# Appendix — Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2621%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2011 - **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1178 ## Text APPENDIX District of Columbia Court of Appeals PERMIT UIE BEN, SPER ev cevesencenancnsonnaneactnseveacacvess Superior Court of the District of Columbia Opinion and Order (January 15, 2010).............. District of Columbia Board of Elections and {thics Opinion and Order (November 17, I os ec can erdusavassusdicceudecaavedhectheviensieveiestinknaxasaenn Petition for Review of Agency Decision and for Writ in the Nature of Mandamus (November 18, 2009) ...........ccccccccececececcececececeecess DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-CV-20 HARRY R. JACKSON, JR., et al... APELLANTS. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS, APPELLEE, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, INTERVENOR-APPELLEE Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CAB-8613-09) (Hon. Judith N. Macaluso, Trial Judge) (Argued en banc May 4, 2010 Decided July 15, 2010) Austin FR. Nimocks, with whom Timothy J Tracey and Cleta Mitchell were on the brief, for appellants. Rudolph McGann filed a brief for appellee Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General for the District of Columbia, with whom Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, and Stacy L. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief, for intervenor-appellee. D. Jean Veta, Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Paul A. Ainsworth, Anne Y. Lee, Richard Anthony Lopez and Jonathan Herczeg filed an amicus curiae brief for Trevor S. Blake, Il, Jeff Krehely, Amy Hinze- Pifer, Rebecca Hinze-Pifer, Thomas F. Metzger, Vincent N. Micone, III, Reginald Stanley, Rocky Galloway, D.C. Clergy United, Lambda _ Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and the Campaign for All DC Families, in support of appellees. Miriam R. Nemetz and Jasmin Sethi filed an amicus curiae brief for the American Psychoanalytic Association, the National Association of Social Workers, the National Association of Social Workers, Virginia Chapter, the National Association of Social Workers, District of Columbia Chapter and the National Association of Social Workers, Maryland Chapter, supporting appellees. Before WASHINTON, Chief Judge, and RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN, KRAMER, FISHER, BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, THOMPSON and OBERLY, Associate Judges. Opinion for the court by Associate Judge THOMPSON, joined by RUIZ, REID, KRAMER and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges. Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge FISHER, joined by WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and GLICKMAN and OBERLY, Associate Judges, at page 53. THOMPSON, Associate Judge: The specific issue before us in this appeal is whether the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics (the 3a “Board”) acted lawfully when it rejected appellants’ proposed initiative measure on the ground that the measure would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination’ prohibited by the Human Rights Act, and therefore was not a proper subject of initiative. As will be seen, however, the underlying issues are much broader and more fundamental. They concern (1) the allocation of the power to enact laws governing the Dzistrict of Columbia, within the framework of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act; (2) the broad legislative authority that Congress conferred on the Council of the District of Columbia (“the Council” or “the Home Rule Council’), subject to specific enumerated limitations; (3) the deference this court owes to the Council with respect to the meaning of the law that the Council passed to enable the people of the District of Columbia to share in the Council’s legislative power through an amendment to the Home Rule Charter, (and, in particular, the deference we owe to the Council’s interpretation of the Charter amendments, as reflected in the nearly contemporaneous implementing legislation that the Council passed); (4) the right of the people of the District to legislate through the initiative process, a right that Congress affirmatively approved when it voted to accept the Charter amendment; and (5) the unique importance of the Human Rights Act, the District’s comprehensive anti-discrimination law, which the people of the District of Columbia, speaking through their elected representatives, have long intended to have the “highest priority.” Thus, once again, we are called upon “to interpret a unique and complex governmental structure” that is the District of Columbia under Home Rule. Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 916 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (“Convention Ctr. IIT’). Appellants’ challenge focuses on the validity of Council legislation that requires the Board to refuse to accept any proposed initiative that would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited by the Human Rights Act (a requirement that we refer to herein as the “Human Rights Act safeguard”). Specifically, appellants contend that, in establishing that requirement, the Council overstepped its authority and acted in contravention of the District of Columbia Charter. Alternatively, appellants contend that the proposed initiative would not authorize or have the effect of authorizing prohibited discrimination. We disagree with both contentions, and we therefore affirm the Superior Court’s rulings that the Council acted lawfully in imposing the Human Rights Act safeguard and that the Board correctly determined that the safeguard required it to reject the proposed initiative. As we go on to explain, we reach this result because (1) resolution of this appeal turns on what legislative authority the Council intended to share with the people of the District of Columbia when it passed the Charter Amendments Act (the “CAA”); (2) the Human Rights Act safeguard is not inconsistent with the Council's intent as conveyed by the language of the CAA; (3) this court owes substantial deference to the Council’s legislative interpretation that the Human Rights Act safeguard carries out the intent of the CAA; (4) the relevant history convinces us that the Council could not have intended to authorize, as a proper subject of initiative, any initiative that would have the effect of authorizing discrimination prohibited by the Human Rights Act; (5) the Home Rule Act gave the Council authority to direct the Board, through the legislation that the Council passed to implement the CAA, to refuse to accept an initiative that would authorize prohibited discrimination; and (6) the Board correctly determined that the proposed initiative would have the _ effect of authorizing such discrimination. On the last of these points, our court is unanimous Factual and Procedural Background On May 5, 2009, the Council passed the Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009 (“JAMA”) D.C. Act 18-70, 56 D.C. Reg. 3797 (May 15, 2009) JAMA amended the District's marriage laws to provide that the District will recognize lawful, same sex marriages entered into in other jurisdictions. See D.C. Code § 46-405.01 (2009 Supp.).! JAMA became law on July 7, 2009, after Congress did not disapprove it On September 1, 2009, appellants—Harry Jackson, Jr., Robert King, Walter Fauntroy, James Silver, Anthony Evans, Dale Wafer, Melvin Dupree, and Howard Butler—filed with the Board their proposed “Marriage Initiative of 2009,” which is the The statute states: “A marriage legally entered into another jurisdiction between 2 persons of the same sex that i: recognized as valid in that jurisdiction, that is not expressly prohibited by §§ 46-401.01 through 46-404, and has not been deemed illegal under § 46-405, shall be recognized a marriage in the District.” Jd ubject of this appeal Through = the DI vs} initiative, appellants sought to undo JAMA amending Title 46, Subtitle I, Chapter 4 of the Code to state: “Only marriage between a man a! woman is valid or recognized in the District of Columbia.” After a public hearing on October 26 2009, the Board rejected the proposed initiative finding that it would “authorize[], o1 have the effect of authorizing, discrimination” prohibited under the Human Rights Act and therefore was “not a proper subject of initiative.” D.C. Code § 1 (b)(1)(C) (2006).- Appellant ought | po! receipt referendum measure, the Board shall refu the measure if the Board finds that it ubject of initiative or referendum applicable, under the terms of title I\ of Columbia Home Rule Act following ground () The measure authori authorizing, adiscrimtina 14 of Title 2 ict of the Couns to § 1-204.46 mandamus, asking the Superior Court to order the Board to take the necessary steps to certify the initiative to allow it to be placed on the ballot Appellants also moved for summary judgment. The District of Columbia intervened in support of the Board and moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment In the meantime, the Council adopted the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009 (the “Marriage Equality Act”) upon its second reading on December 15, 2009 D.C. Act 18-248, 57 D.C. Reg. 27 (Jan. 1, 2010). Thi legislation, which became effective as D.C. Law 18 110 on March 3, 2010, see 57 D.C. Reg. 1833 (Mar. 5 2010), expanded the definition of marriage in the District to include same-sex couples: “Any person may enter into a marriage in the Dzistrict of Columbia with another person, regardless of gender unless the marriage is expressly prohibited by District law. D.C. Code § 46-401 (a) (Supp. 2010); 57 D.C. Reg. 27 (Wan. 1, 2010). Thus, the Marriage Equality Act makes civil marriage available to same sex couples, just as it does to opposite-sex couples. It also provides that judges of record, the Clerk of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or such deputy clerks as the Clerk may designate, and “every minister of any religious society approved 01 ordained according to the ceremonies of his religiou society’ may celebrate marriages in the District. /d § 46-406(b). However, it does not require a minister Id. (italics added). The italicized language ection 1-001. 1¢ (b)(1)(C), sets forth what we refer to as the Human Right \ afeguard of any religion to celebrate any marriage. Rather, the Council expressed in the preamble to D.C. Act 18-248 its intent to “ensure that no minister of any religious society ... shall be required to solemnize or celebrate any marriage.” 57 D.C. Reg. 27.5) The Mayor signed the Marriage Equality Act, it was To that end, the Marriage Equality Act explicitly provides that (c) No priest, imam, rabbi, minister, or other official of any religious society who is authorized to solemnize or celebrate marriages shall! be required to solemnize or celebrate any marriage. (d) Each religious society has exclusive control over its own theological doctrine, teachings, and _ beliefs regarding who may marry within that particular religious society’s faith. (e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious society, or a nonprofit organization that is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious society, shall not be required to provide’ services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, ov retreats, that is in violation of the religious society’s beliefs. (2) A refusal to provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action, or result in a District action to penalize or withhold benefits from the religious socicty or nonprofit organization that 1s operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious society D.C. Code § 46-406 (c)}e) (Supp. 2010) Qa transmitted to Congress on January 5, 2010, see 57 D.C. Reg. 18 and it became law on March 3, 2010.4 Id. By the effective date of the Marnage Equality Act, the Superior Court had ruled on the cross- motions for summary judgment in this lhtigation. On January 14, 2010, the court granted the District's motion for summary judgment, rejecting appellants’ argument that the Human Rights Act safeguard provision is an invalid restriction on the right of initiative and agreeing with the Board that appellants’ proposed initiative would authorize discrimination. This appeal followed. We ordered that the appeal be heard en banc and granted motions by amici to file briefs. Il. Legal Framework An understanding of the powers of the Council under the Home Rule Act, of the District Charter amendment that created the rights of initiative and referendum, and of the nearly contemporaneous legislation that the Council passed, is critical to our resolution of this appeal. Accordingly, we describe these matters in some detail. A. The Home Rule Act 4 The Superior Court, this court, and Chief Justice Roberts, sitting as Circuit Justice, declined to stay the effective date of the Marriage Equality Act. See Jackson v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 130 S. Ct. 1279, 1280 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) The Constitution vests Congress with the authority “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation” over the District. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In 19738, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self- Government and Government Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777, commonly known as the “Home Rule Act.” Title IV of the Home Rule Act sets out the District of Columbia Charter, which establishes the organizational structure of the District government. D.C. Code §§ 1-204.01—1- 204.115 (2006). The Charter became effective when ratified by the citizens of the District of Columbia through a Charter referendum vote. See Home Rule Act, §§ 701, 704 (codified at D.C. Code §§ 1-207.01, 1- 207.04 (2006)). The Charter created a tripartite form of government within the District and vested in the Council the broad legislative power granted to the District. D.C. Code § 1-204.04; Wilson v. Kelly, 615 A.2d 229, 231-32 (D.C. 1992). Section 302 of Title III of the Home Rule Act describes that legislative power in broad terms: “Except as provided in sections 601, 602, and 603 [of the Home Rule Act, codified at D.C. Code §§ 1-206.01 to 1-206.03], the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within the District consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this chapter subject to all the restrictions and hmitations imposed upon the states by the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States.” D.C. Code § 1- 203.02 (2006).