (3) compliance with interim dis-
charge limits during construction, in exchange for foregoing
further penalties. Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co.,
Lid., 94 F.3d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit
overturned a well-reasoned district court decision applauding the
State agency for acting “to eliminate pollution through a
settlement agreement” under which “defendants are building a
new sewage treatment plant.” Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana
Investments Co., 904 F.Supp. 1177, 1183 @. Or. 1995).
Applying its decision in this case, the Ninth Circuit held that,
despite the settlement and order, the Oregon agency was not
diligently prosecuting an action for penalties under a state law
comparable to section 309(g). Knee Deep, 94 F.3d at 516-517.
Allowing such a duplicative and unnecessary citizen suit that
alleges the same violations resolved by state administrative
enforcement contravenes this Court’s teaching in Gwalmey.

Until the issues presented by this case are resolved national-
ly by this Court, companies and municipalities with NPDES
permits in the First and Eighth Circuits will be treated different-
ly and able to operate with more certainty — the certainty to
which they are entitled — than those in the Ninth Circuit.
Those in other circuits will remain in limbo as to which
standards may apply in their jurisdiction: (1) the view of the
Ninth Circuit that allows citizen suits to second-guess state
action, or (2) the views of the First and Eighth Circuits that,
consistent with Gwalmey, preclude unnecessary and duplicative
citizen suits where the state has taken enforcement action. This
uncertainty is bound to disrupt and complicate state regulatory
efforts and needlessly burden federal courts.

27

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.

TIMoTHY R. THOMAS JOHN F. BARG

MARK SMITH Counsel of Record

Law Department SANFORD SVETCOV

Union Oil Company R. CHRISTOPHER LOCKE
of California Landels Ripley &

Santa Ana, CA 92799 Diamond, LLP

(714) 428-7600 350 The Embarcadero

San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 512-8700

ANDREW L. FREY
Mayer, Brown & Platt
2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 778-0602

Counsel for Petitioner

NOVEMBER 13, 1996

APPENDIX A

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT
CALIFORNIA, San Francisco Baykeeper, Save San
Francisco Bay Association, The Bay Institute of San

Francisco, Santa Clara Valley Audubon Society, Kalon
Wofford and Anthony Willis, Plaintiffs- Appellees,

Vv.

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-15139.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 8, 1996.
Decided May 13, 1996.
As Amended July 16, 1996.

7

Before: BROWNING and JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr.,
Circuit Judges, and MERHIGE, Senior District Judge.*

MERHIGE, Senior District Judge:

This case arises under the federal Water Pollution
Control Act (the “Clean Water Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et
seq. The Appellees, Citizens for a Better Environment, et al.
(“CBE”), brought this action in the federal district court for
the Northern District of California pursuant to the citizen suit
provision of that Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. In the Complaint,
CBE asserted a claim for violations of the Clean Water Act
effluent standards, a claim for violations of Clean Water Act
water quality standards, and a state law claim. Although the

* The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by
designation.

2a

district court granted the motion of the Appellant, Union Oil
Company of California (“UNOCAL”), to dismiss as to the
water quality standards claim, the district court denied
UNOCAL’s motion to dismiss, premised on 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) and (iii), as to the effluent standards claim
and the dependent state law claim. The district court certified
its order denying UNOCAL’s motion to dismiss for
immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

I.

The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters. The Act prohibits all discharge of
pollutants except inasmuch as one of several enumerated
statutory exceptions applies. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). One such
exception is where the polluter has been issued a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit.
33 U.S.C. § 1342. The effluent discharge standards or
limitations specified in an NPDES permit define the scope of
the authorized exception to the prohibition in § 1311(a).
Authority to administer the NPDES permit system may be
delegated to a state or regional agency where the state or
regional regulatory scheme meets certain criteria. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b). The entity responsible for issuing permits in the
San Francisco Bay area of California is the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Region
(the “Regional Board”). Private citizens may bring suit
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 to enforce effluent standards or
limitations, which are defined as including violations of 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1).

UNOCAL owns and operates a petroleum refinery in the
San Francisco Bay area of California. Wastewater from the
refinery is subject to UNOCAL’s NPDES permit issued by
the Regional Board. On February 20, 1991 the Regional
Board issued Order No. 91-026, which amended the
UNOCAL’s NPDES permit for the San Francisco Bay area
refinery. The order set a “final” concentration limit on
selenium discharges of 50 parts per billion (“ppb”) and a

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3a

mass emission rate of .85 pounds per day, calculated on a
running annual average. The final selenium limitation was to
take effect December 12, 1993. On June 16, 1991 the
Regional Board issued Order No. 91-099 amending
UNOCAL’s NPDES permit to include an “interim limit” less
stringent than the final limit which took effect immediately
and which was to remain in force until the final limit came
into effect. UNOCAL is in substantial compliance with the
interim limit but is not in compliance with the final limit.

The Regional Board issued these orders pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1314(d of the Clean Water Act, which required the
Regional Board to adopt individual control Strategies for
discharges into waters determined by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) or the state to be
impaired. The Regional Board listed San Francisco Bay asa
“hot spot” under § 1314(J on the ground that it failed to
meet the “applicable water quality standard” of the Clean
Water Act “due entirely or substantially to discharges from
point sources of any toxic pollutants.” See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314()(1)).

The state water board denied an appeal by UNOCAL and
other refiners challenging the selenium discharge limits.
Shortly thereafter, on October 12, 1992, UNOCAL and
others filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Solano
County Superior Court of California seeking to set aside the
interim and final limits on the grounds that the Regional
Board’s listing of the San Francisco Bay as a “hot spot”
violated the Clean Water Act and _ its implementing
regulations.

