# Opposition Brief — National Football League v. Williams

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1979%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1029

## Text

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Supreme Court of the United States

Clik NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGU]

On PevitTion FOR A WRI? OF CERTIORARU TO THE UNIVED
States Court Or ArpeALs For Tie Esauru Cirncen

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

no Rat PETER R GINSBERG
I'L NN GASKINS Counsel of Recor
INETT, LLP CHristiINAN Bureo
33 South 7th Street, (HINSBERG & BURGOS P!
Suite 2900 12 East 49 Street 30th Il
Minneapolis, MN 55402 New York NY 10017
612) 883 Gb00 (646) 374 0029

peinsberg@pimnsbe

lurros com

Counsel for Te spondents
. : yyy : i AVP ;
AeCVINR Vj 4L1QINS and Pat Willrams

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ll

QUESTION PRESENTED

Kevin Williams and Pat Williams (“Williamses”
or “Respondents”) are professional football players
employed by the National Football League (“NFL” or
“Petitioner”). The Williamses play for the Minnesota
Vikings. The NFL, by conducting drug testing in the
State of Minnesota, had an obligation to know and to
abide by Minnesota State drug testing laws. It failed
in both regards.

The NFL contends that § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185, preempts certain Minnesota state statutory
claims which regulate drug testing. The NFL is
wrong. The federal district court considered the
NFL’s arguments and defenses; determined that the
Williamses’ claims were not preempted by the
LMRaA; and properly remanded the state law claims
to state court.

A bench trial was held on claims brought under
the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act
(““DATWA”), Minn. Stat. § 181.950-957. Pet. App.
938a-1l4a. The NFL was found to have violated
DATWA but the trial court declined to continue the
injunction that prevented the NFL from suspending
the Williamses. The Williamses have appealed
whether it was error for the trial court to decline to
issue a permanent injunction in light of the NFL’s
violation of DATWA. Briefing in the Minnesota
Court of Appeals is complete and the parties await

oral argument.

The question presented is whether this Court
should exercise certiorari review where (a) the
underlying dispute could be rendered moot within a
few months by affirmance of the Minnesota appellate
courts of the decision allowing for the suspension of

the Williamses; (b) a threshold jurisdictional defect
precludes this Court’s review altogether because,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), appeals from orders
remanding cases to state courte are not appealable,
notwithstanding this Court’s holding to the contrary
in Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF BIO, Inc., U.S. _,
129 S. Ct. 1862 (2009), premised on Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S, 336 (1976),
which “was questionable in its day and is ripe for
reconsideration in the appropriate case,” Carlsbad,
129 S. Ct. at 1868 (Scalia, J., concurring); (c) where
the question purportedly presented by the Petition
whether defenses are relevant in a § 301 preemption
analysis — arises only in connection with a claim
brought pursuant to the Lawful Consumable
Products Act (““LCPA”), Minn. Stat. § 181.938, on
which the NFL obtained summary judgment in a
ruling from which the Williamses have not appealed;
and (d) no circuit split is presented

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The caption contains the names of al]

parties to this proceeding

The Nationa! Football League Player
Association, the National Football Leagut
Management Council, Adolpho Birch, Dr. John
Lombardo, and Dr. Brian Finkle were parties in the
consolidated proceedings below, but are t}

LiCl
petitioners nor respondents in this Court

hel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATEMENT

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

REASONS FOR DENYING THE

"ETITION
Il. THE PETITION MAY SOON BE MOO'1

Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED
JURISDICTION UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1447(D)
[1]. THE ISSUE ON WHICH THE NFL
SEEKS REVIEW IS NOT PROPERLY
PRESENTED.

IV. THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THI
COURTS OF APPEALS WARRANTING
THIS COURT’S REVIEW .

V. THE NFL CANNOT CONTRACT FOR
WHAT IS [ILLEGAL UNDER STATI
LAW

VI. CONGRESS DID NOT PREEMPT OR
CREATE LAWS THAT CONFLICT WITH
rHE STATES’ RIGHT TO REGULAT!I
DRUG TESTING. ..... A

VII ‘THE CLAIMS IN THIS CASE AR!)
NOT PREEMPTED BECAUSE THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Pape

\GREEMENT NEED Nort BI

MXAMINED TO DETERMINI
CLAIMS

ONCLUSION

va

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415

a sap usliannaien 20
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.

SE IE iia es cetacean ecch ceovdeddeasdssuunsansabnsbaiseyes passim
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344

RRR ese ORD NO cE COS OO eT 9
Brown v. Holiday Stationstores, Inc., 723

F. Supp. 396 (D. Minn, 19GD) ......0cccecersreeessessanes 27
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF BIO, Inc., __

+S Gs 5 Be Be US) ne ili, 10
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386

)__-__, EPNIDSRE Renee narCr et” oes Reem 23, 24, 27
Clark v. Kellogg Co., 205 F.3d 1079 (8th

RRR URED ree set CNG Re ea 25
Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255

Be ie Cee CRIN GIN, BI Dievneninsscececsscesessesstcnsessiones' 27
Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., L.L.C.,

657 U.S. __. 129 &. Ct. 2710 (2008) .................. 19
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193

RSE RR IMEI reat ct reef et oP ae 8
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)............. a

Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners of Am., Local 25, 480 U.S. 290

Vill

Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259

BPM I WII Sys stand csusachcccbnardankoadasiassisscsasanans 21
Ferrell v. Cross, 557 N.W.2d 560 (Minn.
ED dedckae Ascetic tad ut icaea cua isks ck taxustabesosivencevieviis 20

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1

a, tetra ice este edie te psLddataixacasnavensncxoannanc 24
Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 88 F.3d 831

+ __: SHRRAR EASIER eee Oa 16
Graham v. Contract Transp., Inc., 220

Be Fr i, BO aisinicisinsisvicsnanadasercreess 15, 26
Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d

1288 (8th Cir. 1996)................... iteeumsasd saben eas 26, 27
Jones v. Flowers, 647 U.S. 220 (2006) ...........cceeeseeeeeee 8
Karnes v. Boeing Co., 335 F.3d 1189 (10th

oe och cana cies tae eescatceeri macsices 27, 28
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.

Fe I iene Pisa ca neni cece eed cistgnueconvuneionns 8
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef,

BG g SBS UB. SOO CLG BS) vanes cnncncenscscccscecerseeses 24, 25
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) .............. 15
Local 174, Teamsters of Am. V. Lucas

Fiour Co. S60 U.S. SE (AGES) .sccrsscccsccsscsssnvecessns 23

Lodge 76, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm’n, 427
Se Ia sia aoe ren cetaa has ssancusecpcaieiaencins 18

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
Ei ae 0 eaves ennvtcesncssdavenemdccoorss 18, 19, 21

1A

Meyer v, Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d

S0GE a ,. Bt els idcdteoGeroa eee
Neppl v. Signature Flight Support Corp.,

234 F.Supp.2d 1016 (D.Minn. 2002)... 20
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 226 (2007)..........cceeeeees 9,10
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

A nasickcctsvavinssininccbbecesn conse 9
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S.

eC i ikdnsanstcncresncett teeckicoaeedsnasdisceeienniae 21
Sec. and Exchange Comm’n v. Medical

Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S.

ERR ERR ee E EL OLENA ERED ORSEE ENE! 7
Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive, 943 F.2d 764

CFR Rot BED cinvinsvcsqecssaseostinteeaaacsasiereaae 16
South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama,

SP U.S. DE Cinictntceciccies cence 11
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266

Fe BTS Ce Ca Se ix pecssivistnabeiensvenenexanens 16, 17
St. John v. Int? Ass’n of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers, 139 F.3d 1214

eC: SG hicinstitcatneaeee 19
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,

SES UB Ba a ivsccctcctitanddececee 23

Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).. iii, 9, 10, 11

Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516
US. TER ee ikcinrecticuiiionninaaisane 9
Thompson v. Hibbing Taconite Holding

Co., No. 08-868 (JRT/RLE), 2008 WL
4737442 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2008)..........0. ee 28

X

Umphrey v. Fina Ou & Chemical Co., 921

F.Supp. 434 (E.D.Tex. 1996)...........ccccccsssresssssees 27
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523

AL 8
Valles v. luy Hull Corp., 410 F.3d 1071

eee icicncetisessesvesesenens esses mabaaekieis 15
Williams uv. Nat’l Football League, 582

EEE, MIMI snescosevoncscorscssessesssevessevesvese 1
Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 598

i l
Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 654 F.

Supp. 2d 960 (D.Minn. 2009)........00...0cccceeeeeees 1
Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, 555 U.S.

___; 129 S. Ct. 1187 (Mar. 4, 2009)............... 17, 19
STATUTES
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| 27

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Government-wide Implementation of the
Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 55
FO, FN, Be Cee cisshichssnseeriesscasanseses Pree 3 |

Hearing on HF 1108 Before the H.
Commerce and Financial Institutions
Comm., 2005 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn.
SINT acsiviacdstinniiescuamicnmniesasstrtmasere tetas SAR iehe

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Respondents Kevin Williams and Pat Williams
respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the
Petition filed by the NFL.

The Petition should be denied because it may
well be rendered moot before the Court could render
a decision on the merits; because the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d); because the question purportedly presented
is not actually presented given the NFL’s state court
victory on respondents’ LCPA claims; and, because
there is no relevant disagreement among the courts
of appeals requiring the Court’s resolution.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at
582 F.8d 863. Pet. App. la. The court of appeals
decision denying rehearing and rehearing en banc is
reported at 598 F.3d 932. Pet. App. 66a. The final
judgment of the district court is reported at 654 F.
Supp. 2d 960. Pet. App. 42a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment below was entered on September
11, 2009. Pet. App. la. Petitions for rehearing and
rehearing en banc were denied on December 14,
2009. Pet. App. 66a. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT

The underlying facts of this case are undisputed.
For two years, the NFL possessed scientific evidence
that a seemingly innocuous, over-the-counter product
called StarCaps contained an _ undisclosed,

~

potentially lethal controlled substance called
Bumetanide. Bumetanide is on the NFL’s list of
prohibited substances, but nothing on the label or
packaging of StarCaps indicates that Bumetanide is
present in the product. Res. App. 4a at 22. Neither
of the Williamses has ever taken steroids or
performance enhancing drugs. Res. App. 2a-3a at 7,
16.

The NFL knew since 2005 that NFL players were
using StarCaps yet failed to disclose the health risk,
or the risk that usage violated the NFL steroid
policy, to players, including the Williamses, and
then, starting in 2008, punished players for using
that product without any notice or explanation. The
NFL contends that it was defending its strict liability
steroid policy by suspending the Williamses. Lower
federal and state courts have all rejected the NFL’s
defense since it has been proved that the NFL had a
“secret policy” not to suspend NFL players who
tested positive for Bumetanide from as early as 2005
until sometime in 2008.

In July and August 2008, the Williamses and
other NFL players tested positive for Bumetanide.
Reversing years of policy — and playing what the
Minnesota state trial court, after a bench trial,
characterized as “a game of gotcha” — the NFL
suspended the Williamses for four games without
pay. Res. App. 21a at 154.

The NFL detected usage of StarCaps by invoking
a drug testing procedure that indisputably and
materially violated DATWA. The NFL’s conduct also
violated the clear public policy of Minnesota.
Minnesota has a right to police the NFL’s drug
testing activity in Minnesota.

3

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The NFL and the National Football League
Players Association (“NFLPA”) are party to a
nationwide collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”),
which incorporates the NFL Policy on Anabolic
Steroids and Related Substances (the “Policy”). Pet.
App. 115a-157a. The CBA affords players a right to
appeal drug-related suspensions. That appeal was
heard by NFL Vice President and General Counsel
Jeff Pash on November 20, 2008. On December 2,
2008, Pash issued a decision upholding the
suspensions. Pet. App. 77a-91a.

On December 3, 2008, the day after the NFL
issued an arbitration decision suspending the
Williamses for four games for their alleged violation
of the NFL’s Policy, the Williamses filed an action in
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Minnesota for the County of Hennepin and
sought injunctive relief. Following extensive oral
argument, a temporary restraining order against the
NFL’s suspensions was granted.

On December 4, 2008, the NFL removed the

matte: to the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota.! Following summary judgment

1 The Williamses originally sued the NFL and certain
NFL representatives for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, violations of public
policy, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, gross negligence, vicarious liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Since the NFL removed the
case to federal court the day after the Williamses’ state court
filing, the Williamses’ amendment of the complaint to include

[Footnote continued on next page}

motions in federal court, Honorable Paul A.
Magnuson, on May 22, 2009, ruled that the
Williamses’ common law claims were preempted by §
301 of the LMRA but that the DATWA and LCPA
claims were not preempted. On May 22, 2009, the
district court remanded the DATWA and LCPA
claims to state court, declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over them because they
raised significant questions about “the public policy
of the state of Minnesota.” Pet. App. 64a.

