# Amicus Curiae Brief — Nevada v. Hicks

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 533 U.S. 353

## Text

~

Agag ; on / i
JAN j / - f ran 42 «OR
No. 99-1994 ;

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

STATE OF NEVADA; WILLIAMS MOLINI, RICH ELLINGTON;
MICHAEL SPENCER; BILL FITZMORRIS,
Petitioners,
V.
FLOYD HICKS; TRIBAL COURT IN AND FOR THE FALLON
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE TRIBES; JOSEPH VAN WALRAVEN, HON.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF CONFEDERATED
TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION,
HO-CHUNK NATION, LAC DU FLAMBEAU BAND OF
LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA, PUEBLO OF ISLETA,
AND ST. CROIX CHIPPEWA INDIANS OF WISCONSIN
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

William R. Perry
Counsel of Record
Douglas B.L. Endreson
Elizabeth L. Rodke
Angelina Y. Okuda-Jacobs
SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE
ENDRESON & PERRY
1250 Eye Street N.W.
Suite i000
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-0240

January 19, 2001 Attorneys for Amici Curiae

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ALITERMRIEIES sec ceW al vveswenseees¥e ill
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE TRIBES .............. l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........ccccccccnees 2
po eee nares Pet ener eee rey -

I. TRIBAL COURTS RETAIN CIVIL
ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION OVER
ACTIONS BETWEEN INDIANS AND NON-
INDIANS THAT ARISE ON INDIAN LANDS ..... +

A. This Court has long held that tribal courts
have inherent sovereign authority to
adjudicate civil disputes between Indians
and non-Indians arising on Indian lands ....... 4

B. The decisions in Strate and Montana

recognize that Indian tribes have inherent

_ sovereign authority to exercise civil

jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian
EE 5 CARER ORES PRR AO h A eae RARER ERK 10

C. Strate establishes that the main rule of
Montana and the two Montana exceptions
only apply to the exercise of tribal
inherent sovereign authority over non-
Indians on non-Indian-owned fee lands ....... 14

il

D. In furtherance of the Self-Determination
policy Congress has encouraged tribal
courts to develop and operate effectively,
and recognized that these courts exercise
general civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over
Pe ee ere re ee eee 17

E. The power to adjudicate civil disputes
arising on a sovereign’s territory, whether
involving citizens or non-citizens, is
essential to the success of the Self-
Determination policy and a necessary
attribute of sovereignty for Indian tribes as
well as other governments ................. 21

COLA 5.0 6.00 sno siqe cn tn eeheee unre enes 25

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation,
ia ia im an pA mks Maebd¥ x 4s 15
California v. Cabazon Band of Indians,
I EES sei ka kW aes ba doaanees i, if oven
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
a eid a i waged keee sae bee's 22
Cohens v. Virginia,
Sr aREn Ge WOM PAPO TRDBED vi cnc ssc cckensassccurs 25
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
eed bade Kuh e ok a00 wanted s 9,14
Fisher v. District Court,
EI eee 8
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
ae ree 12
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
ONG 6 b-6 bb aninh 0a bo 08 6 passim
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
on sk ee 6A 66 aw ke bs aban ed oe 7
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
eh ets a see eesanvecavace passim
Montana v. United States,
owes esters adeeseceese passim

Morris v. Hitchcock,
ales 5b da Ein weed Ree oes kee 11

iv

National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe

of Indians,

pki BO fe. er errr rere er ee passim
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,

Oe Ws Sr oo 5a nse ee bee seceeus ay Rhy Bee
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,

eee Fi | Pe er eye rie errr 2,9
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue,

Ee Ghee BOE COE 5 hie S855 8 eS 2 a Chinen 408559 22
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,

s,m re er ee er rare ey 2,8
South Dakota v. Bourland,

RE SE ee ee ee rer rr rer ere 15
Strate v. A-] Contractors,

po SER Se ere Serres See passim
Talton v. Mayes,

Se Shas SO oo Wk has c 04 eee eee eeduanetess 5

Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Eng’g,

8k eg) ero rer Perey pe reas Tee 7
United States v. Mazurie,

Ee Mi ee OEE os aid obo ER S4e cok eee 12
United States v. Wheeler,

Cas PETES ho dns 6 ee ees Ke 4,9
United States ex rel. Mackey v. Cox,

pk Belg Yt :.) area 5

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation,
ar Ss Re ob én Sk cube hea es eknee 2, 11, tad

Vv

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,

OD Ss BO ERD 6 6. 5b cn eskn cack oe cee 21
Williams v. Lee,

See BEE EEPMO 5 555s Node erede ct passim
Worcester v. Georgia,

De Mice ed PEt HOMER okt hoch kab uwnaed bb adee les 6
STATUTES:

Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,

RF tied Gee nears a 20 CN oR wd eas 17
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,

ee gs eM, fv ko oe bv ks bees bad ees 6
Indian Tribal Justice Act,

bet Ss WOE, fia wah chk cd chcabcdeeee passim

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS AND RULES
H. Rep. No. 205, 103d Cong.,

