# Writ of Habeas Corpus — Moses, In re (No. 09-644)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1301%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Writ of Habeas Corpus
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

S
“wpreme Court, us

09 644

NOV 30 2009

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

App. No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IN RE: C. LYNN MOSES,
Petitioner

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ARTICLE I, § 9

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Blake S. Atkin*

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Telephone: (801) 533-0300

Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

Attorney for Petitioner C. LYNN MOSES
*Counsel of Record

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether your Petitioner is being held
unlawfully and unconstitutionally having been
convicted of violating the Clean Water Act for having
maintained for twenty years, under contract with
Teton County, a flood control channel! through
uplands where no wetlands are located; when the
regulations that existed in 1980 when he first
undertook that maintenance put this flood control
device outside the jurisdiction of the Clean Water
Act; and after this Court’s decision in Rapanos v.
United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006), and even after
promulgating regulations requiring an individualized
analysis of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, using
criteria that definitely exclude this upland ditch from
such jurisdiction, no government agency, prosecutor,
nor any Court has undertaken the analysis to
determine whether this upland ditch your Petitioner
maintained that carries water for less than two
months cut of the year, was within the jurisdiction of
the Clean Water Act.

il

LIST OF PARTIES TO CONVICTION

Petitioner C. Lynn Moses was the Defendant
in this matter.

Respondent United States of America was the
Plaintiff in this matter.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR
IIT a 6.ak05xn.s0ueuninsen onde amiteed ane ineeueias aenca eae i
LIST OF PARTIES TO CONVICTION................... li
PRR IE CAFE EE iis ces ids voeserersytercemeereenes lil
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIBG....................... Vv

CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE COURTG......... vl

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ADAUF BRP IN cscs sscxevncecavacssccsivecsareesengaes vi

REASON WHY APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT MADE TO DISTRICT
CHIT av xsn'adnuncinisovws our eon canenn apeuunnsc iva ienneueeaataiaee ]

FACTS RELATING TO DETENTION OF

Oa ee in 0 ibs5 sah ka hcase ina nckee op uaatedls MekaeAaeeRESS 2
CAPO T LRN NR ids shgsksceviatedstacacaageeiwepae wane 10
APPENDIX

Declaration of Bill Scott with accompanying

iV

MO WEGIOIIOE GECICIOD vcs s vidcnsses ves acesceccsessaese: la

Letter from Lynn Moses to the Corps of
ics occa take cgannes tatscs peasdaucoushucnsasese 14a

Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v.
United States and Carabell v. United

aera ss sak vias byuaia reas stad cunvebdaracessiaed oun 17a
Excerpt from Trial Record...................0086. 43a
Excerpt from Trial Record...................0000. 45a

Excerpt from Trial Record...............seessee0 47a

Vv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES:
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906,
EE ot ig es raul ekacuwcesiwar ics See 3

Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)..................000. 3

Rapanos _v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208

Paani ak ap ans ox eye ena mendcck vexon don eceanienn 1,1,4,5,8,9
U.S. v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9tb Cir. 2007)............. v1

U.S. v. Moses, _F.Supp. __, 2009 WL 735638 (D.
Ne eee vi

STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES:

BE Ee EM ais tic sien. vouna pbaexinwanwdpdackeveonciepadven an vi
WE BGI occ csvnscscisccerscccreccscivlenndncs 1
RE TE in as bh ceca tuahantsapansdeasidntascxeuasaands vu,8
ae be SR gt sg) Sr ere Ore eon ..10
United States Constitution, Article I, § 9............0... v1

United States Supreme Court Rules, Rule 20......... vi

Vi

CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE COURTS

U.S. v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9 Cir. 2007)

U.S. v. Moses, _F.Supp. __, 2009 WL 735638 (D.
Idaho 2009)

BASIS FOR THE COURT'S JURISDICTION

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant
to the United States Constitution Article I Section
9; 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and United States Supreme
Court Rules, Rule 20.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES |
AND REGULATIONS

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, ARTICLE 1, § 9:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.

28 U.S.C. § 2241:

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and

Vil

any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions. The order of a _ circuit
judge shall be entered in the records of
the district court of the district wherein
the restraint complained of is had.

33 U.S.C. § 1251

(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,
physical and biological integrity of Nation's waters;
national goals for achievement of objective.

