# Opposition Brief — Youngs v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2401%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2010 - **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1004 ## Text ie Se No. 10-273 | eae SPP) In The Lecmsarminounne | Supreme Court of the Anited States 4 PATRICK YOUNGS, Petitioner, » INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE, WHITE MOVING & STORAGE, INC. and PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Respondents. On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Colorado Court Of Appeals * BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS WHITE MOVING & STORAGE, INC. AND PINNACOL ASSURANCE HARVEY D. FLEWELLING PINNACOL ASSURANCE 7501 East Lowry Blvd. Denver, Colorado 80250 303-361-4977 harvey.flewelling@pinnaco)}.com Attorney for Respondents White Moving & Storage, Inc., and Pinnacol Assurance COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE Pinnacol Assurance is a political subdivision of the State of Colorado. There are no parent corpora tions or publicly held companies owning stock in Pinnaco!] Assurance White Moving & Storage, Inc., is a privately held Colorado corporation. There are no parent corporations or publicly held companies owning stock in White Moving & Storage. Inc TABLE OF CONTENTS STATEMENT OF THE CASE | REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION 6 I. The Colorado Court of Appeals Did Not Misapply This Court’s Decisions Regard ing Separation of Powers Il. Petitioner’s Right to Equal Protectio1 Was Not Violated IT] The Colorado Court ol Appeal Did Not Krr in Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Disqualification of Judge: CONCLUSION TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CCA 1D LAW Alaska Public Interest Research Group v. State 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007). 14 Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo. 1982) 16 Christie v. Coors Transportation Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997) 16 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor 478 U.S. 822 (1986) iB: Crowell i sSerLSON. 28) [ Ss Zz \ 1932) pa SLT Culver { Ace Flectruc G7] P??2d 641 (Colo 1999) hh Dee Enterprise { ICAO. 89 P3d 430 (Colo App 2004 passtm Dillard v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 134 P3d 407 (Colo ZOO) ) In re Marrtage of Klmer, 936 P.2d 617 (Colo App. 1997) 19 In re Marriavce Oo} Johnson 10 Colo App ZOU 576 P.2d 188 (1977) 19 Johnson District C'ourt H/4 P 2d 952 Colo LYR6) 19 Kentucky Commission on Human Right Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981) 14 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co... 220 U.S 61(1911) 15 Liteky v. Untted States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994 19 PABLE OF AU'THORITTI (continued Mckay Neu Hamp Aire ( mper atto Appeals Board, 732 A.2d 1025 (N.H. 1999) MGM Supply Co ICAO. 62 P3d 1001 (Colo App. 2002) 1Y Mistretta v. United Stat 1H I {641 (1989 Vevada Industrial Comm'n v. Fee 60 P Yay Ney 19 i) Vorthe J si / fre i7 ( 7 irl } if AA, thor Pipe / Sid ] ) | y() 19 86 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1993 | i / } ! j / ; ; { arbi ia \ ; fiiy j ( / ( 1 / Le 1 >} Van rditum (orp O] Al Lerice | (Lolo oD sO), Ped 14 BhY if) Wierman v. Tunnell, 120 P2d 638 (Colo. 1942 iw Williams v. White Mountain Constructions Co [rie 749 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1988 , STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case involves a claim for benefits made by Petitioner pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-40-101, et seq. (2010) (the Act). On March 29, 2005, Petitioner sus- tained a compensable injury when he tore his left bicep tendon. Petitioner underwent two surgeries; the second involved the use of a graft from Petitioner’s left leg. On May 4, 2006, Petitioner’s authorized treating physician (ATP) determined Petitioner reached maxi- mum medical improvement (MMI) from the effects of the injury. The ATP assessed an impairment rating of 5% to the left upper extremity and 5% to the left lower extremity. The ATP imposed work restrictions pursuant to a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) which found Petitioner could lift up to 30 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently (floor to waist), as well as 40 pounds occasionally and 30 pounds frequently (waist to shoulder). The FCE also stated that Petitioner may push 67 pounds combined weight with both arms, and may pull 73 pounds combined weight with both arms. On September 18, 2006, Petitioner underwent a Colorado Division of Workers’ Compensation inde- pendent medical examination (DIME) pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-107(8)(c) (2010). The DIME was administered through Med Ops Management, Inc. (Med Ops), with which the DIME physician was affiliated. Med Ops scheduled independent medical y examination appointments and made other arrange- ments such as obtaining patients’ medical records, collecting fees and providing a location for exam- inations. The DIME physician issued a report on September 27, 2006 in which she concurred with the May 4, 2006 date of MMI. She rated Petitioner’s impairment at 8% of the left upper extremity and 3% of the left lower extremity. The ATP was deposed on March 13, 2007. The ATP reviewed a list of jobs created by a vocational expert retained by Respondents. The ATP determined that Petitioner could perform ten of the jobs, and stated that Petitioner could