# Opposition Brief — Andrews v. Howard

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1044

## Text

Supreme Coun. US.
FILED

$3 OCT 15 2010

No. 10-58 OFFICE OP THE CLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

MARK EDW. ANDREWS,

IY DOLICTLAS HOWART TR

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JOANNE P. RINARDO

Counsel of Record for Respondent
NANCY J. MARSHALL

On Brief
DEUTSCH, KERRIGAN & STILES, L.L.P
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: (5C4) 581-5141
Pacsimie: (004) 566-1201
jrinardo@dkslaw.com

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Can petitioner avoid fee shifting on remand
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), by declaring that an
issue which the U.S. Supreme Court has ad-
dressed constitutes the “absence of clearly estab-
lished law, demonstrating a lack of reasonable
basis or clearly established law”?

Can petitioner claim that a lodestar analysis of
fee shifting has been bypassed when both the dis-
trict court and appellate court were bricfed on
the issue, and the lodestar analysis was applied?
Can petitioner re-litigate the validity of the

Order of Remand through continual appeals and
a request for rehearing on the issue of the attor

ney’s fees and costs awarded against him by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....... il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........... ill
STATEMENT OF THE CAGE......... l
BACKGROUND ......... ces caeets I
l. Relevant Facts.................. 2
If. Procedural History ........... | 3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION 5

6

~~

l. Existing case law established that removal
was not possible as an officer of the court or
through the need for a federal defender ......

2. Petitioner’s clients stated no federal ques:
Rp ISO RN eat Ae DOR Ee OSPR EE Peet Hes SRE aya

3. Award of fees supported petitioner’s
contentions that the lodestar analyses for
fee shifting was bypassed is patently un
CWI cuccvisses beVGAs UE SAUAAS AAD ASESEeS cu CadsRdSGREESAE SED CO IRA SKA

4. Petitioner is attempting an end around
appeal of the district court’s remand order...

CONCLUSION ..
APPENDIX
District Court Transcript of June 24, 2009 ........ App.

District Court Order of June 20, 2009..

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956) f
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) {

Hensley U. Kckerthart, 461 U.S. 424. 103 S.Ct
1933 (1983)....

Jefferson County, Ala. l Ar k er. SZ / [ J >. ee

199 S.Ct. 2069 (1999)
Johnson v. Georgta Highu a’ Iuxp , ine., 488

F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969)...... 12. ]
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 6383

126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L. Ed. 2d 92 (2006) 14
Louisiana Power & Light Company

Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1995). cert
dented sub nom., 516 U.S. 862. 116 S.Ct. 173
(1995) Dy Ava Ce MT 7 ae oa. 1]

Matter of Fender, 12 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. dented sub nom., 511 U.S. 11438, 114

S.Ct. 2165, 128 L. Ed. 2d 888 (1994)
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servic Inc.,

_._ Us. 7 S.Ct. 2411. 168 L. Kad. 2a

b> Tk 1 1 gd RRR tecepeintooe ROP Ren Men nmr. SF 14
St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261 (5th Cir

SETS Fw ccvicuccexe cone , oe ay 1O
United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742. 66 S.Ct

835, 90 L. Ed. 982 (1946)..... a 14

Willingham i Morgan 39D [ Ss 40Z 1969)

LABLE OF

{ 144]
( 1442
( 1442
\ 144,
( 147/

AT
+ |

THORITIES

c
(Continued

Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BACKGROUND

This case first began in First City Court for the
City of New Orleans. Respondent, D. Douglas How
ard, Jr. (“Howard”) had filed a suit on an open ac
count against a former divorce client defendant,
Leslie Simmons St. Germain (“St. Germain”), seeking
recovery for payment of unpaid fees. Howard won and
collected the fees due. Petitioner, Mark Andrews
(“Andrews”), then sued respondent Howard on behalt
of St. Germain in the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, alleging, inter alia, that Howard
had committed legal malpractice and breach of con
tract. Petitioner requested that Howard join in a
voluntary Motion to Dismiss the legal malpractice
claims without prejudice which respondent lloward

did, believing that the matter had been put to rest

Respondent Howard was wrong. Petitioner then
filed on behalf of his client, St. Germain, and two
former clients of respondent, a RICO action in the
Federal Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that
respondent had committed various RICO violations,
including mail fraud and wire fraud. Additionally,
petitioner, on behalf of his clients, reurged all the
claims that St. Germain had voluntarily dismissed in
the State Civil District Court. Finding that the de
fendants RICO allegations were meritless, the Feder
al Eastern District Court dismissed the case

Respondent appealed the dismissal to the United
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but it affirmed

Lne aism! al and judyvyment wa entered accordingly

Petitioner filed writ t thy (Court. which were de

he pondent Howard filed a Petition for Defama
LIOoOn IN tate district court partly on pround of lodg
ing ol the anpove RICO action which falsely alleged

Lhat he had committed wire and mall fraud Petition

r, on behalf of his chent removed the defamation
iction to the Eastern District of Lousiana even
though he had no valid ground LO remove Lne Late
laim liowever, the Kastern District Court ren ind
1 the matter ind iwarded ittorney Tee tO! Q
frivolous remov: Petitioner appealed the award of

iLtorne y ree LO the ifth Circuit Clo lrt Ol Appeal!