The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and_ biological
integrity of the Nation's waters.

l

REASON WHY APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT MADE TO DISTRICT
COURT

The jurisdictional question presented by this
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was presented to
the District Court in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. The District Court, in denying that motion,
refused to address the jurisdictional issue claiming
that it had been answered on direct appeal and
therefore it could deny the motion without
addressing the jurisdictional issue. While it is true
that the issue has been repeatedly addressed to the
Courts and to the two agencies involved—the EPA
and the Army Corps of Enginecrs, to date, no one has
answered the question presented. Such dodging of
the issue is unbecoming a Court of these United
States and leads the Petitioner to doubt the
possibility of a fair hearing on the issue before the
District Court. The rule of law set out by this Court
in its Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208
(2006), decision needs to be applied to your
Petitioner's case. When that is done there is no
logical way to find that the removal, when no water
is present, of last year’s gravel washed down from an
upland ditch in order to control flood waters that run
at most, for two months of the year and that do not
wash any of the disturbed gravel into a navigable
water has a significant nexus to the physical,
biological, or chemical integrity of a navigable water
of the United States. Your Petitioner deserves to
have his question about jurisdiction answered, and it
is apparent from reading the Court of Appeals

2

decision and the District Court’s denial of the 2255
motion that the lower court’s are not going to answer
it.

FACTS RELATING TO DETENTION OF
PETITIONER

Petitioner, C. Lynn Moses, reported to the
Bureau of Prisons to begin an eighteen (18) month
sentence on August 6, 2008. He currently is on home
confinement and is scheduled to begin a one year
period of supervised release beginning on November
26, 2009.

The conviction and sentence is Ulegal because
it is based on a conviction for which there was no
jurisdiction. Mr. Moses, as president of a
homeowner's association, was convicted of violating
the Clean Water Act by performing flood control
activities, required by contract between’ the
homeowner's association and Teton County, in an
area watered only intermittently (less than two
months out of the year); that contains no wetlands:
and which has never been determined to be within
the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act. In fact,
when the flood control activities began in 1980, the
Army Corps of Engineers specifically determined
that the area was not within its jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act.' The procedure spelled out in
the agency regulations for changing that

! Teton County invited the Army Corps of Engineers to solve the
flood control problem in the area. The Corps of Engineers
specifically denied jurisdiction. Thereafter, the county required
Mr. Moses, by contract, to perform the flood control activities
for which this indictment followed.

determination was never followed and there has
never been a determination of jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act over the area in question.

Our Constitution, with its Bill of Rights and
other guarantees of human dignity and freedom,
would be meaningless were it not for the procedural
due process guarantees that are guaranteed by our
Constitution and held strictly sacrosanct by this
Court. Many totalitarian regimes throughout the
world have touted constitutional guarantees that on
paper sound as profound as our own, but since there
are no procedural guarantees of fairness in their
systems of justice, their constitutions are a “paper
tiger” and the fine sounding guarantees have no true
worth.

There is perhaps no more_ important
procedural guarantee than that of jurisdiction. The
requirement of jurisdiction is so essential to ordered
government that it is the one defect in a proceeding
that cannot be waived, and is raised sua sponte by
the Courts whenever it is recognized. Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 915 (2004),
citing Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S.
379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884) (challenge
to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be
made at any stage of the proceedings, and the court
should raise the question sua sponte). If this Court
upholds and condones the continued detention of Mr.
Moses when the Government has failed to make a
determination of jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act, which its own regulations require, it will be
condoning a mockery of our constitutional way of

life .2

The conviction in this case centered around
the Petitioner’s activities in 2002, 2003, and 2004, in
cleaning a flood channel that had been established in
1980. In 1980, when the flood channel in question
was established, Mr. Moses and Teton County
inquired of the Corps of Engineers whether a permit
was required for the flood control work. They were
told that because the area received water only
intermittently, the Corps of Engineers had no
jurisdiction. See, Declaration of Bill Scott with
accompanying newspaper articles (Appendix, infra,
pp. la-13a).

Over the next twenty years, as new personnel
would join the Corps, some would suggest Mr. Moses
needed a permit to continue maintenance of the flood
control channel. Mr. Moses would remind them of
the events that had occurred in the early 80’s and the
Corp’s determination at that time that it did not
have jurisdiction of this area. See, Letter from Lynn

2 In an attempt at ill timed humor, the Court of Appeals
revealed its failure to grasp the issue Mr. Moses has repeatedly
sought to be answered. In trying to laugh away the
government's failure to apply a site specific analysis to this case
the Court stated that even if Moses was misled by the
Government’s initial failure to assert jurisdiction over this area,
his “sang-froid” when it later asserted jurisdiction showed
either his courage or his “foolhardiness.”. What the Court
missed is that once this area was determined to not be within
Clean Water Act jurisdiction, it required a site specific analysis
to bring it back into the jurisdiction of the Corps and the EPA.
That was true under the 1980 regulations and, as Rapanos
found, that requirement never changed. Is it foolhardy for a
citizen to expect his government to follow its own regulations
before imprisoning him?

Moses to the Corps of Engineers, (App., infra, pp.
14a-16a). The government would then go away,
sometimes for several years, until the next new faces
appeared in the agency.