REN: CEI oN ss cA es aa dwn Guan a 18, 19
S. Rep. No. 88, 103d Cong.,

oe ee anenin wer ere | 18, 19, 20
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 383, 103d Cong.,

Sn NE iG Sa PEAR eC oe oceans eee 19
139 Cong. Rec. H10259 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) ...... 18
139 Cong. Rec. $9172 (daily ed. July 21, 1993) ..... 20, 21
GR: Dc Dre as Skee eax es ea hace eee l

Sk rr rong Chien eh eg Merit fui is” l

OTHER:

HENRY M. HART, JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE |
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Eskridge

oe ee er Peery eee ee 25

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE TRIBES’

Amici, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
Ho-Chunk Nation, Pueblo of Isleta, Lac du Flambeau Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa, and St. Croix Chippewa Indians of
Wisconsin, respectfully submit this brief amici curiae in
support of Respondents by and through their attorneys pursuant
to Sup. Ct. R. 37.3. Amici are all federally-recognized Indian
tribes. Amici tribes have established tribal courts to enforce
applicable law and resolve disputes arising on reservation
lands. All amici tribes are engaged in efforts to pursue self-
determination and self-sufficiency. Non-Indians are frequently
present on amici tribes’ lands as residents, tourists, employees,
in connection with leases, contracts, or routine day-to-day
interaction with tribal government and enterprises, or as patrons
of tribal businesses. With the increased commercial activity
occurring on Indian lands in recent years, amici have
experienced a steady increase in civil cases involving non-
Indians in their tribal courts. The tribal courts regularly hear
and resolve civil disputes involving non-Indians arising on
Indian lands. Amici consider recognition of tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction essential, indeed critical, to the
maintenance of a stable, well-ordered civil society and to their
ability to provide a rule of law which governs the expectations
of persons and entities living, visiting, and doing business in
amici’s tribal territory. Therefore, amici have an interest in a
recognition of their sovereign authority to establish and
maintain tribal courts to adjudicate civil disputes involving
non-Indians that arise on Indian lands.

' The parties have consented to the filing of this brief in letters that
have been submitted to the Clerk. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.3(a). Pursuant to Sup.
Ct. R. 37.6, counsel for amici state that no counsel for a party authored this
brief in whole or in part and no person, other than amici and their counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. This Court established in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.217
(1959) that Indian tribes have retained their power to adjudicate
civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians arising on
Indian lands. In this regard, it was settled in National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)
that “the reasoning of Oliphant [v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)] does not apply” to bar tribal courts from
adjudicating civil suits against non-Indian parties. 471 US. at
854-55. The Court’s statement in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978), that “[t]ribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the
exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal
and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians,” thus
reflects settled law.

2. This Court’s recognition in Strate v. A-] Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997) that “tribes retain considerable control
over nonmember conduct on tribal land,” id. at 454, is in
accord with Williams and is confirmed by the decisions of this
Court upholding tribal civil regulatory authority over non-
Indians on Indian land. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
These decisions confirm the existence of tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians, for “where tribes
possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers,
‘civil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out of] such activities
presumptively lies in the tribal courts.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 453
(quoting Jowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18
(1987)). Alternatively, tribal civil jurisdiction over such
disputes is sustained by the tribes’ power to exclude non-
Indians from such lands, which includes the power to condition
non-Indian conduct on Indian lands. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144.

3

3. As the Court in Strate made clear, the main rule and
exceptions in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
apply only to claims of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indian
activity on non-Indian-owned fee land. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-
60. The nature of the distinction between non-Indian owned
fee land and Indian land is apparent from the Montana
decision, in which the Court considered the effect of a statute
that had taken Indian land to provide it to homesteaders. As to
such lands, the Court stated, Congress would not have intended
to subject the purchaser to tribal jurisdiction. Montana, 450
U.S. at 560 n.9. Similarly, in Strate, the Court held that the
tribe had lost its right to exercise dominion or control over the
right-of-way, which was open to the public as part of the State
higaway system. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56. The
distinction reflected in these cases has no application to Indian
lands. However, even if one assumes, arguendo, that the
Montana exceptions have some application to Indian lands,
tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction is sustained under these
exceptions for the reasons stated in points 1 and 2 above.

4. Congress has “consistently encouraged the .. .
development” of tribal courts. LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 14-15 n.6.
In 1993, for example, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal
Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seg., inter alia to provide
federal funding support for tribal courts equal to that of
equivalent state courts. In the 1993 Act, Congress recognized
that “tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public
health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5).

5. Indian tribes are pursuing the federal goals of self-
determination and self-sufficiency by seeking to improve the
reservation environment for all persons interested in tribal
affairs, whether for social, entertainment, community, or
business purposes. Their success to date has made the

‘ieee i

importance of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over disputes
involving non-Indians arising in tribal territory even more
apparent. Such jurisdiction is essential to the tribe’s ability to
maintain a stable environment for community and business
growth, and to the achievement of the Congressional goals of
tribal self-determination and tribal self-sufficiency.