Vhich affirmed the award ind awarded double cost

ind attorney jee for the frivolou appeal of the
ittorney lee aw rq Pet LIOQNG@I!I ournti anh (lil can
ehearing whic W a dente i Petitioner now“ eek
f ley ol the i i! | ‘ { { }
} r {

I RELEVANT FACTS

Petitioner represented forme: f Howare
in attorney known within the local con munity a fi
premiere divorce attorneyv who agrpre ively protect:
the interest Ol bLnose ( ent hioward repre ented
Hillary Hillyer (“Hillyer i! (OO D-ZvU0t Leshe St

tt binllye ‘

Pitot

KID

; ,

s
‘

Al

HISTOR

rationale of the district court’s decision to remand
and the Fifth Circuit’s affirmation of that remand.’

e ee

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

e Controlling case law existed at the time
of the removal, which established that a
private attorney could not remove a case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442;

e There is no constitutional question
raised by the petitioner’s prior state
claims, nor did prior RICO legislation
raise a federal question;

¢ The district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in taxing of costs and awarding
attorney's fees when no objectively rea-
sonable basis for removal existed. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
sanctioned Andrews for a frivolous ap-
peal of the district court’s award;

¢ The lodestar standard was applied in
awarding attorney’s fees; and

° Petitioner’s continued appeals are an at-
tempt to circumvent the purpose of 28
U.S.C. § 1442.

Petitioner has not sought certiorari: on behalf of his
clients, but only on his own behalf. If this Court were to grant
the wnt, petitioner’s clients would still be responsible for th:

costs and attorney’s fees since they are not parties to the writ

6

1. Existing case law established that re-
moval was not possible as an officer of
the court or through the need for a
federal defender.

To qualify for removal under 28 U.S.C.
8 1442(a)(3), the defendant must show both that the
suit is based on actions taken under the color of office
and that the officer of the federal court has a colora-
ble federal defense. Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker,
527 U.S. 423, 199 S.Ct. 2069 (1999). The district
court, having found that Andrews was not an officer
of the court for purposes of removal, could have
stopped its inquiry there.

Instead, the federal district court asked Andrews
to identify defendants’ purported colorable federal
defenses, which could include official immunity,
sovereign immunity, governmental tax immunity
doctrine, the government contractor defense, acting
within the course and scope of federal duties, and/or
that state law claims could impede enforcement of a
federal law. Andrews asserted the “federal contractors
defense,” 2.e., that he was under federal direction
when he filed his original brief. This new approach
prompted the following dialogue between Andrews
and the federal district court:

The Court: So I was directing you to do
what you did in this Court, to
file what you filed? Are you
saying I was the federal of-
ficer who was directing you to
do what you did?

Mr. Andrews: You didn’t direct me to file the
case, Your Honor.

The Court: Well, name the federal officer
who was directing you.

Mr. Andrews: The entire court was.

This interchange underscores the absurdity of
the argument and supports the district court’s award
of attorney’s fees as well as the sanctions awarded by
the Fifth Circuit. (Transcript, pg. 16, App. 16).

2. Petitioner’s clients stated no federal
question.

Petitioner also averred that the petition was
removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which allows a
defendant to remove a claim over which the federal
court has original jurisdiction arising under the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.
The test for original jurisdiction is whether the
federal court would have had jurisdiction over the
claims filed in the Petition being removed if it had
been filed in federal court. The Petition and the
Amending Petition asserted state law claims of
defamation, abuse of process, malicious persecution,
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Petitioner’s two former and present clients
asserted state law claims of malpractice and breach of
contract, in their reconventional demand. None of

these claims raise a federal question.

Nonetheless, petitioner argued that a_ federal
question was created because respondent Howard’s
Exception of Prescription, filed in state court, argued
that defendants’ reconventional claims were time
barred, where those claims had originally been dis-
missed without prejudice by the federal district court.

Again, petitioner was unable to cite any statutory or

jurisprudential law to support his argument.

Petitioner unsuccessfully argued that there was
“at least an informal recognition that the new re-
moved action had some kind of relation to the former
federal case, and that petitioner was not unreasona-
ble in thinking that such a relationship existed”
because the district court mentioned the prior RICO
suit. Petitioner failed to mention that the discussion
was in the context of the district court chastising him
for filing a motion to remove that was as baseless as

the RICO case which had been dismissed:

And it’s already been decided, in this Court
and the Fifth Circuit, that the underlying
RICO case was legally untenable.

(Transcript, pg. 22, App. 22)

Tne federal district court’s observation that both
the suit and motion were baseless hardly creates a
federal question or any other grounds for removal.
The federal district court held that “there are no
federal causes of action or claims pled in the state
court lawsuit to make it removable under the federal

question jurisdiction.”

Clearly the district court wanted to send a mes-
sage to Andrews when it awarded attorney’s fees and

costs. In the hearing, the district court noted:

It is true that both this Court and the Fifth
Circuit denied the defendant’s, Mr. Howard,
in that case, the defendant’s motion for sanc-
tions. I don’t recall exactly what was said
about that at the time, frankly, but I think I
made a ruling for the bench, as I recall. But
I'm not a big fan of sanctioning lawyers, and
Ym assuming i just gave Mr. Andrews the
benefit of the doubt by not sanctioning him;
although it was certainly plausibie that he
coula have been sanctioned, I think, for filing
the RICO suit, which was totally baseless, as
far as I am concerned.

The Fifth Circuit, as I recall, also, in denying
the sanctions, made the comment that it was
a very close call, which means they could
have gone either way.

Mr. Andrews, before you file anymore, you
now, you filed a RICO claim in this Court,
that was totally baseless; now. you’ve filed a
removal, which was totally baseless. I am
imposing fees and costs this time. This has
got to stop. And I strongly suggest you do a
lot more research before you start filing
things in federal court again.

(Transcript pg. 25, App. 25). Thus, under the facts
and in light of defendants’ failure to legally support

the removal, the award was appropriate.

