# Opposition Brief — Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1613%3A5 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2010 - **Citation:** 561 U.S. 1025 ## Text In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., FKA PHILIP MORRIS, INC.. PETITIONER Vv. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS Vv. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PETITIONER ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO (INVESTMENTS), LIMITED, PETLLTIONER ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY. PETITIONER us UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI! TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION NEAL KUMAR KATYAI Acting Solicitor General Counsel of Record (Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover) (8 ns 2S eee RRS OREN ite ae Pee EI ANNE TR RE SORT a EEDA I SE LEI OE RCM BPS E LIS IRI EGORY C.J. LISA LE Attorneys me , j De Darlin nt of J SL2UC¢ Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 SupremeCtbriefs@ + io ~& | ) ’ ZUZ) D1 4-221 QUESTIONS PRESENTED The petitions collectively present the following ques- tions: 1. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that an unincorporated association of corporations and individuals may form an “enterprise” under 18 U.S.C 1961(4). 2. Whether the court of appeals was required to un- dertake independent appellate review of the district court’s unchallenged findings of fact establishing fraud. 3. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that the First Amendment does not protect petitioners’ pub- lic statements because they were fraudulent. 4. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that petitioners’ statements about “light” and “low tar” ciga- rettes were false, misleading, and not authorized by the Federal Trade Commission. 5. Whether the court of appeals correctly rejected the argument that any reasonable likelihood of future violations was eliminated by the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement or, alternatively, by the passage of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control] Act. 6. Whether the court of appeals correctly sustained relief prohibiting specified conduct and requiring cor- rective statements. 7. Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited, a foreign corporation, was subject to RICO when it used the interstate mails and wires and engaged in other conduct in the United States in furtherance of a scheme to defraud American consumers, and when it conspired with American companies to pursue that fraudulent scheme. 8. Whether the court of appeals correctly rejected Altria’s contention that it did not aet with specific intent to defraud. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Opinions below .... ) . | ia eee Jurisdiction ..... ee ae ee Be ee eae eee Ce eee ee eae ee eee a Armumem ......... ee Ee ee ee ae 14 A. Anunine yrporated association of corporations and individuals may form a RICO enterprise B. The court of appeals was not required to undertake independent appellate review of the district court’s unchallenged findings of fact Ce I os oe ere ee eee eee 27 (. Petitioners’ fraud was not protected by the First PR dy nb oe evecare eee eves reenees case OA D. Petitioners’ statements about “light” and “low tar” cigarettes were fraudulent and not authorized by the FTC ........... , | 50 EK. Neither the master scttlement agreement nor the passage of the F'amily Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act eliminated all likelihood ee ee ; 5: EF. The court of appeals correctly upheld the injunction prohibiting specified conduct and requiring corrective statements ........... 7 G. The court of appeals correctly rejected BATCo’s claim that this case involves an extraterritorial appucation OF RICA) ....... ccs cceccess 62 H. The court of appeals correctly concluded that Altria acted with intent to defraud ...... aie ae CL ANEDUNE oo a or vee ee eee ee oa ees (2 Appendix Transcript of oral argument. (D.C. C Oct. 14, 2008) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES {_asé ‘ 4 ; t- ) } arn 4 | i(/Aaada Fe) n, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Ch cer ie] } AO? US. 1005 (1991) RR V/tma Grow) / f od. 129 S. Ct 6 (POOS IZ, oc, OU 4 S { tf D627 - ; | ; 14, 1 WeTIC OU) ‘ Vi ¢ ‘ , } 4 wal Pre Dri yo } if mf ) f Se sf | Ze QR OTT ( , (XQ) j (,0O7T) Vv. (07 AGH } j . Lyi 166 U.S. 4& Had he soul / ! States, 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009 7) Bridge v. Phi px | 1 & Indem. Ce IRS CF Jil (YOO 1). 64. ¢ HG b (Cj } pri f i a PY, 5 | 4 ' POOL) Pe ) , pAcer ta? »C | ; |? ] ‘A{ i jos | [> y J . ) . ll" ‘ ‘ ON MMLAL Landreth, 566 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009 f YC7e) : Salaz L7. BQ S oo LOD 2OOD) }4) ('} PCTIVCHEL YN Holder HY | j: 3] LOO? (Sth Cir Api petition for cert. pending, No. 09-1235 (filed Ay 2? OO10) 2 f V7 PILOT IDE alth brand Livi \ / y) t¢ i State 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010), appeal pending No. 10-5234 (6th Cir. filed Mar. 9, 2010 6 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005 MedL 4 r} ‘ Blur Cre ce DL | l VM ; P : Lents ( ONTETCTLC E 365 U.S. 127 (1961) ‘ ° { Oy y sy yironmental De f purnd. [ne Cir. 1993 . State Bar, denied, 526 U.S J 2 Lana Bant 19] } ta rttori t 0 PQ 1 9X9 F‘londa S. 136 (1994 Vo vs ] Madigan 538 U.S. 600 (2003) Continued: Lake A LTWAYS Ltd V Sahe LO Be lgian World Arrlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) Levine v. CMP Publ’ns., Imc., 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental s Renta, 530 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) Liv Lg De SLgNS, Inc. v. ET. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005). cert. denied, 947 U.S. 1192 (2006) UVcCombv. Jacksonville Paper Ci (1949).... Vict illo ih Vv. Sale WUcDonald v. Smith. {cIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comn (1995) Mocros oft ( Orp v. Odom, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006 Vatronal ( ONT " OF} Egg Nutrition i FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S Nike, Ine. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 North South Fon. Co 2d Cir. 1996) Ocean Energy 11 J. RHR FC 21 Cases—Continued: Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2000) . . . 6s on 0 oo se . 40, 63, Peel yv. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Ince. 508 U.S. 49 (1993) Republic of the Phillippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct., 106 F.3d 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997) Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co.. 241 (2d Cir. 2001) SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975) SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir 2009), petition for cert. pending, No. 09-1176 (filed Mar. 26, 2010) Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) linited Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 US. 657 (1965) spc _f ontinued ted States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d C t. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984) lnited States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir United States v. Butler, 954 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1992 l/nited States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976) lJnited States v. Cr 4. 3d 71 (ist Cir. 2004) l/nited States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (38d Cir. 1993 cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, and 513 U.S. 812 (1994) ited States v. Feldman, 853 k.2d 648 (9th Cir 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989) rited States v. Goldin Indus., Ine., 219 F.3d 1271 Lith Cir.), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1015 (2000) ited States v. Huber. 603 k denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980) ited States v. Ineo Bank & Try 845 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1988 utes v. London, 66 F.3d 1227 eert. denied, 517 U.S. LL55 (1996) nited States v. Masters, 924 I°.2d 1362 cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919, (1991) nited States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466 (4th Cu denied, 5387 U.S. 1094 (2002) d States v. Navarro Ordas, 770 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 | ) ited State ' NI, (1977 Cases—Continued: United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000 United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 3438 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988) l/nited States vy. Philip Morris USA, Ini 1TT7 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2007) lInited States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2001) ‘ited States v. Stolfi, 889 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1989) l/nited States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir eert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 458 U.S. 1109, and 459 U.S. 825 (1982) nited States v. Turket 19S] rib rl ( 0 \ FTC. cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 | vuderer Vv. Office O} Dis (1 U.S. 626 (1985 id rules—Continued: ), 123 Stat. 1782 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, $ 968, 103 Stat. 506 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. ............ by. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 ).S.C. 1961 S.C. 196101) . 196103) > 1Y61(4) >», 1Y61(D) >. 1961(10) 1962(¢) > 1962(d) », LYb4(a) li 5.C. 1964(b IS U.S.C. 1964(¢) Weapon >of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-45 § 68$02(e), 118 Stat. 3767 » ULS.C. 38345(a)(2) 5 U.S.C. 3345(a)(3) IS U.S.C. 1001 8 U.S.C. 1341 Te) = ee Rule 65(d Rule 65(d)(1 Rule 65(d)(4 cel AnNnPOl]! Authoriia of thi Pre 4 } . ¥ j ) ‘ f crt : 1 s Attorne yu (reneral.. i il. sC Pal ounse! 2007), nttp:;, WWW .JUSLICE v/olc/2007/author! of-the-president-name-ag-070908. pdf Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States No. 09-976 PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., FKA PHILIP MORRIS, IN¢ PETITIONER . UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, | No. 09-977 t.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, ET A! PETITIONERS . NITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET No. 09-979 CRIA GROUP, INC., PETITIONE! ?). NITED STATES OF AMERI No. 09-980 . TOBACCO (INVES ETITIONER U. NITED STATES OF AMI No. 09-1012 4RD TOBACCO COMPANY, PI ?) NITED STATES OF AMERICA, F’ PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CER UNITED STATES COURT OF > TET DIS rRIt TLR ¢ O] 4 WB) ? FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la 1004) is reported at 566 F.3d 1095. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 10la-2181la) is reported at 449 F. Supp. 2d 1. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on May 22, 2009. Petitions for rehearing were denied on September 22, 2009 (Pet. App. 2182a-2815a). On No- vember 10, 2009, the Chief Justice extended the time within which to file petitions for a writ of certiorari to and including February 19, 2010, and the petitions were filed on that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C, 1254(1). STATEMENT The United States brought this action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICQ), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., alleging that petitioners engaged in a coordinated scheme to deceive Americans about the addictiveness and health risks of cigarettes, thereby enhancing petitioners’ cigarette sales and asso- ciated profits. The district court held a nine-month bench trial, admitting nearly 14,000 exhibits and hearing live testimony from 84 witnesses and written testimony from 162 witnesses. Pet. App. 8a. The voluminous evi- dentiary record includes large numbers of petitioners’ internal documents, see, e.g., 7d. at 36a-39a, as well as testimony from numerous former tcbacco industry em- ployees and participants that detail petitioners’ fraudu- lent behavior, e.g., id. at 35a-36a. Based on that record, the district court issued a final decision documenting the “overwhelming evidence” that 3 petitioners conducted and conspired to conduct the af- fairs of a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racke- teering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(¢) and (d), by engaging in a decades-long scheme to defraud that petitioners executed in part through their use of mail and wire communications. Pet. App. 103a, 114a-115a, 1887a; see 2d. at 1885a-2004a. The court’s opinion, which spans nearly an entire volume of the federal Supple- ment, includes more than 4000 enumerated findings of fact and details the affairs of petitioners’ enterprise and petitioners’ pattern of mail and wire fraud. See id. at 119a-1885a. The district court found, and the court of appeals unanimously affirmed, that the government proved that petitioners participated in the conduct of an enterprise and “knowingly and intentionally engaged in a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers, for purposes of financial gain, by making false and fraudulent state- ments, representations, and promises.” Pet. App. 1888a; id. at 5a-6a, 30a. “Put more colloquially, and less legal istically, over the course of more than 50 years, [peti- tioners] lied, misrepresented, and deceived the Ameri- can public, including smokers and the young people they avidly sought as ‘replacement smokers,’ about the devas tating health effects of smoking and environmental to- baeco smoke, they suppressed research, they destroyed documents, they manipulated the use of nicotine so as to increase and perpetuate addiction, they distorted the truth about low tar and light cigarettes so as to discour age smokers from quitting, and they abused the legal system in order to achieve their goal.” /d. at 1887a- 1S&Sa. As the court of appeals observed, a summary of peti tioners’ conduct “cannot adequately present the volume: of evidence underlying the district court’s findings of fact.” Pet. App. 37a. “(T]he evidentiary picture must be viewed in its totality in order to fully appreciate how massive the case is against [petitioners], how irresponsi- ble their actions have been, and how heedless they have been of the public welfare and the suffering caused by” their fraudulent conduct. /d. at 112a. The following summary thus provides but an outline of the nature and history of the RICO enterprise as found by the district court and affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. 