ARGUMENT

I. TRIBAL COURTS RETAIN CIVIL
ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION OVER
ACTIONS BETWEEN INDIANS AND NON-
INDIANS THAT ARISE ON INDIAN LANDS

A. This Court has long held that tribal courts have
inherent sovereign authority to adjudicate civil
disputes between Indians and non-Indians
arising on Indian lands

“Originally the Indian tribes were separate nations within |
what is now the United States.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
218 (1959). As separate nations they “exercised virtually
unlimited power over their own members as well as those who
were permitted to join their communities.” National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851
(1985). Then, as now, Indian tribes relied on their inherent
sovereignty as a source of power to govern. As the Court
explained in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978),
“t]he sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress |
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.

5

That tribal inherent sovereign authority includes judicial
power in civil and criminal matters was decided long ago. In
United States ex rel. Mackey v. Cox, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100
(1856), the Court held that letters of administration granted by
the Cherokee Nation’s probate court were entitled to full faith
and credit under the terms of an 1812 Act which authorized
persons holding such letters when issued “by the proper
authority in any of the United States or the territories thereof,”
to bring suit in the District of Columbia as if the letters of
administration had been granted there. Jd. at 103. In Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), a Cherokee Indian had challenged
his murder conviction in tribal court on the ground that he had
been indicted by a grand jury consisting of only five jurors in
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
the Constitution and laws of the Cherokee Nation. The Court
held that the Cherokee Nation’s powers of self-government
existed prior to the Constitution and were not operated upon by
the Fifth Amendment, id. at 384, and that the claim made under
tribal law “was solely a matter within the jurisdiction of the
courts of that nation.” Jd. at 385.

That Indian tribes have retained their power to adjudicate
civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise on
Indian lands was established in Williams v. Lee, which in turn
relied principally on the historic decision in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). As the Williams Court
explained, Worcester arose from Georgia’s enactment of laws
that sought to prohibit the Cherokee Nation “from enacting
laws or holding courts and [that] prohibited outsiders from
being on the Reservation [without the] . . . permission of the
State Governor.” Williams, 358 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added).
“Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia’s assertion of power
was invalid. The Cherokee Nation . . . is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no

6

right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves,
or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.”
Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (quoting Worcester, 6 Pet. at 561).
The Williams Court then held that while the principles of
Worcester have been modified “where essential tribal relations
were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be
jeopardized . . . the basic policy of Worcester has remained.”
Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.

Congress had recognized these same principles, the Court
further found. In 1834, Congress acted to “assure adequate
government of the Indian tribes” by enacting statutes that
regulated trade with Indian tribes and organizing a Department
of Indian Affairs. Jd. at220. A century later, Congress enacted
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et
seqg., which sought to “encourage[] tribal governments and
courts to become stronger and more highly organized.” Jd.
Furthermore, the Court held when Congress has intended to
grant the States “the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia
had denied” it has done so expressly. Jd. at 221 (footnote
omitted).

Applying these principles, Williams ruled that the Tribe
had exclusive jurisdiction over a civil suit by a non-Indian
reservation trader to collect a debt from an Indian, because “the
exercise of state jurisdiction . .. would undermine the authority
of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.” Jd.
at 223. In so holding, the Court recognized, relying on
Worcester, that relations between Indians and non-Indians on
tribal territory are properly considered an internal affair of the
Tribes, and are subject to the exercise of tribal jurisdiction.
“Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the
Cherokees . . . was the understanding that the internal affairs of
the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of
whatever tribal government existed.” Jd. at 221-22. Thus, the

7

Court held, “[i]t is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian.
He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian
took place there.” Jd. at 223 (citations omitted). The principles
of Williams apply whether the plaintiff is an Indian and the
defendant a non-Indian, or vice-versa. In both cases, tribal
jurisdiction over such disputes is essential to tribal self-
government, for the exercise of such jurisdiction is necessary
not only to insure the resolution of such conflicts in an
efficient, fair and peaceful manner, but also to provide the rule
of law which governs the expectations of persons and entities
living, visiting and doing business in tribal territory. In the
absence of such authority, Indian tribes would be deprived of
the power to make the common law that governs sovereign
territory and relations between persons and entities — Indians
and non-Indian — that are present there. This is a critical
element of the right to self-government for any sovereign.’
Williams thus conclusively sustains a tribal court’s authority to
determine disputes involving a non-Indian party that arise in
tribal territory. See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973) (“cases applying the
Williams test have dealt principally with situations involving
non-Indians”).

The principles of Williams have also served as the
foundation for this Court’s decisions recognizing the
importance of the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. It was well
established two decades ago that “[t]ribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the
exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal

> The question of the existence of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction
is obviously distinct from the issue of whether a state court has jurisdiction
over an Indian’s voluntary filing of an action in state court as a plaintiff.
See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g,
476 U.S. 877 (1986).

