# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Spellacy v. Air Line Pilots Association-International > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_1126%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1999 - **Citation:** 526 U.S. 1017 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S FILED 981113 janii OFFICE OF THE CLERK In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1998 . — EDWARD J. SPELLACY, JR., et a!., Tanke (WO Petitioners AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION-INTERNATIONAL, et al., Do» " , Respondents SI On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit € = PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 2 _ Mark R. Kravitz Counsel of Record DANIEL J. KLat WicciIn & DANA One Century Tower Post Office Box 1832 New Haven, CT 06508 (203) 498-4400 Counsel for Petitioners COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Do the Seventh Amendment and Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court, when ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, to weigh the evidence of the parties or do they instead restrict the court to considering only the evidence that is favorable to the nonmovant and any unfavorable evi- dence that the jury was required to believe? 2. Did both the district court and the court of appeals violate Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by treating each of the 82 petitioners as a single group, rather than as distinct individuals whose claims each had to be evaluated on their own particular merits? LIST OF PARTIES AND AFFILIATES Edward J. Spellacy, Jr.; Stewart W. Beckett, Jr.; Ray- mond H. Albers, Il; Gordon N. Almquist; Gary K. Arm- strong; Donald G. Arneson; James Bailey; W. Schafer Bean; William Harvey Benefield; Tad H. Bingham; Vid- mantas K. Bliumfeldas; Rudolph Brabenec; Robert E. Brickey; Michael D. Burke; Dallas E. Butler; James R. Byrne; James Canitz; Gerald W. Cassidy; Robert C. Cas- sube; Thomas Ceranic; David M. Criley; John W. Cun- ningham; Donald E. Dale, Jr.; Michael J. Dunn; Thomas G. Ebbert; Gerald L. Ellison; Jerome P. Fox; Robert K. Frank; Howell J. Gannon; Benjamin F. Greer; Robert L. Harrell; Albert G. Harrison; William H. Hart; Reginald W. Havill; Robert H. Hays; David K. Holland; Thomas L. Hurd; David E. Jones; Austin L. Joyner; Terrence J. Kane; David A. Klau; Donald K. Law; Byron C. Lewin; Manuel J. Lewis; Keith J. Mackey; John A. Marshall; Kenneth G. McAdams; Robert C. McGrory; Jan A. Menke; James W. Miller; John R. Neff; Ernest J. Neuwald; Thomas M. O’Dell; Terry W. Pope; Michael E. Ranslam; Frank C. Rice, Richard D. Robbins; Jack J. Rogers; Stanley A. Roitz; K. David Savage; Carl E. Schmeusser; George H. Schum acher; Conrad E. Smith; Dorsey L. Spaulding; Michael N. Stafford; William A. Stevens; Timothy G. Sullivan; M. Joel Thompson; John W. Tiger; Constantine G.Vlahakis; J. Robert Wardin; John S. Wentworth; John L. White; John N. Zoller; Donato D’Angelico; Keith Erlewine; Alto J. Furlong, Jr.; Kenneth Lemming; William A. Pitsker; Harry Shepard; Bill M. Shuster and Frank Z. White. There are no corporate petitioners. 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................ ‘ ; LIST OF PARTIES AND AFFILIATES......... na i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................... . iv OPINIONS BELOW...... ee er JURISDICTION ...... eR W NSO eho 68 60-¥.05 6000 0:2 | l STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED............ el wevusecas ON REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ....... i or I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEWING A DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW VIOLATES RULE 50 AND THE SEVENTH eho bx kau ‘ > | rocttiill yy IX€ pectrully uDnN ¢ Mark R. Ky LD | K Wick Ww [) (one Century lowe! ?.( Box 1832 Haven. CT 06508 Q 140 4 19S Al Edward J. SPELLACY, Jr.; Stewart W. Beckett, Jr.; Raymond H. Albers, Il; Gordon N. Almquist; Gary K. Armstrong; Donald C. Arneson; James Bailey; W. Schafer Bean; William Harvey Benefield; Tad H. Bingham; Vidmantas K. Bliumfeldas; Rudolph Brabenec; Robert E. Brickey; Michael D. Burke; Dallas E. Butler; James R. Byrne; James Canitz; Gerald W. Cassidy; Robert C. Cassube; Thomas Ceranic; David M. Criley; John W. Cunningham; Donald E. Dale, Jr.; Michael J. Dunn; Thomas G. Ebbert; Gerald L. Ellison; Jerome P. Fox; Robert K. Frank; Howell J. Gannon; Benjamin F. Greer; Robert , L. Harrell; Albert G. Harrison; William H. Hart; « Reginald W. Havill; Robert H. Hays; David K. Holland; Thomas L. Hurd; David E. Jones; Austin L. Joyner; Terrence J. Kane; David A. Klau; Donald K. Law; Byron C. Lewin; Manuel J. Lewis; Keith J. Mackey; John A. Marshall; Kenneth G. McAdams; Robert C. McGrory; Jan A. Menke; James W. Miller; John R. Neff; Ernest J. Neuwald; Thomas M. O’Dell; Terry W. Pope; Michael E. Ranslam; Frank C. Rice; Richard D. Robbins; Jack J. Rogers; Stanley A. Roitz; K. David Savage; Carl E. Schmeusser; George H. Schumacher; Conrad E. Smith; Dorsey L. Spaulding; Michael N. Stafford; William A. Stevens; Timothy G. Sullivan; M. Joel Thompson; John W. Tiger; Constantine G. Vlahakis; J. Robert Wardin; John S. Wentworth; John L. White; John N. Zoiler; Donato D’Angelico; Keith Erlewine; Alto J. Furlong, Jr.; Kenneth Lemming; William A. Pitsker; Harry Shepard; Bill M. Shuster; and Frank Z. White, Plaintiffs-Appellants, V. