# Opposition Brief — Guevara v. Republic of Peru > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2503%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2010 - **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1082 ## Text 2 @O les No. 10-389 1 CCFO IN THE Supreme Court of the Anited States JOSE GUEVARA, Petitioner, We REPUBLICA DEL PERU, AND MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR DEL PERU, Respondents. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI MARK A. CYMROT Counsel of Record LEE H. SIMOWITZ AMBIKA J. BIGGS BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 861-1500 October 22, 2010 mcymrot@bakerlaw.com Counsel for Respondents ATTEN AE SEE TT ATTA ART IIS MARRIOT AGRE, SS TSMR RAM) WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 QUESTION PRESENTED The petition does not raise an issue of law, but rather a dispute about the insufficiency of Plaintiff Jose Guevara’s evidence. The Eleventh Circuit correctly found that Guevara’s evidence failed to prove any “direct etfect” in the United States from Peru’s reward offer for accurate information directly enabling the capture of an infamous fugitive. With- out a “direct effect” in the United States—i.e., with- out any nexus between the conduct and the United States—the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case for want of subject matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (*FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The Eleventh Circuit did not hold that the “direct effect” had to be a “legally signif- icant act” or satisfy a requirement of “substantiality” or “foreseeability,” as the petition suggests. These arguments were not made below and thus, not addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. Accordingly, they were not properly preserved for this Court. Guevara’s evidence of “direct effect” fails to raise any novel or highly disputed issues. He argues that his arrest in Miami was “in connection with” commercial activity of Peru; the Eleventh Circuit correctly held his arrest was in connection with his criminal activity. The Eleventh Circuit also correctly held that Peru’s refusal to pay Guevara in the United States was not required by the reward offer, thus distinguishing this case from Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). See Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (no direct effect where payment in United States not contractually required). (i) ii The circuit split interpreting the FSIA’s nexus requirement, that Guevara asserts, is illusory and immaterial to the outcome of this case. The three judges of the Eleventh Circuit, including the dissent, agreed that this case was not appropriate for a United States court to decide, as argued by the United States in its amicus brief to the Eleventh Circuit. And there are numerous additional bases to support the result. The petition, thus, should be denied. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....................:..:00000+ i pv Beg Noy y. 8) yy | - . i nanennna iv Fe ey IED ane rsesnasecsonscncercescesosseccenscsesinis 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................004 2 Bin. Fe BE nth tnecancnnsesnsantsstncsanresectectecns 2 B. Proceedings Below ...................:ccccecceeeeeeeee 5 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................0....0.2.04. 9 PEE staenckasarstdcactnsssnteisassoccesenbecmicaenmsasiets 11 Fe MNPTIILDI secscvaccdsansocsstenssnteptcensasensanniersianes 21 APPENDIX APPENDIX A: Emergency Decree No. 049- EE deksnsdensrincéurdensdvensaaneiundienisahebaldésadadionaenens la APPENDIX B: Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion’s Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Compliance with Trial Subpoenas. 12a APPENDIX C: Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Republica BPE FE scsccsiscrscsnceseunsnsssnintexisecsadidessmnanmbbasbitn 20a (iii) iV TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page American Telecom Co., LLC v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007) .... 18 Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289 C2 Sa, HIE vundecssunenutsscrcarecsas 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 20 Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 608 F.3d 1297 Ce a MP cctesccdsucidiedbideustsccssukeniecoss 2, 12,19 Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, A.S., 602 FAs Be CAG CP. BAO) cc evccccsncsccsscescescseses: 16 Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indone- sta, 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998) ............... 16 Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Tele- vision, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982)..... 13 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. kt oo ee oe 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 362 PT hsanicbabantqnensuasesseeseulesunpensiieedessecnavessooth 14 STATUTES Re A AEE vide cicscancsnscenecsussavncacsesvatesssoess 4 Be ee OE IED daacetncosnsiesseoivntsesxtnnvtensunays 4 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).............. 1,11, 12, 14, 16, 17 MISCELLANEOUS 67 Am. Jur. 2nd Rewards § J...............000008.. 10 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States No. 10-389 JOSE GUEVARA, Petitioner, we REPUBLICA DEL PERU, AND MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR DEL PERU, Respondents. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OPINIONS BELOW This case has been before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit twice. The Eleventh Circuit’s first decision in this case held that “a foreign state’s offer of a reward in return for information enabling it to locate and capture a fupi- tive” fell within the FSILA’s commercial activity excep- tion. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The decision, which reversed the district court’s dismissal of Guevara’s lawsuit, is reported at 468 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Guevara I”). 2 On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Guevara and denied Peru’s cross motion for summary judgment, finding Guevara had earned the reward and thus “effectively preempting the ... evaluation decision” of the Peru- vian governmental body (Special High Level Commit- tee or “SHLC”) that determined that Guevara had not earned the reward. 