# Appendix — In re Windsor

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2733%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2011
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1177

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

10-632 OCT 15 2010

rT

”” QOPRICE OF THE CLERK
In ‘The

Supreme Court of the United States

WILLIAM M. WINDSOK,

Petitioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JUDGE ORINDA
D. EVANS, HAWKINS & PARNELL, LLP, CARL
HUGO ANDERSON, PHILLIPS LYTLE, LLP,
CHRISTOPHER M. GLYNN, TIMOTHY P. RUDDY,
ROBERT J. SCHUL,

JUDITH L. BERRY, MAID OF THE MIST
CORPORATION, MAID OF THE MIST
STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., SANDRA
CARLSON, MARC W. BROWN, ARTHUR RUSS.
AND DOES 1 'TO 100,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
To The United States Court of Appeals’for
The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
APPENDIX — VOLUME 1

Wilham M. Windsor

P? ‘O Se

3924 Lower Roswell Rd
Marietta, GA 30068
770-578-1094

APPENDIX CONTENTS !

District Court Order granting Windsor the right to
appeal to the Supreme Court dated November 2,
2009..... eT TLaa ees ers eee saiaeen esa uimereie Gas paeeias 3

Kleventn Circuit Order denying the Petition for Writ
of Mandamus dated September 17, 2009 ............... f

N.D. Ga. Order dated September 25, 2009 on
Windsor’s motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. 144......7

N.D. Ga. Order dated July 30, 2009 on Windsor’s
motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. 455.................. 18

N.D. Ga. Order dated June 30, 2009 on motion to

I NN gs og cans deuce eanneneseewssarse geen yiecsun 24

N.D. Ga. Order dated June 8, 2009 on stay of

subpoena for deposition of Judge Evans............... 43
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR’S AFFIDAVIT OF
PREJUDICE OF JUDGE WILLIAM S. DUFFEY
nN UM eo. aa de caenksdnvheedsventsxess 35

28 U.S.C. 144 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH OF
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR dated August 3, 2009...114

|The exhibits to the affidavits provided herein have not been
included in this Appendix due to the volume. If this Court

wants to see the exhibits, the Petitioner can easily provide

them

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO
RECUSE JUDGE DUFFEY filed August 10,

FIRST MANDAMUS AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM M.
WINDSOR dated August 10, 2009 161

REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC APPROVAL TO FILE
NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL TO THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT filed October
26, 2009

va

Constitution of 1

Constitution of t
Amendment

Constitution of
\mendment

Constitutior

Amendment

Constitution of

Amendment

Constitution of the

Amendment

Constitution of »U i States ‘ourteent!

Amendment.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR.
Plaintiff

CIV7L ACTION NO.
1:09-02027-WSD

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants
ORDER

On October 26, 2009, Wilham M. Windsor
filed a Request for Specific Approval to Fue Notice of
Intent to Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
[73-2]. That request is GRANTED. Windsor may
file the documents he appended as Exhibits A and B

to his request

I'v IS SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of
November, 2009

WILLIAM 8. DUFFEY, JR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAI

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUI

IN RE
W ihiam M Wind

}
Petitione!

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
LJnited States District Court for thi
Northern District of Georgia

BEFORE: TJOFLAT and PRYOR, Circuit Judg
BY THE COURT

Wilham M VW Ind Ol! , proceeding pro st filed
this mandamus petition, asking this Court to order
the recusal of the district judge in Windso1

lependent action for relief from the judgment in

iii
prior case in which Windsor was a co-defendant

Mandamus 1s ialilable “only In dra Lic SItUall

when no other adequate means are available to
remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of
discretion.” See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose,
Inc. 130 F.3d. 999, 1004 (11t» Cir. 1997); In re Lopez
Lukis, 113 F.3d. 1187, 1187-88 (11* Cir. 1997). The
petitioner has the burden of showing that the
claimed right to issuance of the write 1s clear and
indisputable. Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d at 1188.

Recusal of a district court judge is required
under 28 U.S.C. § 144 when a party demonstrates
that the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice”
against him or in favor of an adverse party. A judge
must “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). Matters arising out of the course of
judicial proceedings, however, are not a proper basis
for recusal. Disqualification under 455(a) is required
only when the alleged bias is personal in nature,
that is, stemming from an extra-judicial source
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-55, 114
S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); Loranger

v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780 (11 Cir. 1994).
Generally, a judge’s rulings in a case are not valid
grounds for recusal. Loranger, 10 F.3d at 780.
“Likewise, a judge's rulings in a related case may not
ordinarily serve as the basis for recusal.” United
States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1104 (11% Cir
1993) (emphasis added). In rare cases, recusal may
be required when “such pervasive bias and prejudice
in shown by otherwise judicial conduct as would

constitute bias against a party.” Loranger, 10 F.3d

at. 780 (quotation omitted)

Here Windsol na not hown hia tem!

Iro! an extra jud lal source Rather. hi claim QO}

and prejudice are based on adverse ruling

bias
made by the district court in a related case
al. Chandler, 996

finding in t!

which

are not valid grounds for recu
Kt 2d at 1104. Moreover. the judge’
that Windsor made “scurrilou

related cass
against another d)}

lrrespon: ible” accusation
judge in support of a subpoena Windsor s
the judge does not show extrajudicial o7 pery
is to warrant recusal. Accordingly, th

petit On Jj DENIED

KT LED
S.COURT OF APPEAL
MHLEVENTH CIRCUIT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

MERI
'
ORDER
William M. Windsor 1 ))

three paral federal] lawsult Just one day afte
filing a omplaint 11] Initiating tnis case the thir
of those lawsu)t Windsor filed a Motion to Recuse
Judge William S 1) iiey 17] When Wine B 1)
recusal motion was denied |22]. he filed
Kimergency Motion to Recuse Judge Willian
Duffey | le} When W) \dSO! econd rec ts
was orally denied |58}], he moved for reconsiderat
his Court invited further b id ha
considered the opposition filed by the United State
ind Judge Orinda |) Ibvan it i V ! re
63}. This Opinion and Order suy n ts t

ourt ! rder de} \ id }

‘

In the three federal lawsuits in which Windsor
1s soon pro se, Windsor has filed thousands of
pages of material. To provide context, the following
brief background is drawn from an earher Order in

this case.

In this case, Windsor is collaterally
attacking orders entered in Maid of the Mist
Corp. v. Aleatraz Media, LLC, 1 :06-CV-714
ODE (N.D. Ga. filed Mar. 28, 2006) ("Maid of
the Mist I") ....In August 2007, Windsor and
his fellow defendants lest Maid of the
Mist I. Summary judgment and a permanent
injunction were entered against Windsor and
his co-defendants in Maid of the Mist I, and
they were ordered to pay the plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees and expenses [because of their

stu eye nly litigious actions" [Maid of the
Mist 1 251 at 43]].

In September 2008, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the grant of summary judgment and
entry of the permanent injunction lagainst
Windsor and his codefendants]. See Maid of
the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media, LLC
294 F. App'x 163 (1th Cir. 2008). The
Kleventh Circuit remanded the case only so
that the district court (Evans, J.) might more
fully explain how the amount of the : ‘d of
atterneys' fees and expenses was determined
Id. Following remand, the attorneys for all
parties Gncluding Windsor) negotiated and

signed a Consent Final! Order ani

Judgment [Maid of the Mist I 354]. In
December 2008, the Court (Evans, J.) entered
that Consent Final Order, and the defendants
then paid the plaintiffs the negotiated sum of
$395,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The
Consent Final Order provided that: "The case
is hereby closed all issues having been decided
... No appeals shall be taken from this
Judgment, and the parties waive all mghts to
appeal" [Id. at 4].

Less than six months later, in April
2009, Windsor "requestled]" that his attorney
be "removed as his Counsel of Record" [Maid
of the Mist I 360 at | |. Proceeding pro se,
Windsor ~ but none of the other defendants
collaterally attacked the Consent Final Order.
Since the entry of the Consent Final
Order in Maid of the Mist I, Windsor appears
to have filed more than two dozen motions
(and hundreds, if not thousands) of additional
pages of material, including motions to
"reopen" Maid of the Mist 1, take discovery
from the plaintiffs, recover sanctions,
disqualify opposing counsel, and disqualify
Judge Evans.

In the course of his collateral attack,
Windsor served a deposition subpoena on
Judge Evans. Maid of the Mist Corp. v.
Alcatraz Media, LLC, 1 :09-CV-15483-WSD
(N.D. Ga. filed June 10, 2009) ("Maid of the
Mist II") was [opened] when Judge Evans

moved to quash Windsor's deposition
subpoena in Maid of the Mist I. In June 2009,

this Court (Duffey, J.) stayed and then
quashed that deposition subpoena [Maid of
the Mist Il 4 & 32}. Windsor responded by
filing muitiple motions in Maid of the Mist I]
(again totaling hundreds, if not thousands, of
pages), including motions for disqualification
of this Court [Duffey. J.j, change of

venue, and reconsideration.

Then, in July 2009, Windsor filed a 499
page complaint initiating this case and
opening a third front in his collateral assault
on the Consent Final Order in Maid of the
Mist 1]. In this case, Windsor has sued the
United States of America, Judge
vans, the plaintiffs in Maid of the Mist I,
certain of their employees, and their
attorneys. Again, Windsor filed a small
avalanche of motions, totaling hundreds, if not

thousands, of pages.

[32 at. 1-3]. After Windsor's first motion to recuse
[17] in this case was denied [22], Windsor filed an
interlocutory appeal [37] and a petition for
mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit demanding recusal of this
Court. Last week, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte
dismissed Windsor's appeal |66] and denied
Windsor's petition for mandamus [68]. Although
those decisions ought to put to rest fully the issue of
recusal, the Court is entering this Opinion and
Order supplementing the oral order denying
Windsor's second recusal motion for the sake of

completeness

‘The principal difference between Windsor's
second motion for recusal and his first is that he
belatedly added an argument that 28 U S.C. § 144
warrants recusal in this case. Compare 17 at 1-2]
with [36-2 at 21-22]. Assuming without deciding
that it is proper for Windsor to change the basis on
which he demanded recusal after his first motion
was heard and denied, Windsor's new argument
under 28 U.S.C. § 144 fails for two reasons. First,
Windsor did not attach the statutorily required
certificate of good faith from counsel of record. And
second - accepting as true the properly pleaded facts
in Windsor's § 144 affidavit - he failed to allege
sufficient grounds for recusal.

28 U.S.C. § 144 req ures a district judge to
recuse himself and "proceed no further" when a
party files both (1) "a timely and sufficient affidavit
that the judge before whom the matter is pending
has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party” and (2) "a certificate
of counsel of record stating that it is made in good
faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. [Footnote 1: In addition, "a
party may file only one such affidavit in any case ."
28 U.S.C. § 144.] The potential for abuse of a statute
requiring nearly automatic recusal is obvious, and
each of those two statutory requirements safeguards
against the abusive use of motions to recuse under §
144 as an improper litigation tactic

The only certificate of good faith that Windsor
submitted is one that he himself signed. Indeed,
Windsor acknowledges that every attorney he

contacted or attempted to contact to review his

motion to recuse and attest to his good faith wa:

"either unwilling . .., [unable], or . . unavailable" to
do so [36-2 Mot. at § 23]. Unfortunately for Windsor,
failure to include a certificate . good faith signed by
counsel of record is "fatal" to a § 144 motion filed by
a pro se htigant. Everson v. Liberty Mut. Assur. Co.,
Civ. No. 1 :05-CV-2459-RWS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30244 at *4(N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2008) (collecting
cases); see poe e.g., Morrison v. United States, 432
2d 1227, 1229 (Sth Cir. 1970) ("The requirement of
the mares by counsel is to prevent abuse .").
[Footnote 2: In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1

1981.]

Windsor seeks a waiver of that statutory
requirement because he is proceeding pro se. The
law in this district and circuit, however, is clear. The
requirement that a party file a certificate of good
faith signed by counsel of record serves a critical
function in preventing the tactical abuse of § 144 by
litigants. Id. In every federal case that he has
litigated pro se, Windsor has filed motions to recuse
or disqualify the presiding judge, sometimes as
many as three in the same case . |Maid of the Mist |
1,406 & 470; Maid of the Mist li 17; and 17 & 36].
Indeed, in this case, the Court has already reviewed

3b

and denied an earlier motion filed by Windsor
seeking recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, which did not
require submission of a certificate of good faith
signed by counsel. One district judge has already

recused himself from an earlier case involving

Windsor [Maid of the Mist 18]. And Windsor now

says that he "considerls] every federal judge in
Atianta to be part of lal ring of corruption"

[69-13 at | 3192]. Absent the statutorily required
certificate of good faith from counsel of record,
Windsor's second motion for recusal must. be denied.
28 U.S.C. § 144.

Windsor's second motion for recusal must also
be denied because his affidavit is not "sufficient" to
warrant recusal under 28 U (S.C. § 144. Rather than
offer well-pleaded facts, Windsor's affidavit in
support —f his second motion for recusal is replete
with conclusory statements of his personal
opinion, including the following:

- "Judge Duffey was antagonistic and
biased” [36-3 Aff. at 4 29]:

- "Heis hopelessly biased against me" lid. at
q 31];

"My impression is that Judge Duffey is
mean” lid. at 4 81];

- "Judge Duffey came off to me as angry at
me. He kept his anger under check a lot of
the time, but } quickly realized that it was
always there" lid. at 4} 851;

e "Il most definitely feel that Judge Duftey
has demonstrated a bias against me asa
pro se litigant" lid. at § 106);

e "Judge Duffey should have reported Maid's
Attorneys [sic] and Judge Evans for
professional misconduct .... His failure to
do so 1s also proof of his extreme bias

against me as werll [sic] as violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct lid. at § 111]:

- "Tl have not been treated fairly by Judge
Duffey” (id. at 4] 313 (emphasis in
original];

- "So, the ultimate proof of extreme bias and
lack of impartiality by Judge Duffey is that
he had all of this evidence available to him,
and he slammed me anyway lid. at § 1721.