10

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court as follows:

We recently considered a similar request by
Appellee in litigation involving these parties
in St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261,
264 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Howard I”). In Howard
J, we dismissed the Appellant’s appeal con-
cerning their RICO suit brought against Ap-
pellee and two law firms with which he is
affiliated without imposing sanctions. See id.
at 264. However, we noted that it was a
“close case” on our decision to deny sanction
because the Appellants did not clearly pre-
sent a cognizable civil RICO claim. /d. Here,
we impose sanctions of double costs and at-
torney’s fees against Appellant. Supreme
Court cases exclude a private attorney from
the meaning of “officer of the court,” and the
district court found Appellant’s “officer of
the court” argument to be a_ ridiculous,
“farfetched notion.” Appellants were on no-
tice that the overruling of objections to re-
mand was an obvious result when they were
unable to support their argument at the dis-
trict court. This appeal is frivolous for pur-
poses of Rule 38.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court and
GRANT the motion for sanctions and double
costs and attorney's fees.

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion confirmed that a

constitutional question was not raised by petitioner’s

11

state claims and that petitioner’s prior RICO legisla-
tion did not raise a federai question. Petitioner’s
burden of the additional $5,867.00 imposed by the
Fifth Circuit pales when compared to the defense
costs of over $130,000 that petitioner imposed upon
respondent with his never-ending baseless pleadings
filed in city court, civil district court, state appellate
court, federal district court, federal appellate court,
the U.S. Supreme Court, and the state disciplinary
counsel. The writ of certiorari applied for should be
denied so that the sanctions awarded by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals are upheld.

3. Award of fees supported —- petitioner’s
contentions that the lodestar analyses
for fee shifting was bypassed is pa-
tently untrue.

Petitioner poses the question, “May lodestar
analysis of fees shifting be bypassed?” it was not.
Federal law allows that “la]n order remanding the
case may require payment of just costs and any
actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as
a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In the
Fifth Circuit, the “lodestar” method is used to calcu-
late reasonable attorney’s fees. Matter of Fender, 12
F.3d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.,
511 U.S. 1148, 114 S.Ct. 2165, 128 L. Ed. 2d 888
(1994). Under the “lodestar” analysis, the determtina-
tion of reasonable attorney’s fees involves a two-step

procedure. Loutstana Power & Light Company ov.
Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied

12
sub nom., 516 U.S. 862, 116 S.Ct. 173 (1995), citing
Hensley v. Eckerthart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct.
1933, 1939 (1983). Initially, the district court must
determine the reasonable number of hours expended
on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for
the participating lawyers. /d. Then, the district court
must multiply the reasonable hours by the reasonable
hourly rates. Jd. The product of this multiplication is
the lodestar, which the district court then either
accepts or adjusts upward or downward, depending
on the circumstances of the case, assessing the dozen
factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp.,
Inc., 488 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).

In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit identified twelve
factors to be considered in determining an award of
reasonable fees, which are applied “whenever the
award of reasonable attorney’s fees is authorized by
statute.” Here, the district court applied these factors
when awarding the attorney’s fees. Petitioner did not
even object to the hourly rate awarded Ms. Rinardo,
but nitpicked at such things as whether 3.8 hours for
researching petitioner’s arguments was too much.

The district court’s order makes it clear that the
lodestar method was applied when it awarded
$7,088.00. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that award and
sanctioned Andrews and his clients for a frivolous
appeal. (App. 28).

When Howard filed a Motion and Memorandum
for Attorney’s Fees in the Fifth Circuit, the court
applied the lodestar method with detailed discussions
of the number of hours expended on the litigation

13

and the reasonable hours for the participating attor-
neys, as well as the twelve factors enumerated in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714, 717-718 (5th Cir. 1974). Andrews claim that the
lodestar was bypassed has no merit and is factually
incorrect.

4. Petitioner is attempting an end around
appeal of the district court’s remand
order.

Although Petitioner has not styled this action as
an appeal of the district court’s remand order and the
Fifth Circuit’s affirmation thereof and sanctions, it is
respectfully suggested that he is, nonetheless, at-
tempting to put the appropriateness of the remand
order at issue before this Honorable Court. While the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
correctly noted in its opinion of March 5, 2010, that
appellants had not sought review of the remand
decision, it appears that Petitioner is now contesting
the district court’s remand order through this writ of

certiorarl.

The remand order is non-appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1447, which provides, in pertinent part that:

(d) An order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed
is not reviewable on appeal or other-
wise, except that an order remanding a
case to the State court from which it
was removed pursuant to section 1443

14

of this title shall be reviewable by ap-
peal or otherwise.

The bar against appeal of a remand order applies to
remand orders made on grounds authorized in 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c), t.e., lack of subject matter juris-
diction and a defect in the removal process. Powerex
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., U.S. ;
127 S.Ct. 2411, 2415, 168 L. Ed. 2d 112 (2007).

Referring to the 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bar to the
review of remand orders, this Court has noted that:
“the policy of Congress opposes ‘interruption of the
litigation of the merits of a removed cause by pro-
longed litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the
district court to which the cause is removed.”

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 126
S.Ct. 2145, 2152, 165 L. Ed. 2d 92 (2006), citing
United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 66 S.Ct. 835, 90
L. Ed. 982 (1946). In Rice, the Supreme Court ruled
that:

Congress, by the adoption of these pro-
visions, as thus construed, established
the policy of not permitting interrupt-
ing of the litigation of the merits of a
removed cause by prolonged litigation
of questions of jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court to which the cause is re-
moved. This was accomplished by
denying any form of review of an order
of remand, and, before final judgment,
of an order denying remand.