perform work in a cate- gory that falls between sedentary and light. Respondents’ vocational expert relied on the re- strictions provided by the ATP’s deposition: lifting with both arms up to 30 pounds occasionally and 10-15 pounds frequently; no restrictions for the leg; occasional] shoulder level or above reaching with left arm; and no driving duties while working. The voca- tional expert explained that Petitioner is able to perform light to sedentary, full or part time work. On May 2, 2007, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The issues litigated included permanent total disability (PTD), whether Petitioner overcame the DIME physician’s impairment rating thus affecting a permanent partial disability (PPD) award, and whether Petitioner’s impairment is scheduled under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-107(2) (2010), or whole person under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-107(8) 3 (2010). The ALJ issued an order on July 11, 2007. The ALJ held that Petitioner is not permanently and totally disabled, Petitioner’s impairment resides on the schedule, and Petitioner did not overcome the DIME physiciar’s opinion regarding impairment rating. On May 15, 2007, accusations were made through a local news channel that claimed the owner of Med Ops modified medical reports previously prepared by physicians and used the physician’s electronic signature to “sign” the altered report. Another accusation claimed that the Med Ops owner asked physicians to change reports with the threat of withholding business if the physician would not comply. There is no evidence in the record substan- tiating these accusations. Petitioner appealed the ALJ’s July 11, 2007 order. Petitioner also filed a motion for new hearing and to strike the DIME. The ALJ issued a procedural order dated August 22, 2007 and directed that a hearing be convened regarding the motion. Petitioner was also permitted to take the deposition of the DIME physi- cian, who testified she was 90% certain that nothing of substance was changed in tiie DIME report, and that she did not think that anything substantive was altered. The hearing to consider the merits of Petitioner’s motion for new hearing and to strike the DIME was held on October 24, 2007. On January 8, 2008, the ALJ issued an order denying Petitioner’s motion. The ALJ found that Petitioner introduced no persuasive evidence that Med Ops altered, or coerced the DIME physician in altering, the DIME report. The ALJ found that the DIME was not tainted despite the allegations against Med Ops because Petitioner failed to present persuasive evidence that the DIME report was altered. Petitioner appealed the January 8, 2008 order. Petitioner’s two appeals were combined. The ALJ issued a supplemental order on May 14, 2008. App. 44-63. Crediting Respondents’ vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ held that Petitioner failed to establish that it is more likely than not that he is unable to earn any wages in the same or other em- ployment. The ALJ also found that Petitioner failed to prove that the situs of his functional impairment is beyond the right upper extremity or left lower ex- tremity. The ALJ determined that Petitioner proved he has impairment ratings of 8% of the left upper extremity and 5% of the left lower extremity. The ALJ noted that the DIME physician’s opinion was not entitled to presumptive effect. and the ATP’s opinion regarding the left lower extremity rating was more persuasive than that of the DIME physician. The ALJ ordered that Petitioner is not permanently and totally disabled, Petitioner’s impairment resides on the schedule, and Petitioner is entitled to PPD bene- fits based on the scheduled ratings. Petitioner appealed the ALJ’s supplemental! order. On October 3, 2008, the Industrial Claim ) Appeals Office of the State of Colorado (ICAO) af- firmed. App. 29-43. Petitioner sought judicial review from the Colo- rado Court of Appeals. On March 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for disqualification of judges pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 97. App. 92-112. Petitioner request- ed that judges from the judicial branch recuse them- selves from hearing his case on the alleged grounds of partiality, bias, and predisposition. Petitioner’s mo- tion was purportedly supported by an affidavit by Petitioner’s attorney Chris Forsyth. App. 98-111. On April 8, 2009, the Colorado Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion. App. 64-65. In an unpublished opinion announced on Novem- ber 19, 2009, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the ALJ and ICAO. App. 1-28. Among other things, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the Act’s provision for using AL.Js to hear workers’ compensation cases is unconstitutional. Petitioner filed a petition for re hearing. On February 18, 2010, the Colorado Court of Appeals modified its opinion and denied Petitioner’s petition for rehearing. App. 66-67. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition on May 24, 2010. App. 68. 