Windsor's “impression|sl" and "feelings|"
anpear to flow principally from an Order in Maid of
vié Mist [I that described statements Windsor made
relating to his atLempt to depose Judge Orinda
Kvans after closure of Maid of the Mist I as
"scurrilous and irresponsible." [Maid of the Mist T]
32 at 5|. [Footnote 3: 3 Windsor defends his attempt
to depose Judge Evans as follows: If denied the
ability to depose Judge Evans, I will never know if
Judge Evans was a customer or relative of Maid. |
will never know if Judge Evans, a President Carter
Democrat, drove by my home, saw George W. Bush
and Saxby Chambliss signs in the yard and
established extrajudicial bias against me. | will
never know if Judge Evans established extrajudicial
bias against me because I was in the U.S. Army
during the Viet Nam years, or if the bias came
because I was in the Army Reserves for six years. |
will never know if Judge Evans has a bias against
overweight men with grey beards, pro se parties,
people im the ticket selling business, men accused of
calhing a woman a bitch, or young people who start
and build businesses . The bias is clear. The
problem is that J cannot prove extrajudicial bias
unless 1 can depose her. [36-3 Aff. at 1 74]).] Indeed,
in his § 144 affidavit, Windsor returns to that three
word phrase over and over and over again [36-3 Aff.

>—
>

24, 25, 126, 128, 129, 137, 138, 143, 307 & 316]

ai |
. Characterizing the phrase as a "slur" that was

"antagonistic and improper," Windsor writes: "I don't
know of many words that are much worse that
scurrilous" [Id. at § 316]. [Footnote 4: In rebuttal,

Windsor writes, in part: "I have never murdered

anyone .... Il have never smoked marijuana or used
any drug of any type. I very rarely drink alcoholic
beverages .... My wife and I love animals, have a

cat that is like a third child, and we regularly donate
to cat rescue organizations" [Id. at 9/132 & 134].

Windsor contends that "I am confident that a
reasonable lay person would conclude that Judge
Duffey does not have the impartiality that is
required for this job just based upon his ‘scurrilous
and irresponsible’ assault on me" [Id. at 307
(emphasis added)]. [Footnote 5: Windsor's
objectivity 1s subject to question. In his affidavit in
support of his motion to recuse, Windsor wrote that
he (1) has an "extreme sense of right and wrong" [36
Aff. at 135], (2) has spent "over 2,000" hours on this
case lid. at § 148], and (3) has "no job because [he
has] to work full-time on the legal work" lid. at 4
181].]| Windsor is wrong. "[J]udicial remarks during
the course of [proceedings] that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to, [a party]
ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge ." Liteky v. United States, 5 10 U.S. 540,
555 (1994). Comments on lack of evidence, rulings
adverse to a party, and friction between the Court

and a party do not constitute pervasive bias . Hamm
v. Members of Bd. of Regents, 708 F .2d 647, 651

(11th Cir. 1983). Only where judicial remarks

"reveal such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible"
is recusal warranted. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.

In this case, this Court's "judicial remarks"
plainly do not support a motion fer recusal. In
denying Windsor's petition for mandamus, the
Eleventh Circuit held : "the judge's finding in the
related case that Windsor made ‘scurrilous and
irresponsible' accusations against another district
court judge in support of a subpoena Windsor served
upon that judge does not show extrajudicial or
pervasive bias as to warrant rec sal." In re William
M. Windsor, No. 09-14018-A slip op. at 2 (1th Cir.
Sep. 17, 2009).

Much of the rest of Windsor's § 144 affidavit is
rambling and irrelevant to his motion for recusal. To
the limited extent Windsor identifies factual bases
in his affidavit in support of his contention that
recusal is required, he complains about this Court's
case management orders and adverse prior rulings
in this case and Maid of the Mist 11. However,
"judicial rulings [and] routine trial administration
efforts" are insufficient to require a judge's recusal .
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556: see also United States v.
Chandler, 996 F.2d 1 073, 1104 (11 Cir. 1993) ("a
judge's ruling in a related case may not ordinarily
serve as the basis for recusal") (emphasis added). In
denying Windsor's petition for mandamus, the
Eleventh Circuit held: "Windsor has not shown bias
stemming from an extra judicial source. Rather, his
claims of bias and prejudice are based on adverse
rulings made by the district court judge in a related

case, which are not valid grounds for recusal.” In re

William M Windsor, No. 09-14018-A slip op. at 2
(11th Cir. Sep. 17, 2009). In short, Windsor's
affidavit is devoid of well-pleaded facts that would
"convince a reasonable person that bias actually
exists." Christo v. Padgett, 223 F .3d 1324, 1333
(11th Cir . 2000) (emphasis added).

Windsor's Emergency Motion to Recuse Judge
William S. Duffey [36] - his second recusal motion in
this case - 1s DENIED for the reasons given orally on
the record on September 2, 2009, and for the reasons
set forth in this Opinion and Order. Windsor's oral
motion for reconsideration is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of
beptember, 2009.

CS /

WILLIAM 8. DUFFEY, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR.
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION NO
1:09-02027-WSD

UNITED STATES O]
AMERICA, et al..,

Defendant:
OPINION AND ORDER

On July 27, 2009, William M. Windsor filed a
499-page complaint entitled “Verified Independent
Action in Equity to Remedy Fraud Upon the Court,
Independent Equitable Action for Relief from a Fina
Judgment, Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
[Injunctive Relief, and Other Relief” {1}. Windsor also
filed a number of other motions, incorporating by
reference hundreds of pages of additional materia!
Windsor’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Interlocutory Injunction |11] will be heard on
July 30, 2009. This matter is now before the Court
on Windsor’s: Motion to Approve Service of Proce
on Canadian Parties [3]; Motion for Waiver of

Representation by Counsel and Motion to Allow
Aleatraz Media, LLC and Alcatraz Media, Inc. t
Assign All Rights in Civil Action No. 1:06-C\

ODE 17]; Motion for Change of Venue 115}; and
Motion to Recuse Judge William S. Duffey [17].

We deal first with Windsor’s motion to recuse
The factual basis for that motion is Winds
dissatisfaction oak an order this Court entered in a
related case in which Windsor was a defendant:
Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media, LLC, 1:09
CV-1543-WSD (N.D. Ga. filed June 10, 2009) (“Maid
of the Mist JP). Windsor attached as “Exhibit A” to

his motion for recusal in this case “an order signed

y Judge Duffey against the Plaintiff Maid of the
Mist JJ, and Windsor complains that: “Judge Duffey
has a preconceived idea of pols ‘from information

that has come from outside the case” [17 at 2]
Windsor further complains that “Judge Duffey ha
previously called the Plaintiff ‘scurrilous and
irresponsible’ when the Plaintiff was simply
attempting to take the deposition of Judge [Orinda]
K'vans,” zd., who presided over a third case in which
Windsor was a party: Mazd of the Mist Corp.
Alcatraz Media, LLC, 1:06-CV-714-ODE (N.D. Ga
filed Mar. 28, 2006) (““Mard of the Mist I)

Windsor argues that recusal 1s required by 24
[ 5 & § 455 ana |t oe ere of Judicial Conduct for
United States Judges {17 at 2]. [Footnote 1: Windsor
also asserts bh recusal is required under “Rules of
the State Bar of Georgia Code of Professional]
Conduct, all other relevant st: itutory and state and
federal case law, as well as the Fifth, Sixth, Fighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State

Constitution, the Constitution of the State of

Georgia, and the Court’s inherent powers” {17

Windsor’s motion tor recusal. however. offers no

meaningful argument on those grounds.] 28 U.S.C §
155 provides in pertinent part that any district judge
hall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
impartiality might reasonably be questioned” o1
here “he has a personal bias or prejudice
neerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 455la) & (b)Q)
[Fo tnote 2: The Code of Conduct for United State
Judges includes parallel provisions, providing that
\ judge shall disqualify himse!] herself in

?

proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
tances in which the judge has a pers
or prejudice concerning a party. Canon 3C(Q) of
he Code of Judicial Conduct for United State

Judge “The test under Section 455(a) 1s wheth
an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully

informed of the facts on which recusal wa rught

would entertain a ipnificant doubt about the ude.

impartiality.” United States v.Chandler, 996 F.2d
10738, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993). ‘To warrant recu
1} qualifi ation, any ‘ } | be per

al; it must derive from something

at which the judge learned by particip:

e.” McWhorter v. Citv of Birmingha

()(°¢ PONY

routine tra!

ruling
ordinary admonishments are insufficient to requi

judge recusal. /d. at 556. Indeed rudicial
remark during the cour e of [proceeding Ln i!
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile t
party} ordinarily do not support a bias or part
challen ( ld i| >

ynst Wh

Ui? rudif) i

Neither this Ce

Nt {
nor this Court's admonishment of Windsor fo)
ImMpropt rly attempting to d Post bude I} Van mee
Vaid of the Vist ca CS require recusal in th Ca
“No objective, disinterested iy observer f
informed of the facts on which recusal wa
would entertain a significant doubt about the
[Court's] impartiality.” Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1

en do |

Chis Court's prior ruling

demonstrate deep-seated favoritism or antagon)
that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteks
910 U.S. at 555. Windsor’s Motion to Re d
William S. Duffe 1171 is DENIED
Windsor Viotion for Change (
, ies

iso DENIED. Windsor clected to file this action
pa for hen)

this district. He car rnd

here. Windsor 's dissatisfaction 1o matter how
treme if} win entere VU ! of eM
iS¢ ] not a da tO? ) } i }
iT | )]
Federal | rT \ y |
Vila v\ nd Or fy La ele
efendan ni 1a [ (
artic eK \
,

to Approve Service of Process on Canadian Parties
[3] — which asks that this Court require counsel who
represented the “Canadian Parties” in the now
closed Maid of the Mist cases to accept service on the
“Canadian Parties” behalf in this case — 1s DENIED.

Windsor’s Motion for Waiver of
Representation by Counsel and Motion to Allow
Alcatraz Media, LLC and Alcatraz Media, Inc. to
Assign All Rights in Civi] Action No. 1:06-CV-714
ODE to Plaintiff William M. Windsor [7] is DENIED
Corporations and limited liability companies like
Alcatraz Media, Inc. and Alcatraz Media, LLC must
be represented by counsel in litigation. See Palazzo
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir.
1985); see also Cook v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
297 F. Appx 911, 912 (1th Cir. 2008) (same).
Furthermore, “federal courts have disapproved ‘any
circumvention of the rule lof corporate
representation by counsel] by the procedural device
of an assignment of the corporation’s claims to the ‘
lay individual.” Palazzo, 764 F.2d at 1386 (quoting
Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d

20. 23 (2d Cir. 1983)).

“!Tlo secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination” of this action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, this
Court STAYS all further activity in this case except
as provided below. Windsor shall have until August
31, 2009, to serve the defendants in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Any defendant not
served by that date may not be served thereafter
without permission of the Court. All defendants

served by August 31, 2009, shall have until

September 21. 2009. to file motions to dismiss

Windsor shall have until October 5, Z609 to file a
response. All defendants that filed motions to
dismiss shall have until October 19, 2009, to file
replies. No answer to Windsor’s complaint shall be
required nor shall any discovery be taken until this
Court has ruled on the defendants’ motions to
dismiss and/or entered another order lifting

this Stay and establishing a time for the filing of
answers. Except as provided above, no party shall
file any motion or other paper 27 this case without
prior leave of court. [Footnote 3: The Eleventh
Circuit “has upheld pre-filing screening restrictions
on litigious plaintiffs.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986
F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing cases).]
Leave of Court must be requested by filing a
“Request for Specific Approval” and attaching as an
exhibit to that request any proposed motion or other
paper, together with all proposed attachments to the
motion or other paper. Except for the motions to
dismiss, response, and replies thereto provided for
above, no motion or other paper shall be deemed
properly filed after the entry date of this Order
unless this Court has entered an order granting
specific approval for filing. The parties are reminded
that failure to obey a lawful order of this Court is
grounds for dismissal. L.R.41.3A(3), NDGa

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of July,
2009

WILLIAM 8. DUFFEY, JR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

MAID OF THE MIST
CORPORATION and MAID OF
THE MIST STEAMBOAT
COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs,
Vv. 1:09-cv-1543-WSD-WEJ

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC.,

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC., and

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on United
States District Judge Orinda D. Evans’ Emergency
Motion to Quash Subpoena (“Emergency Motion to
Quash”) [1] and Motion to Supplement United States
District Judge Orinda D. Evans’ Emergency Motion
to Quask Subpoena (“Motion to Supplement”) [8I.
‘The subpoena, served by William M. Windsor, seeks
Judge Evans’ testimony regarding her menta!
processes and the basis for her decisions in the
closed case Maid of the Mist Corp., et al. v. Alcatraz
Media, LLC, et al., No: 1:06-ev-714-ODE (N. D. Ga.
2007) “Maid of the Mist I’).

