# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sherman v. LaMothe

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1109

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

Ab 10-482 UCT 1 2 2010

No.

=RK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

IN THE MATTER OF VELOCITA WORLDWIDE LOGISTICS,
INC..
Debtor.

DANIEL SHERMAN,
Petitioner,
V.

WILLIAM LAMOTHE, RAJAN SOBHANI, CHRIS BRACK,
DANIEL ESTRADA, SCOTT STUDEBAKER, JAMES MICHAEL
WALSH, BRANDON ROBINSON, AND PATRICK STRAYER

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WM CHRIS WOLEFARTH CHARLES “CHAD” BARUCH
SHACKELFORD, MELTON & Counsel of Record
MCKINLEY THE LAW OFFICE OF CHAD
3333 Lee Parkway, BARUCH
Tenth Floor 3201 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75219 Rowlett, Texas 75088
(214) 780-1400 (972) 412-7192

BaruchKsq@aol.com

Counsel for Petitioner
Daniel Sherman

LEGAL PRINTERS LUC, Washington DC e 202-747-2400 e legalprinters.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

The court of appeals decided this bankruptcy
appeal by resolving on policy grounds what if
deemed a question of first impression under Texas
law, without certifying that question to the Texas
Supreme Court. In doing so, the court disregarded
twe Texas Supreme Court decisions from the 1890's,
apparently deeming them too old to be instructive.
The question presented Is:

:. Whether a circult court acts
inconsistently with this Court's decision in LeAman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), or otherwise
commits error, by deciding a state-law question
without certifying that question to the state's
supreme court where—

e the question presented is important to the
state’s jurisprudence,

e there is authority—old but not overruled
from the state’s supreme court resolving the
question contrary to the federal court's
resolution of it,

e the question is difficult enough that the three
federal courts to address it all resolve it on
different theories and grounds, and

e the federal court decides the issue on policy
erounds.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Daniel Sherman, bankruptcy

trustee in /n re Velocita Worldwide Logistics, [ne
Respondents are Wilham LaMothe, Rajan Sobhani,
Chris Brack, Daniel Estrada, Scott Studebaker,
James Michael Walsh, Brandon Robinson, and
Patrick Stryer, who were defendants in the trustee's
adversary action in the bankruptcy court

Lil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented ................ a
Parties to the Proceeding. ai
Table of Contents ................... ereree i]
Table of Authorities ......... en 2 an
Opinions and Orders Below eaekaees
PUTISGICTION......0.00s00rsensceese ete ee | a
SCREWS LTAVOIVOG «.005.05000s00cnsi0eeases naan a yl ! umes ]
tahoe OF GIRS CGO ov necvac.cxsccatsuasvcsscaecescesasvevees oan
Reasons for Granting the Writ .....................0.s.cceceses: 6
I. The Fifth Circuit's Refusal to Certify This Case

Conflicts With This Court’s Reasoning in

Lehman Bros. and Violates Basic Tenets of

POE oss cicanzsessevecaciasininkaseidcstne cetera 7
II. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle to Refine

This Court’s Instructions on Certification

Without Limiting the Broad Discretion

Knunciated by Prior Decisions ....................... 8]
II. The Fifth Circuit Incorrectly Apphed Texas

Law and Policy Concerns in Rejecting Mr.

SS ENG) TERRES INN va isn con xiccsvacncideuscacsassecstaetens 13
IV. Mr. Sherman Properly Requested

ert O ORE ge ee re 16

L\

Conclusion 16
Appendix

Appendix A—Jn re Velocita Worldwide Logistics,
Inc., Opinion of the Court of Appeals (5th Cir.,
June 2, 2010)... |
millon payment to IOxe | In the payment chau
Velocita and the employes avreed to bi momtiv and
individually hable to pay Exel a $1.85) muilhiws
Velocita paid the entire $1.85 muilhon and. lates
entered bankruptcy Vhes | pull | ( eit
leomand i if reat

The Trustee brought suit against the
Employees, attempting to force them to pay their pro
rata share of the $1.85 million to Velocita. Since the
settlement agreement made no mention of
contribution, the Trustee relied on an implied
contractual right to equitable contribution. Both the
bankruptcy court and the district court denied relief.
The Trustee timely appealed to this court.

/
IT.