608 F.3d F.3d 1297, 1305. In response to Peru’s argument that its conduct had insufficient nexus to the United States for jurisdic- tion under the FSIA, the district court held that the Eleventh Circuit already had decided the juris- dictional issues in Guevara I. The district court conducted no further analysis. This decision is published at 2008 WL 4194839. The Eleventh Circuit’s secend decision reversed the district court, holding that: (1) it had not decided the nexus issue in Guevara I, and (2) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Peru’s reward offer did not cause a direct effect in the United States under FSIA’s commercial activity exception. That decision is reported at 608 F.3d 1297 (“Guevara IT’). STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Factual Record Plaintiff Jose Guevara, a former Venezuelan intel- ligence officer, provided security and a safe house in Venezuela for Vladimiro Montesinos, the fugitive head of Peru’s National Intelligence Agency, who had purportedly committed a string of crimes, including arms and drug trafficking, money laundering, extor- tion, bribery, and multiple murders. 3a-5a_ of Guevara Appendix A (hereinafter cited as “Guevara App. A, __”). The first media leaks of Montesinos’ 3 videotapes exposing some of his crimes led to the resignation of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, and created a political and constitutional crisis that had repercussions in Peru for many years. Guevara App. A, 3a. Montesinos quickly fled the country and disappeared.’ Guevara App. A, 3a. When the trail for Montesinos went cold, Peru’s interim President Valentin Paniagua Corazao issued an Emergency Decree providing for a $5 million reward for “accurate information that will directly enable the locating and capturing” of Montesinos. Guevara App. A, 4a; Emergency Decree, Peru Appen- dix A (hereinafter referred to as “Peru App. A, __”). If more than one person supplied information, the reward would be split among them. The reward offer expressly required that information had to be pro- vided to the SHLC, and that the SHLC would decide any reward claims. Guevara App. A, 4a. The decree authorized the government to take a loan from, and open an account in, a Peruvian state-owned bank to pay the reward. Guevara App. A, 4a. The decree gave the reward recipients no right to determine the place of payment. While harboring Montesinos, Guevara and others extracted at least $55 million from him as protection money. DE 296-3, pp. 41589-92; DE 295-3, pp. 4544- 45; DE 295-2; p. 45,757; DE 296-6, pp. 68890, 68900.’ When Montesinos was running out of money, "The Eleventh Circuit recounted the facts in the light most favorable to Guevara. We include a more complete recitation of the record before the district court. * DE refers to the docket entry number on the docket in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 1:04-cv-23223-MGC. + Guevara made trips on Montesinos’ behalf to Lima, Bogota, Miami and Nassau, Bahamas seeking addi- tional funds. DE 201-2, pp. 35, 36, 94. On June 22, 2000, Guevara was arrested in Miami by the FBI after attempting to extort a banker to release a total of $3.7 million from one of Montesinos’ bank accounts. Guevara App. A, 10a. Guevara was charged with extortion and fraud against the United States. 18 U.S.C. $§ 875(b), 371. DE 201-2, p. 108; DE 201-6. While in FBI custody, Guevara was told that he would be released and the charges dropped if he cooperated in Montesinos’ capture. He also was informed of Peru’s reward offer, which the FBI was aware of from published reports. Guevara App. A, 5a-6a. Supervisory Special Agent Kevin Currier testified that Guevara had agreed to cooperate with the FBI before he was informed of Peru’s reward. DE 319-3, pp. 39-42. Currier, who was stationed in Lima, consulted with Minister of the Interior Antonio Ketin Vidal and worked out a plan for Montesinos’ capture. DE 201-3, p. 125. In a single telephone conversation from Lima, Vidal and Currier told FBI Agent Waldo Longa in Miami to instruct Guevara to have his accomplices in Caracas deliver Montesinos to the Peruvian ambassador’s residence. Guevara App. A, 12a-13a. Vidal also explained the terms of the reward to Longa who passed the information to Guevara. Guevara App. A, 13. Guevara then called his accomplice in Venezuela and supposedly gave the instructions. Guevara App. A, 13a. Montesinos never arrived at the Peruvian ambas- sador’s residence; he was captured that same night by the Venezuelan authorities. Guevara App. A, 13a. The next day Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 3) announced that Venezuela had found and arrested Montesinos. DE 201-3, pp. 55, 68; DE 201-4, p. 58. In a diplomatic flap with both Peru and the United States, Venezuela said it alone had located Montesi- nos.” The head of the FBI’s Miami field office stated publicly he did not know how Montesinos was arrested, and Guevara told the media that the Vene- zuelan government had known all along where Montesinos was _ hiding. DE 285-14, DE 265-1, DE 201-2, pp. 69-73. Guevara then submitted a claim for the reward to the SHLC, which conducted an extensive investiga- tion, including meetings and correspondence with FBI Agent Currier and Guevara’s lawyer. DE 326-5, { 5. Despite repeated requests over a two-year period, Currier could not connect Montesinos’ arrest to Guevara’s purported cooperation. DE 326-5, {J 6, 7, 14. Guevara, who was in the best position to provide evidence regarding the circumstances of the arrest, relied only on the coincidence of timing between his call to Caracas and Montesinos’ subse- quent arrest. The SHLC, therefore, concluded that the Venezuelan Government’s intervention was an independent event that resulted in Montesinos’ arrest, and denied Guevara’s claim. DE 326-5, JJ 16, 19; DE 201-4, pp. 20-21. B. Proceedings Below Guevara filed suit against Peru and two ministers seeking the reward in Florida state court. Guevara App. A, 6a. After removing the case to federal court, Peru moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign * Venezuela’s tension with Peru and the United States is reported in a June 29, 2001 Associated Press Worldstream article. DE 285-14. 6 immunity. Guevara App. A, 6a-7a. Peru argued that a reward offer did not constitute “commercial activ- ity” that had sufficient “nexus” to the United States under the FSIA. DE 17, 99 10, 11. The district court dismissed, ruling that a reward offer was not commercial activity. Guevara App. A, 17a. The court did not address Peru’s nexus argument. DE 31. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in Guevara I, hold- ing that the reward offer was commercial activity. Guevara App. C. Because it was not a basis for the district court ruling, the nexus issue was not presented to the Eleventh Circuit, and the court’s opinion did not address the issue. Guevara App. A, 17a. On remand, Peru preserved the nexus issue in its answer. In the midst of discovery, Guevara moved for partial summary judgment, and Peru responded, in part, by again arguing the nexus issue. DE 200, pp. 17-18. The district court granted Guevara partial summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, finding that Guevara had earned the reward. The court relied principally on its interpretation of a preliminary SHLC_ resolution that purportedly acknowledged Guevara’s role in Montesinos’ arrest. Guevara App. A, 14a. This interpretation was contested by an affidavit from the SHLC Chairman, and on reconsideration, by three additional affidavits, including by the draftsman of the resolution. DE 201-8, 9 3; 285-15, 7] 12-13; 285-20, J] 4-5; and 285-21, (3-5. The district court also relied upon a conclusory, hearsay affidavit by FBI Agent Currier stating that Guevara’s cooperation “indirectly” resulted in Montesinos’ arrest, which fails on its face to satisfy the causation requirement in the reward decree (“directly enabling”). Guevara App. B, 40a- 7 41a; DE 119-3, 7 16. Currier acknowledged in his deposition that he had no personal knowledge regarding the circumstances of Montesinos’ capture. In opposing Guevara’s motion to compel Agents Longa and Currier to testify at trial, the FBI disavowed Currier’s affidavit, saying it was unautho- rized and did not reflect the position of the FBI. Peru App. B, p. 16a, n.2. On reconsideration, Peru submitted two sworn affidavits from the Venezuelan Congressional record by Guevara’s accomplice, stating that Guevara had secretly signaled him on the telephone call from FBI custody to murder Montesinos. DE 297-6, p. 43, DE 326-3, pp. 4546-47, 4549-50. Guevara did not dispute these statements, in an affidavit or other- wise, and they stand uncontested on this record. DE 319-1, pp. 16, 17. Guevara’s assertion that he had cooperated with the FBI to bring about Montesi- nos’ capture thus evaporated, along with any possible dispute regarding his ineligibility for the reward. On the nexus issue, the district court found that the issue had already been decided by the Eleventh Circuit in Guevara I, and said no more. Guevara App. A, 13a. After the district court denied reconsi- deration, Peru appealed. DE 284, 344, 349. Guevara did not address the nexus issue in his briefing before the Eleventh Circuit, aside from asserting that the Eleventh Circuit already had determined the issue in the previous appeal. At oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit offered Guevara the opportunity to identify a nexus between Peru’s commercial activity and the United States. After oral argument, the United States submitted an amicus brief urging reversal of the district court, 8 which the Eleventh Circuit accepted. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Republica Del Peru, Peru App. C. The United States said: To protect the prerogatives of the Executive Branch in its conduct of foreign affairs, both the act of state doctrine and principles of interna- tional comity generally preclude U.S. courts from reviewing and overriding the sovereign decisions of foreign states and foreign tribunals. Particu- larly because this judgment against Peru presents two serious foreign-relations dilemmas for the United States, the doctrines are fully applicable here. Peru App. A, pp. 35a-36a. In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit found that it had not previously decided the nexus issue, which had been properly preserved by Peru. Guevara App. A, 15a. On this issue, Judge Cox dissented but suggested, nonetheless, the case might not be appropriate for resolution by a United States Court under the doctrine of international comity. Guevara App. A, 32a. On the merits of the nexus issue, the Eleventh Circuit responded to Guevara’s nexus argument by finding that Guevara’s arrest in Miami was in connection with his own criminal—not Peru’s com- mercial—activity. Guevara App. A, 25a-26a. Peru’s alleged refusal to make payment in the United States fails as a direct effect because Guevara had no right to payment in the United States; the Emergency Decree established a loan and bank account in Peru for payment. Guevara Appendix A, 4a. The Eleventh Circuit also found that Peru’s refusal to pay the 9 reward to Guevara was a “negative activity” that alone did not satisfy the commercial activity excep- tion. Guevara App. A, 25a. The Eleventh Circuit held that the “one-off” tele- phone conversation among the two FBI agents and the Peruvian Minister did not constitute an act in connection with commercial activity. Guevara App. A, 25a. (During oral argument Guevara appeared to abandon, as evidence of direct effect, that single tele- phone call. Jd.) The Eleventh Circuit found this call to be an insufficient basis to exercise personal and subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state by analogy to the minimum contacts test for Due Process. Guevara App. A, 25a. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Guevara’s petition founders on two misconceptions: (1) he misstates the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in order to argue that a purported circuit split on the “direct effects” rule under the FSIA is relevant and case dispositive; and (2) he also misstates the record in arguing that the FBI and State Department differ on the handling of this case. Peru’s reward offer had no effect—legally signifi- cant or otherwise—in the United States; the Emer- gency Decree required all material events to occur in Peru, and Guevara’s claims of a direct effect are factually inaccurate and legally deficient by any precedent. Guevara’s case was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and even if subject matter jurisdiction were present, his case would be dismissed on principles of international comity (as even the dissent in the Eleventh Circuit suggested) and act of state, as well as numerous other grounds 10 including the merits (Guevara did not earn the reward). Public policy also supported dismissal. As set forth in the United States’ amicus curiae brief, assuming jurisdiction over a foreign reward program would violate principles of international comity, create serious diplomatic tensions, and necessarily result in United States law enforcement and _ diplomatic decisions regarding our own reward programs being subjected to review by foreign courts. The United States stated: (T]he federal government has a profound interest in preventing the district court’s judgment from undermining our nation’s relationship with a stable democratic partner in South America. Moreover, the United States operates its own highly successful international reward programs, and the judgment here raises the troubling specter of foreign courts overriding decisions made by U.S. law enforcement and diplomatic officials. Peru App. C, 28a. The United States has at least 15 statutory reward programs, and frequently denies reward claims. 67 Am. Jur. 2d Rewards §5. As the United States recognized, any interference by the United States in Peru’s sovereign decisions regarding a notorious former government official would stress an otherwise friendly relationship. The United States, therefore, urged the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss Guevara’s case on the alternative grounds of international comity and act of state. The question presented, as framed by Guevara, did not and could not have determined the result of this case. The single phone call, and Peru’s “negative 11 activity” in failing to pay the reward, had no direct effect in the United States, regardless of whether those actions or non-actions are characterized as “legally significant acts.” The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling was correct, and numerous other grounds support dismissal. The petition should be denied. ARGUMENT Even if properly preserved for this Court—which it was not— Guevara’s arguments do not raise the issue of whether a “legally significant act” must occur in the United States, as the petition argues.