Over the course of 1993, UNOCAL and others were in
settlement discussions with the Regional Board. Although
other refiners in the area became able to meet the final limits,
UNOCAL and other refiners maintained their inability, due
to technological constraints, to meet the final selenium limits.
On November 8, 1993, UNOCAL, along with other refiners,
reached a settlement agreement whereby UNOCAL and others

4a

would dismiss the state lawsuit and the Regional Board would
adopt a proposed cease and desist order (“CDO”). The
parties dispute whether the settlement agreement and proposed
CDO were released for public comment on November 9,
1993 or November 12, 1993. On November 19, 1993 and
December 15, 1993 public hearings were held on the
proposed CDO at which CBE participated. The Regional
Board, with some minor modifications, issued the CDO on
January 19, 1994 as Order No. 94-015.

The principal elements of the settlement agreement and
the CDO were that UNOCAL and the other refiners
dismissed their state court lawsuit without prejudice,
UNOCAL and others paid the state a total of $2 million
($780,000 of which was contributed by UNOCAL), and the
Regional Board issued the CDO which, among other things,
relieves UNOCAL and others from meeting the final selenium
limit until July 31, 1998. The CDO states, with respect to
the latter element, that:

Compliance with this Order shall be in accordance with
the following tasks and time schedules:

c. The dischargers shall implement a _ removal
technology or technologies, or an alternate control
strategy, which has been determined by the dischargers
to be capable of achieving compliance with the discharge
limitations as specified in [the NPDES permits] and shall
comply with these limits, no later than July 31, 1998.

CBE filed this lawsuit on March 2, 1994. On July 8,
1994, the district court dismissed the water quality standards
claim. The district court subsequently certified the question
of its denial of the motions to dismiss as to the other claims
for immediate appeai pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Sa

Il.

UNOCAL asserts two arguments as to why dismissal of
the effluent standards claim is proper. First, UNOCAL
argues that dismissal is warranted because the citizen suit is
barred under § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) and § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).
Second,—UNOCAL urges that dismissal for failure to state
a claim is appropriate because the CDO issued by the
Regional Board had the effect of extending until 1998 the
deadline for complying with the final selenium limits
specified in the NPDES permit and, thus, there is no effluent
standards violation. The Court reviews each of these
questions of law de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel.,
872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989).

A. Is the Citizen Suit Barred Under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) or § 1319(g)(6)(A) (iii)?

33 U.S.C. § 1365 generally authorizes private citizens to
sue those violating, among other things, “an effluent standard
or limitation” under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6) sets out certain instances where these citizen
suits are barred. The provisions of § 1319(g)(6)(A) are
precisely designed to preclude citizen suits which would be
duplicative of an “administrative penalty action.” See
Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton
Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1993).

The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365, provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and
section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf—

(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator [of the EPA] or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation....

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6a

The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce
such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order,
as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil
penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
Section 1319(g)(6) provides, in relevant part:
[A]ny violation—

(i) with respect to which the Administrator [of the
EPA] or the Secretary [of the Army] has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under this
subsection,

(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State
law comparable to this subsection, or

(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or
the State has issued a final order not subject to
further judicial review and the violator has paid a
penalty assessed under this subsection, or such
comparable State law, as the case may be,

Shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under
subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this
title or section 1365 of this title.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A).
1. Applicability of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii)

§ 1319(g)(6)(A) (iii) precludes this citizen suit if the CDO
at issue in this case is a “final order not subject to further
judicial review,” and if UNOCAL has paid a “penalty” that
was “assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State
law.” Because UNOCAL has not paid a “penalty” “assessed
under ... comparable State law” the Court concludes that
CBE’s suit is not barred by § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).

Ta

a. “penalty”

UNOCAL maintains that the $780,000 it paid to the
Regional Board constituted a “penalty” within the meaning of
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). The district court concluded that the $2
million payment, of which UNOCAL’s payment was a part,
was not a penalty but “was simply settling the refineries’ state
court lawsuit.” The district court noted that the CDO refers
to a “payment” not a “penalty” and that the CDO clearly
Stated that it was issued pursuant to the Regional Board’s
authority under California Water Code § 13301, governing
cease and desist orders. The district court also noted that in
the CDO the Regional Board “expressly declined to invoke its
[California Water Code] § 13385 authority” to impose a civil

penalty.’

UNOCAL argues, essentially, that it has paid out over
$780,000 (10% of which went into the California Water
Pollution Cleanup and Abatement Account that is the
repository of fines levied pursuant to § 13385, and 90% into

' The CDO states, in part, that:

[t]he Regional Board has considered the various
enforcement and penalty options available to it regarding the
violation [of the NPDES permit], including the issuance of
a cease and desist order or a cleanup or abatement order,
imposition of an administrative civil penalty and referral to
the Attorney General for civil prosecution. Under the
circumstances detailed in the Findings set forth above, the
Regional Board has determined that the most appropriate
course of action is settlement of the litigation and issuance
of a cease and desist order.

8a

a “Selenium Mitigation Fund”) and that it elevates form
over substance to call this anything other than a “penalty.”

In support of the formal reasoning of the district court,
CBE asserts two additional reasons why UNOCAL may not
characterize the payment as a penalty. First, UNOCAL itself
insisted on characterizing the financial transfer as a
“payment” and not a “penalty” at the time of the state action
settlement. CBE notes that counsel for UNOCAL stated at
the hearing on the motion to dismiss at the district court that
UNOCAL would not, at the time of the settlement of the state
lawsuit, “sign on to paperwork that characterized it as a
penalty, because of the punitive and bad conduct implications
that the general public takes from that term.” CBE,
appropriately, in the Court’s view, argues that UNOCAL
simply “cannot have it both ways” and that the fairest
characterization of the $780,000 payment is that it was not a
penaity but, instead, the price of avoiding the stigma of a
formal enforcement action.