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in all
respects. With regard to the DATWA claims, the
court noted that “section 301 does not preempt state
law claims merely because the parties involved are
subject to a CBA and the events underlying the claim
occurred on the job.” Pet. App. 15a-16a. Because “a
court would have no need to consult the Policy in
order to resolve the players’ DATWA claim,” and
because the NFL could “not point to a specific
provision of the CBA or the Policy which must be
interpreted,” the court of appeals concluded that the
Williamses’ DATWA claims were not preempted by §
3801. Pet. App. 19a, 22a. The NFL’s petitions for
rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied on
December 14, 2009. Pet. App. 66a-77a.

[Footnote continued from previous page]
claims under DATWA and the LCPA, on January 2, 2009,
occurred while the case was in federal court.

5

The state trial was held from March 8 through
March 12, 2010.2 The court issued findings of fact
and conclusions of law on May 6, 2010, holding that
the NFL had violated DATWA’s three-day notice
provision for notifying players of a positive test, but
refusing to enjoin the NFL permanently from
suspending the Williamses. Res. App. la-37a. The
court concluded that “Kevin Williams and Pat
Williams were not harmed by Defendant NFL’s
DATWA violation,” and therefore “(p]laintiffs failed
to establish success on the merits.” Res. App. 23a,

36a.

On May 21, 2010, after the Williamses requested
a stay of the order pending appeal, Judge Larson
refused to dissolve the temporary restraining order
pending appeal and stayed entry of the final order
pending appeal of the order refusing to dissolve the
injunction. Res. App. 38a-49a.

The Williamses appealed from the May 6, 2010

order to the Minnesota Court of Appeals on May 25,
2010. The briefing of that appeal was completed on

2 DATWA provides broad protections to Minnesota
employees who are subject to employer drug and alcohol
testing. It establishes, inter alia, criteria for testing
laboratories, procedures employers must follow, and
disciplinary limitations for those who test positive. Minn. Stat.
§§ 952-955. The LCPA prohibits employers from disciplining
employees because “the employee engages in or has engaged in
the use or enjoyment of lawful consumable products” —
products such as StarCaps — “if the use or enjoyment takes
place off the premises of the employer during nonworking
hours.” Minn. Stat. § 181.938.

Y

August 30, 2010. Oral argument is expected this fall
and a decision shortly thereafter. Either party can
seek discretionary review in the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, but otherwise judgment on the
Williamses’ DATWA claims will be final in all
respects unless one of the parties petitions for review
by this Court.

After briefing before the Minnesota Court of
Appeals was fully submitted, the NFL filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal on September 8, 2010,
asserting that the Williamses had not properly
perfected an appeal from the trial court’s final
judgment. The NFL claimed, inter alia, that the
appeal was moot and that there is no justiciable
controversy to be heard before the court of appeals.
Res. App. 60a-61a. That motion is pending before the
Minnesota Court of Appeals.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I. THE PETITION MAY SOON BE MOOT.

The ongoing state court litigation may soon
render the Petition moot.

The Minnesota state trial court has denied the
Williamses the relief they seek, a permanent
injunction on the merits of the state statutory claims.
See Pet. 6 n.1, 17 n.3 (noting that the trial court
“entered judgment for the NFL” on the DATWA
claims and “granted summary judgment for the NFL
on the LCPA claim”). The Williamses have appealed
to the Minnesota Court of Appeals from the post-trial
order relating to the DATWA claims. Appellate
briefing in that case was completed on August 30,
2010, and a decision is expected within a few
months. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court's

7

review is discretionary, and because that court
typically decides whether to grant review within
sixty days of a decision by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, the NFL may secure a final judgment on
the DATWA claims well before the end of this
Court’s October Term 2010.

Moreover, the NFL recently moved the
Minnesota Court of Appeals to dismiss the
Williamses’ appeal in the state system altogether.
Res. App. 56a-68a. The NFL has taken the position
that, while the Williamses timely appealed the
Minnesota trial court’s May 6, 2010 post-trial order
setting out findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and although the state court stayed entry of the trial
order, the Williamses did not timely appeal the final
judgment entered by an administrative clerk of the
Minnesota trial court on June 7, 2010,
notwithstanding the court’s stay order. Accordingly,
the NFL’s current litigation position in the
Minnesota Court of Appeals is that there presently
exists an unappcaled “final determination of the
rights of the parties” with respect to these claims.
Res. App. 5la. Should the NFL’s motion be granted
— it is fully briefed and pending adjudication — it is
even more likely that the judgment in the state
system will become final before this Court receives
briefing, hears oral argument, and renders a decision
on the merits.

A final state court decision in the NFL’s favor on
the DATWA claims would render the Petition for
moot. It is elementary that this Court will not decide
moot disputes. Sec. and Exchange Comm'n v.
Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407
(1972) (“Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases
derives from the requirement of Article III of the

v

Constitution under which the exercise of judicial
power depends upon the existence of a case or
controversy”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court will dismiss a writ of certiorari when a
case becomes moot. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484
U.S. 198, 199 (1988).

Although the mootness doctrine excepts the rare
cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading
review,” that exception applies only where “(1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same
action again.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 481 (1990). This exception does not apply
here because “there is no reason to suppose that a
subsequent case wil] not come with relative speed to
this Court.” DeFu sis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319
(1974). The NFL has asserted and preserved its §
301 preemption defense in the state system, and, in
the event the NFL does not prevail in the Minnesota
appellate courts, it could, obtain review by writ of
certiorari via 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

Even if the NFL were correct in its assertion that
there is a circuit split on the preemption issue —
and, as discussed below, the NFL is wrong on this
point — this Court can grant certiorari to resolve
conflicts between the decisions of a highest state
court and a federal court of appeals. See, e.g., Jones
v. Flowers, 647 U.S. 220 (2006) (granting certiorari to
the Arkansas Supreme Court “to resolve a conflict
among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts”);
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 617, 621
(1998) (granting certiorari to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court where the decision of that court

“conflictied) with two federal Court of Appeals
decisions”); accord Braxton v. United States, 600 U.S.
344, 347 (1991) (“A principal purpose for which we
use our certiorari jurisdiction . .. is to resolve
conflicts among the United States courts of appeals
and state courts concerning the meaning of
provisions of federal law”). As a result, the NFL
could seek this Court’s review were the Minnesota
appellate courts to reverse the trial court and enter
judgment ugainst the NFL. Because the Petition
may be rendered moot after a_ substantial
expenditure of this Court’s limited resources,
certiorari is unwarranted,

i. TIE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED
JURISDICTION UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1447(D).

The district court remanded the Williamses’
state statutory claims to the Minnesota trial court.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), “[a]n order remanding a
case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise....” Under
the plain text of that section, the court of appeals
lacked jurisdiction, and this Court now lacks
jurisdiction, to hear petitioner's appeal from the
district court’s order.

Beginning in Thermtron, this Court has
permitted appellate review of remand orders in
certain types of cases despite the plain language of §
1447(d). See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007);
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 U.S. 706
(1996); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516
U.S. 124 (1996). Although the plain language of §
1447(d) is unambiguous, TJhermtron held that
“remand orders are appealable if they are based on

av

any grounds other than the mandatory ground for
remand set forth in § 1447(c)” because “subsections
(c) and (d) are in pari materia and must be construed
together.” Osborn, 549 U.S. at 263 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Thus, Thermtron
opened the door to appeals of remand orders based
on grounds other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, which is a mandatory ground for
remand specified in § 1447(c).

Applying Thermtron, this Court recently
determined that an appeal can be taken from a
remand order in the circumstances here, where a
federal district court declines to _ exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.
Carlsbad, 129 S. Ct. at 1862.

Respondents believe that Thermtron was
incorrectly decided, that this error infected the
Court’s decision in Carlsbad, and that the Eighth
Circuit therefore lacked jurisdiction over the district
court’s remand order. As a result, respondents
intend to request reversal of Thermtron should the
Petition in this case be granted.

Several members of the Court have suggested
that Thermtron was wrongly decided and that
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in that case was a more
faithful application of the statute and the intent of
Congress. See Carlsbad, 129 S. Ct. at 1865 n.* (“We
do not revisit today whether Thermtron was correctly
decided. Neither the brief for petitioner nor the brief
for respondents explicitly asked the Court to do so
here ...”); id. at 1861 (“Today, as in Thermtron, the
Court holds that § 1447(d) does not mean what it
says”) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. (“Thermtron was
questionable in its day and is ripe for reconsideration
in the appropriate case”) (Scalia, J., concurring).

1]

The remand order here comes within the plain
language of § 1447/d), but the order itself is not
predicated on the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction. Absent the Thermtron gloss, the district
court’s remand order would be unreviewable.

Thermtron conflicts with the policy judgment
Congress made about the costs and benefits of
remand appeals. “Congress’ purpose in barring
review of all remand orders has always been very
clear — to prevent the additional delay which a
removing party may achieve by seeking appellate
reconsideration of an order of remand.” Themtron,
423 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). “While
Congress felt that making available a federal forum
in appropriate instances justifies some _ such
interruption and delay, it obviously thought it
equally important that when removal to a federal
court is not warranted the case should be returned to
the state court as expeditiously as possible.” Id.

In cases where a respondent seeks to overturn
this Court’s prior jurisprudence, the Court has noted
that “[wle would normally expect notice of an
intent...in the respondent’s opposition to a petition
for certiorari.” South Central Bell Tel. Co. v.
Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 171 (1999). Respondents
provide such notice.

Ill. THE ISSUE ON WHICH THE NFL SEEKS
REVIEW Is NOT PROPERLY PRESENTED

The Petition also should be denied because the
question the NFL contends is presented relates only
to the players’ LCPA claims. The NFL prevailed in
state court on the LCPA claims on summary
judgment, and the players have not appealed from
that ruling. No matter how the Minnesota Court of
Appeals disposes of the Williamses’ appeal on the

hoe

DATWA claims, the LCPA ruling for the NFL will be
undisturbed.

The NFL's Petition focuses heavily on the
DATWA claims while saying very little about the
LCPA claims. But the Eighth Circuit dutifully
evaluated every “defense” proffered by the NFL with
respect to the DATWA claims. See Pet. 18-29. It
only invoked the “no defenses” statement with
respect to the LCPA claims — and the NFL has
prevailed on those claims in state court in a ruling
that has not been appealed.

Moreover, the NFL grossly exaggerates the
significance of the Eighth Circuit’s statement about
the role of defenses in § 301 analysis. In rendering
its LCPA analysis, the Eighth Circuit authored a
single footnote, upon which the NFL essentially
premises its entire challenge to the Eighth Circuit
opinion, that “the NFL’s defenses to liability under
the LCPA are not relevant to our section 301
analysis.” But it is evident from the 8% Circuit’s
analysis of both the LCPA and DATWA claims that
the Court did look to all of the NFL’s defenses on
both claims.

The NFL asserted three arguments in support of
its argument before the Eighth Circuit that DATWA
was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Each of the
arguments was considered and rejected by the
Kighth Circuit.

The first argument was predicated on the
language of DATWA itself which allows employers to
test employees covered by a CBA for drugs only if
that testing “meets or exceeds” DATWA's
protections. The NFL claimed that that language
required an analysis of the CBA in order to evaluate
the testing performed on the Williamses and thus

13
preempted the claim. The Eighth Circuit rejected
that claim: "DATWA does not state that an employee
who is a party to such a CBA cannot bring a claim
under DATWA. Rather, where there is a CBA that is
at least as protective of employees as DATWA, the
number of possible claims an employee has against
his or her employer will be affected." Pet. App. 19a.
The Eighth Circuit explained that a court does not
need to consult the CBA or NFL’s drug policy in
order to resolve the Williamses’ DATWA claim. Zd.
A court only needs to compare the procedure that the
NFL actually followed with respect to the particular
employee with DATWA’s requirements in order to
determine if an employee should prevail. Jd. Such a
claim, the Eighth Circuit found, was not preempted.
Id.