° Sections 601 to 603 expressly restrict the Council's power to legislate in several specific areas. See D.C. Code §§ 1-203.02, 1-206.02 (a), 1-206.03 (c) (2006). The Council has “no authority lla Under the Home Rule Act, the Council is empowered to pass legislation by a majority vote after two readings, at least thirteen days apart. See D.C. Code § 1-204.12 (a). In general, if the Mayor does not veto an act of the Council within ten days (or if the Council overrides a veto by a two-thirds vote), Council-passed legislation becomes effective after a thirty-legislative-day layover in Congress, unless disapproved by concurrent resolution. D.C. Code § 1-206.02 (c)(1) (2006). to pass any act contrary to the provisions of [the Home Rule Act],” except as specifically provided in the Act. Jd. § 1-206.02 (a). The Council may not approve a budget in excess of estimated revenues. Id. § 1-206.03 (c). In addition, the Council may not “(1) Impose any tax on property of the United States or any of the several states; (2) Lend the public credit for support of any private undertaking; (3) Enact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the functions or property of the United States or which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District; (4) Enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 11 (relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts); (5) Impose any tax on the whole or any portion of the personal income, either directly or at the source thereof, of any individual not a resident of the District . . . ; (6) Enact any act, resolution, or rule which permits the building of any structure within the District of Columbia in excess of the height limitations [established by Congress]; (7) Enact any act, resolution, or regulation with respect to the Commission on Mental Health; [for] (8) Enact any act or regulation relating to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or any other court of the United States in the District other than the District courts, or relating to the duties or powers of the United States Attorney or the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 1- 206.02 (a)(1)—(8). l2a Part E of Title VII of the Home Rule Act set forth amendments to the District of Columbia Election Act, D.C. Code §§ 1-1101—1-1115 (19783), and also contained a provision, section 752, entitled “District Council Authority Over Elections.” Section 771 (e) of the Home Rule Act provided that “Part E of Title VII shall take effect on the date on which title [TV is accepted by a majority of the registered qualified electors in the District voting on the charter issue in the charter referendum.” Thus, section 752 (codified as D.C. Code § 1-207.52 (2006)), became effective upon ratification of the Charter. Section 752 provides that “[nJotwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of any other law, the Council shall have authority to enact any act or resolution with respect to matters involving or relating to elections in the District.” /d. B. The Charter Amendment Act The legislative history of the Home Rule Act shows that Congress considered including in the Act a provision that would have directly conferred on the people of the District the power to propose and enact legislation through an initiative process. See Home Rule Legislation: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Dist. of Coiumbia on S. 1603 and S. 1626, 92d Cong. 161 (1971) (hereinafter, “Hearing on S. 1603 and 8S. 1626”). As finally enacted, however, the Home Rule Act did not provide for the power of initiative (or of referendum). Section 303 of the Act did, however, provide that the Charter may be amended “by an act passed by the Council and ratified by a majority of the registered qualified electors of the District voting in the referendum held for such ratification.’ D.C. l3a Code § 1-203.03(a) (2006). On May 17, 1977, the Council exercised its authority under section 303 to pass the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendment Act of 1977 (the “CAA”). 24 D.C. Reg. 199 (July 8, 1977); see also 25 D.C. Reg. 244 (July 14, 1978). The Council amended the CAA on November 1, 1977, making technical changes to the legislation before it was presented to the voters. H.R. Rep. No. 95-891, at 24 (1978). The District’s electorate ratified the CAA on November 7, 1977, each House of Congress affirmatively approved it, and the CAA (and, thus, an amended Charter providing for the right of initiative) became effective on March 10, 1978. Hessey v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 601 A.2d 3, 12 (D.C. 1991) (en banc); Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 399 A.2d 550, 551 (D.C. 1979) (“Convention Ctr. T’); 25 D.C. Reg. 244 (July 14, 1978). The CAA, codified at D.C. Code §§ 1-204.101-1- 204.115, provides in its definitional section that “[t]he term ‘initiative’ means the process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose 6 Section 303 specifically provides, however, that the portions of Title IV relating to establishment of the Council, the Office of the Mayor, and the judicial system as the tripartite form of government are not subject to amendment (except by Congress). The House-passed Home Rule bill would have permitted initiative petitions for Charter amendments, while the Senate bill would have required all Charter amendments to originate with Congress. The Conference resolution was to permit the Council alone to originate Charter amendments. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-890, at 2 (1978) (Conf. Rep.). l4a laws (except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval.” Jd. § 1-204.101 (a).’ The CAA provided a “very broad” right for the District’s electorate to utilize the initiative and referendum process.8 Hessey, 601 A.2d at 12. However, the initiative and referendum provisions were not self- executing and did not include particulars about how the initiative or referendum process would be implemented. Convention Ctr. I, 399 A.2d at 552-53. Instead, the CAA affirmatively required the Council to “adopt such acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose of {the Act] within 180 days of the effective date of [the Act].” D.C. Code § 1-204.107. C. The Initiative Procedures Act On April 10, 1978, a month after the CAA became effective, the Council introduced implementing legislation as Bill 2-317. D.C. Council, Comm. on Gov't Operations, Report No. 1 on Bill 2- 317 at 1 (May 3, 1978) (hereinafter, “IPA Report”). 7 Section 1-204.101 (b) states that “[t]he term ‘referendum’ means the process by which the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia may suspend acts of the Council of the District of Columbia (except emergency acts, acts levying taxes, or acts appropriating funds for the general operation budget) until such acts have been presented to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or rejection.” Jd. 8 For example, in September 1982, citizens adopted an initiative providing for “severe mandatory minimum sentences for, among others, persons who committed offenses while armed with a pistol or firearm.” Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1379 (D.C. 1989). Lda Many of those who testified before the Council on the bill expressed support for a human rights safeguard in the implementing legislation, and the Committee Report notes that, subsequent to the public hearings on the bill, the Council received “myriad telephone calls” in support. IPA Report, at 4—6. Bull 2-317 was reintroduced as Bill 3-2 in January 1979. Convention Ctr. I, 399 A.2d at 553: D.C. Council, Comm. on Gov't Operations, Report on Bill 3-2 at 1 (Jan. 31, 1979). The Council approved Bill 3-2, including the Human Rights Act safeguard, as the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act of 1979 (the “IPA”), which became law on June 7, 1979. D.C. Law 3-1, 1979 & 1980 D.C. Stat 7.9 D. The Human Rights Act In 1973, the pre-Home Rule District of Columbia Council promulgated Title 34 of the District of Columbia Rules and Regulations, known as the “Human Rights Law” (34 DCRR §§ 1.1—35.3 (1973)). Reg. No. 73-22, 20 D.C. Reg. 345 (Nov. 17, 1973). Through the Human Rights Law, the pre-Home Rule Council declared that “[e]very individual shall have an equal opportunity to participate ... in all aspects of life,” 34 DCRR § 9.1, and it announced an intent “to secure an end... to discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to discrimination by reason of race color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political ° The pertinent language of the IPA ts set out in note 2 supra 16a affiliation, physical handicap, source of income, and place of residence or business.” /d. § 1.1. The pre- Home Rule Council declared that it was using its “prerogative to legislate broadly,” and that the Human Rights Law was intended to be “far- reaching.” D.C. Council, Econ. Dev., Labor & Manpower Comm., Report on Title 34 at 2 (August 7, 1973) (hereinafter, “Human Rights Law Report’). The pre-Home Rule Council was explicit that it adopted the Human Rights Law pursuant to its police powers, explaining that Title 34 “shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the District of Columbia, necessary for the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property in the District of Columbia.” 34 DCRR § 1.3.!° 10 The pre-Home Rule Council also explained that: The District of Columbia Council hereby finds that the failure to provide equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life, whether because of discrimination, prejudice, intolerance or inadequate education, training, housing or health care, not only threatens the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants, but menaces the institutions and foundations of a free democratic society; and threatens the lives, limbs, health, comfort, quiet of all persons and the protection of all property in the District. 34 DCRR § 1.3. In enacting the Human Rights Law, the pre-Home Rule Council borrowed the language of a longstanding police regulation that had been enacted by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia pursuant to their authority “to make and enforce all such reasonable and usual police regulations .. . as “Concerned that [the Title 34] police power regulations might not have the same force and effect as a statute, the post-Home Rule Council of the District of Columbia re-enacted the [Human Rights Law] regulations as The Human Rights Act of 1977.” Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210, 217 (D.C. 2007). The bill (Bill 2-179) that became the Human Rights Act was introduced on June 16, 1977, within a month after the Council passed the original version of the CAA.!'! D.C. Council, Comm. on Pub. Servs. and Consumer Affairs, Report on Bill 2-179 at 1 (July 5, 1977) (hereinafter, the “Human Rights Act Report”). In reporting the bill, the Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs Council explained that, in doing so, it made “no substantive they may deem necessary for the protection of lives, hmbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the District of Columbia.” See Newsweek Magazine v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 376 A.2d 777, 781-82 (D.C. 1977). This court held in Newsweek that the Human Rights Law was “a valid exercise of the [pre- Home Rule Council’s] police power.” Jd. at 782 n.4. We explained that “we view the harmful effects of illegal discrimination ... to be so deleterious to our society as to affect the ‘lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons’ within the District and thus within the purview of... ‘reasonable and usual’ Police Regulations.” Jd. at 782 1! Thus, barely a month after the Council passed the original version of the CAA and before it passed the final version that went to the voters, the Council took action to reinforce the District’s far-reaching Human Rights Law. Bill 2 179, which became the Human Rights Act, was sponsored by all thirteen Council members. See Memorandum from Anglea B Howard, Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, to Robert A. Williams at 1 (regarding Substitution of Pages of Committee Report of Bill 2-179, The Human Rights Act of 1977) (July 7, 1977). changes,” but acted with “the sole effect [of] enact[ing] that law as a statute and thus mak[ing| it a permanent part of the District of Columbia Code.” Id. The Council intended to “reinforce[] .. . [its] view that the Human Rights Act is among our most important laws and is to be vigorously enforced by all agencies and officials of the Dhistrict Government.” Jd. It also sought to “underscore the Council’s intent that the elimination’ of discrimination within the District of Columbia should have the highest priority ...and that the Human Rights Act should therefore be read in harmony with and as supplementing other laws of the District.” Id. at 3. The Council understood that the District's Human Rights Law was “widely hailed as the most comprehensive of its kind in the nation” and sought to put it on “firm legal footing” by re- enacting it as a statute. Jd. at 2. The Human Rights Act, which the Council adopted on July 26, 1977, “has' remained substantially unchanged since 1977, having been amended only to add new classes to the list of those already protected by the Act.” Blodgett, 930 A.2d at 218 n.4. The Act continues to provide that “le]very individual shall have an equal opportunity to participate ...1n all aspects of life, including, but not limited to” those aspects specifically described. D.C. Code § 2-1402.01 (2007). This court has noted that “[t]he Council undoubtedly intended the Human Rights Act to be a powerful, flexible, and _ far- reaching prohibition against discrimination of many kinds.” Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 732 (D.C, 2000). Ill. The Parties’ Contentions Appellants contend that by refusing to accept their proposed initiative, the Board denied the citizens of the District their “guaranteed right under the District of Columbia Charter to be heard” on the issue of the definition of marriage.'* In ratifying the CAA, appellants argue, voters conferred upon themselves and all citizens of the District a right to utilize the initiative process with only one limitation—that the initiative process is_ not available to propose laws appropriating funds (something the parties agree the Marriage Initiative of 2009 does not purport to do). According to appellants, when voters approved the CAA, including its provision requiring the Council to “adopt such acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose of this subpart within 180 days of the effective date of this subpart,” D.C. Code § 1-204.107, they authorized the Council only to provide “procedural” rules to facilitate the people’s exercise of the right to initiative (and to do so “within 180 days,” id.). Section 1-204.107 did not, appellants contend, authorize the Council to “impose additional substantive limitations on the people’s mght of initiative.” Thus, appellants say, when the Council enacted the IPA and added the Human Rights Act safeguard, the Council exceeded the authority conferred to it by the CAA. Noting that the Charter Amendments are “in the nature of constitutional 2 Appellants assert that “voters in thirty-one states have participated in the initiative and/or referendum process to voice their opinion on... the definition of marriage,” and urge that the citizens of the District “are also entitled to voice their views through their votes on this important issue.” provisions, Convention Ctr. JI, 441 A.2d at 915 appellants emphasize that the CAA “cannot bi amended or contravened by ordinary legislation |ot! the D.C. Council.