* Guevara did not raise the issue below, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue, and none of Guevara’s arguments for direct effect turn on the outcome of this issue. Under any existing interpretation of the direct effect clause, Peru’s conduct did not waive sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The Eleventh Circuit held that the evidence did not establish that Peru’s activities fell within any of the three clauses of FSIA’s commercial activity exception, including the direct effect clause. Guevara App. A, 20a-26a. In his petition, Guevara concedes the first two clauses do not apply and challenges only the * Guevara incorrectly asserts that this issue was raised below and addressed by the Eleventh Circuit two times. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, (hereinafter cited as “Pet. _”), pp. 10-11. Neither opinion addressed whether a “legally significant act” must occur within the United States under the commercial activity exception. The Eleventh Circuit’s first opinion address- ed whether the offer of a reward was commercial activity. Jd. at 48a. The second opinion addressed whether Peru’s acts fell within any of § 1605(a)X2)’s three clauses. Jd. at 20a-26a. Guevara did not raise below and the courts did not address whether a “legally significant act” must occur in the United States. 12 Eleventh Circuit’s determination that the third clause—or “direct effect” clause—does not establish an exception to immunity for Peru. The clause provides an exception to immunity when: ... the action is based .. . [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. § 1605(a)(2). Guevara argues that the Court should grant his Petition so that the Court can resolve a purported circuit split on “whether the commercial activity exception’s ‘direct effect’ clause requires evidence that a ‘legally significant act’ occurred within the United States in the order to vest Ameri- can courts with jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.” Pet., i-ii, Question Presented. This case is not appropriate for resolving those issues. Guevara did not raise in the courts below the issue of whether Peru’s purported actions involving the United States were or were not “legally signifi- cant,” or whether any circuit split on that question existed. Rather, he merely asserted that the Eleventh Circuit already had decided the issue of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in its 2006 Guevara I opinion. The Eleventh Circuit did not require Guevara to plead or prove the existence of a “legally significant act.” Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the “legally significant act” issue in Guevara II at all—understandably so, because Guevara did not raise it. As this issue has not been preserved, the Court should deny Guevara’s petition on this ground alone, 13 As support for his argument that the Eleventh Circuit applied the “legally significant act” test, Guevara states that the question the court defined was whether “the effect was sufficiently ‘direct’ and sufficiently ‘in the United States’ that Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the case.” Pet. 14 (citing Guevara App. A, 23a-24a). This language clearly shows that the Eleventh Circuit was concerned about whether the effect was sufficiently in the United States, not whether the conduct or act was sufficiently in the United States. In determining whether Peru fell within the “direct effect” clause of the commercial activity exception, the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that “[nJeither of Guevara’s arguments for a direct effect in the United States reflects [Republic of Argentina v.| Weltover [504 U.S. 607 (1992)]’s requirement of immediate consequences or Harris Corp. [v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982)]’s focus on significant financial consequences in the United States. There- fore, we cannot conclude that a direct effect occurred in the United States as a result of Peru’s promise to pay the reward money.” Guevara App. A, 26a. The Eleventh Circuit thus was not called on to assess the nature or quality of Peru’s alleged acts— “legally significant” or not—because no act was alleged or proven that could possibly have had a direct effect in the United States. Equally to the point, the Eleventh Circuit did not require that Guevara prove a “legally significant act,” either in the United States or outside it. Because Guevara did not have to meet any such legal standard, that test had no significance to the outcome of this case. Guevara’s petition consists mostly of an academic discussion of the “legally significant act” test in the 14 courts; the petition barely attempts to identify Peru’s acts that supposedly waived its sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Guevara argues that the reward “offer itself constituted commercial activity.” Pet. 17- 18. Guevara maintains that he accepted Peru’s offer by performing in the United States, “1.e., he provided information and coordinated efforts from the United States which led to the location and capture of the fugitive Montesinos[,|!” which presumably provided the “direct effect” on the United States under the third branch of § 1605(a)(2). Pet. 18. The record does not support his argument, and Peru’s reward offer defined acceptance as the delivery of informa- tion to the SHLC in Peru. Guevara’s arrest was not commercial activity carried on by Peru, in the United States or in Peru. As the Eleventh Circuit properly held, Guevara’s arrest and subsequent cooperation was in connection with Guevara’s criminal activity, not the reward. Guevara App. A, 25a-26a (“Guevara’s arrest was ‘an immediate consequence’ of his criminal activity, not of Peru’s offer of a reward for Montesinos’s capture” (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618). Law enforce- ment activities do not fall within the commercial activity exception. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 362 (1993) (“Exercise of the powers of police and penal officers is not the sort of action by which private parties can engage in commerce.”). Guevara’s call to Caracas was not a condition of the reward; it was law enforcement activity which cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction under the commercial activ- ity exception. The factual record also defeats Guevara’s argu- ment. Guevara was required to make the call to Venezuela for the much more immediate purpose of 15 obtaining his “get out of jail free card” from the FBI. DE 319-3, pp. 39-42. Guevara submitted no evidence suggesting he was motivated to make the Venezuela call to earn the reward; according to FBI Agent Currier, Guevara had agreed to cooperate with the FBI before he knew about Peru’s reward offer. DE 319-3, pp. 39-42; DE 119-3, J 8. Even assuming that his purported cooperation would satisfy the reward offer, the uncontested evidence is that Guevara was only feigning cooperation while order- ing Montesinos’s murder from FBI custody. Dk 297- 6, p. 43, DE 319-1, pp. 16, 17, DE 326-3, pp. 4546-47, 4549-50. In addition, Guevara presented no evidence that his telephone call to Caracas was related to Montesinos’s capture, except as a post hoc, ergo procter hoc coincidence of time. He even admitted that the Venezuelan government did not need his information; they knew where Montesinos was from the outset. DE 285-14; DE 201-2, pp. 69-73. Nor could the reward offer itself have a direct effect in the United States. Reciting the facts in the light most favorable to Guevara, the Eleventh Circuit confronted a record in which the Emergency Decree defined the operative performance as the receipt of information by the SHLC in Peru (which never occurred); Guevara made a claim to the SHLC in Peru; his counsel met with members of the SHLC in Peru; the alleged breach of contract occurred when the SHLC, after an extensive and good faith review, denied Guevara’s claim in Peru; and Peru declined to make payment from a bank account authorized by the Emergency Decree to be opened in Peru. Guevara App. A, 20a; Peru App. A, pp. la-Ga. Guevara argued that even though every event in connection with the offer took place in Peru, a direct effect sprang from what the Eleventh Circuit de- 16 scribed as “Peru’s failure to make the reward pay- ment within the United States—a sort of ‘negative activity[.]” Guevara App. A, 25a. The Eleventh Cir- cuit observed that no federal court had ever relied on such “negative activity” to confer subject matter jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(2), and correctly rejected Guevara’s argument. See also Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69, 76 (2nd Cir. 2010) (under FSIA, “although the failure to act may have a legally significant effect in the place where the act was to have been performed, the failure to act is not itself an act.”). Guevara’s argument that he was entitled to payment in Miami fails because it is factually inaccu- rate, as the Eleventh Circuit found. Guevara App. A, 23a. The Emergency Decree authorized a loan and bank account in Peru for payment of the reward. Td. The decree requires the loan to be taken from Banco de la Nacion, a state-owned bank, and describes it as an internal indebtedness operation. Nothing in the decree requires payment in the United States, or gives Guevara the power to choose the place of payment. Thus, Guevara’s case is distinguished from Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (direct effect because payment due in the United States) and Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia, 148 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (direct effect when plaintiff entitled under a letter of credit to designate place of payment and it designated its New York bank account), and similar to the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Guirlando. Guevara argued (but abandoned) the proposition that a direct effect in the United States occurred by virtue of the single Lima-Miami telephone call in which Minister Vidal conveyed the terms of the offer to FBI Agent Longa. The Eleventh Circuit held that 17 Guevara’s acceptance-related activity involved only this “one-off” telephone communication that was too de minimis to support subject matter jurisdiction, using the minimum contacts personal jurisdiction test as an analogy, as this Court did in Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619. Guevara App. A, 25a. The Vidal call also was in connection with law enforcement—not commercial—activities. Jd. The participants were discussing how to bring about Montesinos’ arrest, and Minister Vidal did nothing more than repeat the terms of the reward offer. In short, the Eleventh Circuit correctly determined that no act performed by any character in this drama brought about a “direct effect” in the United States within the meaning of § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. This conclusion did not turn on whether any act was “legally significant,” because no act, regardless of how it could be characterized, produced the requisite direct effect in the United States. No party, includ- ing Guevara, raised this issue, and the Eleventh Circuit had no occasion to consider it. Even though the “legally significant act” test is irrelevant to the outcome of this case, Guevara evidently believes that a circuit conflict is a potential ticket to review by this Court. He therefore raises this issue for the first time in his petition, and devotes the lion’s share of the petition to explication of a purported circuit conflict on this irrelevant issue. Guevara argues that some circuits require a “legally significant act” in the United States under the direct effect clause, while others do not. He asserts that the Eleventh Circuit requires a legally significant act to occur within the United States. 18 Contrary to Guevara’s assertions, the Eleventh Circuit does not require a legally significant act, neither within nor without the United States. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly followed this Court’s articulation of the nexus rule in Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, where the Court held that “an effect is ‘direct’ if it follows ‘as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.” (ellipses in original). Guevara App. A, 23a. The Eleventh Circuit did not mention the legally significant act test at all, let alone the location of any such act, nor did it include or make reference to a “substantiality” or “foreseeability” requirement, which Weltover expressly rejected. Here, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the sensible approach recently exemplified by the Sixth Circuit in American Telecom Co., LLC v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007). Noting that some circuits adopt the legally significant act formulation, others reject it, and still others find it “helpful but not required,” the Sixth Circuit said: “But, while the circuits have framed the inquiry differently, these differences have no impact here. The present case is easily resolved without resort to any legally signifi- cant act....” Id. at 540. Like the Eleventh Circuit here, the Sixth Circuit found that the conduct alleged simply could not have had a direct effect in the United States, and dismissed