It also is before the Court on Defendant
William M. Windsor’s Emergency Motion for

Hearing [6]; Verified Motion to Disqualify Hawkins
& Parnell, Carl Hugo Anderson, Sarah Bright,
Phillips Lvtle, and Marc W. Brown [9]: Motion for
Hearing on Defendant William M. Windsor’s Verified
Motion to Disqualify Hawkins & Parne’!, Carl Hugo
Anderson, Sarah Bnght, Phillips Lytle, and Mare W
Brown [11]; Defendant William M. Windsor’s
Emergency Motion for Conference [13]; Defenda
William M. Windsor’s Motion to Reconsider or
Revise Stay Order {15]; Defendant William M
Windsor’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge
Orinda D. Evans [17]; Defendant William M.
Windsor’s Motion for Leave to Exceed Page
Limitation on Motion to Disqualify Judge Evans and
Indwelling Memorandum in Support Thereof [18]:
Defendant Willaam M. Windsor’s Motion for Hearn
on William M. Windsor’s Verified pion to
Disqualify Judge Orinda D. Evans [20]; Defendant
William M. Windsor’s Motion for ns: to ienn
Page Limitation on Response to Emergency Motion
to Quash and Indwelling Memorandum in Support
Thereof [23]; and Motion of Raley & Sandifer, P.C

and Its Attorneys to Withdraw [26]
I. BACKGROUND

These motions all relate in some way to thi
Maid of the Mist | case, over which Judge Evans
presided. In Maid of the Mist I, Plaintiffs’ Maid of
the Mist Corporation and Maid of the Mist
Steamboat Company, L td. (collect pe “Maid” or
“Plaintif{s”) and Defendants Alcatraz Media, LLC
nd Alcatraz Media, a (collectively y“Migteas”) had
. bu:siness agreement whereby Alcatraz sold

} re ” c : }
vouchers or e-tickets (“vouchers”) for tickets to rid

Plaintiffs’ Maid of the Mist boats at Niagara Falls.
At some point the relationship deteriorated, and
Plaintiffs informed Alcatraz that after July 29, 2005,
they would not honor Aleatraz’s vouchers. Because
Alcatraz continued to sell vouchers, Maid filed suit
against Alcatraz and Defendant Windsor alleging
tortious interference with business relations and
seeking a permanent injunction against Alcatraz’s
future voucher sales. Maid also sought attorney's

fees and costs.

The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. On August 8, 2007, the Court granted
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on its
claim for tortious interference, granted a permanent
injunction against Defendants’ sale of vouchers for
rides on Plaintiffs’ boats, granted summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on each of Alcatraz’s
counterclaims, and feund Defendants hable for
attorney's fees and expenses. Judgment was entered
on October 16, 2007, and the case was closed that
day. ‘The Court later entered an order awarding
Plaintiffs’ attorney's fees and expenses.

Following the entry of judgment, Defendants
appealed. On September 19, 2008, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's order, but
vacated the award of attorney's fees and costs,
remanding the attorney’s fees and expenses award to
the Court for a new determination of the amount
awarded. On December 9, 2008, the Court entered a
Consent Final Order and Judgment, in which the
parties agreed that $395,000.00 in attorney's fees
and expenses would be paid to Plaintiffs. The
Consent Final Order and Judgment provided: “The

26

case 1s hereby closed all issues having been decided. .
.. No appeals shall be taken from this Judgment,
and the parties waive all rights to appeal.”

Over five months later, on or about May 20,
2009, Defendant Windsor attempted to serve a
deposition subpoena on Judge Evans seeking Judge
Evans’ testimony. The subpoena’s return date was
June 16, 2009. A declaration by Windsor setting
forth the substance of the testimony he requested
from Judge Evans was attached to the deposition
subpoena. In his declaration, Windsor states that he
intends to depose Judge Evans to prove that she was
biased against Defendants and acted improperly in
forming her decisions in the Maid of the Mist I case.
Windsor states: “In my opinion, there is no logical
explanation for how a federal judge could have
handled a case in this manner.” Windsor Decl. at 4
it.

On June 3, 2009, Judge Evans filed her
Emergency Motion to Quash, requesting expedited
consideration of her motion before the subpoena’s
return date. On June 8, 2009, this Court stayed the
scheduled deposition of Judge Evans until the Court
could decide the motion to quash. On June 10, 2009,
Judge Evans filed a Motion to Supplement her
Emergency Motion to Quash. On June 22, 2009,
Windsor responded to the Emergency Motion to
Quash and the Motion to Supplement. [Footnote 1:
Defendant Windsor also has filed the other motions
identified on page 1 and 2 of this Order.;

Reviewing the subpoena and Windsor’s

accompanying affidavit, it is clear that Windsor is

seeking to require Judge Evans to testify about her
mental process and decision-making in the course of
her official judicial duties while presiding over Maid
of the Mist |. He claims Judge Evans, 1n granting
summary judgment, wrongfully relied on false
testimony offered by the Plaintiffs and that Judge
Kvans otherwise committed perjury or fraud in
issuing her opinions. Plaintiff claims she was biased
or prejudiced against Defendants and accuses her of
judicial misconduct. These scurrilous and
irresponsible statements ultimately are an affront to
the decision Judge Evans reached on the Defendants
claims and defenses. Judge Evans’ decision was
appealed and ultimately affirmed by our circuit. The
attempt now to depose Judge Evans to investigate
her decision-making and mental process is not
allowed and 1s expressly prohibited by longstanding
case law.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 requires a
court, on timely motion, to quash a subpoena that
requires disclosure of a privileged or other protected
matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3). It is well-settled
that the “mental processes of a judge are not the
proper subject of compelled testimony.” United
States v. Harvey, 544 F.Supp. 189, L9L GS. D. Fla.
1982) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
422 (1941) (“a judge cannot be subjected to such a

scrutiny” as the compelled examination “would be
destructive of judicial responsibility”’)). “idludges are
under no obligation to divulge the reasons that
motivated them in their official acts; the mental]
processes employed in formulating the decision may

not be probed.” United States v. Cross, 516 F. Supp.

700, 707 (M. D. Ga. 1981), affd 742 F.2d 1279 (1th
Cir. 1984). See also Robinson v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 70 I.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same); Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1344 (3d
Cir. 1993) (same). Courts will only consider
compelling judicial testimony in the presence of
extreme and extraordinary circumstances, such as a

strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.
See Harvey, 544 F. Supp. At 191 (citing United
States v. Dowdy, 440 F. Supp. 894, 896 (W. D. Va.
1977)).

Windsor does not and cannot show extreme
and extraordinary circumstances warranting
enforcement of the subpoena. Judge Evans issued
thorough and wellreasoned opinions and orders
detailing the reasons for her decision and the
authorities which supported them. The Court of
Appeals has affirmed her rulings. Windsor’s
subpoena 1s an improper attempt to invade the
Court’s decision-making function and processes
which stems from Windsor’s continued
dissatisfaction with the resolution of his case. This is
not a proper basis to subpoena a judge’s testimony,
and the Emergency Motion to Quash must be
eranted on this basis alone.

The subpoena also should be quashed because
Windsor had it issued well after discovery was over
and the case was closed. Ordinarily, a subpoena
served after the close of discovery must be quashed.
See Pushko v. Klebener, 2007 WI. 2671263, at *3 (M.
1D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2007). Rule 45 requires a subpoena to

state the title of the action and the court in which
the action is pending. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a) (emphasis
added). Courts have invalidated subpoenas issued
after entry of summary judgment or after a case has

Gg

been appealed. See Azania v. Squadrito, 1997 WI.
268085, at *2 (7th Cir. May 7, 1997) and Matter of
City of El Paso, Texas, 887 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). Not only is discovery closed, but the
entire case is closed and the Eleventh Circuit has
affirmed Judge Evans’ rulings. [Footnote 2: The
Judicial Conference of the United States has
promulgated regulations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 604

governing the testimony of judicial personnel in
response to issued subpoenas. Among the purposes
of the regulations is to protect the deliberative
processes of the judiciary. The regulations required
Windsor to process his request to depose Judge
Evans in accordance with the Federal Judiciary’s
regulations regarding the testimony of judicial
officers. See Subpoena Regulations Adopted by
Judicial Conference: Testimony of Judiciary
Personnel and Production of Judicial Records in
Legal Proceedings, (March 2003), §§ 1 et

seq. Windsor’s failure to comply with the regulations
is an independent ground for quashing the
subpoena.|

With respect to the other motions Defendant
filed, they seek to disqualify counsel and the Court
who participated in Maid of the Mist I, a case the
Court already has noted has been appealed, affirmed
and which 1s over and closed. The motions are

improper and otherwise are moot.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Judge Orinda D. Evans’ Emergency Motion to Quash
Subpoena [1] and Motion to Supplement United
States District Judge Orinda D. Evans’ Emergency

Motion to Quash Subpoena [8] are GRANTED.

30

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED
Defendant William M. Windsor’s Emergency Motion
for Hearing [6]; Verified Motion to Disqualify
Harkins & Parnell, Carl Hugo Anderson, Sarah
Bright, Phillips Lytle, and Marc W. Brown [9];
Motion for Hearing on Defendant William M.
Windsor’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Hawkins &
Parnell, Carl Hugo Anderson, Sarah Bright,

Phillip Lytle, and Marc W. Brown [11]; Defendant
William M. Windsor’s Emergency Motion for
Conference [13]; Defendant William M. Windsor’s
Motion to Reconsider or Revise Stay Order [15]:
Defendant William M. Windsor’s Verified Motion to
Disqualify Judge Orinda D. Evans |17];Defendant
William M. Windsor’s Motion for Leave to Exceed
Page Limitation on Motion to Disqualify Judge
Evans and Indwelling Memorandum in Support
Thereof [18]; Defendant William M. Windsor’s
Motion for Hearing on William M. Windsor’s Verified
Motion to Disqualify Judge Orinda D. Evans [20];
and Defendant William M. Windsor’s Motion for
Leave to Exceed Page Limitation on Response to
Emergency Motion to Quash and Indwelling
Memorandum in Support Thereof [23] are DENIED
AS MOOT.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that
the Motion of Raley & Sandifer, P.C. and its
Attorneys to Withdraw [26] is GRANTED on the
grounds their chents, Defendants Alcatraz Media,
LLC and Alcatraz Media, Inc., are not parties in this
action and thus they should not be listed as counsel
of record in this action.

3]

SO ORDERED this 30th day of June. 2OOG

/

WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGF

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

MAID OF THE MIST
CORPORATION and MAID OF
THE MIST STEAMBOAT
COMPANY, LTD.,

Plaintiffs,
V. 1:09-cv-0220-WSD-WEJ

ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC.,
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC., and
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Defendants.
ORDER

‘This matter is before the Court on United
states District Judge Orinda D. Evans’ Emergency
Motion to Quash Subpoena (“Emergency Motion to
Quash”) [1]. [Footnote 1: 1 Plaintiffs Maid of the
Mist Corporation and Maid of the Mist Steamboat
Company, Ltd. filed a Motion for Joinder [3] seeking
to join in Judge Evans’ Emergency Motion to Quash,
which the Court construes as a motion to adopt
Judge Evans’ motion. This motion is hereby
GRANTED.] The subpoena, served by William M.

Windsor, seeks Judge Evans’ testimony regarding

her mental processes and the bases for her decisions
in the closed case Maid of the Mist Corp., et al. v
Alcatraz Media, LLC, et al., No: 1:06-ev-714

ODE (N.D.Ga. 2007)

33

On or about May 20, 2009, Windsor attempted
to serve a deposition subpoena on Judge Evans 1n
her chambers. hand-delivering it to Judge Evans’
assistant. The subpoena’s return date is June 16,
9009. On June 3. 2009, Judge Evans filed her
Emergency Motion to Quash, requesting expedited
consideration of her motion before the subpoena‘

return date

Pursuant to ocal Rule 1(B). a party
opposing a motion must serve a response not later
than ten (10) days after service of the motion. L.R
7.1(B). NDGa. Excluding weekends and holiday:
and adding three days for mailing, see L.R. 6.1{A)
Windsor’s response is due on June 22, 2009, after th
June 16, 2009 scheduled deposition date
Accordingly, the Court STAYS the subpoena and
deposition until the Emergency Motion to Quash 1

{ lly briefed and the (Court de Ter the motion

SO ORDERED thi Sth day of June, 2009

WILLIAM 8S. DUFFEY, Jik
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDG!

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

WILLIAM M. Windsor
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION NO
1:09-CV-02027-WSD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS,
HAWKINS & PARNELL, LLP

CARL HUGO ANDERSON

PHILLIPS LYTLE, LLP

CHRISTOPHER M. GLYNN

TIMOTHY P. RUDDY
ROBERT J. SCHU]
JUDITH L. BERRY
MAID OF THE MIS
CORPORATION

MAID OF THE MIS

STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD
SANDRA CARLSON

MARC W. BROWN

ARTHUR RUSS

AND DOES 1 TO

Defendant

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR'’S AFFIDAVIT OF
PREJUDICE
OF JUDGE WILLIAM 8. DUFFEY

| Walham M. Windsor, the under
der pe nalty of
My nameas William M
‘Plaintiff. Lam over t}
Ompetent Lo testily and have |
matter tated herem
2 This William M. Windsor
Prejudice of Judge Wailham S. Duffey (
Prejudice’) is offered in support
Motion “( e Jude Duffey
| have served a
LO IY SO! Compan
17% Media. In (collectively
lam the Plaintiff in
ng myself pro se
lam not an attorne

In an effort to do the | ( iho de

Ol
pro sé party, Nave | tudied the Apple ible be ce real

Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rules, the Georgia
Code of Profes ional Conduct for attorneys, the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated. certain federal
ILE the Federal Rules of Judicial Procedure, thi
Kederal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Code of
Conduct for Uni Judges. and case

ali

law
based upon n

rye Opihton

;

refer to the document number
Action No. 1:09-CV-02027 WSD. W

‘to an “Exhibit #° is made, refer

exhibit attached to this or anothe)

ration/aftfidavit

In this decla

\ction No. L:06-CV-0714-ODE (MIST 1)

1Q In this declaration, references to
Duffey Docket #” refer to the document number i
Civil Action No. 1:09 CV 154:
(Deposition Action’)

| | This Affidavit of Preyudice of Willam
M. Windsor (Affidavit of Preyudice’) is provided im
upport of the Emergency Motion to Re«
Dduiffes

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1? Phe Factual Background involving
Judge Duffey and William M. Windsor 1
paragraphs 13 to 30

1.3 On June 3, 2009, the U.S. Attorns
representing Judge Orinda 1D. lev: Judge

Mvans”) filed a motion to quash a subpoena for

depo ition of Judge lwvans [Duffey Docket #1.]