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION-INTERNATIONAL; J. Randolph Babbitt, III; Richard L. Burke; Sigfrid W. Hauck; Kenneth C. Lankford; John Mitvalsky; Robert E. Anderson; Robert F. Bible; G. Hart Kelley; and Gustave M. Littlefield, Defendants-Appellees. A2 No. 97-7666. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued April 3, 1998. Decided Aug. 12, 1998. Mark R. Kravitz, Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, Con- necticut (Daniel J. Klau, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appel- lants. Michael E. Abram, Cohen, Weiss and Simon, New York City (Peter Herman, Thomas N. Ciantra, Tamir W. Rosenblum, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees. Before: MCLAUGHLIN, PARKER, Circuit Judges, and HURLEY, District Judge.* BACKGROUND McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge. Pan American Airlines (“Pan Am”) went bankrupt. Plaintiffs-Appellants are 88 of the approximately 1600 pilots who used to fly for Pan Am. These pilots were represented by the Airline Pilots Association-Interna- tional (“ALPA”), the certified collective bargaining repre- sentative for pilots employed by all the major airlines operating in the United States. Under ALPA’s union structure, the pilots for each airline elect a Master Execu- tive Committee (“MEC”), of pilots. Subject to ALPA’s * The Honorable Denis R. Hurley of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. A3 oversight, the MEC makes the collective bargaining de sions for the union in negotiations between the airline and its pilots. The MEC for Pan Am pilots had three officers ana four elected representatives. At all times relevant to this appeal, Richard Burke, Robert Anderson, and Gordo: Littlefield were, respectively, the Chairman, Vice-Chair man and Secretary-Treasurer of the MEC. The four elected representatives were Sigfried Hauck, Kennet! Lankford, Robert Bible, and G. Hart Kelley. Pan Am occupies a venerable position in the history of American aviation. In the late 1960’s, however, Pan An ran into financial turbulence. After struggling to survive for two decades, Pan Am began to sell assets. In 1985 sold its Pacific routes to United Airlines (“United”). [1 late 1990, Pan Am sold additional aircraft and routes t United. However, these asset sales merely delayed thi inevitable. In January 1991, Pan Am filed for reorganiza tion under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws. While in reorganization, Pan Am continued to searc! for potential buyers of its remaining assets. In early July 1991, the MEC informed Pan Am pilots that Delta Air lines (“Delta”) had agreed to buy Pan Am’s North Atlar tic routes and “shuttle” operation. Under the proposec Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”), Pan Am would sel! its entire fleet of Airbus 310 (“A-310”) aircraft and up t 19 of its Boeing 727 (“B-727”) aircraft to Delta. In return Delta would sponsor and fund Pan Ams reorganizatiol as a going airline, purchase a 45% equity stake in Par Am, and establish a marketing alliance with Pan An A4 Pan Am also agreed to supply Delta with nearly 800 pilots who were “current and qualified” on those two planes. A “current and qualified” pilot is one who is trained to fly a particular airplane and has made three takeoffs and landings on that plane within the last ninety days. Delta needed approximately 494 qualified pilots for the A-310 aircraft and 280 for the B-727. Since Pan Am did not have enough “current and qualified” pilots to satisfy Delta’s needs, it needed to train some of its pilots for transfer to Delta. Pan Am and Delta agreed that the transfer of pilots and assets would occur no later than November 1, 1991. On July 20, 1991, Pan Am’s crew chief, Vito Cutrune, presented a proposal to Pan Am, Delta, and the MEC that would allow Pan Am to offer pilot training on a strict seniority basis. He concluded that Pan Am had enough money and flight simulator capacity to complete 120 “long course” training programs for the A-310 and 22 long course programs for the B-727. Long course pro- grams were designed for pilots who had never before flown the A-310 or B-727. Accordingly, since every Pan Am pilot would be eligible for training under Cutrune’s proposal, the training would be offered on a strict seniority basis. The long course training proposal was consistent with the seniority-based methodology by which most Pan Am pilot assignments were determined. The Pilot Work- ing Agreement (“PWA”), the collective bargaining agree- ment between Pan Am and its pilots, provided that whenever Pan Am projected a major change or “shift” in its flight operations, it announced the change to the pilots - and issued a “proffer.” See PWA §§ 3, 5. The new flight A6 Short course training is a refresher course for pilots who had once flown, but are no longer qualified to