In 2002, 2003, and 2004, a new sct of faces,
this time at the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), an agency that had never before asserted
jurisdiction, threatened Mr. Moses, the president of
the home owners association with criminal
prosecution unless he stopped his contractually
required maintenance of the flood control channel.
Mr. Moses again reminded them of the determination
made in the early 80’s that the Corps had no
jurisdiction, but this time the agency continued with
this prosecution even though there has never been an
agency determination, by either the Corps of
Engineers nor the EPA, that the area in question is
within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.

The United States Supreme Court made it
clear in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208
(2006), that Clean Water Act jurisdiction does not
reach to everything wet, but that there are in fact
limits to federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act. After Rapanos, the Corps of Engineers and the
EPA issued guidelines to its operatives on how to go
about determining jurisdiction over areas that are
not clearly within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water
Act. See, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United
States and Carabell v. United States, (App., infra,
pp. 17a-42a). Despite those guidelines, neither the
EPA nor the Corps of Engineers has ever applied the
criteria in those guidelines to the arca in question in

6

order to make a determination whether there is
Clean Water Act jurisdiction of the area in which Mr.
Moses performed flood control activities. Without
such a determination his detention is without
jurisdiction and is illegal.

Had the agencies undertaken the
jurisdictional analysis required by the Court’s
Rapanos decision and their own regulations they
would have determined that they do not have
jurisdiction over this area and the travesty of justice
that this petition is attempting to remedy would
never have been an issue.

In Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United
States and Carabell v. United States, (App., infra,
pp. 17a-42a), the EPA and the Corps of Engineers
set out the criteria by which a determination to
assert jurisdiction over an intermittent stream is to
be judged. Under their own criteria, a significant
nexus between Mr. Moses’ activity and the physical,
biological, or chemical integrity of a navigable water
of the United States is not to be had.

First, the Agencies set out those features over
which they will not assert jurisdiction. Mr. Moses’
flood control channel fits directly into this
description:

The Agencies generally will not assert

jurisdiction over the following features:
kk t&

Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated
wholly in and draining only uplands and that do not
carry a relatively permanent flow of water.

See, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following the U.S.

7

Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos v. United
States and Carabell v. United States, (App., infra, p.
18a).

The Agencies defined “relatively permanent
flow of water” as “waters that flow year round or that
have a continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g.,
typically three months).” Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction following the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v.
United States, (App., infra, p. 27). This fundamental
criterion immediately removes Mr. Moses’ activities
in this flood control channel from consideration. Mr.
Moses’ activities were to dig a ditch, albeit a big one,
in which to control the flood waters that would
normally flow through the area in a plane. The
government stipulated at the trial court level that
there are no wetlands in this area. See, Excerpt from
Trial Record, (App., infra, pp. 43a ~— 44a). Therefore
what the evidence showed at trial is a ditch that
drains only uplands. The evidence at trial was that
this channel was used for flood control purposes for
only two months, in the years when there was any
flow at all. See, Excerpt from Trial Record, (App.,
infra, pp. 45a°46a). This upland ditch that does not
carry a continuous flow for at least three months is
viewed by the agencies as being outside their
jurisdiction. Clean Water Act Jurisdiction following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v.
United States and Carabell v. United States, (App.,
infra, pp. 17a-42a).

If that were not enough, even if the agency
were to consider this channel on a case-by-case basis,
its own criteria would weed out this prosecution.

8

In order to assert jurisdiction, the agencies
must determine that a particular activity or feature
has a significant nexus to the purpose of the Clean
Water Act which is to preserve the physical,
chemical, and biological integrity of the Nations
navigable waters. 33 U.S.C §1251. This
determination is, of course, required by the Kennedy
concurrence in Rapanos.

It is undisputed that the area where Moses
built this flood control channel is not a navigable
water of the United States so that what he did had
no impact on the physical integrity of a navigable
water of the United States.

Likewise, there is no suggestion that Mr.
Moses introduced any chemical or biological agent
whatever into the area. Even the trees that were
used as log jams were trees washed down with the
latest flood. Thus, there can be no argument that his
actions affected the chemical or biological integrity of
a navigable water of the United States.

This conclusion becomes more _ painfully
obvious when the Court considers that’ the
undisputed evidence at trial was that even the gravel
that he is accused of disturbing through his annual
maintenance of the flood channel never made it to
the Teton River — the navigable river into which the
flood waters of the channel may sometimes reach.
There is no aquatic environment in this area. See,
See, Excerpt from Trial Record, (App., infra, pp. 47a-
48a). And there are no wetlands through the area of
this flood control channel. See, Excerpt from Trial
Record, (App., infra, pp. 43a — 44a). There simply
can be no argument made that Mr. Moses’ activities

9

had any effect on the physical, chemical, or biological
integrity of any navigable water of the United States.
Therefore there is no jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act and the sentence in this case 1s illegal.