L4 The motion was referred to Judge
Wilham S. Duffey (Judge Duffey”), and this created
the “Deposition Action.” Judge Duffey had neve)
had any dealings with me prior to the referral of that
motion. | never heard the name “Judge William S
Duffey” until on or about June 30, 201 There wa
no conference held, and there was no hearing held

On June & 2009. Judve Duffey entered

an order staying the properly subpoenaed depositio
Duffey Dor ket HA

16 Judge Duffey made a number of
mecorrect Statemen in the order dated June 8, 2009
(See paragraphs 118 to 121 below.) The order wa
{ { }

{ | |

totally pro Judge Mvar md it demonstra

the bia had hegun

li On June 8, 2009, 1 filed a Notice of
\ppearance pro se [Duffey Docket #5.) Lalso filed a
Motion for Llearing (Duffey Docket H6 |

Re: Qn June 10, 2009, the US. Attorney
upplemented his motion to quash. [Duffey Docket

}%) Qn dune 15. 2009. 1 fled a Motion for
Conference. [Duffey Docket #13 |

1) Q)n June 18. 2009. 1 filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order Staying Case and the
Twenty Ninth Declaration of William M. Windsor
[Duffey Docket #15.| This was filed to note the
errors In Judge Duffey’s order. [ file a declaration
with every motion because the FRCP indicates that
you must do so when the motion alleges facts. I also
have to file a Notice of Filing with everything that |
hile as pro se parties are not allowed to doe electronic

mings, so every time [ file anything, there has to be

at least three things filed. Now that J also have to

file a Request to be able to file, | have four things to
file every time | file anything

2 | On June 22. 2009, | filed a Motion to
Disqualify Judge Evans with and the Thirty Second
Declaration of William M. Windsor. [Duffey Docket
#7 |

Ae On June 22, 2009, | filed a Response to
the Motion to Quash and the ‘Thirty: Fifth
Declaration of William M. Windsor. [Duffey Docket
H21.|

Za On June 22, 2009, Lalso filed a
Response to the Motion to Supplement the Motion to
Quash and the Thirty Fourth Declaration of William
M. Windsor. [Duffey Docket #24].

24 On June 380, 2009, the Order to Quash

the Deposition of Judge Iivans was issued by Judge

Duffey [Duffey Docket 1H | The order described
meas “scurrilous and irresponsible.” This wa
written by a man who does not know me, had mn
met me, and who made such a statement and
decision based solely on my affidavit: The only
explanation for this response by Judge Duffey 1

he was predisposed to be biased against me because
l had the audacity to try to take the deposition of

Judge Kvans to obtain information that | need to

pursue my claims against various of the Defendant

25 On duly 10, 2009, I filed a Motion fo
Reconsideration and the Thirty-Seventh Declarati
of Willhham M. Windsor [Duffey Docket #3 1 | and a
Motion for Change of Venue and the Forty-Sixth
Declaration of Wiliam M. Windsor |Duffey Docket
#36]. The Duffey Docket Civil Action No. 1:09-¢.
O1543 WSD iS referenced and imcorporated heren
its entirety as prool of the total dealings betweer
Judge Duffey and me prior to July 27, 2009. ‘The
only affidavits filed in the Duffey Docket were filed
by me. so the only facts before Judge Duffey were tl
facts presented by me. This makes the scurrilou
and irresponsible ur eve ore antagonist
lunproper

26 On duly 2% AGLObS,
begin the instant civil action. [Dock

ae On the morning of July 28, 200%
a Motion for Temporary Restraming Order

| | asked for an inmediate hearing. Ju
Duffey did not set the heariny
3-00 pm

28 When | was told by Anthony
District Court’s Clerk’s Office that Judy
would be presiding in the in |

? '
straight home and prepared

Judge Duffey and a Motion for Change of Venue, and
| returned to file those late in the day on July 28,
2009. [Docket #15 and 17.|

29 On July 380, 2009, the Temporary
Restramimg Order Hearing was held. Judge Duff
denied the motion. [Docket #31.] Judge Duffey
a tributed a order Oh MY Moons regarding
service of process on Canadian defendants, watver ol
representation, motion to change venue, and motion
to recuse Al} were denied [Docket {22 Judge
Duffey was antagonistic and biased in the hearings
Details of this are provided in paragraphs 81 to 116
below and in the ‘Transcript of the ‘Temporary
Restraining Order Hearing {Docket #31.|

30 On August 3, 2009, I filed the

Mmergency Motion to Recuse Judge Duffey. The

entire Docket in Civil Action No. 1:09-ev 02027 WS])

IS referenced and Incorporated heremn as i attached

hereto

JUDGE DUFFEY IS HOPELESSLY BIASED
AGAINST ME

| There is not a cnance in the world that
| will get a fair and impartial trial with Judge
Duffey. Heis hopelessly biased against me. Judge
Duffey doesn’t even pretend to hide his bias; it 1s
plain Lo see

a2 Judge Dutfey is obviously friends with

Judge Kvans. Her chambers are just across the hall

from his. | hoped that Judge Duffey’s commitment
to his oath as a judge would be more important to
him than his fmendship with Judge Evans, but it 1
clear to me that his prejudice for Judge Hvans and

other judges ts overwhelming to him. All | want is 1

Q

have someone fair and impartial with an open mind
to listen to the facts and review as much of the

vidence as is needed to prove each of my claims
is obvious to me that Judge Duffey doesn’t care
about the facts and doesn’t want to consider the
facts

33 When | informed a prospective attorn

that Lhad drawn Judge Duffey to review Judge
Kvans’ Motion to Quash the subpoena that wa:

issued to Judge [vans for a deposition, | was

informed that I had “jumped out of the frying pan

and into the fire” or words to that effeet. | was
informed that Judge Duffey has a huge ego and 1:
mean. From my observation at the TRO Hearing

have to agree

MOTION TO RECONSIDER JUDGE DUFFEY’S
STAY ORDER
IN THE “DEPOSITION ACTION” SHOWS BIAS

34 | detailed the false and unfair
statements in dudge Duffey’s June 8, 2099 Stay
Order [Duffey Docket #4] in a Motion to Reconsider
Stay Order. [Duffey Docket #15.| 1 agreed that the
Stay Order was appropriate under the circumstance:
but asked that the wording of the order be changed
to represent the facts. | made the statements in
paragraphs 35 to 80 in that Motion to Reconsider
and the attached ‘Twenty-Ninth Declaration of
William M. Windsor (Dec #29”):

30 The Stay Order says: “The subpoena,
served by Wilham M. Windsor, seeks Judge Kvans’
testimony regarding her mental processes and bases
for her decisions in the closed case....” [Duffey

Docket #14 Dec #29 FY 29004

}

>

36. This alleged “statement of fact” 1s
unfair and improper because there was no such
evidence before Judge Duffey. In fact, | said just the
opposiote, and even offered to submit. my questions
in advance for approval. [Duffey Docket De
#IOQ YY 29005.|

37 There was no affidavit provided by Mr
Christopher Huber, the U.S. Attorney (Mr. Huber’),
or Judge Evans, so there were no facts before this
Court. for the Movant. [Duffey Docket #14 Dec
#29 4 29006.|

38. The « nly evidence before the Court
consisted of several declarations by me. These
declarations do not indicate that | “seek Judge
Kivans’ testimony regarding her mental processes

and the bases for her decisions....” [seek Judge

Evans’ testimony regarding other than her “mental
processes.” [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4 29007.|

39. | had to look up a definition for “mental

processes.” It seems to be defined as “the process of
thinking.” (iexhibit A hereto.) While some of what |
need to ask will obviously involve thinking, the
process that Judge Evans’ brain uses 1s not the focus
of my planned inquiries. [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dee
#29 4 29008. |

4(). l ask that the Stay Order be revised to
delete the reference to mental processes so that the
Stay Orders says: “The subpoena, served by William
M. Windsor, secks Judge Evans’ testimony in new
proceedings in the case Maid of the Mist Corp., et al
v. Aleatraz Media, LLC, et al., No: 1:06-ev-0714-ODE
(N.D.Ga. 2007).” [Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 4
29009. ]

11. The “closed case” language in the Stay

Order is inappropriate. The declarations and

motions before this Court and in 1:06-ev-0714-ODE
indicate that this is not a “closed case.” [Duffey
Docket #14 -- Dee #29 4 29010.)

42 | have conducted online searches in an
attempt to find a definition for “closed case,” and |
cannot find this term defined. The word “closed” 1:
defined as “not open” and “blocked against entry
therefore define the term “closed case” as a legal
action that is blocked against entry.” (exhibit. B to
Dec #29.) [Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 4 29011.)

13 It is clear that 1:06-CVY-0714-ODE is not
a “closed case” because there are motions being filed
pursuant to the rules of civil procedure and law, and
Aleatraz and | have not exhausted all remedies
available to us under the law and rules in this case
One of Mr. Huber’s justifications for quashing the
subpoena is that the “case was closed.” ‘The use of
the term was convenient for the improper purposes
of Mr. Huber, but the use of the term 1s improper for
this Stay Order. [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 §
29012. ]

Ad A Final Order was issued in Maid \
Alcatraz in December 2008 based upon a settlement
reluctantly agreed to by Alcatraz and me. That
settlement did not, however, include a release in
favor of Maid. We settled based upon fear of what
Judge Evans would wrongfully do to them, but we
did not give Maid or their attorneys any release, and
we did not agree that we would take no further
action in this or related matters. [Duffey Docket #14

Dec #29 4 29013.|

iD. According to my reading of law, rules,
and case law, I have determined that “proceedings”
do not necessarily end after a Final Order is entered

Specifically, Aleatraz and I have legal right to

pursue actions under various sections of FRCP Rule
60, under various Georgia statutes, under Local Rule
83.1C and 83.1F(2), under the Court’s inherent
powers, and probably under various rules and
statutes that 1 do not yet know about. [Duffey
Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4 29014.]

16. Judge Evans issued an order on May
22, 2009 in 1:06-ev-0714-ODE that noted that
\leatraz and | agreed to not appeal the Final Order
That is true, because we did not give up any rights
in so doing as the Supreme Court appeal time either
had expired or was to expire soon. [Duffey Docket
#14 -- Dec #29 4 29015.)

17 An appeal is defined as “a timely resort
by an unsuccessful party in a lawsuit to an
appropriate superior court empowered to review a

final decision.” he lederal Rules of Appellate

Procedure “FRAP”) defines appeal in Rule 3: “An

appeal permitted by law as of right from a district
court to a court of appeals may be taken only by
filing a notice of appeal....”. Appeais must be made
within the time prescribed by statute or by the
governing rules of the appellate court. Such statute:
begin to run only after a final decision has been
made. The timely filing of the notice of appeal with
the clerk of the appellate court and the appellee
completes, or perfeets, the procedure. If the appeal 1s
not taken and perfected within the time set. by
statute, the right to appeal is foreclosed. Ixhibit C
to Dec #29 includes many definitions printed online
defining “appeal” as “a proceeding for review at a
higher court.” [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4
29016.) The Twenty-Ninth Declaration of William
M. Windsor (“Dec #29”) is referenced and

incorporated herein as if attached hereto

48. The actions in 1:06-ev-0714-ODKE, the
Deposition and Action, and this instant action do not
constitute an appeal. There is no higher court
involved, and I have every legal nght to pursue
these actions 1n an attempt to see justice done
[Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4 29017.) That
ALL that I am trying to do.

19. Subpoenas and discovery are

permissible whenever a “proceeding” 1s pending. My

motions create a “proceeding.” [Duffey Docket #14
Dec #29 4 29018.! There is nothing in the FRCP
that provided that | could not take a deposition, and
the court clerk issued and signed the subpoena for
me after reading a letter that | sent explaining my
need as a pro se party.

50. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a district
judge must recuse himself "in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 155(a). [Duffey Docket #1

Dec #29 4 29019.]

51. In US. v. Serarra, the court said: “We
note that section 455(d)(1) defines "proceeding" to
include "pre-trial, tnial, appellate review, or other
stages of litigation." Mach of the statutory examples
of a proceeding implies the judge's participation in
decisions affecting the substantive nghts of litigant
to an actual case or controversy. For example, the
"pre-trial" stage, in most instances, begins with the
filing of a complaint, an indictment, or some other
adversarial document that identifies the parties and
the substantive issues to be litigated. Almost all of a
judge's pre-trial rulings and orders might affect the
ultimate adjudication of substantive nghts.
Accordingly, section 455 confers a right upon the
litigant to seek recusal at this stage. It follows that

the statute grants a similar right during subsequent
phases of the litigation, when a judge has already
decided, or is in the process of deciding, the most
significant issues presented in a case. We therefore
construe section 455(a)'s "proceeding" requirement to
embrace only such activity following the initiation of
an action by a private party or governmental agency
designed ultimately to modify or affect the
substantive rights of a htigant.” U.S. v. Serarra, 851
F.2d 621, 635 (11th Cir. 1988). (emphasis added.) It
"confers a right upon the litigant to seek recusa!

[during].... phases [*3] of the litigation." /a. Thu

: : " }
the proceeding requirement "embracels] only such

activity following the initiation of an action by a
private party... designed ultimately to modify or
AFFECT the substantive rights of a litigant." /d
(Exhibit H to Dec #29.) [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec
#29 4 29020.)

