# Appendix — Windsor v. Maid of the Mist Corp. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2524%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2010 - **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1064 ## Text Supreme Court. US FILED \ \ o7 I OFFICE OF THE CLER» APPEND!X CONTENTS ' ' ! + rr , | ? Supreme Court Order extending date for filing Petitic for Writ of Certiorari dated September Supreme Court Order extending date for filing Petitio for Writ of Certiorari dated July ? 2010 Eleventh Circuit Order denying consideration of M tor rehearing dated June 28. 2010 f Windsor Motion for Reconsideration at ad Motion Rehearing En Banc regarding Order to Pay Sa ons dated May 4, 201¢ ) ) f\ ZO 2010 \A { Ro Nchn ¢ oF tt ( ir toe P ’ VV INGSOF RESPONSE LO KIeVé th ru ager awalal Sanctions dated March 29. 2010 16 Windsor Motion to Vacate Order and Motion fo Reconsideration dated March 8, 201¢ Windsor Motion for Hearing regarding Ability t Sanctions dated March 8. 2010 1 The exhibits and affidavits referenced herein have not bes | | j i } ] > ncluded in this Append x due to the volume. If the ¢ ) , ' see these, the Petitioner can easily provide the Eleventh Circuit Order denying the Appeal dated fo ge a A | |) ANE en ae In an 69 N.D. Ga. Order dated June 30, 2009 on motion to quash | MN ork here og apn ce 171 N.D. Ga. Order dated June 8, 2009 on stay of subpoena for deposition of Judge Evans..............180 PARE IG vious saan onus peias i 182 11° Cir. R. 27-4 182 Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk Washington, DC 20543-0001 September 2, 2010 Mr. William M. Windsor P.O. Box 681236 Marietta, GA 30068 Re: = William M. Windsor v. Maid of the Mist Corporation, et al. Application No. 10A98 Dear Mr. Windsor: The application for a further extension of time in the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice Thomas, who on September 2, 2010 extended the time to and including September 23, 2010. This letter has been sent to those designated on the attached notification list. Sincerely, William K. Suter, Clerk By /s/ Erik A. Fossum Case Analyst Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk Washington, DC 20543-0001 Mr. William M. W indsor P.O. Box 681236 Marietta, GA 30068 Re W lliam M VA nasor v. Maid of the Mist Corpor App Cal The applicatior above-entitled case has been 20 Thomas, who on July including September & This letter has been In No lor ) a. \ the attached notification | | 110 sent to those a ct 1OA98 CXTePNSION ¢ presented 1 / ‘ j } 10 extendea t + + | t which to file a petition tor a writ of certiorari in thy e tery | { } ai | ; ty o to Justice 1 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD Plaintiffs-Appe t A rf WILLIAM M. WINDSO Tr ) \l ( DGE ORINDA D LYS 10 t-Anne On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ORDER Consistent with the Court’s April 26, 2010, Order barring any additional filings in this closed appeal, the Clerk is directed to return unfiled the documents tendered by Appellant after entry of our Order The Clerk may discard any documents tendered by Appellant after the entry of this Order. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE FILED U.S.COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JOHN LEY CLERK APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, Appellee MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., Appellees, V. ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC., Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant and Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DATED APRIL 26, 2010 AND REQUEST TO ALLOW MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC TO BE CONSIDERED \villiam M. Windsor P.O. Box 681236 Marietta, GA 30068 8 Telephone: 770-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-234-4106 Email: bill@billwindsor.com PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, WILLIAM M. WINDSOR William M. Windsor (“Windsor”) hereby submits this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DATED APRIL 26, 2010 AND REQUEST TO ALLOW MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC TO BE CONSIDERED to this Court for consideration for filing Windsor shows the Court as follows: 1. The Order dated April 26, 2010 (“ORDER”) is EXTREMELY UNFAIR from this panel of the Eleventh Circuit. [ORDER is Exhibit 1.] 2. The Clerk of the Court accepted and filed Windsor’s April 6, 2010 “Reasonable Response” to the Panel's request for Windsor to respond to Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees. Now this Panel wants to deny that it was filed. This is unfair and surely improper 3, The Panel's excuse is that the “Reasonable Resporise” exceeds the 20 page limit of Fed.R.App.P. 27(d)(2). {Exhibit 2.] But Windsor’s “Reasonable Response” is not a response to a motion as dictated by Fed.R.App.P. 27(d)(2). The docket in this Appeal will show that Windsor previously filed a response to the motion that met the requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 27(d)(2). The “Reasonable Response” was a response requested by this Panel in regard to an award of sanctions pursuant to FRAP Rule 38. It wasn’t a motion at all. FRAP Rule 38 places no page limits on a / “Reasonable Response.” It simply provides that after notice from the court, a “reasonable opportunity to respond” will be provided. This is what Windsor provided — a response to an outrageous sanction. [See Exhibit 3.] This Panel also refers to 11" Cir. R. 27-4, but it similarly provides “a reasonable opportunity to respond,” and it places no page limits on the “Reasonable Response.” Windsor carefully checked the FRAP and 11" Cir. Rules before filing this “Reasonable Response.” Exhibit 4 shows that there are no rules relative to Answers. Exhibit 5 shows thai there are no rules relative to Responses to an answer on documentation on a request for attorneys’ fees. A search for “local rule 27” in versuslaw.com returns only two cases, and neither case refers to 27-4. [Exhibit 6.] Asa result, it is totally improper for this Panel to reject Windsor’s “Reasonable Response.” This Panel has violated FRAP 38 and 11" Cir. R. 27-4 by denying Windsor a “Reasonable Response.” 4. On March 8, 2010, Windsor filed a Motion for a Hearing on the FRAP Rule 38 sanctions. This 17-page Motion is the proscribed length. The Motion cited over 100 cases in support. On April 5, 2010, Windsor filed a Reply to Appellees’ Response in Opposition to Windsor’s Motion for Hearing on the issue of FRAP Rule 38 sanctions. This 10-page Reply is the proscribed length. This Reply again cited the key Eleventh Circuit case that says Windsor is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. This Panel could have ruled on this motion that pre-dated the “Reasonable Response,” rather than denying it because a subsequent motion was viewed as too long. The hearing would provide the ability for Windsor to provide a “reasonable response. ” 10 5. This Panel wants to award sanctions against Windsor, but this Court has not made an inquiry to determine if Windsor has the money to pay. Windsor cannot afford to pay sanctions. Windsor has submitted financial information to this Court under seal for in camera inspection. Windsor prays that the financial information will be returned based upon this ORDER. 6. This ORDER denies Windsor the ability to file a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court, and it denies him the ability to seek a stay while that appeal is pending. Windsor cannot afford to pay these sanctions, and relief is desperately needed. 7. On March 29, 2010, Windsor submitted a Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Windsor’s file copy is Exhibit 7 hereto. Windsor respectfully requests that this Petition be distributed. The decision of this Panel has to be completely and totally erroneous, and there are significant issues involved. WHEREFORE, Windsor prays that this Court grant said motion and that this Court do as follows: (1) grant this motion; (2) issue an order allowing Windsor’s financial documents to be filed under seal for an in camera inspection; (3) grant Windsor’s Motion for Hearing filed on March 8, 2010; (4) schedule an evidentiary hearing; (5) consider Windsor’s “Reasonable Response” as it was filed, or allow Windsor to file a shorter “Reasonable Response,” if necessary; 11 (6) process the Petition for Reheat np kn it may be considered by the Eleventh | and ') grant such other relief as the Court appropriate Respectfully submitted, tl 1t| O10 W WILLIAM M. WINDSOR re ‘ ’0) KBox f f Manetta. C,A {006 Telephone ()-5 Facsimile: 770-2 34-4101 Email: bill@b iIndsOor (Certificates of ¢ omphlance Service ind Interest have been omitted to reduce the size ac At penal» +4} p | ) | { } } } + )} | i} I { )¢ DI i} ff : ¢.3 ( ( }} +4} A ) thy, ) ty Pay BEFORE: | | BY THE COUR] All pending motions filed by Appr n clu \ppellant Ss motion to vacate and tor reconsiderati« ind any request for relief contained ny omer document filed by Appel mt are )| ) Appellant’s response to Appellees Maid of the Mist, et al. (“Maid”)’s motion for Fleventh Circuit Rule 27-4 sanctions far exceeds the twenty (20) page limit of Fed. R.App.P. 27(d)(2). Therefore, we STRIKE Appellant's response and direct the Clerk to return that document unfiled Maid’s motion for Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-4 sanctions for Appellant's filing of frivolous motions is DENILD tn light of the Rule 38 sanctions that we award below. However, we note that this Order does not preclude the grant of another Rule 27-4 motion filed in any of Appellant's other appeal or petitions pending with this Court In Compliance with the direction tn our February 25, 2010, Order dismissing the appeal as frivolous and granting Rule 38 sanctions to Maid, Maid has filed a statement of its Costs and expenses (including attorneys’ fees). Maid seeks an award of Rule 38 sanctions in an amount of $37,401.17 We have reviewed the declaration of maid's counsel, the records attached thereto, and Appellant's overlong response, which fails to meaningfully challenge the amounts sought by Maid We note that the first of Maid’s billing entries is for work performed before the notice of appeal for this case was filed in the District Court. Consequently, we discount that entry for $67.50 in our determination of the amount to be awarded. APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, Appellee MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., Appellees, V. ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC., Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant and Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. OPPOSITION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR “COSTS AND EXPENSES” UNDER RULE 38 PURSUANT TO ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 25, 2010 William M. Windsor 3924 Lower Roswell Road Marietta, GA 30068 Telephone: 770-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-578-1057 Email: bill@billwindsor.com 16 PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, WILLIAM M. WINDSOR William M. Windsor (“Windsor”) opposes the Plaintiffs’ Application for “Costs and Expenses” filed on March 10, 2010 in the form of “Declaration of Carl H. Anderson, Ir., (“Mr. Anderson”) Counsel for Appellees,” for the reasons expressed herein and in documents referenced. (pages deleted) ARGUMENTS AND UTHORITY This Court’s Order provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established law, is devoid of any reasoning, and doesn’t even contain objectionable summary or conclusory statements — it contains no statements. (See Avalos v. U.S. Att'y Gen. 2006 WL 2567603 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006).) Windsor opposes the Application of Appellees for “Costs and Expenses” for a significant number of reasons. FRAP Rule 38 provides a “reasonable opportunity to respond” and says the court may award “just damages.” An award of ANY damages in this matter would not be just. Windsor finds no page limits mentioned on an FRAP 38 “reasonable opportunity to respond, so this Opposiiton will go significantly over the pages due for a normal response to a motion. If Windsor needs to move for approval to exceed the page count, he so moves. Windsor demands an evidentiary hearing. (pages deleted) Respectfully submitted this 29" day of Marc! 2010. William M. Windsor R William M. Windsor Pro Se 3924 Lower Roswell Road Marietta, GA 30068 Telephone: 770-5 Facsimile: 770-578-1057 Email: bill@billwindsor.« APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS — FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., Appellees, V. ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC., Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant and Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. MOTION TO VACATE ORDER AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY APPELLANT WILLIAM M. WINDSOR William M. Windsor 3924 Lower Roswell Road Marietta, GA 30068 Tele none: 770-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-578-1057 Email: bill@billwindsor.com PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, 20 WILLIAM M. WINDSOR 1. This is a Motion to Vacate Order of this Court dated February 25, 2010 dismissing Windsor’s Appeal and granting sanctions pursuant to FRAP 38 (“ORDER” — Exhibit A hereto) and a Motion for Reconsideration (“MTVMEFR”). The Appeal (“Appeal”) is from the orders of the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Civil Action Number1:09- CV-01543-WSD entered June 30, 2009 and September 2, 2009 (“Appealed Orders” — Exhibit B hereto). Ps This Court’s decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established law, is devoid of any reasoning, and doesn’t even contain objectionable summary or conclusory statements — it contains no statements. (See Ava/os v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 2006 WL 2567603 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006).) 3. This MTVMER contains new evidence, presents an intervening expression of law, explains clear errors in this Court's previous ruling to warrant vacating, and presents law pertaining to “frivolous” appeals. (Ray v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, No. 08-10879 (11th Cir. 04/13/2009).) A. THIS ORDER VIOLATES THE LAW OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REGARDING BOTH SANCTIONS AND DEPOSITIONS Of JUDGES. 4. Windsor is pro se, and sanctions are inappropriate. The District Court never indicated that Windsor’s claims were meritless. In neither of the Appealed Orders did Judge Duffey warn Windsor about anything. None of the Appellees indicated that Windsor’s claims were meritless or even requested 22 sanctions in the District Court. (See Exhibit B.) This is a clear error of law. The Eleventh Circuit says: “Generally, sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38 and § 1912 are inappropriate against a pro se appellant even if the appeal is frivolous. Woods v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Nevertheless, we have imposed sanctions on pro se litigants who were warned by the district judge that their claims relating to various tax issues were meritless. United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2008) (ner curiam); King v. United States, 789 F.2d 883, 884 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). While Pollinger's claims are frivolous in nature, after reviewing the record in full, and considering that Pollinger is a pro se appellant, we deny the government's motion for sanctions.” (Pollinger v. Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board, No. 09-12295 (11th Cir. 01/15/2010). lemphasis added | We have imposed Rule 38 sanctions on a pro se taxpayer after the Tax Court had apprised the taxpayer of the potential consequences of maintaining an appeal based on arguments previously rejected by the court. (Biermann v. Comm'r, 769 F.2d 707, 708 (11th Cir. 1985).) (Perkins v. Commissioner of IRS, No. 07-12689 (11th Cir. 01/09/2008).) 5. [here are many examples of federal district judges giving testimony in the territory of the Eleventh Circuit: 23 “...the courts apparently have had little difficulty in calling federal district judges to the witness stand. For example, in United States v. Jenison,485 F. Supp. at 665, eight United States District Judges from the Southern District o1 Florida testified... And in United States v. Holman, 510 F. Supp. at 1180, a federal district judge testified ... in the Northern District of Florida. See also United States v. Cabrera- Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. at 805 n. 2; United States v. Breland, 522 F. Supp. 468, 471-74 (N.D.Ga.1981) (testimony of nine federal district judges). “Further, the practice of calling federal judges to testify in these cases has been discussed, and approved sub silentio, on two occasions in the Eleventh Circuit. See United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d at 1357; United States v. Perez- Hernandez, 672 F.2d at 1387-88 (defendant adopted record in the Jenison case for purposes of his dismissal motion).” (United States v. Cross, 708 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 06/30/1983).) 6. The justification cited by the Appellees and Judge Duffey to quash the subpoena for deposition was “mental processes.” But Windsor made it absolutely clear that he would not seek testimony about the judge’s mental processes. [Appeal Brief P 34, 41, 53, 54, 56-60.] Windsor even agreed to let Judge Duffey approve the deposition questions in advance. {Appeal Brief P 41, 53, 54.] (See generally Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).) 24 +e Research done by Windsor indicated that judges are clearly subject to depositions. (See Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 10/26/1984); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 09/10/1982); Wynn v. Smith, 446 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 07/12/1971); Young v. Barrett, 912 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 08/27/1990); Doherty V. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 02/24/1984); R.W.T. v. Honorable Donald F. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 07/11/1983); Alan Mcsurely, Et Al. v. John L. Mcclellan, Et Al, No. 82-2369 (DC Circuit) 12/10/82; Glaser v. Board of Bar Examiners, 17 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 02/11/1994); Spry v. Boles, 299 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 02/13/1962); Buckner v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 06/20/1939); Drake v. Portuondo, No. 06-1365-pr (2d Cir. 01/23/2009). 8. But the clearest evidence is the Subpoena Regulations of the Judicial Conference that Windsor identified and used as the roadmap for his subpoena of Judge Evans. [Appeal Brief P 34-41.] The test that should be applied in determining whether a judge may be compelled to testify is well stated by Judge Austin, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Standard Packaging Corporation v. Curwood, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 134 (1973), as follows: "Generally, all individuals are subject to the lawful authority of a competent court to compel testimony of any facts within their knowledge and relevant to the issues at hand. (Citations omitted.) An exemption from compulsory testimony is 45 recognized in certain situations to protect integrity and individual responsibility of government officials whose duties involve thi exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial authority (Citations omitted.) The essential line of demarcation appearing from the cases is that judicial and quasi-judicial officers may be compelled to testify only as to relevant matters of fact that do not probe into or Compromise the mental processes employed in formulating th judgment in question (United States v. Cross 516 I Supp 700 (M.ID.Ga. 06/18/1981 Y Ihe ORDER of thi { ourt fact and law B. THIS COURT ERRED IN ISSUING AN ORDER INDICATING THAT WINDSOR’S APPEAL WAS FRIVOLOUS 10 Windsor’ , Appe al Was not tri 11 Fleventh ¢ ircuit ule ’ frivolous motion ‘A motion ts frivolous if: (a) it is without legal merit and cannot be supported by a reasonabl argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law; or (b) it contains assertions of materi facts that are false or unsupported b y the record or (C) it is presented for an improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary dh needless increase in the cost of litigation a complaint may not be aismissed frivolous if ‘any of the legal point are) arguable on thew merits.’” (Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 § Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).) Since judge do not have an immunity regarding depositions; since t? ladW ¢ ited hy Ine Appe hoe } i¢ to do if only (dS mental prot PSSe and Since Windsor had Ayiet d IO ie Judpe Dultley approve thy depo: hor que Hor ATVANCE there iS Certainly al ars ratyle poi} Most of the ¢ ( ! ryV\ asofr , lound on “trivolous appea refers to criminal Case | tyre { ité ’ ra pron Pe cil () | roorry) ) [ cf cl ry i rive () | | i] | lf ‘ einer iniaw ot tact T olo clain ri di clam describing fantasti or delusional cenano claims with which federal district idges are all too familiar." (Neitzke v. Williams IOUS. Ct. 182 1633 (1989): Bilal v. Driver F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 200 r it Hlepation re} Q)} r i Cie@a4&ny hasel . l¢ va Port are rivoa vhnen they are indi putably aa The mr Su/tentuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1? |? BEL Cir.1990 Battle v. Central State Hospitai | i 1JG ] {) it} { ! QO) rpeuments must truly strike beyond the pale lo j , ‘ nound ol morattty good bel WVIOT OF | Teruaal civilized company]. (Washington v. Alaimo, 9 Ipp 1395 (S81). Gsa. 1996 ify lax Protester | 1d) are objectively frivolous (without any legal or factual basis); (2) whether the person whe sipned the pleadings should have been aware that they were frivolous; of (4) there ts a finding of bad tatth. (Baker v. Alderman, \5% |.jd 516, 524 (1th Cir 1998).) Pro se Windsor spent weeks investipzating the subpoena for Judge Evans, he Response to the Motion to Quash, and the Appeal of the rulings on the Motion to Quash. Windsor’s research indicated that bis actions were absolutely reasonable objective, and proper before filing. There has been no finding of bad faith, nor can they be. Woindsor has done NOTHING ERIVOLOUS! 17 ‘Something more than a lack of ment required |. fora clam to be Considered triivolous. bdo "| tht iS NOt suffrcrent that the claumn be tound mentless, the Clanm must be without a plausible legal or factual beast and lae king In puUstCation. (Jorres v. City of Orlando 2641. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (MD). bla, 2005) (att ae bed Appx. $91 lth Cir, 2008)) Ii Windsor has not submitted rambling: bret: that make no atte Mipt to address the elements 1 quisite to obtarning reversal; has not fled numerous documents containing irrelevant arguments and authorty, did not seck to relitipate issues already adjudicated, has not failed to explain how the lower tribunal erred or to present clear or copent arpuments for overturning the decision below; has not reanued frivolous positions for which sanctions had already been imposed inthe tral forum; has not cited inapplicable or irclevant authorities; misrepresenting facts or law to the coun. All he has done ts identify Judge Evans and Judge Duttey a corrupt federal yudges, which he can prove 29 19. | Windsor has researched every case on “motions to quash subpoenas” on www.versuslaw.com and he has not found a single case that indicates any courts rejected arguments similar to those offered by Windsor or where sanctions were imposed for a frivolous appeal. (See Pollard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 786 F.2d 1063 (11th Cir. 04/14/1986).) (See Exhibit D hereto.) 20. This Appeal was not taken “in the face of clear, unambiguous, dispositive holdings of this and other appellate courts.’ (Capps v. Eggers, 782 F.2d 1341, 1343 (5th Cir.1986). See McDougal v. Comm'r, 818 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1987); Stelly v. Comm'r, 761 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985); Finch v. Hughes Aircratt Co., 926 F.2d 1574, 1579-80, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1991).) Sanctions on pro se litigants are appropriate if they were warned that their claims are frivolous and they were aware of "ample legal authority holding squarely against them." Stel//y v. Comm'r supra. (7aylor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 09-60455 (5th Cir. 10/26/2009).) 21. Windsor has researched every Eleventh Circuit case involving pro se parties filing appeals such as his, and he finds no precedent for finding a pro se party to have filed a frivolous motion in attempts to reverse rulings on motions to quash. See Exhibit E. (See Redeker-Barry v. United States, No. 08- 16166 (11th Cir. 06/25/2009); Kang v. Noro- Moseley Partners, No. 07-10310 (11th Cir. 09/04/2007); Securities and Exchange 30 Commission v. Investment Technology, Inc., 200 Fed.Appx. 858 (11th Cir. 09/14/2006); Lawyers Title Ins. Conp. v. JDC (America) Corp., 52 F.3d 1575 (11th Cir. 05/31/1995); Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir. 04/02/1991); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229 (11th Cir. 03/31/1988); and (Spivey v. ie 683 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 08/16/1982) 22. In Spivey v. Zant the district court's error tainted the evidentiary hearing by denying Spivey, and the court, access to materials which might have helped resolve the factual issues which precipitated the hearing and as to which other, dispositive, evidence was not available. Judge Duffey has done the same thing by denying Windsor access to information that only Judge Evans has that will prove fraud in Civil Action 1:06-CV- 0714-ODE (“MIST-1”) and enable him to get the case reopened. “We therefore vacate the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings. Spivey must be permitted to inspect the materials in Schloth's possession which may bear on the factual issues before the court. The court must then reopen the evidentiary hearing and allow Spivey a full and fair opportunity to cross- examine Schloth based on those materials, and to present whatever additional evidence — the materials divulge.” (Spivey v. Zant 683 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 08/16/1982).) c THERE IS NO BASIS WHATSOEVER FOR THIS ORDER a There is no basis fer this ORDER, and the ORDER is challenged on this basis. 24. — This Court gave a two sentence response to the Appeal of the Motion to Quash: “In reviewing motions filed with the Court, we have also reviewed Appellant's brief, which fails to meaningfully challenge the orders on appeal. Consequently, we sua sponte DISMISS this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED.” This is an erroneous decision. This is an error of fact because it failed to consider the uncontroverted facts. 25. It is interesting that the ORDER indicates that the Appellees’ briefs were not considered. (Page 2 of the ORDER, fourth paragraph — Exhibit A.) 26. The Eleventh Circuit cited no case law to support the ruling; only one case was cited and erroneously — Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 08/19/2003). This case DENIED Rule 38 sanctions: “Fed. R. App. P. 38. "Rule 38 sanctions have been imposed against appellants who raise ‘clearly frivolous claims' in the face of estaolished law and clear facts." Misabec Mercantile, Inc. De Panama v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ACL1 Futures, Inc., 853 F.2d 834, 841 (11th Cir. 1988). “Because Farese has raised valid arguments as to why the district court's dismissal should be reversed or vacated, we conclude that the Rule 38 motion is without merit and deny the motion.” [emphasis added. 32 27. Eventhe Misabec Mercantile case DENIED Rule 38 sanctions: “Rule 38 sanctions have been imposed against appellants who raise ‘clearly frivolous claims’ in the face of established law and clear facts. See, e.g., United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th Cir.1986); Stubbs v. Commissioner, 797 F.2d 936, 938-39 (11th Cir.1986). This is not such a case. We accordingly decline to impose Rule 38 sanctions.” [emphasis added .| 28. The Eleventh Circuit made it clear on January 15, 2010 that sanctions under FRAP 38 are inappropriate against a pro se appellant even /f the appeal is trivolous. (Pollinger v. Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board, No. 09-12295 (11th Cir. 01/15/2010). lemphasis added. | 29. So, this Court has no law to support its ruling on sanctions and no facts -- NO explanation of eny type. If this Court had an explanation for how the Appeal could be considered frivolous, Windsor should have been afforded the due process right to see what they had to say and respond. This Court denied Windsor a complete record of the case, and Windsor was afforded no procedural safeguards. This Court issued this ORDER for illegal reasons. 30. Such dismissals are not favored. They are unfair to litigants. (Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. State of New York, 547 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).) 31. — Such dismissals deny an appellant the opportunity to make legal arguments against the dismissal. The prejudice is particularly acute with respect to pro se parties ... who are generally unskilled in the art of pleading. (7ingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 09/15/1983).) D. THIS COURT’S ORDER HAS ERRORS OF LAW 32. The ORDER dismissing Windsor’s Appeal as frivolous is an error of law because the Supreme Court expressed on October 20, 2009 that courts err in disposing of claims without explanation of any sort. (Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. ___ (2009), (08- 10495).) 33. The decision to deny the appeal is an error of law because, as a general rule, any individual competent to be a witness may be compelled to testify as to facts within his or her knowledge that are relevant to a matter before the court. (See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39S. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979 (1919); Standard Packaging Cerp. v. Curwood, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.UL.1973).) E. THIS COURT'S ORDER IS A VIOLATION OF WINDSOR’'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 34. — This Court has violated Windsor’s Constitutional rights and has denied due process. This Court's cursory treatment of Windsor’s Appeal does not comport with fair procedure and lacks the equality that is required by the Constitution and its amendments. 35. | Windsor has been denied a fair judge at all 34 stages of the proceedings. Judge Evans and Judge Duffey violated Windsor’s legal rights guaranteed in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution under color of law. The 11th Circuit has done so as well. 36. Windsor submits that this Court issued this ORDER for the sole purpose of damaging Windsor because he has sued the Eleventh Circuit and has requested leave of court to sue each of the judges that issued this ORDER. These judges as much as said so. 37. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull must recuse themselves because they have a personal interest in the outcome of this appeal. 38. Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull have become accessories after the fact and conspirators with Judge Duffey and Judge Evans in obstiuction of justice. The ORDER of this Court denies Windsor access to the information that will enable him to recover $1 million “stolen” from him as the result of the fraud upon the courts in MIST-1. Zz THIS COURT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WINDSOR BECAUSE HE IS PRO SE 39. — This Court has discriminated against Windsor because he is pro se. This Court has also discriminated against him because he has had the audacity to tae action against federal judges. 40. Windsor submits that his experience is that judges in the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit ROUTINELY violate the law and twist 35 the facts and the law to accomplish their own improper purposes. These judges have apparently decided that they will take the law into their own hands and do whatever they please. All of the federal judges in Atlanta that Windsor has encountered are dishonest and corrupt. 41. By calling this Appeal frivolous, this Court must prove that the legal points on pages 22-26 and 60- 67 in Windsor’s Appeal are not arguable on their merits. (Anders v. California, supra.) 42. It is not frivolous for Windsor to claim the ERRORS OF LAW cited on pages 28-50 of the Appellant's Brief as these are arguable on their merits. 43. It was not frivolous for Windsor to claim the ERRORS OF FACT cited on pages 27, 50-60 of the Appellant's Brief. G. THESE JUDGES ISSUED THIS ORDER BECAUSE THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT IS CORRUPT. 44. There is nothing wrong with the Appeal Brief. The problem is that Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull are corrupt. They don’t like it that Windsor is exposing the corruption in the federal court system in Atlanta, so they are taking corrupt action to damage him. 45. | Windsor was shocked when the Eleventh Circuit denied the appeals of Alcatraz and Windsor at Summary Judgment. Alcatraz cited six primary errors with 13 subsidiary errors. Windsor cited an additional 10 errors. Judge Hull, Judge Fay, and Judge Dubina did not address the points of error, and the ruling makes absolutely no sense to Windsor. 36 46. Windsor asked that this Court not let that happen again. But Judges Carnes, Barkett, and Hull have proven that they are dishonest. 47. Judges of the Eleventh Circuit have proven their own dishonesty and corruption again and again in these actions. Windsor believes every order issued has been erroneous. All Eleventh Circuit orders involving Windsor are referenced and incorporated herein as if attached hereto. 48. The Affidavit of William M. Windsor, attached hereto as Exhibit F and referenced and incorporated herein, includes information that is not included in this Motion to Vacate and Motion to Reconsider due to page limits. 49. Windsor asks that this Court reconsider the Motion to Disqualify all Eleventh Circuit and Northern District of Georgia judges because there is an appearance of bias that requires recusal. 50. | Windsor asks that this Court reconsider the Motion for Change of Venue so this Appeal may be moved to another Circuit where the judges will not be friends and associates of Judge Evans. Windsor cited 7 cases. By refusing the change of venue and disqualification of the judges, this Court is denying due process to Windsor and Is failing to ensure justice in this case. This Court screams “appearance of bias.” 51. Plaintiffs’ filings relative to this Appeal was filled with false statements and statements not supported by the record. 37 52. By turning a blind eye to the criminal activity and grossly violating Windsor’s Constitutional rights, this Court is a disgrace to the judicial system. This Court is an accomplice to the criminal acts of the Appellees and their attorneys. 53. The Appellees did not quote a single valid case to support their Motion for Sanctions. The Appellees did not provide any valid case law authority for their FRIVOLOUS motion for sanctions. 54. It is well-established that Courts will compel judicial testimony when it is needed and that discovery is absolutely permissible post-discovery. 55. This Court claimed Windsor provided no legal basis for his Motion to Disqualify the Judges. Windsor clearly identified the legal basis in his motion and in his Reply to the Response of Judge Evans. Windsor assumes 28 U.S.C. 144 and 28 U.S.C. 455 are also to be considered. 56. Judge Evans has information material to civil proceedings. She is obligated by law to testify. 57. | When Windsor filed his Appeal, he did not have access to research information that he now has. As a result, some important case law was unknown to him that supports the requirement of Judge Evans to give testimony: Neither are we aware oi any rule generally exempting a judge from the normal obligation to respond as a witness when he has information 38 material to a criminal or civil proceeding. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-707 (1974). (Dennis v. Sparks et al, 101 S. Ct. 183, 449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 11/17/1980).) There is no constitutionally based privilege immunizing judges from being required to testify about their judicial conduct. The doctrine of judicial immunity does not excuse a judge from responding as a witness when his co-conspirators are sued. (Dennis v. Sparks et al, 101 S. Ct. 183, 449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 11/17/1980).) Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. Because of the key role of the testimony of witnesses in the judicial process, courts have historically been cautious about privileges. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in E/kins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 364 U. S. 234 (1960), said of this: "Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." (/n re Suspension to Practice Before United States District Court of Southern District of lowa of John D. Randall John D. Randall, 640 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 01/21/1981).) 39 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced. Page 418 U. S. 711 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 707 (1974). (In re Suspension to Practice Before United States District Court of Southern District of lowa of John D. Randall John D. Randall, 640 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 01/21/1981).) Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "'the public... has a right to every man's evidence." (United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).) As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." E/kins v. United States, 364 U.S, 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Accord, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, See also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 4 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 321 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). (Trammell v. United States, \00 S. Ct. 906, 445 U.S. 40 (U.S. 02/27/1980).) Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle [of no testimonial privilege] 40 only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." See also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev 1961); 4 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 321 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). Herbert v. Lando et al, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 441 U.S. 153 (U.S. 04/18/1979). In Nero Trading's case, the district court's failure to articulate its reasons for forgoing an evidentiary hearing and denying Nero Trading's motion to quash leads us to conclude that Nero Trading was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to question the Service concerning its reasons for issuing the summonses. The district court refused a limited adversarial hearing and issued a perfunctory order with only passing reference to any legal standard and no reference at all to either the merits of the Service's prima facie case or Nero Trading's claims in rebuttal. (Nero Trading, LLC v. United States, Dep't of the Treasury, 570 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 06/10/2009).) H. = THIS COURT ERRED IF IT CLAIMS WINDSOR FILED THE APPEAL FOR ANY IMPROPER PURPOSE 58. Windsor has stated repeatedly under oath, under penalty of perjury, and before a notary that he has never presented any motions for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to Cause unnecessary delay or neediess increase in the cost of litigation. Every motion that Windsor has filed has been supported by a sworn affidavit. (See Affidavit of William M. Windsor attached 41 hereto as Exhibit F. Windsor will be happy to take a polygraph lest to prove this This Court has 90 factua justification for claiming improper purpose (Vit above), so this Court Cannot chain tI pustitye ition Tor the ORDER THIS COURT FERRED IF 11 CLAIMS WINDSOR'S FACTS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 9 All material facts are fully support ad by thy record in Windsor’s Appeal Everything was sworn under penalty of perjury hefore a notary. Windsor’s tact ' were neve; ¢ ontroverted in any manner; the Plaintits did not tile a single affidavit. This Court has no factual ’ } pustitn ation tor ¢ laiming facts were nol support d(ii above), so this cannot he claim as the justiheation tor the ORDER 60 lhe District Court did not find Windsor Response to the Motion to Quash frivolous, nor cick thy Mistrict Court find Windsor’s Motion for Recon: ideratiorl of the Motion to Quash frivolous. I those dispute d motions were not frivolous, th Appeal could not be frivolous. Pro se Windsor could not possibly anticipate that this Court would find something frivolous that the District Court did not question and that Nis researc! proves should be decided in his tavor (| [his Court has failed to apply the proper legal standard and has failed to follow proper procedure in making this determination, and it has based thi decision upon ut known factors that are Clearly erroneous 62 Ihis Court has no right whatsoever to assume that Judge Evans and Judge Dutley are telling th truth. They aren't, and Windsor has proven it (See Windsor's Appeal Buet, P20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 2%.) J THIS COURT ERRED IE TT CLAIMS WINDSOR'S MOTION HAS A LACK OF LEGAL MLRII (4 Ihis Coun cannot claim that Windsor Appeal has a lack of legal ment (hl. A. above). Windsor cited $5 cases, 17 statutes, 14 cules, two treatises, and the Constitution in bis Appeal. An additional 80 Case: are cited herein (4 [his Court erred by failing to property consider the cases Windsor cited K THIS COURT ERRED IE LT CLAIMS JUDGES HAVE IMMUNITY G' Judges are not immune from deposition from thei criminal acts, and from obstructing: pustice by withholding: vital evidence Ob A Memorandum of law on Judicial Immunity that Windsor filed in another court is attached hereto as Exhibit G and 1s reterone ed and ine OFrpPoral d herew bor the forepoing reasons, Windsor respecttully requests that this Court vacate its ORDER dated Lebruary 25, 2010 and reconsider its ORDER based upon the grounds enumerated herein and deny Plaintiffs’ Motion 4 for Sancthons A4 Submitted, this 8th day of March, 2010 William M. Windsor S William M. Windsor Pro Se — wna In rg wy iP ) (Certificates of ( ompiance service, and interested Parties have been omitted to reduce the size and « Of this Appendix APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D “IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., Appellees, V. ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC., Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant and Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. MOTION FOR HEARING William M. Windsor 3924 Lower Roswell Road Marietta, GA 30068 Telephone: 770-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-578-1057 Email: bill@billwindsor.com PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, WILLIAM M. WINDSOR 4S - Windsor demands & Hearing on this Court's order dated February 25, 2010 dismissing Windsor’s Appeal; this Court’s order granting sanctions pursuant to FRAP 38 (“ORDER” — Exhibit A hereto); and Windsor’s Motion to Vacate Order filed March 8, 2010. The Appeal (“Appeal”) is from two orders of the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Civil Action Number1:09-CV-01543-WSD entered June 30 2009 and September 2, 2009 (“Appealed Orders” Exhibit B hereto). The Secona 2010 Affidavit of William M. Windsor (“Aff #2010-2” is attached hereto as Exhibit C. (Att #2010-2 4911.) WINDSOR DEMANDS A HEARING 2 Windsor demands a hearing. Due process mandates a hearing. The Eleventh Circuit has indicated that Windsor is entitled to a hearing in cases such as this (Aff #2010-2 912.) 7 The need for a hearing in this case is even more critical because this Court has issued a grossly inadequate ORDER; this Court is permitting perjury and fraud upon the courts by Plaintiffs; and this Court is committing crimes through its action and inaction in this Appeal. (Aff #2010-2 413.) 4. Windsor is being denied due process. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any governmental deprivation of a property or liberty interest. (Z/pperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).} (Atif #2010-2 414.) - 5. Our founding fathers expressed noble principles in the Constitution -- freedom, justice, and the protection of individual rights. However, in the administration of the laws, something has gone dreadfully wrong. The lofty principles have been usurped by officials with improper intentions. The United States of today is not the benign society that the founding fathers aspired to create. (Aff #2010-2 915.) 