The NFL’s second argument for preemption was
that DATWA provides a cause of action only against
“employers,” and an interpretation of the CBA was
required to determine whether the NFL qualified as
an employer. The Eighth Circuit rejected that
argument, explaining that “[t]he NFL does not point
to a specific provision of either the CBA or the Policy
which must be interpreted.” Only the relationship
between the NFL and the Williamses needs to be
analyzed to determine whether an employer-
employee relationship existed. Pet. App. 22a.3

The NFL’s third preemption argument was also
considered and rejected. The NFL argued that

3 The state trial court did precisely what the Eighth
Circuit suggested and found that an employee-employer
relationship existed without reference to the CBA, by
examining the NFL’s role in the Williamses’ employment.

denying preemption and subjecting its drug policy to
divergent state regulation would render the uniform
enforcement of its drug testing policy nearly
impossible and compromise the integrity of its
business. Pet. App. 23a. The Eighth Circuit rejected
this argument, relying on this Court’s holding in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 212 (1985)
that in adopting § 301 Congress did not give “the
substantive provisions of private agreements the
force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state
regulation.” Pet. App. 24a. National companies
operate in multiple states and have no difficulty
complying with the laws of each state in which they
do business. And to suggest that the Minnesota
Vikings players would have a competitive advantage
over another team’s because their drug tests are
analyzed quicker or in a more reliable fashion is
simply fiction.

The Eighth Circuit also considered the NFL’s
defenses on the LCPA claims. As to those claims, the
NFL's first argument was based on the alleged need
to interpret the CBA to determine whether the NFL’s
ban on Bumetanide, the substance for which the
Williamses tested positive, was a bona fide
occupational requirement — an exception to liability
under the LCPA. Pet. App. 25a. The second
argument was premised on a limitation in the LCPA
which applied its restrictions only to the use of
substances “off the premises of the employer” and
“during nonworking hours.” Id. The NFL claimed
that these provisions in the LCPA required a court to
analyze the terms of the CBA to determine whether
the CBA was applicable to the Williamses’ claim
under the LCPA. The Eighth Circuit noted that the
NFL was unable to direct the court to any specific

15

provision of the CBA that had to be construed in
order to determine what a “bona fide” occupational
condition constituted or “off the premises of the
employer” and “during working hours” meant. Pet.
App. 28a. The Eighth Circuit went so far as to
review the entire 361-page CBA “provision-by-
provision” and found no guidance that could resolve
what “bona fide” occupational condition or what
“working hours” meant, and thus found that the
CBA did not need to be interpreted to resolve the
Williamses’ LCPA claims.

The Eighth Circuit specifically considered what
the NFL now contends that the Court ignored: the
Court reviewed the claims, considered the NFL’s
contention that the CBA was intertwined with the
claims anc needed to be interpreted in order to
resolve the action, and expressly rejected the NFL’s
contentions.

IV. THERE Is No CONFLICT IN THE CouRTS OF
APPEALS WARRANTING THIS COURT’S REVIEW

In this matter, the Eighth Circuit followed well-
established case law allowing union and non-union
employees to enjoy the statutory protections
traditionally provided by states. See Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (“§ 301 cannot
be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights
conferred on individual employees as a matter of
state Jaw”); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071,
1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (a CBA could not waive non-
negotiable rights regarding employee meal times
provided in a state statute and “Section 301 must not
be construed to give employers and unions the power
to displace state regulatory laws”); Graham u.
Contract Transp., Inc., 220 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.

2000) (“It would be inconsistent with congressional
intent under § 301 to pre-empt state rules that
proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations,
independent of a labor contract”) (citing Allis-
Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212).

The NFL contends that the courts of appeals are
divided, but that is simply not so. The only two
federal appellate decisions involving § 301 and state
drug testing laws are the decision below and the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Karnes v. Boeing Co., 335
F.3d 1189 (10% Cir. 2003), both of which hold that §
301 does not preempt such statutes. Notably, the
NFL’s Petition singles out the Tenth Circuit as being
in “conflict” with the Eighth Circuit (see Pet. at 9),
but Karnes belies that assertion. Indeed, the Tenth
Circuit case the NFL cites — Fry v. Airline Pilots
Ass’n, 88 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 1996) — does not even
involve § 301. It involves the Railway Act. See Fry,
88 F.3d at 833. And the NFL’s Petition does not cite
or discuss Karnes. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
case cited by the NFL, Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive,
943 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1991), has nothing to do with
state drug testing laws.

The NFL’s other claims in support of the circuit
conflict are equally strained. The NFL cherry picks
stray language from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th
Cir. 2001), that § 301 preemption “is not mandated
simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in
mounting a defense.” Jd. at 922. The Ninth Circuit
in that case was addressing the NBA’s claim that
NBA players had waived certain state law rights by
entering into a CBA with the league, a defense the
Ninth Circuit stated could be sustained only if the
“CBA includes clear and unmistakable language

17

waiving the... employees’ state right.” Jd. Any fair
reading of the Ninth Circuit opinion demonstrates
that the court then in fact evaluated the CBA in the
course of concluding that no such waiver existed. See
id. (“The NBA and the Warriors have failed to cite
any language, let alone clear and unmistakable
language, in the CBA waiving Sprewell’s state law
right to assert intentional interference claims
against the NBA and the Warriors”) (quotation
omitted). Sprewell does not stake out a position on
the issue the NFL claims warrants this Court’s
review. There is no relevant conflict of law or
controversy to warrant granting the Petition.

V. THE NFL CANNOT CONTRACT FOR WHAT
1S ILLEGAL UNDER STATE LAw.

States, and in this case the State of Minnesota,
have an inherent interest in their citizens’ privacy
rights and in protecting their citizens’ health, safety
and procedural rights. Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S.
290, 303 (1977). DATWA regulates minimum rights
concerning the health, well-being, and due process of
Minnesota employees with regard to employer drug
testing. The NFL challenges Minnesota’s right to
legislate these basic employee rights, seeking to
place itself above Minnesota law and circumvent the
basic minimum requirements imposed upon
employers in the State. Yet, this Court has been
unequivocal, “§ 301 does not grant the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement the ability to
contract for what is illegal under state law.” Allis-
Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212.

There is a_ strong presumption against
preempting a state’s legislation in the areas of the
health and safety of its citizens. Wyeth v. Levine, No.

aw

06-1249, 655 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (Mar. 4, 2009);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
740 (1985) (“[Wle start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress”); Lodge 76,
Intl Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S.
132, 137 (1976) (internal citations and quotations
omitted) (“[iJn short, a State may still exercise
historic powers over such traditionally local matters
as public safety and order ... for policing of such
conduct is left wholly to the states”).

In Farmer, the Court considered a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by
a union employee who voiced dissent regarding a
union’s operation. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 303. As a
result of the employee’s dissent, the union began to
abuse and harass the employee by assigning him
only to jobs of short duration or jobs for which he was
not qualified. The union argued that federal labor
law preempted the employee’s intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim.

The Court explained in Farmer that “inflexible
application of the [preemption] doctrine is to be
avoided, especially where the State has a substantial
interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the
State’s interest is one that does not threaten undue
interference with the federal regulatory scheme.” Jd.
at 302. The Court determined that Farmer
presented a case with “interests so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of
compelling congressional direction, we could not
infer that Congress had deprived the States of the
power to act.” Id. at 296-97. The Court noted that

19

states have a paramount interest in “protecting the
health and well-being of its citizens.” Jd. at 303.
Accordingly, “in light of the discrete concerns of the
federal scheme and the state tort law, that potential
for interference is insufficient to counterbalance the
legitimate and substantial interest of the State in
protecting its citizens.” Id. at 304.

In Metro. Life, the Massachusetts Attorney
General brought suit against an insurer to enforce a
state statute which required that specified minimum
mental) health benefits be provided to Massachusetts
residents. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 727. The insurer
argued, in part, that the National Labor Relations
Act preempted the state statute and deprived the
state of the ability to legislate in the area of health
benefits for employees. This Court soundly rejected
the argument and held that the Massachusetts
statute was a valid exercise of a state’s historic police
powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens
by mandating minimum protections for employees.
Id. at 756.

In two recent pronouncements, protecting states’
regulations from preemption by federal schemes, this
Court reaffirmed the presumption against
preemption. Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., L.L.C.,
557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009); Wyeth, 129 S.
Ct. at 1195. The Wyeth Court recognized the
importance of not treating the issue of preemption
lightly. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3 (“We rely on
the presumption [against preemption] because
respect for the States as independent sovereigns in
our federal system leads us to assume that Congress
does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action”) (internal quotations omitted).

~v

Courts within the Eighth Circuit, most recently
in this matter, have properly applied the Farmer
limitation on preemption. See, e.g., St. John v. Int'l
Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 139 F.3d
1214, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998) (preemption doctrine must
yield in § 801 case in order to protect state’s interest
in addressing intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Ferrell v. Cross, 5567 N.W.2d 560, 566-567
(Minn. 1997) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim and defamation claim can proceed).

Any argument that the NFLPA waived — or could
have waived — the Williamses’ rights by entering into
the CBA fails as a matter of law. Private parties
cannot contract away an employee’s_non-
discretionary state law rights. The Supreme Court
has held that as a general matter a union is
authorized prospectively to waive only statutory
rights related to collective activity, such as the right
to strike, and cannot waive an employee’s individual
rights provided by statute. Alexander v, Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); Neppl v.
Signature Flight Support Corp., 234 F.Supp.2d 1016,
1020 (D.Minn. 2002) (noting that union
representatives cannot waive an _ individual
employees’ statutory rights) (applying Gardner-
Denver).

There can be no real debate that Minnesota has a
bona fide interest in maintaining and enforcing
minimum rights and protections for its employees
from encroachments by employers on their privacy,
due process, health and safety rights. Drug testing
can be acutely intrusive and falsely labeling someone
a drug user based on inaccurate or ill-confirmed tests
can result in major and life-long harm to an
individual. Minnesota exercised its inherent right to

21

protect its citizens and regulate inappropriate
discharge or suspension of employees within the
State based on infringing drug testing.

VI. CONGRESS Dip Not PREEMPT OR
CREATE LAWS THAT CONFLICT WITH THE
STATES’ RIGHT TO REGULATE DRUG
TESTING.

“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone” in a preemption analysis. Metro. Life,
471 U.S. at 736, quoting Retail Clerks ov.
Schermerhorn, 376 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). That which
is not specifically reserved for the federal
government remains in the state’s province. It is a
fundamental principle of federalism that superseding
state law and states’ rights should not be done
lightly. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 736.

Congress has historically been clear when it
wants to preempt an area, including areas impacting
sports organizations. For example, Congress
explicitly created exceptions for sports organizations
in the anti-trust arena. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l
League, 269 U.S. 200 (1922).

In the field of drug testing, Congress has
legislated with regard to motor carriers, commercial
transportation operators and railway operators.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act, 49 C.F.R. Part 40,
382 (2000); Federal Railroad Administration, 49
C.F.R. Part 219 (2001); Drug-Free Workplace Act of
1988, 41 U.S.C. §701 (1988). One year after
Minnesota enacted DATWA, Congress enacted the
Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701,
requiring recipients of federal grants to maintain a
drug-free workplace. Official regulatory guidance
from the federal government states that the Drug-
Free Workplace Act of 1988 is designed to “coexist

with State and local law.” Government-wide
Implementation of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of
1988, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,687 (1990). Thus, the federal
government enacted legislation relating to drug
testing that was designed to supplement, not
supplant, State law.

Despite numerous congressional hearings on the
use of steroids in professional sports, Congress has
chosen not to regulate the field of sports drug
testing. As such, the area remains within the
purview of the States for regulation. The NFL seeks
to have this Court do what it could not successfully
accomplish by lobbying the Legislative branch of
government, exempt it from state drug testing laws.°®
Preemption should not be used to attain this goal.
Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051
(8th Cir. 1998)

———

* Acknowledging that federal law does not preempt the
right of states to regulate drug testing, United States Senator
Byron Dorgan, on September 28, 2010, at the urging of the
NFL, introduced federa) legislation specifically designed to
preempt the field of sports drug testing. The potential for
congressional action in this area undercuts the need for thie
Court's review.

5 On April 7, 2006, the Minnesota House Commerce and
Financial Institutions Committee mot to discuss the enactment
of an amendment to DATWA thut resulted in permitting
random drug testing of professional] athletes. When the floor
opened up to Represontative Goodwin, she specifically noted
that the amendment would pot affect or undermine the
minimum protections for employees set forth in DATWA
Hearing on HF 1103 Before the H. Commerce and Financia)
Institutions Comm., 2005 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006)
(statement of Rep. Barbera Goodwin, Member, House
Commerce and Financial institutions Comm.).

23

VIL. THE CLAIMS IN THIS CASE ARE Not
PREEMPTED BECAUSE THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT NEED Nor BE
EXAMINED TO DETERMINE THE CLALMS.