|” /d. (“As implementing legislation, the Initiative Procedures Act is valid, of course, only insofar as it conforms to the underlying Charte: Amendments’). Appellants urge us to hold that the Human Rights Act safeguard of the IPA conflict: with the broad right of initiative created by the CAA and therefore “cannot be used as a basis for disapproving the Marriage Initiative of 2009.”! Appellant ; also a ert that citizens of the istrict ma‘ not be ubje cted to a limit on their ability to propose legislation that diminishes their power relative to that of the Council because, in the process of ratifying the CAA, they “malde| themselves coextensive lawmakers with the D.C. Council.” For this point, appellants rely heavily on this court's statement in Atchison v. District of Columbia that the power of initiative 1 ‘coextensive with the power of the leyislature to adopt legislative measures, 585 ,; 50, 155 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Convention Ctr. lll, 441 A.2d at 897). However, the issue 1) Atchison and in Convention Ctr. IJ] was whether the initiative process would permit citizens to propose initiatives that were administrative or executive in nature rather than legislativ: We answered that question in the negative by explaining that just as the Council's legislative powers do not extend to administrative matters, an initiative cannot extend to administrative matters.” Convention Ctr. IIT, 441 A.2d at 907 Thus, we held that the voters’ legislative power could be no broader than the Council’s. /d. at 918. We did not consider or address the question raised here, 1.e., whether the Coun intended to and could lawfully, through the Human Rights Act afeguard, enable citizens to have legislative power that | more limited than the legislative power that the Council itself holds through the Home Rule Act. “It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expression ire used. If they go beyond the cass y may be respected but In contrast. the District contends that the CAA “gave the Council the authority to determine what acts were necessary to carry out its purpose, with ni provision for review of that determination by th) court or any other body The District argues that by giving the Councu this authority without defining the purpose and without including words of limitation on the types of acts that the Council could enact to carry out that purpose, the CAA “gave the Council authority broader than that necessary to ensure merely that mechanical procedures exist fo. Initiatives to proceed,” and established no “judicially manageable standards for determining whether th Council has properly exercised its discretion.” As a result, the District asserts, whether the Huma Rights Act safeguard is necessary to the purpose of the CAA is a “nonjusticiable political question.” The District emphasizes that the Council itself passed the CAA in the same Council session in which it devised the IPA, suggesting that the Council well ought not to control the judgment in a sub sequent sult wher! the very point is presented for decision.” Cent. Va. Cmty. Colles: Katz, 546 U.S 356 Hs (Z0UE (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) Moreover. what we aid 1n Convention Ctr lil y Al absent express or implied limitation, the power of th electorate to act by initiative 1s coextensive with t} power Ol! the legislature to adopt legislative measures.” 44] A.2d at #97 (italics added); see also Brizill v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 911 A.2d 1212, 1214 (D.C. 2006) (Voter “generally may approve through initiative any law that the Council may enact through legislation.”) (italics added). Thu rather than answer the question that is before u this case the quoted statement begs the question whether there is ar express or implied limitation on the right to initiat relevant here understood the CAA’s purpose as it carried out its mandate to enact necessary implementing law. Thus, the District urges, even if this case is justiciable, under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, this court should presume that the Council acted in conformity with that purpose when it enacted the Human Rights Act safeguard of the IPA. Therefore, the District maintains, any review of the Council’s action “should be highly deferential.” The District also stresses that section 752 of the Home Ruie Act gave the Council broad “authority to enact any act or resolution with respect to matters involving or relating to elections in the District.” D.C. Code § 1-207.52. IV. Analysis A. The Human Rights Act Safeguard Is Consistent with the Intent of the CAA. We begin our analysis with the observation that, although District citizens’ right of initiative is “very broad,” Hessey, 601 A.2d at 12, it can be no broader than the Council intended when it initiated legislation to share its direct legislative authority with the electorate. This is an important point, which reflects the fact that the people’s right of initiative in the District is quite different from the right of initiative in other jurisdictions.'4 In other jurisdictions, it is the people who, through state 14 For this reason, we have previously cautioned against “equating the initiative right here with initiatives under the simpler governmental structures of the states.” Convention Ctr. ITT, 441 A.2d at 917. 23a constitutions, have conferred rights on_ the legislature, but have reserved general legislative power to themselves as well.'5 By contrast, in the District, through section 303 of the Home Rule Act, Congress gave a broad grant of legislative power to the Council alone (subject to specified restrictions set out in Title VI, including Congress’s power to disapprove Councu legislation). In passing the CAA, the Council had to decide the extent of the legislative power it would share with the people.'® Thus, to resolve the issue that is before us, the Council’s intent when it passed the CAA is paramount.!7 Cf. 15 See, e.g., McGee v. Sec’y of State, 896 A.2d 933, 941 (Me. 2006) (“By section 18 the people, as sovereign, have retaken unto themselves legislative power and that constitutional provision must be liberally construed to facilitate, rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their sovereign power to legislate.”) (citation omitted); Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002) (“Article VI, section 1 [of the Utah constitution] is not merely a grant of the right to directly legislate, but reserves and guarantees the initiative power to the people.”) (italics omitted). 16 As this discussion implies, there is no _ federal constitutional right to initiative. See Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he right to pass legislation through a referendum is a state-created right not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”); Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Congress could “repeal the [District’s] initiative process altogether’). 17 The task before us is therefore fundamentally different from the task we faced in District of Columbia v. Wash. Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415 A.2d 1349 (D.C. 1980) (en banc), where we recognized that, while the “Council’s interpretation of its own authority [under the Home Rule Act, which was passed by Congress, not the Council] obviously commands great respect, .. . [it is not] entitled to weight beyond the inherent persuasiveness of the position taken in a particular instance.” Id. at 1351 n.5. 24a Stevenson v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 683 A.2d 1371, 13876 (D.C. 1996) (reasoning that ambiguous language in the CAA must be read in a way that expresses the Council's intent and rejecting the “premise that the bill as enacted meant something different from the bill the Council intended”). The Human Rights Act Safeguard Is Not Inconsistent with the Relevant Language of the CAA, Which is Ambiguous. a. The Definition of “Initiative” The words used in a statute “are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning” of the statute. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989); Brizill, 911 A.2d at 1216 n.8 (“The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used”). Thus, in our effort to determine the Council’s intent, we turn first to the language of the CAA. As already described, the definitional section of the CAA defines the term “initiative” as “the process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may _ propose laws’ (except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval.” Jd. § 1-204.101 (a). This is the language on which appellants focus primarily, arguing that the “except laws appropriating funds” 25a phrase is “the exclusive substantive limitation” on the right to initiate legislation. Although on its face this language may appear to denote that there is but one limit on use of the initiative process, the context shows that this is not the case. The Charter amendment that established the right to initiative must be read in conjunction with the Home Rule Act, which, although conferring on the Council broad legislative authority, makes clear that the legislative authority is subject to limits implied by the United States Constitution and to the enumerated limits on that legislative authority that Congress set out in Title VI of the Home Rule Act. See D.C. Code §§ 1-203.02, 1-206.02; Convention Ctr. IIT, 441 A.2d at 918 (explaining that voters’ power to legislate by initiative can be no broader than the Council’s legislative power). Since section 1-204.101 (a) obviously could not and did not remove those limits, it cannot be read as expressing the entire scope of restrictions on the initiative right. Rather, section 1-204 101—which Congress recognized as merely “defin[ing| the operative terms” of the CAA!8—does not purport to address, and is ambiguous as to, whether there are other limitations on the right to initiative (and referendum).'9 The Human Rights Act safeguard i: not inconsistent with that ambiguous language.?0 18 H.R. Rep. No. 95-891, at 15. 19 Appellants rely on the ballot language that voters saw and approved as indicative of the “plain” meaning of the CAA. We reject this argument. Appellants are correct that the ballot language did not tell voters that the initiative process could be limited. But neither did the ballot language inform voters about the appropriations restriction expressly stated in the 26a CAA, or about the enumerated limitations on legislative authority set out in Title VI of the Home Rule Act, or about the restrictions implied by the U.S. Constitution. The ballot read: r Che Initiative and Referendum Charter Amendment Authorizes 5% or more of the city’s registered voters (with 5% from each of at least 5 city wards) to propose laws and enact them by public vote or to repeal laws previously enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia by petitioning the Board of Elections and Ethics to conduct a public vote for such purposes. The Board of Elections and Ethics shall place such proposals on the ballot for approval or rejection. The above would not go into effect until October 1, 1978. Thus, the ballot asked voters to approve creation of the right to legislate by initiative, but did not ask them to vote as to the scope of the initiative power. 20 The Superior Court addressed at some length appellants’ argument that “[t]he expression of only one subject- matter exclusion, indicates that all other subjects are proper for initiatives.” Order Granting District of Columbia’s Motion fi Summary Judgment and Denying Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6 (Jan. 14, 2010) (hereinafter, “Superior Court Order”). As the court recognized, appellants’ argument appears to apply the interpretive canon “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” Id. at 10. As both the Supreme Court and this court have explained, however, that canon ‘is an aid to construction, not a rule of law.” Howard Univ. Hosp. v, District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Serus., 952 A.2d 168, 175 (D.C. 2008) (quoting Neuberger v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (internal quotation marks omitted)). More to the point, as the Superior Court explained in its ruling, the canon “depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which b. The Council’s Authority to “adopt acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose” of the CAA The other relevant language of the CAA is section 1-204.107, the CAA provision that directed fis] abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.” Superior Court Order at 11 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002)). Here, the canon does not support appellants’ argument. Section 1-204.101 sets out, via the expressed exceptions to the definitions of “initiative” and “referendum,” a list of sudject areas that the Council meant to render off-limits to direct democracy: appropriations, emergency acts, tax levies, the District’s budget. No inference can sensibly be drawn that by listing these subject areas and no others, the Council intended that the initiative and referendum process would be otherwise unfettered, i.e. subject to no non-subject-matter safeguards and restrictions. Cf. Convention Ctr. I, 399 A.2d at 553 & n.8 (recognizing that, without implementing legislation, the CAA did not “provide sufficient safeguards” against abuse, and relying in part on the Board’s statement that “safeguards that modern voters have come to view as essential” were absent from the CAA). And, quite the contrary, during the Council debate upon the second reading of the CAA, Council Chair Tucker, to expedite a final vote on the legislation, assured Council members that the matter of safeguards (including, as Councilmember Wilson put it, provisions to “protect the citizens against special interests,” and possibly, as Councilmember Shackleton thought necessary, referendum expenditure limits) would be addressed and debated in connection’ with implementing legislation to follow. Final Reading of Bill 2-2, “The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendments of 1977,” at 15, 16-19 (May 17, 1977); First Reading of Bill 2-2, “The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendments of 1977,” at 37 (May 3, 1977). 