fly, a particular airplane. Under the short course plan, only pilots who had previously flown the A-310 were eligible for training. While few Pan Am pilots had experience flying the A-310, four members of the MEC had flown this plane. The short course plan was supported by Cutrune, Pan Am’s crew chief, who told Pan Am executives that his original training proposal, long course training, was simply not feasible. He said that under his “revised anal- ysis,” the necessary simulator time for long course train- ing on the A-310 could not be arranged before the date of sale. Cutrune explained, however, that the short course plan could be accomplished. On August 8, 1991, Pan Am and Delta decided to adopt the short course plan for the A-310. Rather than informing the pilots that a training plan had now been adopted, the MEC told the pilots that Delta was still open to alternative plans. They assured the pilots that Delta would listen to any plan designed to preserve the integrity of the seniority system. The MEC also told the pilots that, rather than deciding which of the competing plans it would endorse, ALPA and the MEC would let an arbitrator decide which plan best served the union’s interests. However, since Pan Am and ALPA had agreed in principle on a plan governing retraining on the A-310, the only issue presented to the arbitrator was the B-727 training. The arbitrator recommended a training plan for the B-727 based on strict seniority. A7 Following the arbitrator’s decision, ALPA, Pan Am, and Delta entered into a formal agreement defining the training for Pan Am pilots. ALPA agreed that the short course training would be used for the A-310, but a strict seniority system would be used to select pilots for B-727 training. The Bankruptcy Court approved this agreement. When Pan Am sold the planes and routes in November 1991, six of the seven MEC members were on the list of pilots to be transferred to Delta. Shortly thereafter, Pan Am went out of business. Accusing the MEC pilot members of feathering their own nests, two groups of pilots sued ALPA and the individual members of the MEC. The first group, the “Spellacy” pilots, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dor- sey, J.), alleging that ALPA and the MEC breached their duties of fair representation by adopting the short course training plan. The Spellacy pilots asserted that ALPA and the MEC violated their duties because: (1) the PWA required that training opportunities be awarded on a strict seniority basis and ALPA failed to protect the pilots’ contractual rights; and (2) ALPA and the MEC advocated the short course plan so that they could secure pilot positions for themselves. The second group, the “Duke” pilots, filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J.). These pilots each held a “proffer,” — i.e., an offer from Pan Am to be transferred to Delta. These proffers had been given before Pan Am realized that it lacked a sufficient number of qualified pilots to send to Delta. The Duke pilots alleged that A8 ALPA should first have ensured that Pan Am honored the existing proffers before implementing a training program. The actions were consolidated for trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Judge Weinstein bifurcated the trial, directing that the issue of liability be tried first. In June 1996, following a three-week trial and three days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for both sets of plaintiffs. The jury found that ALPA had breached its duty of fair representa- tion to both the Duke and Spellacy pilots by engaging in bad faith, arbitrary, and discriminatory conduct. The jury found that 82 Spellacy plaintiffs and 12 Duke plaintiffs had been injured by ALPA and MEC’s conduct. ALPA made a timely motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law. While this post-trial motion was pending, the Duke pilots settled with ALPA. Nearly one year after the jury verdict was rendered, Judge Weinstein set aside the ver- dict for the Spellacy pilots and granted ALPA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. By Memorandum Order and Judgment dated April 14, 1997, amended April 21, 1997, Judge Weinstein held that: (1) the PWA did not require Pan Am to train pilots on a strict seniority basis; (2) the A-310 short course training plan constituted a reasonable balancing between seniority and cost; and (3) there was insufficient proof that the MEC placed their interests above those of the pilots. Alternatively, Judge Weinstein held that a new trial on the issue of ALPA’s liability was warranted. If the grant of judgment as a matter of law was eventually : ; : AY reversed, Judge Weinstein believed that the liability phase should be retried because the evidence did not support a verdict for the Spellacy pilots and the jury “may have been swayed by prejudice against the [MEC].” The Spellacy pilots now appeal, challenging both prongs of Judge Weinstein’s decision. In response, ALPA argues that even if Judge Weinstein’s decision was improper, a new trial is required due to errors in Judge Weinstein’s jury instructions. DISCUSSION Judgment as a Matter of Law The pilots argue that Judge Weinstein erred when he granted ALPA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. They contend that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to their claims, either: (1) ALPA breached its duty of fair representation by failing to fight for the pilots’ rights under the PWA; or (2) ALPA and the MEC engaged in various additional acts that constituted arbi- trary, discriminatory, or bad faith conduct. A. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Andy Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.1997). “While it is hornbook law that we may not substitute our view of the evidence for the jury’s when that evidence allows multiple legitimate inferences,” Goldhirsh Group, Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1997) (citations om:ited), we will affirm a grant of judgment as a matter of law Al10 when “(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise or conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [jurors] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].” Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir.1994) (quotation omitted); see Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir.1995). B. Duty of Fair Representation A union, of course, has a duty to represent fairly all employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 74, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991). This duty extends to both the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, see Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953), and its enforcement and admin- istration. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions “can fairly be characterized as so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ . . . that [they are] wholly ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’ ” O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127 (quotation omitted). Judicial “ “must be highly defer- ential, recognizing the wide latitude that [unions] need for the effective performance of their bargaining respon- sibilities.’ ” Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1106 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127). review of union action, however, All A union acts in bad faith when it acts with an improper intent, purpose, or motive. See Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 531 (10th Cir.1992). Bad faith encompasses fraud, dishonesty, and other intentionally misleading conduct. See, e.g., Baxter v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 7370, 140 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir.1998); Mock, 971 F.2d at 531. Establishing that the union’s actions were sufficiently “arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith,” is only the first step toward proving a fair representation claim. Plaintiffs must then demonstrate a causal connection between the union’s wrongful conduct and their injuries. See, e.g., Ackley v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1472 (9th Cir.1992); Williams v. Romano Bros. Beverage Co., 939 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.1991). 1. Bad Faith Conduct The pilots adduce a welter of evidence presented during the three-week trial to support the jury’s finding that ALPA acted in bad faith. Essentially, they contend that the jury could have found that ALPA acted in bad faith when it: (1) abandoned the principle of seniority mandated by Section 3-A of the PWA; (2) failed to follow its own constitution and by-laws by adopting Pan Am’s training plan without a written decision; (3) entered into “secret” agreements designed to protect the interests of the MEC members at the expense of the Spellacy pilots; (4) made material misrepresentations designed to prevent the disclosure of the secret agreements; and (5) declined to represent or assist the pilots in filing and prosecuting their grievances. We are not persuaded. Al2 Section 3-A of the PWA provides that: Seniority shall govern all pilots in case of pro- motion or demotion, their retention in case of reduction of force, their assignments or reas- signments due to expansion or reduction in force, their choice of vacancies, placement or replacements, provided that the pilot is suffi- ciently qualified for the conduct of the operation to which he is assigned; and, in the event the pilot is considered by [Pan Am] not to be suffi- ciently qualified, [Pan Am] shall furnish the pilot written reasons therefor. Section 3-A shall apply except where specifically excepted in the [PWA]. The pilots construe this provision to apply because either: (1) Section 3-A is the “default” provision and nothing in the PWA preempts application of its strict seniority rule; or (2) the transfer of pilots and equipment to Delta constituted a “reduction in force” within the meaning of Section 3-A. Thus, their argument runs, because Pan Am was contractually obligated to offer pilot training on a strict seniority basis, ALPA breached its duty of fair representation by concluding that the PWA did not govern training for transfer to Delta. ALPA responds that Section 3-A refers only to Pan Am's opera- tions, and its interpretation that the PWA does not apply to training pilots for transfer to Delta as part of a paitial asset sale is, therefore, not unreasonable. Essentially ALPA’s argument is that its interpretation does not have to be right. It need only be plausible. “To uphold the union’s action in interpreting the contract as it did it is not necessary that we find on the merits that such an interpretation was correct.” Tedford v. Al3 Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir.1976) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967)). Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the union took a position on the basis of an informed, rea- soned judgment regarding the merits of the pilots’ claim in light of the language contained in the collective bar- gaining agreement. See id. (union’s contract interpretation must be reasonable and “(1) based upon relevant, permis- sible union factors which (exclude) the possibility of it being based upon motivations such as personal animosity or political favoritism; (2) a rational result of the consid- eration of those factors; and (3) inclusive of a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all employees”); see also, e.g., Bache v. American Tel. & Tel., 840 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir.1988). ALPA’s position that Section 3-A does not apply in the context of a partial asset sale, while arguably wrong, is not so unreasonable as to constitute a breach of the duty of tair representation. Section 3-A does not make any reference to employee rights in the event of an asset sale; it merely requires that rights provided in the PWA be allocated by seniority unless preempted by another provision of the PWA. Moreover, while the PWA contained a few provisions related to asset sales, none provided the rights claimed by the pilots. Section 35, entitled “Acquisitions and Sales,” guaranteed the union’s right to negotiate with Pan Am concerning the effects of an asset sale. Section 1.E pro- vided special protection to junior pilots who were fur- loughed because of a sale of routes. Section 1.D required any successor carrier that might take control of Pan Am to operate under the PWA, absent an agreement to the Al4 contrary among the union, Pan Am, and the successor Car©rrier., In light of the PWA provisions specifically defining the rights and responsibilities of Pan Am and ALPA during a partial asset sale, ALPA’s decision to accept Pan Ams view that Section 3-A’s generic seniority provision applied only to Pan Am’s operations — and not Delta’s - is not unreasonable. See Flanigan v. (International Bhd. of Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am.) Truck Drivers Local No. 671, 942 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.1991) (“[uJnion cannot be taulted for acceding to” employer’s logical interpretation of seniority provision). Pan Am’s conduct during earlier asset sales also sup- ports ALPA’s thesis. See Rupe v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 693-94 (7th Cir.1982) (union’s interpretation of seniority provision reasonable when consistent with employer's previous practices). In 1985, for example, when Pan Am sold routes to United, Pan Am trained only those pilots with experience on the planes transferred to United, not its most senior pilots. In addition, in its 1988 term sheet for the collective bargaining agreement, Pan Am refused to provide pilots any “assurances” regarding their treatment in an asset sale; and it refused to accept any contractual responsibilities that could jeopardize its ability to complete a transaction. Moreover, in late 1990, when Pan Am sold its London Heathrow routes to United, it did not transfer its pilots solely on the basis of seniority. United agreed to hire pilots in seniority by category (1.e., captains hired to fill captain positions; first officers for first officer positions). As a result, senior captains who sought employment at Al5 United, and who were qualified to fill first officer posi- tions, were passed over in favor of junior first officers for the first officer positions. When ALPA subsequently sought Pan Am’s agreement to protect senior pilots dur- ing asset sales, Pan Am again refused to limit its flex- ibility. [he pilots’ alternative contention that Pan Am was required to train pilots for transfer to Delta in order of seniority because the transfer of assets and pilots consti- tuted a “reduction in force” within the meaning of Sec- tion 3-A, is similarly unpersuasive. In the case of a reduction in force, Section 3-A entitled pilots to “reten- tion” by Pan Am, not relocation, or training to promote relocation, to another airline. [he pilots’ remaining bad faith arguments are with- out merit. They argue that ALPA and the MEC violated the union’s constitution and by-laws by allowing Pan Am to amend the PWA without a written agreement. How- ever, ALPA’s position that the PWA did not apply to the adoption of a training program was a reasonable con- struction. Therefore, ALPA