Second, CBE argues that there are other significant
advantages that were obtained by UNOCAL by making a
payment independent of the state statutory provision,
California Water Act § 13385, that is analogous to the
administrative penalty provision of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g). California Water Code § 13385 sets out
formal procedures to be followed and specific factors to be
considered in setting a penalty. Thus, asserts CBE, by
‘making a payment outside the context of § 13385, UNOCAL
avoided a significant level of scrutiny as to the nature and
amount of a penalty. For example, the United States, as
amicus curiae, notes that there was no formal scrutiny of the
economic benefits to UNOCAL of non-compliance and thus

* The Appellees argue, however, that this cuts against the
Appellant because § 13385 requires all penalties to be paid into
the California Water Pollution Cleanup and Abatement Account.

9a

no assurance that UNOCAL has fully disgorged the benefit it
receives from violating effluent standards. CBE also notes
that while payment of an administrative penalty must be made
within 30 days of being imposed, California Water Code
§ 13323(d), UNOCAL was not required to make half of its
payment until a year after the settlement was entered into.

The Court determines that the fairest characterization of
the payment at issue is that it was, indeed, a settlement made
to avoid an enforcement action by the Regional Board.
Accordingly, because UNOCAL has not paid a “penalty,” the
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) bar to citizen suits does not apply. This
conclusion that § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) is not implicated is
buttressed by the Court’s interpretation of the term
“comparable state law,” discussed below.

b. “comparable state law”

Having determined that the payment at issue was not a
“penalty,” the district court also concluded that the payment
was not “assessed under this subsection, or such comparable
State law” within the meaning of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). It is
undisputed that the penalty provision in § 13385 of the
California Water Code is comparable to the federal Clean
Water Act penalty provision of 33 U.S.C. § 1319. It is also
not disputed that the payment at issue in this case was not
levied pursuant to California Water Code § 13385.° The key
issue, therefore, is whether a penalty assessed not in
accordance with § 13385 but, instead, under the aegis of a
related provision of the California statutory scheme is
“assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State
law.” UNOCAL argues, as it did in the district court, that
although the CDO states that it was issued under the authority

* Although the parties dispute the degree of similarity to the
requirements of § 13385 of the procedures and factors that were
actually taken and considered in this case, Appellant cedes that
the specific requirements of § 13385 were not adhered to.

10a

of California Water Code § 13301, because § 13301 is within
the same statutory scheme as § 13385 a penalty assessed
under the former provision is assessed under a “comparable
State law” within the meaning of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).

The district court held that the “comparability assessment
‘= conducted by examining the state statutory enforcement
provision involved,” here California Water Code § 13301,
and “not the state statutory enforcement scheme as a whole.”
Because California Water Code § 13301 is not comparable to
the federal penalty provision in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g),
reasoned the district court, a penalty assessed under § 13301
does not implicate the § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) bar on citizen
suits. In reaching this conclusion the district court
specifically rejected the reasoning of the First Circuit in North
and South Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate interpreting the
term “comparable” in § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). 949 F.2d 552,
555-556 (ist Cir. 1991).

In Scituate the First Circuit held that the comparability
requirement of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) is met where the state
“statutory scheme” contains a penalty provision comparable
to the federal penalty provision and that a state’s decision not
to utilize the comparable state law penalty provision in any
particular case does not negate the “comparability” of the
state action. Jd.; accord, Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI
Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382-383 (8th Cir. 1994). The
Scituate Court reasoned:

The State’s decision not to utilize the penalty provisions
does not alter the comparability of the State Act’s
statutory scheme to the scheme found in the Federal Act.
While the specific statutory section under which the State
issued its Order does not, itself, contain a penalty
provision, another section of the same statute does
contain penalty provisions. These two coordinate parts
are cogs in the same statutory scheme implemented by
the State for the protection of its waterways.

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Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556, (internal citations omitted). Thus,
“[iJt is enough that the [state] statutory scheme ... contains
penalty assessment provisions comparable to the Federal Act,
that the State is authorized to assess those penalties, and that
the overall scheme of the two acts is aimed at correcting the
same violations, thereby achieving the same goals.” Id.
Furthermore, according to the Scituate Court, “[s]o long as
the provisions in the State Act adequately safeguard the
substantive interests of citizens in enforcement actions, the
rights of notice and public participation found in the State Act
are satisfactorily comparable to those found in the Federal
Act.” Id.

In Washington Public Interest Research Group v.
Pendleton Woolen Mills this Court interpreted the terms of 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(@i). 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.1993). The
Court noted that § 1319(g) deals only with administrative
penalty actions. Jd. at 885. The Court then concluded that
when determining whether the EPA was “diligently
prosecuting an action under this subsection,” the phrase
“under this subsection” could mean only that the EPA was
prosecuting an administrative penalty action. Jd. at 886. The
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(i) bar to citizen suits, therefore, was not
implicated “in the face of an administrative compliance
order.” Jd. The Court specifically noted that it was not
persuaded by the reasoning underlying the Scituate Court’s
interpretation of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) which was grounded in
that court’s concern that the discretion of enforcement
authorities to choose enforcement methods be preserved. Id.
This Court noted the language of the statute was clear and
that there was no evidence in the legislative history that
suggested that Congress intended to extend the bar on citizen
Suits to a context beyond administrative penalty actions. Id.
at 885-886. This Court also noted that had Congress intended
that administrative compliance orders preclude citizen suits,
it could have done so—as it has in other instances. Id. at
886.