52. A pending proceeding is any proceeding
in which the rights of the petitioners are at issue. |
am a petitioner, and my rights are at issue in the
motions that are filed in the instant case and in 1:06
cv-0714-ODE. [Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 §
29021.]

55, The revisions in paragraph 29009 of
Dec #29 accomplish this needed change in the Stay
Order. {Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4 29022.]

o4. The language 1n the Stay Order
regarding the service of the subpoena is inaccurate
The Stay Order says: “Windsor attempted to serve
deposition subpoena on Judge Evans in her
chambers....” This, too, is incorrect information
improperly claimed by Mr. Huber. |Duffey Docket
#14 -- Dec #29 { 29023.

55. The Second Declaration of Michelle
Thornton (Ms. Thornton”) is attached as Exhibit D
to Dec #29. Ms. Thornton explains that she
determined the polite way to deliver the subpoena to
the receptionist after consulting with the U.S.
Marshal Service. Ms. Thornton did not go near the
chambers of Judge Evans. (Exhibit D to Dec #29.)
[Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 § 29024.]

56 | respectfully requested that the first
sentence of Page 2 of the Stay Order be revised to
read: “On May 20, 2009, Windsor’s agent hand
delivered a deposition subpoena to Judge Evans’
assistant in the reception area of Judge Evans’ s
office as the assistant advised Windsor’s agent that
she could accept the subpoena on behalf of Judge
Evans. This decision was made after the assistant
contacted the U.S. Attorney, and the U.S. Attorney
advised the assistant. that she couid accept the
subpoena and should return the $40.00 witness fee
to Windsor.” {Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 §
29025.]

57 The nature of the testimony sought i
establish that Judge Evans withheld documents
from Alcatraz and me improperly based upon eithe?
a talse claim by the judge or fraud upon the court by
Maid or their attorneys. ‘This has nothing
whatsoever to do with mental processes or decision
making. [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4 29036

58 The nature of the testimony sought
establish that Judge Evans ignored my report of
hundreds of hes and counts of perjury by Maid and

numerous false sworn pleadings, false pleadings

and improper pleadings by Maid attorneys. This |

nothing whatsoever to do with mental processes;

has to do with dishonesty and a fraud upon the court
(Duffey Docket HY] ] Dec H2Q | 29037

59 The nature of the testimony sought 1
establish that Judge Evans was biased against
Alcatraz and me and in favor of Maid. This ha:
nothing whatsoever to do with mental processes o1
decision-making; this testimony is sought solely due ti
the legal requirement that I must prove bias in orde)
to get Judge Evans recused. |Duffey Docket #14
Dec #29 4 29038. |

60 The nature of the testimony sought 1
generate testimony from Judge Evans that will
establish facts to support my motions to Recus«
Judge Evans. Among other things, I have stated
that 210 of the 410 statements in Judge Evans
Summary Judgment Order were false, and I have
documented these using the evidence that was befor
Judge Evans and ignored. This has nothing
whatsoever to do with mental processes or decision
making; this testimony is sought solely due to the
legal requirement that | must prove bias in order to
get Judge Evans recused. [Duffey Docket #14 -- De
#29 §| 29039]

6] The nature of the testimony

make inquiries as to whether Judge Evan

Kivans may have been improperly
influenced in this matter. This has nothing
whatsoever to do with mental! processes or decisi
naking; this testimony is sought solely due to the
egal requirement that | must prove bias or violation
of the law in order to get Judge Evans recused
\Duftey Docket #14 Dec #29 4 29040.]

62 The relevance of the testimony
to the legal proceedings is that Judge Evan

been impartial, has made illogical

orders that do not reflect the facts, has invented
facts, and much more. In my opinion, there is no
logical explanation for how a federal judge could
have handled a case in this manner. This ha:
nothing whatsoever to do with mental processes o1
decision-making; this testimony is sought solely due to
the legal requirement that | must prove bias in orde}
to get Judge Evans recused. [Duffey Docket #14

Dec #29 4 29041

65 »relevance le testimony 1s that it

hhould prove that Judge Evans was hoodwinked b

Maid and/or was so biased against Alcatraz and me
or in favor of Maid that the judge was simply unfai
to Aleatraz and me for some reason that only Judge
KMvans knows. ‘This has nothing whatsoever to do
with mental processes or decision-making; thi
testimony 1s sought solely due to the legal
requirement that | must prove bias in order to g
Judge Evans recused. |Duffey Docket #14 -- De
{ 29042. |

64 The testimony soug

|

ner

ym any other source or by any ot
Kivans 1s the only person who reviewed thi
documents in camera. Judge Evans is the only

‘son who knows what she was thinking and °'
he was so biased. ‘This has nothing whatsoeve
with mental processes or decision-making; thi
testimony 1s sought solely due to the legal
requirement that | must prove bias in order to
Judge Evans recused. |Duffey Docket #14 -- De
4 29043

65 Ihe mission of judge

istice is done. In Mad v. Alcatraz
done, ana Judge Evans was largely re

thi ‘The feder 11C1a)} must not

withhold documents, turn a blind eye to massive
perjury, 1znore the evidence before the Court, invent
evidence, and show a complete lack of impartiality
There can be no better use of the time of federal]
judicial personnel than to expose the wrongdoing in
this case. [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 4 29044.]

66 Mr. Huber stated: “ } declaration
Windsor states that the deposition seeks testimony
regarding the bases for Judge Kvans' decisions in the
underlying matter and to provide information to
attack those decisions.” This is false. Dec #8 filed
May 20, 2009 is attached to Dec #29 as [ixhibit. |
and is incorporated therein for all purpose
Nowhere in Dec #8 does it say what. Mr. Huber
claims. This copy 1s not notarized as it
exhibit. to the subpoena, but the copy of
was filed with the Court was notarized

Dec #29 4 29045.]

6 Mr fluber also tated “The purported
rationale for issuing the subpoena to Judge Evans |
to discover facts to support my Motion for Recusal
That motion h mady been denied. F hat
reason alone, the subpoena should be quashed a

| spoke with Mr. Huber on June 2, 2009 :;

} ee ; : rn ;
Mery Pi-boan he day before this Mo

ish was filed, and | informed Mr. Huber th:

xy a Second lot ()] 1d) “LISE Jude

addition

2()0)G

nother tederal judage
ommitted wrongdoing, | mo

that Judge Duffey pend a
mal act | t }

clerk review what has happened. I cannot beheve
that any honest court will be able to excuse what
Judge Evans, Maid, and Maid’s Attorneys have dons
[Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 4| 29GQ57 |

69 [ have prepared a list. of questions for
this Court to consider. See Exhibit #1 to the
‘Twenty Ninth Declaration of Wiliam M. Windsor
(“Duffey Docket #14 - Dec #29”) attached to Dec #29
as Exhibit #G. These questions highlight the major
wrongdoing in 1:06-CV-0714-ODE. If this Court
answers “yes” to many of these questions, this should
indicate to this Court that there has been significant
wrongdoing. [Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 ¥
99058. |

70 | have made many thousands of sworn
tatements under penalty of perjury in over 30
declarations, three (3) depositions, and court
testimony at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing. If |
have led, | will be guilty of perhaps over 10,000
counts of perjury. I state emphatically that | have not
hed, and there is not one single sworn affidavit from
Maid to controvert my sworn statements. | will gladly
ubmit toa polygraph if Maid and Maid’s Attorney
will do the same. [Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 §
29059 |

{| The true statement of facts in MIST
have been set out in the Twenty- Fifth Declaration of
Wilham M. Windsor (Dee #25") that has been filed
in MIST? I vans Docket #462

(2 | have done hundreds of hours of
research attempting to find a case that shar
similar facts to the Maid v. Alcatraz case. | have
been unsuccessful | have not even come close to
finding a case with the magnitude of legal abuse

that exist in this cas hay en unsuccessful

finding any cases where 46 of the 50 sworn

paragraphs in the verified complaint were false. |

have been unsuccessful in finding any cases where
the judge granted a $5,000 preliminary injunction
bond in a case where the damages proved to be
approximately $1,000,000. T have been unsuccessful
In finding any cases where one of the parties lied
over 400 times and ceommiited massive perjury, and
most of those hes and that perjury were proven with
the subsequent testimony of the party’s managers. |
have been unsuccessful in finding any cases where
the judge consciously chose to ignore the claims of
over 400 lies, perjury, and false sworn pleadings
galore. | have been unsuccessful in finding any
cases where the judge denied one party the ability to
obtain the names and contact information for
witnesses in discovery. | have been unsuccessful in
finding any cases where the judge made over 200
false statements in its preliminary injunction and
summary judgment orders. [| have been
unsuccessful in finding any cases where the district
court routinely violated its own orders. J] have been
unsuccessful in finding any cases where the district
court invented facts for the plaintiffs so the judge
could rule against the defendants. Perhaps these
cases exist, but | haven’t been able to find them
[Duffey Docket #14 -- Dee #29 4 29061.)

73. ‘This 1s a substantial case in which
approxiumately $1,000,000.00 has been “stolen” from
Alcatraz and me in the guise of a lawsuit. [Duffey
Docket #14 -- Dee #29 § 29062.]

74. If denied the ability to depose Judg
vans, | will never know if Judge Evans was a
customer or relative of Maid. | will never know if

Judge Evans. a President Carter Democrat. drove by

my home, saw George W. Bush and Saxby Chambh
signs in the yard and established extrajudicial bra
against me. | will never know if Judge Kvans
established extrajudicial bias against me because |
was in the U.S. Army during the Viet Nam years, o1
Wf the bias came because | was in the Army Reserves
for six years. | will never know if Judge Evans has ;
bias against overweight men with grey beards, pro
se parties, people in the ticket selling business, men
accused of calling a woman a bitch, or young people

who start and build businesses. The bias 1s clear

The problem is that | cannot prove extrajudicial bia

unless I can depose her. [Duffey Docket #14 Dec
#29 Y 29063.]

75. l have accused Judge Orinda D. Evan
of pervasive bias for the Plaintiffs and pervasive
prejudice against Alcatraz and me in 1:06-CV-0714
ODk. [Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 4 29064.]

76 | have accused Maid of hundreds of
counts of perjury, and | have documented the lie
and the proof in sworn declarations filed in 1L:06-C\
O714-ODE. [Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 4 29065

17 Judge Evans has turned a blind eye and
a deaf car to the perjury and wrongful actions of
Maid and Maid’s Attorneys in 1:06-CV-0714-ODI
[Duffey Docket #14 Dec #29 4 29066.|

78. Judge Evans has previously ignored my
claims of Rule 11 violations and perjury, and Judg
Evans has avoided giving proper consideration to the
merits of my sworn statements under penalty of
perjury in 1:06 CV-0714-ODE. [Duffey Docket #14
Dec #29 4Y 29067

79 | submit that Judge Hvans should be
found guilty of gross judicial misconduct. Base

upon the unbehevable mistreatment of

Defendants in this case, a possible explanation ts

that Judge Evans or someone on her staff was

improperly influenced. T have filed a complaint with

the FBI asking the FBI to investigate this matter
[Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 J 29068.]

80. Judge Duffey ruled that my Motion to
Reconsider was moot when he issued an order to

quash the deposition

MY IMPRESSION FROM TRO HEARING IS THAT

JUDGE DUFFEY WAS MEAN TOWARD ME AND
HOPELESSLY BIASED AGAINST ME

81. My impression 1s that Judge Dutfey 1s
mean. Any reasonable lay person sitting in Judge
Duffey’s courtroom at the Temporary Restraining
Order Hearing would say that Judge Duffey
demonstrated a lack of impartiality and a clear
antagonism to me. Much of this was in the way he
said the things that he said, but I believe the
transcript of his statements will also reveal the
antagonism. A transcript of the TRO Hearing ts not
yet available, but | am filing this motion prior to
receiving it due to the emergency need to get this
filed

82 Judge Duffey clearly violated the Code
of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”) as l read it. Judge
Duffey absolutely did not promote public contidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
(Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the CJC). lle violated Canon
3 B.5) by displaying bias and prejudice. He violated
Canon 3 B.(8) by failing to handle matters fairly. He
violated Canon 3 F.C) by refusing to disqualify
himself in a matter in which his impartiality would

be reasonably questioned by the vast. majority of the

reasonable lay people in America.

83. Judge Duffey’s violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct establish the pervasive bias that he
has shown against me.

84. There are many troubling decisions and
remarks by Judge Duffey in dealing with the instant
civil action in its first week. ‘They reveal a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism such that
removal is appropriate

85. At the TRO Hearing, Judge Duffey
came off to me as angry at me. He kept his anger
under check a lot of the time, but I quickly realized
that it was always there, and it surfaced a number of
times. lLinterpreted his comments about. my 499
page complaint as contempt. The complaint is
extremely long, but 380 pages were simply a hsting
of the false statements made to the court in the
underlying case by defendants in the instant action
The hes were listed for two very good reasons: (1) to
clearly state the issues, and (2) to force the
Defendants to respond to the issues in their Verified
Answers. This is a most unorthodox approach, but |
ama prose htigant who ts at an extreme legal
disadvantage in this case. | have always been an
idea person throughout my business career, and |
have done two extremely unorthodox things in an
attempt to cover my bases and simplify the
litigation. The detailed complaint should shorten
this proceeding because the verified answers should
accomplish a lot. The Defendants cannot dispute

their false sworn statements because | have provided

the proof, often in their own words. If they lie again,

they dig a deeper perjury hole. | expect they will
take the Fifth. T believe that if they can’t controvert

my sworn testimony and proof, they will lose. The

other extremely unorthodox thing that | have done ts
to prepare and file al! the evidence. Every document
along with an extremely detailed chronology of
events. It 1s massive, but it’s all there in Evans
Docket #462, which is referenced and incorporated
herein as 1f attached hereto. The Defendants can
conduct discovery with me, but | have already given

them everything that I could think of before | filed

suit. | swore to it all before a notary, and | will
swear to it all in court.