28a the Council to “adopt such acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose of this subpart within 180 days.”2! This language is in marked contrast to the counterpart language used in the _ bill’ that Councilmember Hobson introduced on January 3, 1977 ‘Bill 2-2, which, as amended, became the CAA). Bill 2-2 directed that “|t}he Council of the District of Columbia shall provide the manner in_ which petitions shall be circulated, presented and certified and measures submitted to the electors.” See D.C. Council, Comm. on Gov't Operations, Report No. 1 on Bul 2-2 at Attachment A 4 (March 16, 1977 (hereinafter, “CAA Report”). The CAA “necessary to 21 Kmphasizing this language, appellanis cite to cases from other jurisdictions in which courts, construing language directing the legislature to enact legislation to implement initiative or referendum provisions, have ruled that the legislature could impose only procedural rules, not additional substantive restrictions. We do not find these cases helpful, because none of them involved the broad “necessary to carry out the purpose” language used in the CAA. Further, the cases generally involve state constitutional provisions that (unlike the CAA) are self-executing, such that all that is left to the legislature is to specify the form of the referendum or initiative petition, see, e.g., Loonan v. Woodley, 882 P.2d 1380, 1386 (Colo. 1994) (applying Colo. Const. art. V. § 1(10)); and, in many jurisdictions, involve provisions that specifically direct the legislature to enact laws to “facilitate . . . operation” of the initiative process and/or specifically provide that “no legislation shall be enacted to restrict the right of initiative.” See, e.g., Cobb v. Burress, 209 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Ark. 1948) (explaining that because the state constitution provides that “laws may be enacted to facilitate” the right of referendum and further provides that “{n]o legislation shall be enacted to restrict, hamper or impair the exercise of the rights herein reserved to the people,” the General Assembly’s attempt to limit the time within which a referendum petition might be filed was beyond the power of the legislature and therefore was void). 2Ya carry out the purpose” language also is in stark contrast to the language used in the bills that were introduced in Congress (bills that culminated in passage of the Home Rule Act) that would have created a right to initiative and mandated the Board (not the elected Council) to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate (1) with respect to the form, filing, examination, amendment, and certification of initiative petitions, and (2) with respect to the conduct of any election during which any such petition is considered.” Hearing on 8S. 1603 and S. 1626, 92d Cong. 163. Similarly, the CAA language contrasts with the language used in section 303 (c) of the Home Rule Act, which also afforded the Council a model it might have used to declare its authority to enact merely procedural rules governing the initiative and referendum process. See D.C. Code § 1-203.03 (c) (2006) (“The Board of Elections and Ethics shall prescribe such rules as are necessary with respect to the distribution and signing of petitions and the holding of elections for ratifying amendments to subchapter IV of this chapter according to the procedures specified in subsection (a) of this section’). By comparison to all of those formulations, the “necessary to carry out the purpose” language that the Council used in section 1-204.107 appears to be purposefully undefined.22 Notably, in other contexts, virtually identical language has been used Indeed, from the language of section 1-204.107, it appears that, rather than resolve the issue of whether to express in the CAA any additional restrictions on the right to initiative and referendum, the Council decided to “evade that point and establish a legislative construction of the |Charter amendment].” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 113 (1926) 30a to authorize the adoption not only of procedural rules, but also of substantive requirements. See, e.g., District of Columbia Ins. Placement Facility v. Washington, 269 A.2d 45, 48—49 (D.C. 1970) (noting that statute that directed the Superintendent of insurance to promulgate such regulations as “he shall deem necessary to carry out the purposes” of the statute authorized the Superintendent to direct that insurance placement facilities ‘ssue crime insurance).2? The fact that section 1-204.107 placed no express limit mandating that the CAA- implementing legislation must be procedural only may be taken as “a convincing indication that none li.e., no such limit] was intended.” Myers, 272 U.S. at 128.24 At the very least, section 1-204.107 is 23 ‘The “necessary to carry out the purpose” language of section 1-204.107 also is strikingly similar to the “Necessary and Proper” clause of Article I, section 8, cl. 18 of thi Constitution, which the Supreme Court has construed as broadening the power of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956-59 (2010) (explaining that the “Necessary and Proper’ clause grants Congress power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers vested in Congress, “grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation” that goes beyond what is described specifically in the list of enumerated powers); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420 (1819) (concluding that if the “Necessary and Proper” clause “does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of |Cjongress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government’). 24 Additionally, the fact that in the CAA the Council reserved to itself the task of adopting implementing rules, rather than assign that responsibility to. the Board, suggests that the Council contemplated that deciding on the rules “necessary to carry out the purpose” of the CAA could entail a balancing of policy considerations that was more suited to ambiguous as to whether it authorized the Council to adopt additional restrictions or limitations on use of the initiative process. That being the case, the additional “restriction” that the Council imposed through the Human Rights Act safeguard is not manifestly contrary to the “acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose’ language of section 1-204.107. Focusing more. particularly on the word “purpose” in the “necessary to carry out the purpose” clause of section 1-204.107, appellants argue that the sole purpose of the CAA was to establish the right of initiative and referendum and that, by authorizing the Council to enact legislation to carry out that purpose, the CAA must be understood to have authorized the Council to do no more than to adopt rules to facilitate citizens’ use of the new power. However, they cite no support for their view that the CAA referred only to this mechanical purpose rather than to the concerns and objectives that motivated the Council to pass the act that became the CAA.25 We deem it significant that the legislative resolution than to administrative decision-making In commenting on the bill that became the CAA, the Board sought “a general grant of rulemaking authority to carry out the processes if approved by the voters.” CAA Report, at 3; H.R. Rep. No. 95-890, at 9 (italics added); H.R. Rep. No. 95-891, at 8 (italics added). By contrast, as enacted by the Council, the CAA directs the Council to adopt such acts as are necessary “to carry out the purpose” of the CAA. The difference in language is striking. See also D.C. Code § 1-1021.02 (2006) (IPA provision that directed the Board to “issue rules and regulations to effect the provisions of’ the IPA) (italics added). 25 Qur dissenting colleagues refer to the preamble to the CAA as printed in the D.C. Statutes-at-Large (“To amend the Charter of the District of Columbia to provide for the power of CAA Report refers to the initiative, referendum, and recall processes as “legacies of the Progressive Era in American politics” that are designed “to provide direct and continual accountability of public official to the electorate.” CAA Report, at 2; see also H.R Rep. No. 95-890, at 8 (containing the same explanation).2° If this is the broad purpose of the CAA, the Council could reasonably have thought, fo: example, that it was necessary to that purpose—i.e the purpose of helping to ensure that the Council initiative, referendum, and recall,” 1978 D.C. Stat. 33) and argue that this resolves “any mystery about the purpose of th CAA.” They do not discuss the preamble to the Human Right Act as printed in the D.C. Statutes-at-Large: “To enact Regulation 73-22, A Regulation Governing Human Rights D.C. Law 2-38, 1977 D.C. Stat i161. The discussion supra documents that the Council had a much more expansiv purpose in mind in enacting the Human Rights Act, including to “underscore the Council’s intent that the elimination of discrimination within the District of Columbia should have th highest priority ... and that the Human Rights Act should therefore be read in harmony with and as supplementing othe: laws of the District.” Human Rights Act Report, at 3. Just a the brief preamble to the Human Rights Act does not discloss this broader purpose, there is no reason to treat the briet preamble to the CAA as disclosing the Council's full purpose 26 That this was a purpose that the Council likely had in mind when it passed the CAA also | uggested by th legislative history of the Home Rule Act, in which there wer discussions of the initiative, referendum and recall processes a means of assuring that elected officials remained responsiv: the electorate. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee o1 Government Operations of the Committee on the District of Columbia, 93d Cong. 11 (1978) (statement explaining that there was probably no need for these powe) ince Council members would be made “additionally re ponsive by then then-proposed two-year terms and since there would continu to be “Federal Government oversight” and “the continu restraining effect of the federal presence”) was accountable to the ntire electorate—for ths Council to disallow » of the initiative oO! referendum process t act legislation that woul have the effect of discriminating against sectors the electorate who might need protection from thi “major form: of discrimination current! encountered citizens. Human Right: Report, : cribing the target of the Hun Right Indeed uc! ‘ n ppt ! Council's reference, in the LPA Report concurrence in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1 Lommiuttes on Government Operation quoted Dougla tatement (which itself quoted the writing Madison) about the need to Lect inoritie iron which the Government is thi nstrument of tl number of the Constituent l ‘87 (Doug oncurring) (citation an nternal quot O mark IPA Report, at 11 id, during the Council debat first reading « IPA, Councilmember Wil xpre ed con mn al nov an government decisions that mt : fa whol iccuse|d Reading iSOnaD|Ly {the IPA ' tne point petween ifewuara DrovVvi CAA Night hu 7 avpret I le} not to econa-gue ouncil’ judgement uffhoientiv strong e of the CAA and the ind Lo decide whethe T the re onnection between the purpos Human Rights Act safewuard. Th the xtent 0 which aepret (>i afeguard s| } end the closene conduce|s relation hip between the mean adopt d and the end to be attained, [were] matters for [the legislature’ determination alons Comstock, 130 8. Ct be “necessary to carry out the purpose CAA, it was not required that the Human Right absolutely necessar' ) proce Se » be launs hed ifemuard be enabk nitiative and referenda l'o conclude that the Human Righ afeguardad ith the CAA, } nough that we incons) W tha on the Hun Rights Act safeyuard l not manifestiv contra) ti the “purpose” of the CAA In short, analysis of the text of the CAA does not enable us to agree with appellants that the Council contravened the express language of the CAA 1: enacting the Human Rights Act saferuard \nd quite the contrary, other factors persuade us tha the Council acted in a manner consistent with it intent when it passed the CAA 2. The Council’s Interpretation of the CAA, Which is Reflected in the IPA Human Rights Act Safeguard, Is Entitled to Substantial Deference. Although the language of the CAA do not tell us whether the Council intended that the CAA implementing legislation could set out additio1 limitations on the right to initiative, what the Council did in) enacting the IPA provid an authoritative interpretation of the intent and meaning of the CAA. This follows from the principl that “a contemporaneous legislative exposition of th Constitution @: by analogy thi Charter! Amendments] when thi frame! were ictively participating in public affan icquiesced i for a long term of years, fixes the construction to bi piven |the Constitution's} provisions. Aldred Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2003) (quoting Myer 72 U.S. at 175): see also Printz (/nited Stat 2 US SO 905 (1997) (Cl|Elarly congressional enactments provide contemporaneous and weight evidence of the Constitutions meanineg!.!”) (citatio! ind internal quotation mark mitted). The principl 36a that the Supreme Court re-affirmed in Eldred is squarely applicable here, because the Council that authored and, in April 1978, began consideration of the bill that became the IPA was largely the same Council that passed the CAA in May 1977.29 We agree with the District that these facts—i.e., the passage of the IPA by Council members who also were the “framers” of the Charter Amendments, and the near-contemporaneity of their work on first the CAA and then the IPA—dictate that we accord substantial deference to the Council’s “legislative construction’®° of the CAA as expressed in the IPA, which was intended to implement the CAA.?! 29 ‘Ten of the thirteen Council members who voted in favor of the CAA were still on the Council when the IPA was passed in March 1979, and all ten voted in favor of enactment; an eleventh, Marion Barry, was still on the Council when the bill that became the IPA was introduced in April 1978, and later, as then-Mayor, signed the IPA into law. 30 Myers, 272 US. at 113. 