1. In 1953, petitioners’ RICO enterprise was estab lished when the presidents of Philip Morris, Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and American met to develop a joint response to the growing public concern about the health risks of smoking. Pet. App. 122a-127a, 1923a-1925a. The companies, normally rivals in the cig arette market, agreed that no manufacturer would “seek a competitive advantage by inferring to its public that its product is less risky than others,” 7d. at 124a, and jointly issued a full-page advertisement entitled “A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” that they pub lished in newspapers nationwide on January 4, 1954. /d. at 128a-132a. “The Frank Statement set forth the indus- try’s ‘open question’ position that it would maintain for more than forty years—that cigarette smoking was not a proven cause of lung cancer; that cigarettes were not injurious to health; and that more research on smoking and health issues was needed.” /d. at 129a. At its core, petitioners’ scheme was designed to “mis- lead[] consumers in order to maximize [petitioners’ | rev- enues by recruiting new smokers (the majority of whom are under the age of 18), preventing current smokers from quitting, and thereby sustaining the industry.” Pet. App. 201 1a; see id. at 18&&a. The goal of the “open question” strategy, as a senior Philip Morris executive later explained, was to create the impression of scientific uncertainty and thereby “give smokers a psychological crutch and a self-rationale to continue smoking.” /d. at 417a. The companies declared in the Frank Statement that “[wJe accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business”; asserted that “[wJe believe the prod- ucts we make are not injurious to health”; and promised to fund objective research into “all phases of tobacco use and health” by scientists “of unimpeachable integrity and national repute.” /d. at 131a-132a. Yet at the time the companies issued the “Frank Statement,” they already had “documented a large num- ber of known carcinogens contained in cigarette smoke.” Pet. App. 396a. Over the ensuing decades, petitioners developed a sophisticated understanding of the toxicity and addictiveness of cigarettes that outpaced that of the public, regulators, and public health authorities. /d. at 9a-lla. As the public’s knowledge increased, the compa- nies intensified the level of their deceptions. The dis- trict court, as the court of appeals explains, catalogued “countiess examples of deliberately false statements” by petitioners regarding the health effects of smoking and secondhand smoke, the addictiveness of nicotine and pe- titioners’ manipulation of nicotine delivery to create and sustain addiction, and the claimed health benefits of “light” cigarettes. /d. at 45a. The district court found that petitioners’ “efforts to deny and distort the scien tific evidence of smoking’s harms are demonstrated by not only decades of press releases, reports, booklets, newsletters, television and radio appearances, and scien- tific symposia and publications, but also by evidence of their coneerted|] efforts to attack and undermine the 6 studies in mainstream scientific publications such as the Reports of the Surgeon General.” /d. at 1894a. In addi- tion, “[La]s their internal documents reveal, [petitioners] engaged in massive, sustained, and highly sophisticated marketing and promotional campaigns to portray their light brands as less harmful than regular cigarettes.” Id. at 1904a. Petitioners “have known for decades that filtered and low tar cigarettes do not offer a meaningful reduction of risk, and that their marketing which em- phasized reductions in tar and nicotine was false and misleading.” Jd. at 1905a-1906a. Petitioners executed their scheme to defraud by uti- lizing an array of jointly created entities, the most visi- ble of whieh was the Tobacco Institute (TI), which served for four decades as “the leading public voice of [petitioners].” Pet. App. 195a; 7d. at 119a. Petitioners jointly financed T'l’s operations through payments ex- ceeding $600 million, cd. at 183a, and their chief execu- tive officers served on TI’s Executive Committee, zd. at 180a, which had the “‘final voice on TI matters’ and To- bacco Institute statements.” /d. at 216a (citation omit ted). TI “created, issued, and disseminated press re- leases, public statements, advertisements, brochures, pamphlets, and other written materials on behalf of [pe- titioners]” that denied “any link between smoking and disease,” denied that “nicotine was addictive,” denied that “cigarette companies marketed to youth,” denied that secondhand smoke “posed a health risk,” and “diseredit|ed] scientists and public health officials who took a different position on these issues.” /d. at 196a. As internal TI documents admit: “Our basic position in the cigarette controversy is subject to the charge, and maybe subject. to a finding, that we are making false or misleading statements to promote the sale of ciga- rettes.” Jd. at 186a. The Tobacco Institute was but one part of a “network of interlocking organizations” that petitioners created to maintain unity and discipline. Pet. App. 1777a. The In- stitute’s Executive Committee emphasized internally that it was “of prime importance that the industry main- tain a united front and that if one or more companies vere to conduct themselves as a matter of self interest, particularly in advertising, obvious vulnerability would be the result.” /d. at 218a (citation omitted). To that end, the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI) and its successor organizations, the Interna- tional Tobacco Information Center (INFOTAB) and the Tobaceo Documentation Centre (TDC), were established to enable Philip Morris, Reynolds, British American Tobacco (BATCo) and other tobacco companies to “meet disereetly to develop a defensive smoking and health strategy for major markets,” including the United States. /d. at 1619a (citation omitted); see also zd. at 320a-335a. BATCo acknowledged internally that “[t]he aim of ICOSI is defensive research aimed at throwing up a smoke screen arid to throw doubt on smoking research findings which show smoke causes diseases.” /d. at 1624a (citation omitted). The members of this group included Philip Mere . .eynolds, Lorillard, BATCo and Tl, as well as for ».tobaeco companies. /d. at 327a 328a. Petitioners also formed a variety of organizations to create what they termed “marketable science.” Pet. App. 1687a. For example, through the Council for To- bacco Research (CTR) and Lawyers’ Special Accounts, petitioners jointly financed research programs that were directed hy company lawyers and ecaleulated to yield favorable results. /d. at 240a-275a. Petitioners regu- larly cited the conclusions of the scientists funded through these programs as if they were the objective results of disinterested research, without revealing that the scientists had, in fact, been funded by the industry. Id. at 195a. Petitioners likewise created organizations that ap peared to have no connection to the industry, but were in fact designed to generate purportedly independent evidence for use as “ammunition” in manipulating public opinion. Pet. App. 1614a (citation omitted). For exam- ple, petitioners created the Center for Indoor Air Re search (CIAR) in a manner designed “to ‘hide’ industry involvement,” zd. at 1652a (citation omitted), and CIAR’s influential papers on secondhand smoke failed to dis close the organization’s connection to the tobacco indus- try. Jd. at 165la-1653a. Similarly, Indoor Air Interna- tional (LAI) held itself out as “a ‘learned society’ dedi- cated to ‘promoting indoor air quality,’” id. at 1695a- 1696a (citation omitted), while in reality it was funded by Philip Morris and BATCo and run by the law firm of Covington & Burling, zd. at 1695a-1698a, which served as legal counsel! for TI and the industry. /d. at 181a, 214a. “All billing was processed through Covington & Burling to avoid any direct connection to the industry [d. at 1695a.' he district court found that attorneys actively facilitated and “nlayed an absolutely central role” in petitioners’ legal activity “lalt every stage” by, inter alia, “directling| scientists as to what research they should and should not undertake”; “vett[ing! scientific research papers and reports”; “hid[ing] the relationship between [scicntifie wit nesses] and the industry”; “devis[ing] aad carr| ying] out document de truction policies”; and taking “shelter behind baseless assertions of the attorney client privilege.” Pet. App. 106a Q 2. In 2006, after developing an immense trial record, the district court held that petitioners had participated in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and conspired to do so, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). Pet. App. 1885a, 1995a. The court determined that petitioners’ enterprise had the common purpose of preserving and expanding the cigarette market through fraud, 2d. at 1923a-1925a; that it operated through formal and infor- mal organizations, 7d. at 1925a-1928a; and that it has functioned as a continuous unit since 1953, id. at 1928a- 1930a. The district court specifically found that petitioners “knowingly and intentionally engaged in a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers, for purposes of financial gain, by making false and fraudulent state- ments, representations, and promises.” Pet. App. 18&8a. [t explained that, “[iJn the majority of instances, the authors of the fraudulent statements alleged as Racke- teering Acts were executives, including high level sci- entists—CEOs, Vice Presidents, Heads of Research & Development, not entry level employees—at each of the [petitioner] companies who would reasonably be ex- pected to have knowledge of the company’s internal re- search, public positions, and long term strategies.” /d. at 1984a. The court found it “absurd to believe that the highly-ranked representatives and agents of these cor- porations and entities had no knowledge that their pub- lic statements were false and fraudulent,” explaining that the “Findings of Fact are replete with examples of C.E.O.s, Vice-Presidents, and Directors of Research and Development, as well as [petitioners’] lawyers, making statements which were inconsistent with the internal 10 knowledge and practice of the corporation itself.” /d. at 1890a-1891a. Based on its findings about the profitability of peti- tioners’ participation in the enterprise and the sophisti- cation and resilience of their scheme to defraud, the dis- trict court found a reasonable likelihood of future viola- tions. Pet. App. 2007a-202la. The court accordingly granted injunctive relief enjoining petitioners from com- mitting further acts of racketeering or fraud relating to the marketing of cigarettes, id. at 2069a-2070a; from reconstituting specified organizations, id. at 2';69a; and from making express or implied health claims about cig arettes, including use of descriptors such as “light” or ‘low tar,” 27d. at 2070a-2071a. The court’s order requires that petitioners make corrective statements in specified media, zd. at 2071a-2077a; maintain publicly accessible document depositories, id. at 2077a-2084a; and disclose certain marketing data to the government, id. at 2084a. 3. Petitioners appealed, challenging the district court’s liability ruling and injunctive relief. [n their ap- pellate briefs, petitioners made almost no mention of the district court’s factual findings and presented no argu ments purporting to show that any such findings were erroneous. At oral argument, counsel representing all petitioners (App., irfra, la) represented that, although petitioners did not “agree with the fact findings of the The electronic versions of the government’s appellate briefs on DVD-ROMs explain the evidentiary record in detail (e.g., Gov't C.A. Br. 5-58) and include an embedded hyperlink for every record citation, enabling the reader to display immediately the relevant page of the record. A similar DVD version of the district court’s opinion also in- cludes an embedded hyperlink for each ofits numerous record citations Cf. Order, No. 06-5267 (D.C. Cir. July 28, 2008) (directing clerk to file lodged DVDs). 1] district court,” “we’re bringing legal challenges to the court” and “haven’t challenged * * * any fact finding.” Id. at 5a, 7a. 4. In May 2009, the court of appeals unanimously affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Pet. App. la-100a. The court’s decision affirmed the district court’s liability findings in all significant respects, but remanded for further proceeding on “four discrete is- sues.” /d. at 6a, 100a. The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ threshold argument that petitioners could not be liable under RICO for participating in the conduct of the affairs of an “enterprise” because, in petitioners’ view, RICO “pro- vides an exclusive list of possible enterprises that covers lonly] groups of individuals associated in fact, not mixed groups of individuals and corporations associated in fact.” Pet. App. 18a. The court held that the defini- tion of “enterprise” in 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) is non-exhaus- tive and includes groups of corporations associated in fact (like petitioners). Pet. App. 18a-20a, 28a. The court reasoned that petitioners’ contrary argument was incon- sistent both with RICO’s text and the uniform decisions of al] ten courts of appeals to have addressed the ques- tion, and that RICO’s broad statutory understanding of “enterprise” ensures that sophisticated racketeers can- not evade liability by employing the corporate form. /d. at 18a-29a. The court of appeals concluded that other purported legal challenges were not properly presented. For ex ample, although the court indicated that it shared peti- tioners’ doubt that a corporation’s specific intent to de- fraud could properly be established by aggregating the knowledge of disparate corporate employees under a theory of “collective intent,” it did “not pass on the mer its of such astandard * * * because the district court relied on a permissible view of specific intent.” Pet. App. 33a, 41a. The court explained that the “over- whelming indirect and circumstantial evidence was suffi- cient to allow the district court to reasonably infer that the high level executives, including ‘CEOs, Vice Presi dents, |and| Heads of Research & Development’ for [pe- titieners| knew about their respective companies’ ‘inter- nal research, public positions, and long term strategies’’ and “then made, caused to be made, and approved public statements contrary to this knowledge.” /d. at 39a (cita- tion omitted). The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ First Amendment defenses, concluding that petitioners’ public statements were “clearly and deliberately false” and therefore fell outside the scope of protected speech. Pet. App. 43a-45a. The court explained that it was “not dealing with accidental falschoods, or sincere attempts to persuade,” and that “[petitioners] knew of their fal- sity at the time and made the statements with the intent to deceive.” Jd. at 45a. The court similarly held that “Noerr-Pennington protection” tor attempts to per- suade the legislature or executive to take particular ac tion “does not apply” because the doctrine does not ex- tend to “deliberately false or misleading” statements and petitioners’ racketeering acts were themselves “in- tended to defraud consumers.” /d. at 44a, 46a. The court rejected petitioners’ contention that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had “blessed their use of labels such as ‘light’ and ‘low tar’” cigarettes, ex- plaining that the argument was foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Altrra Group, Ine. v. Good, 1298S. Ct. 