# Opposition Brief — Dodson v. University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2431%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2011 - **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1135 ## Text ; j Sipe Coot, US, a ) FILEG Vo NOV 29 2010 No. 10-308 OFFICE OF THE CLeny 3n The Supreme Court of the Anited States PATRICIA DODSON, Petitioner, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS FOR MEDICAL SCIENCES, By and Through the University of Arkansas System, Board of Trustees, et al., Respondents On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit — —- ---—_— @ -- - BRIEF IN OPPOSITION ELIZABETH THOMAS SMITH Attorney for University Respondents UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS 2404 North University Avenue Little Rock, AR 72207-3608 (501) 686-7608 esmith@uams.edu COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 TABLE OF CONTENTS Jurisdictional Statement Constitutional And Statutory Provision: Involved ............ Statement Of The Case Statement Of The Facts A. Status Of Embryos §. Reliance On Control And Disposition Agreement .... Rights In Embryos Never Belonged To Dodson .... Upon Dissolution Of The Dodson-Lay Marriage, UAMS Continually Asserted Control And Direction Over The Eva a ee Argument. A. Dodson Has No Constitutional Right To The Embryos B. There Is No Case Or Controversy Permitting Review..... This Case Does Not Present An Im portant Unsettled Question Or Con flict Of Law.......... VI. Conclusion. APPENDIX Transcript on Motion to Dismis District Court Order TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Ace Constr. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2001) ..... Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 GE Pac skcnstsnseessctucccanautes Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S (2009) Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 2003) Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979). Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508 (2005) Carlson v. Hyundai Motor Co., 222 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2000) DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curlam) District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ............. mien | f Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Medical Sciences, 601 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2010) ........0.. passim Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (200B)............00.000s. Friends of Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Beebe, 578 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2009) General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908)..... Glic v. Ballentine, 397 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1968) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~— Continued Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB (In re Goetzman), 91 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 1996). Johnson v. Bechtel Assoc. Prof. Corp., 801 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1986)............. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) . Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001) ...16, Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895)...... North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971) (per curiam).. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) Powell v. Lane, 289 S.W.3d 440 (Ark. 2008) Prince v. Arkansas Bd. of Examiners, 380 F:. 337 (8th Cir. 2004) Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 (1923) ae passim Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 1] U.S. v. Eisner. 323 F.3d 38 (6th Cir. 1963).. 3 Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 198: eens , 1] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~ Continued STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) § 42 U.S.C 1602, et seq 1983 OTHER SOURCES U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2 U.S. Const. amend. V Sup. Ct. R. 10. Sup. Ct. R. 14(1)(e)(iv) Sup. Ct. R. 15 Fed. R. App. P. 431(d)(2) Jurisdictional Statement This Court would have jurisdiction if there wer an issue of unsettled law involving a case or contro versy. However, neither is present in the case which is offered on Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Sup. Ct R. 10 Il. Constitutional And Statutory Provisions Involved 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects citizens of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof from the deprivation of any rights, privileges, o1 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws but does not create a fundamental right in Dodson to determine the di: position of the embrvo Ill. Statement Of The Case Dodson and her former husband. Jackson O. Lay agreed that control and direction of embryos created from their tissue would be relinquished if their mar riage was dissolved. Dodson and Lay’s marriag dissolved. Dodson has attempted to obtain control and direction over the embryos by filing suits in State and Federal courts. Dodson’s complaints have been dismissed, and upheld on appeal. The embryos have since been destroyed. Dodson now requests this Court to grant Certiorari regarding her desire to obtain control of