To this point, the government and the Courts’
answer to Mr. Moses’ jurisdictional challenge has
been to deflect the question by stating it has already
been answered. But this Court cannot ignore these
fundamental issues of jurisdiction and still contend
that we are part of a civilized nation. Mr. Moses has
repeatedly asked each court that has reviewed his
case to address the jurisdictional issues, but no one
can point to any decision—either by the District
Court or by the Court of Appeals—where the Court
has addressed the requirement that the agencics
undertake a site specific review of this area only
intermittently blessed with water, to determine
whether there is a significant nexus between Moses’
activities thereon and the physical, biological, or
chemical integrity of a navigable water of the United
States. See, Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct.
2208 (2006). Mr. Moses’ demands, that a
jurisdictional determination be made, fell on deaf
ears when he repeatedly, over a twenty year period,
asked the agencies to do it before the prosecution was
brought, and his arguments that Clean Water Act
jurisdiction be determined before he pay the price of
conviction were likewise ignored by the Courts. If
there was any doubt before Rapanos, there is no
doubt now, that jurisdiction over intermittent water
can only be exercised after a site specific review of
the area involved. The early review of this area
resulted in an agency determination that there was

10

no jurisdiction, and no such site specific review has
ever been made thereafter to reverse that first
determination.

The regulations that existed in 1980 when the
flood control activity first began would have allowed
the Corps of Engineers to exercise jurisdiction over
this area, but only after the District Engineer made a
site specific determination that such exercise of
jurisdiction was justified. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1977),
footnote 3. Apparently, such a site specific analysis
was made at that time and the Corps determined
that it did not have jurisdiction. See, Declaration of
Bill Scott with accompanying newspaper articles
(Appendix, infra, pp. 1a-13a). In “Flood Hearing
Stirs Controversy”, Bill Scott stated, “[clontacted by
telephone in Walla Walla, Washington, a district
spokesman for the Corps is looking into the situation,
and if it determines Teton Creek to be _ not
intermittent, it will claim jurisdiction over the
matter, the spokesman said”. See, “Flood Hearing
Stirs Controversy’ news article attached to
Declaration of Bill Scott, (App., infra, pp. 7a-13a).
There is no evidence that that initial determination
that there was no Clean Water Act jurisdiction,
because this area was only intermittent, has ever
been reversed by any later. site specific
determination.

CONCLUSION

Because there is no demonstrated Clean Water
Act jurisdiction over the area in which Mr. Moses
performed his flood control activities, his immediate
release from any further impediment of this
conviction must be immediately ordered.

1]

DATED this 25 day of November, 2009.

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
a

Blake S. Atkin

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX

la

Blake S. Atkin (ISB# 6903)
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
136 South Main Street, Suite A401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Fax: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Defendant
UNITED STATES DISTRCIT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
“wae
C. LYNN MOSES,
Defendant.
DECLARATION OF BILL SCOTT

CR No. 05-0061-B-BLW

I, Bill Scott, under penalty of perjury, depose
and state as follows:

2a

1. I am over the age of 18 years of age and am
competent to testify about the matters set forth
herein. I make this declaration on the basis of
personal knowledge.

2. I am an independent party and have no
personal interest in the outcome of this case.

3. As a reporter I hold myself to the highest
ethical standards and stand by the truthfulness of
the articles that are published under my name.

4, J attended a public hearing on June 9, 1982
regarding the flooding that had taken place the year
prior and was imminently expected in Driggs, Idaho.

E.R. pg. 77

5. At the meeting, I took notes and recorded the
events that took place in my notes and shortly after
ihe meeting, and provided the information for the
article on June, 11, 1982 entitled A Driggs fears
worsening flood dangers, @ that appeared in the
Idaho Post Register attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”

6. I authored the attached article that appeared
on June 17, 1982 in the Teton Valley News attached
hereto as Exhibit “B.”

‘2 The articles accurately set out what took place
at the meeting that took place on June 9, 1982 as I
was in attendance at the meeting.

3a
8. I attended the meeting as a _ news

correspondent and had no financial stake in the
outcome of the meeting.

I declare under penalty of perjury and upon personal
knowledge that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 28 day of March, 2006, Idaho Falls, Idaho.

_T/s/
BILL SCOTT

E.R. pg. 78
Exhibit A

Driggs fears worsening flood dangers
By BILL SCOTT
Post- Register correspondent

DRIGGS — One year after flood waters nearly
invaded Driggs, residents and local irrigators are
fearful of a worse flood this year and blaming each
other for the predicament.