believed that Pan Am could proceed without reaching a written agreement with ALPA. Since “ALPA’s interpretation of its governing doc- uments is not unreasonable[,] by following its own inter- pretation ALPA did not breach its [duty of fair representation] in bad faith.” O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., Int'l, 939 F.2d 1199, 1207 (5th Cir.1991); see Baker v Newspaper & Graphic Communications Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 166-67 (D.C.Cir.1980). Al6 ALPA’s decision not to file grievances on behalf of the effected pilots, or to assist pilots in prosecuting griev- ances, similarly does not rise to the level of bad faith. While “a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance Or process it in perfunctory fashion,” union members do not have an “absolute right to have [their] grievances taken to arbitration.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191, 87 S.Ct. 903; see Cruz, 34 F.3d at 1153-54; Pyzynski v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 421 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir.1970). In this case, ALPA decided that pursuing a grievance for the senior pilots would be fruitless. It reasoned that under the PWA, Pan Am was only required to consult with ALPA regarding the implementation of an appropri- ate training plan. Thus, prosecuting pilot grievances would not result in the adoption of a more favorable training program since the most senior pilots did not have a contractual right to receive training for transfer to Delta. This position is reasonable because: (1) ALPA had unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate contractual restric- tions on Pan Am’s freedom to arrange employment opportunities at other carriers; and (2) Pan Am, on two prior occasions, implemented asset sales involving employee transfers without permitting ALPA to do more than comment on the terms. Because ALPA’s decision not to prosecute pilot grievances was based on a reasonable interpretation of the PWA, ALPA did not breach its duty of fair representation. See Chaparro-Febus v. International Longshoremen Ass'n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325, 330 (lst Cir.1992). Finally, the pilots contend that ALPA and the MEC forged “secret” agreements with Pan Am and Delta that sacrificed the pilots’ rights under the PWA. They assert Al7 that the “secret” agreements and subsequent misrey sentations designed to cover their tracks constituted faith. The pilots rely on Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farm: 25 F.3d 1138 (2d Cir.1994), and Aguinaga v. United } Commercial Workers, 993 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir.1993 reliance is misplaced. In Lewis and Aguinaga, the unions entered into s: side-agreements with the employer that vitiated contractual rights of the employees. However, as cussed above, the Pan Am pilots had no such biguous contractual entitlement. Moreov: employees in Lewis and Aguinaga were trick: believing that their rights were preserved until it » late to protest the employer's action. See Lewis, 25 1143; Aguinaga, 993 F.2d at 1471. In contrast, w! MEC delayed confessing its agreement with Pan An period of time (or masked that agreement b' that the arbitrator decided the issue), the delay di prejudice the pilots. The pilots here knew ALPA’s tion in time to challenge its decision, were aware t! Am adopted a training policy contrary to the cated by senior pilots, and hired attorneys to ances and organize resistance to Pan Am’s propose Under these facts, we cannot say that ALPA or ths acted in bad faith by entering into a deal with | and Delta regarding the selection of pilots for train the A-310 and B-727 aircraft. See Ryan v. New York N paper Printing Pressmen’s Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451. 4 (2d Cir.1979). x: 7 - ~ ~ ; - ‘ 4 + n = - 3 ~ 4 — 2 * ~ 4 — — — - — t ~= ot 4 > ~ — —_ - . / a Pon = a ~ a > ad a ° — , : _ | a a a “+ - > ” "es pons 2 , ~ — ~ o— == = - x — é ~f = — © ps Pee —-~ — “- / a | " - ~~ + & — > - a = > ’ ~ a ae : = oO ~~ s n ~ = -. — =_ ™ “ - z= { ’ — -_ 2 - 2 is . = - —_ — - d a " - ™ c + ~ - 7 Y vee — r f > _ ~ ‘ i . ai did not obstruct the pla ntiffs’ ab Immediately after the Bankruptcy Court sale agreement between Pan Am sentatives explained the agreemer ings in New York and Miami. A] they “may file a grievance ip pro al lI} f You feel you | incorrect application of our Worl . > lenge it.” Plaintiffs Appellant: ope did indeed file yprievance [The pilots’ claims re riyv fail The evidence dot > Hot it, absent the illeged ‘ 1 ft pilots to meet Delt ‘ / ay | tO ept I ( ’ ry ’ , rit ( | } ’ | rr \ ? ’ i tll Fespe L¢ 1 Cutr 1¢ nit I hy 1 + il Talsead the er [ | I it OuUuTSE ( TT) NOW ¢ tT T 2) | Uuring tl t week > , It WOUILG t init i¢ ) i i { +. and | i iF ’ A22 guota, the lack of simulator time, and genuine doubts ibout whether the long course training could be accom- plished in time to meet Delta’s firm deadline. Pan Am ntormed the MEC that, even if the MEC opposed the hort course plan, Pan Am “would move| | ahead thout the union’s