Section 301 of the LMRA is a jurisdictional
statute under which “[s)uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 was
expanded to include a federal common law
interpreting collective bargaining agreements,
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Muls, 363 U.S 448,
461 (1957). This federal common law was deemed to
preempt the use of state contract law to interpret
collective bargaining agreements and enforcement.
Local 174, Teamsters of Am. V. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).

Allis-Chalmers expanded the application of § 301
preemption beyond cases specifically alleging
contract violations to those whose resolution “is
substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms
of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220. This
Court reiterated that test for preemption in
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987),
Acknowledging that “the pre-emptive force of § 301 is
60 powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of
action for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization,” the Caterpillar Court
explained that § 301 preempts only “claims founded
directly on rights created by collective-bargaining

- 7

agreements, and also claims ‘substantially
dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining
agreement.” Caterpillar, 482 US. at 394
(1987)(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23
(1983)(internal quotation marks omitted).
Caterpillar specifically rejected the contention that
“all employment-related matters involving unionized
employees be resolved through collective bargaining
and thus be governed by a federal common law
created by § 301.” Td. at 396 n. 10 (internal
quotation marks omitted), explaining that employee
claims unrelated to the terms of a CBA were not
preempted.

In clarifying when claims are preempted under §
301, the Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), held that states can
provide substantive rights to workers irrespective of
the existence of a CBA. Id. at 413. A state court suit
seeking to vindicate these state law rights is
preempted only if it “requires the interpretation of a
collective-bargaining agreement.” Id.

Lingle considered whether § 301 preempted an
Illinois statute permitting an employee to file a claim
for retaliatory discharge due to a_ collective
bargaining provision which provided the employee
with a contractual remedy for any termination
without just cause. Jd. The employee filed a claim
with Illinois’ Worker's Compensation Commission
alleging a work related injury. /d. Thereafter, her
employer terminat:d her for filing a false worker's
compensation claim. Jd. The employee went
through the procedures outlined in the collective
bargaining agreement and then sued, alleging that

25

her employer had violated the Illinois statute
banning retaliatory terminations. Id.

The Court analyzed the elements of the Illinois
statute and found that “{nJeither of the elements
requires a court to interpret any term of a collective-
bargaining agreement.” Jd. at 407. “Thus, the
‘State-law remedy in this case is ‘independent’ of the
collective-bargaining agreement...for § 301 pre-
emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim
does not require construing the collective-bargaining
agreement.” Id. Therefore, § 301 did not preempt
the Illinois state claims.

In Clark v. Kellogg Co., 205 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir.
2000), seasonal employees brought an action against
their employer alleging breach of an oral contract to
hire them permanently, promissory’ estoppel,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent
misrepresentation. The employer claimed that § 301
preempted the breach of contract claim because the
employer had an existing CBA with a union in which
the employees were members.

Relying on Lingle, the Eighth Circuit in Clark,
noted that “[w]hile Section 301 preempts claims
founded directly on rights created by a CBA and
claims substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA,
not every dispute concerning employment or
tangentially involving a provision of a CBA is
preempted by Section 301.” Clark, 205 F.3d at 1082.
Because the Clark plaintiffs were not seeking to
enforce any provision of the CBA, there was no
preemption because the “state law claims neither
originate in, nor refer in any substantial way to, the
rights and duties established in the CBA.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit has made a concerted effort
to be “faithful to Supreme Court precedent” by

“requir[ing] that a claim be grounded on the rights
established by a CBA, or substantially dependent on
an analysis of a CBA, before it may be found to be
preempted.” Graham, 220 F.3d at 914 (no § 301
preemption where plaintiff claimed employer
defamed him by terminating him as a result of a
negative drug test and finding that the “defamation
claim does not rely on any rights conferred by the
CBA,” but instead on “a right created by state law
(namely, to be free from false and harmful
statements made about him to others), which is a
right that is independent of any CBA”).

The Williamses’ case needs no reference to or
analysis of the CBA and is independent of it. The
only relevant analysis involves an application of the
NFL’s actions to the confines of DATWA and a
determination of whether those actions violated the
Statute. The NFL’s defense that it was merely
complying with its CBA cannot insulate it from
liability. Section 301 preemption is not applicable
simply because a defendant without substance refers
to the CBA in defending itself.

In Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.8d 1238
(8th Cir. 1995), an employee brought an action to
restrain his employer from suspending him pending
an investigation into the employee’s conduct. ZId. at
1239. The employer argued that § 301 preempted
the employee’s claims because the collective
bargaining agreement specifically authorized the
employee’s claims. Jd. The Eighth Circuit reversed.
Id. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court
explained that “a defendant cannot, merely by
injecting a federal question into an action that
asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform
the action into one arising under federal law” and

27

“(t]he fact that defendant argues...that there was
Sust cause’ under the terms of the CBA for the
discipline plaintiff received, does not create a basis
for § 301 preemption.” Humphrey, 58 F.3d at 1244
(quoting Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 399); see also,
Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683,
692 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiffs claim is the
touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the
CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's
claim. If the claim is plainly based on state law, §
301 preemption is not mandated simply because the
defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense”);
Umphrey v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., 921 F.Supp.
434, 4387 (E.D.Tex. 1996) (“although the employers
may defend against claims by arguing that their
actions were authorized under the CBA and its rules,
this fact does not transform the claim into one which
requires an interpretation of the CBA”); Brown uv.
Holiday Stationstores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 396, 403 (D.
Minn. 1989) (employer’s claim that its conduct is
authorized by a CBA is insufficient to warrant
preemption). In Humprey, the claim was not
preempted since the Court’s decision was based upon
a review of the facts and the statute, and no review
of the CBA was involved — as in the Wiiliamses’ case.

The decision in Karnes is also instructive.
Karnes, 335 F.3d at 1189. In Karnes, Boeing
terminated the plaintiff, pursuant to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement and the anti-drug
policy incorporated in the CBA, after the plaintiff
tested positive for marijuana. The plaintiff argued
that the employer’s conduct violated Oklahoma's
Drug Testing Act, 40, § 562(A), prohibiting
termination based on a positive test result unless a
second confirmatory test were performed. As a
threshold matter, the Tenth Circuit determined that

~v

the plaintiffs claim was not preempted for § 301
purposes because “[iJn order to establish a violation
of this section, [the employee] must show that Boeing
(1) discharged him based on his drug test, and (2)
failed to confirm the result through a second test.
Neither inquiry requires a court to interpret, or even
refer to, the terms of a CBA.” Zd. at 1193. “Thus,
[Plaintiffs] Drug Testing Act claims are clearly
independent of the CBA and are not subject to § 301
preemption.” Jd. at 1194. The Tenth Circuit further
held that the mere fact that the discharge may have
been consistent with the anti-drug policy contained
in the CBA “is irrelevant because ‘§$ 301 does not
grant the parties to a [CBA) the ability to contract
for what is illegal under state Jaw.” Jd. at 1994
(citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212); see also
Thompson v. Hibbing Taconite Holding Co., No. 08-
868 (JRT/RLE) 2008 WL 4737442, *4-5 (D. Minn.
Oct. 24, 2008) (“[w]hether the employer violated its
own testing policies is a separate question from
whether it satisfied the requirements set forth in
DATWA...” and holding that the “[aJllegations that
[the employer] violated such non-negotiable state law
rights doles] not require an interpretation of the
CBA, and would not be preempted under the LMRA”)
(emphasis added).

Like in Karnes, because resolution of the
Williamses’ DATWA claims does not require an
interpretation of the CBA, the NFL’s preemption
claim fails.

29

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted,
Steven E. Rau Peter R. Ginsberg
FLYNN GASKINS Counsel of Record
BENNETT, LLP Christina N. Burgos
338 South 7th Street, GINSBERG & BURGOS PLLC
Suite 2900 12 East 49% Street, 30th Floor
Minneapolis, MN 55402 New York, New York 10017
(612) 388-9500 (646) 374-0029
pginsberg@ginsbergburgos.com
Counsel for Respondents

Kevin Williams and Pat Williams
September 29, 2010

APPENDIX

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Fourth Judicial District Court of Minnesota
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order for Judgment (May 6, 2010)...........:ceeeeesrenveneenes la

Fourth Judicial District Court of Minnesota

Order and Memorandum of Law Granting Plaintiffs’

Motion to Stay Dissolution of Temporary Injunction

Pending Appeal (May 21, 2010)........sssrccrsrscecscesersese 38a

Minnesota Court of Appeals
The National Football League’s Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal! as Moot (Sept. 17, 2010)............008 50a

la

Court File No. 27-CV-08-29778
Judge Gary Larson

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN

DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Kevin Williams, Pat Williams,
Plaintiffs,
¥.

National Football League,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

The above-entitled matter came on for a court trial
before the Honorable Gary Larson, Judge of Hennepin
County District Court, on March 8, 2010 through March
12,2010. Kevin Williams and Pat Williams appeared
personally and through their attorneys, Peter Ginsberg, Esq.,
Steven Rau, Esq., and Christina Burgos, Esq. The National
Football League appeared by its attorneys, Joseph Schmitt,
Esq., Daniel Nash, Esq., and Marla Axelrod, Esq.

The parties agreed to dismiss John Lombardo, M.D.,
and Brian Finkle, M.D., as Defendants. At the
commencement of trial, Adolpho Birch was also dismissed
from the action. Based upon on the files, records, testimony,
and proceedings herein, the Court makes the following
findings:

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FINDINGS OF FACT

That the National Football League (“NFL”) is an
unincorporated nonprofit association comprised of 32
member clubs, including the Minnesota Vikings
(Vikings ").

That the National Football League Management
Council (“NFLMC”) is the exclusive multi-employer
bargaining representative for the NFL member clubs,
including the Vikings.

That each member club is separately owned. Upon
purchasing an NFL team, each owner agrees to be
bound by the NFL Constitution and Bylaws and other
agreed upon internal rules.

That Kevin Williams (“Kevin”) plays football for the
Vikings and has been in the NFL for seven years.

That Kevin’s contract with the Vikings contains a
weight bonus clause.

That Kevin is a starting player for the Vikings and
has been selected to play in the Pro Bowl five times.

That Kevin has never taken steroids, performance
enhancing drugs, or attempted to mask any banned
substance.

That in 2006, Kevin had surgery on his left knee for a
torn patella. Kevin found that maintaining a lighter
weight helped him feel better.

That, shortly efter his operation, in the start of the
2007 season, Kevin took Star Caps.

That a team mate initially told Kevin about and gave
him Star Caps. Kevin subsequently purchased Star
Caps from GNC stores or over the internet.

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That Kevin took Star Caps for the perceived health
benefits, to meet his contractual weight requirements,
and to avoid his coach's reprimands for not mecting
the weight requirements prescribed in his contract.

That Kevin never saw any notice or warnings about
Balanced Health Products or Star Caps. Kevin would
not have taken Star Caps if he had known that they
contained the banned substance Bumetanide.

That Pat Williams ("Pat") plays football for the
Vikings and has been in the NFL. for thirteen years.

That Pat's contract with the Vikings contains a
weight bonus clause.

That Pat is a starting player for the Vikings and has
been selected to play in the Pro Bowl a number of
times.

That Pat has never taken steroids, performance
enhancing drugs, or attempted to mask any banned
substance.

That Pat suffers from high blood pressure and gout,
and takes medications for these conditions.

That, due to these health conditions, doctors advised
Pat to maintain a specified weight.

That Pat first took Star Caps while playing for the
Buffalo Bills to help alleviate the retention of extra
fluid in his joints.

That Pat first heard about Star Caps from another
player on the Buffalo Bills. Pat spoke with his trainer
about taking Star Caps, and the trainer told him that it
would be okay. He purchased Star Caps from GNC
stores or over the internet.

That Pat never received any notice or warnings about
Balanced Health Products or Star Caps. No one ever

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advised Pat not to take Star Caps. Pat would not have
taken Star Caps if he had known that they contained
the banned substance Bumetanide.

That Pat reviewed the contents of the Star Caps
bottle, which states that it is an all natural supplement
and did not list any prohibitive substance. He also
tried calling the players’ hotline, but never received
an answer.

That Kevin and Pat are both members of the NFL
Players Association (“NFLPA”), the exclusive
bargaining representative for all! NFL players. Kevin
and Pat have been NFLPA members since they began
playing in the NFL.

That in 2006, the NFLPA and the NFLMC negotiated
and entered into a comprchensive collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA") that governs the
terms and conditions of players’ employment with
members clubs and establishes procedures for
discipline and dispute resolution.

That the CBA states that players are employed by a
member club of the NFL.