538 (2008) (Altria). Pet. App. 46a-47a. In addition, the court emphasized that the district court “did not find liability solely based on the use of descriptors such as ‘light’ and ‘low tar’”; rather, the district court permissi- bly found that “( petitioners] orchestrated ‘highly sophis- ticated marketing and promotional campaigns to portra) their light brands as less harmful than regular ciga- rettes,’” despite their knowledge of the falsity of that claim. /d. at 47a-48a. The court further concluded that the Master Settle- ment Agreement (MSA) executed in separate lawsuits by the tobaceo companies and several States did not eliminate the likelihood of petitioners’ future violations. Pet. App. 6la-67a. It explained that petitioners “began to evade and at times even violate the MSA’s prohibi- tions almost immediately after signing the agreement” and that petitioners’ failure to alter their conduct after the MSA amply warranted the district court’s conclusion that future violations were likely. Jd. at 64a, 67a. The court rejected challenges to liability that were specific to petitioners Altria and BATCo, Pet. App. 55a- 60a, and it rejected most of petitioners’ challenges to the district court’s injunctive order. The court explained that the injunctions “sufficiently specify the activities enjoined,” 7d. at 73a, and that the district court permis- sibly required that corrective statements appear in the same media that petitioners used “to promulgate false smoking and health messages.” Jd. at 83a." The court vacated the finding of liability as to CTR and TI because those entities had been dissolved pursuant to the MSA. Pet. App. 100a. he court also vacated certain minor provisions of the injunction and remanded for reconsideration of those “discrete issues,” such as the application of the injunction to petitioners’ overseas subsidiaries and clarification of the requirements for point-of-sale displays. /bid. The panel also rejected the government’s cross-appeal on remedies, /d. at 14 5. Petitioners tiled five separate rehearing petitions, all of which the court of appeals denied without dissent. Pet. App. 2183a. Meanwhile, petitioners Philip Morris, Reynolds, and Lorillard filed a “Suggestion Of Mootness And Motion For Partial Vacatur,” arguing that the June 2009 pas- a of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Yontrol Act (FSPTCA), Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 “a 1776, had rendered aspects of the injunction moot. The government’s opposition explained that the EF SPTCA did not render the injunetion moot and that any request to modify the injunction in light of the legis- lation should be directed to the district court in the fi rat instance. Gov't Opp. to Suggestion of Mootness 3-4, 11-12. The court of appeals denied the suggestion of mootness and vacatur motion without opinion. ARGUMENT Collectively, petitioners suggest that nearly every aspect of the unanimous decision of the court of appeals presents a significant legal error warranting certiorari. That suggestion is without merit. The D.C. Circuit cor- rectly resolved the only pure question of law the peti- tioners presented in a ruling that reflects the uniform judgment of all ten courts of appeals to have considered the issue. The remaining legal issues that petitioners now raise are either not properly presented on the re- cord in this case, not subject. to any conflict, or otherwise unworthy of review. The petitions should therefore be denied. 92a-99a. The government's peti 1 forawrit of eertiorar seeks review of the remedial : S] ect of the c ‘ourt’s judgm ent ld A. An Unincorporated Association Of Corporations And Individuals May Form A RICO Enterprise Petitioners Philip Morris and Lorillard contend that certiorari is warranted because the court of appeals pur- portedly erred in holding that a RICO “enterprise” may consist of corporations and individuals associated in fact. 09-976 Pet. (PM Pet.) 24-28; 09-1012 Pet. (Lorillard Pet.) 11-28. In their view, 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) “provides an ex- clusive list of possible enterprises” and that list includes “sroups of individuals associated in fact” but “not mixed groups of individuals ard corporations associated in fact.” Pet. App. 18a. That contention lacks merit. RICO’s text and the reasoning of Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009), demonstrate that RICO provides non-exhaustive examples of an “enterprise” that illus- trate, but do not restrict, the ordinary meaning of the term. All ten courts of appeals to have confronted the question have likewise concluded—without as much as a dissenting opinion from even one jJudge—that corpo- rate entities associated in fact may form a RICO enter prise. No further review is warranted. 1. a. Congress routinely defines statutory terms in one of two ways. Exhaustive statutory definitions— which state precisely what the defined term “means”— establish a self-contained meaning for the term that “excludes any meaning that is not stated.” Burgess v. United States, 558 U.S. 124, 1380 (2008) (citation omit- ted). Terms so defined take their meaning from the def- inition Congress provides in statute instead of the “term’s ordinary meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). By contrast, non-exhaustive defini- tions merely state that the defined term “includes” cer- tain enumerated things. In that context, “the term ‘in- cludfes]’ is not one of all-embracing definition, but eon- l6 notes simply an illustrative application of the general principle,” Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941), that itself builds upon the “ordi nary connotation of the [underlying] term.” Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 88 (1937); rd. at 85-86; American Sur. Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1933) (the term ““‘include’ is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement” in definitional provisions). RICOQO’s definitional section, 18 U.S.C. 1961, provides a non-exhaustive definition of “enterprise.” Section 1961(4) states that the term “‘enterprise’ excludes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) (emphasis added). As the court of appeals ex- plained, Congress’s “use of the word ‘includes’ indicates that RICO’s list of ‘enterprises’ is non-exhaustive.” Pet. App. 25a-26a. The term therefore encompasses groups that fall within the ordinary meaning of “enterprise” — such as “a group of individuals, corporations, or partner- ships associated in faect”—even though Section 1961(4) does not “expressly mention{] this type of association.” Id. at 19a; see id. at 21a. The broader context of Section 1961 confirms “the non-exhaustive nature of ‘includes’” because Congress chose in that provision to “alternat[e] between the words ‘means’ and ‘includes’ to introduce the section’s various definitions,” thereby “signal[ing] its intent to distinguish between [the] exhaustive and non- exhaustive lists” defining RICO’s statutory terms. /d. at 26a. One month after the court of appeals issued its deci- sion, this Court confirmed that Section 1961(4)’s defini- tion of “enterprise” is non-exhaustive. In Boyle, this 17 Court made clear that Section 1961(4)’s “obviously broad” “enumeration of included enterprises” does “not purport to set out an exhaustive definition of the term” and does “not specifically define the outer boundaries of the ‘enterprise’ concept.” 12958. Ct. at 2243 & n.2. Like the court below, Boyle concluded that Congress’s dispa- rate use of “means” and “includes” in RICO’s defini- tional section demonstrates that the inclusive definition of “enterprise” retains the “ordinary meaning” of the term and therefore “does not foreclose the possibility that the term might include” other types of enterprises other than the “specifically enumerated” ones. /d. at 2243 n.2 (citing the Court’s similar interpretation of Sec tion 1961 in H.J. /ne. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989)). Boyle therefore reasoned that the ineaning of “enterprise” reflected in “ordinary usage” informs the meaning of the term in RICO and held, based on that ordinary meaning, that an association in fact of individuals “must have a purpose” to qualify as an “enterprise.” /d. at 2244. Boyle’s reasoning is fatal to Lorillard’s contention (Pet. 14-18) that Section 1961(4) exhaustively describes the entities that may constitute an “enterprise.” In re- solving the question whether “an association-in-fact en terprise must have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity,” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. 2244 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the Court expressly held that Section 1961(4) does not provide “an exhaustive definition” of “enterprise” or “define the outer boundaries” of the term. /d. at 2243 & n.2. If Lorillard were correct that RICO’s text provides a wholly exhaustive definition, then the ordinary meaning of “enterprise” would have been irrelevant and the (purportedly exhaustive) defini 1s | text in Section 1961({4) would have controlled. See rhart, 530 U.S. at 942 (citing cases). The Court in interpreted “enterprise” based on the “meaning of term in ordinary usage” as reflected in dictionary tions precisely because the definitional text was yt itself exhaustive. See Boyle, 1298S. Ct. at 2244. The court of appeals’ decision also follows from the gic of several decisions of this Court that have repeat- edly drawn a distinction between “means” and “in cludes” when Congress has alternated between those terms to introduce statutory definitions. Those deci- sions nave consistently found that such “disparate inclu sion or exclusion” (Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (citation omitted)) to reflect an intent to provide a non-exhaustive definition of those terms that Congress has defined to “include” specifically enumer- ated items. See, e.g., Boyle, 1298S. Ct. at 2243 n.2 (con struing Section 1961(4)); see also, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 & n.15 (1977); Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 nl (1934); American Sur. Co., 287 U.S. at 517; ef. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237 (concluding that the definitional use of “require” instead of “mean” in Section 1961(5) reflects that the scope of the defined term is “broad”). Lorillard asserts (Pet. 16) that Section 1961’s other definitions beginning with “includes” are “exhaustive” even though it offers argument only for the definition of “Attorney General.” Even that definition, however, is not “exhaustive.” The enumeration in Section 1961(10) does not, for example, specifically include a person se lected by the President to perform temporarily “the functions and duties” of the Attorney General, 5 U.S.C. 3345(a)(2) and (3), or an independent counsel that could have been appointed by a court to prosecute RICO viola- 19 tions, 28 U.S.C. 593(b), 599 (expired 1999), neither of whom are “designated by the Attorney General” under the definition. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(10); cf. Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney General, 31 Op. Off. Legal Counsel —_ (2007), http://www.justice. gov/olc/2007/authority-of-the-president-name-ag- 070908.pdtf. Lorillard makes no attempt to demonstrate that any other definition in Section 1961 that begins with “includes” is exhaustive, but simply quotes (Pet. 16) the definition of “person” and “documentary material” with- out elaboration. 3ased on Congress’s direction in RICO that courts may issue appropriate orders, “including, but not limited to,” three categories of orders, 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), Loril lard also contends (Pet. 16-17) that Congress used the term “includes” differently in Section 1961 because Con- gress omitted the phrase “but not limited to.” But that supplementary language in Section 1964(a)—which is not a definitional section--simply emphasizes the breadth of the appropriate remedial orders that it au- thorizes. Section 1961 had no need for such emphasis because it employs “includes” in a significantly different context: the juxtaposition of “means” and “includes” in that section itself makes clear that the inclusive defini tions are non-exhaustive. See Pet. App. 27a. Lorillard’s reliance (Pet. 17) on Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009), is also misplaced. Although Curciert interpreted a single, free-standing provision defining “Indian” to “inelude” certain categories of Indi ans as comprehensively defining the term, 25 U.S.C. 479, it did so because other statutory provisions specifically showed that Congress recognized that the definition did not “encompass tribes other than those” in the statutory enumeration. 1298S. Ct. at 1066. And, unlike RICO, the 20 definition in Carciert does not disparately employ “means” and “includes” to define different statutory terms, reflecting Congress’s intent to enact exhaustive and non-exhaustive definitions. b. Because the ordinary meaning of “enterprise” is not restricted by Section 1961(4)’s non-exhaustive “enu- meration of included enterprises,” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2243 & n.2, Lorillard’s heavy emphasis on that enumera- tion is misplaced. As Boyle explains, the ordinary mean- ing of “enterprise” encompasses “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertak- ing,’ or ‘project.’” /d. at 2244 (citation omitted). And Lorillard’s own arguments show that “a group of corpo- rations associated in fact” constitute, in common par- lance, just such a “joint venture[].” See Lorillard Pet. 26. So long as a joint venture by corporate entities re- flects a common “purpose,” embodies “relationships among those associated with the enterprise,” and has “tongevity sufficient to permit those associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose,” Boyle, 129 8S. Ct. at 2244, it qualifies as an “enterprise” under RICO. Philip Morris resists the conelusion that the “ordi nary meaning” of enterprise can include a group of cor- porale entities, asserting that “a group of unaffiliated corporations informally cooperating in an effort to influ- ence government policy” would not be thought of as an “enterprise.” PM Pet. 26-27. But that assertion (which reflects a factual premise far removed from this case) cannot be squared with this Court’s explanation that “an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2245. Even an “‘informal’ group” without much “structure” can constitute an enterprise if its members coordinate their actions to pursue a common objective. I bid. c. Petitioners’ restrictive interpretation of Section 1961(4) disregards this Court’s repeated admonition that “RICO is to be read broadly.