# Opposition Brief — Exide Technologies v. EnerSys Delaware, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2011
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1216

## Text

en

ret mer waived any argu

yurt of Appeals for the Third Circuit erred in app

the “Countryman Test” (defined below) to determi
whether the Agreements (defined below) wer¢
executory,” when the Petitioner failed to assert ar
rybjection to the use of the Countryman Test or proposs
the use of any other test of executorimess in proceeding
before the Court of Appeals (or either of the lower court
that addressed this matter prior to the Court
Appeals), and, in fact, affirmatively argued to all three

ourts below that the Countryman Test applied and \

atisfied, and raised the issue of the use of the
Countryman Test for the first time in its Pe i
Writ { Ce? OT ,
2. Should the Pet.tion be denied because there
real, intolerable or genuine conflict among the fed
yurts of appeals regarding the test for detern
hether a contract 1s executory
3 n ld tn i lion ¢t ene te (
extent that there ts a conflict among the federal «
of appea rey ding the t t for determining wl ner
intract OX, tor. t not tf nt at
: Shi ne Pe n b¢ t e¢
extent that there mnflaet ay g the feder T
ippea regarding (ne le for determining whe
r | ay! r r

yu i i | } ( ur ad parc ¢
tent that there is a conflict among the federa
f appeal reoparding the test for deten ng vhetl
contract 1s executory, it rel { ul e whic
Lsufficiently important
{ bye if i@d because to U

f hould the Petitior

ent that there is a conflict umong the federal court

f ippeal ; regarding the test for determining whetl
ontract is execulory, Chis Is not an apy ;
rasointion of ch conflict

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
BELOW AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

’

lhe names of all parties in the United States Cour

Appeals for the Third Circutbare Exide Technologie

Petiboner) and EnerSys Delaware Ine (Respondent

Isa wholly-owned

ory a?

XI DI HA WAIVIED ANY
ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT O]

APPEALS APPLIED itt
INCORRECT TEST TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE AGREEMENT
ERE EXARCUTORY

TF |
vvI

Che Proceedings Kefore the ¢

Appeals

Il THERE IS NO CONFLICT AMONG
TiE FEDERAL COURTS Ot
APPEALS REGARDING THE TEST
FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A
CONTRACT IS EXECUTORY

\. There Is No Conflict Between the
Sixth Cireurt and the Circuits That
Have Adopted the Countryman Test
Regarding the Test for Determining
Whether a Contract Is Execulory

There Is No Conflict Between the
Mleventh Circuit and the Circuit
That Have Adopted the Countryman
fest Regarding the Test for
Determining Whether a Contract 1
le xecutory

1.TO THE EXTENT THERE IS A
CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAI
COURTS OF APPEALS REGARDING
THE DEFINITION OF EXECUTORY
CONTRACT, IT IS UNDEVELOPED AND
DOES NOT WARRANT TILE GRANT OF
EXIDE’'S PETITION.

rO THE EXTENT THERE IS A
CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS REGARDING
THE DEFINITION OF EXECUTORY
CONTRACT, IT IS BASED ON
OUTDATED AUTHORITY AND DOES
NOT WARRANT THE GRANT OF
EXIDE’S PETITION

PO THE EXTENT THERE IS A
CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAI
COURTS OF APPEALS REGARDING
THE TEST TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A CONTRACT IS
EXECUTORY, THE ISSUF RAISEDIS
NOT IMPORTANT ENGUGH TO
WARRANT GRANTING EXIDI
PETITION

iO FHE EXTENT THERE IS A
CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAI
COURTS OF APPEALS REGARDING
Tk DEFINITION OF EXECUTOR,
CONTRACT AND ime IS
DETERMINED TERAT THE ISSUE
RAISED IS IMPORTANT ENOLIGH TO
WARRANT RESOLUTION BY TILIS
COURT, THIS CASE IS A POOR
VEHICLE TO EFFECT SUCH

RESOLUTION

rHeE COUNTRYMAN TEST IS_ THt
CORRECT AND APPROPRIATE TEST FOR
DETERMINING WHETHER A CONTRACT
IS EXECUTORY

CONCLUSION

PABLE Ot

APPENDIX A K

tRIEF OF APPI
MXTDE TECHNOLOGTI iN i
UNEPED STATES COURT OF APPEAI
POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, DATED
JANUARY 12, 2009