This appeal asks us to consider whether Texas
law would imply a right of contribution for a co-
obligor of a settlement agreement that paid more
than its proportionate share of the settlement.2 The
Trustee relies primarily on Fares v. Cockri/l, 31
S.W. 190 (Tex. 1895), and Merchants’ National Bank
v. McAnulty, 33 S.W. 963 (Tex. 1896), two century-
old Texas cases that recognize an implied right to
contribution. The Employees argue that the doctrine
announced in these cases has only been applied to
sureties and guaranties in the 100 years since it was
announced, and caution against expanding its
application here.

Under Texas law, a claim for contribution is
separate from the underlying tort or contract. “The
obligation to contribute is not founded upon contract.
.. but upon principles of equity and natural justice
which requires [sic] that one shall not be made to
bear more than his jut share of a common burden to

2 Since the appeal is taken frem the district court’s summary
judgment ruling, our review is de novo. Mongrue v. Monsanto
Co., 249 F.3d 422, 428 (5 Cir. 2001). We apply the same
standards as the district court. /d.

3a

the advantage of his co-obligors.” M/cKelroy v.
Hamilton, 130 S.W. 2d 1114, 1116 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939). The reasoning that underlies the right of
contribution is that the co-obhgors have made an
implied promise to bear the burden equally: “[iJn
suits for contribution the right of action is on the
unplied proniuse for reimbursement and not upon the
debt.” AM/ler v. Miles, 400 S.W. 2d 4, 7 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) (emphasis added).

iexas courts have long allowed actions for
contribution in guaranty and surety cases even
where the right was not set out in the note or
contract. Occasionaliy, Texas courts have recognized
the right to contribution in language broad enough
to be construed to cover the situation here. See, e.g.
E'mplovers Cas. Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d
606, 609 (Tex. 1969) (“The general contribution rule
is announced in 18 AM. JUR.2d 16, Contribution § 7,
in this language: ‘The primary requisites of the
equitable right to contribution ... are (1) a situation
wherein the parties are in aequali jure under some
common obligation or burden, and (2) compulsory
payment or other discharge, by the party secking
contribution, of more than his fair share of the
common obligation or burden.’”). Other cases have
defined the right to implied contribution more
narrowly. “Under Texas law, there is a very limited
right of contribution on a breach of contract claim;
that is, a contribution right exists among co-
guarantors on a note, or in any situation where there
is an implied promise of co-obligors to pay their
proportionate shares of a common. obligation.”
Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, No.

4a

3:98-CV-2913-M, 2000 WL 1281198 at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 8, 2000)(unpublished), revd on other grounds,
407 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2005).

Notwithstanding the broad language quoted
above, Texas courts, to the best of our knowledge,
have not found occasion to extend the contribution
right implied in guaranty and surety agreements to
other types of contracts. Because the doctrine has
been limited to guaranty and surety agreements, if
stands to reason that features of these contracts
make them more conducive to equitable contribution
than other types of contracts. An examination of the
underlying reasons why Texas courts have allowed
contribution only in these’ limited types of
agreements bears out this contention.

First, in sureties and guaranties, the subject
matter of the contract is (generally) money that has
been lent to one party on the binding assurance of
another or others. Should the lendee fail to repay,
the only contested item is completely fungible and
thus easily divisible, making pro rata lability simple
to calculate and knowable in advance. Second,
contribution accords with the settled expectation of
the guarantors: if there are three guarantors, in the
absence of contractual provisions to the contrary,
each can expect to bear no more than one-third of
the amount at issue. The implied promise underlying
the right to contribution is implied because it is
expected and desired ex ante. Disallowing
contribution would force each guarantor in a multi
party guaranty to gamble with his potential liability.
This would stifle the lending that guaranties

va

encourage. Third, contribution in the world of
guaranties and sureties is both fair and efficient. It
speeds the collection process for lenders and ensures
that each of the guarantors or sureties is treated
equally by default. In sum, surety and guaranty
contracts feature both an easily divisible subject
matter and an unmistakable underlying intent as to
how the parties will bear the risk of default by the
lendee.

