# Amicus Curiae Brief — Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_0993%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1999
- **Citation:** 525 U.S. 1143

## Text

\ »

No. 98-964

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1998

a
DILAWAR M. EDWARDS, Ph.D.,
Petitioner,
V.

CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA;
JOHN PIERCE WATKINS, Ph.D., President;
NANCY Z. NELSON, Ed.D., Vice President for Academic
Affairs; WILLIAM BENEDETTI, Ed.D., Dean in their
official capacities; DAVID CAMPBELL, Chairperson,
Educational Studies Dept.,

Respondents.
+

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Third Circuit
*

BRIEF OF AMICI

The Association of American Educators
The Association For Supervision
And Curriculum Development
The Association For Educational
Communications and Technology

In Support of Petitioner
*

Rosert R. MELNICK

Counsel of Record
Mewnick & MELNICK
Federal Building, Suite 300
18 North Phelps Street
Youngstown, OH 44503
(330) 744-8973

Counsel for Amici

QUESTION PRESENTED

1. Whether the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was
correct in applying the standard of public secondary
school cases to that of a university professor and conclud-
ing that a professor does not have a First Amendment
academic freedom right to choose classroom materials
and subjects in contravention of the University dictates?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

California University of Pennsylvania was a party at
the U.S. District Court level, and was dismissed at sum-
mary judgment on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The
remaining Respondents listed in the caption were parties
to the proceedings in the court below.

In addition, Dr. Angelo Armenti, the current Presi-
dent of the University at the time of trial, was automat-
ically substituted as a party for purposes of Petitioner’s
request for injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 25 (d)(1).

Che Petitioner is properly listed in the caption, and is
not a corporation for purposes of Supreme Court Rule

29.6.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ee ERTS 65s csi cee ec dicvecsuetevess i
rARsino 10 THE PROCEEDINGS ..........0c00005 il
SEES SAE PAT ERPRPIL EADS x os visa bveccavccvevencvcs iv
RI Gk Clie a Sno xa'ns ov basis Petdaveews es l
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
SE EEE on 4h 6 hb Vis oy cK a 4 bee's bee o's l
SUREMIOE GEE” SPEER PRRIGE on dnc ck Va accuse donee’ 2
waWaemameneees We 20S CASE 66... cece cbse e evan 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................. 2
a PROS ER ES aR Ral Bie cr a 3
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT A UNIVERSITY
LEVEL IS OF A DIFFERENT NATURE THAN AT
THE HIGH SCHOOL/SECONDARY LEVEL...... 3
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS A WELL-RECOGNIZED
CONCEPT AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL AS
OPPOSED TO THE SECONDARY LEVEL AND
RE ON WP RENCE Es hee Cire Ko esse deunecesees 6
cok sy ke iiwins chs Sibel db ae ee oak be 11

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. Of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172
Be ae | RRR Re ie ra eae ee eo sen vary A SE
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ............ 11
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794
Ce Ee SOE ak vce ee ORE EE Pe Ras ee es 5
Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District, 782
Pauge. Pls (5a SG DORR nae hewereecbeesese en 1]
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) ............. 11
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)............... 1]
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)............. 11
STATUTE
DO CISA. GRC. DOES) ck cece Coben eh neeek se everiess l
CONSTITUTION
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution...... b, Oy 20
OTHER
American Association of University Professors,
“Policy Documents and Reports” (1984)........... 10
Lectaratign Gf -F ametee TASES? oo ohn ho eR SEK KE EW eo 8
General Report of the Committee on Academic Free
dom and Tenure, | AAUP Bulletin 17 (1915),
reprinted in 53 Law and Contemporary Prob-
MOONS FAS CE is 65 00 2 RE Cee eee Le ea 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
W. Kaplin, The Law of Higher Education ‘3.6.1 (2nd
L SEG SS hs o aW ca RE RR CORN ASOT AN Ca Re es 10
Professors on Guard: The First AAUP Investigations,
Ae” ae od rer airy era ee meer 8
Religion in the Curriculum: A Report from the ASCD
Panel on Religion in the Curriculum................. 7

JURISDICTION!