That member clubs have agreed to resoluuons, which
govern their relationships with each other. The clubs
agreed to share revenue from certain sources, such as
television contracts and national marketing
agreements.

That the national contracts are negotiated by a
committee of owners, who must be approved by the
member clubs. Revenue from these deals is
administered by the NFL. on behalf of the member
clubs, and maintained in an agency account.

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That the revenue sharing provides, among other
things, that clubs with higher revenues will share with
clubs with lower revenues.

That the Vikings have sole authority to hire, firc,
negotiate, and sign contracts with players, cut players,
and provide special bonuses for players.

That the NFL reviews and approves every NFL
contract for Vikings players and team personnel.

That Kevin and Pat entered into NFL player contracts
which set forth the terms of their employment. The
NFL, standard form contract is collectively bargained
and is included as Appendix C to the CBA.

That the contracts for Kevin and Pat are on the
standard NFL mandated forms and were approved by
the NFL.

That players may only use agents who are approved
by and registered with the NFL to negotiate their
contracts.

That Kevin and Pat’s contracts state that they are
employed by the Vikings as a “skilled footba!!
player,” accept such employment. and agree to give
their best efforts and loyalty to the club.

That the Vikings Vice President of Footbal!
Operations, Rob Brzezinski (‘Brzezinski’)
negotiated specific contract terms with Kevin and his
agent, Tom Condon (“Condon”).

That, as part of the employment contract, the Vikings
ugreed to pay Kevin a yearly salary for his
performance, services. and other promises. The
contract also provides for individually negotiated
bonuses paid by the Vikings to Kevin, and the
payment terms of these bonuses.

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That these bonus provisions are not part of the
standard NFL contract. and must be approved by the
NIL and the NFLPA.

That Kevin's contract includes a weight provision,
negotiated by Brzezinski, under which Kevin could
eam up to $400,000 in 2008, if he met certain
required weight goals. Under this provision, Kevin
specifically agreed not to engage in any last minute
weight-reducing tactics such as excessive use of a
steam room, use of diuretics, fasting. et cetera

That Brzezinski negotiated a standard NFL contract
with Pat and his agent. Angelo Wright (“Wright”)
As part of this employment contract, the Vikings
agreed to pay Pat a yearly salary for his performance,
services, and other promises,

That Pat's contract includes a weight provision,
negotiated by Brzezinski, under which Pat could earn
up to $400,000 in 2008. if he met certain required
weight goals. Under this provision, Pat specifically
agreed not to engage in any last minute weight-
reducing tactics such as excessive use of a steam
room, use of diuretics, fasting, et cetera.

That many of the rules and regulations governing the
NFL and the teams are collectively bargained for,
including, post-season pay, retirement plans, collepe
draft rules.

That, pursuant to the CBA, Kevin and Pat are entitled
to receive vanous retirement benefits, including
pensions. The retirement plans under the CBA are
established and administered pursuant to the Taft-
Hartley Act.

That the CBA establishes the amount of a player's
pension, which is administered through the auspice of
a separate pension fund. The specific amount of

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retirement benefits payable to Kevin and Pat are
controlled by the plan,

That the Vikings financial obligations for such
benefits are controlled by the CBA. The benefits are
the financial responsibility of the Vikings, not the
NFL. The Vikings are required to make contributions
to the plan for the benefit of Kevin and Pat during
their employment. The Vikings’ contributions to the
retirement plan are paid out of the Vikings’ share of
the agency account maintained by the NFL.

That Pat and Kevin are paid directly by the Vikings
with funds that the Vikings receive from many
sources, including league-wide revenue sharing,
supplemental revenue sharing, fees which the NFL
receives from media and endorsement contracts, and
other sources.

That the NFL negotiates and enters into al! media and
endorsement contracts on behalf of the teams. Fees
from these contracts are paid into the revenue sharing
program.

That the NFL maintains and manages an agency
account where the shared funds are deposited. The
NFL then distributes these from the agency account to
the teams pursuant to a formula created by the NFL.

That the Vikings sell merchandise through retai]
outlets, the internet, and other arenas. The Vikings
keep part of these proceeds and then tum a certain
portion over to the NFL into the revenue sharing
account. A portion of ticket sales for all home games
are also turned over to the NFL for revenue sharing.

That the NFL also manages a separate supplemental
revenue sharing program, where money is collected
from higher revenue generating teams and distributed

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to lower revenue generating teams. Teams may not
opt out of this process.

That the Vikings, like all teams in the NFL, are
required to participate in a revenue sharing program.
The NFL Commissioner imposes discipline if a team
fails to pool funds appropriately.

That without revenue sharing, the Vikings could not
pay all of its salaries and business expenses.

That the NFL is a tax exempt not-for-profit
corporation. Accordingly, the NFL loans funds to
teams at a lower rate than a for-profit entity could
normally borrow funds. Some teams are able to
borrow funds for as low as 1%.

That the NFL avoids the unrelated business tax due to
its tax structure.

That the NFL controls many areas of operation for the
Vikings through the NFL owner’s manual which
dictates rules governing who can own and operate
NFL teams and where they can operate, the operation
of teams, salaries, salary caps, television, public
relations, playing rules, publicity, revenue sharing,
and discipline.

That the NFL commissioner may discipline
individual players for violations of NFL rules,
including imposing suspensions and/or fines.

That the NFL must approve a company before a
player may contract with it for endorsement purposes.

That players can only wear NFL approved clothing on
game days.

That the NFL also maintains a credit facility from
which teams may borrow money.

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That the NFL enforces a debt ceiling for all teams of
$150 million. The amount each team has borrowed is

known only to the NFL.

That the NFL determines a player’s performance-
based pay by looking at the player's salary, draft
status, and playing time.

That the NFL controls, in immense detail, what
players may wear during games including sock and
chin strap color, the type of tape that may be used on
shoes, how jerseys are tucked in, and even how a
player may use a towel

That under the NFL's conduct policy, Vikings players
are subject to discipline by the Commissioner if they

violate an NFL policy.

That the CBA specifically provides the amount that
players receive for playing in the Pro Bowl. Kevin
and Pat have been selected to the Pro Bow! several
times. The Vikings pay its Pro Bowl players with
money given to them by the NFL.

That the Vikings have qualified for the playoffs
during Kevin and Pat's tenure with them. The CBA
provides the terms of the players’ post-season pay.
The NFL gives the Vikings money to pay its players
for post-season play.

That the CBA establishes a policy on Anabolic
Steroids and Related Substances (the “Policy”.

That the Policy is designed to eliminate the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in the NFL. The Policy
articulates three goals: (1) protecting the fairness and
integrity of professional football; (2) protecting
players’ health and safety, and; (3) insuring that NFL
players do not send the wrong message to young fans,

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whom may be tempted to use performance-cnhancing
drugs.

That the Policy, although negotiated by the NFLPA
and NFLMC, is administered by the NFL through an
Independent Administrator and Consulting
Toxicologist.

That Dr. John Lombardo (“Lombardo”) is the
appointed Independent Administrator and Dr. Bryan
Finkle (“Finkle”) is the Consulting Toxicologist.

That Adolpho Birch (“Birch”) is the NFL's Vice
President of Law and Labor Policy and is the person
at the NFL with the responsibility over the Policy and
the liaison with the NFLPA.

That Stacy Robinson (“Robinson”) is the NFLPA
Director of Player Development, and he is Birch’s
counterpart for the NFLPA with responsibility over
the Policy.

That, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, Finkle
served as the Policy’s Consulting Toxicologist and
was appointed jointly by the NFLPA and the
NFLMC. Finkle also consults for the U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, the
National Olympic Committee, the British Olympic
Committee, the National Basketbal! Association, and
the Nationa! Hockey League.

That, although Lombardo serves as the Policy’s
“Independent Administrator,” Lombardo reports to
and takes directives from Birch.

That, although the Policy provides that Lombardo has
sole discretion to certify ea positive test, which
includes determining whether to grant therapeutic use
exemptions and verify the chain-of-custody, this is
not, in fact, how the Policy works.

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That Birch specifically directed Lombardo how and
when to report certain, specific types of positive tests.

That the Policy provides that the NFL, and
specifically Birch, bear responsibility for imposing
discipline in accordance with the Policy. The Policy
also provides that the testing costs and compensation
for Lombardo and Finkle are paid by the NFL.

That Kevin and Pat received a copy of the Policy each
year at training camp. Both Kevin and Pat read,
understood, and were familiar with the policy and the
list of substances prohibited by the Policy.

That the Policy forbids players from having
prohibited substances in their bodics. The prohibited
substances are listed in Appendix A to the Policy.
The list is negotiated between the NFL and the
NFLPA and includes steroids and potential blocking
and masking agents, such as diuretics that hinder the
detection of banned substances.

That Bumetanide is one of the banned substances on
the prohibited list. Bumetanide was included in the
Policy’s prohibited substances list at all times
relevant to this lawsuit.

That the Policy provides that the unknowing use of a
prohibited substance is not a defense to such use.

That the Policy also states that the use of a dietary
supplement that contains a prohibited substance is not
a viable excuse or a defense to the use thereof.

That the NFL has sent several letters to the players
warning them not to use any dietary supplements
because they often contain prohibited substances that
are not listed on the packaging.

That the NFL also sent alerts for specific brands of
products that should not be used.

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That the NFL never sent an alert about Star Caps.

That the Policy provides that whoever tests positive
for a prohibited substance is subject to a first-time
minimum four-game suspension without pay, to be
administered by the NFL (i.e. Birch).

That the Policy provides a detailed procedure for
collecting specimens, protecting the chain-of-custody,
reviewing test results, and maintaining
confidentiality.

That the NFL was not aware of and did not take into
consideration the Jaws of the State of Minnesota, and
specifically the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the
Workplace Act ("DATWA"), which governs drug
test collection for Minnesota employees.

That the Policy provides that a specimen collector
must observe the player furnish a urine sample, and
then split the sample into “A” and “B” bottles and
forward the samples to the appropriate lab for testing.

That the NFL uses two laboratories to conduct player
drug tests, the UCLA Olympic Analytical Laboratory
(“UCLA Lab”) and the Sports Medicine Research
and Testing Laboratory in Utah (“Utah Lab’),

That the UCLA Lab and the Utah Lab are certified
and accredited by the World Anti-Doping Agency
("WADA") and the Intemational Organization for
Standardization (“IOS”).

That the UCLA Lab does not conform to the specific
requirements of DATWA, but in all respects meets or
exceeds the requirements for testing by laboratories
as set out in DATWA.

That the Policy states that Lombardo may choose
which laboratories to use.

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That Lombardo testified that the UCLA lab is
overworked and cannot possibly conduct player drug
tests within three days, as required by DATWA.

That the NFL has an ownership interest in the Utah
Lab and has a financial arrangement with the UCLA
lab.

That the Policy requires that all NFL players be
subject to annual drug tests as part of their pre-season
physical examination during training camp.

That Kevin and Pat’s urine samples were collected at
the start of training camp, on July 26, 2008, pursuant
to the Policy's annual pre-season testing provision, as
noted in the NFL manual.

That Kevin and Pat observed the collectors split their
specimens into "A” and “B” bottles and signed the
chain-of-custody forms.

That Kevin and Pat’s samples were sent to the UCLA
Lab, which received them on July 28, 2008.

That the UCLA Lab completed an initial screening
test on Kevin's “A” bottle on August !, 2008. The
lab then performed a confirmatory test on Kevin's
“A” bottle sample beginning on August 6, 2008, and
completing it on August 12, 2008. The results of the
confirmatory test were certified on August 12 or 13,
2008.

That on August 13, 2008, the lab notified Lombardo
of Kevin’s initial positive screening and positive
confirmatory test results.

That Lombardo then reviewed the chain-of-custody
forms and scheduled a testing date for Kevin's “B”
bottle sample.

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That on August 27, 2008, Lombardo sent Kevin
written notification of his positive test result. The
letter was sent in an envelope marked ‘confidential. "
The letter was addressed to the Vikings and placed in
Kevin’s open locker.

That Lombardo’s letter advised Kevin that his “B”
bottle test would occur on September 9, 2008, and
that he was entitled to have a qualified toxicologist
observe the “B” bottle test.

That after receiving Lombardo’s letter, Kevin told his
wife; his agent Condon, and his coach, Brad
Childress, about his positive test results.

That Condon informed his colleague Tracy Lartigue
(‘““Lartigue ") about Kevin’s positive sample.

That on September 2, 2008, Lartigue sent Birch a
letter appealing Kevin's positive test result. Lartigue
copied Robinson in his letter.