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12a

The Court concludes that the requirement in
§ 1319(g)(6)(A) (iii) that any penalty be “assessed under this
subsection, or such comparable State law” before it precludes
citizen suits means that the penalty at issue must have been
assessed under that provision of state law that is comparable
to § 1319(g). There are several reasons for this conclusion.
First, this is the plainest reading of the statutory language.‘
Second, § 1319(g) mandates various public notice and
comment procedures as well as penalty assessment factors.
Unless any penalty is assessed according to the particular
provision of state law that is comparable to § 1319(g), there
is no guarantee that the public will be given the requisite
opportunity to participate or that the penalty assessed is of the
proper magnitude. Third, as noted by the United States in its
amicus brief, the holding of Scituate leads to the anomalous
conclusion that state administrative enforcement actions would
more broadly preclude citizen suits than the administrative
enforcement actions of the EPA. Nothing in the language and
structure of the § 1319(g)(6)(A) in any way suggests that
Congress intended such a dichotomy. Nor has the UNOCAL
pointed to any legislative history that would indicate that
Congress intended that state administrative actions be given

* As the Supreme Court has stated, “the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56, 108 S.Ct. at 381, quoting Consumer
Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). “Absent
a Clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” GT7E
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. at 108, 100 S.Ct. at 2056. “If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court ... must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.” Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81
L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

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13a

broader preclusive effect than the administrative actions of the
EPA.

2. Applicability of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)

§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) precludes this citizen suit if the State
“has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under
a State law comparable to this subsection.”

The district court concluded that the § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)
bar was inapplicable for two reasons. First, the district court
concluded that the action at issue was not taken “under a
State law comparable to this subsection.” Additionally, the
district court concluded that “because of the entry of the
settlement agreement and the CDO, the Regional Board’s
enforcement action is no longer still being ‘prosecuted’ within
the meaning of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).”

UNOCAL has made no contention in its briefs as to why
the district court erred in concluding that the action was no
longer being “prosecuted” within the meaning of
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).° It seems plain that no action is being
prosecuted at this time. Thus, § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) is
inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court concludes, for the
reasons discussed above with respect to § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii),
that the district court did not err in concluding that the
Regional Board’s action was not taken “under a State law
comparable to this subsection.”

B. Did the Regional Board’s Cease and Desist Order
Effectively Defer the Compliance Date for Selenium
Discharges so that UNOCAL is not “in Violation” of
an Effluent Standard or Limitation?

UNOCAL asserts that CBE has failed to State a claim
because the facts it alleges do not constitute a “violation of an

* Indeed, the Appellant raised this provision in the district
court only in a footnote of its briefs and it was dealt with by the
district court in a footnote to its decision.

= iii,

14a

effluent standard or limitation” within the meaning of
§ 1365(a)(1)(A) because the CDO issued by the Regional
Board had the effect of modifying UNOCAL’s NPDES permit
to extend until 1998 the deadline for complying with the final
selenium limit.

33 U.S.C. § 1365 generally authorizes private citizens to
sue those violating, among other things, “an effluent standard
or limitation” under the Clean Water Act.° “Effluent
standard or limitation” means “an effluent limitation or other
limitation under section 1311” or “a permit or conditions
thereof issued under section 1342 [the NPDES provision] of
this title.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). Thus, violation of the
limits specified in an NPDES permit is a violation of “an
effluent standard or limitation” within the meaning of § 1365.

The district court concluded that the issuance by the
Regional Board of the CDO extending the compliance
schedule was akin to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
and did not suspend the limits and deadlines contained in the
NPDES permit or shield UNOCAL from this citizen suit.
While UNOCAL concedes that the CDO did not purport to
modify the NPDES permit and did not constitute a formal

®° Section 1365 provides, in part, that:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and
section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence
a civil action on his own behalf—

(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator
[of the EPA] or a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation....

33 U.S.C. § 1365.

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15a

amendment or modification of the NPDES permit,’ it argues
that the CDO did have the practical effect of modifying the
compliance date contained in the NPDES permit. For the
first time on appeal, UNOCAL also argues that the district
court was foreclosed, under either the doctrine of exhaustion
of remedies or the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), from addressing
the argument that the CDO issued by the Regional Board
failed to effectively modify the NPDES compliance date
because California law provided CBE a right, of which they
did not avail themselves, to review of the CDO by appeal to
the state water board or by judicial review in state court.
California Water Code §§ 13320, 13330.

The Court concludes that the federal courts are not
precluded from addressing the issue of whether the CDO
effectively modified the NPDES compliance date. While it
is true that there, were procedures available for CBE to
appeal the CDO within the state system, this action does not
challenge the validity of the CDO but rather seeks to enforce
the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Furthermore, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 makes no mention of exhaustion of state
remedies as a prerequisite for bringing a citizen suit.
Similarly, Younger abstention is not appropriate. There are
three requirements for the invocation of Younger—ongoing
state proceedings, implication of an important state interest in
the state proceedings, and an adequate opportunity to raise
federal questions in the proceedings. World Famous Drinking
Emporium v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).
While failure to exhaust state appellate remedies may satisfy
the requirement that there be ongoing state proceedings, Id.,

” There are specific, mandatory procedure for NPDES permit
modification. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 23, § 2235; 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.62. See also Ackels v. U.S.E.P.A., 7 F.3d 862, 864, n.1
(9th Cir. 1993). It is undisputed that these procedures were not
followed in this case.

16a

the doctrine is simply not relevant where the federal action is
not seeking a ruling on the validity of the state action.

The Court further concludes that the CDO at issue did
not modify, effectively or otherwise, the terms of UNOCAL’s
NPDES permit. This conclusion is appropriate for the
following reasons.