the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Notably, although the Sixth Circuit in American Telecom catalogued the circuits with regard to their positions on the “legally significant act” issue, it did not identify the Eleventh Circuit as yet having taken any position on the question. That agnosticism remains unchanged after the Eleventh Circuit’s deci- 19 sion here. Even if there is a circuit conflict on this issue, the Eleventh Circuit’s non-position is not in conflict with any other circuit, making this case a particularly unsuitable vehicle for resolving whatever conflict may exist. Guevara also relies on public policy arguments, none of which are valid. First, Guevara maintains that because the United States—like Peru—offers rewards as adjuncts to law enforcement, United States courts should compel Peru to pay him the award he contends that he has earned. Pet. 18-19. To the contrary, the SHLC, a duly constituted organ of the Peruvian government, following in good faith the procedures set out in the reward offer, and with the participation of the FBI and Guevara’s attorney in the process, determined that Guevara had not earned the reward. As the United States explained in its amicus brief to the Eleventh Circuit, and as Judge Cox noted in his dissent, the courts of the United States would violate basic principles of comity if they sat in judgment on the acts of other sovereign nations in determining entitlement to reward offers. indeed, public policy dictates precisely the opposite conclusion from that urged by Guevara. As the United States also ex- plained in its amicus brief, if a United States court can “effectively preempt{] the ... evaluation decision” of the Peruvian government (Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1305), courts of other nations would be encouraged to “preempt the .. . evaluation decision[s]” of the United States, and order payment of rewards to claimants that the United States had determined to be unjustified. In fact, when Guevara accepted the reward offer, he also accepted the stipulation that his entitlement 20 to the reward would be decided by the SHLC in Peru. Guevara is no different from a party who signs a garden-variety contract that contains a forum selec- tion clause dictating how and where disputes under the contract will be resolved. Guevara, having accepted and participated in that process, cannot now ask a U.S. court to supplant the Peruvian tribunal whose decision Guevara agreed to respect. Second, Guevara reverses course and argues that a reward offer is not “typical” commercial activity, and should be evaluated under some unspecified new FSIA standard “requir[ing] closer scrutiny.” Pet. 21. (“This is not a typical fact pattern; this case does not involve the type of commercial activity regularly considered by the courts in determining whether an exception to the FSIA’s presumed immunity applies.”). Guevara cannot have it both ways: hav- ing persuaded the Eleventh Circuit in Guevara I that a reward offer is commercial activity potentially subject to FSIA jurisdiction, Guevara cannot in good conscience maintain in this Court that a reward offer is in some way less commercial than the activities that ordinarily fall within the exception. Indeed, if Guevara had made this concession to the Eleventh Circuit in Guevara ]—that a reward offer is not “typical” commercial activity—this case would have been over in 2006. Third and finally, Guevara argues that FBI Agent Currier’s urging to the Peruvian government to pay the reward to Guevara exposes a “yawning conceptual gap” between the FBI and the position taken by the United States in its amicus brief to the Eleventh Circuit. Pet. 22. That “gap” is illusory. The FBI later disavowed Currier’s statements as unauthorized. Even if the FBI had not disavowed 21 them, Agent Currier’s letters do not contradict the considered position taken by the United States in this litigation with regard to the application of the doctrine of international comity. Agent Currier did not and could not take a legal position on this issue on behalf of the FBI. CONCLUSION There is no law, no equity and no public policy that would justify the district court assuming jurisdiction over Guevara’s reward claim and entering judgment for Guevara. Guevara invites this Court to second- guess the decision of an organ of the Peruvian government, which is an inappropriate undertaking for a United States court. His petition should be denied. Respectfully submitted, MARK A. CYMROT Counsel of Record LEE H. SIMOWITZ AMBIKA J. BIGGS BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 861-1500 October 22, 2010 mcymrot@bakerlaw.com Counsel for Respondents APPENDIX la APPENDIX A STATUTE LAWS YEAR XIX - No. 7608 EMERGENCY DECREES EMERGENCY DECREE NO. 049-2001 ESTABLISHING A FINANCIAL REWARD IN EXCHANGE FOR ACCURATE INFORMATION LEADING TO THE LOCATION AND CAPTURE OF VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS TORRES THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC WHEREAS: The authorities of the Peruvian Judiciary, the Office of the Prosecutor General and the National Police are concentrating working on prosecuting sev- eral criminal acts committed by various officials between 1990 and 2000; Vladimiro Montesinos Torres stands out among said officials, who, during the aforementioned period held the position of Advisor in the National Intelligence System. The aforesaid person was involved in serious crimes which affect the security of the State and society overall, in accordance with the evidence which has been obtained in special proceedings and judicial inquiries which are being conducted pursuant to Laws Nos. 27378, 27379 and 27380 on organized crime; Therefore, a warrant for his arrest has been issued by several Courts as the alleged perpetrator of crimes against government administration, public corrup- tion, embezzlement, crimes against persons, aggravated murder, drug trafficking, national security and others; 2a There is a need to adopt exceptional economic and financial measures to grant a financial reward to the person or persons who provide(s) accurate informa- tion which will enable locating and capturing Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos Torres, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Emergency Decree; Said measures will contribute to deciding the criminal acts under investigation, by virtue whereof there are matters of national security which justify its immediate issuance; Exercising the authority vested under Article 118 paragraph 19) of the Peruvian Political Constitution: As approved by the Cabinet by way of a vote; and required to report to the Congress of the Republic; DECREES: Article 1-Financial Reward Establish a financial reward in the amount US $5,000,000.00 (FIVE MILLION 00/100 UNITED STATES DOLLARS),- which shall be given to the person or persons who provide(s) accurate informa- tion that will directly enable locating