That Kevin arranged for Dennis Crouch (“Crouch”),
an independent toxicologist, to observe his "B" bottle
test. Both Crouch and Finkle observed the “B” bottle
test on September 9, 2008.

That the confirmatory "B" bottle test was positive for
the presence of Bumetanide.

That Finkle reviewed the “B” test. On September 17,
2008, Finkle notified Lombardo, via e-mail, of his
certification of Kevin’s positive test result.

That Lombardo notified Lartigue, by phone, on
September 22, 2008, that Kevin’s final test was
positive for Bumetanide.

That on September 22, 2008, Lombardo notified
Birch, by mail, of Kevin's positive test result. This

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was the NFL’s first notice of Kevin’s positive test
result.

That Lombardo’s September 22, 2008 letter was
received by the NFL on September 24, 2008.

That, on September 26, 2008, Birch sent a letter by
express mail, on behalf of the NFL, to Kevin and the
Vikings notifying them that Kevin would be
suspended for four games because he tested positive
for a banned substance.

That, with regard to Kevin's drug test, the NFL did
not comply with DATWA’S three-day notice
requirement.

That Kevin testified at trial that he was not harmed
because of Lombardo's or the NFL’s delay in
informing him of his positive test result.

That Kevin acknowledged that Bumetanide was in his
system and does not challenge that he tested positive
for Bumetanide.

That the UCLA Lab completed the initial testing
screening on Pat’s “A” bottle sample on August I,
2008. The lab performed a confirmatory test on Pat's
“A” bottle sample on August 6, 2008, and completed
the analysis on August 12, 2008.

That the lab certified Pat's result as positive for the

presence of Bumetanide. On August 13, 2008, the
lab notified Lombardo of Pat’ s positive test result.

That Lombardo requested the chain-of-custody
documents for Pat's test. Lombardo conducted an
initial review of al] documents, and scheduled a date
to conduct testing on Pat’s “B” bottle sample.

That, on August 27, 2008, Lombardo sent Pat written
notification of his positive results. The letter was in

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an envelope marked “confidential” and was sent to
the Vikings and placed in Pat’s open locker.

That Lombardo scheduled Pat’s “B” bottle test for
September 9, 2008.

That shortly after receiving Lombardo’s letter, Pat
told his wife; his agent Wright; and his coach, Brad
Childress, about his positive test result.

That Pat chose not to have an_ independent
toxicologist observe his “B” Sample test.

That Pat’s “B” bottle sample was certified as positive
on September 10, 2008. On September 11, 2008,
Lombardo was notified that Pat’s “B” bottle showed
the presence of Bumetanide.

That Finkle reviewed the documents and certificd
them to Lombardo on September 23, 2008.

That Lombardo reviewed the documents and certified
the positive results to Birch on September 29, 2008.
This was the first notice that the NFL received of
Pat's positive test results,

That Lombardo’s note was received by the NFL on
October 1. 2008.

That on October 3, 2008, Birch sent the letter to Pat
and to the Vikings notifying them that Pat would be
suspended for four games because he tested positive
for a banned substance.

That, with regard to Pat’s drug test, the NFL did not
comply with DATWA’s _ three-day notice
requirement.

That Pat testified that he was not harmed by either
Lombardo’s or the NFL’s delay in informing him of
his positive test results.

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That Pat acknowledged that Bumetanide was in his
system. Pat does not challenge the results showing
that he tested positive for Bumetanide.

That on October 24, 2008, journalist Josina Anderson
reported that a “highly-placed NFL source” released
information that several NFL players tested positive
for Bumetanide.

That on October 24 or 25, 2008, Jay Glazer, a news
reporter, reported that Kevin and Pat tested positive
for Bumetanide.

That Commissioner Roger Goodell was apparently
not interested in discovering the source of the leak
and did not request an investigation, on behalf of the
NFL, to determine if anyone at the NFL was
responsible for the leak.

That Birch testified that, in his opinion, reference by
reporters to the NFL or League includes the NFL
Football League, the NFLPA, players, agents,
coaches, trainers, and team doctors. Birch defines the
NFL as including all of these groups and individuals.

That Birch conducted a very brief investigation on his
own concerning the leak. Birch concluded that no
one from the NFL was involved in the leak., contrary
to the newspaper reporter's assertion.

That Birch's single-handed investigation is highly
suspect,

That Birch reached a totally unsupportable and

unfounded conclusion, alleging that a certain
individual outside of the NFL was the actual source

of the leak.

That it is impossible for the Court to conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that any particular

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individual was the source of the leak regarding
Plaintiffs’ positive test results.

That the Court finds that Kevin and Pat’s attorney
was not the source of the leak.

That Birch’s contradictory testimony in this regard is
not credible,

That in 2005 and 2006, Lombardo and Finkle became
aware that a cluster of players’ urine samples were
testing positive for Bumetanide.

That Bumetanide is a very potent and dangerous drug
and can cause serious side effects, including death, if
inadvertently taken and not under the supervisions of
a physician.

That Finkle became concemed because he had neither
seen this drug nor its level of potency in previous
tests,

That Finkle and Lombardo discussed their concerns
regarding Bumetanide. After interviewing players
who had taken Star Caps and subsequently tested
positive, it became clear to them that Star Caps was
creating the positive test results.

That because of the clear correlation between
Bumetanide and Star Caps, Finkle and Lombardo
requested that the Utah Lab performed a study on Star
Caps. The study confirmed that Star Caps contained
Bumetanide.

That it was obvious to Finkle that if a player took Star
Caps, he would test positive for Bumetanide.

That Lombardo advised Birch that Star Caps
contained the “secret” banned substance.

That Birch indicated that he would inform the FDA or
another appropriate agency of this finding.

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That Birch made a conscious decision not to inform
the FDA or any other regulatory agency that Star
Caps contained Bumetanide.

That Birch now knew that Star Caps contained
Bumetanide and that NFL players were inadvertently
ingesting Bumetanide.

That Birch made an affirmative decision to not
disclose to the teams, the NFLPA, or the players, that
Star Caps contained the banned substance
Bumetanide and should not be used.

That prior to 2007, a number of players tested
positive for Bumetanide and were not referred for
discipline.

That Birch knew full weil that players would continue
taking Star Caps and testing positive for Bumetanide

That Birch, thereafter, directed Lombardo to report
any future players for discipline who tested positive
for Bumetanide, even though their use thereof was
inadvertent. Birch was playing « game of “gotcha.”

That the NFL recently filed pleadings in American
Needle v. Nat'l Football League, No. 08-66), 2009
WL 3865438 (2009), and argued before the United
States Supreme Court that, contrary to its assertion in
this case, the NFL should be treated as a single entity
with the various member teams for anti-trust
purposes,

That on December 3, 2008, Kevin and Pat filed suit
against the NFL; the Policy's Independent
Administrator, Lombardo; the Consulting
Toxicologist, Finkle; and the NFL’s ice President of
Law and Labor Policy, Birch. The complaint alleged
a variety of common law torts based on Defendants’
purported breach of their fiduciary duty to wam

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players that Ster Caps contained Bumetanide.
Defendants removed the action to federal] court on
December 4, 2008.

That after this suit was removed to federal court, the
Suit was consolidated with a mattcr captioned Nat'l
Football League Players Ass'n v. Nat'l Football
League and Nat'l Football League Management
Council, No. 08-CV -6254, 2009 WL 1457007 (D
Minn. May 22, 2009) (the “NFLPA Suit")

That the NFLPA Suit alleged claims on behalf of five
NFL players, including Kevin and Pat, and sought to
overtum the suspensions of those players on the
grounds that their suspensions were the product of
arbitrator bias, a public policy violation, and were
inconsistent with the CBA. In support of the public
policy claim, the NFLPA argued that the NFL failed
to warn the players that Star Caps contained
Bumetanide, in violation of state law fiduciary
Obligations. In support of its claim that the awards
were inconsistent with the CBA, the NFLPA argued
that the NFL had iwnposed harsher discipline on
players who tested positive for diuretics in 2008 than
it had imposed on players who tested positive for
diuretics in 2006,

That Kevin and Pat filed a first amended complaint in
federal court on January 2, 2009, which added counts
under DATWA, Minn. Stat. § 181.950 ef seqg., and the
Lawful Consumable Products Act (“LCPA"), Minn
Stat. § 181.938.

That, on April 14, 2009, the parties in this case
Stipulated to dismiss Finkle as a party. On March &,
2010, Plaintiffs dismissed, with prejudice, individual
Defendants Birch and Lombardo

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That between January and Apnil 2009, the parties
engaged in expedited discovery followed by an
accelerated summary judgment briefing schedule.

That following discovery, Defendants, Plaintiffs; and
the NFLPA filed cross-motions for summary
judgment in federal court.

That on May 22, 2009, the federal court denied Kevin
and Pat's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted
Defendants’ summary judgment motion in part,
holding that Plaintiffs’ common law claims were
preempted by section 30] of the Labor and
Management Relations Act. Nat'l Football League
Players Ass'n v. Nat'l Football League, 654, F. Supp
2d 960, 967 (D. Minn. 2009). The Court held,
however, that Plaintiffs’ claims under DATWA and
the LCPA were not preempted. and remanded those
claims to this Court.

That the United States District Court rejected all of
the common law claims asserted by Kevin and Pat,
holding that those claims were preempted by Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Nar /
Football League Players Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 2d at
967.

That the Court granted in full Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment filed in the NFLPA Suit.

That in addressing the NFLPA’‘s claims under Section
301 of the LMRA on their ments, the Court first
reviewed the NFLPA‘s claim that the arbitration
award upholding Plaintiffs‘ suspensions did not
“draw its essence from the CBA." The Court
rejected the NFLPA’s claim that the suspensions were
inconsistent with the CBA because several play «s in
2006 and 2007 had not been suspended for a positive

167.

168

169,

22a
diuretic test. Nat'l Football League Players Assn.
654 F. Supp. 2d at 968.

That the Court addressed and dismissed the NFLPA’s
claim that the award violated public policy because it
condoned a “breach of fiduciary duty.” The Court
rejected the argument about Lombardo’s alleged
failure to warm, concluding that “Lombardo’s
decision not to publish specific wamings about Star
Caps does not violate his duties to players.
Lombardo testified that he decided to send a general
warming about weight-loss supplements rather than
about Star Caps in particular because ‘the problem is
the whole area of weigh[t) reduction products.’ Nar‘!
Football League Players Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 2d at
970. The Court therefore concluded that “Lombardo
exercised his discretion under the Policy to educate
players, and did so in a general way because he
believed that all weigh[t}-reduction products, not just
Star Caps, carried risks.” Jd The Court, therefore,
all claims related to Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim.

That the parties filed cross-appeals with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
affirmed the district court’s decision in its entirety.
Williams yv. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th
Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’
statutory claims were not preempted because it could
not identify “a specific provision of either the CBA
or the Policy which must be interpreted.” /d. at 877.

That on June S$, 2009, Plaintiffs attempted to file a
second amended complaint in this case identifying the
bases for their statutory claims, adding a new
“retaliation” claim, and specifically alleging breaches
of the collectively-bargained Policy.

That this Court held that Plaintiffs were not permitted
to file the second amended complaint without leave of

23a

Court, pursuant to a filed motion. Plaintiffs never
submitted a Motion for Leave to File the Second
Amended Complaint.

171. That the Court's summary judgment decision left
only two of Plaintiffs’ claims for resolution: (1)
Plaintiffs’ claim under the three-day notice provision
of DATWA; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claim under
DATWA's confidentiality requirements and the
collectively-bargained Policy on Anabolic Steroids
and Related Substances.

ORDER
Phat Defendant NFL is Plaintiffs Kevin Williams and
Pat Williams's employer for purposes of DATWA
That Defendant NFL violeted DATWA’s three-day
notice requirement.
That Plaintiffs Kevin Williams and Pat Williams were
not harmed by Defendant NFL’s DATWA violation.
“ That Plaintiffs Kevin Williams and Pat Williams
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Defendant NFL’s’ violated DATWA’s
confidentiality provision.
5 That Plaintiffs Kevin Williams and Pat Williams’s
request for a permanent injunction is denied.
6 That this Court's previous temporary injunction ts
dissolved
That the attached memorandum is_ incorporated
herein

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

BY THE COURT

2a

Dated: May 6, 2010 s/Gary larson =
Gary Larson

Judge of District Court

JUDGMENT
| hereby certify that the judgment contained in this
heretn above constitutes the Judgment of the Court

Dated Court Administrator

25a

MEMORANDUM
I, LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The NFL is Plaintiffs’ Employer for
Purposes of DATWA.