agreement. In light of Pan Ams nambiguous intention to proceed with or without the on’'s blessing, we cannot say that ALPA’s decision not IV O« ite a seniority-based training system was the , +}, — > , the pilots injuries use Wwe onclude that Judge Weinstein correct! L\LPA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law weed not address either ALPA’s contention that Judge , tein erred in instructing the jury or the pilots argu ff anew trial was imprope A23 In re PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC./DELTA AIR LINES, INC. PILOT EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION. Walter B. DUKE, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. Edward J. SPELLACY, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, V. AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. Nos. MDL 963, CV 92-1049, CV 93-0853. United States District ¢ ourt E.D. New York \pril 14, 1997 tt M. Karsten, Sack opector & Barrett, West Hartford Ce lL, Sigismund Sapinski, Jr Updike, Kelly & Spel x Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff Spellacy M it I | LITi¢ Ste Dou las I tt i iumMme Ne York Cj tor P tiff, Duke O } A ty | . H etz ma & H f \ M el E. Abrams. Peter Herman, T} ( VeIss & m< Ni « k ( if By. ‘ WEINSTEIN, Senior District ludge < | ent 7: tot d. + \4 ] Sues A24 FACTS During the terminal days of the then-bankrupt Pan American Airlines, it sold, under bankruptcy court aegis, the last of its major air routes and hundreds of its remain- ing planes, agreeing to furnish enough qualified Pan Am pilots to fly those planes as Delta employees. Since too few pilots were qualified, Pan Am agreed to train a sufficient number to meet Delta’s requirements. rhe local Airline Pilots Association Negotiating Com- mittee had to make a series of decisions in cooperation with Pan Am on who would be trained. As a result of their determinations, those on the committee, together with hundreds of other pilots, were able to obtain employment with Delta as qualified pilots. Scores of other Pan Am pilots were denied that opportunity because they were not given the necessary training. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Pilots who were unable to obtain employment by Delta brought a number of suits. They were concentrated in the Eastern District of New York by the Multidistrict Panel. Some pilots sued Delta Airlines. Their complaints were dismissed because Delta did not decide which Pan Am pilots were to be trained. [hree groups of pilots sued the Air Line Pilots Asso- ciation (“ALPA”) on the ground that they had been dis- criminated against by ALPA and that, under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq., 181 et. seq., they had A25 a right to damages. The groups were denominated at the trial as Duke 1, Duke 2 and Spellacy plaintiffs. The case was bifurcated. Tried at one time were al] three groups’ claims on the issue of liability. The jury found for almost all plaintiffs. Following motions to set aside the \ erdicts, the court suggested that a mediator attempt to resolve differences among the parties. With the assistance of the mediator the Honorable Milton Mollen, the Duke 1 and Duke 2 plaintiffs settled with ALPA. Their claims have been dis- missed as moot. DISMISSAL [he issue now is whether defendants’ motion to dis- miss or, in the alternative to provide a new trial, should be granted. It is with great renitence that a trial judge approaches a motion to ignore the decision of a well- instructed, well-advised, capable jury. The Spellacy plain- tiffs’ case should, however, be dismissed for at least three reasons: First, insofar as the Spellacy plaintiffs are concerned, the pilots’ collective bargaining agreement with Pan Am which called for training on a seniority basis for opera- tions of Pan Am - was not applicable to the subsequent Delta-Pan Am agreement entered into with the approval of the bankruptcy court to sell aircraft to Delta and to furnish trained pilots. The Delta-Pan Am agreement did not call for the kind of Pan Am operational decisions covered by the ALPA-Pan Am agreement. As a matter of law, the straight seniority system did not apply to the A26 Spellacy plaintiffs. Bankrupt, Pan Am was permitted to minimize training costs to itself by departing from strict seniority in a reasonable way in training pilots for trans- fer to Delta. Second, the training program as devised and exe- cuted constituted a reasonable balancing of seniority and cost factors by those in charge of the process during a stressful period for everyone: the pilots, Pan Am, the bankruptcy authorities and creditors. A large number of pilots had to be retrained or requalified during a short period while Pan Am continued to operate. Third, the jury’s failure to draw a line somewhere reasonable in the Spellacy seniority list indicated that, despite its high quality, it was swayed by prejudice against the ALPA representatives because they ended up, as a result of their decisions, as Delta employees. EQUITY There is no basis in equity for an order either requir- ing some form of reinstatement of the Spellacy plaintiffs