Assuming arguendo that Texas courts would
imply a right to contribution in settlement
agreements as a general matter, we decline to do so
here. The factors that justify the contribution right
implied in sureties and guaranties are absent here.
First, the subject matter of the settlement
agreement. involved more than money. Although a
$1.85 million payment constituted one part of the
agreement, the remainder comprised individually
tailored injunctions against the Employees and
Velocita.? Texas courts have recognized that the
general rule of an equally divided pro rata
contribution is altered when, for example, co-obligors

3 The presence of disparate injunctions, in addition to money,
distinguishes the instant case from Greenspan v. Green, 255
S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). In Greenspan, a bankruptcy
trustee was allowed to assert a contribution claim against a co-
judgment debtor, even though the “joint judgment [was]
without a provision for contribution between the co-debtors.”
Id. at 918. Although the case supports the Trustee's position, it
is not entirely analogous because the underlying judgment only
involved money, thus making it more similar to a surety or
guaranty than the instant settlement agreement.
Furthermore, at oral argument, the Trustee specifically
disavowed any theory of recovery based on co-debtor status.

6a

shared unequally in the consideration received out of
the note, in which case “contribution my be prorated
according to the benefits each received.” Dittbherner
v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
In this case, the benefits that the individual
Employees received from being released from the
suit were presumably not equal. Some Employees
must have been less involved in the actions that Exel
alleged were trade secret’ violations. The
individually tailored injunctions support this
contention: LaMothe, for example, faced = an
injunction that was notably more strict than that
faced by the other Employees. Thus, contrary to the
Trustee’s arguments, implying ae right to
contribution would necessarily force the district
court to open up the underlying settlement to
determine an equitable division among the
Employees.

The instant facts are in stark contrast to the
situation in Dittberner, where the court was able to
find the amount of consideration received by each
party to the promissory note as a percentage of the
whole. Jd. at 534. In cases where the percentage
that each party should bear is obvious from the face
of the contract or where the parties entered into the
arrangement with their potential share of lability
allocated by existing law, it is relatively easy for the
courts to calculate each party’s contribution. The
implied promise on which the right of contribution
rests 1s more plausible in such cases. The difficulty
of equitably apportioning contribution here weighs
against implying the remedy.

Additionally, nothing indicates that
contribution would accord with the expectations of
the Employees and Velocita. Allowing contribution
would imply an eleven-way promise that the
Employees and Velocita would almost surely not
have made in the circumstances of this case.4 The
Trustee has not pointed to anything in the record
indicating _ that, ex ante, the Employees
contemplated an arrangement at all analogous to a
guaranty.

III.

In conclusion, we do not find the obligations in
the instant settlement agreement to be analogous to
the obligations in surety and guaranty agreements,
the contractual arrangements in which Texas courts
have allowed contribution claims against co-obligors.
Here, where each party appears to have received a
different benefit from the settlement agreement, the
shared burden is neither completely fungible nor
easily divisible. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment that, on these facts, a right to
contribution should not be implied.

AFFIRMED.

HAROLD R. DeMOSS, JR., Circuit Judge, concurs in
the judgment only.

' Each of the Employees had a different interest in Velocita:
LaMothe, for example, appears to have been a principal in the
company. We find it highly unlikely that the more “minor
players” signed the agreement with the understanding that
they could each be lable for approximately $200,000 of the
payment to Exel.

oa

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

DANIEL J. SHERMAN, §
8
Appellant, §
§
V. § Civil Action No.
§ 3:08-CV-1516-K
WILLIAM LaMOTHE, et al., §
§
Appellees. §
JUDGMENT

The Court having affirmed the order of the
United States Bankruptcy Court on the matters
appealed in this case, judgment is hereby entered for
Appellees. It is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
THAT:

the bankruptcy court’s order of June 9, 2008,
granting summary judgment is affirmed.

Signed March 26¢t, 2009.

s/ Ronnie Jacobson
RONNIE JACOBSON
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

DANIEL J. SHERMAN, 8
8
Appellant, §
§
\ § Civil Action No.
§ 3:08-CV-1516-K
WILLIAM LaMOTHE, et al., §
S
Appellees. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is an appeal from the
bankruptcy court's order’ granting summary
judgment in Adversary No. 06-03533 on June 9,
2008, and Appellees’ Motion for Leave to File a Sur-
reply (Doc. No. 17). The Court DENIES the motion
for leave to file a sur-reply and turns to the appeal of
the bankruptcy court’s order.

Appellant Daniel J. Sherman, Chapter 7
Trustee for Velocita Worldwide Logistics, Inc.
(“Velocita”), seeks to recover from Appellees their pro
rata share of a _ $1,850,000 settlement paid by
Velocita in an underlying state court action. The
bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for
Defendants-Appellees, finding no right of
contribution or indemnification pursuant to a
settlement agreement.