6. Our founding fathers did not intend for judges to be able to lie, cheat, and help others “stea from parties they are sworn to protect through fairness and impartiality. But this is exactly what Judge Duffey Judge Evans, and the judges of the Eleventh Circuit have done. (Aff #2010-2 416.) “Few more serious threats to individual liberty can be imagined than a corrupt judge. Clothed with the power of the state and authorized to pass judgment on the most basic aspects of everyday life, a judge can deprive citizens of liberty and property in complete disregard of the Constitution. The injuries inflicted may and enduring.” (Judicial Immunity vs. Due Process, Robert Craig Waters, Cato Journal, Vol.7 No.2 (Fall 1987).) be seve;©re The guarantee of Constitutional rights is being illegally revoked by this Court. (Aff #2010-2 917.) 8. Windsor has tried repeatedly for close to a year to obtain justice. In every instance Windsor’ s appeals for justice and protection of the laws have been rejected in favor of a cover up of attorney and judicial wrongdoing and protection of the lawbreaking officers of 47 the court. In every instance Windsor’s rights, ostensibly protected by the Constitution and the laws, have been scorned, and Windsor’s appeals to the authorities have been ignored or rejected with contempt. In even instance where legal actions were filed with the courts the courts have ignored the crimes. The courts have failed to ever allow Windsor to be heard and to present his evidence or examine the evildoers. The courts have never even considered the facts and the overwhelming evidence that Windsor has amassed. Instead, federal judges have committed one crime after another while violating their oaths of office and the Code of Judicial Conduct. (Aff #2010-2 418.) 9 Although evidence of the crimes was provided to various authorities of the federal government, officers from these authorities failed to perform their legal duties to investigate. Each official to whom the crimes were presented had a statutory duty the capacity, and the authority, to address the crimes. Each official willfully failed to act and instead covered up the crimes. (Aff #2010-2 419.) 10. On July 31, 2006, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Am/ong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006), as amended Oct. 10, 2006, in which the court noted that when under the threat of sanctions, the person threatened is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id at 1193. The issue presented itself again in 2007, and the district court granted the application for a hearing, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. (Hudson v. International Computer Negotiations, Inc., 499 F.3d 1252, 19 A.D. Cases 1249 (11th Cir. 09/17/2007).) (Aff #2010-2 420.) 48 11. This Court is supposed to make its rulings based upon legal evidence and to clearly state its factual and legal findings in its orders. This Court has not done so. Windsor must have a fair opportunity to challenge the “evidence” presented and to present evidence in defense, including the right to cross examine witnesses and require proper authentication and form for documentary evidence at a formal evidentiary hearing. (Aff #2010-2 421.) ..a party threatened with sanctions is entitled to a hearing. Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000); Amilong & Amlong v. Denny's Inc. No. 04-14499 (11th Cir. 07/31/2006). 12. Windsor has provided uncontroverted proof in the record of thousands of instances of false testimony, false pleadings, and tampering with evidence by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys. Windsor has provided uncontroverted proof of false statements and perjury in the documents filed by Plaintiffs in Windsor’s Appeal. Windsor must be able to cross examine these witnesses. (Howell Mill/Collier Assoc. v. Pennypacker's, 194 Ga. App. 169, 171 (2) (390 SE2d 257); Mitcham v. Blalock, 214 Ga. App. 29, 31 (2), 32; Citadel Comp. v. All-South Subcontractors, 217 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1), 738 (458 SE2d 711). Under these cases and the standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence, significant portions of Plaintiffs’ filings should be excluded from consideration. (Aff #2010-2 4 22.) 13. Plaintiffs’ Attorney, Mr. Carl Hugo Anderson, has committed multiple counts of perjury in his filings with this Court related to Windsor’s Appeal. 49 Windsor must be given the opportunity to prove this perjury by examining Mr. Anderson. The perjury of Mr. Anderson should be more than sufficient to cause this Court to vacate its ORDER awarding sanctions. (Aff #2010-2 423.) 14. This Court must conduct a hearing. refer this to an impartial judge, or refer this motion to a magistrate judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and file a Report and Recommendation. Someone must weigh evidence. Judge Duffey never conducted a hearing. Judge Evans never conducted a hearing. The Eleventh Circuit never conducted a nearing. (See Amiong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006).) (Atf #2010-2 424.) When threatened with sanctions, the party threatened is entitled to a hearing. (Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000).) (See Jolly Group, Ltd. v. Medline Indus., Inc., 435 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) and Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 202 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 1999) (table entry, no WL citation).) (See Bernstein v. Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. No. 06-14013 (11th Cir. 06/08/2007).) 15. The Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that sanctions such as this Court has ordered are “in the nature of civil contempt” and require a hearing. (Aff #2010-2 425.) Sanctions designed to compensate one party for expenses incurred due to the opposing party's 50 misconduct is in the nature of civil contempt requiring notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to the award. (Campos v. City of Naples, 202 Fed.Appx. 381 (11th Cir. 10/25/2006).) (B.2. Harbert Intern., LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 914 (11th Cir. 2006) (See Kaplan v. Daimler-Chrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th) Cir. 2003); Oakes v. Horizon Financial, S.A., 259 F.3d 1315, 1320 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) Even the award of sanctions under the court's nherent power must "comply with the mandates of due process." (Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49-50 (1991); Roadway Express v. Piper, e/ al, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 447 U.S. 752 at 764 (U.S. 06/23/1980); In re Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575-76; Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., inc., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 06/13/2002); Boddie v. Connecticut 401 U.S. 371, 379 28L. Ed. 2d 113, 91S. Ct. 780 (1971).) 16. Aperson's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court - are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, and to offer testimony. (United States v. Frazier, No. 01- 14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004).) (See also United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383 (8 Cir. 1969); Chernekoff v. United States, (9 Cir. 1955) 219 F.2d 721; United States v. Cummins, 425 F.2d 646, 649, (8 Cir. 1970); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 75 S. Ct. 409, 99 L. Ed. 467 (1955).) (Aff #2010-2 426.) S1 lo say that courts have inherent power to deny all right to defend an action and to render decrees without any hearing whatever is, in the very nature of things, to convert the court exercising such an authority into an instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute of justice upon which the exercise of judicial power necessarily depends. (Hovey V. E/liott, 17 S. Ct. 841, 167 U.S. 409 at 414 (U.S 05/24/1897).) (See also Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 90, 18 S.Ct. 383, 387 (1898). "[Bly 'the law of the land' is intended ‘a law which hears before it condemns.'" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64 (1932) (citation omitted). (United States v. Frazier, No. 01-14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004); Jn re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507-08 (1948); Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 54 S.Ct. 330, 336 (1934); United States v. Frazier, No. 01- 14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004); /n re Noel], 93 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 11/21/1937); Hammond Packing Company v. State of Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 29 S. Ct. 370, 53 L. Ed. 530; “rar v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 81S. Ct. 723, 5 L. Ed. 2d 754; Council of Federated Org ern v. Mize, 339 2d 898 (5th Cir. 12/2: ler Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 . Ed. 531 (1864).) Typically, we require the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on damages.... See United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 957 (5th Cir.1979). 17. Windsor will utilize the hearing to challenge the basis and reasonableness of such proposed sanctions. (Aff #2010-2 927.) 18. Windsor will also utilize the hearing to establish that this Court has violated several criminal statutes. (Aff #2010-2 428.) 19. The Plaintiffs and their attorneys are dishonest. Windsor will prove at the hearing that the Plaintiffs have dirty hands. (Aff #2010-2 429.) 20. At the hearing on this motion, the Court will find that sanctions must be imposed against the Plaintiffs because they have frivolously denied factual allegations that are true and have made factual allegations that are false. (See Williams v. R.W. Cannon, Inc., No. 08-60168-CIV-UNGARO/SIMONTON (S.D.Fla. 09/24/2008).) (Atf #2010-2 4 30.) Zi, At the hearing, Windsor will address and present evidence and testimony relative to bad faith. (Aff #2010-2 4931.) 22. Windsor will show at the hearing that the facts before this Court do not warrant sanctions. (Aff #2010-2 4932.) 23. | Windsor will show at the hearing that the Plaintiffs have not provided the information necessary to support a claim. (Aff #2010-2 433.) 24. Windsor will show at the hearing that any attempt by the Plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees is barred by collateral estoppel. (Aff #2010-2 434.) 53 25. Windsor has stated repeatedly in his declarations filed with this Court that he does not have a frivolous bone in his body and has never filed any motions that were frivolous. Windsor will provide proof of this at the hearing as well as testimony from attorneys and other special witnesses. (Aff #2010-2 435.) 26. Windsor objects to the affidavits provided by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Carl Hugo Anderson is a known perjuror. He must not be allowed to testify through affidavits. Cross examination is mandatory with this liar (Aff #2010-2 436.) 27. Windsor needs a reasonable period of time following the hearing to file an amended response to the ORDER and information regarding sanctions. (Aff #2010-2 437.) WINDSOR DEMANDS DUE PROCESS 28. Windsor objec ts because this Court has previously violated Windsor’s Constitutional rights to due process. (Aff #2010-2 438.) 29. [he courts have denied Windsor due process for four years. Windsor has NEVER been granted an evidentiary hearing and has been denied a ) neutral judge. (Aff #2010-2 4 39.) 30. Procedural due process requires notice and the opportunity to be heard. Windsor has been denied both. (Aff #2010-2 440.) 54 "An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’ " (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) ("due process requires a neutral and detached judge in the first instance’ " (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972)) ‘For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Partie: whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.' " Fuentes v. Shevin 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale | Wall. 223, 233 (1864); Armstrang v. Manzo 80 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (other citations omitted)). These essential constitutional promises may not be eroded. (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 542 U.S. 507, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (U.S 06/28/2004).) (See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S 366, 389; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 368-369 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537; Ozie Powell v. Alabama Haywood Patterson v. Same Charley Weems and Clarence Norris v. Same, 53 S. Ct. 55, 287 U.S. 45 (U.S. 11/07/1932).) It is true, of course, that "the fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked." (Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246.) (See Hagar v. Reclamation District \\\ U.S. 701 '08; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 10 Fong Yue Ting v. United States. “/ong Quan \ United States. Lee Joe v. United States, 13 5. ' 1016, 149 U.S. 698 (U.S. 05/15/1893) As the Supreme Court noted in Mu/lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust. Co Itihe fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportuni to be heard." 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (quoting Grannis \ Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783 L.Ed. 1363 (1914).) (See Jn re Oliver, 333 U.S 157, 273 (1948). See, e. g., Joint Anti-Fascist 41 U.S., at 143, 164 165, 171-172, 178, 185 (concurring opinions of Black, Frankfurter, DOUGLAS, and Jackson, }}.) Cole v. Arkansas, $33 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) yniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S 1969); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 1938); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 96 S. Ct. at 909; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70S. Ct. 652, 65 1441. Ed. 865 (1950); (KJeiner v. First National Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 01/31/1985 } Committee v. McGrath, 3 +] Inis Court never pave any notice to Windsor of any sper ific conduct that it considered to be potentially sanctionable. (See Allapattah Servs., Inc. \ Exxon Corp., 372 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1371 (S.D. Fla 2005); Byrne v. Nezhat 261 F.3d 1075, 1133-34 (11 Riggs v. Dayco Prochacte. Ine Pe ot be ea. ) 1 » « WINI )>( RK | )} MAN] ys | SC y\ } }? Y f ; () re Av ] CO pit ) i 1 pro cle ff ic } j , CO Oo ne pie lo Dpoe itor 1toOp ) Tal fficisa i? Out yt te rolrepr (hye | \t] ta Vinndiso}l leg) NEE ye weal 1() ive festimg nic. mie to quesho | tiff torn / dare hye | q4 (yf Vf ’ | ra hea4¢n an he cann f «hy ‘ ! | | | ‘ ; tit *t) i fry ( i ¢j ane ; ra lc ft} 7 Co if Hoy (( ) i? ! | | f (i) { } ré 1) 7 or age ¢ cit ( } lp @ fea ' doe | oo A ’ ; or . f i ... [W]e see no reason why the absence of a motion of a party to the litigation or some third party requesting that a seal or protective order be lifted should remove a federal court’s ability to monitor and modify its previous orders in exercise of its “supervisory power over its own records and files.” (Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).) The law is clear that it is within the Court's discretion, sua sponte, to unseal the record. (See In re Cendant, 260 F.3d at 192.) It is also beyond question that this Court retains the power to modify or lift seal orders that it nas previously granted. (Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, at 784-785 (3d Cir. 1994).) Furthermore, because there exists an antecedent, extremely broad, right of access to judicial records and proceedings promoting "a pervasive common law right 'to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents," /n re Cendant, 260 F.3d at 192, this Court intends to order the unsealing of the record. (Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 497 (E.D.Pa. 11/23/2004).) 