6 REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION Petitioner has not provided any compelling reason for this Court to grant his petition for a writ of certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 10. Petitioner’s primary ar- gument appears to be that the Colorado Court of Appeals misapplied this Court’s prior decisions in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) and North- ern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) in holding that giving ALJs in the executive department jurisdiction under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-201 (2010) to hear workers’ com- pensation cases in Colorado does not violate the sepa- ration of powers provisions of either the Colorado or United States Constitutions. Petitioner’s argument is without merit and fails to justify certiorari review. Petitioner further argues that the Colorado Court of Appeals erred in concluding that § 8-43-201 does not violate constitutional equal protection require- ments because there is sufficient rational basis for using ALJs to advance the legitimate governmental goals of quick and efficient resolution of workers’ compensation claims. Whether there is a sufficient rational basis for using ALJs to hear claims under the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act is not an im- portant federal question. Petitioner fails to cite any relevant decision of this Court or any other court with which the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals is in conflict. Finally, Petitioner maintains that his attorney’s affidavit attached to his motion for disqualification of 7 judges establishes that the Colorado judicial branch is the equivalent to the membership of a “prison gang,” and that based upon alleged statements by two members of the judiciary, the entire Colorado judicial branch ts biased and thus Petitioner was denied a fair and impartial tribunal in his workers’ compensation appeal. Petitioner’s argument is based upon mere suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjec- ture, or innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions which may not form the basis of a legally sufficient motion to disqualify. Petitioner has not established any reason for granting a writ of certiorari to review the denial of his motion for disqualification. I. The Colorado Court of Appeals Did Not Misapply This Court’s Decisions Regarding Separation of Powers Petitioner contends that the separation of powers analysis of a panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Dee Enterprises v. ICAO, 89 P.3d 430 (Colo. App. 2003), which was followed by the panel of the Colora- do Court of Appeals in the instant case, is flawed in determining that federal law allows for workers’ compensation proceedings to be heard by an executive branch ALJ. Petitioner’s argument is summarized as follows: (1) Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932), determined that workers’ compensation claims in- volved private rights; (2) Northern Pipeline Construc- tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), held that suits that arose at common law regarding private rights must be heard by an Art. III judicial 8 branch judge; (3) Thus, the Colorado Court of Appeals violated the rulings of this Court by holding that the Colorado workers’ compensation system involves rights that are purely statutory, did not exist at common law, and “has many characteristics of a public rights case.” Dee Enterprises, 89 P.3d at 436- 437. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the holding of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Dee Enterprises is consistent with Art. III as well as the Court’s opinions in Crowell, Northern Pipeline, and other precedents such as Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod- ucts Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). In Crowell, supra, the Court upheld the constitu- tionality of agency adjudication of workers’ compensa- tion claims, notwithstanding its determination that workers’ compensation involves private rights. 285 U.S. at 51. Crowell determined that an administra- tive tribunal may make findings of fact and render an initial decision of legal questions as long as there is adequate judicial review. Jd. at 51-65. In order to ensure that the “essential attributes” of judicial power remained in Art. III courts, Crowell insisted upon de novo review of the agency’s determinations of “Jurisdictional fact” as well as legal determinations. Id. at 58-63. However, Crowell found Art. IIIT would be satisfied by a review of the agency’s other fact finding only upon the administrative record. /d. at 63-65; see Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agen- cies, and Article ITI, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 924 (1988). In Northern Pipeline, supra, the Court held unconstitutional the authority granted to non-Art. III 9 bankruptcy judges under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to adjudicate common law rights. Northern Pipeline stated that the Court’s precedents establish that only controversies involving private rights may be re- moved from Art. III courts and delegated to admin- istrative agencies for their determination. 458 U.S. at 70. Perhaps incongruously, Northern Pipeline re- affirmed Crowell and noted tha: therein the Court had approved the use of administrative agencies as adjuncts to Art. III courts. /d. at 77. Northern Pipeline compared the unconstitutional Bankruptcy Act with the approved administrative workers’ compensation scheme in Crowell and deter- mined that the bankruptcy courts were exercising powers far greater than those lodged in the adjuncts approved in Crowell. Id. at 78-86. The Colorado Court of Appeals in Dee Enterprises, supra, 89 P.3d at 438, made the same comparison between Colorado work- ers’ compensation provisions and the portion of the Bankruptcy Act found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline. Northern Pipeline noted that in Crowell, the agency did not possess the power to enforce any of its compensation orders, and was appealable to a district court which had sole power to enforce it or set it aside depending upon whether the agency order was in accordance with the law and supported by evidence in the record. 