the embryos. There is no case or controversy permitting review by this Court IV. Statement Of Fact The University of Arkar for Medical Science (“UAMS”) will provide clarification regarding the tatus of the embryos and will addre three m) statements of fact presented in Dodson’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Misstatements of fact that bear on what issues properly would be before the court if Certiorari were granted are to be addressed by Re pondent Sup Ct. R. 15 A. Status Of Embryos It is true that at the district court lev agreed to maintain the status quo of the embryo pending resolution of this case lhe Current Medical Director at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences is directed to continue to maintain the frozen embryos at their current location and in their current condition and state pending the final resolution of thi htigation District Court Order App. 4 his case was finally resolved on June 9, 2010, b issuance of the mandate by the Eighth Circuit ‘Issuance of the mandate formally marks the end of appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction returns to the tribunal to which the mandate is directed for such proceedings as may be appropriat« ” Carlson Hyundai Motor Co., 22: 3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir 2000) citing Johnson v. Bechtel Assoc. Prof. Corp., 801 2d 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The mandate signaled conclusion of the proceeding UAMS maintained babtu quo until the hina resolution of this case A party may move to stay the mandate pe nding the filing of a petition for writ ol certiorar! n the pupreme Court. Kules of Appellate Procedure Rule Wild \2 Tif the mwurieved } party fails to obtain an order granting his appheation Hor tay! he hall answer for all damage ma cost which the othe party may istain by re“uson the stav. 2R USC. 8 VIO Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not operat i Lay of judgment ihe filing of a petition for certiorarl dot nol automatically Lay proceeding if the District Court which a mandate affirminy the judgment has issued, Gli Ballentine, 397 2d 590 694 (8th Cir. 1968); U.S isner ns bd Oth Cir. 1963 Without the vrantiny of a stay of our mandate aflirming the lower court dism: il there obviou iy wii no impediment | i hye | { } the lower « int dismi - ha iat iiise i] Crise f | i i lune 9, 2010, control and determination of the dispo ition of the embryos tn question re ted with UAM at that time. No re quest for stay was made to Judy Moody; no petition for stay of the mandate was fil with the United Stat supreme Court 10 Bf issued by Judge Moody or the United Stat upremeé Court. UAMS exercised its control and has d of the embryos. This case now moot, and the re Dodson reaue CANNOL De mance i B. Reliance On Control And Disposition Agreement Dodson asserts that UAMS relies solely on the control and disposition of embryos agreement as its basis for dismissal of this petition. While UAMS does rely on the agreement signed by Dodson and Lay upon creation of the embryos as one basis for denial of Dodson’s wishes, it is not the only basis. UAMS also relies upon the divorce decree issued in Hot Spring County, Arkansas which did not grant Dodson the right to control the embryos. Further, UAMS relies upon the Order by the Pulaski County Circuit Court of Arkansas dismissing Dodson’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Permanent Injunction and Temporary Injunction against UAMS, its Medical Director, and Chancellor. UAMS also relies upon the District Court’s Order dismissing Dodson’s complaint alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process, and Breach of Implied Contract requesting injunction and specific performance — requiring UAMS to discontin- ue interfering with |Dodson’s] wishes regarding the disposition of her embryos. Finally, UAMS relies upon the Eighth Circuit opinion, and the denial of Dodson’s request for en banc rehearing, and mandate uphold- ing the dismissal of Dodson’s complaint by the East- ern District of Arkansas. C. Rights In Embryos Never Belonged To Dodson Dodson alleges: “As part of the property settle- ment agreement between Dodson and Lay, any and all rights, if any, that Lay had in the frozen embryos belonged to Dodson.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari pg. 3 (emphasis added). This statement is factually inaccurate, as the rights to the frozen embryos in question never “belonged” to Dodson. The order filed in the Chancery Court of Hot Spring County, Arkan- sas between Jackson O. Lay Jr., Plaintiff, and Patri- cia Dodson, Defendant, states: * y . 2. The decree, the Property Settlement Agreement and the Control and Disposition of Embryos Statement are not inconsistent. 3. Under the terms of the Control and Dis- position of Embryos Statement, upon dissolu- tion of the marriage by court order, all control and disposition of the tissues as of January 29, 1997, was relinquished to the Medical Director of the University Hospital in Vitro Fertilization Program. 4. This court was not called upon to inter- pret the third party contract. 