APPENDIX B PETITION OF APPELLEI

KE AIDEI TECHNOLOGIES FOR
REHEARING EN BANC IN THE UNITED
TATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THI
PMIRD CIRCUTT, DATED JUNI NO
APPENDIA C ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THI
THIRD CIRCUIT, DATED JUNE I, 201
APPENDIX D COMPLAINT IN H |
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWAR
DATED AUGUST 20, 2

WM)

sub nom

A rceara

OTHER AUTHORITII

nN leg I
" . A > | 1
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i
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a) WAT
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nied i , {
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requests that this Cor
a writ of cerlrorari seeking revie.
of the United States Court of Appeal

he Judgmer

tor

ind Upinion
[ 1Csrenst (“Courtof Appeal

Thir

t to knersy ind |
4 [exide Technologie I}

entered into an Asset Purchase Agreemer
“Petition” or “Pet ati
A sy on June 10, 1991), Ene

‘ a\ ' '
enting

$135 million, repres

Exide”),
APA”) Petition

All of the a> el

y business, including plant

trademark: tradename
und related goodwill Pet
APA (and also in ¢
price), Ex.
worldwide

Lad hnolop Vy
sider |

Idition, at closing on the

fully patd $135 million purchase

i the
1 perpetual, exclusive

‘rT anted ene rs
royalty-free license to use certain trademart including
lo xia (collectively the “Marks”), on produ

he industrial battery business pursuant to a ‘Tra
into the AP

old
h was incorporated

Agreement
it (“Trademark Agreement

(Oa Obtaining the perpetual

ldwide, royalty-free right to use the Mark
ym industrial batteries was critical to the decision
“nerSys to enter into the APA Transcript of March
004 Hearing at 126, 128, 130, Jn re Faide Technolog:

an
NO UZd-]

11125 (Bankr D Del.)

t April 15, 2002, t e and ats debtor affiliates
intary petitions for relief under Chapter II of
litle 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy
Code") | he United States Bankruptcy Court for th
District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”)

tal,No O2Z-111% os ee

ry (72 years atler the
xide filed four Notices of Rejecti
‘Trademark Agreement, «
elated iuyreement
Agreements”) Pet at8, Poet App 29a &n 3, /n
Technologve etal ? 25, DI 1613, 1614,
Y 1617 (Banks | ). The four Notices of Reyection
deseribed above are collectively referred to as the
Notices to Reject " Wxide’s primary objective in filing
to Reject was to recapture the exclusive

Marks (including “Exide”) on industrial

App 1Ou, notwithstanding that it had

nsferred that right lo bneroys in perpetuity in ld

paid f rthat transfer Pet

erand) lasupporting: oj on prar gv | 1
request that at be permitted to reject the Agreeme
the Rejection Order” and the “Bankruptcy Court
Opinion,” respectively) Pet App. 27a-S88a, Pet at
On February 27, 2008, the Umited States District Cour
f the District of Delaware (the District Court
Hormed the Rey ccthron Order ina Memorandum O
the “District Court Order Vet App

On June 1, 2010, the Court of Appea !

mn (the “Court of Appeals Opinion”), determ ‘

at the Arrceement are not execrtory and cannot be

reiected, and a judgment (ihe Court of Appeal
Judgment’) vacating: the District Court Order

{ and
remanding for further proceedings consistent with tl
Court of Appeals Opinion Pet App la-l3a, Opp. Apy
78a-79a On June 1h, 2010, Exide petitioned the ¢

Appeal lor rehearing en banc Op) App oba
On Jims As) O10. the € ird of Apy " Lore t
} tion for rehearing ¢ } Ap) 4-\-$
kexide did} eek astay of Lhe mandate L(t
Appeals and, on Ju 2010, the Cour tl Appe
edit mandate Jr v6 } de Tech (ie et ¢ i
OS-1872 (3d Cir. July 010) On July 14, 2010, tl

District Court vacated the District Court Orde

remanded the case to the Bankruptey Court for furtt

4 4
\ ] !
proceeding in re Arve jechno ( Vt
1) | D. Ds July ] , )
( Au ) theo } | ' '
i rder tf { I ne ther hing Y
eyvection Order ind denied the N ; r
i / . ,

in order that amonded tts Aupust 27, 2010 Orde
respects that are not relevant to this Petition 77
ide Technol Tle el a No QO 1) ]