and capturing Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos Torres. In the event several persons provide the said information, the financial reward shall be divided among them. Article 2-Special High Level Committee Establish a Special High Level Committee in the Ministry of the Interior /Department of Homeland Security] for the purpose of evaluating information received and deciding on granting the financial reward. The Special High Level Committee shall consist of: — the Secretary of Homeland Security, who will preside — the Undersecretary of Homeland Security — the Director General of the National Police 3a — the Director General of Intelligence of the Department of Homeland Security Article 3- Accurate Information For purposes of this Emergency Decree, accurate information shall be that [information] provided through any means to the Special High Level Com- mittee and which enables locating and capturing Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos Torres, who is wanted. Article 4-Use of a Pseudonym The informant or informants may use a pseu- donym, in which case the Special High Level Committee shall provide a secret code for subsequent identification upori receipt of the information in order to grant the Financial Reward. Articie 5-Protection and Safety Measures The Special High Level Committee, in keeping with the degree of risk or danger, shall adopt the following measures for the protection and safety of the informant: a) Police protection for the informant and his family, which may include a change of residence; b) Withhold his identity and other personal infor- mation during proceedings. Article 6- Secret Information All information involving application of this Emer- gency Decree is secret. Any person who violates this provision, shall be administratively, civilly or crimi- nally liable, as the case may be, in accordance with current law. Article 7- Scope of the Financial Reward The Department of Homeland Security shall pay the Financial Reward 24 hours after the actual 4a location and capture of Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos Torres. Said reward, as well as the measures for safety and protection, shall apply to nationals and foreigners. Article 8-Government Loan The Department of the Economy and Finance is hereby authorized to obtain a Government Loan with Banco de la Nacién for up to US $5,000,000.00 (FIVE MILLION 00/100 UNITED STATES DOLLARS), ear- marked for financing the issuance of the Financial Reward which is the object of the Emergency Decree; said funds shall be deposited in an account defined by the General Directorate of the Treasury for channe- ling to the Department of Homeland Security in the same currency as the pertinent disbursement is made. The government loan shall be paid over a period of four (4) years, which includes a one-year (1) grace period and an option for early payment, in consecutive semi-annual installments, and if possible, in equal amounts, accruing interest at the LIBOR rate plus 3%. Article 9- Servicing the debt Services for pay off, interest and other expenses relating to this Government Loan shall be handled by the Department of the Economy and Finance, debited from funds provided therefore in accordance with inter-sectoral priorities and goals of the Sector in each fiscal year budget for Public Debt servicing. Article 10- Exercise of the early payment option and charged to recoveries The first funds recovered from the criminal acts object of this investigation, as set forth in the whereas clauses of this Emergency Decree, shall be ear- marked for early pay off of the debt incurred in the Government Loan authorized in Article 8, until paid 5a in full, in exercise of the stipulated early payment option. Article 11- Authorization to sign The Secretary of the Economy and Finance or his appointee are hereby empowered to sign the loan contract, and the Director General of National Debt is also empowered to sign the other government loan documents authorized in the foregoing article. Article 12- Schedule and payment The National Government Budget Administration and the Public Treasury General Directorate shall schedule and draw, respectively, payable to the Department of Homeland Security section, up to the equivalent in legal tender of the amount indicated in this Emergency Decree, charged to the Supplemen- tary Loan that shall be approved by the pertinent law and/or to the budgetary modifications on closing of Fiscal Year 2001, as stipulated in Law No. 27209, on Management of the National Budget. Article 13-Approval This Emergency Decree shall be approved by the Cabinet and the Secretaries of the Economy and Finance and Homeland Security. Issued at the Government House in Lima on the sixteenth of April two thousand one. VALENTIN PANIAGUA CORAZAO Constitutional President of the Republic JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR Cabinet Council President JAVIER SILVA RUETE Secretary, Economy and Finance 6a ANTONIO KETIN VIDAL HERRERA Secretary of Homeland Security 22266. (Translator’s note:] In the U.S., the Department of Homeland Security is equivalent to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Peru. 7a CERTIFICATE OF ACCURACY I, Esther Cecilia Crespo, an interpreter certified by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for and on behalf of Liaison Services, Inc., hereby certify that the foregoing translation, attached hereto and consisting of 2 page(s), is a true and accurate translation of the original document. /s/ Ksther Cecilia Crespo Esther Cecilia Crespo I U.S. Court Interpreter ¢ Translator ir 1:04-cv-23223-MGC Document oe 2 Entered fn rust Pie menazit! HIDAL ecién | Tuletay ad feo) Legis naa — (ro [osoce] DENOMNL OOM [wou | mn sma UL TRASOMIDO PARA TERA wow Eh MIRE UNONDOE ALGO LECTION SO Pw, (and ge RPT UNOMO WA TICAN, ome gt SNAPS VELAUOR SOs Juana BCP RICA esd 54 ODWR2 VERITON OE APA Pua i IRA OKT NDC er BRD VIDEO CAMARA PARA CORI TAT KA NOX fe MIPMI? MITPKA LOGRIORA ALS AGEHANA 110 ab P10 aes ge MER UTR EIMBICALREFRAIA VSILOOLE? Ww gy) EM WORINA CA Ac TOms wow c) ars MMOTAIWAY'O ra) RELACION DE TIPOS DE BIENES MODI ADOS REFERENTE A LA DENOMINACION pe == ——F new] comma es re ures QUA COW LOTONIOUPLICASORA Com EO:TOR INTEUIOET E. DUFUCADORA 1 joes ogia PROTECTION | MANION SISTEMA OF Paoriccion WULTIMEORA «ROTI CTON DU. N° 049-2001.- Esta- ampensacién Econdmica a (adades de] Poder Judicial. ¢! Ministe 0 y ja/Policia Nacional del Pend, se encuen- bocadas shesclarccimicniu de lus diversos ilicitos Penales cn que fabrian currido diferentes funcions- rins.catre los aifos 1990 y 2000: Que, entre gichos funcionanos desiaca la persona de Viadimiro Lenin Monicsinos Torres. que en el periodo establackie ejcrcid el cargo de Ascsor cn cl Sistema de Intefigencia Nacional: Que, Ja persona antes indicada estaria trans en graves dehtos que alectan. la seguridad del Estado y a la somedad en s\i conjunto, conforine a las evidencias | Que $¢ vienen ol¥emicndo en los procedimicnios espe- | clales ¢ investigactuncs judiciales gue se Hevan a cabo en aplicacidn de las Leyes N°s. 27378 (T.295,§154}. 