This Court reviews de novo the bankruptcy
court’s decision. See Cooper Cameron Corp. v. U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Admin., 280 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2002). A
bankruptcy court’s order granting summary
judgment is correct when the pleadings and evidence
in the record establish that no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the trustee is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Matter of
Criswell, 102, F.3d 1411, 1414 (5th Cir. 1997). A
lower court’s grant of summary judgment should be
affirmed if the judgment can be supported on any
ground. Harris v. Edward Hyman Co., 664 F.2d 943,
945 (5th Cir. 1981).

Appellant raises several issues on appeal: (1)
whether the bankruptcy court erred in concluding
that a judgment entered under a_e settlement
agreement does not provide a basis in law or in
equity for a subsequent contribution claim; (2)
whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding
that a right of contribution does not arise out of the
agreed order entered into under the settlement
agreement in this case; (3) whether the Bankruptcy
Court erred in concluding that no right of
contribution exists in this case because the prior
judgment was entered pursuant to a _ settlement
agreement; and (4) whether the Bankruptcy Court
erred in its decision on the parties’ respective
motions for summary judgment.

First, it is important to note that indemnity

and contribution are mutually exclusive; one with a
right of indemnity has no right of contribution

lla

against the indemnitor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 23(c). In the bankruptcy court, Appellant
pursued an indemnity claim that has been dropped
here in favor of solely contribution.

There is no common law right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors in Texas. Jowa Mfg. Co. v
Weisman Equip. Co., 667 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1983, writ refd nre.) (citing
Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 52 S.W.2d 1094,
1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)). Contribution thus must
be statutorily created or based on a contract among
joint tortfeasors, as Appellant alleges here. The
underlying settlement agreement and agreed final
judgment settled tort claims for misappropriation,
tortuous interference with contract and prospective
business relationships, unfair competition, violations
of various statutory provisions, and a host of other
claims. The agreed final judgment notes the
defendants are joint and severally liable.

By statute, each defendant who is jointly and
severally liable is hable for the damages recoverable
by the claimant pursuant to statute in proportion to
the respective percentage of ae ged TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.015. If a defendant who is
jointly and severally liable pays a larger proportion
of those damages than is required its percentage of

responsibility, that defendant has a right of
contribution for the overpayment against each other
defendant with whom its (s/o) is jointly and severally
hable to the extent that the other defendant has not
paid the proportion of those damages required by

12a

that other defendant’s percentage of responsibility.
Td.

Yet there is no statutory right to contribution
among defendants who enter into a joint settlement
agreement that resolves all of a plaintiffs claims.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Gen. Cable Indus.,
Inc., 966 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. App.—-E] Paso 1998,
pet. denied). The statute does not create a right of
contribution in a settling party, but it also does not
prohrbit a contractual contribution claim. Jd. In
Southwestern Sell the settlement agreement
specifically provided for a “right to assert the claim
for contribution or indemnity’—that is, it explicitly
created a contractual claim for contribution between
settling defendants. /d. at 168. “Although a settling
defendant does not have a statutorily created right
to seek contribution, neither of the [statutory
provisions] prohibited the parties from creating a
right to contribution by settlement agreement.” /d.
at 171.

Because there is no. statutory right of
contribution among settling defendants and no such
provision was written into the contract, Appellant
would have the Court imply one in the contract.
“Under Texas law, there is a very limited right of
contribution on a breach of contract claim that is, a
contribution right exists among co-guarantors on a
note, or in any situation where there is an implied
promise of co-obligors to pay their proportionate
shares of a common _ obligation.” Interstate
Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-
2913-M, 2000 WL 1281198, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8,

13a

2000) (Lynn. J.). revd on other ground 10" sd
708 (5th Curr. ZO0OO)

Texas public policy favo) ettlement
effectuate the efficient administration of justic
Klbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1992)
Appellant would have the Court Openhh Up a Lal
court's agreed judgment, signed on May 25, 2004, in
an ultimately futile attempt to determine the pro

rata lability of ten individual defendants. Such an
action would frustrate Texas public policy of
encouraging settlement Settling tortfeasors may
agree among themselves as to their re pective
responsibility for a plaintiff damage eC