31 Cf. Winters vu. Ridley, 596 A.2d 569, 572, 577 (D.C. 1991) (Schwelb, J., concurring) (discussing whether an inmate's “good time credit” accumulated pursuant to the “Good Time Credits Act” (“GTCA”) passed in 1986 could be applied to reduce the inmate’s mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree murder; observing that ten of the thirteen members of the Council who passed the GTCA were also members of the Council in 1989; and reasoning that the Council’s unanimous passage in 1989 of a resolution and legislation declaring that the GTCA was not intended to affect mandatory minimum sentences imposed for first-degree murder was “surely revealing as to what the 1986 Council intended to accomplish” through the GTCA and “provide{d] persuasive evidence of [the Council’s}] intent in 1986... . [i]Jn the absence of evidence that the members of the Council were mistaken, or worse, about what they initially intended”). 37a That is not to say that we must accept any provision that the Council enacted as part of the IPA; we have not hesitated to strike down a provision of the IPA where it squarely conflicted with a provision of the CAA. See Price v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 645 A.2d 594, 596-99 (D.C. 1994) (striking down IPA provision that required the Board to use the November 1989 voter registration roll to calculate the number of signatures required for an initiative or referendum petition where the specific terms of the CAA required use of the December 1993 voter registration roll, because “to the extent any IPA provision is inconsistent with the Charter Amendments, the latter controls”); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (explaining that longstanding acceptance will not “save [a practice] if it is contrary to the Constitution”). But where, as here, the relevant CAA provisions admit of more than one meaning, the Council’s legislative construction of those provisions when it drafted the IPA less than a year after it passed the CAA is entitled to substantial weight. Myers, 272 U.S. at 113, 174—75.#2 Thus, we must begin with a presumption that the Human Rights Act safeguard that the Council 32 See also Winters, 596 A.2d at 578 (Schwelb, J., concurring) (“The views of a subsequent legislature are not conclusive as to the intent of an earlier one, but they carry ‘considerable retrospective weight.”) (quoting Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 211 (1985)); Stevenson, 683 A.2d at 1376 (observing that “the legislative history both at the time of enactment and afterwards . . . points unmistakably to the Council’s intent” in enacting the “5 percent” language of the CAA) (italics added). 38a enacted as part of the IPA is consistent with the CAA. That there was more than one _ possible interpretation of the relevant provisions of the CAA was made evident at the outset, when, during the debate on the IPA, both the Corporation Counsel and the General Counsel to the Council advised that the Council did not have the power to impose the Human Rights Act safeguard.33 But the elected representatives of the people—the Council and the Mayor—thought otherwise. Importantly, it was the Council members, not the lawyers, who were privy to the full panoply of discussions, conferences, and considerations that led to adoption of the CAA, and who had the authority to propose and vote on the IPA. It is their understanding that informs our analysis.34 An observation by the Supreme Court in 33 For example, the Office of Corporation Counsel opined that “[aJny substantive restrictions on the rights of the voters . . . are contrary to [the CAA] and, hence, are void and of no effect,” Supplemental Memorandum from Louis P. Robbins, Principa!' Deputy Corporation Counsel, Office of the Corporation Counsel to Judith W. Rogers, Special Assistant for Legislation, at 2 (June 2, 1978) (3 Op. C.C.D.C. 102, 103 (1978)); see also Memorandum from Edward B. Webb, Jr., General Counsel to Council Members, at 2 (June 7, 1978) (opining that the Human Rights Act safeguard “engrafts ... a new requirement not in the Charter amendment” and represents “an indirect attempt to further amend the Charter and is, therefore, legally without effect”). 34 And, although a few Council members questioned whether the IPA restriction on referenda dealing with any budget item (including capital budget items) comported with the CAA, see Second kKeading of Bill 3-2, “Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act of 1979,” Excerpt at 7 10, 15 (Mar. 27, 1979), we see no evidence that any Council 39a Myers is instructive. The issue before the Court in that case was whether “under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 272 U.S. at 106. The Court noted that the First Congress had decided the issue—i.e., had “early adopted as the practical construction of the Constitution that this power was vested in the President alone[,]” id. at 153—“wirain two years after the Constitutional Convention and within a much shorter time after its ratification[,]” and while “numberfing] among its leaders those who had been members oi the Convention.” Jd. at 136. Regarding the First Congress’s decision, the Supreme Court observed that “[iJt was of course to be expected that the decision would be received by lawyers and jurists with something of the same division of opinion as that manifested in Congress, and doubts were often expressed as to its correctness.” Jd. Nevertheless, the Court observed, “the acquiescence which was promptly accorded [the First Congress's interpretation] after a few years was universally recognized.” Jd. “[T]he decision of Congress in 1789 and the universal practice of the Government under it, had settled the question beyond any power of alteration.” Id. at 146 (quoting Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 330 (1897)). So, here, the doubts expressed by lawyers who had neither the authority to enact the CAA nor were answerable to member thought that the Human Rights Act safeguard contravened the CAA. Thus, we see “no cause to suspect that a purpose to evade” the CAA mandate prompted the Council to adopt the Human Rights Act safeguard. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199—200. 40a the electorate do not undermine our reliance on the Council's interpretation (as reflected in the IPA) of language in the CAA that can bear more than one meaning. 3. We Accept the Council’s Interpretation of the CAA As Reflected in the IPA Because It Is Consistent with the Concerns and Objectives T h at the Council Contemporaneously Emphasized as Having the “Highest Priority.” The District of Columbia Charter is a “constitutional analog.” Wash. Home Ownership Council, 415 A.2d at 1367 (Gallagher, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court reasoned long ago in Myers, in determining ultimately whether to accept the legislature’s near- contemporaneous construction of an ambiguous constitutional provision, it is important to understand the context in which the framers did their work and the concerns that animated them. %5 35 The particular facts discussed in Myers again are instructive. The opinion recounts that under the Articles of Confederation, the states’ union “had not worked well,” in part because there was no strong Executive; rather, Congress was given the power of appointing certain executive officers and also exercised the power of removal. See 272 U.S. at 110, 116. “The debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an intention to create a strong Executive” and to specify “many of his important functions . . . so as to avoid the humiliating weakness of the Congress during the Revolution and under the Articles of Confederation.” Jd. at 116-17 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Constitution does not specify that the Ala Accordingly, we look to the context in which the Council passed the CAA (both the original version of the CAA and the revised version that was put to voters in November 1977) and the broader legislative agenda and objectives that motivated Council members at the time. Almost immediately after passage of the original version of the CAA in May 1977, the Council turned its efforts toward introducing and passing (on July 26, 1977) a bill that re-enacted the Human Rights Law as the Human Rights Act of 1977.56 As described above, the Council explained that it intended the re-enactment to “forcefully convey to the executive and administrative agencies of the District Government the importance which the Council places on vigfo]Jrous enforcement of its provisions” and to reinforce and underscore the Council's intent that the District’s human rights law be given the “highest priority” and “be read in President may act alone to remove officials whose terms are not -acified. The First Congress, however, passed laws that .lected its “legislative construction” that the President does have the power of removal of officers appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. /d. at 113, 153. The Court’s opinion makes clear that it accepted that legislative construction, by members of the First Congress who were among the framers of the Constitution, because the interpretation was consistent with the concerns and objectives that guided the framers. Jd. at 115-37, 164 (setting out various statements by members of the First Congress, and concurring in the interpretation that carried the day, because “to hold otherwise would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other differences with the Senate or Congress,” to act as a strong Executive). 36 The Mayor signed the Human Rights Act into law on September 28, 1977. harmony with and as supplementing other laws of the District.” Human Rights Act Report, at 3. The Council emphasized, inter alia, its objective to reinforce the principle that the Human Rights Law was intended as a supplement to every District licensing and_ benefit scheme—--to make it “unequivocally clear, for example, that a licensed establishment which has been found to discriminate in violation of the Act, could have its license suspended, revoked, or otherwise restricted for that reason.” Id.37 The Council explained, too, that it was 37 Both the Human Rights Law and the Human Rights Act contained language nearly identical to the following current provision of the Act: (a) Whenever it appears that the holder of a permit, license, franchise, benefit, or advantage issued by any agency or authority of the government of the District is a person against whom the Office has made a finding of probable cause [that the holder is violating the Human Rights Act] pursuant to § 2-1403.05, the Office, notwithstanding any other action it may tale or may have taken under the authority of the provisions of this chapter, may refer to the proper agency or authority the facts and identities of all persons involved in the complaint for such action as such agency or authority, in its judgment, considers appropriate, based upon the facts thus disclosed to it. (b) The Commission, upon a determination of a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter by a holder of, or applicant for any permit, license, franchise, benefit, exemption, or advantage issued by or on behalf of the government of the District of Columbia, and upon failure of the respondent to correct the unlawful discriminatory practice and comply with its order, in accordance with § 2-1403.15 (a), shall refer this determination to the appropriate taking action in the wake of Newsweek, 376 A.2d 777, a decision of this court issued on March 28, 1977, and an earlier decision from 1974,°8 that called into question the District government’s powers to enforce some of the remedies provided in the Human Rights Law, which had been promulgated by the pre- Home Rule Council (under its more limited powers) as a regulation rather than a statute. Human Rights Act Report, at 2. D» ‘ng the Council discussion of the bill upon its final reading, Councilmember Barry urged the Council to “go on record as carrying out our progressive tradition in this city of being in the forefront of human rights,” and to make _ the District’s human rights law “as broad and as sweeping as we _ possibly can,” to eliminate discrimination “under any guises.” Final Reading of agency or authority. Such determination — shall constitute prima facie evidence that the respondent, with respect to the particular business in which the violation was found, is not operating in the public interest. Such agency or authority shall, upon notification, issue to said holder or applicant an order to show cause why such privileges related to that business should not be revoked, suspended, denied or otherwise restricted. D.C. Code § 2-1403.17 (a), (b) (2007). 38 Mendota Apartments v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 315 A.2d 832, 833, 834, 835 (D.C. 1974) (upholding Commission on Human Rights order that petitioner cease and desist from racial discrimination in the rental of apartments (“refusing to lease an apartment to [complainant] because she is a Negro”), but concluding that the Commission did not have aority to award damages to campensate complainant for the anguish and humihation suffered because of petitioner’s discriminatory practices, since that was beyond the scope of reasonable and usual police regulations). 44a Bul 2-179, “The Human Rights Act of 1977,” at 75 (July 26, 1977). Councilmember Rolark explained that she co-sponsored the bill because she “kn[e]w how hard that fight has been to obtain human rights in the District of Columbia for all of us and I do underscore ‘all.” Jd. at 76. We believe it is reasonable to assume that the Council did not come by these strong views only in June 1977 (when the bill that became the Human Rights Act was introduced), and that Council members held these views as they passed the original version of the CAA the previous month, in May 1977. And, in any event, the Council had forcefully articulated these views before it passed the amended version of the CAA (on November 1, 1977) that was presented to voters. This history and the strong language that the Council used when it re- enacted the District’s human rights law (and when it included the Human Rights Act safeguard in the bill that the Council Committee on Government Operations reported to implement the CAA) inform our analysis. In lght of them, we find it inconceivable that the Council would have intended to permit individuals to use the initiative process to circumvent the human rights law, which the Council had just affirmed had the “highest priority,” Human Rights Act Report, at 3, and which, we have recognized, “was enacted to aid . . . the public at large.” JBG Props., Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 364 A.2d 1183, 1185 (D.C. 1976).89 39 Cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 552 (1987) (“We agree with the Secretary that [ijt is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow either the State 45a For this reason, we are persuaded that the Council would have understood the human rights law as “supplementing” the CAA, Human Rights Act Report, at 3, and as an implied lhmitation on the initiative and referendum prerogative (in a manner similar to the way in which the District’s human rights law was and is a limitation implied in the various “permit, license, franchise, benefit, [and] advantage” schemes administered by agencies of the District government. D.C. Code § 2-1403.17 (a)).4 See IPA Report, at 10 (“It is [an] implied restriction to ensure that no initiated measure will establish an affirmative policy in favor of discrimination in this community”). Stated differently, we are persuaded that the Council would have viewed the CAA as permitting citizens to place initiatives and referenda on the ballot only insofar as consistent with the District’s human rights law (and that, by broadly describing its mandate to adopt “acts as are necessary to carry out the purpose” of the CAA, the Council left the door open for the IPA to incorporate explicitly that human rights safeguard).