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. I/mrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985); accord Boyle, 129 8. Ct. at 2243 (citing cases). Congress followed a “pattern * * * utilizing terms and concepts of breadth” in RICO, including in the statute’s inclusive definition of “enter- prise.” Russello, 464 U.S. at 21; see also NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994) (“RICO broadly de- fines ‘enterprise’”); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-581, 583 (1981) (construing “enterprise”). If there were any doubt on that score, Congress’s express statutory direction that RICO be “liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes” confirms the “expan sive” seope of its “concept of an association in fact.” Boyle, 1298. Ct. at 2243 (quoting RICO, Pub. L. No. 91- 152, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947); see also S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969) (“enterprise” is defined “to include associations in fact, as well as legally recognized associative entities,” and that “infiltration of any asso- clative group by any individual or group capable of hold- ing a property interest can be reached”); H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970) (same). ‘he broad scope of the enterprise concept reflects RICO’s origins. “RICO was an aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498. And, while Congress undoubtedly intended the statute to be used to combat organized crime, “Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more gencral statute, one which, al- though it had organized crime as its focus, was not lim- ited in application to organized crime.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248: accord NOW, 510 U.S. at 260. RICO aceord- ngly targets criminal associations that “extend well be PLP J aoe yond|] those traditionally grouped under the phrase ‘or- ranized crime’” in order to target “a wide range of crim- inal activity, taking many different forms” and involving “a broad array of perpetrators operating in many differ- ent ways.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243, 248-249. Congress’s decision to provide a broad, non- exhaustive definition of “enterprise” capturing the full range of associational forms that might be employed by sophisticated criminals is consistent with its intent that RICO be “a weapon against the sophisticated racketeer as well as (and perhaps more than) the artless.” United States v. Perholiz, 842 F.2d 348, 353 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988) (rejecting petitioners’ inter- pretation of “enterprise” for its “hizarre result{s]”). As the D.C. Circuit explained, an association of individuals and legal entities that exhibits common purpose, organi zation, and continuity is plainly among “the kinds of en- tities Congress had in mind.” Pet. App. 28a (emphasis omitted) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). Congress had no reason to doubt that corporations, labor unions, partnerships, or other legal entities would be capable of entering into the sort of dangerous de facto alliances that characterize RICO enterprises. See id. at 24a (ex- plaining that, on petitioners’ theory, “racketeers who would otherwise constitute an association-in-fact might evade RICO’s grasp by virtue of their ability to operate through corporations and establish complex networks of companies, kickbacks, and contracts to achieve their elicit ends”). As the Seventh Circuit observed: Surely if three individuals can constitute a RICO enterprise, as no one doubts, then the larger associa- tion that consists of them plus entities that they con trol can be a RICO enterprise too. Otherwise while three criminal gangs would each be a RICO enter- prise, a loose-knit merger of the three, in which each retained its separate identity, would not be, because it would not be an association of individuals. That would make no sense. United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.), eert. denied, 500 U.S. 919, and 502 U.S. 823 (1991); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-394 (2d Cir. 1979) (petitioners’ reading would “perversely insulate the most sophisticated racketeering combinations from RICO’s sanctions”), cert. denied 445 U.S. 927 (1980); see also McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 143-144 (7th Cir. 1985) (““[WJe cannot believe that Congress would have wanted gangsters to be able to escape the clutches of section 1962(c) Just by avoiding the corporate form.”). d. Lorillard contends that vagueness concerns, prac- tical considerations, and the rule of lenity, should “resolvie any] ambiguity” in Section 1961(4) by limiting enterprises to those expressly listed. Lorillard Pet. 20; id. at 20-25. But Section 1961(4) is an inclusive, not ex- clusive, definition whose text employs capacious, not ambiguous terms. Congress specifically directed that RICO’s terms be “liberally,” not narrowly, construed to effectuate the statute’s remedial goals, Boyle, 1298S. Ct. at 2243, and this Court has declined repeated requests to narrow the scope of RICQO’s “enterprise” concept with restrictions that themselves are not found tn the statu- tory text. See, e.g., id. at 2245-2246 (declining to impose limits that are not “fairly inferred from the language of the statute”); VOW, 510 U.S. at 260-261 (refusing to adopt economic-motive limitation); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-581 (declining to limit “enterprise” to legitimate associations because RICO imposes “no restriction upon the associations embraced” by the term and because Congress could have, but did not, “narrow ] the sweep of 24 the definition by inserting” additional text). The Court has repeatedly rejected similar appeals to narrow RICO’s provisions based on the rule of lenity. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246-2247; see also NOW, 510 U.S. at 262; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 n.10; Russello, 464 U.S. at 29. e. Petitioners’ remaining contentions largely reflect policy arguments of the kind this Court has rejected “in favor of the clear but expansive text of the statute,” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. 2246-2247 (collecting cases). Lorillard asserts that the “purpose of RICO” is to protect corpo rations from being “victimized by organized crime,” not “to combat ecrporations engaged in joint criminal activ- ity.” Lorillard Pet. 18-19 (emphases omitted). But as the court of appeals explained, there is no dispute that corporations can be RICO defendants under the stat- ute’s plain terms. Pet. App. 2la (discussing 18 U.S.C. 1961(3), 1962(c)). Indeed, this Court has emphasized that “[RICO’s] use ‘against respected businesses alleg- edly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified crimi- nal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.’” H..J/. /ne., 492 U.S. at 249 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499). Quite the contrary, the “ability to use RICO against busi- nesses engaged in a pattern of criminal acts” is a result that itself is “inherent in the statute as written.” /bid. (quoting Sedima, supra); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (explaining that the fact that plaintiffs have brought “fraud cases * * * against” nominally legitimate busi nesses under RICO “does not demonstrate ambiguity” in the statute, “JiJt demonstrates breadth’) (citation omitted). 2. Petitioners ultimately provide no sound reason for this Court to revisit RICO’s definition of “enter prise” so soon after Boyle addressed the term’s mean- ing. Petitioners concede that their interpretation of Sec- tion 1961(4) finds no support in the “uniform” decisions of the courts of appeals, Lorillard Pet. 12, 27, which all agree “with the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that a group of corporations can constitute an ‘associated in fact’ RICO enterprise.” PM Pet. 27.* Indeed, all ten courts of ap- peals to have considered the question have held that legal entities like corporations that are associated in fact may form or be part of a RICO enterprise. See United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1243-1244 (1st Cir. 1995) (corporation and a sole proprietorship), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1155 (1996); Huber, 603 F.2d at 393-394 (2d Cir.) (corporations and individuals); United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d-822, 828 (3d Cir. 1983) (individuals and a corpo- ration), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); United State: v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625-626 (5th Cir. 1982) (individ- uals and corporations), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 458 U.S..1109, and 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1990) (group of corporations); Masters, 924 F.2d at 1366 (7th Cir.) (aw firm, two police departments, and three individuals); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1989) (five legal enti ties): United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 655-656 (Yth Cir. 1988) (individuals and corporations), cert. de- nied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989); United States v. Navarro Ordas, 770 F.2d 959 19 (11th Cir. 1985) (group of corporations), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 352-354 (D.C. Cir.) (group of indi Lorillard suggests (Pet. 27) that review is warranted to resolve wnetner ar orpe ration and its ¢ mployees Can constitute an associat n-fact enterprise. That issue is not preserted by the facts of this ca nd was not addressed by the court of appeal: viduals, corporations, and partnerships). Those courts have reached that unanimous conclusion without even one judge in dissent. Pet. App. 19a-20a (citing cases). In many other cases—including in an eleventh court of appeals—the courts have similarly upheld RICO claims involving association-in-fact enterprises with members including corporations. Jd. at 20a-2la.° Congress, in turn, has repeatedly amended RICO’s definitional sec- tion against the background of that strikingly uniform appellate authority without adjusting R1CO’s definition of “enterprise.” See, e.g., U nited States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 484-485 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1094 (2002): see also, e.g., Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d } AL. 547-553 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007); Living Designs, Ine. v. ET. Dupont de Neniowrs & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005), a denied, 547 U.S. 1192 (2006); Ureited States v. Cranci, 378 F.3d 71, 79-85 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Goldin Indus., Ire., 219 F a 1271, 1275-1277 & n.6 (LLth Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1015(2000); U/nited States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 794- 795 (3d Cir. 1998): United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, and 513 U.S. 1012 (1994): United States v. Blinder, 1O TF, 3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993): United States 2 Butler, 954 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Stolfi, 889 F.2d 378, 379-380 (2d Cir. 1989); Ocean Energy Ll, Ine. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 748-749 (5th Cir. 1989); B unker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983); (/nated States v. Campanatle, 518 F.2d 352, 357 n.11 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.c. 1050 (1976). See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce- ment Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 968, 103 Stat. 506 (adding bank fraud as a predicate act); Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 13886 (adding criminal in- fringement of copyright and tratficking in counterfeit labels for corn- puter programs, movies, and im UsiCc). Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6802(e), 118 Stat. 3767 (adding offenses relating to biological, chemical and nuclear materials). 27 Petitioners’ reliance on the oral argument transcript in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465 (ar- gued Apr. 26, 2006), see, e.g., Lorillard Pet. 11-12, 16-17, simply underscores the absence of authority for their pusition.’ The Mohawk petitioner argued that corpora- tions cannot be members of an association-in-fact enter prise, even though its petition for a writ of certiorari did not separately raise the issue. At oral argument, Justice Scalia noted that the Court would have been “unlikely to accept certfiorari]” on that issue if it had been raised, given the unanimous holdings of the courts of appeals. 05-465 Tr. at 6. This Court ultimately dismissed the writ in Mohawk as improvidently granted, 547 U.S. 516 (2006), and denied a subsequent petition that expressly presented the question. See Microsoft Corp. v. Odom, 552 U.S. 985 (2007); Pet. at i, 18-19, Mecrosoft, supra (No. 07-138); Br. in Opp. at 2, 11-14, Microsoft, supra. There is no reason for a different result here. B. The Court Of Appeals Was Not Required To Undertake Independent Appellate Review Of The District Court’s Unchallenged Findings Of Fact Establishing Fraud Although petitioners expressly disclaimed any chal- lenge to the district court’s factual findings on appeal, they now contend that the court of appeals was nonethe- less required to undertake “independent appellate re- view” of the more than 4000 findings of fact made by the When the Court decided Boye, it presumably was familiar with the oral argument in Mohawk. The petitioner repeatedly cited to the Mohawk argument transcript, Pet. Br. at 48 n.37, 53 n.42, Boyle, supra; teply Br. at 12-13, Boyle, supra; and his amici specifically argued that corporations could not constitute an association-in-fact enterprise be- cause Section 1961(4) employs the term “includes” to set out an “ex- haustive” list of cntities constituting a RICO “enterprise.” See Cham ber of Commerce Amiei Br. at 32-33 & n.5, Boyle pra district court. See PM Pet. 13-23 (citing bose Corp. ' Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)); see also 09-977 Pet. (RJR Pet.) 29; Lorillard Pet. 28-29. The question of the proper standard of re- view for a party’s challenge to factual determinations is not presented when the party makes no such challenges. Moreover, no court has adopted petitioners’ view that every factual determination in a fraud case must be sub- jected to de novo review on appeal. Finally, petitioners do not explain how independent review would have made a difference to the outcome here, given the “overwhelm- ing evidence” establishing their fraud. Pet. App. 103a. 1. In Bose, the Court held that the “ultimate fact” of “actual malice” in a defamation case is not an ordinary factual finding reviewed only for clear error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 466 U.S. at 498 n.15, 499-500. The stan dard of review for such ultimate facts, the Court ex- plained, “must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the ig of independent review applied in New York Times Co. Sullivan, [376 U.S. 254 (1964)],” which held that palelt in defamation actions must review the record as a whole to ensure that the ow does not interfere with free expression. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499. The Court empha- sized, however, that even in such a case, an appellate ecourt’s review of the record must give + te due regard’ to the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,” 7d. at 499-500 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)), and must afford “special deference” to the “trial judge’s credibility determinations,” ab sis omitted). It is unclear whether petitioners are con- tinuing to assert that their statements about cigarettes are not in fact false—that, for example, it remains an open question whether cigarettes cause disease—or in- stead whether petitioners are asserting that their state- ments were not deliberately false at the time they were made. Either way, petitioner’s contention fails in the face of the district court’s extensive factual findings based on evidence that the court of appeals correctly labeled “overwhelming.” Pet. App. 39a. As the court of ippeals explained, the district court found that petition- ers’ statements were “clearly and deliberately false,” and it provided “countless examples” of such “deliber- ately false statements.” /d. at 45a. The basis for the district court's findings included “decades of evidence that scientists within the [peti- tioner] corporations and outside scientists hired by the corporations and their joint entities were continually conducting research and reviewing the research of other scientists regarding cigarettes and health, addiction, nicotine and tar manipulation, and secondhand smoke.” Pet. App. 35a. “The evidence at trial demonstrated that the results of this research—essential to the core of [pe- titioners’] operations, including strategie planning, prod- uct development, and advertising—were well known, acknowledged, and accepted throughout the corpora- tions.” Jbid. “These results established that cigarette smoking causes disease, that nicotine is addictive, that light cigarettes do not present lower health risks than regular cigarettes due to smoker compensation, and that secondhand smoke is hazardous to health.” /bzd. Trial testimony and internal company documents “demonstrate that [petitioners’| top officials were di- rectly informed of negative research results,” Pet. App. rT { > 37a, and “that the executives crafted their corporate priorities and strategies in response to these findings.” Id. at 36a-37a. For example, Dr. William Farone, a Philip Morris scientist for 18 years whom the district court found to be “impressive and credible as both a fact and expert witness,” 7d. at 35a-36a (quoting zd. at 445a), testified that there was “widespread acceptance” at the company “that smoking caused disease,” zd. at 36a, that nicotine is addictive, id. at 37a-38a, and that petitioners’ “superior knowledge of compensation * * * was closely held within Philip Morris and the tobacco industry.” /d. at 38a. Indeed, petitioners’ own documents support the finding that their statements were false, and deliber- ately so. TI’s Vice President of Public Relations advised its President confidentially: “[Ojur basic position in the cigarette controversy is subject to the charge, and may be subject to a finding, that we are making false or mis- leading statements to promote the sale of cigarettes.” Id. at 37a (citation omitted). Based on specific examples and “hundreds more find- ings” of fact, the court of appeals concluded that the district court had sufficient evidence from which to con- clude that petitioners’ “executives, who directed the ac- tivities of the [petitioner] corporations and their joint entities, knew about the negative health consequences of smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of nicotine, the harmfulness of secondhand smoke, and the concept of smoker compensation,” and that “[t]hese executives then made, caused to be made, and approved public statements contrary to this knowledge.” Pet. App. 38a- 39a; see id. at 45a (district court provided “countless examples of deliberately false statements by [petition ers|”). Those findings defeat petitioners’ efforts to char- acterize their public statements as good-faith expres- 38 sions of opinion on a matter of legitimate disagreement. There is no reason for this Court to review both the dis- trict court’s and the panel’s evaluation of the trial re- cord, which included nearly 14,000 exhibits and the testi- mony of nearly 250 witnesses, 7d. at 8a, especially given that petitioners disclaimed any challenge to the district court’s factual findings below, see App., infra, 5a, Ta. b. Money or property. Petitioner Reynolds ad- vances the related argument that the statements on which the district court based fraud liability were “not directed to consumers” or aimed at obtaining their money or property, but rather addressed “important publie controversies.” RJR i-et. 15. This assertion con- tradicts the district court’s factual findings. Reynolds asserts that “[nJeither court below disputed that. most of the allegedly ‘fraudulent’ speech was not designed to deprive consumers of money or property.” RJR Pet. 14- 15. That is simply incorrect: The district court specifi- cally found that “the vast majority of [petitioners’] state- ments were made with the primary purpose of influenc- ing smokers” and “potential smokers,” as well as the general public, Pet. App. 1960a, while the court of ap- peals concluded that all of the racketeering acts on which the district court relied “were intended to defraud eonsumers,” zd. at 46a. The premise of Reynolds’ disagreement with the courts below is its assertion that any statement other than a “product advertisement” necessarily was not di- rected at consumers or intended to deprive them of money or property. See RJR Pet. 16 (contending that “98.9% of the ‘fraudulent’ public statements identified by the district court * * * were not product advertise- ments,” and thus that such statements are “plainly not speech directed at consumers”). But a statement obvi- oy ously need not take the form of an advertisement to be targeted at consumers or intended to persuade them to purchase cigarettes. To cite one particularly notable example, the Frank Statement itself was not a “product advertisement,” but it was plainly targeted at consum- ers—indeed, it was entitled “A Frank Statement To Cig- arette Smokers”—and the evidence at trial showed that, like petitioners’ many other false public statements, the k'rank Statement was designed to obtain money or prop- erty by persuading smokers to continue purchasing ciga- rettes. Pet. App. 128a; see, e.g. 1d. at 417a (noting that, according to petitioners’ own documents, the open ques- tion strategy was intended to “give smokers a psycho- logical erutch and a self-rationale to continue smoking”). ce. Materrality. Petitioner Reynolds argues (Pet. 18- 20) that both courts below erred in deeming its false statements material to consumers. Pet. App. 41a-438a. As with its challenge to the falsity findings, Reynolds’ arguments on materiality amount to an attack on the district court’s factual determinations and present no question of law warranting this Court’s review. Reynolds asserts that there was “not a scintilla of evidence or any district court finding that any of the challenged statements (excluding ‘lights’) were ‘impor- tant to a reasonable person purchasing cigarettes.’’ RJR Pet. 18 (quoting Pet. App. 42a). But the district court specifically found that petitioners’ false state- ments were material to consumers, Pet. App. 1986a- 1990a, and that petitioners intended the public to rely on their claims. /d. at 198a. Those findings of materiality, are neither speculative nor “counterintuitive.” RJR Pet. 18. As the panel explained, the matters addressed in petitioners’ false statements are important to a reason- able consumer “because each concerns direct and signifi- 40 cant consequences of smoking.” /d. at 43a. “When de- ciding whether to smoke cigarettes, tobacco consumers must resolve initial reservations (or lingering qualms) about the potential for cancer, the risk of addiction, or the hazardous effects of secondhand smoke for friends, family, and others who may be exposed.” J/bzd. The open question strategy itself shows materiality. That strategy reflected petitioners’ recognition that, to meet their objectives, it was necessary only to create enough publie uncertainty to reassure smokers that the connection between smoking and disease was an “open controversy,” “not a closed case.” Pet. App. 1752a (cita- tion omitted). For similar reasons, there is no merit to Reynolds’ contention (Pet. 19-20 & n.5) that its false statements could not be material because they contra- dicted “[tjhe overwhelming public knowledge of smok- ing’s health effects.” Such contradiction was an integral part of the open question strategy. As Brown and Wil- liamson observed in 1967: “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public.” Pet. App. 456a; see id. at 43a (“| Petitioners’| prevarications about each of these issues suggests full awareness of this obvi- ous fact; reasonable purchasers of cigarettes would con- sider these statements important.”).'* '* Reynolds incorrectly contends that the government was required to prove that identified consumers actually relied on petitioners’ misrepresentations. As this Court has explained, “[ujsing the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO, even ifno one relied on any misrepresentation.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2138 (2008). That is because the mail and wire fraud statutes “punish[] the scheme, notits success.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 849, 371 (2005) (quoting U/nited States v. Preree, 224 F.3d 148, 166 (2d Cir. 2000)) 4] Reynolds is therefore incorrect in contending (RJR Pet. 6-7) that its First Amendment challenge resembles the one at issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 5389 U.S. 654 (2003). Nike involved non-fraudulent, freestanding cor- porate speech about publie policy issues, not, as in this case, an integrated course of conduct designed to de ceive and defraud consumers. As the government ex- plained in the portion of its Nike amicus brief that Reynolds quotes in its petition (Pet. 6-7), the First Amendment concern in that case arose because the Call fornia law at issue permitted private suits challenging speech “that does not injure individuals or materially affect their purchasing decisions.” U.S. Amicus Br. at 9, Nike, supra. In this case, by contrast, the district court specifically found, and the court of appeals correctly agreed, that petitioners’ false statements both injured individuals and materially affected consumers’ decisions about whether to purchase cigarettes. The issues in Nike. therefore are not presented here. As the govern- ment noted in Nike, suits of this kind—based on “legis- lation that protect[s| purchasers of goods and services from deception, including fraud”—“are unquestionably compatible with the First Amendment.” /drd. d. Specific intent to defraud. Reynolds contends (Pet. 23-28) that the court of appeals erred in upholding the district court’s finding that it acted with specific in- tent to defraud consumers. Pet. App. 32a-4la. To the extent that this argument reflects disagreement with the district court’s view of the evidence, it simply re- peats the belated challenge to the district court’s finding that petitioner’s statements were deliberately false and fails for the same reasons. See pp. 35-38, supra. In ad- dition to challenging the finding of falsity, however, Reynolds advances two specific arguments about the 42 manner in which the courts below determined that the specific-intent requirement was satisfied. Those argu- ments lack merit and do not warrant review. i. First, Reynolds argues (Pet. 23-26) that the dis- trict court rested its specific-intent finding on an inecor- rect legal standard because, Reynolds contends, the court considered the “collective intent” of the corpora- tion as a whole and did not require that any single em- ployee act with specific intent to defraud. /d. at 23-24 (emphasis omitted).'? That argument is incorrect. Al though the district court mentioned a “collective know!l- edge doctrine,” Pet. App. 1980a, the court made clear that a finding of specific intent requires proof that a per- son with authority to act on behalf of the corporation possessed the requisite wrongful intent or acted with reckless disregard for or willful blindness to the truth. Id. at 198la. Indeed, the district court noted that, in Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.5d 664, 670 n.6 (1996), the D.C. Cireuit stated that “the pro- seribed intent (willfulness) depend|s] on the wrongful intent of specific employees.” /bzd. The district court also specifically rejected the proposition “that aggrega- tion of different states of minds of various corporate actors is sufficient to demonstrate specific intent in cases where individuals within a corporation make fraudulent statements.” /bid. The district court’s analysis is consistent with the court of appeals’ articulation of the governing legal prin- ciples, which Reynolds does not dispute. As the court of appeals explained, see Pet. App. 32a-34a, “[c]orporations * Petitioner Altria presents a separate slatulory argument premised ona challenge tu the legal standard the district court applied in deter- mining whether Altria acted with specific intent to defraud. See Altria Pet. 7-10. That argument is addressed in Part H, «zfra. 43 may be held liable for specific intent offenses based on the ‘knowledge and intent’ of their employees.” /d. at 33a (quoting New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. vy. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909)). “Because a corporation only acts and wills by virtue of its employ- ees, the proscribed corporate intent depends on the wrongful intent of specific employees.” /bid. A showing of specific intent does not require that individual officers or employees personally testify to their frame of mind. “A person’s state of mind is rarely susceptible of proof by direct evidence, so specific intent to defraud may be, and most often is, inferred from the totality of the cir- cumstances, including indirect and circumstantial evi- dence.” /bid. Applying these principles, the court of appeals cor- rectly upheld the district court’s finding that Reynolds acted with specific intent to defraud. As the panel ex- plained, the district court concluded “that the chief exec- utiveofficers and other highly placed officials in the [pe- titioner] corporations made or approved statements they knew to be false or misleading, evineing their specific intent to defraud consumers.” Pet. App. 34a. In light of the “overwhelming evidence” that petitioners knew of the toxicity and addictiveness of their products, the dis- trict court explained that “it is absurd to believe that the highly-ranked representatives and agents of these cor- porations and entities had no knowledge that their pub- lic statements were false and fraudulent.” /d. at 1890a; see 7d. at 1984a (noting that, “[iJn the majority of in- stances, the authors of the fraudulent statements al- leged as Racketeering Acts were executives, including 44 high level scientists—-C EQs, Vice Presidents, Heads of Research & Development, not entry level employees.”)