Bankr. D Del )
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. EXIDE TITAS WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT THAT
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THI
INCORRECT TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THE AGREEMENTS WERE EXECUTORS

t u uid Kidde

( Le Vect \)
{ Appellee filed tr
ried no objec
roposed no ot}
Appellee’s Opy
pete

REL Ee

much lower bar, allowing for treatrment of a contract

, ecutory af rejection would “-ellieve the debtor of
burdensome or disadvantageous obligratio

{'itrewuit amd the Circuits "That hbiave Adopted
the Countryman Test Regarding the Test for
Determining Whether = fo’s arpourment that the Saxth Cur". saancl to> cas cetliascussed below, the aii cu S10Yr "
¢ of the PFourctiomazal twas dicta

>—rell, the = Fh Fg q€lircunt rmoteci that tiho ter

y contract” is anot defined in the Bankrupt«
then stateci- “CWongress apparently had inrn

it
1iti9© autory contracts set forth :
imtryrmman, ‘ortracts in BRanrnl-ruptcy Pa
"The 7 e-? then re-stated, verbatim t
Ourntrymman aa t i171 > a wspplied t
Qurmtryrianm “Besst to Che fucts ard comclucde a, “*Le jJleur
re are material obligations left to bo performed
th partic to the contract.”"?’ [ad at a’72 Based on tha
lirigz the Court Reldthat the contract in question wa
ecutory ld at 4°73
CCconspiciuoiusty refi QOpPimi]3S8i is mr
ritiom of the la arther, since t}
l riot preciude uny finding of comflict between the appr re
he im &F , Fre wre Wat’! Ftv tealty Frmeet
226 SB .kF 5B8So, 56839 (Bankr WY ID Ky 1998) Ceriting Ferrel
and stating “he prevaihng definition throughout ths«
CL¥ymited States is reneratli referred to as t h«
Clounmtrymrman’ dofinition The Sixth Circeait 1s, n«dopte«
ttacat. ¢

bamkruptcy petition, the debtor enter« J amto a: pritra c
to purchase burial plots ith the purs« Lasse pric« f r the«
ots to be paici over a When the debtor later
ajaefaulteda on hes pay rt oblipat ons wnder tf
rpmtract, the cermetery owner cance nHhecontract ar
perio. te the deobtor’s banmkrupt« lamp, Vbtuinmaci
default pert for the balamce ie Jolly 74

J After tne debtor f1

edi his bankrupt«

SRWUBF LA ELE
ahol« a-corifl
aafly raraquair
of cert~ore.y
Clireciwit do
the ¢C*ountr
\ 976, 978
rplimnmtryrmarnr
tatimy {t
Jaoattly t39 ce
ad defimitio
urther ww ne
ma »priflict t
imilar fix
iis that ha
"r eee Jolly ¢«
ot. executor
‘ fi ,
appled the
2arme comecltu
iriirigze rmater
tai ac 2AQOD s
4 “ oo 4
L,at ié 114 [ 1d at 386-87 i € Aust? I ¢ (
| iL tUAS
Tr { ; raion b BR nor } , ned |
rn Wl, asarepuedc oY mnNne ICIOW ANG Aa { CD,

by Circuit Judge Thomas L Ambro im his concurrn
pimion in the Court of Appeals in this case, rejectior

| \ a
yuld not have divested EnerSys of its mghts under th

lrademark Agreement Pet App 14a-2la As a result

at least from the perspective of Judge Ambro, selection

it
! the Countryman Test or the Functional T wou
) nave Made anv ailiference in this case
' fA ‘ry r T ; 4
‘ r I Dp] It rt } a
he issue of impact of reyecuon addressed by Judge Amt

e were remanded to the Court of Appeals for application of

different executory contract test, and if it were deternur

VI. TO THE EXTENT THERE IS A CONFLICT
AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF
EXECUTORY CONTRACT AND IT IS
DETERMINED THAT THE ISSUE RAISED IS
IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO WARRANT
RESOLUTION BY THIS COURT, THIS CASE IS
A POOR VEHICLE TO EFFECT SUCH
RESOLUTION

the extent it 1s delermined that there 1s a confli
ng the federal courts of appeals regarding the

yper definition of executory contract and that the

ue is Important enough to warrant resolution by 1

rguing for application of the Functional Test given it:
ulure to make that argument to the Bankruptcy Court
the District Court, or the Court of Appeals, that failure
makes this case a poor vehicle to resolve any issues
lating to the definition of executory contract since thi
ourt would be addressing those issues without the
benefit of any analysis from the Bankruptcy Court, the
strict Court, or the Court of Appeals