Petitioner’s application for a writ of certiorari
attempts just what the statute forbid: “the inter
ruption of litigation of the merits of a removed cause
by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction
For this reason, the sanctions award should be up

held, and the writ of certiorari should be denied

*

CONCLUSION

The district court not only remanded this matter
to state court, but exercised its discretion and award
ed Howard all attorney’s fees incurred in remanding
the suit. The award was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which then awarded attorney’s fee
and double costs for a frivolous appeal. The award
was appropriate because petitioner was unable to cite
any legal support for the removal. Instead, petitioner
proferred theories for removal that were deemed “far
fetched” and a “crazy notion” by the lower court. The
sanctions incurred are well-documented and reason

able. The requested writ of certiorari should be denied
Respectfully submitted

JOANNE P. RINARDO
NANCY J. MARSHALI
On Brief
DEUTSCH, KERRIGAN & STILI LJ
755 Magazine Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 7O1L3O
Telephone: (504) 581-5141]
Facsimile: (504) 566-1201]
Counsel of Feecord for Responde ni

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
HASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

D. DOUGLAS HOWARD, JR
V

LESLEY SUMMONS ST. GER LOUISIANA
MAIN, LILLLARY ROSE SMITH WEDNESDAY

09-3450 “J

NEW ORLEANS

MELISSA BRANIGHAN, MARK JUNE 24, 2009

KDW. ANDREWS, ANDREWS 9-30 AM
ARTS & SCIENCES LAW, LLC, 4
DAVID EF. SIMMONS, DDS

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING
HEARD BEFORE
THik HONORABLE CARL J. BAKRBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES

FOR THE PLAINTIFI
HOWARD & REED
BY: SHAWN ©. REED, ESQUIK!
AMY YENARI, ESQUIRE
16N. COLUMBIA STREET
COVINGTON, LA 70433

HOWARD & REED
BY: D. DOUGLAS HOWARD, JR., kSG
JONATIIAN PETERS, ESQUIRE
9ST. CHARLES AVENU!
SUITE 306
KEW ORLEA

CIVLL DOCKET N

(

}

RR THE DEFENDAN'I
ANDREWS ARTS & SCIENCES LAW, LILA
BY: MARK EDW. ANDREWS, ESQUTRI
7104 COLISEUM STREE'
NEW ORLEANS LA 7011

Reihit COUNTER DEFIENDAN'
DKMUTSCH, KERRIGAN & [1] LI
BY: JOANNE RINARDO, KSQUIRI
5H MAGAZINE S']
NEW ORLEANS LA 70]
FRIC] COURT REPORTER

CATHY PEPPER, CRR, RMR, CC!

00 POYDRAS STREET, ROOM |
W ORLEANS L.A 701

104) 589-7779

PHROCKEDING,

so here we are, again

Frankly, Judge, this is a case that involves purely
state court causes of action. In the 7revino case, as
this Court is aware, the Supreme Court said that you
can avoid federal court by the plaintiff only using

relying on state court causes of action

Well, as you know, this saga began in First City
Court for the collection of a debt. It has escalated
this point now, and it’s an ongoing attack on the
personal and professional reputation and integrity of

]

Mr. Howard. One would think that this would have

‘ :
( nded at some point, bu

THE COURT What’s the status of the

MS. REED: Open account

THE COURT by Mr. Howard against Ms

ie \ + > + a ry } .s \
St. Germain and [5] somebody else

MS. REED [hat’s correct. That’s correct

THE COURT for some legal work he «

nnection with a divorce, right’

MS. REED That's COrreci

THE COURT What were the amount of the

legal fees involved?

MS. REED: About $4,000.

THE COURT: $4,000. And now we've had
two federal lawsuits, two state court suits, RICO
suits, defamation suits, appeals to the Fifth Circuit,
writs to the U.S. Supreme Court

MS. REED: Yep.

THE COURT: over a suit for attorney’s
fees over three or $4,000.

MS. REED: And I would tell you, Judge,
that

THE COURT: ITIl tell both sides here, this
is absurd. Both of you, both sides need to grow
up here and make this go away. I mean, this is abso-
lutely mdiculous. Okay.

You can proceed from there

MS. REED: Judge, and I want to —I want
to make this clear that I think it was Mr. Howards
intention to make —

THE COURT: Mr. Howard has now collect-

ed his fees, right?
MR. HOWARD: Yes.

MS. REED: Yes. But we have paid over
$100,000 in fees [6] to defend the suits brought by
Mr. Andrews. In addition to that, Your Honor,
Mr. Andrews doesn’t stop. He’s now posted this in

formation on his web site about Mr. Howard. He's

App. 6

written the bar association on numerous occasions.

which cases have been dismissed.

If Mr. Andrews would stop the continuous on-
going attacks, then perhaps we could end this matter;
but, it’s impossible to do that.

So, with that said, Your Honor, the reason I got
involved in this case, and I']l tell you, is because I felt
like maybe I could interject some levity and calm
between the parties. And the very first thing I do is
get a motion for sanctions filed against me. I’ve never
met this man before in my life before this morning,
and | still haven’t formally met him. So I agree with
you that this is a very difficult case. But I will tell you

THE COURT: I didn't say it was a very

difficult case.
MS. REED Well. it’s absurd.

THE COURT: You said. I said it’s absurd. is
what I said. Yes.

MS. REED: But it’s on ongoing character
assassination that hasn’t stopped. If you go to his web
site today, you'll find all of this information, that
Mr. Howard has basically stolen from chents, his

malpractice, his — on and on and on and on.

}

i

‘

} So, with that said, in an effort to try to stop

this, the plaintiffs filed a suit on state court causes

of action solely, Your Honor. And these state court

App. 7

causes of action are defamation, malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. There were absolutely
no federal claims whatsoever urged in this case.

There is no federal question. I think this Court
previously dismissed the RICO actions; and, so, from
that, the defense now wants to argue that that

THE COURT: Which was affirmed by the
Fifth Circuit, right?

MS. REED: Which was absolutely affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Andrews says he’s
got a pending writ application to the U.S. Supreme

Court?

MS. REED: Yes, sir, but that’s really irrele
vant to this case, and [ll tell you why. It’s because in
this very lawsuit, Mr. Andrews filed a reconventional
demand, where he realleged all of the same things.
So, regardless of what happens with the RICO suit,
Mr. Howard still has the same exact state court
claims because it didn’t just end or begin with the
RICO. It’s an ongoing. It’s everywhere. It’s the bar

association. It’s in the community. It’s on his web site.
So, really, what happens with the U.S. writ is not
going to change what’s ongoing in state court for

defamation and [8] malicious prosecution and his

ongoing intentional infliction of emotional distress.