‘! “[T]o hold of Alaska or Native Alaskans to select [i.e., own] portions of the [Outer Continental Shelf]—a vital national resource reserve held by the [government] for the public.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 49 See also Filippo v. Real Estate Comm'n of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 268, 269, 270 (D.C. 1966) (upholding order of Real Estate Commission suspending petitioner's real estate broker’s license on ground that he “exhibit[ed] and offer[ed] for sale a house .. . to Negroes at a higher price than the same house was exhibited and offered for sale to white persons[,]” in violation of the police regulations prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination for reasons of race). 41 It may be asked why, then, did the Council not state a human rights restriction in the CAA. We addressed a similar 4bha otherwise’ would be to conclude that the Council intended to confer an initiative right that could “make it impossible[,)” Myers, 272 U.S. at 164, to achieve the Human Rights Act objectives that the Council emphasized had the highest priority Our recognition of this implied Human Right Act safeguard does not portend a dilution of the important right of the electorate to propose laws. In the thirty-plus years since passage of the IPA, the Council has never attempted to impose any further legislative limitation on the right to initiative or referendum. The fact that it has not done so weighs heavily against the possibility that any further restrictions on the right of initiative are implied in the CAA.42 question in Atchison, where the issue was whether the Council's failure to include in the CAA a provision that would have granted the Council the express power to amend or repeal an initiative act meant, that the Council had no such power. 585 A.2d at 154. We cited the Supreme Court's observation in United States v. Wells; Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 358 (1988) about Congress’s failure to include a particular provision in a tax bill: “Equally plausible is that the Committee omitted the express exception as umnecessary.” Atchison, 585 A.2d at 156 42 Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907—08 (“[Wle do not think the early statutes imposimg obligations on state courts imply a power of Congress to impress the state executive into its service. Indeed, it cam be argued that the numerousness of these statutes, contrasted with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive . suggests an assumed absence of such power,.”) (italics omitted). Similarly, the fact that the Council, acting within (and somewhat beyond) the 180-day legislative period described in the CAA, identified no additional limitations as necessary to carry out the purpose of the CAA, presumably would weigh against a finding that additional types of limitations are necessary The legislative history of the IPA reflects that when the Council set about crafting provisions to carry out the purposes of the CAA, it focused on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reitman, which the Committee on Government Operations’ Keport discussed in some detail. [PA Report, at 9-11. In Reitman, the Supreme Court affirmed a ruling of the Supreme Court of California striking down, a violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Proposition 14 an initiative measure that provided that the state could not abridge the right of any person to sell or decline to sell his property as he or she chooses. 387 U.S. at 370-71. The Supreme Court held that “/t]he California Court could very reasonably conclude’ that the result of Proposition 14 was that “[t]he right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State’ basic charter,” id. at 376-77, and that the initiative measure would “significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations.” /d. at 38] Having studied Reitman, the Council Committee on Government Operations came to the view that for the Board to accept an initiative or referendum that would have the effect of discriminating, would involve the District government in condoning and assisting with discrimination.** The Council cited Such involvement and compli ity, the Council! yubtle realized, could not be avoided by a post election repeal ota discriminatory measure; rather, the involvement of the Board and the expenditure of District funds to put such an initiative on the ballot would constitute the very involvement that thi the language in Reitman that “the initiative proc may not be used to place the Government in th posture of affirmatively condoning discrimination and that “when the Government's official position of neutrality toward protected minority classification (such as those identified in the Human Rights Act of 77) 1s removed and a policy of discrimination imposed, such measures will fail.” IPA Report, at 9 Accordingly, the Committee recommended including in the IPA a mandate that the Board not accept any initiative oO} referendum that would authoriz discrimination or hay the effect f authorizin discrimination prohibited | the Human Right Act ‘ I my I } ental ( expr ed e Mur kK rit . As disc rher, the Hun I ts La i polce-] \ I rewu won leermne ‘ i! ! ection of ve limb health yn t d quiet pel na the } tectio! I | propert A lin t Distn t ( himbia i) { 1¢ { wri Whi th ( cluded the Human Rights A evuard the IPA ent would h ttorded tl Cou d re iicipa that n it Live icren ! th at tect tf author oy rl 1 be threat react d to life and mb. It w m ré rt I that I pid Wade ( unt I rid ’ ! ra pronibited discrimination the bas! i Kua Activist Anit Brvant led prot nent camopalg f repr rdinance, which wa ucct ful during the electio! GC T Y ihe pre reported that t campaign |} lent clashe betwee! proponent ind oppons nt i rey ee, @.p Gay Rights Showdown in Mian iM} June la ntty www.time.com/time/magazine/articie/0.91/1.9189 O.Atml t ted July 10) yt inter campalg worke! Na hospita ed ifte! eating) Washington Post re ad that th bitter | I th in " t t Dade ¢ rel The Council's acceptance of the Committee's recommendation was consistent with the “highest priority’ objective that the Council expressed during the same time period when it crafted the CAA Because the Human Rights Act safeguard is consistent with that objective, we accept the Council's legislative interpretation, reflected in the IPA, that the safeguard implements the intent of the CAA.‘ B. Section 752 Gave the Council Authority to Direct the Board to Refuse to Accept Initiative and Referendum Measures That Would Authorize or Have the Effect of Authorizing Discrimination. We further conclude that the Council was not obhged to allow initiatives that would have the effect of authorizing discrimination prohibited by the Human Rights Act to be put to voters, and then t one of the most emotionally charged In recent memo! with near hvsteria on bot ice ol the 1 L Marv Ru ‘ Gay Rights Loses 2-1 in Miami Law, Washington Post, Jun 8, 1977, section A 4, col. 1. An editorial cartoon in the pape! captured the atmosphere of violence, depicting supporters of Bryant throwing rocks at upporters ol the anti-discriminatior rdinance. Washington Post, June 10, 1977, section A 26, co We note, as Chief Justice Roberts did when he declined tay the effective date of the Marriage Kqualits Act. tl when the IPA wa passed (with the not-easily overlooked Human Rights Act safeguard), the legislation laid over before Conegre for thirty legislative day without disapproval either house. That “Coners chnose!l| not to act 1 if ur not determinative of the legal 1 ies, but do weigh against appellants position that th ibviously important nd substantive provision of the IPA contlicted with the ( Jach on 1.) ¢ ( f 1 AOa repeal them, or to wait for them to be challenged as having been improper subjects of initiative, should they be approved by voters. Rather, the Council could legislate, as it did through the IPA, that the Board must refuse to accept initiatives and referenda that would authorize prohibited discrimination. We reach this conclusion because the CAA did not provide the Council its exclusive grant of authority to enact laws on matters relating to the initiative and referendum process. Rather, as already described, section 752 of the Home Rule Act conferred on the Council, “|njotwithstanding any other provision of this [Act] or of any other law, authority to enact any act or resolution with respect to matters involving or relating to elections in the District.” D.C. Code § 1-207.52 (emphasis added).*6 As a provision of the Home Rule Act not subject to amendment by the Council or by the voters of the District, section 752 remains one of the provisions 46 We are satisfied that initiatives and referenda are “matters involving or relating to elections” within the ordinary meaning of the word “election.” Section 412 (b) of the Home Rule Act authorized the Council to call “|a] special election . . . by resolution of the Council to present for an = advisory referendum vote of the people any proposition upon which the Council desires to take action.” D.C. Code § 1-204.12 (b) (italics added). The amended Charter specifically refers to a referendum as a “referendum election.” D.C. Code § 1-204.102 (b)Q1). The D.C. Code provisions relating to initiatives and referenda are set. out in Title 1, Chapter 10, Subchapter I of the Code, entitled “Regulation of Elections.” In lght of these usages, we see no reason not to recognize that the initiative process, like the referendum process, enta:tls an “election.” Thus, we conclude that section 752 gave the Council authority to enact laws with respect to the initiative (and referendum) election process. governing District affairs. See D.C. Code § 1-203.03 (a) (providing that only the District Charter as set forth in Title IV of the Home Rule Act is subject. to the Charter-amending procedure); D.C. Code § 1 206.02 (providing, per section 602 of the Home Rule Act, that the Council “shall have no authority to pass any act contrary” to the provisions of the Home Rule Act except as specifically provided in the Ilome Rule Act); and D.C. Code § 1-207.61 (a) (2006) (providing that the provisions of the Home Rule Act “shall prevail and be deemed to supersede” any other laws with which they are in conflict). Moreover, the “[njotwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of any other law” language of section 752 is “strong stuff’ that cannot be assumed to have been superseded by an after-enacted law. Winters, 596 A.2d at 573 (Schwelb, J., concurring) (reasoning that “lal clearer statement [than “notwithstanding any other provision of law’) is difficult to imagine” and that this language “must be read to override any conflicting provision of law in existence at the time” and as “powerful evidence that Congress did not intend any other, more” general, legislation, whenever enacted, to qualify the authority .. . set out” in the Act that contains the “notwithstanding” clause) (italics omitted). And, the legislative history of the Home Rule Act suggests strongly that, through section 752, Congress intended to give the Council authority to legislate on substantive matters regarding clections (and not merely to establish procedures).47 47 Section 752 appears to have originated as section 742 of a House bill, H.R. 9056, 93d Cong. 109-110 (1973), and thereafter was inciuded in a later bill, H.R. 9682, 93d Cong. At the same time, “a statute generally should be read to give effect, if possible, to every clause,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 829 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and it is a “basic axiom .. . that courts should construe all legislative enactments to give them = some meaning[.]” Losado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415 (1970). Adhering to these basic rules of construction, we decline to interpret the Council’s authority under section 752 of the Home Rule Act in a way that effectively would mean that the initiative right, conferred through the Charter- amending procedures also set out in the Home Rule Act, could be rendered meaningless, or in a way that would so diminish the initiative right as virtually to nullify it. This “basic 131 (1973), as section 752. The record of the Senate hearings shows that Congress was urped to leave to the Council “important nitty-gritty questions” such as whether ex-felons would be permitted to vote and whether there could be a durational residency requirement for voting (the constitutionality of which was in question). See Hearing on S. 1603 and S. 1626, 92d Cong. 222, 228. Congress was urged to “make only those changes” to the Election Act that were “absolutely necessary to enable the first clection to be held,” leaving it to the Council or Congress later to make “a thorough revision.” /d. at 231. The Report of the Committee on the District of Columbia on H.R. 9682 together with Dissenting Views, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (Sept. 11, 1973) includes a “Dissenting Commentary on Significant Provisions of H.R. 9682.” H.R. Rep. 93-482, at 141 (1973). That commentary asserts that section 752 “would permit the local government to exempt all District employees from the Hatch Act, which currently prohibits employees of the Federal and _ District Governments from taking an active part in_ political management or in political campaigns.” Jd. at 165 (internal quotation marks omitted). 53a axiom” articulated in Rosado is especially applicable here since the right of initiative is “a right that Congress affirmatively approved.” See Stevenson, 683 A.2d at 1375 (“[I]t 1s not without significance that Congress affirmatively approved the Charter Amendments Act after passage by the Council.”). Accordingly, we must, if we can, harmonize section 752 and the CAA. We can do so, as follows. At the time the Home Rule Act was passed, the Mlection Act mandated that the Board would be an independent agency. Specifically, the Ilection Act provided (and still provides, see D.C. Code § 1- 1001.06 (a) (2006)), that “[iJn the performance of its duties, the Board shall not be subject to the direction of any non-judicial officer of the District.” D.C. Code § 1-1106 (a) (1973). We interpret section 752° to confer upon the Council the authority to enact laws giving direction to the Board in the handling of clection matters, notwithstanding the Board’s status as an independent agency.”