: ; oat =
Second, as noted by Exide in its Petition

equent to the issuance by the Court of Appea

ord lenying Exide’s petition for rehearing er banc

xide filed ‘complaint (the “Exide Declaratory
Judgment Complaint”) in the Bankruptcy Court
ecking a declaration of rights under its confirr

rpanization (the “] de Plan

Op) ' ‘ ) nt) e DD ;
Judgment Cc nplaint, f gea ert mong Live
things, that based on the discharge and revest

provisions of che Bankruptcy Code and notwithstanding

that the Court of Appeals has determined that thi
Apreemenés are not executory and cannot be rejected
KnerSys does t have an enforceable right post
confirmation to use the EXIIEF mark under the
(Trademark) Agreement”, and “Reorganized Exidk
not encumbered by any use restriction provided in the
Trademark] Agreement,” and prays for an orde
declaring those assertions to be correct Opp App. 95a
oa In other words, according to Exide, even if it
Petition were denied, it would still get all the relief
suught in connection with rejection of the Agreement
e, exclusive use of the Exide trademark ar
tradename, even though it would be unable to re)
the Agreements While EnerSys strongly disagrees will
e claims asserted inthe Exide Declaratory Judgment

Complaint, the fact that these claims are being assert

by Exide and, if accepted, would render moot the issue
which Exide asks this Court to review (2 e , whether the
reements are executory and can be rey eLed), make
this case an extremely poor vehicle to resolve issue
relating to the definition of executory contr
Vhird, if the Petition is granted and this Court we

decide that the version of the Munctional Test Exid
asserts has been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit shoul

have been applied, the Agreements would still!

to be non-executory because re} ior of the
Aura vesike ox .] ly not “ert eee
Apreements Was Cclea&rly ( critical a requ 1 OY
> > frenera Lit ( M2 4} is d it. 1La¢4 (¢ Uf
P
.

hat exide confirmed its plan of reorganization in Apr
of 2004 without the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court
granting its request to reject the Agreements, whic]
did not come until April of 2006, two years after the plan
had been confirmed See In re aide Technolog

’ /
J1e8, cl

No 02-11125, D I 4341 dated Aprij 21, 2004 & D |

378 dated April 3, 2006 (Bankr. D Del.), Pet App a
SIA

Fourth, 1f the Petition ts granted, for reasons stated

Judge Ambro in his concurring opimon, even if the

Agreements were found to be executory and Exide wert
permitted to reject, EnerSys would not be deprived of
ts rights under the Trademark Agreement Pet. App

l4a-2la

THE COUNTRY MAN TEST IS THE CORRECT AND
APPROPRIATE TEST FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A CONTRACT IS EXECUTORY.

For the reasons stated by Professor C ym:
article, see Countryman, Ezxecutory Contracts

ink rupicy, Part 1,57 Minn L Rev 439, 460 (1973), and

his

for the reasons stated

n the multitude of decision
including the seven court of appeals decisions cited by
Exide, Pet. at 17, which have adopted the C

he

ountryman
Pest, the Countryman Test ts the

cor ind

appropriate Lest for determining whether

(
executory In the event the Petition is grant rs
will address in detail why the Countryman T
correct. However, for the hmited purposes of | Bri
Opt osition, EnerSy respectfully notes the following

lurst, Section 365 of the Bankruptey Code per
issumption or rejection of executory contract
tion