App. 8

Judge, this is a case that, although RICO claims
were made, those are just a small minutia of the facts
that make up this state court claim. And to say that
this Court’s dismissal of the RICO action, and the
Fifth Circuit approving that, somehow turns a defa-
mation suit into a federal question is also ludicrous,
Your Honor. There is no — the very fact that this
Court dismissed the RICO case, the Fifth Circuit
approved the dismissal, if anything, supports the fact
that there is no federal jurisdiction or federal ques-
tion in this case.

No new — in the original petition, all of the same
set of facts were contained in the original petition
that was filed in Civil District Court. The supple-
mental and amending petition filed by Mr. Howard
really just recited more specifically the various causes
of action. So our first argument is, his whole removal
was untimely because —

THE COURT: What defenses, other than
trying to remove — removing this case here, removing
Mr. Howard’s defamation and malicious prosecution,
et cetera, state court suit, what defenses, affirmative
defenses, has Mr. Andrews or his clients asserted
here in this case?

MS. REED: Well, I think that that’s a very
important question because, under his argument that
he is an officer of the court, not only would he have to
be an officer of the court, [9] which we say he’s not
and we'll get into that, the second part of that test by
the Supreme Court is that he would have to have a

App. 9

federal defense in order to maintain jurisdiction
under 22 1442 — 28 U.S.C. 1442. The only defenses
that he’s alleged in this case, res judicata, prema-
turity, and prescription.

THE COURT: Res judicata based on —
MS. REED: On the fact that —
THE COURT: —- the fact that 1 did not

sanction him, and the Fifth Circuit did not sanction

him’?
MS. REED: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KEED: And so, therefore but, Your
Honor, all of those claims are still state court, state
court claims. The prescription would apply state court
law of prescription and tolling or peremption. Res
judicata would also apply in state court, what the
state court res judicata laws would be. Prematurity
are state court prematurity. And this Court would
really just be applying state court defenses to a state
court cleiin.

Under 1441 — let’s look ~— that’s another thing
that he argues. Well, would it have been proper to file
this suit in federal court to begin with? And the
answer is absolutely not. There is no diversity be-
tween the parties. There is no federal claim here. The
amount in controversy is over $75,000. The legal fees
alone are over $100,000, and that’s [10] an actuai

App. 10

damage. So there is no way that this suit could have
been filed as original jurisdiction in federal court.

Then, Mr. Andrews attempts to say that, well,
he’s an officer of the court; and, now, in his reply
brief, he says, well, that’s novel law. That’s not novel
law. There is plenty of law to the effect that just
because we're licensed to practice before a federal
court doesn’t make us a federal officer of the law or
officer of the court.

There’s several cases that we cited, one very
similar to this where Mr. Berg successfully defended
himself in federal court under a malicious — it was a
racketeering case, then filed a malicious prosecution
action. The defense tried to remove it to federal court
by saying, well, that case arose in federal court, it
was about a racketeering charge; and, so, therefore,

the malicious prosecution involves a federal question.

The Ninth Circuit sent it back and said, abso-
lutely not. That’s a state court issue. It needs to go
back to state court. Just by the very fact that you
would have to look at some federal issues involved
does not change it into a federal question case that
would be removable.

Same in the Cammer case. A defendant was held
by its local bar association — he was in private prac-
tice, he was also held on disciplinary charges — that
was the Shimek case. He came up on disciplinary —

THE COURT: Carnmer was the case where
the lawyer —

App. 11

[11} MS. REED: In contempt.
THE COURT: in federal court was held in

contempt —
MS. REED: Right.

THE COURT: under a statute which
allows a federal judge to find in contempt an officer of
the United States for violation of their official duties.

MS. REED: You're exactly right.
THE COURT: Yes.

MS. REED: And in Shimek, this attorney
that had — because of what he did in federal court, the
state filed disciplinary action against him. He sought
to remove his disciplinary proceeding to federal court
saying, well, this started in federal court. And they

said, no. They sent it back.

The U.S. Supreme Court — citing the U.S. Su-
preme Court case of Willingham that says just be-
cause a lawyer is can practice before the court
doesn’t make them an officer of the court. An officer of
the court — even if — well, let’s — even if we assume
that he wins on his issue that he is an officer of the
court — which clearly he’s not under any case that he’s
cited. In fact, | don’t think he ever cited a case that
made him an officer of the court. Even if that was the
case, the test under 1442 1s not only are you an officer
of the court, you also have to have a federal defense
available to you under 1442.

App. 12

This is clearly to prevent a state from applying —
[12] going off and applying some weird law to a
federal officer that, in federal court, would be given
immunity of some sort, or they were actually working
for the government.

Not only does he not have a defense, and he’s not
an officer of the court, I can’t find anywhere in his
pleadings where he’s ever even alleged that he has
a federal defense in this case. So, therefore, he cer-
tainly hasn’t met the test under 1442 for federal
jurisdiction.

And under 1441, there is nothing that’s been
done and nothing that could happen in the future,
with the U.S. Supreme Court or any other court, that
would change this issue into a federal question.

THE COURT: All right. I understand your
argument. Let me hear from Mr. Andrews. Thank
you.

MS. REED: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Andrews —
MR. ANDREWS: § Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: — you removed this case,
what is ostensibly, on its face, a pure state law claim
based on state laws of defamation, malicious prosecu-
tion and abuse of process, you removed it to federal
court on two grounds, as I see it, right?

MR. ANDREWS: Yes, Your Honor.