First, the CDO does not purport to modify the NPDES
permit. In the Findings to the CDO, the Regional Board
states in paragraph 4 that “[t]he effluent limitations imposed
under Order No. 91-026 [amending the NPDES permit to
include the finai selenium limits] become effective on
December 12, 1993.... The Regional Board is adopting this
Order to enforce the provisions of Order No. 91-026.” Thus,
the Regional Board did not intend to modify the Permit but
instead worked out a compliance schedule wherein, according
to paragraph 7 of the CDO, if “the dischargers have failed to
comply with the provisions of this Order [the official may ...]
request the Attorney General to take appropriate action
against the dischargers, including injunctive and civil
remedies, if appropriate, or to issue a Complaint for Board
consideration of Administrative Civil Liabilities.” Thus, the
language of the CDO itself fits with the conclusion that the
CDO was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Second, as noted above, federal and state regulations
govern the modification of NPDES permits. It is not disputed
that these regulations were not followed in this case. These
regulations, both procedural and substantive, ensure that the
standards embodied in an NPDES permit cannot be evaded
with the cooperation of compliant state regulatory authorities.
For instance, there are public notice requirements for a
permit modification process that are different than those
required in an enforcement action. Further, there is a five
year duration on the life of an NPDES permit that the
“effective modification” asserted here would violate.

§ 1342(6)(1)(B).

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Third, even if the CDO were to be construed as having
effectively extended the compliance date in the NPDES
permit, such a modification would likely run afoul of the
substantive constraint on the ability of regulators to modify
permits found in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(0) (the “anti-backsliding”
provision). This provision prohibits, with certain narrow
exceptions,* any modified permit from containing “effluent
limitations which are less stringent than the comparable
effluent limitations in the previous permit.” UNOCAL asserts
that the “effective” modification of the permit under
consideration would not violate the anti-backsliding provision
because the permit contained interim limits which would
remain in full effect until the final limits actually took effect.
Essentially, argues UNOCAL, the final limits have never
taken effect so they cannot be backslided on. This argument
seems to assume that effluent standards are not effectively
part of the NPDES permit until they take effect. It appears
to the Court, however, that a modified NPDES permit that
does not contain a strict effluent limitation that had been
about to come into effect is, indeed, “less stringent” than the
previous, unmodified NPDES permit—regardless of whether
the limitation had yet taken effect.

Ill.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of
UNOCAL’s motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED.

* Appellant has asserted that two such exceptions are
applicable. Appellant asserts that “new information is available”
that “would have justified” a less stringent standard under
§ 1342(0)(2)(B)(i) and that there is no “reasonably available
remedy” under § 1342(0)(2)(C). Because it is not necessary so
to do, the Court does not comment on the applicability of these
exceptions.

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18a

APPENDIX B

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER
ENVIRONMENT-CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.
UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER
ENVIRONMENT-CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.
EXXON COMPANY USA, Defendant.
Nos. C 94-0712 TEH, C 94-0713 TEH.

United States District Court,
N.D. California.

July 8, 1994.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THELTON E. HENDERSON, Chief Judge.

The two above-captioned related cases are identical
citizen suits brought by non-governmental environmental
conservation organizations against defendant oil companies.
The suits challenge each defendant’s discharge into portions
of the San Francisco Bay of waste water containing the
chemical selenium from oil refineries owned by each
defendant located in the San Francisco Bay area. The first
suit is brought against defendant Union Oil Company of
California (“Unocal”) and concerns Unocal’s refinery at
Rodeo, California, which discharges waste water containing
selenium into the San Pablo Bay. The second is against the
Exxon Corporation (“Exxon”) and concerns Exxon’s refinery
at Benicia, California, which discharges selenium into Suisan
Bay. Plaintiffs allege that the selenium levels in the effluent

19a

discharged from Unocal and Exxon’s refineries violate the
federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act” or
“Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 ef Seq.

Defendants Unocal and Exxon have moved to dismiss the
suits on several grounds. In addition, Exxon has moved that
the suit against it be dismissed on the ground that venue over
that case properly lies in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California. Oral argument on these
motions was heard by the Court on June 6, 1994. After
consideration of the parties’ written and oral arguments, the
Court rules that venue in the suit against Exxon, Citizens for
a Better Environment-California v. Exxon, No. C 94-0713
TEH, indeed lies in the Eastern District and therefore
ORDERS that the case be TRANSFERRED from this Court
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California. As for the suit against Unocal, the Court
DENIES Unocal’s motion to dismiss. The reasons for these
rulings are set forth in the memorandum opinion and order
that follows.

I. BACKGROUND

In these two actions brought pursuant to the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, the
plaintiff environmental groups seek to enforce effluent
discharge standards and deadlines contained in certain
pollution permits issued to defendants Unocal and Exxon
pursuant to the Clean Water Act. These suits are undertaken
in the face of an administrative order, issued by a state
agency charged with enforcing the Clean Water Act, which
purports to grant defendants a five-year extension of the
deadline by which they must come into compliance with the
pollution discharge standards contained in their permits. The
issue central to these motions is what effect the state
administrative order has on the enforceability of the standards
contained in defendants’ pollution permits.

20a

A. THE REGULATORY FRAME-WORK

The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters. The statute is structured such that all
discharge of pollutants is prohibited except insofar as one of
several enumerated statutory exceptions applies. See 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). One such exception obtains where a
polluter has been issued a permit pursuant to the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES permit” or
“permit”), authorizing it to discharge designated pollutants at
certain levels subject to certain conditions. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342. The effluent discharge standards or limitations
specified in an NPDES permit define the scope of the
authorized exception to the 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) prohibition,
such that violation of a permit limit places a polluter in
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Private parties may bring
citizen suits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 to enforce effluent
standards or limitations, which are defined as including
violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1).