."* Thus, contrary to Reynolds’ assertions (Pet. 24-25), the district court did in fact find, properly based on in- ferences from “overwhelming” evidence, that petition- ers’ executives knew the information that rendered their public statements false and misleading—in other words, that they acted with specific intent to defraud. The court of appeals therefore correctly held that the “dis- trict court did not commit legal error by imputing to [pe- titioners’| executives knowledge of the falsity of their statements based on inferences reasonably drawn from the facts shown.” Pet. App. 35a. As noted, the district court explicitly disavowed the “collective intent” theory that petitioner attributes to it. ‘“ Petitioner Reynolds challenges the validity of the district court’s inference of knowledge on the ground that “most of the alleged ‘fraud’ was statements by the Tobacco Institute.” RJR Pet. 26 (emphases omitted). But even if that were true, Reynolds did not dispute its re- sponsibility for Tl’s conduct in the court of appeals. and for good reason. As the panel explained, petitioners (including Reynolds) cre- ated TI, staffed its board and its committees, and used TI (along with other joint entities) to conduct their “joint public relations through false and misleading press releases and publications.” Pet. App. 9a; see also rd. at 188a (petitioners funded TI’s operations with contributions ex ceeding $600 million). Indeed, the district court found that petitioners formed TI to serve as their collective spokesperson on matters of smok- ing and health and to provide a confidential forum in which to refine and coordinate their fraudulent scheme. See generally id. at 177a-230a. Petitioners structured their operations in this way because, as the TI Executive Committee stressed, it was “of prime importance that the in- dustry maintain a united front and that if one or more companies were to conduct themselves as a matter of self interest, particularly in adver- tising, obvious vulnerability would be the result.” Jd. at 21&a (citation omitted). Petitioners’ effort to characterize TI as “a separate entity” (RR Pet. 26) is thus squarely at odds with the record. 45 Pet. App. 198la. But even if it had not, the court of ap- peals explained that the district court “relied on a per- missible view of specific intent,” id. at 41a, finding that the individuals who made and directed the fraudulent statements in fact knew that those statements were false. See id. at 1890a. Because the district court’s “conclusions based on the proper standard are sufficient to uphold its judgment,” zd. at 41a, the court of appeals correctly found no need to decide the validity of the “collective intent” theory that petitioners challenge here. Accordingly, the validity of that theory is not pre- sented for this Court’s review. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 944 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) (“| We are a court of review, not of first view.”). ii... Second, Reynolds contends Pet. 27-29) that it was deprived of due process because it was denied the oppor- tunity to “show[] that all corporate statements accu- rately reflected the prevailing internal views—and cer- tainly the speakers’ views.” RJR Pet. 27, 28-29. The record in the district court belies the assertion that Reynolds was “tricked” into “putting on no defense on a hotly contested issue.” Jd. at 28. Reynolds had every opportunity and incentive in the nine-month trial in this case to establish, by oral testi- mony or otherwise, the exceedingly unlikely propositior that its executives believed the public statements made on behalf of the corporation. In their opening state- ment, petitioners declared that “the evidence will show, Your Honor, these defendants gen|uine ]ly believed their positions, advanced legitimate assessments of the sci- ence, and made statements with no intent whatsoever to mislead or to defraud anybody.” 9/22/04 Tr. 337. The government then presented volumes of evidence estab- lishing petitioners’ specific intent to deceive. As the 46 court of appeals explained, “(t]he government presented evidence indicating that specific high-ranking corporate officials were directly informed” about “the negative health consequences of smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of nicotine, the harmfulness of secondhand smoke, and the concept of smoker compensation,” and that “{t]hese executives then made, caused to be made, and approved public statements contrary to this knowl- edge.” Pet. App. 38a-39a.'° The central dispute at trial was whether the statements made by petitioners and their employees “accurately reflected” the “prevailing internal views” of the corporation and the speaker. RJR Pet. 28-29. It is simplv implausible that Reynolds pos- sessed but deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence that not only would have disproved the showing Reynolds contended the government was required to make but also would have rebutted the specific evidence the government presented. Reynolds’ factbound claim of unfairness lacks any merit and does not warrant this Court’s review. 2. Petitioners Reynolds and Lorillard contend (RJR Pet. 7-8, 17-18; Lorillard Pet. 29-30) that a subset of their public statements—those directed in the first in- stance toward Congress or other governmental agen- cies—enjoy protection under the Noerr-Pennington ” Indeed, the government’s post-trial brief provided more than 20 pages of “examples of particular executives, employees, and agents of [petitioners] who possessed the specific intent required under the mail and wire fraud laws,” with citations to the supporting record evidence. C.A. App. A1l393-A1414. Petitioners made no attempt to rebut this evidence in the district court, claiming only that the officers who made or approved petitioners’ false statements might have “personally be- lieved” the statements were true despite a wealth of contradictory evi- dence. Jd. at Al1489 (citing petitioners’ joint post-trial brief) 47 doctrine. The court of appeals correctly rejected that contention, which does not present any legal issue war- ranting review. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine bears only slight, if any, relevance to this case. Under that doctrine, “[tlhose who petition government for redress are gener- ally immune from antitrust liability.” Professional Real E’state Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures tndus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993); see Hastern R.R. Presidents Con- ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (Noerr); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pen nington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). Were this an antitrust case, the Noerr-Penninaton doctrine might have some conceivable bearing. But as the court of appeals ex plained, Pet. App. 44a-46a, this case concerns fraud on consumers; petitioners’ liability rests on their use of the mails and wires while executing a scheme to defraud cigarette purchasers of their money. 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 (Supp. II 2008)."° This Court has never suggested, and petitioners cite no case holding, that the Noerr- Pennington doctrine confers some sort of generalized immunity from laws punishing consumer fraud. See Pet. App. 44a-45a."‘ » Petitioner Reynolds argues (Pet. 16) that its speech before Con gress or other government agencies does not constitute “consumer fraud” because it “was not directed to consumers.” But the same state- ments may be intended both to influence government agencies and to defraud consumers of money or property. The district court’s findings make clear that what petitioners describe as their “Noerr-Pennington speech” was In fact an integral part of petitioner's overall strategy to portray the health effects of smoking as an “open question” and thereby to obtain money from cigarette smokers by means of false represent LiONs. * Petitioners are thus mistaken in claiming (PM Pet. 26n.4; RJR Pet 18)) that the decision below conflicts with other circuits’ application 48 Similarly, while Noerr-Pennington immunity stems in part from First Amendment right-to-petition con- cerns, see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138, this Court has stressed that “[t]he Petition Clause * * * was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble|,| * * and there is no sound basis for granting greater consti- tutional protection to statements made in a petition * * than other First Amendment expressions.” Mc- Donald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985); see id. at 484 (concluding that “petitions to the President that contain intentional and reckless falsehoods do not enjoy consti- tutional protection”) (internal quotation marks and cita- tion omitted). Petitioners appear to contend that the Noerr-Pen- nington doctrine confers immunity from all liability for any speech—even knowingly false statements—that is addressed to a government agency and takes the form of “efforts to affect governmental regulation.” Lorillard Pet. 29-30; see RJR Pet. 17. But that sweeping proposi- tion cannot be squared with established and unquestion ably constitutional prohibitions against making false when ’ eral courts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1001 (prohibiting false statements to the federal government); 18 U.S.C. 162] (perjury of witnesses); see also Buckman Co. v. Plain tiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (explaining that federal law “amply empowers the [Food and Drug Administration] to punish and deter fraud against the Administration’). the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. All of the eases on which petitioner rely, like Noerr itself, involved immunity from antitrust claims. None involved consumer fraud. be In any event, the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not squarely presented in this case. As a precautionary measure, the district court excluded evi- dence of certain testimony petitioners’ executives pro- vided to Congress. See Pet. App. 46a; id. at 1962a- 1963a. Even if those statements were properly ex- cluded, a question the court of appeals found no need to resolve, see id. at 46a, the district court specifically found “that the vast majority of [petitioners’] statements were made with the primary purpose of influencing smokers, potential smokers, and the general public and are, therefore, not protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.” /d. at 1960a; see id. at 46a (concluding that, ever if petitioners’ congressional testimony was prop- erly excluded, petitioners’ “remaining acts were in- tended to defraud consumers, so Noerr-Pen nington pro- tection does not apply”). Indeed, even if the district court had excluded from consideration not just congres sional testimony but all of petitioners’ statements to the FTC and other federal regulators, the record would still contain ample evidence—including misleading market- ing materials, press releases, statements on television talk shows, and advertising campaigns—to support the finding of a scheme to defraud consumers. In view of that record, the question that Reynolds seeks to raise (RJR Pet. 17)—whether First Amendment protection applies to deliberate deception of regulatory bodies and legislators in pursuit of a fraudulent scheme aimed at consumers—is not properly presented. DD. Petitioners’ Statements About “Light” And “Low-Tar” Cigarettes Were Frauduient And Not Authorized By The PTC Petitioners Reynolds and Philip Morris (RJR Pet. 29-34; PM Pet. 29-30) contend that the court of appeals erred in upholding fraud liahility based on their adver- tising of “light” and “low-tar” cigarettes. That conten- tion is based on two arguments, neither of which has merit or warrants review. First, petitioners argue that “they should be immune from liability because the [FTC] * * * has blessed their use of labels such as ‘light’ and ‘low tar.’” Pet. App. 46a-47a. But as the court of appeals explained, that argument is “entirely foreclosed” by this Court’s decision in Allria, which held that “the FTC has in fact never required that cigarette manufacturers disclose tar and nicotine yields, nor has it condoned representations of those yields through the use of ‘light’ or ‘low tar’ descriptors.” Pet. App. 47a (quoting Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 900). Second, petitioners contend that their “light” and “low tar’ descriptors were not actionable under the fraud statutes because although such statements “could be interpreted to imply a heaith benefit, that is not the only reasonable interpretation that could be drawn from the terms.” Lorillard Pet. 30-31; see also RJR Pet. 30. The district court found, however, that petitioners knew and intended that consumers would interpret “light” and “low tar” descriptors to convey a health benefit, see Pet. App. 1068a-1096a, even though petitioners “have known for decades that filtered and low tar cigarettes do not offer a meaningful reduction of risk, and that their mar- keting which emphasized reductions in tar and nicotine was false and misleading.” /d. at 46a (quoting zd. at >] 1905a-1906a); see itd. at 1140a-1147a, 1255a-1256a. There is also no merit to petitioners’ characterization of “light” and “low tar” descriptors as “simply verbal rep- resentations of numerical ratings authorized by the FTC.” Jd. at 49a. That argument “founders on the dis- trict court’s finding that ‘there are lights of certain brands with higher tar levels than regulars of other brands from the same company, and there are also lights and regulars of the same brands that have the same FTC tar rating.’” /bzd. (quoting zd. at 1907a); see 2d. at 1142a (finding that the terms “light” and “low tar,” as used by petitioners, are empirically “meaningless” and “arbitrary”’). This evidence, “which [petitioners] do not attempt to show is clearly erroneous, reveals the descriptors were not simply representations of numeri- cal ratings and thus were not ‘literally true.’” /d. at 49a. In any event, the “fraudulent activity surrounding ‘light’ cigarettes was not merely limited to the use of misleading descriptors.” Pet. App. 48a. The district court found, for example, that petitioners’ public state- ments about the demand for light cigarettes were “bla- tantly false,” 7d. at 1906a; that petitioners “withheld and suppressed their extensive knowledge and understand- ing of nicotine-driven smoker compensation,” id. at 1907a; and that petitioners intentionally designed their light cigarettes to facilitate smokers’ ability to compen- sate and thereby obtain the required dosage of nicotine to remain addicted, zd. at 1905a. See generally id. at 775a-850a (describing petitioners’ efforts to “design commercial cigarettes that were capable of delivering nicotine across a range of doses that would keep smok ers addicted,” including through filter design, the place- ment of ventilation holes, paper porosity, and alterations to the chemical form of the nicotine delivered to smok ers’ brains). EK. Neither The Master Settlement Agreement Nor The Pas- sage Of The Family Smoking Prevention And Tobacco Control Act Eliminated All Likelihood Of Future Viola- tions Both courts below properly found that an injunction was warranted, especially given petitioners’ vast, decades-long fraudulent enterprise. Pet. App. 60a-67a, 2007a-2021a; see 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) (injunctions available under RICO to “prevent and restrain violations”). This Court has long recognized that “|iJn exercising its equi- table jurisdiction, [a] federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the same type or class as un- lawful acts which the court has found to have been com- mitted.