® This is what the Council did in imposing the Human Rights Act safeguard of the IPA, by declaring that, consistent with the Council’s interpretation of the scope of the right of initiative in the CAA, the Board must refuse to accept initiative measures that it determined would authorize prohibited discrimination. In doing so, the 48 As originally proposed in the House Bill (H.R. 9056), section 752 (then numbered = as_ section 742) read “Injotwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of any other law, the Council shall have jurisdiction to legislate with respect to matters involving or relating to elections in the District” (italics added). H.R. 9056, 93d Cong. 109 110. This language supports a reading that a focus of section 752 was the Council’s authority vis-a-vis the independent Board. da Council explicitly relhed on its authority under section 752. See IPA Report, at 11 (“Further legal support for the provisions of the enabling legislation here presented are found in [section 752], which yrant|s}] the Council plenary authority over all election matters.”). Under section 752-——and despite what one court has called the “general rule favoring postelection review” of the validity of a proposed initiative measure’9—the Council had authority to require the Board to conduct pre-election review of whether the subject matter of a proposed initiative is a proper subject matter. See Convention Ctr. Ill, 441 A.2d at 914 (concluding that the IPA mandate that the Board exclude from the ballot a referendum measure that would negate a budget-request act “comports with the Charter Amendment limitations on the initiative right [and that] the reliance of the Board ... on that provision was entirely proper’).5 4 Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 19838) (per curlam). Appellants have not contended that the resultant prior subject-matter restraint on initiative measures implicates the First Amendment. right to free speech, and relevant persuasive authority is to the contrary. “The First Amendment imposes no restriction on the withdrawal of subject matters from the initiative process.” Mariyuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 84-85 (holding that, by complying with the so-called Barr Amendment (through which Congress banned the District from making any expenditures to reduce penalties associated with marijuana) in rejecting a proposed initiative that would reduce marijuana penalties, the Board did not viviate the First Amendment, because “although the First Amendment protects public debate about. legislation, it confers no right to legislate on a particular subject.”) (citing Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1996)) (holding that state supreme court decision removing an abortion initiative from the ballot did not violate a voter's First Amendment rights because the voter remained free “to argue Nha The Board’s decision, as has been made evident by this and many other cases, is subject to prompt judicial review. For all the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded by appellants’ contention that the Council either overstepped its authority or acted in contravention of the CAA when it imposed the Human Rights Act safeguard of the IPA.°! C. The Proposed Initiative Would Authorize or Have the Effect of Authorizing Discrimination Prohibited by the Human Rights Act. against legalized abortion, to contend that’ pre-submission content review of initiative petitions is unconstitutional, or to speak publicly on any other issue”), overruled on other grounds by Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1085, 1099 (10th Cir. 2006) (en bane) (“Although the First Amendment protects political speech incident to an initiative campaign, it does not protect the right to make law, by initiative or otherwise.”). There is “no law ... establishing a right to have a particular proposition on the ballot.” Skrzypczak, 92 F.3d at 1053. ' One final point: There is no doubt that, through the Human Rights Act and the Human Rights Act safeguard, the Council has sought to promote a_ broad policy of non- discrimination that will preclude voters from putting some measures on the ballot. To the extent that citizens disagree with this fundamental policy, they are not without a remedy. The Council “is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.” Legal Serus. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 56a Appeliants further contend that even if the Human Rights Act safeguard is valid, their proposed “Marriage Initiative of 2009” does not run afoul of the restriction. They assert that this court’s decision in Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995), establishes “conclusively” that the Human Rights Act “does not reach the marital relationship.” The Board urges us to uphold its determination, arguing in its brief that the proposed initiative (providing that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in the District of Columbia”) would render not only JAMA but also the Marriage Equality Act “null and void and would consequently strip all same sex married couples of their attendant rights and_ responsibilities’ of marriage in the District of Columbia” based solely on the “gender and/or sexual orientation of the spouses. In its November 17, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Board distinguished Dean and reasoned as follows: While neither the HRA [fi.e., the Human Rights Act] nor its legislative history explicitly mentions same-sex marriage, it 1s without question that the HRA must “be read broadly to eliminate the many proscribed forms of discrimination in the District.” Since JAMA’s enactment, the District recognizes same-sex marriages that have been properly entered into, performed, and recognized by other jurisdictions. This did not exist when Dean was decided. Consequently, couples who fall within JAMA’s purview are entitled to the same 57a benefits of marriage that are afforded heterosexual married couples, and the denial of these benefits to married couples on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individuals who comprise the couples now constitutes a “proscribed form af discrimination.” It is clear that this result is the intent of the Council, which voted 12-1 to pass JAMA. The Initiative seeks to deny recognition to JAMA marriages on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individuals who comprise the couples. As a result, the Board finds, and both the District’s Attorney General and General Counsel for the Council agree, that the Initiative authorizes or would authorize discrimination proscribed by the HRA and is therefore not a proper subject for initiative. Id. at 11. We agree with the Board's interpretation of Dean, its view that the Human Rights Act analysis in Dean has limited continuing significance, and its conclusion that the proposed initiative would have the effect of authorizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.®? In Dean, a panel of this court 52 Although the Board’s brief argues that the proposed initiative would authorize or have the effect of authorizing discrimination on the basis of “gender and/or sexual orientation,” the Board’s decision was that the initiative would authorize discriminatien prohibited by the Human Rights Act in that it would “deny recognition to... marriages on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individuals who comprise the 5Ra considered a claim by a same-sex couple that, “by refusing to issue them a marriage license, the Clerk lof the Superior Court acting through the Marriage License Bureau] discriminated against them because of their sex or sexual orientation, in violation of the Human Rights Act, D.C. Code §§ 1-2501 to -2557 (1992).” 653 A.2d at 318. Before reaching this issue, the court set out a lengthy discussion of the language and legislative history of the District's marriage statute, which, the Dean court concluded, “demonstrate that neither Congress nor the Council of the District of Columbia has ever intended to define ‘marriage’ to include same-sex unions.” /d. at 310. The Dean opinion noted that the only significant changes in the District's marriage and divorce provisions since 1901 had occurred in the Marriage and Divorce Act of 1977, D.C. Law 1-107, 1977 D.C. Stat. 114. Jd. at 311. On the path to enacting that legislation, which “merely amended existing code provisions,” /d. at 312, the Council had declined to act favorably on a bill introduced by Councilmember Dixon that would have permitted marriages between persons of the same sex. /d. at 311. The court saw no “indication that more recent Congresses, or the Council in amending the marriage statute, ever modified the fundamental legislative understanding that ‘marriage’ is limited to opposite-sex couples. /d. at 314. Rather, the court concluded, there was a “consistent legislative understanding and intent that ‘marriage’ means and thus is hmited to—unions between persons of opposite sexes.” Id. at 315. This “statutory couples.” Accordingly, our analysis focuses only on _ the correctness of that ruling. 59a understanding [was] further confirmed by the ordinary sense and meaning traditionally attributed to the word ‘marriage” in dictionary definitions. /d. The court could not “conclude that any legislature for the District of Columbia that has addressed the marriage statute has ever intended to authorize same-sex unions.” TJ/d. (“[Clases from other jurisdictions with marriage statutes similar to the District's aor? have uniformly interpreted [‘}marriage,’ by definition, as requiring two members of opposite sexes”). Turning to the Human Rights Act claim, the Dean court noted that the version of the Human Rights Act in effect at the time made it “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for one to “deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,’ services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodations,” if the denial is “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the... sex... [or] sexual orientation . . . of any individual.” Id. at 318-19. The court acknowledged the appellants’ argument that “when the Marriage License Bureau, a place of public accommodation under the Clerk of the Superior Court, refuses to issue marriage heenses to same-sex couples, gays and lesbians are unlawfully denied an ‘equal opportunity’ to participate in marriage, an important ‘aspect of life.” Jd. at 318. The court assumed, “without formally deciding,” that the Marriage License Bureau is a “place of public accommodation” (in which discrimination was specifically prohibited 60a under the Human Rights Act). Jd. at 319.59 The court further acknowledged that “Itlhe Council! undoubtedly intended the Human Rights Act to be a powerful, flexible, and far-reaching’ prohibition against discrimination of many kinds, including sex and sexual orientation.” Jd. The court reasoned, however, that the Council “did not intend the Act to prohibit every discriminatory practice,” id., and went on to hold: [Wle cannot conclude that the Council ever intended to change the ordinary meaning of the word “marriage” simply by enacting the Human Rights Act. Had the Council intended to effect such a major definitional change, counter to common understanding, we would expect some mention of it in the Human Rights Act or at least in_ its legislative history .... There is none [Als we have seen—“marriage” requires persons of opposite sexes; there cannot be 3 The court noted that the Human Rights Act defined a “place of public accommodation” to include “establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind,” as well as “public halls.” It noted the position of amicus Human Rights Commissioners that “all District of Columbia agencies are places of public accommodation, within the meaning of the Human Rights Act, because they provide goods and services to District residents.” Jd.; cf. Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 853 A.2d 288, 297 (N.J. App. Div. 2004) (holding that “any State governmental agency is a place of public accommodation” for purposes of the definition of “place of public accommodation” in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. § 10:5-5 (1)); see also Thomas v. Cnty. of Camden, 902 A.2d 327, 332 (N.J. App. Div. 2006) (“|P]ublic entities .. ., by their very nature, constitute a place of public accommodation’). discrimination against a same-sex marriage if, by independent tatutory definition extended to the Human Rights Act, there can be no such thing Id. at 320. While the Dean court unambiguously concluded that the Marriage Bureau’s implementation of the District's longstanding marriage statutes, and the definition of marriage reflected therein, did not amount to discrimination prohibited by the Human Rights Act, there is no dispute that the landscape has changed dramatically. Through JAMA and the Marriage Equality Act, the Council has both acknowledged and endorsed an expanded definition of marriage to include same-sex unions. As the briefs inform us, several other jurisdictions, too, currently authorize same-sex marriage. The question now is whether an initiative measure that would deny recognition to individuals who have entered or wish to enter into same-sex marriages in the District or elsewhere, and would deprive them of the benefits and obligations that come along with such recognition, would authorize or have the effect of authorizing discrimination on a basis prohibited by the Human Rights Act. We have no difficulty concluding that the proposed initiative would do so.‘ 44 In 2002, the pertinent provision of the Human Rights Act was amended to read as follows: Except as otherwise provided for by District law o1 when otherwise lawfully and reasonably permitted, it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for District government agency or office to limit or refuse 62a The proposed initiative would require District government agencies and offices that provide or administer an array of services, programs, and benefits otherwise available to married persons, to deny certain of those services, programs, or benefits to individuals who are partners to a same-sex rather than opposite-sex union.