8

and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.” Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (footnote
omitted). The protection that Williams affords from State
jurisdiction also remains in force, as the Court made clear in
Strate v. A-]1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). “[S]tate courts
may not exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising out of on-
reservation conduct — even over matters involving non-Indians
— if doing so would ‘infringfe] on the night of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”” Strate,
520 U.S. at 452-53 (quoting Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.
382, 386 (1976) (quoting Williams, 359 U.S. at 220)). As these
decisions recognize, litigation in a forum other than the tribe’s
simply “cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to
maintain authority.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 60.

The policy of Williams is further reflected in the tribal
court exhaustion rule announced by this Court in National
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845 (1985) and reaffirmed in Jowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9 (1987). The Court concluded in LaPlante that the
assumption of jurisdiction over reservation affairs “by any
nontribal court... infringes upon tribal law-making authority,
because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply
tribal law.” LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16. In order to further the
federal policies of tribal self-government and _ self-
determination, the orderly administration of justice, and to
secure the benefits of the tribal court’s expertise, the exhaustion
rule requires that challenges to tribal court jurisdiction be heard
first in tribal court. See National Farmers Union, 471 US. at
856-58.

As Santa Clara Pueblo and the exhaustion rule cases
confirm, tribal courts have the authority and responsibility to
decide questions of federal law, including claims under the
Indian Civil Rights Aci, Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65-
66, and federal law challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction

9

of tribal courts. As the Court explained in E/ Paso Natural Gas
Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999), “[ujnder normal
circumstances, tribal courts, like state courts, can and do decide
questions of federal law ....” Jd. at 485 n.7.

It is also clear that the jurisdiction of tribal courts over
non-Indians in civil matters is not limited as it is in criminal
cases. As the Court held in National Farmers Union, “(flor
several reasons . . . the reasoning of Oliphant [v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)] does not apply” to bar tribal
courts from adjudicating civil suits against non-Indians.
National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854. The Court
reaffirmed this holding in LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 15. As the
Court explained in National Farmers Union, while Congress
created federal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
committing crimes on reservations, “there is no comparable
legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil
disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an
Indian reservation.” National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Court observed that the
Attorney General’s Opinion of the mid-nineteenth century
relied on in Oliphant had concluded that tribes had no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians but did retain the power to
determine civil controversies arising on their reservations. Jd.
at 854-55.

The decisions of this Court thus establish that Indian tribes
retain the full scope of their civil jurisdiction over non-Indian
activity on Indian lands, and that this is an “aspect[] of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (citation omitted). Williams
recognizes, as does Worcester, that control of non-Indian
conduct on Indian lands is within the scope of a tribe’s internal
affairs, over which tribal authority is retained and that the
exercise of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over disputes

10

between Indians and non-Indians arising on Indian lands is
essential to tribal self-government. Williams, 358 U.S. at 221-
23. Indian tribes were certainly not divested of this authority
by treaty, as Williams and Worcester show. Nor is there any
basis for such a claim in the federal statutes — to the contrary,
as we show infra, Congress has been steadfast in its support for
tribal courts, and has recognized their jurisdiction over Indians
and non-Indians. Indeed, the Court in LaPlante expressly
rejected a claim that the federal grant of diversity jurisdiction
had limited the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts, LaPlante, 480
U.S. at 18, a holding which Strate reaffirms. See Strate, 520
U.S. at 452. Finally, as we have shown, settled law makes clear
that Indian tribes have not been implicitly divested of their civil
jurisdiction over suits against non-Indians pursuant to the
principles of Oliphant. See LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 15; National
Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854-55.

B. The decisions in Strate and Montana recognize that
Indian tribes have inherent sovereign authority to
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
Indian lands

The decisions in Strate v. A-] Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) both
expressly recognize that tribal civil jurisdiction extends over
non-Indians on Indian lands. In Montana, the Court held that
it could “readily agree” with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
“that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting and
fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United
States in trust for the Tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 557. In
Strate, the Court reaffirmed this ruling and the broader
principle that “tribes retain considerable control over
nonmember conduct on tribal land.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 454
(footnote omitted).

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NS Lae Sg,

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11

The Court’s conclusions reflect well-settled law. As we
have shown above, Williams establishes that tribal inherent
sovereign power to adjudicate civil disputes involving Indians
and non-Indians on Indian lands has been retained. The Court
has also made clear that Indian tribes have broad civil
regulatory authority over non-Indian activity on Indian lands.
As the Court held in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324 (1983), “tribes have the power to manage the use
of their territory and resources by both members and
nonmembers . . . to undertake and regulate economic activity
within the reservation . . . and to defray the cost of
governmental services by levying taxes.” Jd. at 335-36
(citations omitted). Indeed, in Mescalero, the Court expressly
relied on Montana in upholding tribal power to regulate the use
of tribal lands and resources, including wildlife, on tribal
territory. Jd. at 337. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130 (1982) and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), the Court
upheld tribal inherent sovereign authority to tax non-Indian
activity on tribal land.’ In addition, in California v. Cabazon

> These cases followed and relied on the Court’s earlier decision
sustaining a tribal permit tax imposed on non-Indians in Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904). See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142; Colville,
447 US. at 153.