37. | Whatever is under seal should establish either that Maid committed fraud upon the courts by filing bogus documents, or that Judge Evans withheld documents that were extremely relevant to MIST-1. In either case, this evidence should prove that the order te quash the subpoena was improper. (Aff #2010-2 947.) 38. — There is no justification for keeping the 58 Diesel contents secret from Windsor. Windsor has obtained the valid documents directly from The Niagara Parks Commission and the State of New York. Copies of these contracts were previously filed in MIST-1 by Windsor and were provided to Judge Evans. Since Windsor has the contracts, so there is no confidentiality justification. In addition, these documents have now been made public by the news media, and these documents are available for review or download on the Internet. (Aff #2010-2 9 48.) 39. ‘There is not “good cause” to keep these documents under seal. These documents cannot be used for improper purposes. Lifting the seal will not disclose any corporate secrets or information as the documents are now public. Lifting the seal will not protect scandalous or defamatory matter as there is none in these documents. (Aff #2010-2 449.) Under the common law, there is a well- established presumption of pubic access to judicial documents. (See Mixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).) This public right of access is codified for bankruptcy cases in 11 U.S.C. § 107(a), which provides that all papers filed in a bankruptcy case are public records open to examination, except as specifically provided in the statute. (See Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d at 6-7; In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 1999); William T. Bodah and Michelle M. Morgan, “Protective Orders in the Bankruptcy Court: The Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code Section 107 and its Constitutional Implications,” 24 Hastings Const. L. Q. 67 (Fall 1996).) The 59 statute provides for two exceptions to this broad right of public access: the court may (and, on motion of a party in interest, shall) (1) protect an entity with regard to certain commercial secrets and information, or (2) “protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter contained in a paper filed in a case under this title.” (Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy § 107.03|1] |b) (15th ed. Rev. 2007).) “...in light of the public’s common law presumptive right of access to judicial documents, the court has the authority to lift a protective order or seal on documents in its files, even in the absence of a motion. [A] district court can modify a protective order when a third party requests judicial documents after the parties have filed a stipulation of dismissal pursuant to settlement. (Gambale v. Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2nd Cir. 2004).) [he existence of a common law right of access to judicial records is beyond dispute. (See Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981) (Criden 1).) This Court has made it clear that our "strong presumption" of openness does not permit the routine closing of judicial records to the public. The party seeking to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden of showing that "the material is the kind of information that courts will protect" and that “disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure." (Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen,733 F.2d 1059, 60 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., \6 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 02/23/1994),) 40. It has been a violation of Windsor’s Constitutional rights to due process as well as First Amendment and common law rights that Judge Evans has kept these documents under seal. (Aff #2010-2 450.) There is both a First Amendment and common law right to inspect judicial records. (See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985) (First Amendment).) While the public’s right to inspect judicial records may give way in certain circumstances to other, more pressing interests, such as the Government's interest in maintaining confidentiality in order to successfully build a criminal case, “Is}uch circumstances will be rare . . . and the balance of interests must be struck with special care.” (Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S: 39, 45 (1984).) 41. Windsor’s most basic legal rights are at stake here. (Aff #2010-2 451.) “The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern,” (Landmark Commc’‘ns, ~ v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839, 98S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1978); (Romero v. Drummond (11" Cir. iPetc Even if the initial sealing was justified, when there is a subsequent motion to remove such a seal, the district court should closely examine whether circumstances have changed sufficiently to allow 61 the presumption allowing access to court records to prevail. In this case, we see no reason to maintain the impoundment.” (Mi/ler v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 02/23/1994).) 42. Judge Duffey, Judge Evans, and this Court have no legal right to conceal evidence. There is a legal obligation to disclose. The actions of these judges constitute obstruction of justice. (Aff #2010-2 952.) “The post-judgment discovery by a defeated litigant of evidence establishing, clearly and convincingly, that the prevailing party gave false testimony which likely affected the result may provide a basis for vacating a judgment under Rule 60(b). E.g., 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S§ 2860- 61 (1995); see Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1976) (requirement of clear and convincing proof).) 43. The Middle District of Georgia has ruled that discovery can be obtained from judges in matters involving disqualification, one of the important issues in this civil action: (Aff #2010-2 953.) “| conclude that the discovery mechanisms of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure would be available in an appropriate Case to a party who contemplates filing a motion for disqualification of the presiding judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455(a), and who wishes to establish relevant facts from witnesses other than the presiding judge such as, in this instance, Judges 62 Fitzpatrick and Elliott.” (Cheeves v. Southern Clays, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1570 (M.D.Ga. 06/17/1992.) 44. Windsor has provided extensive proof of fraud and dishonest activity in this case. (See MIST-1 Doc.462, incorporated herein as if attached hereto.) The documents under seal will provide proof of a specific act of fraud. (Aff #2010-2 454.) “...after final judgment has entered, our strong interest in the finality of judgments leads courts to intervene in a search for evidence of fraud only if there has been some showing that a fraud actually has occurred. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1118-22 (6th Cir. 1976) (discovery in aid of a motion attacking a final judgment on the basis of fraud should be permitted only if there is some evidence of fraud); see also Midwest Franchise Corp. v. Metromedia Restaurant Group, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D. lowa 1997) (prima facie showing of fraud required); United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 826 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same). (Duhaime v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 183 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 06/28/1999).) 45. Discovery may certainly be appropriate in an effort to prove fraud upon the court. (H.. K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 06/09/1976).) (Aff #2010-2 455.) 46. Judge Evans has violated 18 USC § 1512(c), and she shall be fined under this title or 63 imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. (Aff #2010- 2 456.) THIS COURT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WINDSOR BECAUSE HE IS PRO SE 47. Windsor submits that this Court has discriminated against him because he is pro se. This Court has also discriminated against him because he has had the audacity to take action against federal judges. (Aff #2010-2 457.) 48. Windsor submits that his experience is that judges in the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit ROUTINELY violate the law and twist the facts and the law to accomplish their own improper purposes. These judges have apparently decided that they will take the law into their own hands and do whatever they please. All of the federal judges in Atlanta that Windsor has encountered are dishonest and corrupt. (Aff #2010-2 458.) 49. Pro Se Windsor is being denied equal protection, a violation of his Constitutional rights. (Aff #2010-2 459.) 50. | Windsor’s Motion to Vacate and Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 8, 2010 is referenced and incorporated herein as if attached hereto as are all documents filed in this Appeal. (Aff #2010-2 460.) WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests that the Court do as follows: 1) Schedule the evidentiary hearing; 64 Issue an order giving Windsor the ability to conduct depositions prior to the hearing; 2) Issue an order lifting the seal on MIST-1 Doc 168; 3) Grant Windsor a jury trial; and 4) Deny any fees to the Plaintiffs, and grant such sanctions and other relief to Windsor as the Court deems appropriate. Submitted, this 8th day of March, 2010 William M. Windsor /s/ William M. Windsor Pro Se 3924 Lower Roswell Road Marietta, GA 30068 Telephone: 770-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-578-1057 Email: bill@billwindsor.com (Certificates of Compliance e, Service, and Interested Parties have been omitted to reduce the size and cost of this Appendix.) IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 09-14735-DD MAID OF THE MIST COTRPORATION, MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Versus WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Defendant-Appellant JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS, Movant-Appellee. BEFORE: CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT: Now pending before the Court are numerous motions filed both by Appellant and by Appellees Maid of the Mist, et al. ("Maid"). Included in those motions are Appellant's "Emergency Motion to Disqualify Eleventh Circuit Judges and Motion to Change Venue" and Maid's Motion for Sanctions for Filing a of this Court and for transfer to another venue. 66 It is plain from review of Appellant's motion, as well as this history of this appeal and the previous cases filed by Appellant in this Court, that he seeks to disqualify the members of this Court based on his belief that previous adverse rulings were the result of bias, dishonesty or some other improper motivation or intent, up to and including relationships with Judges Evans and Duffey of the Northern District of Georgia. However, as the Supreme Court stated in Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 555,114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994), "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." see also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001); McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F .2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). Appellant's motion to disqualify and the other motions filed by Appeliant fail to allege any valid basis for disqualification. Consequently, Appellant's motion to disqualify this Court is without merit and is DENIED In reviewing the motions filed with the Court, we have also reviewed Appellant's brief, which fails to meaningfully challenge the orders on appeal. Consequently, we sua sponte DISMISS this appeal AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED. See 11th Cir. R. 42-4. With the exception of Maid's Motion for Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Appeal, all remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT. We now turn to Maid's Motion for Sanctions for Filing a Frivolous Appeal. Although this motion initially cites to 11th Cir. Rule 27-4 (sanctions for filing a 67 frivolous motion), the motion later cites to Fed.R.App.P. 38 and was filed contemporaneously with Maid's brief as required by Rule 38. We therefore consider this motion filed pursuant to Rule 38 and analyze it under that rule. We take into consideration the fact that, despite Appellant's prolific filings, Appellant is a pro se litigant. Rule 38 provides that: "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." "The purpose of Rule 38 damages is to compensate appellees who are forced to defend judgments awarded them in the trial court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to ‘preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of consideration.’ ... Another important purpose is to discourage litigants from unnecessarily wasting their opponents’ time and resources." See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 Fad 141, 145 (3rd Cir. 1993), We have imposed Rule 38 sanctions upon "appellants who raise ‘clearly frivolous claims' in the face of established law and clear facts." See Farese v, Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) citing Misabec Mercantile, Inc. De Panama v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ACLI Futures, Inc. 853 F.2d 834, 841 (11th Cir. 1988). After review of the matters pending before us, we readily conclude that Appellant's conduct in this Court meets the requirement for imposition of Rule 38 sanctions. Therefore, Maid's Rule 38 motion is GRANTED. 68 Maid is DIRECTED to file a statement of costs and expenses within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Appellant's response to Maid's statement will bi due within fourteen (14) days of service of Maid’: Statement FILED L).S. COURT OF APPEAL ' ELEVENTH CIRCUIT] FEB 25 2010 IHOMAS K. KAH! CLERK APPEAL DOC.NO. 09-14735-D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD Appellees, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, IN¢ Defendants; and WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant and Defendant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division Case No. 1:09-CV-01543-WSD Judge William S. Duffey, Jr BRIEF OF DEFENDANI/APPELLAN] WILLIAM M, WINDSOR William M. Windsor $924 Lower Roswell Road Marietta, GA 30068 lclephon 0-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-578-105 Email: bill@billwindsor.com PRO SE FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLAN | WILLIAM M. WINDS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS William M. Windsor, Pro Se, hereby certifies pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and 11" Cir. Rule 26.1-1 that the following persons, judges, associations of person, firms, partnerships, or corporations may have an interest in the outcome of this case: 1) Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC, Defendants (jointly “Alcatraz”) 2) Anderson, Judge R. Lanier, United States Appellate Judge. 