86. At the TRO Hearing, Judge Duffey was
much more than rude to me in criticizing the
Verified Action that. 1 filed. Specifically, Judge
Duffey indicated that | was improperly trying to sue
based upon criminal statutes. He said the criminal
complaints were shown as “counts.” I responded
that these were clearly identified as “RICO Predicate
Acts” and that | was not attempting to sue for
criminal offenses because | am well aware that such
action 1s not permitted. A review of Docket #1 will
show that the predicate acts were clearly identified.
See paragraphs 2759, 2801, 2862, 2868, 2874, 2880,
2899, 2931, 2940, and 2948 of the Verified Action
Docket #1. I did, however, prepare an amendment to
make it even clearer that evening so | could file the
“Request for Specific Action” to be able to file the
motion the next morning. ‘The manner in which
Judge Duffey handled this demonstrated his
pervasive bias and deep-seated antagonism. And the
Court Clerks refused to file my Request for Specific
Action to file the Amendment. | am trying to file
this again today.

87. The Verified Action does not. have
“counts.” See Docket #1, heading betore paragraphs

2692, 2741, 2809, 2835, 2852, 2861, 2867, 2873,

2879, 2898, 2930, 2939, 2947, 2955, 2972, 2980,
2987 3011, and 3016. The Verified Action
specified each legal issue as a “CLAIM FOR

RELI,” and each predicate act was identified as
the first paragraph under the “CLAIM” heading
(paragraphs 2759, 2801, 2862, 2868, 2874, 2880,

Docket #1). For example, these all read similar to
the following: “O.C.G.A. 16°8-3 1s a predicate act
under the Georgia RICO Act.” I felt this was totally
clear, but this 1s my first filing of a lawsuit pro se,
and | am doing the best that |can. It seems to me
that a predicate act 1s a “claim for relief with RICO,
because RICO requires that multiple predicate acts
be proven along with some other factors. Therefore,
clearly identifying each claim seems quite important
In acriminal action, | believe each of these would be
“counts” or “causes of action.” I believe Judge
Duffey’s complaint about this is merely a
manifestation of his deep-seated antagonism for mi
88. l‘ederal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“ERCP”) Rule 8 (d): “Pleading to Be Concise and
Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency. (1) In
General. Kach allegation must be simple, concise
and direct. No technical form is required.” My
understanding from this was that “no technical form
was required.” I generally patterned my Verified
\ction after the format used by Maid in the
underlying case with some improvements, including
the fact that all of my statements are true, and
virtually all of theirs were false. [vans Docket #1
| have no doubt that my Verified Action could have
been more concise, but I sincerely did not know what

to leave out If was clearly direct The Defendant:

cannot claim that there was any confusion about
what the claims are!

89. FRCP Rule 8 (d) (2): “Alternative
Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set
out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single
count or defense or in separate ones. If a party

makes alternative statements, the pleading 1s

sufficient if any one of them 1s sufficient.” 1 quoted

several different statutes in the “Claims for Relief”
and “Predicate Acts” as alternatives. My
understanding of this rule is that what I did was
sufficient. If it was not, I ask the Court for
understanding, 1f guidance 1s denied. | did my very
hest

90 FRCP Rule 8 (d) (3): “Inconsistent
Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many
separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of
consistency.” I stated “as many separate claims” as
felt | had. It seems to me that the best approack to
winning is to state as many valid claims as you have
in an effort to prevail on at least some. | find the
law 1s as gray as the world gets. If it were black
and-white, it would all be much easier

Q | KkRCP Rule 8 (e) “Construing Pleading
Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” |
sk this Court to construe the Verified Action so
0 do Justice

92 lf the Court has any problem of any
type with anything that | have filed or alleged, l ask
the Court to schedule a conference so any issues may
be addressed. My requests for conferences with
Judge Duffey and Judge Evans have all been
ignored. In the business world, we address problem

face LO face or by telephone email rax-or letter.

resolve them, and move on. | base this request on
the following research: "Court errs if court dismisses
pro se litigant without instruction of how pleadings
are deficient and how to repair pleadings." B.Platsky
v. CIA, 953 F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991). If this
Court feels this case does not apply, all the Court
needs to do is tell me why. | am happy to accept
constructive criticism and general guidance. [ am
not looking for the Court to be my attorney.

93. While I will try to do the best possible
job on pleadings, my research shows this: “...the
case law clearly indicates that the allegations of a
pro se jitigants complaint are to be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Justice Scalia in Castro v. United
States 02-6683) 540 U.S. 375 (2003) 290 F.3d 1270,
vacated and remanded. ON WRIT OF CERTIORAR!]
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT (December 15,

2003). “...pro se pleadings should be held to "less

stringent standards" than those drafted by
attorneys.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971)
See also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 86 (CA%
1980); French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 996 (CA7
1976). Pro se pleadings are to be considered without
regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are
not to be held to che same high standards of
perfection as lawyers. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of
arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies
rants. They should not raise barrier:

~

between litis
which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper
pleading is important, but its importance consists in

its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of

a just judgment." Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co
303 U.S. 197 (1938).

94, | expressed at the TRO Hearing on July
30, 2009 that | understand pro se pleadings are to be
held to a less stringent standard. Judge Duffey took
issue with that statement and admonished me
indicating that he has some problem with my filin;
He did not identify what those problems might be
Judge Duffey should have identified what those
problems were so I could address them. I believe hi
problem with my pleadings is his deep seated
antagonism that Iam filing anything. | am happy
address any concerns at any time.

95. At the TRO Hearing, Judge Duffey
expressed displeasure with the amount of time
required to read the Verified Action. ‘This 1s quits
disconcerting because my legal research on
pleadings primarily indicated problems with
complaints that were inadequate in terms of detail
\s a result, | was extremely detailed in an effort to
cover everything. I read cases about each and ever
“cause of action” and “predicate act, and |
attempted to cover the issues addressed in the ca
law. I also studied and used the Eleventh Circuit
Pattern Jury Instructions and the Kleventh Circuit
Grand Jury Manual on RICO in addition to
hundreds of case law reports

46 The Venfied Action is 499 page: but th
listing of the false statements 1n the Verified Action

filled 380 of those pages — just the hes and suspected

r

he Verified Action would have been 119 page
rather than 499 if I had left out the false statement:

(or if the Defendants had not made false statements)

lies.

/2 of the 119 pages constitute the causes of action and

“predicate acts.” I imagine I put too much in these

but I had no one to advise me, so | felt I had to cove)
all the things that came up in the case law that |
reviewed. I have been told that the rules do not allow
any attorney to advise me, and I have reviewed case
to that effect. So, lam on my own

97. My research also discovered thi In
Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, the plaintiff's ci

rights pleading was 150 pages and described by a

federal judge as "inept." Nevertheless, it was held
“Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for
protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor
to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to
technicalities.” Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway
151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeal
IS. | listed all of the false statements and

tatements that I beheve are false in the Verified
Action for a very specific purpose. ‘The Verified Actio1
requires a Verified Answer, and this Court should
start to see that everything that | have alleged ts tru
once the Defendants are forced to make statement
under oath. I feel that this Court has done a
disservice to justice and has violated my right

telling the Defendants to file Motions to Dism1
shielding them from filing Answer ‘hi
demonstrates extreme bias again

sb, | learned from my research prio

filing the Verified Action that the Federal Court
have recently been using Bell Atlantic v. Twomb/;
decided by the Supreme Court in 2007, 1n rulin
against inadequate pleadings. I read that Federal]
Courts across the USA rushed to this new dec)
dismiss lawsuits right and left stating that they
were not specific enough, didn't contain enough
icts, and such. I read that judges across the

country have ] ed thi new Case a 1mavic Wand

go through their stacks of cases, wiping them out
right and left by dismissal. I read that Bel/ Atlantic
V Twombly has been the number one quoted Case
when defendants file a motion to dismiss per
wWww.versuslaw.com

lOO. So that Judge Dulfey and the
Defendants cannot claim that my pleadings are
omehow defective due to the manner in which ths
Predicate Acts were presented, I prepared an
amendment to the Vemfied Action as Exhibit B to the
Request for Specific Approval to Amend Complaint
that | am required to file. I no longer have the right t

make filings without Judge Duffey’s prior approval

,

101 | based my amendment on FRCP Rule
15 (a): “Amendments Before Trial. (1) Amending a

Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading

once as a matter of course: (A) before being served
with a responsive pleading; or (B) within 20 day
after serving the pleading if a responsive pleadin
not allowed and the action is not yet on the trial
calendar. (2) Other Amendment [In all other «

a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party's written consent o1

‘he court should freely give

require

1O2 la d that Judge Dutfey grant Leave
to allow me t ‘the amendment under FRCP

15 (a)(1) because an amendment 1s allowed a
matter of course; | have not been served with a
responsive pleading; it 1s within 20 days after thi
Verified Action was filed, and the action 1s not o
trial calendar. In the alternative, ] asked for ]
ot the Court. wh) 7" court hould freely
pive...when ju

?

tice so requiré

103. Judge Duffey’s action at the TRO
Hearing on July 30, 2009 in instructing thi
detendants to fle Motions to Dismiss indicates to ms
that Judge Dutftey choose: to ignore the tact la I
this Court to review the evidence. Read the Tenth
Affidavit of William M. Windsor that was filed a:
hour before the TRO Hearing. which is referenced a
incorporated herein as if attached hereto. [Docket
#29.| It provides proof of some of the wrongdoing
Much more detail with citations to the evidence 1
the Twenty-fifth Declaration of William M. Wind
Kivans Docket #462, which 1s referenced and
incorporated herein as if attached hereto. Someons
needs to care about what these Defendants hav
LO4 In Maid v. Alcatraz, Maid did
action, did not even plead :
for damages, never amended the Verified C
but was led a summary judgment ba
ortious interference with fals« worn into
that claimed damages of le than $100
received $400,000 from Alcatraz and me
51 million in lhtigatio1 Kpense Compared
Verified Action has 1 I 108 andin

| found t ‘esearch

approach that pleading
ne IN! tep by coun e]
outcome and acces pl
leading 1s to f:

;

’
ill be COT) I

Conlev v. Gibson

Judge Duffey al

LO6

also questioned in the
July 30, 2009 TRO Hearing and was critical of me

for not having legal counsel. As I had explained
previously in filings with this Court, | was unable to
find an attorney who was willing to risk retribution
from judges and attorneys for filing a lawsuit

iainst a federal judge and a large law firm
bias against me asa pro se li
appearance of impropriety’ that

reasonable lay

Ul

In
lefinitely feel that Judge Duffey has demonstr:

That was

shown j

person. Rather than ndicule

or

|

istise me, Judge Duffey should have respecte:

in
position and provided just a modicum of support.

)
Above all, he should have cared just a tiny little bit
ibout truth and justice. I do not believe

?

that Judge
Duffey cares one iota about truth or justice

LICe beheve
e 1s mean and will do whatever pleases him
regardless of the law or fax
seem mean, bi

Judge Evans does
ut they share the other trait
from the Eleventh Circuit

pomeo!
, the supreme Cour

urt, or

Congress needs to step in down here and see what
happening. This isa fnghtening situation

107 tte

hat I didn’t even know that I needed to serve t

Defendants. (Docket #31

that nas

At the TRO Hearing, Judge Duffey

tia
Transcript to come.) H
Courtroom Deputy Clerk had to t
me ‘his 1s abs lutely fa]

iaise,
Dervaslve

and it demonstrates hi
bias and deep-seated antagonism
nown for at least 40 years that
to be served in a lawsuit
rbout the services

| have
» defendants |

} ' 7, " ,
Judge Duffey complained

ras:
acti y

of the

four days after the
omplaint was

lays alter the Motion
tor TRO Was filed as pro eSS Server mM New York
ind Michigan were handling serv

ice there and afte
A } } 7
ice in Atlanta had been partially

This was a mere 116 days before service 1s required
under the FRCP. Judge Duffey’s attitude and
comments were objectionable, and they sent a
message loud and clear to the Defendants that. he
was totally biased against me

108. At the Temporary Restraining Order
llearing, | beheve that Judge Duffey did not adhere
to the FRCP in berating me. Judge Duffey took the
position that he would not allow any party that had
not been served with the complaint to be a party to

the TRO Hearing. ‘Those are not the rules. As I read

it, FRCP Rule 56 is very specific about the need to
notify or attempt to notify the Defendants, and I had
been notifying the key people for two weeks.
Documentation of all of the notice was available in
writing as | advised Judge Duffey during the TRO
llearing, as required by FRCP Rule 56. The proof of
the notice to the parties 1s attached hereto as Exhibit
| belheve this demonstrates the pervasive bias
and deep-seated antagonism of Judge Duffey against
mi

109 At the ‘Temporary Restraining Order
Hearing, Judge Duffey made major changes to the
legal process in this cease. This must violate the
FRCP and is a violation of my Constitutional right
and rights to Due Process. He entered an order

requiring me to have all parties served by August

That is 35 days after the complaint was filed. The

KRCP provides 120 days to complete service with
extensions avallable for good cause. Judge Duffey
entered an erder saying the defendants not served
by August 31 could not be served thereafter unless
he approved. He took 85 days away from me for no
good reason other than deep-seated antagonism. |

1m anxious to serve all of the Defendants as sor

possible. One of the defendants has disconnected
telephones and email addresses that are now
disconnected at home and work, and she has

apparently moved and changed jobs. [ will hire an

investigator to try to locate her. | am also concerned
with service on the three Canadians because of the
actions taken by Maid in MIST-1 to block efforts
with Canadian witnesses.