The Court in Colville relied upon opinions by “Executive Branch
officials . . . [that] consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess a broad
measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian
reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest,” id. at 152,
and observed that “[fJederal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to
tax non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic activity” and
that “[n]Jo federal statute . . . shows any congressional departure from this
view.” Jd. at 153. The Court held that “[i]n these respects the present cases
differ sharply from Oliphant . . . in which we stressed the shared
assumptions of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative Departments that
Indian tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.” /d.

12

Band of Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), the Court specifically
upheld the power of Indian tribes to conduct gaming activities
on Indian lands free from state jurisdiction and control. Jd. at
221-22. These cases make clear, as the Court held in United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), that Indian tribes “are
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory.” Id. at 557 (emphasis
added).

The broad scope of tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction
recognized by these decisions confirms the existence of tribal
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over disputes between Indians
and non-Indians arising on Indian lands. In Strate, the Court
recognized the broad scope of tribal civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction by holding that “where tribes possess authority to
regulate the activities of nonmembers, ‘[c]ivil jurisdiction over
[disputes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the
tribal courts.”” Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting LaPlante, 480
USS. at 18).

Thus, when nonmembers are engaged in activities on
Indian lands over which tribal regulatory authority extends,
whether these activities involve entertainment as in Cabazon,
recreation as in Mescalero, consumer sales as in Colville,
commercial transactions as in Merrion, or participation in
internal tribal relations, as in Williams and Santa Clara, their
activities are within the scope of the tribes’ civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction. Indeed, the role of the court in such disputes is that
of a neutral arbiter, rather than active like a legislature,
regulatory body or criminal prosecutor. See Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (“legislative
jurisdiction] refers to the ‘authority of a state to make its law
applicable to persons or activities’, and is quite a separate

Thus, the Court concluded in Colville that tribal civil powers to tax “are not
implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes’ dependent status.” Jd.

13

matter from ‘jurisdiction to adjudicate””’) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).

When disputes arise from non-Indian presence in
connection with these activities, whether sounding in tort,
contract, arising under a statute or otherwise, the power of the
tribal court to resolve such disputes is recognized. Non-
Indians entering a reservation depend upon the existence of a
stable legal system and tribal court to resolve any civil dispute
that may arise concerning their activities. The provision of
such a system, like “police protection and other governmental
services” is part of “the advantages of a civilized society that
are assured by the existence of tribal government.” Merrion,
455 US. at 137-38 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
In sum, that power, like the power to tax, is “an essential
attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management.” Jd.
at 137.

Tribal power to adjudicate civil disputes that arise on
Indian lands is also sustained by the tribes’ civil regulatory
power to exclude non-Indians from such lands. That power
includes the authority to condition non-Indian entry onto Indian
lands. See Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 333. “Nonmembers who
lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the power to
exclude them. This power necessarily includes the lesser
power to place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or
on reservation conduct.” Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144. Tribal
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians may therefore
be sustained as a condition to non-Indian entry, presence and
conduct on Indian lands. This condition is plainly reasonable
— anyone entering the territory of another sovereign surely
expects that disputes arising from their activities will be subject
to adjudication in the courts of that sovereign. And anyone
desiring to avoid being subject to such authority may decline to
enter such lands.

14

C. Strate establishes that the main rule of Montana
and the two Montana exceptions only apply to the
exercise of tribal inherent sovereign authority over i
non-Indians on non-Indian-owned fee lands
While recognizing tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians i
on Indian lands, Strate and Montana both rejected claims of
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activity on non-Indian-
owned fee land. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-60; Montana, 450 U.S.
at 563-567. In so doing, the Court made clear that Montana’s
main rule and exceptions apply only to claims arising on non-
Indian-owned fee lands.

As the Court in Strate made clear, Montana “describes a
general rule that, absent a different congressional direction,
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of
nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject
to two exceptions.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added).
The Court applied Montana based on its prior determination
that “the right-of-way, for the purpose at hand [is aligned] with '
land alienated to non-Indians.” Jd. at 456. On this basis, the )
Court held that “[oJur decision in Montana, accordingly, ;
governs this case.” Jd. Strate thus confirms that “/r]egarding
activity on non-Indian fee land, Montana delineated — in a main !
rule and exceptions — the bounds of the power tribes retain to |
exercise ‘forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.’” Jd. at
453 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

Even if Strate had not made this clear, there is certainly
nothing in Montana to suggest that either the main rule or the
exceptions apply to determine the scope of tribal authority over
non-Indian activity on Indian lands. The Montana Court
plainly did not apply either the main rule or the exceptions in
concluding that tribal power extends to such activity on Indian
lands. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557. Finally, if more were
needed, the decision in E/] Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,

|
|
——

15

526 U.S. 473 (1999), confirms that Strate, and hence Montana,
apply only to situations involving non-Indian owned fee land.
As Justice Souter stated for a unanimous Court “Strate dealt
[only] with claims against non-members arising on state
highways.” Jd. at 482 n.4.