5. Under the terms of the Property Settle- ment Agreement the plaintiff has relin- quished his right to either consent or object to available options, if any, for disposition of the embryos as listed in the Control and Disposi- tion of Embryos Statement. (emphasis added). Pet. App. 66. The Property Settlement Agreement did not give Dodson control of or rights to the embryos. Dodson’s divorce excluded the “available options” referenced by the Hot Spring County Court. The Control and Disposition Agreement executed by Dodson and Lay set forth that control and direction for disposition of the tissues (embryos) “rests with the couple” and provided three options referenced by the divorce court. However, the Control and Disposition Agreement also stated: “I, Patricia Lay, and I, Jack- son O. Lay agree that all control and direction of our tissues will be relinquished to the Medical Director . under the following circumstances: dissolution of our marriage by Court Order....” Pet. App. 70-71. This Agreement was signed by both Dodson and Lay. ‘ Thus, the statement that the “rights . . . in the frozen embryos belonged to Dodson” is simply not true. D. Upon Dissolution Of The Dodson-Lay Marriage, UAMS Continually Asserted Control And Direction Over The Embryos Dodson’s statement: “She therefore paid the fees to UAMS for the embryos it now claims ownership of” is misleading (emphasis added). In 2000, Dodson sued UAMS for the ability to control the disposition of the embryos and Dodson’s case was dismissed with prejudice. UAMS retained the embryos in storage and mistakenly billed Dodson for such storage for a number of years. UAMS never relinquished control or ability to determine the disposition of the embryos. In fact, when the billing mistake was discovered; UAMS returned the monies paid by Dodson for storage which was mistakenly billed — no right was created by this mistake; certainly not a constitutional right. Stating that UAMS now claims ownership of the embryos indicates that UAMS did not claim owner- ship or control of the embryos before. It is clear by the many years of denial of Dodson’s requests to control these embryos, that UAMS has always maintained the pesition that control in the embryos rested with UAMS upon dissolution of the marriage between Dodson and Lay. V. Argument A Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted only for compelling reasons, including when “a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. The matter presented to this Court on Petition for Writ of Certiorari is not a compelling reason to sup- port Certiorari. A. Dodson Has No Constitutional Right To The Embryos Dodson cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protection from deprivation of rights or privileges as the “relevant provision involved.” While § 1983 protection is im- portant and essential, it protects citizens of the United States from the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. It does not create a fundamental right in Dodson to decide/determine the disposition of the embryos in question. Dodson has not cited any case that supports her position of having a fundamental, constitutiona! right to solely decide the disposition of the embryos and, in effect, force Lay to become a father. Her simplistic theories presented to the lower courts that Lay “waived” any objections to parenthood by participating in creation of the embryos, or that “issues of financial obligations can be decided later” is unsupported. Section 1983 does not confer on this Court jurisdiction to review on a Writ of Certiorari the judgment or order in question as required by United States Supreme Court Rule 14(1)(e)(iv). Further, simply restating her state court claim for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction against UAMS, it’s Medical Director, and Chancellor as a § 1983 claim in federal district court does not provide her with federal court jurisdiction. “If a litigant has raised and lost claims in state court, he may not recast those claims under § 1983 and try again. He must follow the appellate procedure through the State courts and seek review before the Supreme Court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 4138, 415-16 (1923).” Prince v. Arkansas Bd. of Examiners, 380 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 2004). B. There Is No Case Or Controversy Per- mitting Review “The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal questions only in the context of actual ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies, Art. III, § 2, and an actual controversy must exist at all stages of review, not just when the complaint is filed.” In this case, there is no longer any actual controversy between the parties about owner- ship or possession of the underlying property.” Alva- rez v. Smith, 558 U.S. __, 180 S.Ct. 576, 580 (2009). The doctrine of mootness applies when there is no longer any actual controversy regarding ownership or possession of the underlying property, there is no claim for damages, and the case does not fit within the category of cases that are “capable of repetition” while “evading review.” An abstract dispute solely about the meaning of a law falls outside the scope of the constitutional words “Cases” and “Controversies.” Id. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). “[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318-319 (1974) (per curiam). 