110. At the TRO Hearing, Judge Duffey even
removed the requirement for the Defendants to hile
answers to the complaint. Instead, on his own
initiative, he instructed the Defendants to file
Motions to Dismiss. He did this having never heard
a word or read a word from any of the Defendants.
The Defendants filed no affidavits, and no one spoke
of the issues at the nearing other than Judge Duffey
and me. This indicated to me, and J believe everyone
in the courtroom, that Judge Duffey had already
decided the case. He claimed to have read the
Verified Action, but if he did, an honest judge could
not say that there was not a massive amount of
evidence before the court as to fraud upon the courts
and illegal activities of the Defendants. Judge
Duffey didn’t just provide indications of pervasive
bias against me, he might as well have just come
right out and said it. He proved pervasive bias and a
complete lack of impartiality.

111 | beheve that Judge Duffey was not
honest when he said he had read the Verified Action.
fle made a comment about my business, but the
Verified Action clearly explained that Alcatraz is my
son's business, and it provided a precise explanation
as to my limited involvement in that business
[Docket #31 — transcript to come.] If Judge Duffey

judge, he should have felt that | had established a
great deal of wrongdoing and did so under oath with
citations to the evidence in the Evans Docket. An
impartial judge should have felt that | either had th
proof or was the biggest perjuror to ever appear in a
courtroom. | have never led or knowingly made a
false statement in this court or in Judge Evans’
court. | have never lied in an affidavit or in a court
anywhere. I have never been accused of lying in a1
affidavit or in a court. Judge Duffey should have
reported Maid’s Attorneys and Judge Evans for
professional misconduct as 1s required by the Code of
Judicial Conduct. [lis failure to do so is also proof of
his extreme bias against me as werll as violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. He has only seen facts
from me. ‘There is NO evidence from the Defendant:
-none. Yet he has decided | am wrong. There is not
a shred of fairness, justice, or impartiality in that. |
have asked reasonable lay people whether they feel a
judge is biased if he reads about massive dishonesty
by a group of people and without hearing a word
from the accused, the judge decides the party
making the complaint was wrong

unanimous: BIASED.

112. At the TRO Hearing, Judge Duff
denied a simple request from me to allow the
Canadian Defendants to be served through their
Atlanta attorney. In his denial, Judge Duffey’s order
referred to FRCP Rule 4() as the rule I needed to
follow, as I already was well aware. RCP Rule
1(f)(3) actually says “by other means not prohibited

by international agreement, as the court orders.”

That is precisely why I filed the motion. TI believe

that Judge Dutfey’s motiy ALIONS Were le ir: do} |

anything to help Windsor, Judge Duffey did this
because of his deep-seated antagonism for me.

113. dudge Duffey has also ordered on July
30, 2009 that there may be no filings in this Civil
Action without his grant of Leave of Court. This ts ;
violation of Due Process Rights, violating my
Constitutional Rights to have my motions heard and
ruled upon, which denies my meaningful access to
the courts.

114. Judge Duffey even branded me as a
“litigious plaintiff’ in the order dated July 30, 2009
(attached hereto as Exhibit 2). “Litigious” is
identified as “tending to engage in lawsuits.’
(Iixhibit 3 hereto.) A “litigious plaintiff” is a person
who tends to file lawsuits.” Judge Duffey has no
basis to say that. He would have no idea what |
have and haven’t been involved with 1n terms of
htigation unless he has false information obtained
from some extra-judicial source. Other than Maid of
the Mist’s totally improper lawsuit against me, the
only lawsuits that I have been involved with
personally for the last 15+ years were two legal
actions involving real estate (one was an eviction in
which my wife and I prevailed but never got paid,
and the other was a small claims lawsuit by an

attorney trying to buy our home that was dismissed

because it was improper under the law). A third

lawsuit was filed against me in California by a
National Park Service employee who claimed his
photograph taken by me at a National Park while he
was on duty should not have been used on my
personal travel web site. My insurance carrier paid
the man $1,000 to go away. My 15 year history as
what Judge Duffey describes as a “litigious plaintiff”

is that my wife and T sued some people who bounced

their rent checks on our unsold Ohio residence,
stiffed us for $30,000 or so, and refused to vacate.
Contrary to Judge Duffey’s presentation in the order
dated July 30, 2009, that I am involved in “three
cases,’ the truth 1s that | am involved with one
issue: Maid of the Mist and their attorneys. Maid
sued me wrongfully. I have sued Maid.

115. The “lhtigious plaintiff’ case that Judge
Duffey cites in his order is Martin-Trigona v. Shaw,
a case 1n which a litigant had filed over 250 lawsuits
and used litigation as a cruel and effective weapon
against his enemies, who are more often imagined
than real. ‘Tmgona has reportedly sued literally
hundreds, if not thousands, of attorneys, judges,
their spouses, court officials, and other human
beings. His lawsuits have been pursued with
"persistence, viciousness, and general disregard for
decency and logic." He has used legal pleadings to
ventilate his contempt and hatred of persons of
Jewish heritage and to level accusations which "have
often been personal, have often emphasized racial o1
religious affiliations, and have often involved the
members of ... judges' and counsel's families." The
purpose, nature and effect of his resort to multiple
litigation has been to involve as many persons 1n as
many confounding legal processes as posstble. The
second Circuit issued a decision in the Martin-

Trigona case for authority that "Iffederal courts have

both the inherent. power and the constitutional]
obligation to protect. their jurisdiction from conduct
which impairs their ability to carry out Article ITI
functions." Procup v. Strickland, 792 ¥.2d 1069 (11th
Cir.1986) (en banc). Robert procup is serving a life
sentence for murder. The case involved an

Injunction to require him to have an attorney to file

any more claims. He had filed 176 lawsuits as a

prisoner plaintiff. ‘These were mostly frivolous, and

he fatled to comply with rules and procedures. The
case speaks only of prisoner lawsuits where there is
a big litigious plaintiff issue. The result was that
the injunction was vacated, and the case was
remanded. So now we have Judge Dutfey putting
me in the same category as Serial Frivolous Lawsuit
hiler Martin’ Trigona and murderer Robert Procup.
[ find this absolutely outrageous and strong proof of
the deep-seated bias that Judge Duffey has against
me or anyone who would have the audacity to sue ;
federal judge.

116. 1] have not impaired the federal court's
ibility to carry out Article IIT functions. All I have
done is try to find some justice somewhere. ‘This
action by Judge Duffey is proof of his deep-seated
antagonism for me, a father and grandfather who
had the audacity to sue a judge and expose
corruption in the judicial and legal system in
Atlanta, Georgia. | am outraged by Judge Duffey
classifying me as a litigious plaintiff.

117. Judge Duttey has made false
statements 1n his orders. This 1s a scary situation
when you are faced with federal judges who
routinely make mistakes about the facts or
intentionally make false statements as Judge Evans

did

FALSE STATEMENTS IN JUDGE DUFFEY’S
JUNE 8, 2009 ORDER TO QUASH DEPOSITION

IN THE “DEPOSITION ACTION” SHOW BIAS

‘lhe false statements in Judge Duffey’s
order dated June 8, 2009 in Civil Action No. 1:09-CY

1543-WSD-WEJ are the following paragraphs 119
121:

119. The Stay Order says: “The subpoena,
served by William M. Windsor, seeks Judge Evans’
testimony regarding her mental processes and bases
for her decisions in the closed case....”. [Duffey
Docket #14 -- Dec #29 § 29004.]

120. The “closed case” language in the Stay
Order is inappropriate. The declarations and
motions in the “Deposition Action” and in 1:06 ev
0714-ODE indicate that this is not a “closed case
[Duffey Docket #14 -- Dec #29 J 29010.)

121. The language in the Stay Order
regarding the service of the subpoena 1s inaccurate
The Stay Order says: “Windsor attempted to serve a
deposition subpoena on Judge Evans in her
chambers....” This, too, 1s incorrect. information
improperly claimed by Mr. Huber. [Duffey Docket
#14 -- Dec #29 ¥ 29023.) I provided a sworn
affidavit from my assistant that told the truth

FALSE STATEMENTS IN JUDGE DUFFEY’S
JULY 30, 2009 ORDER

IN THE INSTANT ACTION SHOW BIAS

122. The false or incorrect statements in
Judge Duffey’s order dated July 30, 2009 in the
instant action are the following:

123. “To warrant recusal or disqualification,

any bias “must be personal and extrajudicial; 1t must
derive from something other than that which the

judge learned by participating in the case
McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674,
678 (11t Cor. 1990).” [Docket #22 -- Page 3.] This

case 1s not the controlling case at the Supreme
Court.

124. Judge Duffey cites Liteky v. United
States (Supreme Court 1994) nearby in his order
regarding deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, and
then he also uses McWhorter v. City of Birmingham
(11% Cir, 1990) to claim that bias has to be
extrajudicial. Under stare decisis, the Supreme
Court trumps the district courts. Therefore, Judge
Duffey should have known that Liteky (a Supreme
Court case from 1993 — 3 years after McWhorter)
supports my position not Judge Duffey’s: “The fact
that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source
outside judicial proceedings is not a necessary
condition for ‘bias or prejudice’ recusal.” Liteky, 510
U.S. at 554 (emphasis original).

125. In this case, the deep-seated
antagonism 1s so severe that it really doesn’t matter
where it comes from.

126. “Windsor’s Motion to Recuse Judge

William S. Duffey [17] is DENIED.” I believe Judge
Duffey was totally dishonest when he said he

shouldn’t be recused. He claims calling me
“scurrilous and irresponsible” did not demonstrate
deep-seated antagonism. (Exhibit 1.) Give me a
break! | say that calling me scurrilous and
irresponsible demonstrates severely deep-seated
antagonism, a complete lack of impartiality. How
could a judge be impartial when he has fabricated in
his own mind that someone is evil? Judge Dutfey
wrote that “No objective, reasonable, lay observer
fully informed of the facts on which recusal was
sought would entertain a significant doubt about thi
[Court’s] impartiality.” [Docket #22, Page 4.| I’ve
got a deal for Judge Duffey: We will have a survey

done of random lay people. If the majority say that a

judge who called someone “scurrilous and

irresponsible” is not likely to be biased in a lawsuit
involving that person, I'll dismiss my case and
release all of the Defendants forever. If the majority
say that a judge who would say that is biased, then
re4sign from your position as a judge. You have
nothing to lose because you have already issued a
federal court order stating that this is how
reasonable people would view it.

127. During the ‘Temporary Restraining
Order Hearing, | understood Judge Duffey to say
that “he” didn’t feel 1t was appropriate to recuse
himself. [Docket #31 — transcript to come.] What
Judge Duftey feels is not the criteria to be used
Case law shows very clearly that it is what a
reasonable lay person would feel. Judge Duffey’s
order says that, but it is crystal clear that Judge
Duffey made this ruling because it was what he
wanted to do. It was clear to me that Judge Duffey
wants to control protecting Judge Evans and making
my case go away.

128. Judge Duffey called me “scurrilous and
irresponsible” without ever laying eyes on me or
learning anything about me. He made that
statement without knowing the facts about me and
while ignoring the facts that were in front of him

129. Jam not scurrilous. | am not
irresponsible. Not even close.

130. lam almost 61 years old. I have been
married for 38 years. [ am the father of two and the
grandfather of two. I worked throughout college and
paid most of my school expenses working as a disc
jockey and 'T'V announcer before starting the first of
my businesses as a junior in college. I earned a BBA

degree in marketing from Texas Tech University
where | was named to Who’s Who, served as a
Student Senator for two years, was the president of
varlous student organizations, was one of three
judges on the Faculty-Student Discipline Board, won
a number of awards as a speaker and debater, and
was involved in a wide variety of activities while
working full-time, serving in the Army Reserve, and
managing to make decent grades. | joined the Army
Reserve during the Viet Nam War and spent six
years in the Army Reserve.

131. Ihave been called “the father of the T
shirt industry” since I started the trade magazine
and trade shows for the imprinted T-shirt busines:
before ar-yone realized it was an industry. As a
magazine publisher and trade show producer for
most of my career, | have written hundreds of
magazine articles, manuals, and books, and I have
spoken at trade shows and conferences throughout
the US and in Europe and Asia. I have employed
thousands of people during my career during which |
have owned or served as President or CEO of over 50
companies. I served as President of a $225 millon

annual revenue company for Goldman Sachs and

CEO of a large company for Bain Capital, another
mega billion dollar financial group.

132. Ihave never murdered anyone. In fact
| have never been arrested or accused of a crime,
haven’t been guilty of a traffic violation or parking
violation in about 10 years, and didn't have a traffic
accident in my first 42 years of driving. I have never
smoked marijuana or used any drug of any type. |
very rarely drink alcoholic beverages. No one in our
family (wife, children or grandchildren) have ever
been arrested or accused of a crime. None of them

did as well as | have staying out of traffic accident
but they are all truly wonderful people who are a
benefit to society
This lawsuit is the first that | have eve.

filed pro se, and other than Maid of the Mist, | have
had an attorney file only one lawsuit in my behalf in
the last 17 years (and that was to evict a tenant who
didn’t pay the rent). I always show up for jury duty
We pay our bills, and we have an excellent credit
record.

134. My wife and I love animals, have a c:
that is like a third child, and we regularly donate
cat rescue organizations. I babysit for our

granddaughters as often as possible and drive the

first-grader’s carpool on ‘Thursdays. My wife and |

attend Peachtree Presbyterian Church. I rarely us
“coarse” language. My mother died of breast cance)
31 years ago, and our family has supported breast
cancer as our primary cause. My wife was friend
with Susan G. Komen’s sister, Nancy, and she wa
involved in the early days of supporting and helping
the Susan G. Komen Foundation. When my father
became ill in January 2008, I stayed with him day
and night for two months in the hospital and in hi
final days at a hospice. We never left him alone
because his mother dies when he was two, and hi
father as an entertainer who left him to live on hn
own throughout his pre-teen and teen years. | am
the executor of his small estate.