More fundamentally, the Court’s rulings in Williams,
Mescalero, Merrion, Colville, and Cabazon establish that on
Indian lands, tribal civil jurisdiction exists over Indians and
non-Indians alike, and is an element of the tribes’ inherent
sovereign authority. These cases show that on such lands, there
is simply no basis for the contention that tribal inherent power
in civil matters has been curtailed. In sum, on Indian lands the
existence of tribal civil jurisdiction reflects well-settled law,
and is part of the expectations of Indians and non-Indians alike.

Furthermore, the distinction made in Montana and Strate
between Indian land and non-Indian owned fee land is clear
from these decisions, as well as in those in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989), and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679
(1993).* In Montana, Brendale and Bourland, the Court
considered statutes by which Congress had taken Indian land
for the specific purpose of opening reservations to
homesteaders or taking lands for flood control projects. The
Court concluded in these cases that Congress had also divested
tribes of regulatory control over non-Indians on these lands,
relying on congressional intent in those statutes. E.g.,
Montana, 450 U.S. at 559-61; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422-23
(opinion of Justice White), 435-37, 441-42, 446-47 (opinion of
Justice Stevens); Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689-94. For example,

* These decisions confirm that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indian
activity on non-Indian owned fee land may be shown under the Montana
exceptions. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-60; Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67;
Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695-96; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 443-44, 456-59.

16

as the Court explained in Montana, Congress would not have
intended “that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would
become subject to tribal jurisdiction. . . .” Montana, 450 U.S.
at 560 n.9. Similarly, in Strate, the Court’s holding that the
highway right-of-way on which the claim arose was the
equivalent of non-Indian-owned fee land for purposes of the
jurisdictional issue turned on the Court’s determination that the
right-of-way was congressionally-authorized and had been
issued with tribal consent, that the tribe had lost its right to
exercise dominion or control over the right-of-way, and that the
right-of-way was open to the public as part of the State
highway system. Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56. None of the
circumstances present in these cases have application to Indian
lands, where the rule is otherwise.

However, even if one assumes, arguendo, that the
Montana exceptions have some application to claims of tribal
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over claims arising from non-
Indian activity on Indian land, the exercise of this jurisdiction
is authorized here.

The first Montana exception “covers ‘activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial . ating, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements.’” Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-57 (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). If “consensual relationships” are
required for a tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over a civil
case arising on Indian land, then the consensual presence of
non-Indians on Indian land establishes such a relationship, ana
authorizes the exercise of civil adjudicatory jurisdiction for the
reasons shown supra at 4-13. The second exception,
concerning “conduct that ‘threaten: ur has some direct effect on
the political integrity, economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe,”” id. at 457 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at
566), is also satisfied when a dispute arises on Indian land.
This is confirmed by the Strate Court’s reliance on Williams to

17

illustrate a case in which the exercise of tribal jurisdiction is
authorized by the second exception. Strate, 520 U.S. at 458-59.
For the reasons shown supra at 4-10, the exercise of tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over claims arising on Indian lands is
necessary to preserve the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them and is thus authorized by
the second exception.

D. In furtherance of the Self-Determination policy
Congress has encouraged tribal courts to develop
and operate effectively, and recognized that these
courts exercise general civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians

As the Court acknowledged in LaPlante, “[t]ribal courts
play a vital role in tribal self-government . . . and the Federal
Government has consistently encouraged their development.”
LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 14-15. In 1934, when Congress enacted
the Indian Reorganization Act, federal policy “encouraged
tribal governments and courts to become stronger and more
highly organized.” Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. Congress later
enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §1301
et seg., which requires tribal courts to adhere to most
requirements of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides special training for tribal judges and
directs the Interior Department to prepare a model code to
govern the tribes’ administration of justice. Jd. §§ 1302, 1311.

In 1993, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Act
(“ITJA”), 25 U.S.C. § 3601 et seg., which established the
Office of Tribal Justice Support within the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to provide funds, training and technical assistance to
tribal court systems. Jd. § 3611. The Act also established a
new system for base support funding for tribal justice systems,
id. § 3615, and authorized $50 million a year to be appropriated
for this purpose, id. § 3621(b) — which was about four times the

18

size of prior federal support provided to tribal courts. See H.R.
Rep. No. 205, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1993) (hereinafter
“House Report”); S. Rep. No. 88, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 3
(1993) (hereinafter “Senate Report”). The increase in funding
implements recommendations of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights that spending for tribal courts be authorized in
amounts equal to that of equivalent state courts. See 139 Cong.
Rec. H10259, H10262 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Miller, Chairman, House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs). In addition, $7,000,000 per year was
authorized to assist tribal courts in developing tribal codes and
rules of procedure, tribal court administrative procedures and
court records management systems, and tribal standards for
judicial administration and conduct. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 361 1(e),
3621(a).