458 U.S. at 78. Northern Pipeline also observed that Crowell involved the adjudication of congressionally created rights. Jd. Northern Pipeline further noted the agency in Crowell “made only specialized, narrowly confined factual determinations 10 regarding a particularized area of the law” that were “statutorily channeled,” that such agency “possessed only a limited power to issue compensation orders pursuant to specialized procedures, and its orders could be enforced only by order of the district court,” and that such orders would be set aside if not sup- ported by the evidence. /d. at 85. ‘The Court decided Thomas v. Union Carbide Ag- ricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) against a backdrop of criticism regarding the plurality opinion of Northern Pipeline. See Fallon, supra, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 929. Recognizing that a strict construction of Art. III was not possible “in this area of ‘frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents,” the Thomas Court upheld as constitutional the power granted to non-Art. III arbitrators to make final decisions on compensation claims submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency, subject to review by an Art. III court only for “fraud, misrepresenta- tion, or other misconduct.” The Court stated that pursuant to its constitutional powers under Art. I, Congress “may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Art. III judiciary.” Thomas, supra, 473 U.S. at 593-594. The Court distinguished Thomas from Northern Pipeline on the basis that the right to compensation under the statutory scheme in T’homas did not re- place a right to such compensation under traditional common law. Id. at 584. The Court was persuaded 1] that the statutory scheme did not violate separation of powers because, although the dispute involved two private parties, it had many of the characteristics of a public rights case. Thomas noted that the rights asserted were purely statutory and arose from a regulatory scheme designed to promote the public purpose of safeguarding the public health. /d. at 589 The Colorado Court of Appeals in Dee Enterprises v. ICAO, 89 P.3d 430, 436 (Colo. App. 2003), deter mined that the workers’ compensation scheme at issue is similar to the regulatory scheme in 7’homas in that the rights provided by the Act are purely statutory and, contrary to the argument of Petitioner here, did not exist at common law. This also is con sistent with other states’ workers’ compensation schemes. See, e.g., McKay v. New Hampshire Com pensation Appeals Board, 732 A.2d 1025, 1029 (N.H 1999). Dee Enterprises remarked that prior to the Act, employees injured in the course of employment were required to prove negligence on the part of their employer in order to recover for injuries. Since the Act was enacted, employees may recover compensa tion from their employers for job-related injuries regardless of fault. 89 P.3d at 436. The Act also de fines both the terms of compensation to the injured employee and the procedures for arriving at the proper amount of compensation. /d. at 437. ALJs and the ICAO possess only such power as is conferred upon them by the Act, and they cannot exercise any jurisdiction, exert any powers, perform any duties, or 12 assume any authority unless the right so to do is given them by statute. /d. Dee Enterprises determined that, as in Thomas, supra, “the Colorado workers’ compensation scheme has many characteristics of a public rights case and serves the legitimate purpose of safeguarding the public health.” /d. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that granting ALJs and ICAO the task of hearing and determining workers’ compensation matters “does not diminish the likelihood of impartial decisonmaking |sic], nor does it threaten the role of the judiciary,” and that “|tlo hold otherwise would ‘defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to fur nish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task.’” Jd. (citing Thomas and quot ing Crowell) Petitioner here points out that Thomas did not overturn Crowell’s holding that workers’ compensa tion matters involved private rights. However, this is a distinction without a difference. Petitioner over looks the fact that neither Northern Pipeline nor Thomas overturned the Court’s analysis in Crowell approving administrative adjudication of workers’ compensation claims, subject to judicial review, de- spite the existence of private rights. Dee Enterprises further interpreted Thomas as not requiring de novo review of the agency findings, and review by the Colorado Court of Appeal: ol ICAO’s final orders for errors of law and abuse of discretion “is sufficient to protect the proper exercise of judicial function.” /d.; see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43 308 (2010) (listing grounds for setting aside agency orders). This interpretation ts also consistent with the observation by the Court in Northern Pipeline, supra that de novo judicial review of “jurisdictional” and “constitutional” facts has been undermined by late: cases. See 