App. 13

THE COURT: One, on behalf of all defen-
dants, that there is a federal question, so it arises
under federal law. And, [13] secondly, that as it per-
tains to you as a named defendant, that you being,
quote, an officer of the court, you have a right to
remove it under the so-called federal officer removal

provision.
MR. ANDREWS: § Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let’s talk about the federal
officer removal statute first. Do you have a single
case which holds or implies in any way that a private
lawyer in private practice who practices in federal
court is an officer of the United States courts for the
purposes of this removal statute or any other statute?

MR. ANDREWS: I do not have a case that
holds so. What I have is the Herron case from 1994 or
96, in the Fifth Circuit, where, in footnote two, they
say, “We do not reach this question.”

THE COURT: They say, “We do not reach
this question.” That’s a far cry from holding or even
implying that that’s the law, right?

MR. ANDREWS: Yes, Your Honor. But |
have the First Circuit —

THE COURT: So Im asking you, again, do
you have a single case? And I think you’ve answered

it, but ’'m assuming, it sounds like you have no case.

MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, [ have the

First Circuit case of Jones vs. Pinetta, where a court

App. 14

reporter was found to be allowed LO remove unde r the

statute.

[14] THE COURT: Well, this is a court
reporter reporting 1n federal court. That’s a far ery

from a private lawyer

Certainly, if you sued my court reporter in federal
court for something — 1 mean, in state court for some
thing she did here, I would guess she would be a
federal officer and able to remove: but, that’s a far cry

from you being a private lawyer in private practice

I mean, [ just think this is such a farfetched
notion that it’s ridiculous. And I was hoping that you
could come up with one single case to tell me where
you came up with this sort of crazy notion that a
private lawyer can somehow be a federal officer, an
officer of the United States courts, for purposes of the

removal statute

MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, [| have the
line of cases that interpret subsection one of the
federal officer removal statutes. Most of the cases
have been based on the contractor defense, federal

contractor defense.

THE COURT: That’s the whole purpose of
the federal officer removal statute. It’s to make sure a
federal officer engaged in executing his or her official
duties is not subject to, for example, arrest in state
court for just, you know, performing their official
duties, in state court. And they can’t — they’re allowed

to remove it here so they can assert a federal defense

App LD

such as the common one is immunity, federal officer
immunity; or, 1n the case of a contractor, federal | 15]

contractor defense

I mean, this is something I've just | don’t know
where you pulled this notion out of the alr some
where, you know. I'm waiting to hear what basis you

have for making this allegation

MR. ANDREWS Your Honor, under ub
section one, and in mostly federal contractor case

people acting under federal officer

THE COURT: Which federal officer were
you acting under when you did whatever youre
alleged to have done in the court? What federal officer
was directing you to file the pleadings you filed, o1
file the RICO suit, or filed any other pleadings that
youre and I’m not making any understand, I’m
not making any prejudgment here on any validity
whether there is any validity at all to Mr Howard
state court claims against you. But in the federal
contractor defense context, the contractor has to show
that the contractor was acting pursuant to the dire

tions of a federal officer

For example, the government comes up with
plans as to how to build something, and they tell the
hire a contractor, and this is how we want it built
and designed. And the contractor does it in accor
dance with the government’s specifications and di
rections; then, they are generally entitled to assert

the federal contractor defense

App. 18

MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, that was
under 1441.

THE COURT: Did you find that case?

MR. ANDREWS: Yes, sir, I cite it in my
brief. And what Rivet held was that the claim preclu-
sion was a federal defense; and, therefore, in the
Rivet case did not create removability [18] under
Section 1441.

But my reading of Rivet, and I quoted from Rivet
in my reply brief — ’m sorry, my response brief, and
they said that claim preclusion is a defense; and,

therefore —

THE COURT: Sure, it’s a defense. It can be
a defense. It’s a defense in state court. But you can
raise that in state court, and the state court is fully
competent of ruling on that.

Okay, let’s move on to another question, because

you're not doing too well, here, Mr. Andrews, so far.

What is the federal law that would give this
Court federal question jurisdiction?

MR. ANDREWS: 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(d),

Your Honor.

THE COURT: All that statute provides is
that when I dismissed the federal RICO claim with
prejudice, and then I dismissed your state law claims
in the original underlying suit without prejudice, you
had a right to go back and refile those in state court,

if you did it timely.

App. 19

MR. ANDREWS Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And whether you did or did
not, the state court will have to sort that out: but,
that doesn’t give you federal jurisdiction here. Those
were on that’s on the supplemental jurisdiction

claims.
MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, you did

THE COURT: So that’s your only argument

here for federal question is TRB7(d)?

[19] MR. ANDREWS: Mr. Howard sued me
THE COURT: No. Answer my question

MR. ANDREWS: No. Your Honor. I have a
much weaker claim based

THE COURT: You have a weaker one than

)

that’
MR. ANDREWS Yes, sir

THE COURT: Well, let me hear what the

weaker one is because

Mk. ANDREWS: The weaker one is based
on the civil RICO suit. The stronger one is the
1367(d), which would normaily be something to be
worked out in state court. It would normally be the
plaintiffs/counter-defendants’ defense to the counter-
claims; but, he amended his complaint, his main
action. He amended it to include claims against me for

filing the reconventional demand that I was supposed

App. 20

to have known was time barred. He, therefore, made
this federal question of 1367(d) a part of his main

action.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that any
time a lawyer does something in federal court and
is subsequently sued in state court for legal mal-
practice, say, or under any state law theory, that
that’s removable to federal court? Because that’s
where your argument would lead to. We'd have
almost well, we’d have a whole slew of state law
cases removed here just because it involved a lawyer

who did something in federal court.

MR. ANDREWS: No. Your Honor, that’s not
what I’m [20] saying.

THE COURT: That seems to be where your
argument would go, you know, would lead to. That

would be a logical conclusion.