Judgment was entered on August 10, 1998 by the
Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the District
Court which had been entered on April 16, 1997 (App.
B-1). The Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc, and the Court of
Appeals denied the Petition on September 14, 1998 (App.
C-1).

Jurisdiction of the Court is conferred under 28 U.S.C.
sec. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

rhe First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-

vides as follows:

Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.

RNS 3 sessilis

' The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

Counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in
part. No person or entity, other than the Amicus Curiae, its
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation and submission of this brief.

INTEREST OF AMICI

As organizations serving a membership that includes
thousands of professors, teachers, students and scholars,
it behooves us to defend the First Amendment rights of
the faculty, especially those that relate to faculty rights
and protections as guaranteed by the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement and the Constitution of the United States.

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amici incorporate herein by reference the facts as
delineated by Petitioner in his Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Academic freedom at a university level is of a differ-
ent nature than at the high school/secondary level. The
Third Circuit erred when it applied the Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. Of Educ., 910 F. 2d 1172 (3rd Cir. 1990) case
~ a secondary school case and set of facts — to the univer-
sity level. There are key distinctions between high school
and university students, and distinctive settings between
high school versus university classrooms, and between
the credentials of high school teachers and university
professors. There is a fundamental necessity of academic
freedom for the university level professor regardless of
whether it is a state or private college or university.

Professor Edwards has been denied the right that
every other professor at this uitiversity has to exercise his

PPR mere oe

or her professional judgment about the selection and use
of teaching materials in courses they teach. This has been
done on the basis of a procedurally irregular, ideologi-
cally driven abuse of power by administrators who
believe that the use of materials including references to
religions and/or containing world-views or ideas based
in religions or any consideration or references to religions
and/or expression of a conservative and pro-religious
(but not partisan or proselytizing) point of view, is tanta-

,

mount to “fundamentalism,” and must be excluded from

a public university.

ARGUMENT

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT A UNIVERSITY LEVEL IS
OF A DIFFERENT NATURE THAN AT THE HIGH
SCHOOL/SECONDARY LEVEL.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, at App. A-6, cites
the Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. Of Educ., 910 F. 2d 1172 (3rd
Cir. 1990) a public school case where it explained that:

No court has found that teachers’ First Amend-
ment rights extend to choosing their own curricu-
lum or classroom management techniques in
contravention of school policy or dictates.

(emphases added)

The court then proceeds to apply the above public school
case to a public university:

We conclude that a public university professor
does not have a First Amendment right to
decide what will be taught in the classroom.

If a public school and a public university are the same —
and there are no differences — then the court’s logic
would be understandable and acceptable.

Inasmuch as public schools and public universities
differ, and do differ very significantly, the court’s rea-
soning is erroneous, and must be reversed.

There are many differences between schools and uni-
versities in institutional governance, and differing char-
acteristics and level of maturity of the target group
served, such as: pupils /students /freshmen /sopho-
mores /juniors /seniors /undergraduates /graduate
/scholars /doctoral /post-doctoral candidates; classroom
environment, educational setting, type of instruction, and
major differences in methods and requirements between
schools and universities.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously
used case-law that is relevant to secondary schools and
applied it to universities.

Case-law for schools is determined within a frame-
work of: public school pupils/students (who are more
immature and impressionable than university students);
school teachers (not required to specialize with an earned
terminal degree, and professionally are somewhat lim-
ited); school settings (moderate expectations and restric-
tive educational governance and policy).

The frame of reference at universities is quite differ-
ent from schools in that there are: public university stu-
dents /scholars (who are older /mature /quite
sophisticated); university tenured professors (who are
highly qualified in their fields - an earned terminal

degree — and have earned tenure, and have professional
autonomy and exercise professional judgment); univer-
sity settings with Collective Bargaining Agreements and
stated policies meant specifically for fostering higher
education and higher learning, and the pursuit of truth.