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. llazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioners Philip Morris and Lorillard nonetheless contend that the Master Settle- ment Agreement (MSA) and the FSPTCA “[floreclose [fluture [rJacketeering” and thus “extinguished the dis- trict court’s jurisdiction.” PM Pet. 28; see zd. at 28-31; Lorillard Pet. 31-32. Petitioners do not contend that the district court’s injunction conflicts with any decision of this Court or any court of appeals, and their challenge is without merit. 1. Petitioners erroneously contend that the injunc- tive relief ordered in this case was barred by the MSA —an agreement between state attorneys general and some tobacco companies settling tort and reimburse- ment suits through a variety of state-specific injunctions and consent decrees, see Pet. App. 61la-66a, 1864a-1870a. As an initial matter, they cite no authority whatsoever 53 for the proposition that a racketeer’s settlement of other causes of action with other parties can strip a federal district court of “jurisdiction” to provide injunctive re- lief for the United States in a RICO case. PM Pet. 28; see Pet. App. 62a (characterizing this argument by peti- tioners as “odd”); cf. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Ine., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975) (“I njunctive relief is not barred by a defendant’s disclaimer of an intent to violate the law in the future.”). In any event, this con tention ignores the district court’s express factual find- ings regarding petitioners’ violations of the MSA, as well as the settlement’s inadequacy when compared to the injunction issued here. As the court of appeals found, petitioners “cannot hide behind the MSA to avoid the imposition of RICO remedies when they do not comply with the agreement.” Pet. App. 66a. Those petitioners subject to the MSA “began to evade and at times even violate the MSA’s prohibitions almost immediately after signing the agree- ment.” /d. at 64a. For example, “although the MSA vequired [petitioners] to dissolve CIAR, only two days after signing the MSA Lorillard’s general counsel wrote to Philip Morris, Reynolds, and Brown & Williamson asking to ‘discuss the status of the plan to reinstate CIAR.’” Jbid. (citation omitted). “Shortly thereafter, Covington & Burling LLP informed the CIAR contrac- tors ‘[tj]he members of CIAR have decided to create a new organization to continue the work. . . . The mem- bers of CIAR that will be members of the new organiza- tion intend to continue to fund the research.” /d. at 64a- 65a (citation omitted). “Subsequently, in 2000, Philip Morris initiated a new research program that had the same offices, phone numbers, and board as CLAR and many of the same employecs, management, researchers, o4 peer reviewers, and grantees.” /d. at 65a; see also zbid. (“CIAR is not the lone example of [ petitioners’| organi. zations poised to circumvent the MSA’s prohibitions against joint activities or participation in an enter- prise.”). Moreover, as further “evidence of the MSA’s failures and pitfalls, the district court noted that despite the MSA [petitioners] still fraudulently denied the dangers of secondhand smoke, marketed ‘low tar’ cigarettes as a healthier alternative to quitting, and falsely denied manipulating nicotine delivery and marketing to youth.” Pet. App. 66a; see also zd. at 1873a-1877a (summarizing additional MSA violations by petitioners); 7d. at 2044a (“| Petitioners] continue to make affirmative statements on smoking and health issues that are fraudulent.”). Petitioners offered “no rebuttal” to these factual find- ings. /d. at 66a. Additionally, the MSA does not include core compo- nents of the injunctive relief ordered in this case. See Pet. App. 1884a (MSA does not enjoin against future RICO violations, regulate “‘light’ and ‘low tar’” descrip- tors, require corrective statements, or fund smoking cessation programs. ). Finally, the States “could not be relied upon to ‘vigor- ously’ enforce the MSA,” Pet. App. at 66a (citation omit- ted); some provisions of the MSA had either expired at the time of the district court’s order or were on the cusp of expiring, cbzd.; and BATCo and Altria were not even parties to the MSA, zbid.; see id. at 1879a. The MSA is no substitute for the injunction ordered in this case, and it certainly did not deprive the district court of “juris- diction” to enter injunctive relief. 2. Shortly after the panel decision was issued, Con- gress enacted the FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 1238 Stat. 1776. Congress specifically cited the district court’s findings in this case in its own legislative find- ings, see § 2(47)-(49), 1238 Stat. 1781, and instructed that “(njothing” in the new Act “shall be construed to * * affect any action pending in Federal, State, or tribal! court,” § 4(a), 123 Stat. 1782. Nonetheless, several peti- tioners filed a Suggestion Of Mootness And Motion For Partial Vacatur (“Suggestion Of Mootness”) in the court of appeals, arguing that the new law rendered aspects of the injunction “moot.” The government opposed the motion, explaining that the legislation was not co-exten- sive with the injunction in this case and arguing that any request to modify the injunction should be presented to the district court in the first instance. The panel denied the Suggestion Of Mootness. See PM Pet. 1. The court of appeals also denied Philip Morris’s petition for re- hearing en banc, which made a similar argument. See Pet. App. 2183a. Review of the court of appeals’ summary rejection of petitioners’ claims regarding the new legislation is not warranted. See PM Pet. 29-31; Lorillard Pet. 31-32. Petitioners can assert their claim that the injunction in this case should be modified in light of the new law in the district court, which is the appropriate forum to con- sider it in the first instance. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009) (party subject to an injunction may seek relief from the district court in light of changed circumstances). In particular, that court is better situ- ated to evaluate petitioners’ factual contention that the new legislation renders it unlikely that they “will engage in future joint racketeering activity of the type the dis- trict court found and on which it premised its forward- looking injunctive relief.” PM Pet. 30. The district court’s disposition of such a request would then be ony reviewable in the court of appeals and, if necessary, i this Court. Review now is premature. Allowing the district court to evaluate this contention in the regular course is especially appropriate in light of the fact that petitioners Reynolds and Lorillard, as well as other plaintiffs, have brought a First Amendment challenge to the FSPTCA. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010), appeal pending, Nos. 10-5234 and 10-5235 (6th Cir. filed Mar. 9, 2010). Petitioners cannot establish that the new law “dispels any doubt” about whether they will engage in future racketeering, PM Pet. 30, while two of them are simultaneously attempting to invalidate the legislation." Nor is there any merit to Philip Morris’s cursory suggestion that the new legislation renders this case moot. PM Pet. 30-31. That very contention was re- jected by Congress in the text of the Act itself. § 4(a), 123 Stat. 1782. In an attempt to alter the meaning of this text, Philip Morris points to some of the legislation’s provisions that address topics also covered by the in junction, but it does not and cannot claim that the new law wholly duplicates the district court’s injunction. For example, the Act does not purport to provide tailored remedies for decades of fraud, such as the corrective statements ordered by the district court. Nor does it provide any redress for the harm to the millions of vic- Lims of petitioners’ scheme who, as petitioners intended, © Philip Morris argues in the alternative that this Court should grant vacate, and remand to allow the court of appeals to consider its argu- ment regarding the impact of the new legislation. I'M Pet. 28,31. But the court of appeals has already considered the impact of the new leg lation, denying petitioners’ Suggestion Of Mootness and petitions for rehearing en bance, so a GVR would not be appropriate oJ continue to purchase cigarettes because they have be- come chemically dependent on nicotine. See Gov't Pet. t 29-31, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Ine., No. 09-978 (filed Dec. 10, 2009). KF. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Upheld The Injunction Prohibiting Specified Conduct And Requiring Correc- tive Statements 1. The district court enjoined petitioners from “com- mitting any act of racketeering, as defined in 18 U. § 1961(1), relating in any way to the wenchach a ukeren marketing, promotion, health consequences, or sale of cigarettes in the United States,” Pet. App. 2069a, and from “making, or causing to be made in any way, any materia! false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation, or engaging in any public relations or marketing endeavor that is disseminated to the United States publie and that misrepresents or suppresses in- formation concerning cigarettes,” id. at 2070a. Petition- ers contend that these provisions are too vague to sat- isfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). PM Pet. 31-34; Lorillard Pet. That claim, which involves application of settled law to the particular circumstances of this case, does not warrant this Court’s review and is meritless in any event. RICO specifically authorizes district courts to “pro- hibit{] any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in,” 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), and that is precisely what the district court did in this ease. This is not. a case in which the district court “enjoin[ed] all future illegal conduct of the defendant” or even all future violations of RICO “however unrelated to the violation found by the court.” Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 133. Instead, the court exercised its 5 ds well-established equitable authority to enjoin petition- ers “from committing other related unlawful acts.” /bzd. In doing so, there was no requirement “that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed.” Jbid. As the district court ex- plained, “Rule 65(d) does not require the [dlistrict (cjourt to ‘predict exactly what [petitioners] will think of next,” especially since “it would be impossible to foresee what the ingenuity and creativity of [petitioners’] cadres of sophisticated lawyers could ‘think of next.’” United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Ine. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2001)). The eases that Philip Morris cites (Pet. 32-33) are inapposite. In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), this Court held that an order pro- hibiting acts “as charged in the complaint” was imper missible under Rule 65(d), which bars courts from de- seribing the acts enjoined “by referring to the com- plaint.” Jd. at 410; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C). In International Longshoremen’s Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64 (1967), the Court va eated an injunction purporting “to enforce an arbitra- tor’s award” where that award “contain[ed] only an ab- stract conclusion of law, not an operative command ¢a- pable of ‘enforcement.’” /d. at 74. Here, the district court order did not refer to the complaint or direct the “enforeement” of abstract conclusions of law. And it “specified the matters about which [petitioners] are to avoid making false statements or committing racketeer- ing acts: the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences, and sale of cigarettes, along with related issues that [petitioners] have reason to Know are of concern to cigarette consumers.” Pet. App. 73a-74a The court of appeals concluded that the injunction ‘sufficiently specif]ied] the activities enjoined as to pro- vide [petitioners | with fair notice of the prohibited con- duct,” given that the district court “did not abstractly enjoin | petitioners] from violating RICO or making false statements, but instead specified the matters about which [petitioners] are to avoid making false statements or committing racketeering acts.” Pet. App. 73a-74a. The court of appeals went on to observe that separate and apart from the clear terms of the injunction itself, “the context of the district court’s legal conclusions and 4,088 findings of fact about fraud in the manufacture, promotion, and sale of cigarettes” provided yet more clarity. /d. at 74a. Petitioners argue that this observa- tion by the court of appeals “squarely contravenel(d| Rule 65(d)” by referring to the findings of fact. PM Pet. 33; see Fed. KR. Civ. P. 65(d)C1 (CC) (‘Every order grant ing an injunction * * * must * * * describe in rea- sonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or re- quired.”). An appellate opinion cannot “contravene{ }” this rule (PM Pet. 33), for it is not an “order granting an injunction,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). The district court’s injunction order did not rely on the findings of fact to provide specificity or otherwise violate Rule 65(d). At bottom, petitioners’ objection is not that the in- junction is unclear, but that it happens to be broad. But tule 65(d) limits vague injunctions, not comprehensive ones, and this Court has stressed that broad decrees prohibiting future violations of a statute are “wholly warranted” “where a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949) (coneluding that an order “enjoin- [ing] any practices which were violations of th/e] statu- - 60 tory provisions” was justified by the defendant’s “record of continuing and persistent violations”). That is exactly what the record established here. Pet. App. 74a (citing McComb, 336 U.S. at 192). 