For purposes of DATWA, the NFL is Plaintiffs
employer. DATWA governs only ‘‘employer drug testing of
employees." Kise v. Product Design & Eng'g, 453 N.W.2d
$61, 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). DATWA defines an
employer as “a person or entity located or doing business in
this state and having one or more employees, and includes
the state and all political or other governmental subdivisions
of the state." Minn. Stat. § 181.950, subd. 7. An employee
is “a person, independent contractor, or person working for
an independent contractor who performs services far
compensation, in whatever form, from an employer.” /d.
subd. 6. Plaintiffs are indisputably employees of the NFL as
well as the Vikings, for DATWA purposes.

The evidence adduced at trial shows that the NFL,
along with the Minnesota Vikings, is a joint employer of
Plaintiffs. The doctrine of joint employer status recognizes
that a worker may have more than one employer. See Zheng
v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The
regulations promulgated under the FLSA expressly recognize
that a worker may be employed by more than one entity at
the same time”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2003)); Gargano
v. Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 888 F.Supp. 1274, 1278 a.2
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The concept of ‘joint employer’ most
frequently arises in the context of claims asserted under the
[NLRA], whether by individuals or the National Labor
Relations Board’), affd, 402 80 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
Whether a person “‘possesse[s] sufficient control over the
work’" of employees to qualify as a joint employer “‘is
essentially a factual issue.” JIJnfernational House v. NLRB,
676 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1982) quoting Boire v
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964)).

£08

_ The NFL, not the Vikings, controls everything about
the drug testing process for Minnesota employees including
when the testing occurs, where it occurs, how often it occurs,
who conduct the specimen collection, and which !ab tests the
sample. Moreover, the NFL's reach extends beyond drug
testing to virtually every aspect of a player's employment,
down to the uniforms the players are obligated to wear.

The NFL has significant contro] over the players’
employment. See Boire, 376 U.S. 473 (determining joint
employment under the National Labor Relatiens Act based
on the “indicia of control” exercised by an employer); Auto.
Trade Ass'n of Maryland v. Harold Folk Enters., Inc., 484
A.2d 612 (1984) (finding joint employer status may be found
where two or more businesses exercise some contro] over the
work or working conditions of an employee). The Minnesota
Supreme Court articulated a five-part test to determine
whether an employment relationship exists: (1 the right to
contro! the means and manner of performance; (2) the mode
of payment: (3) the furnishing of materia’ or tools; (4) he
control of the premises where the work is done; and (5) the
right of the employer to discharge. Guhlke v. Roberts Truck
Lines, 128 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1964). The NFL is an
employer under each part of this test.

1. The NFL Controls Plaintiffs’ Means and Manner
of Performance and the Location of Team Play,

The NFL directly and indirectly controls many
aspects of a player's life both on and off the field. This
control emanates from a series of formal mules and
regulations existing both separate from and in conjunction
with the CBA.

In Boire v. Greyhound Ccrp.. the Supreme Court
indicated that a determination of joint employment, under the
National Labor Relations Act, is based on the “indicia of
control” exercised by an employer. 376 V.S. 473 (1964).
There. the Court found that maintenance workers hired by an

27a

independent contractor to clcan a bus terminal were jointly
employed by Greyhound, the bus company which owned the
terminal. /d@ The Supreme Court remanded the case for a
factual evaluation of the contro! Greyhound exercised over
the work of the maintenance employees. /d.

Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that Greyhound was an employer of the maintenance
workers because it exerted control over many aspects of the
workers’ employment. N.L.R.B. v. Greyhound Corp., 368
F.2d 778 (Sth Cir. 1966). The court looked to the following
facts: (1) the employees constituted a homogeneous, readily
identifiable and stable unit; (2) the service agreements gave
Greyhound the nght to establish work schedules, assign
employees to perform work, specify the exact manner and
means of accomplishing work, ind to contro] regular and
overtime wages; (3) employees used Greyhound’s equipment
and supplies in their work, and; (4) in the course of their
duties, porters were given detailed supervision by other
Greyhound personnel. /d. at 781.

Similarly, the NFL exerts control over many aspects
of the players’ employment. The NFL exerts some of its
contro! over the means and manner of a player’s performance
by exercising control over the teams. The NFL directly
regulates teams and team owners. For example, anyone
buying into the NFL as a team owner must adhere to the rules
and guidelines set forth in Policy Manual! for Member Clubs,
2009 edition (“NFL Owner's Manual”). Any owner failing
to abide by the NFL Owmer’s Manual faces punishment
issued by the NFL. Like all prospective owners, the NFL
required the Wilfs, the Vikings owners, to und ergo an
extensive background check by the NFL before they were
permitted to purchase the Vikings.

The NFL Owner's Manual also governs the manner
in which the Vikings operate. It dictates rules governing
team operations, salaries, mechanism of salary caps,

46a

television contracts, public relations, playing rules, publicity,
revenue sharing, and discipline. The NFL Commissioner has
sole authority ever such issues. The NFL maintains a strict
hold over the contract process -refusing, for example, to
approve contracts that do not use an NFL-mandated form or
are not negotiated by registered agents. Before a player can
sign on with a team, the NFL must review and approve his

contract.

The NFL also controls where teams can operate. If
the Vikings relocated, the Wilfs would be required to pay the
NFL an excise tax. If an expansion team joined the NFL, it
too would have to pay the NFL an excise tax. The NFL's
contro] also extends to team playing schedules and locations.
The NFL decides which teams will play against each other
each week, when. where, and at what time the games will be
played.

The NFL's level of control over the location, manner,
and means of players’ performance makes it appropriate to
adjudicate it as an employer for DATWA purposes.

2. The NFL Controjs the Mode of Payment to
Plaintiffs.

The NFL argues that it should not be considered
players’ “employer” under DATWA because it does not
issue a weekly paycheck to players. Nothing in DATWA
requires such a restrictive reading. In fact, language defining
“employee” suggests the contrary -DATWA specifically
contemplates looking beyond the technicalities of how an
employee is paid and instead focuses on “compensation, in
whatever form." Minn. Stat. § 181.950(6).

The NFL negotiates for, collects, and apportions
funds from which Plaintiffs and all other NFL players are
paid. As stated earlier, the NFL’s level of control over NFL
teams is akin to that of a franchisor over a franchisee. The
NFL is aware of the specific financial conditions of teams

29a

requiring credit while individual teams do not know about
other teams’ finances. NFL teams must operate within the
confines of rules and regulations imposed by the NFL. The
NFL even identified the League as a franchise, and the teams
as franchisees, in its 2000 IRS filing.

An additional sign of the degree of the NFL‘s contro]
over teams is the NFL’s avoidance of the unrelated business
tax. Companies, such as Target and McDonalds, would be
required to pay the unrelated business tax if one were to
borrow from the other. Here, member teams are neither
independent entities nor “unrelated” to the NFL in a
corporate sense. Hence, member teams avoid the unrelated
business tax when revenue filters to them from NFL bond
transactions.

At the heart of the NFL's control is commercial
control. The NFL even determines the companies with
whom players can contract for endorsements. None of these
enumerated control points, or others proved at trial, are
dictated or addressed in the CBA. With a few exceptions
involving pre-season play, the NFL negotiates and enters into
all media contracts on behalf of the teams. The NFL has
contracts with CBS, ESPN, Fox, and others. The NFL
controls national sponsorships with companies such as Coca-
Cola and Verizon. The NFL runs the NFL Network, the NFL
website, NFL Film, and historical programming without any
input from the teams or players. The NFL is the conduit
from which revenue from those dea!s is distributed in order
to fund teams and pay players.

The NFL also controls team finances as part of
Revenue Sharing and Supplemental Revenue Sharing
programs. All teams receive revenue sharing from the NFL.
The revenue sharing comes from fees received by the NFL
far, infer alia, media and-endorsement contracts. The NFL
maintains and manages an agency account where shared
funds are deposited. The NFL then distributes these funds

Va

from the agency account to teams pursuant to a formula
created by the NFL. The teams are removed from the
process and revenue pooling occurs automatically. To
solidify the NFL’s control over the process, the NFL
Commissioner exercises discipline if a team fails to pool
funds appropriately. Moreover, teams are not permitted to
opt out of this process.

While NFL teams technically remit checks to players
as compensation, some of these funds come from the NFL
League Office. Part of players’ salaries are paid for with
funds from the NFL through the revenue sharing program.
Player benefit plans, including pensions, tuition
reimbursement, severance pay, and termination pay, are
funded by NFL contracts and the NFL revenue stream. With
regard to Plaintiffs, revenue sharing ts particularly important
The Vikings could not pay its players’ salaries and business
expenses without the additional income it receives from
revenue sharing.

The NFL controls the mode of payment to Plaintiffs
because jt controls and supplies many of the funds to the
teams that the teams then pay Plaintiffs for the performance
and services. The NFL meets the payment control prong of
the Guhlke test.

3. The NFL Controls the Materials and Tools Used
by Plaintiffs.

The NFL controls many of the materials and tools
used by Plaintiffs in the course of their employment. The
NFL acts as a franchisor of NFL teams controlling the rules
that players must follow in order to play professiona!
football. The NFL controls just about every aspect of
Plaintiffs’ workplace performance including what they wear,
how they are permitted to act, and what football and non-
football rules they must follow.

3la

Moreover, the NFL furnishes and regulates the tools
and materials with which players perform on the field. The
NFL dictates step-by-step exactly what an NFL uniform must
look like to pass as suitable attire. The NFL controls even
minute details, such as the color of a player’s chinstrap. The
NFL’s power over players’ tools and materials may even
override medical advice and/or treatment. For example, the
NFL League Office has final approval, even if contrary to
medical advice, on whether a player will he permitted to use
tinted eye shields during a game. If a player chooses not to
follow the rules imposed by the NFL, he [aces fines or
possible discharge. The NFL also meets the material and
tools control prong of the Guhlke test for determining the
identity of a worker's employer.

4. The NFL Controls the Right to Discipline and
Discharge Plaintiffs.

The NFL’s power to control is most evident in its
ability to discipline and discharge players. The NFL's
conduct policy applies to all NFL players and club
employees. The NFL Commissioner is empowered to
impose fines and subject NFL players and personnel,
including coaches, referees and owners to non-monetary
discipline as well. The NFL determines game-related
misconduct including on-field infractions. NFL employee
Merton Hanks enforces the uniform policy and the NFL
collects fines for violations. The NFL also polices and
punishes player conduct off of the field.! The NFL also

| For example, Commissioner Goodell recently suspended
Pittsburg Steelers Ben Roethlisberger for six games for violating the
league’s personal conduct policy, even though he was not charged with
any crime. It is interesting to , note that a highly respected newspaper
charactcrizes Roethlisberger's position as “an employee of the NFL.”

William C, Rhoden, Commissioner sends pn message to rookie class,

GLOBAI. EDITION OF THE N.Y. TIMES, April 24-25, 2010, at Sports 13.

J4a

maintains the right to discharge players. For example. the
NFL discharged Vikings player Bryan McKinnie from the
2009-2010 Pro Bowl Team, The NFL withheld McKinnie’s
Pro Bowl pay and required him to re-pay his Pro Bowl
related expenses.

Finally, the NFL has the sole right to discipline
players under the steroid Program. Although the
Independent Administrator, in theory, has discretion whether
to refer a player for discipline, Birch usurped Lombardo’s
authority in deciding who to refer for discipline. The NFL
has ultimate authority to impose discipline under the
program, Neither the Vikings nor any other team, is
empowered to issue, prevent, or alter any discipline under the
Program.

The NFL meets almost all of the criteria under
Guhlke. The NFL has the right to contra | the means and
manner of performance, the mode of payment, the furnishing
of material or tools; exerts some control of the premises
where the work is done, and has the nght to discharge and
discipline players. /d. Based on the Guhlke test established
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the NFL is a joint
employer of Plaintiffs for DATWA purposes.

B. DATWA Applies to the NFL’s Drug Testing ip this
Case.

DATWA applies to employers who conduct drug or
alcohol testing. Minn. Stat. § 181.951. As established above,
drug or alcohol testing is defined as an “analysis of a body
component sample ... for the purpose of measuring the
presence or absence of drugs, alcohol, or their metabolites in
the sample tested.” Minn, Stat. § 181.950(5). DATWA
defines ‘‘drug” as a controlled substance as defined by Minn.
Stat. § 152.01(4). Minnesota’s controlled substance statute
specifically includes “anabolic steroids," -a substance for
which the NFL tested players.

