# Reply Brief — City of New York v. Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2720%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2011
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1264

## Text

| | No. 10-618 S i

Sapte Cour, U.S.
FILED
FEB 8 ~ 201
Supreme Court of the United Stytes
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Petitioners,

METROPOLITAN TAXICAB
BOARD OF TRADE, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CourT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO

Of Counsel Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York

FRANCIS F. CapuTo LEONARD J. KOERNER*

SUSAN PAULSON 100 Church Street

ADAM STOLOROW New York, New York 10097

(212) 788-1010 or 1362
lkoerner@law.nyc.gov

* Counsel of Record
Counsel for Petitioners

February 8, 2011

234668 $

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

;

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pag

TABLE OF CON Tiere ret bescceccccs

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........... i}

REPLY ARGU Meme peas cecccccce l

yiagee a) | ee l
A. This Court Is Being Asked to Review
the Decision of the Court of Appeals,

Not the Decision of the District Court..... 3

B. This Case Presents an Urgent Question
of National Importance Requiring
Immediate Review ...........0ceeeeeee:

CONCLUSION 63 cus Eas oss cce 1]

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES

Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70 (2008) ........ Trerre ry 5

Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v
City of Dallas,
No. 3:10-C V-769-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140240 (N. Dist. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010)..... 8

Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Mich. Dep't of Labor & Econ. Growth,
543 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2008)............ 6

Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316 (1997) ........ ' 1,5, 6

Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v.
City & County of San Francisco,
546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008)... . 6

Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n ‘
King County,
No. C08-1048RAJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72409 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010)... S

Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939) D

Cited Authoritr

Page

Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York,

633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ....... 9 2
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co..

514 U.S. 645 (1995) ......... a eo 5. 6, 10
Ophir v. City of Boston,

647 I. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009)...... TTT 8
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder.

475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007)....... af 6
STATUTES
49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(6). 7
19 U.S.C. § 32919(a)..... ene ie
REGULATIONS
35 Rules of the City of New York § 1-78(a)(3)

(“Lease Cap Rules”)........... eals’ ruling, and that case did not involve
EPCA. See Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v. City
of Dalias, No. 3:10-CV-769-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140240 (N. Dist. Tex. Aug. 30, 2010) (front-of-the-line
privileges awarded to compressed natural gas taxicabs
at Dallas Love Field airport challenged as preempted by
the Clean Air Act).* The Court of Appeals’ ruling informs
other courts that they need no longer concern themselves
with finding the line between true incentives and de facto
mandates.’ Respondents’ assurances that courts in other
circuits will apply their own definition of “related to”
misses the critical point that, in cases challenging hybrid
vehicle incentives, these courts will look to the Second
Circuit’s EPCA-specific interpretation of “related te”

8. The Boston and Seattle cases cited by Respondents were
decided before the Court of Appeals’ ruling, and thus cited the
decision of the District Court, not of the Court of Appeals, for
the distinction between an incentive and a de facto mandate. See
Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009), Green
Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n v. King County, No. CO8-1048RA,, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72409 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010).

9. Respondents posit four categories of incentives that
would be safe from preemption challenges, but fail to apply these
categories to any of the numerous state and local incentives cited
in the Petition. Opp. at 36. None of the cited incentives fall within
category (1) (own use) or (4) (market participant). Categories (2)
and (3) are Clean Air Act provisions of limited applicability to the
I’ PCA-based preemption challenges addressed here.

9

before considering what that phrase has meant in ERISA
cases. The Court of Appeals’ ruling both diverges from
existing preemption jurisprudence and sets a uniquely
bad precedent for future EPCA cases.

The Court of Appeals’ ruling is already working its
mischief, and this Court should act swiftly to correct it.
Kach incentive program that is stifled before it can be
implemented will decrease the likelihood that other courts
will be presented with this issue at all. The interlocutory
nature of this appeal should not prevent the Court from
taking this opportunity to address the proper scope of
preemption under EPCA. The factual record in this case is
well developed, and the Court of Appeals’ decision, resting
solely on the basis that Respondents had “demonstrated a
likelihood, indeed a certainty, of success on the merits” of
their preemption claim, presents this Court with a clean
and clearly decided issue worthy of review. App. 12a.

This Court should not heed Respondents’ attempts to
distort or obscure the question presented. Respondents’
decision not to challenge the $3 upward adjustment of
the lease cap at the preliminary injunction stage (they do
challenge it on the merits), does not mean that this case
is not about incentives. See Opp. at 30; see also App. 5a
(Court of Appeals noting that “[fJor obvious reasons, the
| Respondents] did not challenge the $3 upward adjustment
of the lease caps for hybrid taxis, which benefitted them’).
To the contrary, this case squarely presents the question
whether the City’s clean-vehicle incentive program creates
a preempted mandate. Both the $3 upward adjustment and
$12 downward adjustment provide financial incentives for
fleet owners te change their economic behavior. Neither
the Court of Appeals nor the District Court drew any

10

legal distinction between the upward and downward
adjustments.’® The Court of Appeals’ determination that
the incentive/mandate analysis is irrelevant does not mean
that its decision excludes incentives. On the contrary,
it is dangerously overbroad precisely because it erases
this critical distinction and sweeps both incentives and
mandates within its reach.

Finally, Respondents are wrong in ‘epeatedly
asserting that the Petition presents a hypothetical
case to this Court. See Opp. at 3, 15, 20, 24, 32. The
Lease Cap Rules have been invalidated by the Court of
Appeals on a preemption theory that does not square
with precedents of this Court, or with how other Courts
of Appeals have understood those precedents. The Court
should reverse and remand, and the Court of Appeals
should be required to decide this case in accord with this
Court’s precedents. Whether Petitioners will ultimately
prevail under the proper application of preemption law
is irrelevant to this Court’s determination whether to
grant this writ. This case raises an issue of considerable
and immediate importance, because few if any incentive
programs designed to encourage fuel-efficient vehicle use
will be able to escape the breadth of the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of preemption under EPCA.

10. Indeed, the entire purpose of the District Court's
evidentiary hearing, properly required under Travelers, was to
determine whether the downward adjustment was permissible as
an incentive or preempted as a de facto mandate. App. 34a-35a.

1]
CONCLUSION

or the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorar? should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL A. CarDozo

Of Counsel Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York

FRANCIS F. CApuTO LEONARD J. KOERNER*

SUSAN PAULSON 100 Church Street

ADAM STOLOROW New York, New York 10007

(212) 788-1010 or 1362
lkoerner@law.nyc.gov

* Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioners

February &, 2011

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2720%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