135. I loan money to people in need and will
do just about anything to help a friend. If you ask
my triends, former employees, and associates, |
believe they will say, contrary to Judge Duffey’
claims, that J am extremely reliable and have one o

the strongest senses of responsibility that you will

find. I believe they will also say that I have ai
extreme sense of right and wrong. I go by the rul:
and | believe everyone else should

136. Lam not evil, but I will readily admit
that J HATE LIARS. I am willing to fight for what
right.

isi respectfully submit that calling me
scurrilous and irresponsible is libel made legal] by
Judge Duffey’s position of immunity. He owes me an
apology, and he needs to amend that order to remove
the hbel. I assure you that it will be used again
Alcatraz Media and me by a company that Alcatraz
sued for breach of contract because the attorney
representing them was 1n the courtroom as an
observer for the Temporary Restraining Order
Hearing

138. Judge Duffey’s order of July 30, 2009

ays “He can, and will, receive a fair hearing hers

says otherwise. The actions and words of Judge
Duffey say otherwise. These words are an outrag:

139. I donot beheve that Judge Duffey
reason tor denying the Motion to Change Venue |
sincere, and it doesn’t appear to be valid. He cited
no case law to support his ruling. If every judge in
the Northern District of Georgia violates the Code «
Judicial Conduct, the ERCP, the Local Rule: P and
the Constitution in efforts to protect Judge Evan
there is no way to get a fair trial here. I will have t
appeal this

140. Judge Duffey’s order of July 30, 2009
says “...no party shall file any motion or other pape

in this case without prior leave of court. Thi

lwleventh Circuit has upheld pre filing screening

restrictions on litigious plaintiffs. Martin-Trigona \

Shaw, 1986 F.2d 1384, 138’ lth Cir. 1993) (citing
cases). ‘The claim that | am a litigious plaintiff 1

absolutely false as detailed in paragraphs 115 to

above. Martin-Trigona v. Shaw is not at all

applicable here, and Judge Duffey should ha

known it Al) you have to do js read the case

14] Judge Duttey violated his Oath to be a
judge, when he did not uphold the U.S. Constitution
in this matter. [28 U.S.C. §453.] Judge Duffe:
actions in denying, depriving, and overlooking my
legal and Constitutional rights were prejudicial to
me. Judge Duffey did not faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the mandated dutie
incumbent upon him. I beheve Judge Duffey act
without jurisdiction

142. Judge Duffey has intentionally
effectively denied my Constitutional right to
effectively "petition the Government for a redr

rievance U.S. Constitution, Amendment /

MY ATTEMPTS TO GET JUDGE DUFFEY OR
SOMEONE TO CARE ABOUT THE TRUTH

fundamental! legal } ues that exist ustice: |
ray play due proce , Constitutional! protection
right to a fair trial before an Impartial mud re; the
requirement that witnesses, attorneys, and judg
the truth; the requirement that witnesses, attorne
and judges do not violate the law

country and commit fraud 1pon the court. Judy
Duffey has branded me “scurrilous and irrespon

]
?

and a litigious plaintiff, both of which are absolut
false Judge Duffey has made false

tCatementl

protect Judge Evans and deny my right
have to wonder whether anyone 1n the district «
the Northern District of Georgia cares about a
ion of the legal system. While
Inconvenient to go to another district, | belie
ily way that I can get

eC COTTNIM) 4

4

mselves offer inducements to tran:

if, the persons so induced were predisposed ti

late the law and the offered inducements provide
act on their predisposition
ociety cannot long remain free if we permit thi

,

‘to offer more than opportunity

+

Or

1S. vs. Jannottie, 673 .2d 57§
and. Indes ]
LLer

i W

all protection
imply cover
believe if is vital to conside}
before Judge Duffey
lon LO qua h the depo

147. To make it absolutely clear: There
not a single piece of evidence and not a single
iffidavit from anyone with any defendant. They
have filed nothing. In either the “Deposition Action
or in the instant civil action
148 To make it absolutely clear: | have filed
VERYTHING. |: pent over 2,000 hour -compiling
verything. My purpose in doing so was to get all
he evidence into the court record, and | did
149. Now, let me explain why I did thi
knew that most of the statements in the Verified
Complaint of August 29, 2005 were false. I knew
Christopher Glynn had committed perjury and that
Maid attorneys had filed a false sworn affidavit. A
ecrious illness kept me from working on the cass
from November 2005 until Apri! 2006. When I read
Christopher Glynn's March 14, 2006 sworn affidavit
| knew that almost all of it was false.
eard Glynn le on the witness stand at th
-reliminary Injunction Hearing, | decided that |
should document all of the hes and false statement
ind statements that | felt were false. | felt that th

dishonesty would become a bigger issue in the cast

than the contract dispute: ii slander
omeone gave a deposition or signed an affiday
went through the transcript and marked the
oe lies. [| put these into a spreads
» permitted, | began gathering thi
prove the statements were false. My focus wa:
using their own testimony to prove their stat
false because | know that Alcatraz dispute:
tatements do not have the finality of when ;
from Maid admitted that their statements or
tements of a fellow Maid manager wer

time in January 2007, though | still had plenty of
citations needed to make it perfect. Alcatraz’s
attorney, Brian Raley, never got it filed. [ was sick
150. When I was informed that Judge Kvans
ruled against us on summary judgment, | have never
been more shocked in my life. It was wrong. It could
not be justified based upon the evidence. I had
informed Judge Evans on lebruary 2, 2007 ata
earing in her chambers that the Plaintiffs had led
r 400 times and that their attorneys had violated
Rule 11 repeatedly
LD] That Judge Kvans found us to be
stubbernly litigious” or in “bad faith” or whatever i
was that she claimed justified attorney’s fees wa:
mind boggling to me. We didn’t “expand” the
litigation. We dealt with their massive hes and
claims, and our focus 1n discovery was proving their

various statements to be false. as we have

ubstantially done.

L152 | was totally confident that we would
win on appeal, but the Eleventh Circuit relied on thi
facts quoted by Judge Evans rather than the real
facts, so we lost. Judge Evans made up her own set

facts, and many of those facts were blatantly false

153 lf wanted to go to the Supreme Court,

received legal advice that 1t would be a waste of
money because of the bogus fact problem. So, | bit a
hole in my lower lip and agreed to settle out of fear
for what Judge Evans would punish us with. I| fully
intended to pursue this matter as soon as | had time
to complete adding my citations and adding more to
my master chronology. The settlement agreement
between the parties in Maid v. Alcatraz does not
have any releases because | would not provide any

} ]
nave now aone wit!

the filing of this lawsuit. I agreed not to appeal to
the Supreme Court because we had already run out
of time on that, so | gave up absolutely nothing in
agreeing not to appeal. Appeals are an action to a
higher court, so my new lawsuit is not an appeal
action for fraud upon the court 1s an action that
permitted even after entering into a settlement. |
have case law on that, because that was the gating
issue that | had to resolve before preparing to fil
this civil action.

154. My first approach wa:
case reopened with Judge. Evans. On April 24
| filed a Motion to Reopen [Evans Docket #362], a
Motion to Recuse Judge Evans [Evans Docket #361]
and a Motion requesting Discovery in April 2009

f my documents and detailed affida.

filed many o
so my testimony and the testimony of Alcatraz
employees would be in the record. On April 2%
2009, | filed two Motions for Sanctions for ;
discovery abuse and Rule 11 violations. [Evans
Docket #363 and 364.] On May 12, 2009, I filed
declarations for approximately 750 customers that
should prove the claims about customer complaint

LO be false [Evans Doc Ket #368. | We seri these tt

Mr. Carl Hugo Anderson as we obtained them
2006 and 2007. On May 13, 2009, I filed

all the hes through my Third Declarat

Docket #377]. and I had a few mistakes

missing citations, so I cleans

Third Amended Declaration On May 13, 2009,
Fifth Declaration [Evans Docket #378] was my
attempt to get all of the documents into the court

record. I completed that. task with my Twenty-Fift

Declaration {Evans Docket #462]. The reason |

}

had to get all of this into tl record

Raley had failed to do so. | wanted everything in the
record before I filed this civil action, so discovery
would be far less important since about everything
that | know 1s in the record for all to see. | prepared
a detailed declaration showing Judge Evans’
involvement specifically.

155.
vans for a deposition. | did this after writing to her

and receiving no response. [Evans Docket #389. |

156. On May 22, 2009, Judge Evans denied
my Motion for recusal, Motion to Reopen Case, and
Motions for Sanctions. She declared my Motion for
Discovery to be moot. [Evans Docket #390.|

157. On June 4, 2009, I filed Verified
Motions for Sanctions against detendants Glynn,
Ruddy, and Schul for perjury. [Evans Docket #393
396, and 299.] I did this because of the law in
Georgia that enables you to get orders and
judgments set aside based upon perjury. My
research revealed that Rule 11 may be sued against
litigants as well as their attorneys. Procup v.
Strickland, 792 GI.2d 1069 (11 Cir. 1986)

158 My first goal has been to get the
judgment set. aside. Since the District Attorneys,
U.S. Attorney, and FBI have all said they don’t have
time for perjury or little million dollar deals like thi
this was my only option. | couldn't sue them for
perjury. | had to get Judge Evans to acknowledge
that they had committed perjury. So, | gave her all
of the proof on three silver platters. T have
requested hearings with many motions, but | have
never received a hearing.

159. On June 4, 2009, | filed a Motion to
Compel Judge Evans and Maid to produce

documents that they each have that | need to be 9

to establish that key evidence was witbheld from us
[Evans Docket #403.)

160. On June 4, 2009, | filed a Second
Motion to Recuse Judge Evans with additional]
information and justification. [Evans Docket #406. |

161. OndJune 10, 2009, I filed a motion to
disqualify the attorneys in the case because they

now have major conflicts with their clients. [Evan

Docket #412.] As Il see it, the chents may say their
attorneys told them to he, or the attorneys may say
their chents told them to file false sworn pleadings.

162. On June 15, 2009, I filed a Motion to
Stay. That motion has been ignored thus far. | also
filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit. [vans
Docket #418.]

163. On June 23, 2009, many of my motions
were submitted to Judge Evans for action, but she
has done nothing on any of them

164. InJuly, 1 filed rephes to vanous
responses filed by Mr. Anderson.

165. On July 10, 2009, I filed a Motion to
Strike Twelve Responses of Maid for lack of service
[Evans Docket #456. |

166. OnJuly 15, 2009, Mr. Carl Hugo
\nderson filed a Motion for Permanent Injunction to
Restrict Future Filings by me.

167. OnJuly 16, 2009, | held an Ikmergency
Motion for Conference. [Evans Docket #464.| Judge
Evans has gnored this just as she ignored
approximately six motions requesting hearings filed
SrLiCe April

168. OnJuly 16, 2009, | filed a Verified
Complaint of Professional Misconduct pursuant to
Local Rule 83.1C. Judge Evans has not. set this for

hearing as 1s required by the rules. | also filed my

‘Twenty Fifth Declaration that completed the filing of
all of my proof. [Evans Docket #462. ]
169. 1 filed several motions in Civil Action No

1:09-cv-01543-WSD (the “Deposition Action” created
by the U.S. Attorney). Judge Duffey took no action on

my filings, my request for a conference, and my
requests for hearings. My requests for conferences
have said: “Because 1 am pro se, and because of the
possibility that the filings of a pro se party might be
viewed with skepticism, Windsor respectfully
requests a conference with this Court and the
attorneys involved. Because I am pro se, and
because of his confusion with some Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Local Rules, Windsor
respectfully requests a conference with this Court
and the attorneys involved. Because I have a
number of motions pending, Windsor believes it
would be beneficial for a conference. Windsor
requests that this Motion be considered on an
expedited basis. Because Windsor’s limitations as %
pro se party could place him at an improper
disadvantage at any time, Windsor requests that
this Motion be considered on an expedited basis.”

170. ‘The federal judicial svstem does not
seem at all fair or efficient to me. | imagine the idea
of forcing everything to be done on paper is viewed
as a time-saver, but the inability to call or write the
judge or have a meeting 1s just beyond my
understanding. Businesses do not operate this way
We'd all go out of business very quickly.

L71. With Judge Evans ignoring everything
and refusing to schedule a conference or a hearing, |
began preparing my Verified Action to file in the
instant civil action. | had hoped to get things resolved

in the original civil action, but | felt ] had run out of

time. | understood there to be some statute of
limitations issues looming on the horizon, so I was
forced to get it filed. I filed it on July 27, 2009.
[Docket #1.] Everything that I have filed since has
had a very specific purpose.

OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE IGNORED BY
JUDGE DUFFEY PROVES DEEP-SEATED
ANTAGONISM AND BIAS TOWARD ME

172. Now, the evidence before Judge Duffey

is overwhelming and has not been controverted in

any way by the Defendants. So, the ultimate proof of

extreme bias and a lack of impartiality by Judge
Duffey is that he had all of this evidence available to
him, and he slammed me anyway. This is an
impossibility for anyone with an ounce of decency o1
honesty, much less impartiality. He is calling for
motions to dismiss after having that in front of him
This shows the most extreme bias

173. Judge Duffey has done this because he
doesn't hke the idea that anyone would sue a judge
hke I have.

174 Judge Duffey al Oo does
parties like me

175. Judge Duffey also doesn’t hke anyone
who files a lot of material like me. | wish there
wasnt so much, but there is. Iam also extremely
detail-oniented and thorough. | approach every

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2733%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.