®° The initiative thus would take away from those individuals a civil right that the Council has seen fit to recognize and expressly allow, and its effect would be to authorize discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to provide any facility, service, program, or benefit to any individual on the basis of an individual's actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of residence or business D.C. Code § 2-1402.73 (2006) (italics added). This amendment is fairly regarded as a clarification. As discussed, in 1977 the Home Rule Council re-enacted without substantive change the Human Rights Law, regarding which the pre-Home Rule Council said that it was “a priority .. . that District government will be the first to comply” with the “spirit” of the law, such as by addressing complaints of d officers. Human Rights Law Report, at 2. In Executive Order 94-132 (May 19, 1994), then-Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly summarized the interpretation that enjoycu acquiescence: that “Offices and agencies of the District government are covered by the prohibitions of the Human Rights Act.... No... agency of the District government may engage in any prohibited activity, including denial of full and equal enjoyment of its services, iscrimination against police facilities, privileges or advantages to any person in violation of the Human Rights Act.” See also note 53 supra 55 The Board's brief refers to the “more than 200 District rights and responsibilities of civil marriage.” 63a Although, theoretically, it is possible’ that heterosexuals of the same gender would enter into a same-sex marriage, there can be no dispute that the impact of District agencies’ refusal to recognize same sex-marriage would fall most heavily on gay and lesbian residents,°® denying them the ability to participate fully in an important aspect of life in the District We must address, however, the question of whether the Human Rights Act safeguard of the IPA required the Board to evaluate a proposed initiative under the Human Rights Act of 1977—the legislation specified in the [PA—rather than under the version of the Human Rights Act at the time of the Board’s determination. As the District’s brief acknowledges, under general rules of statutory construction, a statute that specifically refers to another statute “incorporates the provisions referred to...as of the time of adoption without subsequent amendments, unless the legislature has expressly or by strong implication shown its intention to 6 See Estenos v. PAHO/WHO-Fed. Credit Union, 952 A.2d 878, 887 (D.C. 2008) (explaining that under the Human Right Act, “despite the absence of any intention to discriminate, practices are unlawful if they bear disproportionately on a protected class and are not independently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason”) (quoting Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 29 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (“[T]he Council imported into the Human Rights Act, by way of the elfects clause, the concept of disparate impact discrimination|.|” (further citation omitted)); cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 8 (1967) (rejecting the argument that because a statute prohibiting interracial marriage applied equally to black and white citizens, it did not discriminate on the basis of race) 64a incorporate subsequent amendments.” 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.08 (7th ed. 2008) (italics added). We are satisfied that the italicized exception rather than that general rule, is applicable here. The legislative history of the IPA guides our interpretation. As reported by the Committee on Government Operations, Bill 2-317 prohibited initiatives that discriminated “by reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, — political affiliation, physical handicap, source of income, and place of residence or business.” Memorandum from Louis P. Robbins, Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, to Judith W. Rogers, Special Assistant for Legislation, regarding Supplemental comments on Bill 2-317, the “Imitiative, Referendum, and Kecall Procedures Act of 1978,” at 1 (June 2, 1978) (quoting Amendment to § 212 of Bill No. 2-317). As explained to members of the Committee in a memorandum from the Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, the amendment to the bill when it was re-introduced as Bill 3-2, stating that “the Board of Elections [and] Ethics cannot accept any petitions which authorize discrimination prohibited under the Human Rights Act of 1977,” was “merely a_ technical change, whereby the language [that] prohibits” specific discriminatory types of petitions has been deleted . . The effect is synonymous with that of Bill 2-317 [which contained the list of proscribed categories of discrimination, including’ sexual orientation].” Memorandum from Deborah K. Green, Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, to the Committee on Government Operations, on Bill 3-2, the “Initiative Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979,” Kebruary 6, 1979. at 2 In light of that documentation, we regard the IPA’s reference to the Human Rights Act of 1977 a a shorthand indication that the Council meant to require the Board to perform its gatekeeper function by determining whether a proposed initiative would authorize discrimination of the type currently prohibited by the District’s human rights law, not by looking only to that law as it existed in 1977. We see no evidence that the Council “intended by such specific reference|] [to the Human Rights Act of 1977 and to its D.C. Code citation] any limitation on subsequent amendments which ameliorated the remedial scheme.” HEOC vu. Chrysler Corp., 546 F Supp. 54, 74 (B.D. Mich 1982). Moreover, in enacting the Human Rights Act, the Council re enacted pnor law (the Human Rights Law) that explicitly was intended to “provide a regulation of sufficient scope and flexibility to be responsive to future needs for the protection of civil and huinan rights,” since “there may be contexts and reasons for discrimination tomorrow that we do not anticipate today.” Human Rights Law Report, at 2. We believe it would contravene the legislative intent to require the Board to apply a dated version of the Human Rights Act that may not be, as the pre-Home Rule Council described and as the Home Rule Council implicitly echoed, adequate to answer the “future needs and circumstances of modern life.” /d V. Conclusion The Council acted within its authority under the CAA and the Home Rule Act in enacting the Human Rights safeguard of the IPA and in directing the Board not to accept initiatives that contravene that safeguard. Because appellants’ proposed initiative would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination on a basis prohibited by the Human Rights Act, it was not a proper subject of initiative Therefore, the Board acted lawfully in refusing to accept the initiative on that basis. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superor Court upholding th Board’s determination 1s Affirmed FISHER, Associate Judge, with whom WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and GLICKMAN and OBERLY, Associate Judges, join, dissenting: This appeal is about legislative authority — that vested in the Council of the District of Columbia and that yranted to the voters at large. In 1978, five year after the Home Rule Act transformed governance in the District of Columbia, the Council, the voters, and the Congress of the United States, acting in collaboration, amended the District Charter (Title IV of the Home Rule Act) for the first time, creating the right of initiative so that the voters themselves could propose and approve legislation An initiative 1s “the process by which the electors of thi District of Columbia may propose laws (except law appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified clectors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval.” D.C. Code § 1-204.101 (a) (2006). If a majority of those voting approves an initiative, it becomes law, assuming (as 1s also true for an act of the Council) The following year, the Council enacted implementing legislation known as the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979 (the “IPA”). In addition to establishing procedures for submitting, processing, and voting on an initiative petition, the IPA placed a limit on the subject matter that could be addressed by an initiative The Council instructed the Board of Elections and Ethics not to accept a measure if it “authorizes, or would have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited under” the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. This subject matter limitation on the right of initiative is not found in the Charter, which created that right, or in the mor comprehensive Home Rule Act, which places certain limits on the legislative power of the District In 2009, appellants? proposed that the voter exercise their night of initiative and declare that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman | valid or recognized in the District of Columbia.” Th Board refused to accept the measure, holding that the proposal was not a “proper subject of initiative” because it would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited by the Hiuman Rights Act. This court must decide, as a matter of first impression, whether the IPA's that it is not disapproved during a mandatory period Congressional review. D.C. Code § 1-204.105 (2006) ' Appellants, the proponents of the Marriage Initiative of 2009, are Bishop Harry Jackson, Jr., Reverend Walter Fauntroy, Reverend Dale Wafer, Melvin Dupree, Apostle Jame Silver, Reverend Anthony Evans, Robert King, and Elder Howard Butler 68a “Human Rights Act limitation” is a valid restriction on the right of initiative. For the reasons which follow, we would hold that it is not Had our view prevailed, we would not have reached the question whether the Board properly refused to accept the proposed initiative. In lhght of the majority’s holding, however, and in lhght of recent legislation recognizing and authorizing same sex marriages in the District of Columbia, we agree with the majority’s conclusion that the proposed initiative would authorize, or have the effect of authorizing, discrimination prohibited by — the Human Rights Act, as amended in 2002 The Factual and Procedural Background On two occasions (in 2009 and 2010), appellant Jackson and others presented referendum® petitions to the Board. seeking to suspend two acts of the Council relating to same-sex marriage, but their efforts were unsuccesstul. The Board rejected the proposed referenda, citing the Human Rights Act (“HRA”), litigation ensued, and the acts became law.‘ “The term ‘referendum’ means the process by which thi registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia may suspend acts of the Council of the District of Columbia (except emergency acts, acts levying taxes, or acts appropriating funds for the general operation budget) until such acts have been presented to the registered qualified clectors of the District of Columbia for their approval or rejection.” D.C. Code § 1 204.101 (b) (2006) ‘ The Superior Court, this court, and Chief Justice Roberts, sitting as Circuit Justice, declined to stay the effective date of the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality 69a “No act is subject to referendum if it has become law according to the provisions of § 1-204.04 fafter a period of congressional review].” D.C. Code § 1- 204.102 (b)(2) (2006). The Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009, which became law on July 7, 2009, provides that the “ District of Columbia will recognize “|a] marriage legally entered into in another jurisdiction between 2 persons of the same sex... .” D.C. Code § 46-405.01 (2010 Supp.). On March 3, 2010, the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009 became law. It allows couples of the same sex to marry in the District of Columbia. D.C Code § 46-401 (2010 Supp.). Meanwhile, on September 1, 2009, appellants submitted the Marriage Initiative of 2009. The Board refused to accept the initiative, reasoning that, “lijf passed, [it] would, in contravention of the HRA, strip same-sex couples of the rights and responsibilities of marriages currently recognized in the District. . . Because the Initiative would authorize discrimination prohibited by the HRA, it is not a proper subject for initiative, and may not be accepted by the Board.” Appellants petitioned for review by the Superior Court, and for a writ of mandamus. ‘The trial court allowed the District of Columbia to intervene and later granted summary Amendment Act of 2009. See Jackson v. District of Columbia 3oard of Elections and Ethics, 1308. Ct. 1279 (2010) 70a judgment to the Board and the District. This appeal followed. ll. The “Constitutional” Framework The Constitution of the United States of America vests in Congress the power to legislate for the District of Columbia “in all Cases whatsoever.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. However, in 1973 Congress enacted the District of Columbia Self Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 93 198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973) (codified at D.C. Code §§ 1- 201.01--1-207.71), popularly known as the Home Rule Act. Through this transforming legislation, Congress delegated some, but not all, of its legislative power over this jurisdiction to the Council of the District of Columbia while retaining ultimate legislative authority over the District. See D.C. Code §§ 1-204.04, 1-206.01; see also District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Central Labor Council, AFL- CIO, 442 A.2d 110, 113-14 (D.C. 1982) (discussing Congress’s delegation of legislative power). Congress intended, among other things, to “grant to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers of local self- government... and, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon Although the acts 5 of the Council related to same-sex marriage have become law, this appeal is not moot. We have held that the right of initiative may be used to repeal or amend existing legislation. Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 909 & n.38 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (Convention Center 111 dla essentially local District matters.” D.C. Code § 1 201.02 (2006). Nevertheless, the Home Rule Act contains several limitations on the legislative power of the District.6 For example, the Council has no authority to “[ijmpose any tax on property of the United States,” to enact a “commuter tax” on the income of persons who do not reside in the District, to alter the organization and jurisdiction of the [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2621%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.