In enacting the ITJA, Congress found that “Indian tribes
possess the inherent authority to establish . . . tribal justice
systems” and that “Congress and the Federal courts have
repeatedly recognized tribal justice systems as the appropriate
forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and
property rights.” 25 U.S:C. § 3601(4), (6). As the Senate
Report shows, the latter finding “was added to emphasize that
tribal courts are permanent institutions charged with resolving
the rights and interests of both Indian and non-Indian
individuals.” Senate Report at 8. The House Report reflects
the same understanding, stating that:

As for non-criminal jurisdiction, Indian tribes
have the inherent right to exercise civil
jurisdiction within the territory it [sic]
controls. Tribes exercise a broad range of
civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-
Indians on Indian reservation lands in which
the tribes have a significant interest. Hence,
non-Indians may be sued in tribal court. . . .

19

The general rule is civil jurisdiction
‘presumptively lies in tribal court, unless
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute.’ Jowa Mutual Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. (1987) at 18.

House Report at 8-9.°

When it enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Act, Congress
found that “tribal justice systems are an essential part of
tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring
health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5). The Senate Committee

further

public

on Indian Affairs added this finding:

[T]o reflect the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), with
regard to the authority of Indian tribal
governments to provide for the protection of
the health and safety of reservation residents
and the political integrity of the tribe. From
all of the testimony presented to the

* The Conference Committee Report likewise stated:

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 383, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1993) (footnote

omitted).

The Conferees recognize the long standing principle that
Indian tribes retain all sovereign authority not expressly
divested by the Congress. This principle was articulated
by the Supreme Court in Jowa Mutual Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). The Supreme Court
recognized that civil jurisdiction on an Indian reservation
“presumptively lies in tribal court, unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.”
480 U.S. 9 (1987) at 18.

20

Committee, it is clear that tribal justice
systems are an integral part of the efforts of
Indian tribal governments to exercise that
authority.

Senate Report at 8.
More broadly, the Senate Report concluded that:

Tribal justice systems are critical to the
maintenance and enhancement of the inherent
and delegated sovereignty of tribal
governments. Except when the Congress has
established that federal jurisdiction is
exclusive, tribal courts hear cases on virtually
all aspects of governmental and private
activity. ...

It is the Committee’s view that strong
tribal justice systems are necessary both as a
function of the exercise of tribal sovereignty
and as a means to assure the fair and just
administration of the laws enacted by tribal
governing bodies and laws enacted by the
Congress that require implementation by tribal
governments.

Senate Report at 3. As Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Senate
Indian Committee, told the Senate when he presented the
Indian Tribal Justice Act to the floor:

While it is a bill that reflects compromise,
more fundamentally, it represents the
preservation of the sovereign authority of
tribal governments to determine the future of
their tribal justice systems. Sovereign nations,
no matter how limited or expansive their
sovereignty might be, can only exercise that

Ee

21

sovereignty through the legal systems they
develop to implement civil-and criminal codes
and to enforce regulatory provisions.

139 Cong. Rec. $9172, $9176 (daily ed. July 21, 1993).

As these enactments show, Congress has repeatedly
recognized that tribal courts play a critical role in tribal self-
government, and has encouraged and funded their development,
enacted procedural protections which are enforceable in tribal
courts, and recognized that tribal civil jurisdiction extends to
Indian and non-Indians alike.

E. The power to adjudicate civil disputes arising on a
sovereign’s territory, whether involving citizens or
non-citizens, is essential to the success of the Self-
Determination policy and a necessary attribute of
sovereignty for Indian tribes as well as other
governments

As the Court noted in California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), Congress has enacted
numerous statutes in furtherance of “the congressional goal of
Indian self-government, including its ‘overriding goal’ of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development.” Jd. at 216 & n.19; see also New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 & n.17 (1983);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 138, 143-
44 (1980). As the Court further recognized in Cabazon,
“[s]elf-determination and economic development are not within
reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and provide
employment for their members.” 480 U.S. at 219. Indian tribes
today are pursuing these goals by developing tribal enterprises,
improving the delivery of services to reservation residents and
businesses, and enacting laws to provide a stable environment
for the growth of the reservation residential and business
communities.

22

All amici tribes are engaged in efforts to pursue self-
determination and self-sufficiency. All amici tribes employ
Indians and non-Indians in tribal government positions as well
as in tribal enterprises. Indeed, approximately 75-80 percent of
the workforce of the amicus Ho-Chunk Nation is non-Indian.
The amici tribes also operate gaming casinos as well as
entertainment and recreational establishments on reservation
lands. Cf California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
Amicus Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation also
operate numerous enterprises related to its timber resources
which employ hundreds of individuals on the Reservation,
including non-Indians. In addition, private businesses of
different kinds are located on reservation lands of amici Pueblo
of Isleta and Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin. Furthermore, all amici tribes
engage in various commercial and consumer transactions with
non-Indians on reservation lands. Cf. Central Machinery Co.
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Ramah Navajo
School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The Colville Tribes also
frequently enter into contracts with non-Indian business on the
Reservation in connection with their forestry enterprises. The
amici tribes also promote tourism, see e.g., New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), which brings
Indian and non-Indians alike to their reservation lands. In
addition, many residents of amici’s reservations are non-
Indians or Indians of other tribes who have married tribal
members.