MR. ANDREWS: The original action for
defamation was not removable. I looked. It wasn’t
removable. It was only when these claims for my
bringing the reconventional demand two weeks
earlier, only when those claims were amended into

the petition that it —

THE COURT: 1 don’t see where anything
really changed. It sounds like Mr. Howard just
thought of a few other legal bases, but he was alleg-
ing the same basic facts. I mean, all of this comes
from the original RICO lawsuit and what you did in

state court in connection with that —

App. 21

MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, he -

THE COURT: -— that you accused him of all
of these things. And I don’t Know how that changes

anything.

MR. ANDREWS: He could not have sued
me for filing the reconventional demands until I filed
the reconventional demands two weeks before he

sued me on them.

THE COURT: But the reconventional de-
mands just regurgitated what you had already al-
leged in this Court and in state court. I don’t see how

that changed anything.

MR. ANDREWS: Because he sued me for
bringing them as time barred. That was an element
of his suit, because they were time barred. It didn’t
matter what they said.

(21) THE COURT: If they are, they are; if
they are not, they are not. But state court can figure
that out as well as I can. I don’t see any way that
gives us federal jurisdiction here.

Anything else you want to add, Mr. Andrews’?

MR. ANDREWS: No, Your Honor. Thank

you.

THE COURT: All mght. As I said, this case
arises out of a suit originally brought by Attorney
Douglas Howard in First City Court seeking un-
paid legal fees against Ms. St. Germain. And, ulti-
mately, at some point, a default was entered when

o»)

App. 22

Ms. St. Germain did not timely answer that lawsuit
in First City Court, and a judgment was entered on
behalf of Mr. Howard.

Apparently, after being unable to get that judg-
ment set aside, Mr. Andrews, on behalf of Ms. St.
Germain and another client, came to this Court and
filed a federal RICO, a racketeering lawsuit, against
Mr. Howard alleging that he had engaged in a crimi-
nal racketeering enterprise in conjunction with his

practice of domestic law.

This Court, ultimately, after hearing argument
on the case, on the motions to dismiss — | don’t re-
member now if it was a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment, but 1 held that the plaintiffs
in this Court, in the RICO case, failed to state a
viable claim under RICO, and I dismissed all the
federal claims in that case with prejudice, and |
dismissed the supplemental state law claims without

prejudice.

The plaintiffs in that RICO case appealed to the
[22] Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. It is true that both this Court and the Fifth
Circuit denied the defendant, Mr. Howard, in that
case, the defendant’s motion for sanctions. I don’t
recall exactly what was said about that at the time,
frankly, but I think I made a ruling from the bench,
as I recall. But I’m not a big fan of sanctioning law-
yers, and I’m assuming I just gave Mr. Andrews the
benefit of the doubt by not sanctioning him; although,
it was certainly plausible that he could have been

App. 23

sanctioned, | think, for filing that RICO suit, which

was totally baseless, as far as I am concerned.

The Fifth Circuit, as I recall, also, in denying the
sanctions, made a comment that it was a very close

call, which means that could have gone either way.

My understanding is the underlying judgment
has been paid; is that right? The legal fees have been
paid?

MS. REED: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It would have been nice if
everybody would have just acted as grown-ups at that

point and put this thing, this mess behind them; but,
for whatever reason, neither side appears capable of

doing that.
It’s alleged — and | haven't looked at Mr. An-

drews’ web site, but it’s alleged that Mr. Andrews and
his chents are continuing on what might be termed a
vendetta, a retaliation against Mr. Howard. Mr.
Howard, in turn, has filed a state court lawsuit
alleging defamation, abuse of process and [23] mali-
cious prosecution. Again, I’m not going to attempt to
judge the validity of any of those claims.

And as a result of the filing of that suit, we’re
here now because Mr. Andrews removed that state
court lawsuit here, arguing that there is federal
jurisdiction under the so-called federal officer re-

moval statute and/or under the federal question

statute, removal statute.

App. 24

I think neither of those arguments are plausible
for the reasons I’ve largely stated. It’s clear to me
that there are a number of cases — it is hard to find a
case precisely on point like this one, and maybe
because this is so farfetched that nobody else has
thought of filing something like this; but, in my view,
there is no way that a private lawyer, acting in his
private capacity in private practice, who handles a
case in federal court can be considered an officer of
the Courts of the United States for purposes of the
removal statute.

And there is plenty of case law that indicates
that that is the proper analysis. And you can look at
the Cammer case from the United States Supreme
Court, Cammer versus United States, where the
Supreme Court held that a lawyer was not an officer
of the court within the statute empowering federal
court to punish as contempt misbehavior of any of its
officers in their official transactions.

The district court case out of Florida, Florida
versus Shimek, S-H-I-M-E-K, 1973, which held that a
lawver is not [24] an officer for removal statute
purposes. There, an officer attempted to remove —
apparently, a lawyer, I mean, had done something in
federal court which led to state disciplinary proceed-
ings against him. And he argued that he was an
officer of the federal court acting in that capacity;
therefore, he could remove the state disciplinary
action to federal court. The court said, no, that’s not

correct.

App. 25

And one case that’s pretty close to our case here,
closest in terms of factual background, is Berg versus
Leason, a Ninth Circuit case from 1994, where after
successfully defending himself in federal court against
allegations of violations of federal security and rack-
eteering laws, the plaintiff, who had been the defend-
ant in the federal court action, plaintiff sued in state
court for malicious prosecution. And the defendant
removed the case; and, the circuit court — the district
court refused to remand it. The Court of Appeals held
that malicious prosecution claim did not arise under
federal law simply because one element of proof re-
quired that the underlying action was legally unten-
able. And it’s awfully close to we have here.

Ard it’s already been decided, in this Court and
the Fifth Circuit, that the underlying RICO case was
legally untenable. Whether or not that ultimately leads
a state court to conclude that it would be considered
malicious prosecution or abuse of process or defama
tion is another matter to be decided in state court.