3) Anderson, Jr., Carl Hugo (“Mr. Anderson”), Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 4) Barkett, Judge Rosemary, United States Appellate Judge. 5) Batten, Timothy C., United States District Judge. 6) Berry, Judith L. (“Berry”), customer of Alcatraz and Maid. 7) Birch, Judge Stanley F., United States Appellate Judge 8) Black, Judge Susan H., United States Appellate judge. 9) Blackburn, Judge, United States District Judge. 19) Bright, Sarah Louise (“Ms. Bright”), Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 11)Brown, Marc W. (“Mr. Brown”), Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 72 12)Carlson, Sandra (“Carlson”), Assistant Controller of Maid. 13)Camp, Jack T., United States District Judge. 14)Carnes, Judge Ed, United States Appellate Judge. 15)Carnes, Judge, United States District Judge. 16)Chambliss, Senator Saxby. 17)Conway, Judge, United States District Judge. 18)Cooper, Clarence, United States District Judge. 19)Cox, Judge Emmett Ripley, United States Appeilate Judge. 20)Dubina, Judge Joel F., United States Appellate Judge. 21)Duffey, Hon. William S. (“Judge Duffey”), United States District Judge. 22)Edmondson, Judge J.L., United States Appellate Judge. 23)Evans, Hon. Orinda D. (“Judge Evans” or the “DC”), United States District Judge. 24)tverybody Loves Travel, LLC, company owned by the owners of Defendants Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC. 25) Fay, Judge Peter T., United States Appellate Judge. )Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). )Forrester, J. Owen, United States District Judge. 28) Fuller, Judge, United States District Judge. 29) Georgia Athletic and Entertainment Commission (“GAEC”). 30)Glynn, Christopher (“Glynn”), President of Maid. 26 27 73 31)Godbold, Judge John C., United States Appellate Judge. 32)Granade, Judge, United States District Judge. 33) Hawkins & Parnell (“H&P”), Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 34) Hill, Judge James C., United States Appellate Judge. 35) Hull, Judge Frank M., United States Appellate Judge. 36) Huber, Christopher J, United States Attorney. 37)Hunt, Willis B., Jr., United States District Judge. 38) Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit. 39)Kravitch, Judge Phyllis A., United States Appellate Judge. 40) Maid of the Mist Corporation (“Corporation”), Appellee, and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. (“Steamboat”), Appellee, (jointly “Maid”). 41)Marcus, Judge Stanley, United States Appellate Judge. 42)Martin, Beverly B., United States District Judge. 43)Mendell, Brett A. (“Mr. Mendell”), Former Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 44)Mickle, Judge, United States District Judge. 45)Moore, Judge, United States District Judge. 46) Moye, Charles A., United States District Judge. 74 47)Murphy, Harold., United States District Judge. 48) National Association of Ticket Brokers. 49) New York State Bar Association. 50) New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation 51)New York State Comptroller's Office 52)Niagara County New York District Attorney. 53) Niagara Parks Commission 54)O’Kelley, William C., United States District Judge. 55)Pannell, Charles A., United States District Judge. 56)Penland, James W. (“Mr. Penland”), Former Counsel for William M. Windsor, Appellant. 57)Phillips Lytle (“Phillips”), Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 58)Pryor, Judge William H., United States Appellate Judge. 59) Quillian Yates, Sally, Acting Unites States Attorney. 60) Raley, G. Brian (“Mr. Raley”), Former Counsel for Defendants Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC. 61)Reserve 123, Inc., a Company owned by the owners of Defendants Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC. 62)Reserve XL, Inc., a company owned by the owners of Defendants, Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media LLC. 63)Round America, LLC, a company owned by William M. Windsor. 75 64) Royal, Judge, United States District Judge. 65)Ruddy, Timothy P. (“Ruddy”), Vice- President of Maid. 66)Russ, Arthur (“Mr. Russ”), Counsel for Appellees, Maid of the Mist Corp. and Maid of the Mist Steamboat Company, Ltd. 67)Schul, Robert J. (“Schul”), Controller of Maid. 68)Shoob, Marvin H., United States District Judge. 69) State Bar of Georgia. 70)Story, Richard W., United States District Judge. 71)Sullivan, Kathleen E. (“Ms. Sullivan”), Former Counsel for Defendants Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC. 72)Take 5 Tours, Inc., a company owned by the owners of Defendants Alcatraz Media, Inc., and Alcatraz Media, LLC. 73) Thrash, Thomas W., United States District Judge. 74) Tidwell, G. Ernest, United States District Judge. 75)Tjoflat, Judge Gerald Bard, United States Appellate Judge. 6) United States Attorney General. 7) United States Attorney's Office. 8) United States Supreme Court. 9) Vining, Robert L, Jr., United States District Judge. 80)Ward, Horace T., United States District ludge. 81)Wilson, Judge Charles R., United States Appellate Judge. = / - / / - / 76 82)Windsor, William M. (“Windsor or Appellant”), Defendant and Appellant. (Defendants Alcatraz and Windsor are reflected herein as “A&W.”) 83)ZZ Tours, Inc., a company owned by William M. Windsor. No corporate disclosure statement is necessary for this party because Windsor is a natural, human, person. Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of November, 2009. William M. Windsor: | William M. Windsor Pro Se 3924 Lower Roswell! Road Marietta, GA 30068 Telephone: 770-578-1094 Facsimile: 770-578-1057 Email: bill@billwindsor.com 77 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Appellant Windsor requests oral argument. This case is heavily fact dependent in a record that contains thousands of false statements. Windsor believes that oral argument will aid the court by providing a more in-depth explanation of the facts and will give the court the opportunity to question Windsor about facts and issues to aid the court in making a more informed decision. Windsor ts pro se, and Windsor believes the oral argument will assist the court in any areas where Windsor was at a disadvantage as a pro se party in the preparation of the written appeal. Windsor also believes that the Eleventh Circuit discriminates against pro se parties. An oral argument might reduce the opportunity for this Court to discriminate. 78 | TABLE OF CONTENTS Certificate of Interested Persons............. Statement Regarding Oral Argument. Table of Contents................cescceee 1. Statement of Jurisdiction............ I]. Statement of the Issues............... Il]. Statement of the Case................ A. Statement of the Proceedings Below B. Statement of the Facts................. IV. Summary of Argument..................... V. Standard of Review..............scscccessees VI. Argument and Citations of Authority..... A. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY ALLOWING JUDGE EVANS TO FILE A MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AND TO | CREATE THIS CIVIL ACTION................ 22 | B. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY DEMONSTRATING PERVASIVE BIAS AGAINST SDN neem RNAP TAREE & C. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS IN Oe pasos h cece dueakswvexsass 24 D. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY ENCOURAGING PERJURY, S UBORNATION OF PERJURY, RULE 11 VIOLATIONS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DISHONEST PARTIES, DISHONEST ATTORNEYS, AND DISHONEST JUDGES. ......cccccseeees 26 79 E. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY MAKING FACT DECISIONS THAT WERE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS THAT WERE BEFORE THE ENE cada wachucssauscassauiaedeceuceaseacs 27 F. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY COMMITTING PERJURY......28 G. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY ISSUING ORDERS WITHOUT LEGAL FUE LOE Wiel BON sk ev ccesessecsns 28 H. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE ERRORS OF LAW AS CRITERIA THAT WOULD JUSTIFY RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUASH I. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE ERRORS OF FACT AS CRITERIA THAT WOULD JUSTIFY RECONSIDERATION OF THE ei) ¢y oe 2) Se 50 J. JUDGE DUFFEY HAS VIOLATED THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND HAS DEPRIVED WINDSOR OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS......60 K. JUDGE DUFFEY FAILED TO PROVIDE VALID LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR DENYING CHANGE OF VENUE.........63 . Conclusion -- Relief Sought....... 80 Certificate of Compliance. Certificate of Service. $1 TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885).......61 Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 112) te, sepecccccscccedacavececesdareencd Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978) ......... 62 Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, ho a eC et 62 Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pensioa Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) .........: 3] Corwin v. Walt Dinsey Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 iss vanceccceseceeccdsdueccacseas 18 Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) ............ 6] Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)....62 FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation omitted)........61 Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, SN FUP OOD, FOe LI, ZOO... accccccscceveccscevere ose 62 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966)...... 62 Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, Cee OF os, Be SOY, 371, OTE woees vn ces cen scccrses sO Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 sree tris sensed cnecesieeeevcsesscevcunectaen Johnson v. Beto, 337 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (S.D. is sae twice soccene $eaeseoa cence 66 Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968).............58 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. cn civnauvebauntecdertscnssescdas 3] 82 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 RRR anne oe pe ee a Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980)............31, 32 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 EES Paar A re 66 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)...31 Murphy v. Florida, 42\ U.S. 794, 797 (1975)......66 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14,75 S.Ct pS 0 | pcg Ok ne 5] Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438....62 Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d | (Sth Cir. 1966).....66 People v. Zajic, 88 \\l|.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 SRR a ORIN TCA ee SE an a en 57 Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96S. Ct 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976)...................... | Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332..............62 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1S. Ct. at ae seer sero. Se Nes 62 United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 Fe EE ETE ee nn ae 66 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-736 ee a ree Det a iy 18 United States v. Sciarra, 85) F.2d 621, 635 (11th Snare cisco cab actincveeuadsckskocdacoumie ao United States v. Tokars, 839 F. Supp. 1578, 1581 eS a ecauaaes 66 United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (Sth Go B, , - | Sea ARR Beene rarest ren ae eS pce 66 Zurich v. Matrix, 426 F.3d 1281, 1286-1288 (10" Cir. 2005) 6) statutes IS U.S.C. 37] 6 Ik U.S.C. 100] 6 Ik U.S.C. 1503 64. 6‘ Ik U.S.C. 1512(b) 6 Ik U.S.C. 1512(c) 6 Is U.S.C. 1621 64 18 U.S.C. 1622 64 18 U.S.C. 1623 64 28 U.S.C. 144 j9 28 U.S.C. 455 Q 23 28 U.S.C. 1404 64 42 USA 19X34 64 28 U.S.C.A.§81332 28 U.S.C.A.§129] O.C.G.A. 16-10-70 64 O.C.G.A,. 16-10-93 oe O.C.G.A. 43-4B.. 19 Subpoena Regulations Adopted by Judicial Conference 34. 37, 54 Rules Code of Judicial Conduct 1 46, 47, 4%, 64 FRAP 31(a)(1) 2 LR 3.1B, NDGa 63 LR 7.1C, NDGa 1S - 64 LR 7.2B NDGa 14 LR &3.1C, NDC LR &3.1FQ2) NDGa he R.Civ.P. Rule || hR.Civ.P. Rule 34 EF R.Civ.P. Rule 37 bR.Civ.P. Rule OU i RoCiv.P. Rule 60(d)(3) State 14 rol Georgia ule (Conduct Treatises Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, § IIIT 600 NEES ADE IY BL OO ES TO Meat 58 Robert Craig Waters. Tort & Insurance Law 6 | Journal, Spr. 1986..... Constitutional Provisions Constitution of the United States 6 I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION District Court Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction for the District Court’s subject matter 1s diversity among the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.§1332. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction: The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has juriscliction of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.4 i291 because this is an appeal of final decisions 0° the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a district court within the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. Filing Dates Establishing the Timeliness of the Appeal: The Order Staying the Case (“Stay Order’) was entered on June 8, 2009. [R.4.] (Depo-Doc.4.) The “Order Granting Motion to Quash and Motion to Supplement” (“Quash Order’) was entered June 30, 2009. [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.) The Motion for Reconsideration (“MFR”) was filed on July 10, 2009. [R.34.] (Depo-Doc.34.) 8/7 The Motion for Change of Venue (“MCV”) was filed on July 10, 2009. [Depo-Doc.36.) The “Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Change of Venue” (“Reconsideration Order’) was entered September 3, 2009. [R.42.] (Depo-Doc.42.) On September 15, 2009, the appeal fee was paid. (Depo-Doc.44.) The Appeal was docketed on September 21, 2009. [R.DS1.] {DS1.] FRAP Rule 31(a)(1) provides that the appellant must serve and file a brief within 40 days after the record is filed. The record was filed on October 14, 2009, so based upon FRAP, the Brief is due by November 23, 2009. (Depo-Doc.47.) However, on September 22, 2009, the U.S.C.A. issued a notice to Windsor stating that Appeliant’s Brief was to be filed within 40 days from September 21, 2009. This set a deadline of November 1, a Sunday, so the Brief may be due on Monday, November 2, 2009. (Depo-Doc.48.) This civil action is shown as a “closed case” by the District Court. [R.DS1.] [DS1.] 88 Assertion that the Appeal is from an Appealable Order that establishes the Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction: The Order Granting the Motion to Quash (“Quash Order’) was filed on June 30, 2009. [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.) The Motion for Reconsideration (“MFR”) was filed on July 10, 2009 (Depo-Doc.34.) The Reconsideration Order (“Reconsideration Order’) [R.42.| (Depo-Doc.42) was entered on September 3, 2009. These orders are final and appealable. The Reconsideration Order is a reconsideration of the Quash Order. These address the same subject, so this is an appeal of both orders. il. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES This 1s an appeal from an order dated September 3, 2009 (“Reconsideration Order’) and the underlying order dated June 30, 2009 (“Quash Order’) that led to this appeal. These orders are jointly referred to as the “Appealed Orders.” The issues of error before the Court of Appeals are as follows: Whether Judge Duffey erred by allowing Judge Evans to file a Motion to Quash Subpoena and create this civil action. Whether Judge Duffey erred by demonstrating pervasive bias against Windsor. Whether Judge Duffey erred by making false statements in orders. Whether Judge Duffey erred by encouraging perjury, subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations, obstruction of justice, dishonest Plaintiffs, dishonest Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, and dishonest Judge Evans. Whether Judge Duffey erred by making fact decisions contrary to the facts that were before the court. Whether Judge Duffey erred by commiting perjury. Whether Judge Duffey erred by issuing orders without legal justification. Whether Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor did not cite errors of law that would justify reconsideration on the Court’s orders. Whether Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor did not cite errors of fact that would justify reconsideration on the Court’s orders. Whether Judge Duffey erred by violating Windsor’s Constitutional rights. Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to report Judge Evans to the appropriate authorities for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to report Plaintiffs’ Attorneys to the appropriate authorities for violations of the State Bar of Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Whether Judge Duffey erred by failing to provide valid legal justification when denying Motion for Change of Venue. 91 Wl. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This 1s an appeal from orders of the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Case Number 1:09-CV-01543-WSD: Order entered September 3, 2009 [R.42.] (Depo-Doc.42) (“Reconsideration Order’), and Order entered June 30, 2009 (“Quash Order”) [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.). Jointly referenced as the “Appealed Orders,” these orders contain rulings on quashing a deposition and denying a change of venue. A. Statement of the Proceedings Below On August 29, 2005, Maid initiated civil action 1:06 CV-0714-ODE (“MIST-1”) in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, by filing a Verified Complaint seeking injunctive relief. It was verified by Glynn. [R.1.] (Doc.1.) ” On October 12, 2005, A&W filed a Verified Answer and told the truth; Alcatraz filed a counterclaim. Windsor signed the Verified Answer swearing that virtually everything in the Verified ’ Throughout this Brief, the Record Excerpts are referenced as “R.#.” Please note that there are two records. Two Docket Sheets are provided (DS1 and DS2). Citations to the record in 1:09- CV-01543-WSD (DS1) are cited as “Depo-Doc.” Citations to the record in 1:06-CV-0714-ODE (DS2) are cited as “(Doc.#-Pg.#.)” “Dec#” is used to refer to the numbered declarations of William M Windsor. Interested persons are defined on pages i to iv 92 Complaint was false. [R.3.] (Doc.3;Doc.315:Exh.A Pg.23-9]48-49.) Windsor compiled the proof that the Verified Complaint was false using the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses. (Doc.377;Doc.462.) On March 20, 2006, Maid filed an “Updated Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order” alleging that A&W were improperly selling Maid vouchers. (Doc.6-Pg.1.) Maid claimed that A&W had violated the Lanham Act. (Doc.6-Pg.6.) A&W removed the action to the U.S. District Court. (Doc.1-Pg.1.) On March 28, 2006, A&W filed a Response to Motion for TRO. Windsor told the truth under oath, swearing that Maid’s claims were false. (Doc.4.) Windsor compiled the proof that the Motion was false using the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses. (Doc.377;Doc.462.) On March 29, 2006, the case was assigned to Judge Evans. (Doc.8.) On March 30, 2006, Judge Evans established the erroneous position that what Glynn of Maid said was true and what Windsor said was false. The TRO was issued. [R.10.] (Doc.10.) (Doc.361- Dec#2:Pg.25-4]81;Doc.381-Dec#7:P25-439; Doc.315;Doc.462.) 93 On March 30, 2006, A&W filed a motion with justification for a $400,000 bond. (Doc.11.) Judge Evans ordered only $5,000. (Doc.10.) This demonstrated bias. (Doc.462.) On April 11 and 12, 2006, Judge Evans held the only evidentiary hearing in this case on Maid’s request for a preliminary injunction. (Doc.35; Doc.36; Doc.37.) At the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Evans informed Maid that they had seven days to identify a cause of action. (Doc.36- Pgs.166-167.) On April 19, 2006, Maid filed a Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Injunction. This identified claims of tortious interference and false advertising as the legal arguments for the hearing a week before. (Doc.27-Pg.1.) On May 12, 2006, Judge Evans granted a preliminary injunction (“PI”) based upon Maid’s new tortious interference claim. Judge Evans maintained her position that what Glynn said was true and what Windsor said was false. Judge Evans made many false statements in the PI Order. [.33.] (Doc.33-Pg.1.) Windsor compiled the proof that the P] Order was false using the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses. [R.377.] (Doc.377-Exh.9; Doc.462.) 94 On January 22, 2007, A&W moved for summary judgment (“SJ”) on Maid’s tortious interference claim, and Maid moved for SJ on tortious interference, attorney fees under O.C.G.A.§13-6-11, and all Alcatraz counterclaims. (Doc.146;Doc.148.) On February 2, 2007, Windsor brought the hundreds of lies, perjury, and Rule 11 violations of Maid to the attention of Judge Evans, but she cut him off in mid-sentence and ignored it. [R.174.] (Doc. 174-Pgs.34,45-47,25-28.) On August 9, 2007, Judge Evans granted Maid’s motion for summary judgment (“SJ Order’) and denied Alcatraz’s motion. Judge Evans made as many as 200 false statements in the SJ Order. [R.251.] (Doc.251.) Windsor compiled the proof that the SJ Order was false using the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses. (Doc.377_Exh.22;Doc.462.) On September 7, 2007, Alcatraz appealed the SJ Order (Appeal No. 07-14214-BB). On September 10, 2007, Windsor appealed the SJ Order. (Appeal_ No. 07-14235-BB). (Doc.254;Doc.256.) On October 21, 2008, the U.S.C.A. vacated and remanded the SJ Order in part. (Doc.344.) 95 On October 29, 2008, an order was entered making the USCA mandate the judgment of the D¢ (Doc.346.) On December 9, 2008, Judge Evans entered by consent a “Final Order and Judgment.” (Doc.354.) A&W did not provide any releases; th only promise was to not appeal the summary judgment to the Supreme Court. (Doc.354-Pg.4.) On April 24, 2009, Windsor began efforts t get the case reopened and to get Judge Evans recused: April 24, 2009 -- Motion to Recuse Judg: Evans. [R.361.] (Doc.36]1.) April 24, 2009 -- Motion to Reopen Casi (Doc.362.) April 27, 2009 -- Motion for Sanction (Doc.363.) April 27, 2009 -- Motion for Sanction (Doc.364.) May 7. 2009 -- Motion for Discovery (Doc.374.) 96 May 13, 2009 -- Amended Dec #3 [R.377.] (Doc.377.) May 20, 2009 Reply 10 Response to Motion to Recuse. (Doc.381.) May 22, 2009 — Reply to Response to Motion to Reopen (Doc. 385.) On May 22, 2009, Windsor filed Notice t lake Deposition of ludge Evans (Doc.389.) On May 22, 2009, Judge Evans entered order denying several of Windsor’s motions (Doc.390.) On June 3, 2009, Judge Evans filed an Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena. [Depo Doc.!.) On June 8, 2009, Judge Duffey issued an Order Staying Case. [R.4.] (Depo-Doc.4.) On June 10, 2009, Judge Evans filed a Motion to Supplement Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena. (Depo-Doc.8.) On June 18, 2009, Windsor filed a Motion for Reconsideration or Revision of Order Staying Case | Depo-Doc.15. | lifth Declaration of W141 ( omplete timeline Ol happened in this ca much more. (Doc.364.-Dec#12:4912007-12014.) Maid’s managers have committed hundreds of counts of perjury and have conspired to commit fraud upon the courts. (Doc.362-Dec#1:41; Doc.385: Dec#6:419;Doc.364-Dec#12: 412007; Doc.377-Amended_ Dec#3,Exhs.1-28.) 46 of the 50 paragraphs in the Verified Complaint were false or incorrect and/or not based upon the personal knowledge of Glynn. (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3- Exh.1:Pgs.1-158.) The lies, false sworn pleadings, false pleadings, and discovery abuse continued throughout MIST-1. This deprived A&W of a fair trial. (Doc.363;Doc.364-Dec#12;Doc.377-Exh.23; Doc.361-Exh.16.) The dishonesty of Maid and Maid’s attorneys was compounded by the bias and improper and illegal acts of Judge Evans, who withheld documents from A&W, violated the rights of A&W by denying the most basic discovery, and acted without the impartiality required of a judge (Doc.381; Doc.377-Amended Dec#3:Exhs.9,22.) Windsor has documented everything. (Doc.377;Doc.378;Doc462.) Evidence before the court consists of the entire docket in MIST-1, especially Docs. 361-362-363-364-368-374-377- 378-38 1-383-385-462-474. [R.DS2.] On May 12, 2006, Judge Evans signed an 100 The Pl Order « tatements. Windsor has do as 17 of these statements are testimony of Maid’s manager R.2 ) Amended Dec#3-Exh.9:Pes.1-& had the evidence before her know the facts. Judge Evans wa advised by A&W that sworn affidavits fi customers proved that the alleged the injunction had been proven to | Judge Evans did nothing. |R.174.](D On August 8, 2007, Judge | Summary Judgment Order (“SJ Orde! Windsor has documented that as mat 416 statements by Judge Evans are t or are conclusions based on false staten [R.377.] (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3-Ex! 184.) Judge Evans claimed 1n the SJ Order that she rejected the statements of fact presented by the parties, so she drafted the facts based on the evidence. [R.251.] (Doc.251:Pg.3.) Judge Evans invented facts and made statements that are proven se Rae | to be false by the evidence. [R.377.] (Doc.377- Amended Dec#3.Exh.22? Windsor has charged Judge Evans with perjury, obstruction of justice, RICO, fraud upon the court, and more The facts relevant to the District Court’s consideration of the Motion to Quash were set out 1 Depo-Doc.34 P.3-7 § 16-30: Depo-Doc.21; Depo Doc.24. A comprehensive statement of facts 1n Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE has been set out in the sworn Twenty-Fifth Declaration of William M. Windsor (“Dee #25” — Doc.462). Itis a horror story of abuse and violations of the law by the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, and Judge Orinda D. Evans. [Depo-Doc.21 Dee #35 930 Maid has not filed a single affidavit in 2009, so Windsor’s declarations are uncontroverted and provide the only facts for this Court to consider \% IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Appellant Windsor asserts that the Appeal Orders constitute error summarized as follows Windsor seeks reversal of the Appealed Orders. Judge Duffey issued the order denyins Windsor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Ordet Quash Deposition (“MFR”), and denying Wind; Motion tor Change of Venue (“MCV”) after initially issuing an Order to Quash the Dep R.42.] (Doc.42.) [R.32.] (Doc.32) ludge Duttey erred by allow ns ¢ I chiiti Vil cll oO file a Motion to Quash Subpoena and create tl civil action. Neither Judge Evans nor Judge Duft 4 AU cited any legal authority for the creation of c1\ action 1:09-CV-01543-WSD or to have a sitti judge file a Motion to Quash her own subpo¢ issued by the District Court Clerk Judge Duffey erred by demonstratins pervasive bias against Windsor. The denial of 1 motions was because of the bias, not based upon th merits or law Judge Duffey erred by making statements in orders Judge Duffey erred by encouraging perjury, subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations obstruction of justice, dishonest Plaintiffs, dishonest Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, and dishonest Judge Evans Judge Duffey and federal judges in Atlanta, Georgia improperly encourage these actions ludge Duffey erred by making fact decisior contrary to the facts that were betore the court [here is no factual support for the Appealed Orders ludge Evans did not file a single affidavit. [R.DS] Judge Duffey erred by commiting perjury Judge Dutfey and federal judges in Atlanta, Georg improperly make false statements 1n orders to damage litigants. The Appealed Orders cont ? false statements ludge Duttey erred DY 1ISSUII p orders W thout legal justification Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor d not cite errors of law that would justify reconsideration on the Court’s orders Judge Duffey erred by claiming Windsor di not cite errors of fact that would justify reconsideration on the Court’s orders Judge Duffey erred by violating Windsor’s Constitutional rights by violating the Constitution nd the Code of Judicial Conduct Evans to the appropriate authorities for violations the Code of Judicial Conduct [), . ' +4! . ] rofessional Conduct 1 ] na $4 | { LOY C Jutiey € ed \ rOVIG a ustification w len Mo CI ;\ _ a i STANDARD OF REVIEW Windsor ask this Court to consider that the standard of review should be plain error. The errors in this case are so fundamental that, absent the errors, an unbiased judge would have reached a different result. A district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Corwin v. Walt Dinsey Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).) Since plain error has permeated the entire proceedings due to Judge Duffey’s bias, Judge Evans’ bias, and the dishonesty of Maid and Maid’s attorneys, Windsor respectfully proposes t!iat this Court elect to conduct a de novo review of the entire record under both its review and supervisory powers. Plain-error review involves four prongs. (United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-736 (1993).) Windsor meets the requirements. Errors have been made of such a nature that to leave them uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. 