458 U.S. at 82, n. 34. The Dee enterprise court stated that this scheme “is consistent with the purpose of the Act, which 1s to avoid congestion of the courts with piecemeal litigation and to provide a method whereby claims arising out of work-related Injuries can be resolved in a just and speedy manne! RY P3d at 437 Dev Ienterprise also rejected the aryument that itis a violation of Art. III to deny parties to worker compensation proceedings the option to consent to an adjudication by an ALJ. /d. at 437-438. Petitioner here does not cite any authority to establish that such an option } required to avoid an Art. IIT violation, but merely cites a case, Commodity Futures ‘Tyadinp Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 822 (1986). in which the regulatory scheme at issue did provide uch an Op tion. Moreover, Dee Knterprises pointed out that “the Colorado Act, like the agency modei approved in Crowell and Schor, deals with only a particularized area of law, and the rights to be adjudicated in th employer-employee relation hip are of preat WN por tance to the publi health and welfare in that the 14 provide a method by which workers” compensation matters may be speedily and justly resolved” consist ently with the purpose of the Act, which is to provide quick and efficient delivery of benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation. 89 Psd 43%) see Colo Rev. Stat. § &-40-102 (2010) (stating the lepishaitive intent of the Act) Workers’ compensation is an area of law that ha been subject to administrative adjudication for a considerable period of time. Alaska Publre Interest Reesearch G;roup f State. 167 PSdd 27, be (Alaska 2007). In most jurisdictions inp the United State workers’ compensation claims are processed through administrative ayences, and such systems are almost universally held constitutional even though they utilize administrative apencies, do not provide for trials by jury, and involve only private disputes. See Plasti-Line Inc. vo. Tennessee Human Riphts Conan sion. 746 S.W.2d 691, 698 CTenn. 19BR) Kentucky Commission on Human Riphts oo Fraser, 625 S.Wo2d ROY 54-855 (Ky 1981): Nevada Industrial Comin vw. Reese, 560 PY2d 1452, doo, nm. 6 (Nev 1977) A demonstrated by Thonia: Mapra, and Miustretta ¢ United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989), the Court has more recently emphasized a “flexible understand ing. of separation of powers.” See also himiat o LTT Kederal Ilectrical International, 986 kY%d 1LIOS8, LLO9 1110 (7th Cir. 1993) Collowing Thomas and other more recent decisions of the Court regarding Art. TID) 15 Petitioner here wants a return to a rigid and unworkable system that is out of touch with the needs and practices of the modern administrative state for agencies to adjudicate private as well as public disputes. This request must be denied. II. Petitioner’s Right to Equal Protection Was Not Violated Petitioner argues that § 8-43-201, which provides executive branch ALJs with jurisdiction to hear and decide workers’ compensation matters, violates his right to equal protection. Generally, the provisions of the Act are presumed constitutional and the burden rests with the party challenging them to prove un- constitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911): Williams v. White Mountain Constructions Co., Inc., 749 P.2d 423, 4380 (Colo. 1988). Petitioner has made no such showing here to justify certiorari review. Petitioner’s equal protection rights were not vio- lated. The receipt of workers’ compensation benefits is not a fundamental right. Dillard v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 134 P.3d 407, 413 (Colo. 2006). Petitioner has not shown he is a member of a suspect classification. Accordingly. a rational basis analysis must be applied. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Culver v. Ace Electric, 971 P.2d 641, 646 (Colo. 1999). The chal- lenged provision will be allowed to stand if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmentai 16 objective and is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capri- cious. If any conceivable set of facts would lead to the conclusion that the challenged provision serves a legitimate purpose, the interpreting court must as- sume those facts exist. Christie v. Coors Transporta- tion Co., 933 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Colo. 1997). The Colorado General Assembly intended the Act to “assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reason- able cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-40-102(1) (2010). The purpose of the Act is to protect employees who sustain injuries arising from employment. Vanadium Corp. of America v. Sargent, 134 Colo. 555, 562, 307 P.2d 454, 459 (1957). This purpose is effectuated by providing a reliable source of income without the need of proving fault and providing a framework within which claims are speedily resolved. Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645, 647 (Colo. 1982). The administrative law struc- ture allows for the speedy resolution of workers’ compensation claims without the necessity of proving fault. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the Aci and its use of ALJs exist for many more reasons than merely “administrative convenience.” Petitioner questions the conclusion of the Colo- rado Court of Appeals below that using ALJs to hear workers’ compensation claims advances the Act’s goals of quick and efficient claims resolution. Peti- tioner asserts that because the Act includes in its appellate procedures the . ‘extra step” of review by the ICAO, the Colorado workers’ compensation scheme “takes longer than other actions.” Petitioner provides no evidentiary or legal support for this assertion. Petitioner also overlooks the expedient timelines and other streamlined processes that pervade the Act. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-207(1)(e) (2010) (limiting discovery); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-209 (2010) (hearings shall commence within 100 days after the hearing is set, and only one extension of time of 60 days te commence the hearing is permitted); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-215 (2010) (ALJ has 15 working days after the conclusion of a hearing to issue a written order); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-301 (2010) (a petition to review must be filed within 20 days of the mailing of an order, briefs must be filed within 20 days, ALJ has 30 days after briefs to issue supplemental order, ICAO has 60 days after receipt of record to issue order); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-302 (2010) (ALJ has 30 days from entry of an order to issue a corrected order); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-3809 (2010) (Colorado Court of Appeals directed to hear appeal within 30 days); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-313 (2010) (Colorado Supreme Court directed to advance workers’ compen- sation cases on its calendar and render final decision within 60 days). Moreover, unlike Art. III judges, ALJs are presumed to possess special expertise and competence in dealing with the medical evidence that is a ubiquitous part of workers’ compensation cases. See Wierman v. Tunnell, 120 P.2d 638, 640 (Colo. 1942). Because Petitioner has not shown beyond a rea- sonable doubt that the current adjudicative provisions 18 of the Act fail to serve the legitimate purposes of the Act, his equal protection argument is without merit. Petitioner has advanced no legitimate argument to support the disturbance of the well-established law. He has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that § 8-43-201, which provides ALJs exclusive jurisdictien to hear and decide entitlement to workers’ compensa- tion benefits, is unconstitutional. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the existence of any important federal questions or meaningful conflict in appellate opin- ions. Thus, certiorari review is unwarranted. Ili. The Colorado Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Disqual- ification of Judges Petitioner asserts that the Colorado Court of Appeals below has an “appearance of impropriety” and erred in rejecting the facts alleged by Petitioner's attorney's affidavit in support of the motion for disqualification of judges. Petitioner has attempted to relate purported “partiality, bias and predisposi- tion” of the entire “judicial branch” specifically to Chief Justice Mullarkey of the Colorado Supreme Court and Chief Judge Davidson of the Colorado Court of Appeals. Contrary to Petitioner’s motion, the affidavit of Chris Forsyth does not demonstrate that Chief Justice Mullarkey and Chief Judge Davidson “have acted with particular malice toward the issue of workers’ compensation judges being in the judicial branch.” Nothing ‘in the affidavit of Chris Forsyth states facts, even if true, from which 19 it may reasonably be inferred that they have bias or prejudice that will prevent them from dealing fairly with Petitioner. The “facts” set forth in affidavit are legally insufficient because they are based on mere suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, con- jecture, or innuendo, and are statements of mere conclusions of the pleader which may not form the basis of a legally sufficient motion to disqualify. See Johnson v. District Court, 674 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. 1986). Regarding Chief Justice Mullarkey, Mr. Forsyth merely recites hearsay of purported statements she made and the fact that she participated in the denial of certiorari in MGM Supply Co. v. ICAO, 62 P.3d 1001 (Colo. App. 2002), in which Mr. Forsyth was an attorney for the unsuccessful petitioners. Regarding Chief Judge Davidson, Mr. Forsyth cites her opinion in Dee Enterprises, supra, in which Mr. Forsyth again was an attorney for the unsuccessful petitioners. Affidavits that contain only opinions and hearsay statements do not establish any bias or prejudice. See In re Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 619-620 (Colo. App. 1997). Adverse rulings alone do not constitute evidence of prejudice or bias warranting disqualifica- tion of a judge. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); Jn re Marriage of Johnson, 40 Colo. App. 250, 252, 576 P.2d 188, 190 (1977). Petitioner failed to establish any basis for dis- qualification of judges, or any important question of federal law. Petitioner has not established any reason 20 to warrant certiorari review of the denial of his motion for disqualification. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny the Petition. Respectfully submitted, HARVEY D. FLEWELLING PINNACOL ASSURANCE 7501 East Lowry Blvd. Denver, Colorado 80230 303-361-4977 harvey.flewelling@pinnacol.com Attorney for Respondents White Moving & Storage, Inc., and Pinnacol Assurance --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2401%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.