The Act provides that, in any given state or region,
authority to administer the NPDES permitting system can be
delegated by the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) to a state or regional regulatory agency, provided
that the applicable state or regional regulatory scheme under
which the local agency operates satisfies certain criteria. See
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). In California, EPA has granted
authorization to a state regulatory apparatus, comprised of the
State Water Resources Control Board (“State Board”) and
several subsidiary Regional Water Quality Control Boards, to
issue NPDES permits. The entity responsible for issuing
NPDES permits and otherwise regulating discharges in the
region at issue in these cases is the California Regional Water
Quality Control Board, San Francisco Region (“Regional
Board” or “Board”).

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B. HISTORY OF UNOCAL AND EXXON’S NPDES
PERMITS

Exercising its delegated authority under the Clean Water
Act, the Regional Board in 1989 and 1990 issued NPDES
permits for Unocal, Exxon, and four other Bay Area oil
refineries, specifying certain limits on the amount of
pollutants that the refineries could discharge into the San
Francisco Bay and its estuary (“Bay”). Selenium, a toxic
element, occurs in high concentrations in the relatively low
grade crude oil from the San Joaquin Valley that is refined at
the six Bay Area refineries. Selenium passes through the
refineries and is present in the wastes that they discharge into
the Bay.

The 1987 Amendments to the Clean Water Act required
states to identify a list of navigable waters for which water
quality standards established under the Act were unlikely to
be achieved “due entirely or substantially to discharges from
point sources of any toxic pollutants listed pursuant to [33
U.S.C. § 1317(a)].”_ 33 U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(B). Selenium
has been listed by EPA as a toxic pollutant pursuant to this
code section. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.15. As part of such
listing, the state must identify the point sources causing
selenium pollution in the listed waters and develop an
“individual control strategy” (“ICS”) to control each point
source so as to achieve the water quality objectives for such
waters “as soon as possible, but not later than 3 years after
the date of the establishment of such Strategy.” 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1314()(1)(C), (D).

On February 3, 1989, when the California Water
Resources Controi Board published its list required pursuant
to the 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments, the State Board
did not identify several portions of the upper San Francisco
Bay Estuary—San Pablo Bay, Carquinez Strait, and Suisan
Bay—as “toxic hot spots” for selenium, nor did it specify oil
refinery selenium discharges as a substantial cause of
selenium pollution in the Bay. EPA took issue with these

22a

omissions, among other things. Exercising its regulatory
authority under the Clean Water Act, EPA issued a final
listing on September 28, 1990, designating these portions of
the Bay as “impaired waters” due to selenium pollution, and
attributing that selenium substantially to the discharges from
the six Bay Area refineries: Unocal’s refinery in Rodeo,
Exxon’s refinery in Benicia, Shell Oil Company’s
manufacturing complex in Martinez, Tosco Corporation’s
refinery in Avon, Chevron U.S.A.’s refinery in Richmond,
and Pacific Refining Company’s facility in Hercules. EPA
stated that it disapproved of the ICS’s then in effect for
Unocal, Exxon, and the other dischargers, and made known
its intention to issue its own ICS’s not later than December
31, 1990, which would require compliance with specified
effluent limits, calculated based on state water quality
standards, within three years of the date of issuance.

Responding to EPA’s rebuke, on February 20, 1991, the
Board issued an order listing San Pablo Bay, Carquinez
Strait, and Suisan Bay as “hot spots” under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(), and amending Unocal, Exxon, and the other
refineries’ NPDES permits to specify certain concentration-
and mass-based limits on the amount of selenium that each
refinery could discharge. By the terms of the amended
permits, these new limits (“final limits”) would become
effective on December 12, 1993. On June 16, 1991, the
Board issued an additional order, amending the permits of
Unocal, Exxon, and the other refineries to include interim
selenium discharge limits (“interim limits”), significantly less
stringent than the final limits. The interim limits went into
effect immediately on that date and were to remain in force
until the final limits took effect.

C. STATE COURT LAWSUIT BY REFINERIES

Unocal, Exxon, and the other Bay Area refineries sought
unsuccessfully to challenge the Regional Board’s listing of
San Pablo Bay, Carquinez Strait, and Suisan Bay as impaired
waters, each filing applications for review with the State

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Water Resources Control Board. On October 16, 1992,
shortly after those applications were dismissed by the State
Board, the Bay Area refineries and their trade association, the
Western States Petroleum Association (“WSPA”), filed a
petition for writ of mandate in Solano County Superior Court
seeking to set aside the Regional Board’s orders imposing the
final limits and the interim limits on the ground that the
listing of the above-noted regions of the Bay as impaired
bodies of water was in violation of various provisions of the
Clean Water Act and of EPA administrative regulations
promulgated under the Act.

D. SETTLEMENT OF LAWSUIT AND REGIONAL
BOARD ENFORCEMENT ACTION

The refineries and WSPA did not press for a hearing on
the merits of their state court suit but instead initiated
settlement negotiations with the Regional Board and the
California Attorney General’s Office, which proceeded over
the course of 1993. Three of the Bay Area refineries,
Chevron, Tosco, and Pacific Refining, reduced their
discharge levels, such that they would be in compliance with
the final limits when they took effect. Unocal, Exxon, and
Shell, however, contended that they could not comply with
the final limits. Although the other three refineries had
succeeded in reducing their effluent levels to meet the final
limits, Unocal, Exxon, and Shell maintained that, due to
technological constraints, they could not reduce their selenium
discharge levels sufficiently to comply with the final limits
scheduled to take effect on December 12, 1993.

On November 8, 1993, the six refineries, the state, and
the Regional Board agreed on a settlement pursuant to which
the refineries and WSPA would consent to dismissal of their
State court action, and the Board would issue a Cease and
Desist Order (“CDO”). The Board published the proposed
settlement and CDO in the days that followed, and noticed
public hearings on them.