At a public hearing here Wednesday some
residents blamed the increased flood danger on
stream channeling in a subdivision on the creck.
These concerns were discussed with officials of
several government agencies, in an effort to
determine where the responsibility lies.

Lynn Moses, developer of The Aspens
subdivision, which straddles Teton Creek one-half
mile east of the city limits, placed the blame for last
year’s flood on inadequate culveris under the county

4a

road bordering his property. Others blamed Moses,
for doing the channelization work The Teton County
Board of Commissioners and its Planning and Zoning
Commission for approving the subdivision in the first
place; the Driggs City Council for the same reason;
the Bureau of Water Resources and Corps of
Engineers for allowing the channelization work to be
done; and mother nature for dropping a heavy
cloudburst in Teton County at the wrong time.
Main channel

Teton Creek enters the subdivision property in
one main channel; and splits into three channels
within the property boundaries. The county road
(Driggs Cemetery rd.) bordering the property has
three sets if culveris, one at each channel. Work done
by the developer closed off the two smaller channels
and deepened the main channel. When last year’s
cloudburst hit, water ran over the banks, onto the
road, and into town.

The channelization work was done without
Knowledge of or permission from the Bureau of
Water Resources or the Corps of Engineers, and
representative of both agencies at the hearing said
they had no jurisdiction in the matter because they
classify the stream as intermittent and therefore
permits for such work are not required.

Teton County Planning Administrator Dan
Letham said the subdivision was approved
“contingent upon channelization” of the stream bed.

Given warning

“The developers were adequately warned that
this area floods,” Lethan said, adding that they were
told to set up a homeowner's association which would
have stream maintenance as “a continuous project.”

Sa

“Lynn (Moses) indicated he had permits to do
the channelization,” Letham said. “It’s. their
responsibility,” he added.

Lowell Curtis, chairman of the Teton County
Board of Commissioners, said the county had been
unaware that the water was being restricted to one
channel. “We can’t go in there and divert water,”
back into the other channels, Curtis said. He laid
responsibility for that on the developers.

Several lifetime residents of the area testified
that the subdivision property is known to flood
almost every year. One said it was “God's way” for
the stream to split into three channels and “they've
molested that.”

Flood plan

Water used to backup into the subdivision,
which some referred to as a flood plan, rather than
move onto the road and into town.

“Anybody that’s lived here knows that’s a flood
plan,” one said, a sentiment also expressed by others.
No homes have been built in the subdivision, which
is owned by Moses, Charles Peak and Mark
Rockefeller, all of Teton County. Last year’s flood
damaged the subdivision property, however, and
Moses earlier this year filed a claim for $1,200 for
damages. The claim was denied.

Irrigators at the hearing said they were fearful
the channelization would interfere with headgates
and canals downstream from the subdivision. Those
whose canals come from upstream of the subdivision
were concerned as well, worried that they may be
forced to take more water in their canals than they
can handle if another flood condition arises, resulting
in flood damage to other areas.

6a

Authority unclear

No clear authority or responsibility was
determined at the hearing, which Curtis had called
to “answer questions and speak to concerns.”
Establishing such authority would partially depend
on whether the stream should be classified as
intermittent or continuous, and whether the
subdivision property should be considered a flood
plain.

Irrigation water taken from the creek leaves it
dry much of the year, prompting the government
agencies to classify it as intermittent and therefore
out of their jurisdiction. However, the stream would
flow year round if the water was not diverted.
County Attorney Russell Webb said that leaves the
legal classification in question. Webb also said that
what he described as “very strong language” in the
county’s subdivision ordinance leaves “a_ serious
question in my mind whether the subdivision is
legal.” The ordinance provides that for subdivisions
within a flood plan, “the developer shall demonstrate
conclusively...that such development will not present
a hazard to life, limb or property.”

Lots of snow

With water content of the snow in the
mountains this year higher than average and much
higher than last year, the one point agreed upon by
those present was that the potential for more serious
flooding is there. So far, cool weather has kept water
flow down, but county Civil Defense Director Jim
Park said he was “very seriously concerned about the
flood threat this year.”

E.R. pg. 79

7a
Exhibit B

Flood Hearing Stirs Controversy
By Bill Scott
Staff Writer

Just over one year ago, on June 9, 1981, warm
weather and a cloudburst in Teton Canyon sent
waters swirling down Teton creek, overflowing the
banks, running down the roads and in to the edge of
Driggs.

This year, with mountain snows deeper than
average and much deeper than last year, many are
nervously eyeing the weather and fearful of an even
worse flood.

At a public hearing at the courthouse last
week, many laid the blame for the seriousness of last
year’s flooding on stream channelization work done
by the developers of the Aspen subdivision, which
borders Teton Creek about one-half mile east of the
city limits.