Therefore, case law for school cases and school teachers
is quite inappropriate application to universities and univer-
sity professors.

In Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F. 2d 794,
800 (5th Cir. 1989) the Court refers to “teachers” (not
university professors), and “school curricula,” and says:

Although the concept of academic freedom has
been recognized in our jurisprudence, the doc-
trine has never conferred upon teachers the con-
trol of public school curricula. (emphases
added)

The court again refers to: a school case, to school teachers,
to “school policy or dictates,” and “choosing their curricu-

lum,” and emphasizes:

the Bradley court’s instruction that public
school teachers must abide by ‘school policy or
dictates’ when choosing their curriculum.
(emphasis added)

The court somehow fails to distinguish between curricu-
lum and curriculum materials. To be “choosing their curric-
ulum” is an entirely different matter than it is to be choosing
their curriculum materials.

Significantly, the Third Circuit’s academic freedom
standard is found in Keyishian and Tinker. Bradley v. Pit-
tsburgh Bd. Of Educ., 910 F. 2d 1172, 1176 (3rd Cir. 1990):

We do not have to delineate the scope of

[teachers’] academic freedom . . . under the First
Amendment. . . See Tinker . . . [and] Keyishian-

. courts have found this right to encompass
the right to exercise professional judgment in
selecting topics and materials for use in class.
(emphasis added)

The court has asserted that:

the First Amendment does not place restrictions
on a public university’s ability to control its
curriculum. App. A-7

The university arguably may have some influence or
control on the faculty university-wide curriculum com-
mittee on which professors are involved in making cur-

riculum decisions.

Nevertheless, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
erred in failing to maintain very significant and crucial
differences and distinctions among terms such as: “cur-
riculum” “course” “subjects” “topics” “course outline”
“syllabus” “curriculum materials,” “teaching materials,”

etc.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS A WELL-RECOGNIZED
CONCEPT AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL AS
OPPOSED TO THE SECONDARY LEVEL AND
MUST BE PROTECTED

The Association for Educational Communications
and Technology’s Code of Professional Ethics requires
that professors:

1. Shall encourage independent action in an
individual’s pursuit of learning and shall pro-
vide access to varying points of view.

2. Shall protect the individual rights of access
to materials of varying points of view.

8. Shall in the design and selection of any edu-
cational program or media seek to avoid content
that reinforces or promotes gender, ethnic, racial
or religious stereotypes. Shall seek to encourage
the development of programs and media that
emphasize the diversity of our society as a
multi-cultural community.

App. I, Ex. No. 469

In 1987, The Association for Supervision and Curric-
ulum Development came out with a report entitled: Relr-
gion in the Curriculum: A Report from the ASCD Panel on
Religion in the Curriculum. Of the many excellent points
made, of particular relevance to Dr. Edwards’ efforts as a
teacher educator with his students were the following
recommendations by the ASCD Panel:

1. Teacher Educators, both preservice and
inservice, should ensure that teachers acquire
not only the substantive knowledge required
to teach about religion in society but also the
attitudes and understanding necessary to treat
the subject with sensitivity in the classroom.

2. Teachers, administrators and members of
the public should be aware of the impact of
court decisions on the curriculum and should
recognize that teaching about religion is not
unconstitutional.

3. State departments of education should
address the issue of fair and factual treatment

of religion in the curriculum by all local edu-
cation agencies.

4. Textbook selection committees at the state,
district and local school levels should require
such treatment of religion in all curricular
materials ...

5. Publishers should revise textbooks and
other instructional materials to provide ade-
quate treatment of diverse religions and their
roles in American and world culture and to
include appropriate religious and moral
themes in literary and art history anthologies.