27379 [T.298,§1S5] y 27380 (1.295,8156] relauvos a $s crnunalidad unganizada: Que, por tai motivo se encucnim mequisitoriado por diferentes Juzgadas, por ser presunto aulor de delitos contra 1a Administracién Publica, Corrupcidn de Tun- Gonanos, Peculado, Conira ta Vida, el Cuerpo y la Salucl, Homicidio Calificado, Homicidio Agravado, Trafico Hicito de Drogas, Contra la Seguridad y otras: Que, resulia necesano adoplar medidas excepcio- nalts en materia econdmica y financier para el otor- £amiento de una compensacion ccondmica p favor de la persona oO personas que proporcionen informacida veraz que permita 1a ubicacidn y capturm de Viodimiro Lenin Montesinos Tomes, de contormidad con el pm. 7 SNihek; cedimienio que cl presente Dex Prin era : bleee Que, dichas medidas contnhuirdn con el esc laree: mento de los slicios penales que s¢ encuentran cn investiaacron eo virtud de lo cual existen razom’s de interés nacional que: juslican su expedicidn en tania iinediata La uso de las facultades conteridas en elmerso 19) ct Ardiculo TIS® de da Constitucién Polittea del Peru {1.241,§213) Con el vulu aprobatono del Consejo de Minsstras Con cargo de dar cuenta a! Congreso de la Repo blica DECRETA Articulo 1°.- Compensacion Ecandmica Establézcase una Compensacidn Econdmica gs cendente a la suma de USS § 000 00,00 (CINCO MILLONES Y 00/100 DOLARES AMERICANOS gue seri olurgade ala persona que proporcione infur- macion veraz que pernita en forma directa la ubscacion y captura de Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos Tones Tra tindose de vanas persanas que proporcionen dicha informacion, ls commpensacidn coondmica sera distri buida entre éstas, Articuln 2°.- Comision Especial de Alto Nive! Coastituyase en el Minisiceo del Interior una Co misidn Especial de Alto Nivel con Ja finalidad ok cvaluar In mformacion recibida y decidir el otorga- mientu de ta Compensacién Economica. La Comission Especial de Alto Nivel estard conformada por: - Muinistro del latevior, quien lo presidirs - Viceministro del Interior — Director General de fu Policia Nacional ~ [ircctor General de Inteligencia dei Minisieno de Interior Articulo 3°.- Informacién Veraz. Para fos efectos del presente Deereto de Urgencia se considers informacidn veraz 1a que se propacciane por cualquier mecho ala Conusidn Especial de Alte | Nivel, y que pasihilite fa ubicacidn y captura ded re quisiionado Viadimiro Lenin Montesinos Tones Articula 4*.- Uso de Scuddnimo El informante o los infonnanies podein usar un scuddnuna, en cuyo caso 19 Comision Especial de Alto Nivel a la recepcidn de ta infonnacidn te asignard un cddigo seereto que permita su posteriur ideniificocion pam efecto del otorgamiento de la Compensacidn Eco- némica Articulo $*.- Medidas de Protecclén y Seguridad LaComisién Especial de Alto Nivel, sega cl vrado de nesgo 0 peligro, adoptard las siguientes medidas de protecerdn y seguridad de! informante: 4) Proxescidn palicial para el informante y su fame- lia, QUe purde encluir Cl cambio de resklena b) Reserwa ck su icentded y demas datos persony- les en las dihgesicias que se practiquen 1On9D 2) ANU 700! «51S y E YAY [ey ——— in EL Ser aFSATR a 59.Ceay & 1:04-cv-23223-MGC — Document 119-2 O §211 Articulo 6°. Informacion de Curdcter Secreto Voda informacion relucronaha con la apheacidi del presente Decrvto de Urgenciis Gene e} canictey de se- ered, Los que infrinjan esta disposicidn, weaned en responsabilidad adminisirativa, civil y/o penal, seguin conesponda, de confonmidad con lo establecsdo en la legistacién vigenty, Articulo 7". Aleance de la Compensaciin keu- némica El Ministerio del [nterior bard ctectiva la Compen sacién Econdmica a las 24 horas de produccion ta ubivactén y captup¥de Viadimiro Lemn Monicsinos AsACION asi como las medidas de 1dad, aleanzan anacionales y eaten: N*/- Operacion de Endeudanucnto In- f a! Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas a Qperacién de Endcudamicniv Intemo Nacidén haste porta sama de USS ‘O MILLONES Y 08100 OLA. ¥ Decreia de Urvencia. dichos recursos seran Ds crtnia Cucnia que para el efecte detemuine in General del Tesoro Publice pura su cana- diente La operacién de Endeudanuenio lntcmu seni iii celada en un plazo de cuatro (4) ais, que incluye un (1) aho de gracia, mediante cuolas semesirtics cin- culivas ¥en lo posible iguales, devenganda una tasa de interes anual de Labor mds un mareen adiciorxal de 3%, con opcion de prepago Articulo 9.- Servicio de la Deuds FI servicio de amorizacidn. iniereses y demis gay- O$ Que OCasiOne fa presenic operacidn de Enmlouds- micmto Interno serdn atendhdos por el Ministero de Economia y Finanzas, con cargo a los recursos gue ont funcidn de las peoridades intersectonales y metas del Sector le coreespondan en cada Ejecercin Presupuestal para cl sesvicto de la Deuda Publica Articula 10°. Ejercicio de li opcian de prepago con cargo a recuperactones Las primeras recuperaciones de los recursos prove- nienies de los ilicitos penales nuterial de investigacion sciialados en la parte consicterativa del presente Decre- to de Urgencia serdn destinadas a prepagar Ia douda Ceavads de la operacién de Endeudamiento Intemo cue dutoriza eb Articulo 8* hasta su cancelacidn (otal, cn gjercicid de la opcién de prepago establecida. Articulo 11° Autorizacion de Suscripcién Autoriaase al Ministro de Economia y Finanzas 0 a quien él designe, a susenbir cl contralto de présiaiao, asi como al Director General de Crédito Publico a suscribic los demas documentos de la operaciin de S16 10D 29- AR OD! ompensacidn Econdmica s gue se reborn | Entered on FLSD Docket 4p Narmag Pealey eon. - ee ee Jenceud mento lier: = U4 4/B00H Oe -pitge 8 of ¥ Canhal Toei 4472944 Taletay 4405798 — A QMOTAR RY, JALGO.COM : wry MOLINa!KdO!Oe COM e6 ewe etn Wr QM se ten rt i preescente Articula 12° Calendarizacion ¥ pape \ ad te G Dinos ten Geers Herth del PreMaytoc ster Patties | He Tesure Pubiice valendancusn ¥ DHL, PSPC CUvaMEY ata rs ded Pitca Missy fy del interiog haste por el squivaleme es money pana de) monty aque se rehere eh presale Decieyy de Vigencia, Con care al Crddio Saplsmentane qu, we apruche por ha norma legal pertnente 5/0 ct Carey a lay molcaciones pesupuenimas al crerie del Avy Fiscal 2001, denuo del marco dy to establecido en fs Ley NY 2720) [T.283,8030). Lev de Ges Pres.’ puestans del Extade Ariiculo 13.- Kefrendo El presente Decreio de rgencin retrosdad pore! Farsideate dei Consejo de Ministcus par igs , Minastios de Boonuuitay Fiawizas y del lntenior Dade er hi Casa de divcrsdrs dias del mies VALENTIN PANIAGL A CORAZAU. Pradiane Crecz as srt Corbina, or Lamas. a fos torr del afte stos oid one Nes la Kew 2 CANTER REZ OEE ULE TAK Pescge, | Cel wesc Miastes EXVIFR SW UREL EY Ltn? 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