106 ee vs ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY The legal system was structured so that grave miscarriages of justice, such as the one in this case, should not happen. Unfortunately, the legal system and its protections do not exist in the federal courts in Atlanta, Georgia. Federal judges in Atlanta routinely violate the law and the rights of litigants for their own misguided purposes. Oaths theoretically require honesty. The federal judges in Atlanta ignore their oaths and the oaths of others. The system theoretically provides safeguards and checks and balances such as Rules 11, 34, 37, Local Rule 83.1C, Rule 60, 28 U.S.C. 144 and 455 that provide means to call party, attorney, and judicial dishonesty to the attention of judges. The federal judges in Atlanta ignore these rules and laws as they abuse the rights of litigants for their own improper purposes. The worst of hardships has resulted from the dishonesty in this case. A&W have lost approximately $1,000,000.00, have been saddled with an injunction that is a violation of Georgia law, have been defamed, and have lost years of man hours fighting the injustice. Now others are unfairly using the erroneous decision in this case in litigation 107 against Alcatraz in efforts to “void” O.C.G.A.43- 4B. To Alcatraz, the financial cost represents years of pre-tax profits. To Windsor, the financial cost represents money that this retiree expected to live on in retirement. None of this should have happened. The hardship has been extreme, unexpected, unfair, and illegal. And it continues. Maid and Maid’s Attorneys deliberately planned and carefully executed an unconscionable scheme to obtain tudgments and injunctions against A&W, to force A&W to incur significant legal expenses and to obtain money from A&W. (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3:Exh.23; Doc.363: Doc.364-Dec#12.) Amended Dec#3 and the exhibits thereto provide proof of the massive dishonesty and bad faith. [R.377.] (Doc.377-Amended Dec#3:Exhs.1- 28;also-Doc.378-Dec#5;Doc.462.) When Judge Evans created this action to cause Judge Duffey to enter the picture, Windsor felt he would finally get someone to look at the facts. Sadly, Judge Duffey has quickly proven to be as dishonest as Judge Evans. There is no basis for the orders that Judge Duffey issued in this matter. His orders are filled 108 with lies. The ONLY facts before Judge Duffey were those provided by Windsor, yet Judge Duffey managed to invent his own facts so he could rule against Windsor. There was no legal basis for Judge Duffey’s orders, so he just lied again and again to protect his next-door neighbor, Judge Evans. Judge Duffey and Judge Evans are part of the corruption that is rampant in the federal court system in Atlanta, Georgia. What has happened in this civil action and in the underlying action is quite simple. Judge Evans showed pervasive bias, ignored the facts and the law, and has done everything that she could to cheat the Defendants. Windsor has proven massive dishonesty and wrongdoing by the Plaintiffs, their attorneys, and Judge Evans. Judge Evans is now trying to cover up her criminal actions, and her friend, Judge Duffey, has come to her rescue by issuing the Appealed Orders without factual or legal support. Judge Duffey 1s committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and he is relying on the corruption in the Eleventh Circuit to cover him and his next-door neighbor, Judge Evans. Judges of the Eleventh Circuit have proven their own dishonesty and corruption again and again in these actions. (See the Appeals in 1:06-CV-0714-ODE, 1:09-CV- 01543-WSD, 1:09-CV-02027-WSD, and the Complaint of Judicial Misconduct and Judicial Review Petition filed by Windsor against Judge Evans with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh 109 Circuit.) Windsor comes now to appeal the corrupt actions of Judge Evans and Judge Duffey to a corrupt group of Eleventh Circuit judges. Windsor is filing a motion to disqualify all Eleventh Circuit and Northern District of Georgia judges because Windsor is convinced that he will never receive a fair hearing. Honest judges will reverse and remand the orders of Judge Duffey if the decision 1s based on the motions filed, the case law cited, fundamental! legal rights and obligations, and what the Jaw should be. [Depo-Doc.2] P1-2;Dec #35 41 1-15.| A. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY ALLOWING JUDGE EVANS TO FILE A MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AND TO CREATE THIS CIVIL ACTION, Neither Judge Evans nor Judge Duffey cited any legal authority for this civil action, the motion by Judge Evans, or the orders by Judge Duffey. Windsor cannot find any rule in the FRCP or any case law to provide a legal basis for a judge to file a motion to quash in a civil action in which she is presiding and has been accused of misconduct The subpoena for Judge Evans’ deposition was provided and signed by the District Court Clerk 110 in response to a letter from Windsor explaining the need. Judges have no power to file motions in their own court. Judges have no power to cause a civil action to be created without first filing a civil action Phis “civil action” simply appeared without explanation. [R.DS1.] [Depo-Doc. 1. | B. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY DEMONSTRATING PERVASIVE BIAS AGAINST WINDSOR. Judge Duffey does not have a fair or impartial bone 1n his body when it comes to his fnend, next door neighbor, and former supervisor, Judge Evans Judge Duffey’s initial involvement in thi: matter was to enter an order that made statement: that improperly favored the position of Judge Evan | Depo-Doc.15. Dec #29 4 29001.| lhe Stay Order says: “The subpoena, served by William M. Windsor, secks Judge Evans testimony regarding her mental processes and base for her decisions in the closed case....””. This language 1s totally inappropriate. [Depo Doc.15. Dec #29 4 29004.| There was no such evidence before the Court. |Depo-Doc.15. Dec #29 { 29005. ] lhe “closed case” language in the Stay Order iS also inappropriate. The declarations and motion: before the Court and in |:06-cv-0714-ODE indicate that MIST-1] 1s not a “closed case.” | Depo Doc.15. Dec #29 49 29010 “It follows that the statute grants a similar right during subsequent phases of the litigation, when a judge has already decided, or 1s in the process of deciding, the most significant issues presented in a case. We therefore construe section 455(a)'s ‘proceeding"” requirement to embrace only such activity following the initiation of an action by a private party or governmental agency designed ultimately to modify or affect the substantive nghts of a litigant.’” (U.S. v. Sciarra, 85) F.2d 621, 635 (1 Ith Cu 1QR8).) lhe language in the Stay Order regarding the service of the subpoena was also inaccurate. The Stay Order says: “Windsor attempted to serve a deposition subpoena on Judge Evans in her chambers....”. This, too, is incorrect information improperly claimed by Mr. Huber. [Depo Doc.15. Dec #29 4 29023.| The Second Declaration of Michelle Thornton (“Ms. Thornton’) attached to Depo-Doc.!5 as Exhibit D explains that she determined the polite way to deliver the subpoena to the receptionist after consulting with the U.S. Marshal Service. Ms. Thornton did not go near the chambers of Judge vans. (exhibit D to Depo Doc.15.) | Depo Doc.‘ Dec 429 ¥ 290274 | } [he pervasive bias continued. Judge Dulfey's next act of bias was to declare Windsor “scurrilous and irresponsible” based SOLELY on Windsor’s testimony. [R.32.] (Depo-Doc.32.) W mndsor does not believe there Cal) he any hy tel proof of extrajudicial bias than having Judge Dutt make such a statement when he had no facts before him to indicate anything negative about Windsor Neither the Plaintiffs’ Attorneys nor Judpe levan have filed any affidavits in 2009. [R.DS1. | IR .DS2.] So, Judge Dullfey decided Windsor wa ‘scurmlous and irresponsible because he charged ludge vans with misconduct and criminal violations. This is bias against Windsor and prejudice for federal judge Phis as extrajudicial bias, and it has been pervasive C. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS IN ORDERS ludge Dulfey’s Reconsideration Order falsely SAYS “Windsor also has not demonstrated that there is any nced to correct a Clear error of law o1 fact. In fact. Windsor does not cite any case or Statutes to support his conclusory allegations. Windsor simply rehashes the arguments he made both before Judge Evans and this Court. He cites to over a dozen of his declarations and other filings as “legal support” for his motion for reconsideration. A review of these documents reveals that they simply express Windsor’s disagreement with Judge Evans’ rulings (which were affirmed on appeal) and the Court’s June 30 Order. This disagreement is not an appropriate ground for reconsideration.” Judge Duffey’s claims are false and dishonest. Windsor compared his Response to the Motion to Quash and his Motion for Reconsideration to prove this false statement by Judge Duffey. [Depo-Docs.21,24,34.] There were 117 paragraphs in the Response to Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena [Depo-Doc.21], 55 paragraphs in the Response to Motion to Supplement Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena {Depo-Doc.24], and 36 paragraphs in the Motion for Reconsideration [Depo-Doc.34]. The 36 paragraphs constitute just 21% of what was in the prior responses. Of the 36, 23 paragraphs are new; eight (8) paragraphs are responses to issues raised by the orders that required some previous information to be repeated and emphasized (two of the eight paragraphs summarized what had been expressed in 114 46 paragraphs in the responses); three (3) paragraphs were repeated; and two (2) paragraphs were changed slightly to update them. If Windsor admits that five pages are essentially repeated, this means only 3% of the Motion for Reconsideration could be even remotely characterized as a “rehash,” and after all, it is a motion to reconsider what had been previously discussed. Only two (2) paragraphs (paragraphs 2 and 23) repeat arguments presented to Judge Evans. Windsor has therefore proven that Judge Duffey’s statement that Windsor “simply rehashes the arguments he made both before Judge Evans and this Court” is false and dishonest. Windsor finds this typical of the dishonesty of the federal judges in Atlanta, Georgia. Federal judges in Atlanta routinely make false statements to avoid dealing with the facts and the law to accomplish their own improper purposes. D. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY ENCOURAGING PERJURY, SUBORNATION OF PERJURY, RULE 11 VIOLATIONS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DISHONEST PARTIES, DISHONEST ATTORNEYS, AND DISHONEST JUDGES. Judge Duffey ignored Windsor’s uncontroverted proof of massive dishonesty in MIST-1. Judge William S. Duffey, Judge Orinda D. Evans, Judge R. Lanier Anderson. Judge Rosemary Barkett, Judge Stanley F. Birch, Judge Susan H. Black, Judge Blackburn, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Conway, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge J.L. Edmondson, Judge Peter T. Fay. Judge Fuller, Judge John C. Godbold, Judge Granade, Judge James C. Hill, Judge Frank M. Hull, Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge Mickle, Judge Moore, Judge William H. Pryor, Judge Royal, Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, and Judge Charles R. Wilson have all ignored the dishonesty in this matter. Their actions support perjury, subornation of perjury, Rule 11 violations, obstruction of justice, dishonest parties, dishonest attorneys, and corrupt judges. EK. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY MAKING FACT DECISIONS THAT WERE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS THAT WERE BEFORE THE COURT. Judges, just like jurors, are obligated to deal with only the facts presented to them for consideration. Judges and jurors are not allowed to let their personal prejudices replace or affect the facts, but Judge Duffey did. The only facts before Judge Duffey in this Civil Action are contained in the declarations of 116 Wiliam M. Windsor. [R.DS1.] [R.DS2.] Judge Duffey erred by making fact statements that were not facts presented by Windsor. There were no affidavits presented by any other parties, as is required by Local Rule 7.1 A.(1). Therefore, every statement made by Judge Duffey that 1s not cited to a Windsor declaration or expressed as law or case law is improper. Judge Duffey made various statements that seem to purport to be facts in the Appealed Order, but these statements must not be considered. Neither Judge Evans nor Plaintiffs filed any affidavits in 2009. Windsor’s fact statements have not been controverted. That’s because they are true. This Court must not accept that what Judge Duffey writes is true. Proof of this is provided in Depo-Docs.4,32,42,6,13,15,17,20,21,24,34,36. (See also R.377;Doc.377;R.390;Doc.390;Doc.462.) Fk. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY COMMITTING PERJURY. Judge Duffey has made false statements, and this is perjury. Judge Duffey knew statements he has made in his orders are false. He made them while under his oath as a federal judge and as a member of the State Bar of Georgia. He made the statements intentionally for the purpose of perverting the legal system and covering up for his next-door neighbor, Judge Evans. This Court should ask the U.S. Attorney to have a grand jury consider perjury and obstruction of justice charges against Judge Duffey and Judge Evans. G. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY ISSUING ORDERS WITHOUT LEGAL JUSTIFICATION. Judge Duffey did not have legal justification for issuing the Quash Order (Depo-Doc.32) or the Reconsideration Order (Depo-Doc.42.). Judge Duffey had no legal authority for this civil action, the motion by Judge Evans, or the orders issues. (F< P.) There is no rule or case law to provide a legal basis for a judge to file a motion to quash in a civil action in which she is presiding and has been accused of misconduct. So, there is no 118 rule or case law to permit another judge to rule on such a motion. Judge Duffey ignored the facts and the law in the Motion for Reconsideration, and Judge Duffey’s failure to address the legal issues raised had no legal justification and was an abuse of discretion. (Depo- Doc.34,42.) H. JUDGE DUFFEY ERRED BY CLAIMING WINDSOR DID NOT CITE ERRORS OF LAW AS CRITERIA THAT WOULD JUSTIFY RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUASH ORDER. Windsor provided a lengthy list of motions, responses, and declarations as legal support for the Motion for Reconsideration. (Depo-Doc.34 42.) Contrary to the claims of Judge Duffey, these motions and responses cited various laws and case law. The declarations provided factual support for that law. Judge Duffey dismissed consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration with the patented dishonest judicial response “simply expressing disagreement with rulings.” Judge Duffey speaks of Judge Evans’ rulings and affirmation on appeal as if these were rulings that enyone should give any credence to. They were 119 frauds. Judge Duffey conveniently ignores all of the proof. The only facts before Judge Duffey and this Court are that those rulings were perjury and fraud upon the courts. Windsor did specify errors of law and fact made by Judge Duffey in his previous decision. Windsor did not rehash in the Motion for Reconsideration the arguments he had previously presented as he addressed 15 specific errors of law and fact. When a judge fails to address the errors of law and fact expressed in a motion, the order must be reversed and remanded. Judge Duffey’s Reconsideration Order (Depo-Doc.42_ P2) stated that “A motion for reconsideration is appropriate where there is...a need to correct a clear error of law or fact.” [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2524%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.