10 Here, UAMS appropriately carried out the Eighth Circuit’s mandate and has destroyed the embryos. There is no longer a case or controversy to be decided, nor is the case capable of repetition. Thus, Certiorari should not be granted. C. This Case Does Not Present An Inm- portant Unsettled Question Or Conflict Of Law 1. Dodson argues Certiorari should ve granted because there is an “unanswered question” of what “the inextricably intertwined analysis” of Rooker- Feldman entails. Dodson states “the complexity of inextricably intertwined analysis is an issue that has given numerous courts significant difficulty.” In support of this argument she cites Burrell v. Virginia, a Fourth Circuit case, as a “prime example.” 395 F.3d 508 (2005). While the district court’s dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds was overturned, that case does not raise an issue of complexity or question regarding “inextricably intertwined.” The Burrell Court held: “the concern addressed by Rooker- Feldman — that lower courts will not act as Courts of Appeals from State courts — is simply not present and the doctrine does not bar federal court review of Rurrell’s claims.” /d. at 512. Burrell had been criminally charged with opera- tion of an uninsured motor vehicle without paying an uninsured motorist fee, and obstruction of justice. He sued in federal district court for emotional distress, emotional pain, inconvenience, mental anguish, and 1] damage to reputation alleging violation of rights including Fifth Amendment, due process commerce clause, and civil liability under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court was simply wrong in applying Rooker- Feldman to bar a civil suit which arose from a crimi- nal arrest. Burrell was not a state court loser seeking to overturn a state court judgment. In fact, the crimi- na! charges were dismissed prior to his filing suit in federal court. The Fourth Circuit had no problem determining the correct application of the doctrine. The fact that a lower court’s decision was overturned does not give rise to grant Certiorari. Additionally, Dodson cites the Eleventh Circuit in Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983), as support for her Petition. Wood is also distin- guishable from the case at bar and does not support the theory that the analysis of “inextricably inter- twined” needs definition by this Court. In Wood, it was clear the Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to raise the issue in the lower court, causing the Rooker- Feldman bar not to apply. “Interpreting Rooker to preclude a federal district court from considering an issue that the plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to raise in state court might pose due process prob- lems.” (Wood at 1547) citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810 (1947), and General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 S.Ct. 475 (1908). Dodson alleges that the Eighth Circuit Panel was conflicted in the application of the “inextricably intertwined” element of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 12 justifying the Writ of Certiorari. Dodson is mistaken. Dodson is relying on a footnote in the Opinion affirm- ing dismissal of the Dodson case. The footnote reads: It appears there is some tension in our prior precedents as to whether the Rooker- Feldman doctrine will bar a federal court from exercising jurisdiction when a state court previously ruled against the plaintiff without reaching the merits of the dispute. Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Medical Sciences, 601 F.3d 750, ___ n.5 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court points to two of their prior holdings, Friends of Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Beebe, 578 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2009) (a state court’s failure to reach the merits of an issue does not preclude federal court jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman) and Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB (In re Goetzman), 91 F.3d 1173, 1178 (8th Cir. 1996) (reaching the final merits on an issue does not deter- mine the applicability of Rooker-Feldman). Failure to reach the merits of the dispute is a different issue than whether two cases are inextrica- bly intertwined. Dodson mistakenly relies on this footnote’s reference to tension in the Court’s prior precedents, as the footnote is irrelevant to the dispute in question. The footnote that Dodson relies upon does not apply to the present case. As stated above, the footnote refers to the applicability of Rooker- Feldman in cases where the previous state court issues did not reach the merits of the case. The panel explained how the Arkansas state court reached the merits in Dodson: “this is not a case in which the 13 state court simply held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the plaintiff's case without prejudice. Rather, the state court discussed the merits of [Peti- tioner’s] case extensively and dismissed Dodson II with prejudice.” Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Medical Sciences, 601 F.3d 750, __, (8th Cir. 2010). The footnote serves as a note of clarification from the majority to indicate that the merits were reached and dismissal of Dodson II was proper. This note is not an avenue to grant a Writ of Certiorari. Moreover, this case is clearly distinguishable from Friends of Lake View. In that case, the Eighth Circuit held Rooker-Feldman did not apply because, in the state proceedings, the Arkansas Supreme Court released jurisdiction without considering the merits of the constitutional claim, although the claim was raised and fully briefed. Friends of Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Beebe, 578 F.3d 753, 759. Unlike Friends of Lake View, the Dodson II court did not simply dismiss the claims based on lack of jurisdic- tion, but extensively reviewed Dodson’s claims and the conduct of UAMS to determine whether UAMS’s conduct was ultra vires, illegal, unconstitutional, or arbitrary to reach its decision that sovereign immunity applied. Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Medical Sciences, 601 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2010). Because the court in Dodson II fully discussed and considered the merits of Dodson’s claims, the panel affirmed the lower court’s finding that Rooker-Feldman barred federal jurisdic- tion. Jd. In fact, in Dodson II the parties stipulated “the court shall determine as a matter of law whether 14 or not plaintiff has a claim, and not whether she stated a claim.” Pet. App. 42. The Eighth Circuit’s concurring opinion does not support Petitioner’s reliance on the “tension” refer- enced in footnote 5 of the panel’s majority opinion and Friends of Lake View. In fact, the concurring opinion does not address whether the merits of Dodson’s case were reached in the previous state courts, as dis- cussed in the majority’s opinion. The concurrence focuses on whether the harm to Dodson was caused by a legal conclusion rather than a state court judg- ment, not whether the previous court reached the merits of the claim. The clarification and limitations on Rooker-Feldman from Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., are discussed by Judge Melloy. He explained Dodson is clearly distinguishable from post-Exxon cases. Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Medical Sciences, 601 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2010) (Melloy, J., concurring). In Exxon, the plaintiff was not seeking to over- turn the (favorable) verdict. Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005). “The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, raised the [issue of]... subject matter jurisdiction ...” and improperly applied Rooker-Feldman to the case during an interlocutory appeal based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II). Jd. at 290. “Exxon Mobil, at that point prevailing in Delaware, was not seeking to overturn the state-court judgment. ... In both [Rooker and Feldman], the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state pro ceeding ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejec tion of that judgment. Plaintiffs in both cases called upon the District Court to overturn an injuri- ous state-court judgment.” Jd. at 291-92. Dodson also called upon the district court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment and “properly invoked concur rent jurisdiction” did not exist. To understand this further, we must analyze Dodson against Riehm v. Engelking, cited for the notion that Rooker-Feldman would not apply when an unconstitutional action was being challenged rather than the court order from which the unconstitutional actions arose. 538 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2008). Riehm involved an ex-parte order for immediate custody of David Riehm, a 17-year-old student, placing him in emergency protective care. Riehm wrote essays which raised the question of whether he might intend harm to himself or others. An ex-parte order was enforced, a psychiatric evaluation was had and Riehm was released after 72 hours. The order was not chal- lenged, nor did the order continue to cause harm to Riehm, because he had been released. Riehm sued for violations of his right to free speech, unreasonable seizure, his mother’s right to family integrity, and due process for failure to pay medical bills and state law claims. Riehm, 538 F.3d at 965. Procedurally, Dodson and Riehm differ in that Dodson was a party to the Control and Disposition Agreement which was a subject of all three suits. 16 Also, Dodson was a party to all three suits, and all three judgments essentially upheld enforcement of the control and disposition agreement. The actions of UAMS are controlled by these state court judgments, and thus, distinguishable from Riehm. The distinc- tion between Dodson and Riehm does noi support the idea that tension over Rooker-Feldman exists to necessitate Supreme Court review of this matter. Granting a Writ of Certiorari in this matter would not ease “tension,” if any, of this Court’s prior precedents or converge the majority and concurring opinions, as Dodson suggests. Therefore, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 2. The district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It is clear that the object of Petitioner’s federal lawsuit was to obtain district court “appellate” review of the rulings by the Pulaski County Chancery Court and the Hot Spring County Chancery Court. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdic- tion to hear such attempted appeals. “Ihe Rooker Feldman doctrine recognizes that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). 17 Federal district courts are prohibited not only from exercising jurisdiction over straightforward appeals from state court decisions, but also indirect attempts to undermine state court decisions, and thus are barred “from exercising jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with specific claims already adjudicated in state court.” Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492-93. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. “A general federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judg- ment ‘if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it.’” Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 493 (citing Pennzoil Co. v Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 5 (1987)). If the federal court can only provide relief by determining that the state court was wrong, “it is difficult to conceive of the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment” that is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. See also Ace Constr. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2001); Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2003); Prince v. Arkansas Bd. of Examiners, 380 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 2004). In applying Rooker-Feldman to Dodson’s Com plaint, the district court correctly found Dodson’s claims to be “inextricably intertwined with the State court proceedings. .. . |and] could succeed only upon a finding that the state courts wrongly decided the issues.” Pet. App. 31-32. During the hearing, Judge Moody ruled from the Bench stating: 1 8 “— the relief sought is essentially the same. And for me to accept this case and decide the case on the merits would potentially just effectively reverse the state court ruling in order for your client to prevail. And that’s exactly what Rooker-Feldman says _ this Court should not do. Now the other issue, even though the claims, the parties may not be exactly the same, the law also is clear that if the claims are ... inextricably intertwined, then, in other words, if they are basically the same issues just stated in a different way then I should not accept jurisdiction of that case. So, I’m going to rule that I don’t have ju- risdiction based on Rooker-Feldman.” App. 2-3. 3. All three circuit judges determined dismissal was proper; and rehearing en banc was not warrant- ed. Certiorari is not necessary in this case. At the end of the district court’s ruling from the Bench, Judge Moody stated: “although I don’t think it’s necessary to address it, I do think that there’s a serious question that all of these claims are barred by res judicata.” App. 3. The court was correct. Judge Melloy’s concur- ring opinion agreed that the dismissal of Count 1 should be affirmed but under res judicata and collat- eral estoppel. Thus, the resuit would be the same. Dodson previously litigated her claims for specific performance and knowingly failed to raise § 1983 19 claims in state court in 2000. Dodson was barred from bringing this suit by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because the district court could be affirmed “on any ground supported by the record,” dismissal was proper and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should not be granted. See Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003). Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar preventing federal courts from acting as appellate courts over state court judgments. Collateral estoppel and res judicata are doctrines of claim preclusion dealing with the legal issue of whether the claim has actually been decided either in state court or federal court, or both. The two doctrines serve similar pur- poses in that they each preclude a second “bite at the apple” but serve different functions and both can apply in one case, as in Dodson. Dodson’s claims are barred by both Rooker-Feldman and res judicata. Dismissal was proper and Certiorari should not be granted. Federal courts must “give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged. (citation omitted) ... Con- gress has directed federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding what effect to give state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006). “The purpose of res judicata is to put an end to litigation ... ” Powell v. Lane, 289 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Ark. 2008); to ensure the finality of judicial deci- sions. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). 