Southwestern Bell 966. S.W.2d at 171. rather than

ask a court five vears later to do to the work for

them

Here, there 1 no mention of contribution (o)
indemnity) between the Defendant: in the
settlement agreement The setthng parties were
free to negotiate a_ provision’ providing for

contribution. They did not include such a provision
and the Court 1s unwilling to imply one for them
‘The bankruptcy court was thus correct in granting
Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment, finding no basis in law or in equity for a
contribution claim

After review of the bankruptcy court record
the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, the
Court concludes that the bankruptcy’ court's
determination was correct The decision of the

bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED The Clerk 1:

l4a

nt pul uUANnTL I Bankrupt f

SO ORDERED

IN THE t
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
DALLAS DIVISION

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Defendants. § Adversary No.
§ 06-03533

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Came before the Court for hearing on June 4,
2008, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion”) and Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff's
Motion”).

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings,
deposition, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, and other matters presented to the court show
that there is no genuine issues of material fact, and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US.
317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial
burden of articulating the basis for it motion and
identifying evidence, which shows that there is no

L7va

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Material issues are those
that could affect the outcome of the action. Wyatt v.
Hunt Plywood, Co. Inc., 297 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir.
2002).

If the moving party meets this burden, Rule
56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the
pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or
other admissible evidence that specific facts exist
over which there is a genuine issue for trial.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Wallace v. Texas
Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1996).
The burden is on the non-movant to make a showing
sufficient to establish an issue of fact for each
element as to which that party will have the burden
of proof at trial. HKpps. v. NCNB Texas Nat Bank,
838 F.Supp. 296, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1993), affd 7 F.3d
44 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986)). The nonmovant’s burden may not be
satisfied by conclusory allegations and denials,
speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated
assertions, metaphysical doubts as to the facts, or a
mere scintilla of evidence; and legalistic arguments
are not adequate substitutes for specific facts show
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita,
475 U.S. at 586-87; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc);
SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993);
Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047.

lSa

The court must draw inferences in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, factual
controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant
“only when there is an actual controversy, that is,
when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.”. MicCa/lum Highlands, Ltd. v.
Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th
Cir.), revised on other grounds upon denial of rel’g,
70 F.3d 26 (1995); see also Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048;
SWS. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494
(5th Cir. 1996). The Court will not, “in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could
or would prove the necessary facts.” AfcCallum, 66
F.3d at 92. Once a summary judgment motion is
made and properly supported, the nonmovant must
go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts
in the record showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bance).

Application To the Present Motions

Based on the record made before the Court,
there are no material fact issues in dispute, and the
Court finds that summary judgment should be
granted as a matter of law as to Defendants’ Motion
and denied as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's
Motion.

The Defendants’ Motion involves the right of

contribution and indemnification among parties to
an agreed judgment entered in the 192nd District

19a

Court of Dallas County, Texas, pursuant to a
settlement agreement. With respect to the right of
contribution, under Texas law, a judgment entered
under a settlement agreement does not provide a
basis in law or in equity for a_ subsequent
contribution claim. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins,
739 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tex. 1987). Therefore, a right of
contribution does not arise out of the agreed order
entered into under the settlement agreement
between the Plaintiff and Defendants in this case.
As to the right of indemnification, under Texas law,
common law indemnity has been abolished, except
where a party is vicariously hable. Aviation Office of
America, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander of Texas,
Inc., 751 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1988); Bonniwell v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1984). And a
right of indemnification exists against a party who is
vicariously lable only when there has been a judicial
determination or admission that such party is hable
to the claimant. Humana Hosp. v. American
Medical Systems, Inc., 785 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. 1990).
Since there has been no finding in this case that the
Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff, no right of
indemnification arises.

The Plaintiffs Motion also involves the right
of contribution and indemnification. As previously
mentioned, no right of contribution or
indemnification exists in this case since the prior
judgment was entered pursuant to a settlement
agreement.

Based on the foregoing, it is

20a

ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.

DER 7H#

[Case No. 09-10146 Document: 00511170272
Date Filed: 07/12/2010]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10416

In the Matter of: VELOCITA WORLDWIDE
LOGISTICS. INC.

Appellant
V.
WILLIAM LAMOTHE; RAJAN SOBHANI; CHRIS
BRACK; DANIEL ESTRADA; SCOTT
STUDEBAKER; JAMES MICHAEL WALSH;
BRANDON ROBINSON; PATRICK STRYER,
Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit
Judges.

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
denied.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT
s/Emiho M. Garza
United States Circuit Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2593%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.