US.C § 365. It does not permit assumption or rejecti
statutory

of all contracts Since a basic tenet of

ruction is that a statute should be construed
f o that

hat effect 1s given to all of its provisions,
part well be rmoperative or superfluous, void «

msignificant unless the provision Is the result of obvioeu

mistake or error, Szalvernian v ]
Investor Fund, J, P, 51 3d 28, 31 (8d Cir, 1995), Co
f Pa Dept of Public Welfare v US D pt f flealt}
and Iinman Services, 928 } 378. 1885 (3d Cir 199]
the term “executory” must define a subset of all debt
mtract
The legislative history of Section 3¢ rovide on
:

elp in creating that subset by stating that, general
‘chntory contracts are contract
emains due to some extent on both sides

58, reprinted in U.S Code

sin “which performances

’

‘

989, Goth Cong., 2d Sess

Cong & Ad News 5787, 5844; If R Rep N

0 595,

Cong , 2d Sass. 347, reprinted an 1978 US Code Cor
& Ad News 5787, 5963 & 6303 (empha l supplied
“he Countryman Test fends meaning to the tern
executory” within the constraints imposed
Congress te, by limiting executlory contract:
due on both sides and

ntracts with performance

jistingruishing within Chat universe between executory

ind non-executory contracts by reference to the

quantum of perf rmance remaining on both side And
meaning ascribed by the Countryman Test to tt
term executory is supported by common sense B
tor ntracts tot ew

fexecutary co

ing the universe

;

atlerial obligations remaining on both side
Countryman Test ensures that only contracts with son
threshold level of importance will be subject t

pecial powers of assumptron and reject

second, the Countryman Test introduces a level
byectivity and consistency to distinguishing betwet
executlory contracts and non-executory centracts |
reference to a well established body of federal
bankruptcy law that has developed since the
Countryman Test was first announced in 1973, includiny

aw in the seven circuits that have formally adopted tt
1.

Countryman Test, and state contract law

12 Exide attacks the Countryman Test on the ba that

ud produce results that vary based on the law of the applicable

tate Pet at 22 However, Exide cites no examples of actua
3eS applying the Countryman rest and the materiality law
alate, in which the result would have been different had ¢

iw of a different state been applied In fact, the laws of t

les are very consistent in defining maternal versus no
material contractual obligations, as evidenced by the fact tl
at least forty three states have either adopted or cited w
approval the f ve-factor test stated in Section 24] of tl
Restatement (Second) of Contracts or its predecessor, Sects
75 Cart N Pickerill, Precutory Contracts Re-Revisiled, 83 AM
BANKR LJ 63, 84 n 128 (2009) (collecting cases) Further
Exide 1s incorrect in stating that the Court of Appeals Opintwr

the first time the concept of substantial performance ha

ntroduced into the materiality analysis Pel at 10, 11, 14
19 In fact, numerous courts have considered substant
erformance in their materially analysis in applying

«

Countryman Test See, ¢g, Vermont Plastics vy Brine, In
3d 272, 279 (2d Cir 1996), Jn re Munple, Ltd , 868 F2d 1129
1130 (9th Cir 1989), Royal Bunk of Canudav Fene

Minancal Leasing Corn, No 8&7 Cow 1056, 1992 US Dist LEX

16, *24-25 (SD NY June 29, 1992), Jacob & Youngs, It
Kent, 129 N F889, 891(N Y 1921), reh'g dented, 130 N I
NOY 19077 r , , he 1NQIN UW 49 ) \

i ae | aso ge ¢ ~¥ & 5 »

‘ er! hat the Countryman Test has worked cr
1 1} CAS by i lling lkexids \ } I
racn mé blivatlions extending tothe future
it 2G s belied by the tuct Fxrde ha ! iffiry il
Dligation that extend into the futur Kather
required only to refrain from interfering with the
exclu ve, worldwide, perpetual, : vulty-free license that
tl provided to I nerosy 1991 and for which it wi: W
pull twenty years ayo. Pet. App. 29a. That is not
onerous” burden under anyone’s definition In fact
tt ease, the Countryman ‘Test has not work
chief but, rather, has prevented an abuse by
{the bankruptcy Code rejection power
The Countryman ‘Test ha er 1 the bankrup
proce in tne | nited stats well over th waSt Ul {
eight year is evidenced by its formal ad iption’ (
reuits and the fact thatit has not been directly rejecled
iny federal court ofappeals | he event the Pel
rranted Ener Vili re Lhe if Nn
nt in Tk nm er dat

---

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