24a

The principal terms of the settlement were that the three
refineries that had not complied with their final selenium
limits—Unocal, Exxon, and Shell—would receive a nearly
five year extension until July 31, 1998 of their deadline for
complying with their final limits, and in exchange would pay
the state $2 million and, along with the other refineries,
would drop their state court action. Oddly, however, neither
the settlement agreement nor the CDO expressly state that
Unocal, Exxon, and Shell are relieved from having to comply
with the final limits contained in their NPDES permits until
July 31, 1998. Rather, the CDO effects this purported
extension by providing that Unocal, Exxon, and Shell

shall cease and desist from discharging waste in violation
of [their NPDES permits] by complying with the
following:

* K * * bad Sd

3. Compliance with this Order shall be in accordance
with the following tasks and time schedules:

* * * * * *

c. The dischargers shall implement a removal
technology or technologies, or an alternate control
Strategy, which has been determined by the
dischargers to be capable of achieving compliance
with the discharge limitations as specified in [the
NPDES permits] and shall comply with these limits,
no later than July 31, 1998.

CDO at 7. The settlement agreement stated that the
above-quoted provision of the CDO “effectively modified”
the deadlines specified in defendants’ NPDES permits for
complying with the final selenium limits. The CDO also
provided that Unocal, Exxon, and Shell would implement a
study to identify technologies for reducing selenium discharge
levels, and would carry out pilot tests and source reduction
studies.

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25a

The terms of the settlement agreement dismissing the
refineries’ state court suit specified that the dismissal was to
be “without prejudice” and expressly provided that nothing in
the agreement waived the refineries’ right to challenge the
validity of the final limits contained in their NPDES permits.
The refineries agreed only to refrain from challenging the
final limits unless and until the refineries should find in 1998
that they are unable to identify or implement a workable
removal technology or other control strategy that would
enable them to meet the limits, and the Board declines to
extend the July 31, 1998 deadline further. Thus, in effect,
the refineries merely agreed to drop their challenge to the
final limits so long as the limits are not being enforced, but
retained the right to challenge them once they are.

On November 19, 1993, and December 15, 1993, public
hearings on the CDO were held at which the instant plaintiffs
and other members of the public testified. The Board made
some minor modifications to the CDO in response to
comments received from the public and from EPA, and issued
a final CDO on January 19, 1994. Plaintiffs filed these
lawsuits on March 2, 1994.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”)
12(b)(6) when a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The Court must accept as
true the factual allegations of the complaint and indulge all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, construing the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dodd
v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1968); NL
Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.
1986). Unless the Court converts the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
into a motion for summary judgment, the court may not
consider material outside of the complaint. Powe v. City of
Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1981). However, “on
a motion to dismiss a court may properly look beyond the
complaint to matters of public record and doing so does not

26a

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary
judgment.” Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc. , 798
F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Matters of public record
include court and agency orders and agency regulations. Id.
Thus, this Court may take judicial notice on this motion of
rulings and regulations issued or published by the Regional
Board or by EPA, regardless whether such documents were
filed as attachments to the complaint.

The Court must construe the complaint liberally, and
dismissal should not be granted unless “it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Intake Water
Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568,
569 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163, 106 S. Ct.
2288, 90 L.Ed.2d 729 (1986). However, legal issues on
which the actionability of the claim depends can and should
be resolved at this stage. Dismissal is appropriate if, as a
consequence of such resolution, the court determines that, as
a matter of law, the complaint’s allegations fail to state a
claim.

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(3) where venue
in a case does not properly lie in the court in which it is
filed. However, where the court deems it to be “in the
interest of justice,” the court may instead transfer an
improperly venued case to a court in which it could have been
brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

WI. DISCUSSION

In their complaints in each of these two related cases,
plaintiffs allege three causes of action: that defendant has not
complied with an applicable effluent standard or limitation—to
wit, the final selenium limits and accompanying compliance
deadline contained in their NPDES permits—in violation of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); that defendant has
not complied with an applicable water quality standard, also
in violation of the Clean Water Act; and that defendant has

27a

engaged in an unfair business practice in violation of
California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

As to the first cause of action, defendants contend that
the CDO issued by the Regional Board properly extended the
deadline by which defendants are required to comply with the
selenium discharge limits specified in their NPDES permits,
such that their present failure to meet that limit does not
violate the federal Clean Water Act. Alternatively,
defendants argue that, in any event, plaintiffs may not bring
a citizen suit to enforce the effluent standards specified in
defendants’ NPDES permits because the Regional Board has
already taken enforcement action as to that violation and
defendants have paid a penalty, thereby precluding a parallel
citizen enforcement suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).
Finally, defendants charge that plaintiffs’ suits are barred for
failure to satisfy the notice requirements imposed under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) for citizen suits.

As to the second cause of action, defendants urge that
water quality standards—as distinct from _ effluent
standards—are not enforceable in citizen suits under the Clean
Water Act and that the count must consequently be dismissed.
As for the third cause of action, defendants contend that
dismissal of the first two claims necessitates dismissal of the
third state law claim as well. Finally, defendant Exxon
charges that the suit against it must be dismissed for improper
venue since its refinery is not located within the geographic
area for which venue properly lies in this Court.