Officials of several government agencies, local,
state and federal, attended the hearing at the
request of the Teton County Board of Commissioners,
which called the hearing, and spent nearly 3 % hours
in a buck-passing session which left responsibility for
the flood situation as far up in the air as it had been
prior to the hearing. While the consensus appeared
to be that the channelization work had exacerbated
the problem, none would take the responsibility for
having allowed the work to be done, no facts were
presented to prove responsibility on any side, and no
solutions to the problem were reached.

In further developments since the hearing, one
agency says it may have jurisdiction the matter, but

8a

as yet has not decided what to do about it. Other
agencies continue to deny responsibility, and the
developers of the subdivision have _ refuted
statements made at the hearing, saying they were
based on hearsay and conjecture.

The Aspens subdivision is owned by three
men, Lynn Moses, Mark Rockefeller and Charlie
Peak, all of Teton County. It comprises 30 lots on 50
acres, and was approved as a subdivision about two
years ago by the Teton County Planning and Zoning
Commission, and the Teton County Board of
Commissioners.

The area was known to flood during high
water periods, and the subdivision was approved
“contingent upon channelization” of Teton Creek,
according to Dan Letham, Teton County subdivision
ordinance administrator, who testified at the
hearing. Letham said he understood there was to be
no

Continued on page 7
E.R. pg. 80

Flood Controversy

Continued from page 1

re-routing of the stream, just channel enlargement,
and that “Lynn (Moses) indicated he had permits for
the work.”

Ernest Carlsen, assistant regional supervisor
of the Idaho Department of Water Resources in Idaho
Falls, and Harold Borgers of the US. Army Corps of
Engineers, both testified at the hearing that they
had no knowledge of the stream work and had not
been asked for permits. Both also said that permits
would not have been required in any case, because

9a

they classified the stream as intermittent and
therefore out of their jurisdictions.

Moses testified that he had not asked for
permits because he knew the stream was
intermittent and _ therefore permits were not
required. In a subsequent conversation with the
Teton Valley News he said he had not told Letham
that they had permits, but “may have told him we
could get permits if we needed then,” and that
Letham “may have misunderstood the statement.”

Contacted by telephone in Walla Walla,
Washington, a district spokesman for the Corps is
looking into the situation, and if i1t determines Teton
Creek to be not intermittent, it will claim jurisdiction
over the matter, the spokesman said.

“We are just becoming familar with it. The
only thing I can tell you now is that at the present
time it appears we will be sending a ‘cease and
desist’ order to the developers,” the spokesman said.
He said if the stream is classified as year-around, the
channelization work would be in violation of the
federal Clean Water Act of 1977, which prohibits fill
work below a stream’s high water mark without a
section 404 permit from the Department of the Army.

E.R. pg. 81

No determination has been made as to how the
situation will be resolved, the spokesmen said. “We'll
work out how to resolve the violation or whatever has
been determined there,” the spokesmen said.

Moses and Rockefeller maintain that the
stream is intermittent, and would be even without
irrigation diversion.

10a

“The stream here is dry for eight to ten months
of the year, and never runs in the winter, even
though there is no diversion then,” Moses said. The
stream does run year around through Alta, he said,
but hits a subsurface hard-pan layer and disappears
underground for several miles after it crosses into
Idaho.

Lavell Johmson, a watermaster for the Grand
Teton Canal which is diverted from Teton Creek in
Wyoming and runs into Idaho, testified at the
hearing that right now the stream loses 360 cubic
feet per second (c.f.s.) between the Alta school house
and the culverts at the lower end of the subdivision,
and the water is going into the aquifer.

Moses and Rockefeller said no re-routing of the
channel was done, but the main channel was cleaned
out and deepened, and in two locations in the
subdivision, old channels were cleaned out and re-
opened. They said the channel running through the
subdivision

E.R. pg 82

was capable of carrying flood-level flows, but that the
water backs up at the county road at the lower end of
the subdivision (the Driggs Cemetery Road) because
the culverts there are inadequate to carry the flow.

They say county officials have known about
the inadequacy since before the subdivision was
approved, but have refused to replace the culverts
with a bridge which could handle the flow.

The Idaho Department of Water Resources
maintains records of peak flows in Teton Creek, both
above and below irrigation diversions. Last year’s

lia

peak flow, recorded below the Grand Teton Canal
diversion on June 9, was estimated at 1,900 c.f.s.
The previous recorded high at that point was 880
c.f.s., recorded June, 28, 1968. Typical recorded peak
flows, since 1950 have been less than 600 c.f.s.

George Matejko, a hydrologist for the U.S.
Forest Service, testified at the hearing that the 100-
year flood level would be about 1,300 c.f.s., and
classified last year’s level as “at least a 135-year
flood.” The maximum water carrying capacity of the
culverts under the county road below the subdivision
is 785 c.f.s., according to engineer Arnold
Woolstenhulme, who performed hydrologic study for
the developers prior to their stream work. Concrete
and gravel obstruct, part of the flow through the
culverts now, Moses said, and trees and other debris
which high water carries downstream can further
obstruct flow through the culverts.