20 Dodson’s constitutional claims, if they exist at all, could and should have been brought in the Pulaski County Chancery Court and were thus _ properly barred by res judicata as determined by Judge Melloy’s concurring opinion. Dismissal of Count | does not change by Melloy’s concurrence. Dodson has not articulated how a Writ of Certiorari is necessary in this case when all three circuit judges affirmed the district court. VI. Conclusion Dodson’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied, as it does not meet the requirements of Rule 10 of the United States Supreme Court. There is no important question of federal law that has not been settled, or that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. Further there is no case or controversy permitting review. For the above-discussed reasons, Dodson’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted, ELIZABETH THOMAS SMITH Attorney for University Respondents UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS 2404 North University Avenue Little Rock, AR 72207-3608 (501) 686-7608 esmith@uams.edu App. 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION PATRICIA DODSON, Plaintiff, Vv. No: 4:08CV03925 JMM UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS FOR MEDICAL SCIENCES, by and through the University of Arkansas System Board of Trustees; JAMES E. LINDSEY, Trustee, in his official capacity only; TIM E. HUNT, Trustee, in his official capacity only; JANE ROGERS, Trustee, in her official capacity only; CARL JOHNSON, Trustee, in his official capacity only; JOHN ED ANTHONY, Trustee, in his official capacity only; MIKE AKIN, Trustee, in his official capacity only; SAM HILBURN, Trustee, in his official capacity only; JIM VON GREMP, Trustee, in his official capacity only; JOHN TYSON, Trustee, in his official capacity only; BEN HYNEMAN, Trustee, in his official capacity only; B. ALAN SUGG, President of the University of Arkansas System, in his official capacity only; I. DODD WILSON, M.D., Chancellor, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, in his official and individual capacity; and JACKSON O. LAY, Defendants. Friday, February 27, 2009, Little Rock, Arkansas, 9:01 a.m. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES M. MOODY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE App. 2 APPEARANCES: On Behalf of the Plaintiff: MR. RICHARD “CHRIS” MADISON, Attorney at Law Madison Law Firm 3011 Corporate Center Drive Bryant, Arkansas 72022 * * + [37] just simply doesn’t have subject matter jurisdic- tion in a challenge to a state court decision. Now, I realize that your point is that the issues that you are raising here, the constitutional issues under Section 1983, are different in some way than those decisions that were presented in either the Hot Springs Chancery Court or the Pulaski County Chan- cery Court. But when I look at those cases and com- pare them with the claims that are being asserted here, even though the vehicle under which you are bringing the claim is different - I mean, it is a 1983 claim as opposed to the claims that were asserted in the state court case — the relief that was sought is essentially the same. And for me to accept this case and decide the case on the merits would potentially just effectively reverse the state court ruling in order for your client to prevail. And that’s exactly what Rooker-Feldman says that this Court should not do. Now, the other issue, even though the claims, the parties may not be exactly the same, the law also is clear that if the claims are — and this phrase is hard for me to say — inextricably intertwined, then, in App. 3 other words, if they are basically the same issues just stated in a different way, then I should not accept jurisdiction of that case. So I’m going to rule that I don’t have jurisdiction based on Rooker-Feldman. So I will be dismissing the complaint, which essentially moots your motion to amend the complaint and add [38] John Doe defen- dants. And although I don’t think it’s necessary to address it, I do think that there’s a serious question that all of these claims are barred by res judicata. That will be the ruling of the Court. Any questions about anything? We'll be in recess. MS. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 9:57 a.m.) REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/ Elaine Hinson, RMR, CRR, CCR Date: April 17, 2009. United States Court Reporter App. 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION PATRICIA DODSON, PLAINTIFF v. NO. 4:08CV03925 JMM UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS FOR MEDICAL SCIENCES, By and Through the University of Arkansas System Board of Trustees, et. al. DEFENDANTS. ORDER Pending is the Plaintiff's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (Docket # 2). Defendants have responded and state that the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (“UAMS”) is currently maintain- ing the embryos in question in a frozen state at its facility. Defendants agree to maintain the embryos in their current state and condition pending the final resolution of this case. Accordingly, the Current Medical Director at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences is directed to continue to maintain the frozen embryos at their current location and in their current condition and state pending the final resolution of this litigation. Wherefore, Plaintiffs motion for Temporary Restraining Order is denied as moot. App. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of October, 2008. s/ James M. Moody James M. Moody United States District Judge --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2431%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.