App. Vol. III, Tr. Feb. 19, 3-4

The American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) was formed to stem the erosion of academic
freedom for professors who faced reprimand or dismissal
for making statements or acting in a manner displeasing
those in authority. Professors on Guard: The First AAUP
Investigations, (W. Metzger ed. 1977). Its founding docu-
ment, the Declaration of Principles (1915), recognized the
need for the university to set a basic curriculum and
established that the independence of the professor regarding
classroom method and scholarly view is essential in maintain-
ing the intellectual integrity of the professor and the univer-
sity. It defined academic freedom in the classroom:

It is scarcely open to question that freedom of
utterance is as important to the teacher as it is to
the investigator. No man can be a successful
teacher unless he enjoys the respect of his stu-
dents and their confidence in his intellectual
integrity . . . this confidence will be impaired if
there is suspicion on the part of the student that
the teacher is not expressing himself fully or

frankly, or that college and university teachers
in general are a repressed and intimidated class
who dare not speak with the candor and cour-
age which youth always demands in those
whom it is to esteem.

General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 1 AAUP Bulletin 17 (1915), reprinted in 53 Law
and Contemporary Problems 393, 398 (1990).

In its Declaration of Principles (1915) the AAUP set
forth that the university’s authority over the university
professor is not that of “a public employer which may
reasonably restrict the speech rights of employees.”
Instead, the professor is an “appointee” and .. . once
appointed, the scholar has professional functions to per-
form in which the appointing authorities have neither

Lid

competence nor moral right to intervene.

Law and Contemporary Problems at 397. The professor’s
function is one of an appointed professional with a
specialized competence in his academic area. This com-
petence has been recognized by, and must be free from

interference by those in authority.

The 1915 document has been refined as to the rights
accorded tenured professors. The A.A.U.P.’s 1940 State-
ment of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure, (and
Interpretive Comments thereto) is now widely accepted
by university professors and universities:

institutions of higher education are con-
ducted for the common good and not to further

the interest of either the individual teacher or

the institution as a whole. The common good

depends upon the free search for truth and its

free exposition.

10

American Association of University Professors, “Policy
Documents and Reports” 1, 3 (1984). Controversial
thought and inquiry are “at the heart of the free academic
inquiry which the entire statement is designed to foster.”
A.A.U.P., Policy Documents and Reports, 1970 Interpre-
tive Comments at 5. The A.A.U.P. recognizes the tenured
protessor’s right to free and full inquiry of the subject
matter under his instruction, since the common good
requires “free” search for truth and the discussion of
controversial ideas. These concepts have long been recog-
nized by both professors and the courts, and A.A.U.P.
academic freedom principles are often incorporated into faculty
contracts — (e.g., the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between SSHE and APSCUF App. 117, 975) — M. Olivas,
The Law and Higher Education: Cases and Materials on Col-
leges in Court, 134 (1989). Courts refer to the A.A.U.P.
declarations as indicia of general practice or custom
when faculty contracts are ambiguous, acknowledging
the importance of the above-stated basic tenets. W.
Kaplin, The Law of Higher Education ‘3.6.1 at 180 (2nd Ed.
1985).

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the
importance of academic freedom and protected it under
the First Amendment, recognizing the importance of the
teacher’s “free play of the spirit” to the preservation of
academic integrity:

It is the special task of teachers to foster those
habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry
which alone make for responsible citizens, who,
in turn, make possible an enlightened and effec-
tive public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their
function by precept and practice, by the very

1]

atmosphere which they generate; they must be
exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry.
They cannot carry out their noble task if the
conditions for the practice of a responsible and
critical mind are denied them

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952).

University students are less impressionable than
younger students and are able to appreciate that the
university's policy is one of neutrality toward religion
'ititon v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Widmar v. Vincent,

454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 14 (1981)

Thus university professors have more latitude in
choosing their subject matter than those who teach youn-
ger students, Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District,
782 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (C.D. Cal. 1992), even regarding
controversial subjects such as Origins. Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)

¢

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Court should grant the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Ropert R. MEeLNick

Counsel of Record

Metnick & MELNICK

Federal Building, Suite 300
18 North Phelps Street
Youngstown, OH 44503
(330) 744-8973

Counsel for Amici

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_0993%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