to positions held before the sale of Pan Am’s aircraft to Delta or to those which they might obtain at Delta now. It would be impossible to restore the status quo ante. Any equitable causes, implied or explicit, in the complaint and at trial are decided against the Spellacy plaintiffs for the same reasons that the jury verdict cannot stand. See Fed- eral Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a). A27 CONCLUSION This decision covers all remaining aspects of the MDL case. Final judgment for defendant is now entered in these, the remaining open cases. No costs or disburse- ments. SO ORDERED. A28 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE 40 FOLEY SQUARE NEW YORK 10007 CAROLYN CLARK CAMPBELL CLERK (Filed Oct. 13, 1998) At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the ninth day of October one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight. Edward J. Spellacy, Jr., and Stewart W. Beckett, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, V. Dkt No: 97-7666 Airline Pilots Association-International and J. Randolph Babbitt, III, Defendants-Appellees. A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by the appellants Edward J. Spellacy, Jr., and Stewart W. Beckett, ae. Upon consideration by the panel that decided the appeal, it is Ordered that said petition for rehearing is DENIED. A229 lt is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in banc has been transmitted to the jr idges for the court in regular active service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that no such judge has requested that vOte be taken thereon FOR THE COURT By S/ Beth ] Meador Beth J. Meader Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 20. Permissive Joinder of Parties plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly r in the alternative in respect Of or arising ot rine i tio! rccurrence rr series of trans ri 1 if any question of law or fact { i the persons will r1iSé NM tne action 1 na eSSé rgo or other property subject ty proce in rem) may be joined in one actior ni r tnere serted against them joint I tne ternative iny right to relief I ut f the same t1 il iction, ¢ ] r se f tral tio! r occurrence ind if ar r fact common to all defendants \ plaintiff or defendant need not be I { ; I defer ling ivdall { | the ré Tt : ent 7 y He eT tryy ' rT ré A3] Rule 50. Judgment as a Matter of Law in Actions Tried by Jury; Alternative Motion for New Tria! Conditional Rulings (a) Judgment as a matter of law. (1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue a) there is no legally sufficient evidentiary bas for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court ma\ grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim, counterclain cross-claim, or third party claim that canr under the controlling law be maintained wit! out a favorable finding on that issue. (2) Motions for judgment as a matter law may be made at any time before submissi of the case to the jury. Such a motion sha specify the judgment sought and the law ar the facts on which the moving party is entitle to the judgment. (b) Renewal of Motion for Judgment After Tria Alternative Motion for New Trial. Whenever a rr for a judgment as a matter of law made at the clos: the evidence is denied or for any reason is not grant the court is deemed to have submitted the action t. jury subject to a later determination of the legal questi raised by the motion. Such a motion may be renewed | service and filing not later than 10 days after entr\ judgment. A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 ma, joined with a renewal of the motion for judgment as matter of law, or a new trial may be requested in alternative. If a verdict was returned, the court ma\ disposing of the renewed motion, allow the judgms A32 stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. If no verdict was returned, the court may, in disposing of the renewed motion, direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law or may order a new trial. (c) Same: Conditional Rulings on Grant of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. (1) If the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or deny- ing the motion for the new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the appellee on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court. (2) The party against whom judgment as a matter of law has been rendered may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. (d) Same: Denial of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. If the motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling the party to a nts NN tN Bruce P. Murphy v , David L. Nelsor / Dnt 14 ¢ Ci , ii Li) ¥ i ] r vy S1Si1k . 1Ty \ Ty rT : a v r | | i ’ ‘ ) | ty +} i 4 I Litil , J » ] | i ld M. G re | H Peter A | il , i { | | I K i f 4 ; pert } P . ’ } i i t i . | } m1 ~ } ‘ _rirtfs< pellacy Plaintiffs Raymond Albers y Cordon Almquist . \salry Armstrong . 7 : A . Malad Arnesol . .VIN baer v ‘ - ¥ v e ee ¥ ’ ¥ . 7 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_1126%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.