[25] So Mr. Andrews is not a federal officer.
Beyond that, he has not raised a colorable federal
defense. And, lastly, there are no federal causes of
action or claims pled in the state court lawsuit to
make it removable under the federal question juris-
diction. And so, for those reasons, I’m going to grant
the motion to remand this case. ’m remanding it for
lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Mr. Andrews, I’m going to — was there a request
for sanctions in this case or for imposition of fees and

costs?

App. 26

MS. REED: Yes, Your Honor, there was.

THE COURT: I’m going to award Mr.
Howard reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in con-
junction with needing to file the motion to remand
and arguing it here today. I’m going to order that a
motion for fees, properly supported and documented,
be filed within 15 days; that any opposition or tra-
verse to that motion be filed seven days thereafter,
and I'll issue my ruling on that.

All right.
MS. REED: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. HOWARD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Andrews, before you file
any more, you know, you filed a RICO claim in this
Court, which was baseless; now, you’ve filed a remov-
al, which was totally baseless. I am imposing fees and
costs this time. This has got to stop. And I strongly
suggest that you do a lot more research before you
start [26] filing things in federal court, again.

Thank you, Counsel.

MS. REED: Thank you, Yeur Honor.

(WHEREUPON, at 10:10 a.m., the proceedings
were concluded.)

App. 27

REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE

I, Cathy Pepper, Certified Realtime Reporter,
Registered Merit Reporter, Registered Professional
Reporter, Certified Court Reporter, Official Court
Reporter for the United States District Court, East-
ern District of Louisiana, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best
of my ability and understanding, from the record of
the proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered

matter.

s/ Cathy Pepper

Cathy Pepper, CRR, RMR, CCR
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court

App. 28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

D. DOUGLAS HOWARD, JR. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 09-3450

ST. GERMAIN ET AL SECTION: J(4)
ORDER

(Filed Jul. 20, 2009)

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for At-
torney’s Fees (Rec. Doc. 59), filed in accordance
with the Court’s ruling in open-court on June 24,
2009, which granted Plaintiff’s motion to remand the
above-captioned matter and awarded attorney’s fees
and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) in connection
with Defendants’ wrongful removal of this case.
Plaintiff avers that no costs were incurred in the
filing of the motion to remand, and thus he seeks only
a reasonable attorney’s fee in the present motion. The
Defendants’ opposition attempts in large part to
argue against the validity of the Court’s determina-
tion that a fee award is warranted in the present
circumstances. As the Court has already made its
determination as to the propriety of an award under
§ 1447(c), the Court will not address Defendants’
arguments that such an award is improper.

To the extent Defendants oppose the quantum of
Plaintiff’s requested award, the Court finds that

Defendants’ arguments are unavailing. Under the
provisions of § 1447(c), “[aJ]n order remanding [a]

App. 29

case may require payment of just costs and any
actual expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred as
a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “(T]he
imposition of both costs and attorneys’ fees against
the removing party may be awarded in the Court’s
discretion” upon a finding that removal is improper
under § 1447(c). Miranti v. Lee, 3 F.3d 925, 928 (5th
Cir. 1993).

The Fifth Circuit adheres to the “lodestar” meth-
od for calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees in the
context of an award under § 1447(c). Halliburton
Latin America SA v. Intern. Technical Solutions, 273
F.3d 392, 392 (5th Cir. 2001). This method requires
the district court to “determine the reasonable num-
ber of hours expended on the litigation and the rea-
sonable hourly rate for the participating lawyers”
based on “contemporaneous billing records or other
sufficient documentation so that the district court can
fulfill its duty to examine the application for
noncompensable hours.” La. Power & Light Co. v.
Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995). “A lode-
star is calculated by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended by an appropriate hourly rate in

the community for such work.” Heidtman v. County of

El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999). The
lodestar is presumed to be the reasonable fee, but it
may be adjusted after considerations of the factors
listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on
other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87

App. 30

(1989). Gonzalez v. Associates Health & Welfare Plan,
2002 WL 31933208, 1 (5th Cir. 2002).

In this case, Plaintiff has requested a fee award
in the amount of $7,088.00, which the Court finds to
be appropriate in light of the hours reasonably ex
pended and the hourly rate charged in procuring a
remand of this matter. The Court notes that the
$7,088.00 fee award is especially appropriate in light
of the two-year history of vexatious litigation against
Plaintiff by the Defendants in this matter, which has
already nearly resulted in sanctions against Defen-
dants on two prior occasions. See Civil Action No. 07
9040, Rec. Docs. 33 and 39. Additionally, the Court
notes that Defendants’ various grounds for removal
while ultimately baseless were wide-ranging and
complicated, and thus required significant effort by

counsel for Plaintiff.

Finally, to the extent that Defendant Andrews
argues that an award of $7,088.00 against him indi
vidually would be financially ruinous, the Court notes
that it is within the Court’s discretion to impose any
fee award against all the Defendants, jointly and
severally, as parties to the improper removal. See,
e.g., Park Nat. Bank of Houston v. Kaminetzky, 976
K. Supp. 571, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Thus, Andrews’
arguments related to his individual financial situa

tion are irrelevant

As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff's request
ed fee award of $7,088.00 is reasonable in the circum
stances of this case. Accordingly,

App. 31

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees (Rec. Doc. 59) is hereby GRANT
ED. Plaintiff is hereby awarded $7,088.00 under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) as a reasonable attorney's fee for the
remand of this matter, to be paid by Defendants
Lesley Simmons St. Germain, Hillary Rose Hillyer
Melissa Branighan Lumina): Mark Kdward An
drews, Andrews Arts & Sciences Law, LLC, and

David ki. Simmons, jointly and severally

New Orleans, Louisiana this ZOth da

{ '
ha eJ UT

Car! J. Barbier
CARI. J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_2299%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.