33a

Minn. Stat. § 152.01 (4)(6). Minnesota law also
states that a controlled substance includes drugs, which are
defived as “as medicines and preparations recognized in the
United State Pharmacopocia or National Formulary and any
substance or mixture of substances intended to be used for
the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease of either
humans or other animals.” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 2.
Bumetanide is included in this definition, Drug testing for
Bumctanide falls under the auspices of DATWA and applies
to the NFL in this euse.

DATWA covers the substances under the NFL's drug
testing Policy. DATWA applics to the NFL and the drug
testing at issue in this case.

C. Defendants Did Not Comply With DATWA's Three-
Day Notice Requirement for Test Results.

Minnesota Statute § 181.953 subdivisions 3 and 7
provide that the “laboratory shal} disclose to the employer a
written test result report ... within three working days after a
confirmatory test” and that the employer ‘“[within three
working days after receipt of a test result report from the
testing laboratory ... shall inform in writing an employee ...
of a positive test result on a confirmatory test.” The lab did
not disclose the confirmatory “B” sample test results to the
NFL within three days and that the NFL did not disclose the
results to Plaintiffs three days later.

Kevin and Pat were initially tested on July 26, 2008,
but did not receive notice of the positive test results until
September 26, 2008 and October 3, 2008, respectively. Dr.
Lombardo stated that players generally receive notice of the
initial test “anywhere from 14 days to 30 days, 35 days,
sometimes longer, ” hut that there is no time period by which
he must inform players of 8 positive test result

Lombardo reports 1o the NFL, is paid by the NFL,
and takes direction from the NFL. Lombardo is an agent of

$4a

the NFL and received Plaintiffs’ test results, in his capacity
as an agent of the NFL. Lombardo reccived both Kevin and
Pat's “A sample test results on August] 3, 2008. Plaintiffs
did not receive confirmation of their test results until Jate
September and carly October. Regardicss of whether the
NFL desired to give Plaintiffs’ test results an additional level
of review, they violated DATWA by not disclosing the
confirmatory test results to Plaintiffs within three working
days. This lapse in time violates DATWA's three-day notice
requirement. The NFL's practice docs not meet or exceed
DATWA’s three-day notice requirement

Although, Defendants failed to comply with
DATWA's three-day notification requirement, Pluintiffs
testified that they did not suffer any harm as a result of the
delay, When asked how he was harmed by any delay in
notification, Kevin responded, “‘] don't know, | wasn't.’
Similarly, Pat answered, “Il guess [| wasn't harmed.’
Because Plaintiffs did not suffer any damages as a result of
the delay in notification, they are not entitled to relicf under

DATWA.

D. Plaintiffs Failed to Prove that the NFL Breached
DATWA's Confidentiality Requirement.

Plaintiffs claim that the NEL breached — the
confidentiality requirement of DATWA DATWA's
confidentiality requirement states thal “test result reports and
other information acquired in the drug or alcohol testing
process are .., private and confidential information, and
may not be disclosed by an employer or laboratory to unother
employer or to a third-party individual, governmental
agency, or private organization without the written consent of
the employee or job applicant tested.” Minn. Stat
§ 18).954(2). Plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the NFL disclosed Plaintiffs’ test results
inappropriately

35a

Plaintiffs’ stated, at trial, that they shared the results
of their positive drug tests with others. Kevin told his wife,
Vikings’ Coach Brad Childress, his agent Candon, and his
attorney. Coach Childress testified that he told Vikings Vice
President of Football Operations Brzezinski. Condon told
Lartigue, another agent in Condon’s office. Kevin also told
David Black and Dennis Crouch, two independent
toxicologists. Kevin also stated that he may have told
additiona) people, but “can’t remember everybody on the
list.” Pat told his wife, his agent Wright, Kevin, and Coach
Childress. Plaintiffs’ coach, agents, and attomey, as well as
Brzezinski all testified that they were not the source of the
leak. Lartigue and Plaintiffs’ wives did not testify. Because
sO many people outside of the NFL were informed of
Plaintiffs’ test results prior to the media reports, it is
impossible for the Court to conclude by a preponderance of
the evidence that the NFL must have violated DATWA’s
confidentiality provision.

The Court dues conclude, however, that the media
leak was clearly of no importance to the NFL Commissioner,
as he did nothing to determine that the NFL did not violate
DATWA's confidentiality provision. The Commissioner did
not conduct an investigation or make any inquires into the
matter. Birch was likewise cavalier about the leak of highly-
confidential information or potential violation of state law.
Birch claimed to have conducted his own investigation into
the leak at the NFL. However, Birch also claimed that the
tern “highly placed NFL source” that told the media about
Plaintiff's test results could have referred to anyone even
tangentially involved in the NFL, including players, agents,
or coaches. Given Birch’s definition, it is nothing short of
miraculous that he could single-handedly launch a thorough
investigation.

Plaintiffs’ failed to support their allegations that the

NFL leaked Plaintiffs’ test results to the media with
evidence. Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the

J0&

evidence that the NFL breached DATWA'’s confidentiality
requirement.
E. Plaintiffs’ Request for a Permanent Injunction is
Denied.

Plaintiffs seek an injunction, permanently enjoining
the NFL from disciplining Plaintiffs as a result of the drug
testing and subsequent discipline. DATWA provides that
“[a]Jn employee ... has standing to bring an action for
injunctive relief requesting the district court to enjoin an
employer or Jaboratory that commits or proposes to commit
an act in violation of sections 181.950 to 181.954." Minn.
Stat. § 181.956 (3).

This Court has discretion to issue an injunction if
Plaintiffs have proven their case on the ments. Bio-Une, Inc.
v. Burman, 404 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 3987). “In
determining whether permanent injunctive relief is
warranted, the district court must first determine whether the
plaintiff has proven its case.” Thomas & Betts Corp. v.
Leger, No. A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391, at *25 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 24, 2004) (citing Minn. Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp $84, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd,
498 F.2d 13]4 (8th Cir. 1974)). If the court finds that a
plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, it must then balance the
likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff against the
possibility of injury to the defendant and other interested
parties as well as any public policy considerations. /d.

Plaintiffs failed to establish success on the merits.
The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent
injunction and dissolves the temporary injunction that was
put in place on December 3, 2008.

il. CONCLUSION

Based on Minnesota law and the facts adduced at
trial, Defendant is Plaintiffs’ employer for purposes of
DATWA. Defendant violated DATWA's three-day notice

37a
requirement. Defendant’s drug testing notice policy did not
meet or exceed DATWA. However, Plaintiffs admitted that
they did not suffer any harm from the delay in notice.
Plaintiffs, therefore, may not recover for Defendant's
violation. Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendant violated
DATWA's confidentiality provision. Plaintiffs’ request for a
permanent injunction is denied and this Court's previous
temporary injunction is dissolved.

Jjsa

Court File No. 27-CV-08-29778
Judge Gary Larson

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN
DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Kevin Williams, Pat Williams,
Plaintiffs,
We

Nationa! Football League,
Defendant.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STAY DISSOLUTION OF
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

The above-entitled matter came for a hearing before the
Honorable Gary Larson, Judge of Hennepin County District
Court, on May 6, 2010. Steven Rau, Esq., Peter Ginsberg,
Esq., and Christina Burgos, Esq., appearea for and on behalf
of Plaintiffs, Kevin and Pat Williams. Joseph Schmitt, Esq.,
appeared for and on behalf of Defendants, the Nationa!
Football League. Based upon all files, records, ar
proceedings herein, together with the arguments of counsel,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

|. Plaintiffs Kevin Williams and Pat Williams“ Motion to
Stay Dissolution of Temporary Injunction Pending

hm

39a

Appeal is PREMATURE AS THEY HAVE NOT YET
FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL.

If Plaintiffs Williams and Pat Williams timely file a
notice of appeal, the Court will grant their motion to stay
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for
Judgment of this Court dated May 6, 2010,

The order to stay dissolution of temporary injunction
pending appeal will be conditioned upon Plaintiffs
posting a supersedeas bond in the amount of $10,000.

The attached memorandum is incorporated herein.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: May 21, 2010 s / Gary Larson
Gary Larson
Judge of District Court
C-1655 Government Center
Minneapolis, MN 55487
(612) 348-6102

4ua
MEMORANDUM

x Introduction

On May 6, 2010, this Court issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment after the
matter came before the Court for a trial March 8 - 12, 2010.
The parties submitted post-trial briefs and the case was taken
under advisement on April 2, 2010.

In its Order, the Court found that the Nationa! Football
League, (“Defendant”), is Kevin Williams and Pat Williams’,
(“Plaintiffs”), employer for the purposes of the Drug and
Alcohol in the Workplace Act (“DATWA"). The Court also
found that Defendant violated DATWA by failing to abide
by the Legislature’s mandate that employees be given notice
of a failed drug test within three days. However, the Court
found that Plaintiffs were not damaged by Defendant's
DATWA violation in delaying notice of Plaintiffs’ positive
test results. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a
permanent injunction and dissolved its temporary injunction.

Plaintiffs have stated their intent to appeal this Court’s
decision and seek & reinstatement of the temporary injunction
pending appeal. Plaintiffs have not, however, filed a notice of
appeal or appeal. Plaintiffs instead filed a Motion to Stay
Dissclution of Temporary Injunction Pending Appeal with
this Court. Defendant opposes the motion.

Il. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

The tial court may continue an injunction in effect
pending appeal, notwithstanding the filing of cost and
supersedeas bonds. David N. Volkmann Const., Inc. v. Isaacs,
428 N.W.2d 875, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Svate v.
Robnan. Inc., 107 IN. W.2d 51, 53 (Minn. 1960)). If a stay is
permitted, the trial court must establish and approve the

4la

terms of security to protect the respondent. Minn. R. Civ. P.
62.02, 62.03; see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. |
(trial court must approve amount and form of supersedeas
bond), 108.01, subd. 4 (on appeal from decision requiring
assignment of documents, supersedeas bond may be waived
if documents are deposited with officer appointed by trial
court). David N. Volkmann Const., 428 N.W.2d at 876.

According to Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure Rule 108.02, subd. 1,

A party seeking any of the following relief must
move first in the trial court: (a) a stay of enforcement
of the judgment or order of a trial! court pending
appeal; (b) approval of the form and amount of
security, if any, to be provided in connection with
such a stay; or (c) an order suspending, modifying,
restoring, or granting an injunction while an appeal is
pending pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 62.02.

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 62.02 also provides for
the granting of an injunction pending appeal. It states,

When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or
final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an
injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend,
modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the
pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the
rights of the adverse party.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 62.02.

When determining whether or not to grant a stay
pending appeal, the trial court must balance the appealing
party's interest in preserving the status quo, so that effective
relief will be available if the appeal succeeds, against the
interests of the public or the prevailing party in enforcing the
decision and ensuring that they remain “secure in victory”

42a

while the appeal is pending. DRJ, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 741
N.W.2d 141, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).

“The party seeking a stay pending appeal must show (1)
that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that it will suffer
irreparable injury unless the stay is granted; (3) that no
substantial harm will come to other interested parties; and (4)
that the stay will do no harm to the public interest.” James
River Flood Control Ass'n v. Watt, 680 F.2d 543, 544 (8th
Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); see Arkansas Peace Cir. v.
Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control, 992 F.2d 145, 147 (8th
Cir. 1993). “Thus, the factors considered in evaluating
[defendant's] motion are virtually identical to those
considered in assessing the initial motion for a preliminary
injunction.” Metro Networks Commc'ns Lid. P'ship v.
Zavodnick, No. Civ. 03-6198, 2004 WL 73591, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 15, 2004) (citing United Healthcare Ins. Co. v.
AdvancePCS, Civ. No. 01-2320, 2002 WL 519720, at *1 (D.
Minn. Mar. 22, 2002)).

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 62.02 only applies
when the party seeking a stay has filed an appeal. Plaintiffs’
Motion to Stay Dissolution of Temporary Injunction Pending
Appegl is premature because Plaintiffs have not yet filed an
appeal or notice of appeal. However, when Plaintiffs file
such an appeal, the Court will grant their motion based on the
following analysis.

B. This Court may exercise its discretion to grant a
stay.

In exercising its discretion to grant a stay of dissolution
of th® temporary restraining order, this Court must balance
Plaintiffs’ interests in preserving the status quo against
Defendant's interest in enforcing discipline against Plaintiffs.
The Court must determine if Plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits, will suffer irreparable injury unless the stay is
granted, if substantial harm will come to other interested

43a

parties. and whether the stay will harm the public interest.
Each factor is discussed below.

I, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits.

Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits.
Plaintiffs have the burden on appeal to prove that the trial
court made an error of fact or law. Graffius v. Control Data
Corp., 4

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1979%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