A. VENUE IN CITIZENS FOR A_ BETTER
ENVIRONMENT V. EXXON

The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365, under which plaintiffs have brought these
suits, contains a special venue provision stating that

Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source
of an effluent standard or limitation or an order
respecting such standard or limitation may be brought

"

28a

under this section only in the judicial district in which

such source is located.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1) (emphasis added). As is clear on the
face of the complaint, Exxon’s refinery is located in the City
of Benicia, see Complaint ¢ 9, which is within the County of
Solano. Solano County is in the geographic region covered
by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California, not this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 84(b). The Eastern
District is therefore the only district in which venue is proper
under the Act. On this basis, Exxon urges that the Court
dismiss the suit for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
Conceding this venue error in their opposition papers,
plaintiffs urge that the Court transfer the case to the Eastern
District rather than dismiss it.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) instructs that:

The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong ... district shall dismiss, or if
it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district ... in which it could have been brought.

Whether the interest of justice militates in favor of transfer
rather than dismissal is a judgment committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. “[T]ransfer is generally ...
consistent with the ‘interest of justice’ ... because it
eliminates the delay and additional expense associated with
reinstituting suit in another forum.” Banque de la
Mediterranee-France, S.A. v. Thergen, Inc. , 780 F.Supp. 92,
95 (D.R.I. 1992). On the facts of this case, the Court holds
that transfer rather than dismissal is appropriate.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Citizens for a Better
Environment-California v. Exxon, No. C 94-0713 TEH, shall
be TRANSFERRED FORTHWITH from this Court to the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. In
view of this ruling, the remainder of this opinion and order
shall address only the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant
in the Unocal case.

29a

B. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF
EFFLUENT STANDARD OR LIMITATION

Under the Clean Water Act, dischargers are strictly liable
for any violation of the terms of an NPDES permit.
California Public Interest Research Group v. Shell, 840 F.
Supp. 712, 714 (N.D. Cal. 1993). As explained above, the
Act authorizes private parties to bring citizen suit enforcement
actions, and provides, in pertinent part, that such actions may
be brought against

any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of ... an
effluent standard or limitation under [the Act].

33 U.S.C. § 1365. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (defining
“effluent standard or limitation”). As noted above, the
definition of “effluent standard[s] or limitation[s]” for which
violations are actionable under this section includes effluent
standards or limits prescribed in NPDES permits, since
violation of such limits places a polluter in violation of 33
U.S.C. §1311(a). Additionally, violations of terms
contained in NPDES permits are generally enforceable of
their own accord in citizen suits. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(f)(6).

There is no dispute that on December 12, 1993—the date
the final selenium limits took effect under Unocal’s NPDES
permit—and every day since then, Unocal’s discharges of
selenium have exceeded the daily limits under its NPDES
permit. Rather, Unocal contends that plaintiffs’ citizen suit
should be dismissed on the grounds: (1) that the CDO issued
by the Regional Board properly extended the deadline hy
which defendant is required to comply with the final selenium
discharge limits specified in its NPDES permit, such that the
deadline specified in its permit is no longer in effect; (2) that,
in any event, the citizen suit is barred under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) because the state agency charged with
enforcing the Act, acting pursuant to a “comparable” state
law, has already issued a “final order” regarding the

30a

violation, assessing a “penalty” against Unocal which Unocal
has paid; and (3) that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the
notice requirements for a citizen suit. Each of these
objections, if correct, would provide an independently
adequate basis for dismissing plaintiffs’ suit. Thus, in order
to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must establish that none of these
objections is well-founded.

1. WHETHER, ON THE MERITS, THERE IS NO
VIOLATION OF UNOCAL’S NPDES PERMIT
BECAUSE THE REGIONAL BOARD’S CDO
VALIDLY EXTENDED THE COMPLIANCE
DEADLINE CONTAINED IN UNOCAL’S
PERMIT

Unocal’s first argument for dismissing plaintiffs’ claim
under the Clean Water Act seeking to enforce compliance
with an effluent standard or limitation—plaintiffs’ first cause
of action—is that, on the merits, Unocal has not violated its
NPDES permit because the CDO issued by the Regional
Board validly extended until 1998 the deadline for complying
with the final selenium limit specified in the NPDES permit.’

' Unocal labels this argument a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), reasoning that if
the NPDES limits are effectively suspended such that Unocal has
not violated an effluent limit, then this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, for 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) confers jurisdiction
over citizen suits against polluters only where violations of
effluent standards or other orders exist. However, the Supreme
Court has held that, generally, assertion of a claim under a
federal statute “alone is sufficient to empower the District Court
to assume jurisdiction over the case and determine whether, in
fact, the [statute] does provide the claimed rights.” Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359, 79
S.Ct. 468, 473, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). In such cases, a finding
of no statutory violation results in dismissal for failure to state

(continued...)

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As recounted above, pursuant to the settlement reached by the
Regional Board, the State Attorney General’s Office, and the
Bay Area oil refineries in late 1993, the Regional Board
issued a CDO containing several terms that had been agreed
to in the settlement. The CDO provided, in pertinent part:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Section 13301
of the California Water Code, that Shell Oil Company,
Union Oil Company of California, and Exxon Company,
U.S.A. shall cease and desist from discharging waste in
violation of Order No. 91-026 [—the order amending the
refineries’ NPDES permits to impose final selenium
discharge limits—] by complying with the following:

cad * * * * aK

3. Compliance with this Order shall be in accordance
with the following tasks and time schedules:

* * * * a cad

c. The dischargers shall implement a removal
technology or technologies, or an alternate control
Strategy, which has been determined by the
dischargers to be capable of achieving compliance
with the discharge limits specified in Order No.
91-026 and shall comply with these limits, no later
than July 31, 1998.

' (...continued)

a claim rather than for lack of jurisdiction. The Court will
therefore treat Unocal’s argument here as a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Ultimately, however, the label
affixed to the motion is unimportant. Regardless whether
dismissal on such grounds is correctly characterized as based on
absence of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, in both cases
it hinges on the same legal question: whethe

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_1771%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