These actions are improving the environment for the many
and growing number of persons and businesses with an interest
in reservation activities for social, entertainment, community,
and business purposes. At the same time, as participation in

—_—_— Seer a ae = —

23

reservation activities by Indians and non-Indians increases, the
importance of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over disputes
arising from these activities becomes more apparent. The
exercise of tribal jurisdiction over disputes arising in tribal
territory is essential to the tribe’s ability to make and apply the
law governing relations between Indians and non-Indians on
Indian lands. A stable reservation legal environment where
civil disputes can be fairly and efficiently resolved is also
essential to the achievement of the Congressional goals of tribal
self-determination and tribal self-sufficiency. Absent such an
environment, tribes will be unable to attract non-Indians to
engage in business transactions, patronize tribal enterprises,
pursue recreational and tourist activities in tribal territory, and
thereby fulfill the congressional purposes. Congress enacted
the Indian Tribal Justice Act to promote the resolution of such
disputes in tribal courts in an effective and predictable fashion.
See 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4), (5) and (6).

This is why the amici tribes have found it essential to
establish tribal courts with general jurisdiction to resolve civil
disputes brought before them that arise on the reservation. On
all of amici tribes’ reservations, the tribal courts, including
appellate courts, regularly adjudicate cases involving non-
Indian parties as plaintiffs and defendants. For example, since
1995, approximately 891 civil cases have been filed in the
Tribal Court of the Pueblo of Isleta. In 157 of these cases one
of the parties was a non-Indian. Of these 157 cases, 65 were
settled out of court, and 51 were resolved in favor of the non-
Indian party. Over the same period, 804 civil cases were filed
in the Tribal Courts of the Ho-Chunk Nation, which does not
generally distinguish between cases filed by members and
nonmembers, but which has confirmed that nonmembers
appear as plaintiffs and defendants in its courts. The cases filed
include general civil matters, child support and domestic
violence cases. The State has also appeared as the plaintiff in

24

the tribal courts of the amici Lac du Flambeau Band, Pueblo of
Isleta and Ho-Chunk Nation. These cases involve matters such
as enforcement of state court orders, garnishment actions, and
child support. The amicus Colville Tribes have an agreement
with the State of Washington providing for modification and
enforcement of child support awards against tribal members in
tribal court, as a result of which the State appears as plaintiff in
numerous cases in tribal court. County child support agencies
also frequently appear before the Tribal Court of the Ho-Chunk
Nation. Many, if not most, judges in the tribal courts
maintained by amici are lawyers.

As these caseloads indicate, non-Indians who enter a
reservation to do business with a tribe, those who reside on the
reservation, and the States as well, depend upon the tribal court
to resolve civil disputes that arise from their activities and
responsibilities. In these cases, evidence needed for trial is
commonly located on the reservation, often far from (and,
indeed, beyond the subpoena powers of) the nearest state court.
For example, on the Colville Reservation the tribal court is
significantly closer to most locations on the Reservation than
state courts, which are located as far as fifty miles from the
Reservation boundary.

The actions of Congress and this Court protecting the
authority of tribes to establish courts exercising general civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over reservations are further
complemented by this Court’s more general recognition of the
interests any sovereign has in providing a forum for resolution
of disputes arising on that sovereign’s territory but involving
non-citizens. Chief Justice Marshall long ago noted the
importance to the functions of a government of making courts
available for the resolution of disputes and enforcing the law,
observing:

25

No government ought to be so defective in its
organization as not to contain within itself the
means of securing the execution of its own
laws against other dangers than those which
occur every day. Courts of justice are the
means most usually employed; and it is
reasonable to expect that a government should
repose on its own courts, rather than on others.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387-88 (1821); see
also HENRY M. HART, JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW, 342-43 (Eskridge and Frickey, ed. 1994) (noting the
dispute settlement function of courts is important “to the good
ordering of society”). These concerns are as important to
Indian tribes as they are to any government.

CONCLUSION

This Court’s established tradition of sustaining tribal court
civil adjudicatory authority over cases involving non-Indians,
Congress’ understanding and treatment of tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction and its specific actions supporting and
strengthening tribal courts, and the fundamental importance of
tribal courts to the successful implementation of the self-
determination policy and to the exercise of tribal self-
government all compel the conclusion that the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribal Court has inherent tribal sovereignty to
exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over the proceedings
before it.

For the foregoing reasons, amici urge this Court to affirm
the decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case.

January 19, 2001

26
Respectfully submitted,

William R. Perry
Counsel of Record
Douglas B.L. Endreson
Elizabeth L. Rodke
Angelina Y. Okuda-Jacobs
SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE
ENDRESON & PERRY
1250 Eye Street N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-0240

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386018_0868%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.