E.R. pg. 81

Thus, Moses claims, the culverts and the
country road act as a dam when flood waters come,
backing water into the subdivision and causing
damage to the subdivision property and possibly to
the town.

Earlier this year, Moses submitted a claim to
the county commissioners for $4,200, for damage to
subdivision property resulting from the flooding last
year. The claim was denied.

Jay Calderwood, county road _ supervisor,
testified at the hearing that channelization work by
the developers had restricted the flow to a single
channel, rather than thred channels which it had

12a

occupied in the past. The stream enters the
subdivision property in a single channel, but three
sets of culvers under the county road carry water
from three apparent channels out the bottom end of
the subdivision. Restricting the flow to one channel
increases flood problems, Calderwood said.

Moses’ and Rockefeller, in a _ subsequent
conversion with the Teton Valley News, refuted this
claim as well, saying the stream actually splits into
only two channels, and both channels have been
maintained. The third apparent channel splits off
where the water backs up at the comity road, they M,
and not within the subdivision boundaries. Water is
presently flowing through all three sets of culverts,
they said.

Ron Carlson, regional) supervisor of the Idaho
Department of Water Resources, contacted by

telephone on Idaho Falls, said
E.R. pg. 82

his department's position continues to be that the
situation is outside the jurisdiction of his
department. The stream is intermittent according to
his department’s definition, and therefore outside the
jurisdiction of the state stream channelization laws.

Also, he said, his department would not take
any action anyway because of a lack of funds. He
said determining the authority in this case would
likely have to be done in the courts, and a single
court case “would eat up our money for our stream
channelization program.”

The developers say the solution to the problem
would be to replace the culverts under the county
road with a bridge which could handle the peak flows

13a

and would be less likely to become blocked with
debris.

County officials have said they plan to install
a bridge, but no time has been set. Estimates of cost
for a bridge range from $15,000 to $40,000.

The flooding problem has become worse in
recent years because farmers are doing more
sprinkler irrigation and diverting less water into the
canals, resulting in a higher peak flow downstream,
according to Lavell Johnson.

The controversy over the matter is likely to
continue for years, and no simple answers are
apparent. At the hearing, Letham summed it up:
“Right* now, I don’t think any one individual can
solve it-passing the buck isn’t going to work. It’s got
to be handled together.”

E.R. pg. 83

14a

Continental Real Estate Co.
Investments and Exchanges
130 North Main Driggs, Idaho 83522
Telephone: (208) 354-8771
Fax: (208) 354-8113
April 25, 1996

Mr. Robert A. Brochu

Corps of Engineers

1820 E. 17% St. Suite 350
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Re: Maintenance of Teton Creek Stream
Channel and
Irrigation Diversion in “The Aspens’.

Dear Rob:

I am _ responding to your inquiry
concerning our “County Mandated” stream
channel maintenance, that has been done
since 1980.

You have reported that the Corps of
Engineers no longer has any_ records
concerning their inquiry into the situation in
the early 1980’s. To shed some light on their
involvement, I send herewith a copy of the
Teton County Commissioners minutes of
September 7, 1983.

The meeting was to discuss’ the
replacement of some inadequate culverts with
a bridge large enough to avoid backing the
water up onto private property. They wanted
to be assured that the Aspen’s Homeowners

lSa

Association would continue to maintain the
channel so the water would be delivered where
they were going to build the new bridge.

Included also, is a copy of the November
28, 1983 Commissioners minutes further
elaborating on our duty to the County, to
maintain the channel if they built a new
bridge. The log diversion mentioned was to
protect an irrigation diversion point, which
was worked very well for 16 years.

You will also find a copy of the
referenced agreement that we made with
Teton County for perpetual maintenance of the
stream channel. We entered into this
agreement in good faith, only after we were
told the Corps of Engineers had no jurisdiction
over maintenance of the channel and the
irrigation diversion on the _ intermittent
stream. (Note: Letter from Watermaster
confirms its intermittent nature in spite of
upstream diversions.)

E.R. pg. 229

We continue to operate in good faith to
meet our obligation to Teton County as well as
our duty to protect the property of the
numerous homeowners in “The Aspens’.

Based on 16 years experience with this
obligation, we know that water quality has
been improved through the dramatic decrease
of soil erosion, as a result of our efforts. We
consider that an important factor in meeting
the intent of the Clean Water Act.

I trust this will satisfy your inquiry.

Enclosures

16a

Sincerely,

_Sfs/ =
C. Lynn Moses

President

Aspen Homeowners Assoc. Inc.