2. The district court also ordered petitioners to pub- lish corrective statements on their websites, as a one- time full-page advertisement in thirty-five major news- papers, and in ten advertisements on a major television network over the course of one year. Pet. App. 83a. “The court chose these media in order to ‘structure a remedy which uses the same vehicles which | petitioners] have themselves historically used to promulgate false smoking and health messages.” /bid.; see also id. at 2047a-2048a. The district court found such statements appropriate to counteract decades of false and mislead- ing statements by petitioners concerning the health ef- fects of smoking and nicotine addiction, commercial speech that even at the time of the court’s order “continue[d] to omit material information or present information in a misleading and incomplete fashion.” /d. at 2043a; see id. at 86a (all such statements were “at- tempts to persuade the public to purchase cigarettes”). The court of appeals properly concluded that against the hackground of petitioners’ false and fraudulent state- ments to consumers about their products over 50 years, the publication of appropriate corrective statements addressing petitioners’ false assertions in the same me- dia petitioners themselves have used is a suitable means of preventing petitioners from continuing to deceive their customers. /d. at $3a-89a. The court of appeals affirmed this aspect of the dis trict court’s order only in the abstract, however, noting that the content of the corrective statements has not yet been determined. See Pet. App. 88a. Indeed, the dis- ty] trict court said it would determine the content of the corrective statements based on submissions by both the lTnited States and petitioners, id. at 204%a-2049a, so petitioners themselves will have an opportunity to shape the statements. Accordingly, review of the corrective statements requirement by this Court at this time, as petitioner Reynolds urges (Pet. 34-56), would be prema- ture. The court of appeals cautioned the district court that the statements must be “carefully phrased so they do not impermissibly chill protected speech.” . Pet. App. 88a. “Consequently, the court must confine the state ments to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial informa- tion,’ gearcd towards thwarting prospective efforts by [petitioners] to either directly mislead consumers or capitalize on their prior deceptions by continuing to ad- vertise in a manner that builds on consumers’ existing misperceptions.” /bid. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).. The court of appeals coneluded that “/a]ssum- ing the corrective advertising once drafted meets these requirements, itis a permissible restraint on | petition- ers’| commercial speech.” /d. at 89a (emphasis added). This Court could not meaningfully evaluate petitioner Reynolds’ claim that the corrective statements will vio- late the First Amendment and RICO without knowing what the corrective statements are. Reynolds erroneously contends (Pet. 35) that the court of appeals’ affirmance of a corrective statement obligation in the abstract conflicts with National Com- mission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). In that decep- tive advertising case, the Seventh Circuit modified an FTC order requiring corrective statements on the ex- 62 press ground that the case did not involve “a long his tory of deception” that had “permeated the consumer mind.” /d. at 164. That is precisely what the district court found here. See Pet. App. 2047a-2048a. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit contrasted the record before it with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (1977), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 9450 (1973), which sustained a corrective advertising require ment as a remedy for decades of false advertising. See id. at 769 (upholding corrective statements because, after fiftv years of false claims, “advertising which fails to rebut the prior claims * * * inevitably builds upon those claims; continued advertising continues the decep- tion, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly”). Likewise here, the pancl explained, petitioners “violated RICO by making false and fraudulent statements to consumers about their products” for “over fifty years.” Pet. App. Sd. G. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Rejected BATCo’s Claim That This Case Involves An Extraterritorial Ap- plication Of RICO BATCo contends that the deciston below conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals holding that KICO does not apply to conduct oecurring outside the United States merely because it has “effects” in the United States. 09-980 Pet. (BATCo Pet.) 10. This case, however, does not provide any occasion for resolving the asserted conflict. In addition to engaging in overseas conduct with effects in the United States, BATCo en- gaged in extensive conduct within the United States, and it also conspired with U.S.-based petitioners. BATCo may therefore be held liable for violations of RICO’s substantive and conspiracy provisions without regard to any foreign conduct, and this case does not involve extraterritorial liability under the test used by any of the courts of appeals. In any event, the cases giving rise to the asserted conflict involved private civil RICO damages actions, in which the plaintiffs were re- quired to show that the defendants’ actions had proxi- mately caused their injuries. Those decisions are not relevant to this case, which arises from an action by the United States for equitable relief under Section 1964(a)—a provision that does not impose a proxi mate-causation requirement. 1. The premise of BATCo’s petition is that its liabil- ity rests on “wholly foreign conduct.” Pet. i; see zd. at 13 (arguing that “this Court has long treated laws as having extraterritorial reach if they apply to conduct that occurs in a foretgn country”). That is incorrect. BATCo is liable under RICO’s substantive provision because it used the interstate mails and wires—and en- gaged in other conduct within the United States—in furtherance of a scheme that was aimed at defrauding American consumers. Such an application of RICO pre- sents no issue of extraterritoriality. See Pusquuntino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005) (application of the wire-fraud statute did not have extraterritorial ef- fect where defendants “used U.S. interstate wires to execute a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue”); Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Even where the sig- nificant effects of the regulated conduct are felt outside U.S. borders, the statute itself does not present a prob- lem of extraterritoriality, so long as the conduct which Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the LInited States.”); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 479-480 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991); Republic of 4 the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358-1359 (9th Cir 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989). This Court has explained that “|[mlJail fraud * * * occurs whenever a person, ‘having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,’ uses the mail ‘for the purpose of executing such scheme or arti- fice or attempting so to do.’” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 8. Ct. 2151, 2138 (2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 1341). “{T]he indictable act under § 1341 is not the fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud.” Jd. at 2140; see Pas- guantino, 544 U.S. at 355 n.2 (noting that the Court has adopted a parallel construction of the identical language of the wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343). Thus, in Pas quantino, this Court rejected the argument that the application of the wire-fraud statute to a scheme to de- fraud the Government of Canada of liquor-tax revenues gave the statute extraterritorial effect, emphasizing that the defendants In that case “used U.S. interstate wires to execute a scheme to defraud.” 544 U.S. at 371. Be- cause the defendants’ “offense was complete the mo- ment they executed a scheme inside the United States,” the Court explained, the “domestic element of [their] conduct is what the Government is punishing.” /bid Like the offenses in Pasquantino, BATCo’s predi cate offenses were consummated when it used the United States mails and wires in furtherance of petition- ers’ fraudulent scheme. See, e.g., Pet. App. 1851a-1852a (describing BATCo’s practice of delivering sensitive research reports to petitioners in the United States by sending unmarked envelopes to an attorney in Ken- tucky); 7d. at 591a-592a (BATCo sent report document- ing the phenomenon of nicotine compensation to B&W _- 65 in the United States); id. at 690a (BATCo sent research on the physiological effects of nicotine to B&W in the United States); see also id. at 2145a. Indeed, before trial, BATCo stipulated that it had used the U.S. mails and wires as alleged by the government in eleven sepa- rate instances, including mailings to BATCo’s United States affiliate B&W. See BATCo Pet. 3 n.3 (describing BATCo’s affiliation with B&W); Gov’t Exh. 86,700, 91 1 (stipulating that the documents identified in Racketeer- ing Acts 11, 30, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 60, and 63 were “trans- mitted via U.S. mails as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1341” and that “[a]ll requirements for mailing pursu- ant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341 have been satisfied with respect to” those mailings); 7d. 11 2-3 (similar stipulation for wire-fraud offenses). BATCo’s various claims (Pet. 5 n.4) that its mailings were “unpublished,” were not “di- rected at U.S. consumers,” and did not “describe[] state- ments or conduct by BATCo in the United States” are irrelevant under the mail-fraud statute, which prohibits any use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to de- fraud.. See Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 21388. In light of its stipulations, BATCo cannot now contend (Pet. 31) that its liability rests on “wholly foreign conduct.” Moreover, BATCo’s domestic conduct in furtherance of the U.S.-based scheme to defraud extended well be- yond its use of the mails and wires: the district court also documented BATCo’s direct and extensive partici- pation in petitioners’ enterprise in the United States. For example, BATCo was the organizer of a nicotine pharmacology conference for petitioners in South Carolina. Pet. App. 848a-849a. Its representatives at- tended T'l’s “College of Tobacco Knowledge” for train- ing in the enterprise’s coordinated public-relations mes- sages. /d. at 221la-222a. They also attended meetings in 66 the United States of the joint industry groups that were used to coordinate the affairs of the enterprise. See, e.g., 7d. at 326a-327a (ICOSI meeting in Kansas City, Missouri); 7d. at 332a-33838a (INFOTAB meeting in Washington, D.C.). BATCo maintained “frequent and direct” contacts with “high level smoking and health research scientists” at the U.S.-based TI Research Com mittee and the CTR, including frequent visits to the United States by BATCo scientists and executives. /d. at 138a-139a. BA'T'Co operated an experimental tobacco farm in North Carolina for producing tobacco that was genetically engineered to yield extra nicotine. /d. at 788a. And BATCo sold millions of cigarettes in the United States through a marketing agreement with a Reynolds subsidiary. /d. at 2022a n.&83. In sum, even without the actions taken by BATCo abroad in furtherance of the scheme to defraud United States consumers, there was ample evidence to support $ATCo’s hability under RICO. Although the court of appeals had no occasion to discuss BATCo’s conduct within the United States, the government argued that BATCo’s liability could be sustained on that basis, see Gov’t C.A. Br. 175-177, and it would provide an alterna- tive ground for affirming the judgment below. 2. In addition to violating RICO’s substantive provi- sions, BATCo also engaged in a RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Pet. App. 1991a-2002a. Under RICO, a conspirator is liable for the acts of its co conspirators undertaken in furtherance of the conspir acy, Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997), and it is well established that a co-conspirator outside the United States may be held liable for substantive offenses committed in furtherance of a conspiracy by conspirators inside the United States. See, e.g., Ford v. 67 United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619-624 (1927) (defendants whose conspiratorial activity occurred outside the United States were liable for conspiracy to violate United States law because of conduct of other conspira- tors within the United States); accord United States v. Inco Bank & Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919, 920 (11th Ci 1988) (“It is well settled that the government has the power to prosecute every member of a conspiracy that takes place in United States territory, even those con- spirators who never entered the United States.”); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Since there is no dis- pute that the conduct of BATCo’s co-conspirators oc curred in the United States, that principle—which KATCo does not address—provides an independent ba sis for the decision below. 3. The court of appeals based its decision on the “substantial domestic effects” of BATCo’s overseas con- duct. Pet. App. 58a. As the court correctly explained, “(blecause conduct with substantial domestic effects implicates a state’s legitimate interest in protecting its citizens within its borders, Congress’s regulation of for- eign conduct meeting this ‘effects’ test is ‘not an extra- territorial assertion of jurisdiction.’” /bird. (quoting Laker Airways Lid. v. Sabena, Belgian World Avrlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984))."" Aceording to - Phe evidence amply supported the conclusion that BATCo’s foreign conduct was intended to cause, and did cause, substantial effects in the linited States. KATCo was a founding member of ICOSI—a joint or ganization used, in the words of an internal BATCo document, to “throw[] up a smoke screen and to throw doubt on smoking researct findings which show smoke causes diseases.” Pet. App. 1624a. BATC iso founded or participate {in other joint entities and covert pera tions” that petitioners used to further the goals of the enterprise 6S BATCo, the court’s analysis conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals that have held that domestic ef- fects of foreign conduct are insufficient to establish RICO liability. For the reasons explained above, this case does not implicate that asserted conflict because BATCo’s domestic conduct—and its conspiracy with the domestic cigarette manufacturers—provide independent grounds for liability, and that lability is not extraterri- torial under the test used by any court of appeals. In any event, BATCo’s suggestion of a conflict is in- correct. BATCo’s argument rests in part (Pet. 12, 20, 30) on several decisions addressing the extraterritorial effect of various statutes other than RICO. As BATCo admits (Pet. 34), however, “RICO is quite different” from those statutes, and therefore those decisions shed little light on whether, or under what circumstances, Congress intended RICO to apply to con [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1613%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.