E. R. pg. 230

17a

CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION
FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURTS
DECISION IN
RAPANOS v. UNITED STATES & CARABELL v.
UNITED STATES

This memorandum provides guidance to EPA
regions and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [“Corps”]
districts implementing the Supreme Court’s decision
in the consolidated cases Rapanos v. United States
and Carabell v. United States! (herein referred to
simply as “Rapanos”) which address the jurisdiction
over waters of the United States under the Clean
Water Act.2. The chart below summarizes the key
points contained in this memorandum. This
reference tool is not a substitute for the more
complete discussion of issues and guidance furnished
throughout the memorandum.

Summary of Key Points
The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the
following waters:
e Traditional navigable waters
e Wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable
waters
e Non-navigable tributaries of traditional
navigable waters that are _ relatively
permanent where the tributaries typically flow
year‘round or have continuous flow at least
seasonally (e.g., typically three months)
e Wetlands that directly abut such tributaries

' 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)
? 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.

18a

The agencies will decide jurisdiction over the
following waters based on a fact-specific analysis to
determine whether they have a significant nexus
with a traditional navigable water:

e Non-navigable tributaries that are not
relatively permanent

e Wetlands adjacent to non‘navigable
tributaries that are not relatively permanent

e Wetlands adjacent to but that do not directly
abut a relatively permanent non-navigable
tributary.

The agencies generally will not assert jurisdiction
over the following features:

e Swales or erosional features (e.g. gullies, small
washes characterized by low’ volume,
infrequent, or short duration flow)

e Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated
wholly in and draining only uplands and that
do not carry a relatively permanent flow of
water

The agencies will apply the significant nexus
standard as follows:

e A significant nexus analysis will assess the
flow characteristics and function of the
tributary itself and the function performed by
all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to
determine if they significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
downstream traditional navigable waters

e Significant nexus includes consideration of
hydrologic and ecologic factors.

Background

19a

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA”
or “the Act”) “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters.” One of the mechanisms adopted by
Congress to achieve that purpose is a prohibition on
the discharge of any pollutants, including dredged or
fill material, into “navigable waters” except in
compliance with other specified sections of the Act.‘
In most cases, this means compliance with a permit
issued pursuant to CWA §402 or §404. The Act
defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point sourcel,]"5 and provides that “[t}]he term
‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.”®

In Rapanos, the Supreme Court addressed
where the Federal government can apply the Clean
Water Act, specifically by determining whether a
wetland or tributary is a “water of the United
States.” The justices issued five separate opinions in
Rapanos (one plurality opinion, two concurring
opinions, and two dissenting opinions), with no single
opinion commanding a majority of the Court.

The Rapanos Decision

Four justices, in a plurality opinion authored
by Justice Scalia, rejected the argument that the

* 33 U.S. C. §1251(a)

* 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), § 1862(12)(A).

* 33 U.S.C § 1362(12)(A).

* 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). See also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) and 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(s).

20a

term “waters of the United States” is limited to only
those waters that are navigable in the traditional
sense and their abutting wetlands.? However, the
plurality concluded that the agencies’ regulatory
authority should extend only to “relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies
of water” connected to traditional navigable waters,
and to “wetlands with a _ continuous’ surface
connection to” such relatively permanent waters. ®

Justice Kennedy did not join the plurality’s
opinion but instead authored an opinion concurring
in the judgment vacating and remanding the cases to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.? Justice Kennedy
agreed with the plurality that the statutory term
“waters of the United States” extends beyond water
bodies that are traditionally considered navigable.'®
Justice Kennedy, however, found the plurality’s
interpretation of the scope of the CWA to be
“inconsistent with the Act’s text, structure, and
purposei,]” and he instead presented a different
standard for evaluating CWA jurisdiction over

"Id, at 2220.

"Id. at 2225-27

* Id. at 2236-52. While Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's
decision to vacate and remand the cases to the Sixth Circuit, his
basis for remand was limited to the question of “whether the
specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nexus with
navigable waters.” 126S. Ct. at 2252. In contrast, the plurality
remanded the cases to determine both “whether the ditches and
drains near cach wetland are ‘waters,” and “whether the
wetlands in question are ‘adjacent’ to these ‘waters’ in the sense
of possessing a continuous surface connection....” Id, at 2235.
"Td. at 2241

2la

wetlands and other water bodies.'! Justice Kennedy
concluded that wetlands are “waters of the United
States” “if the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the other covered waters
more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ When, in
contrast, wetlands effects on water quality are
speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the
zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term
‘navigable waters.” !?

Four justices, in a dissenting opinion authored
by Justice Stevens, concluded that EPA’s and the
Corps’ interpretation of “waters of the United States”
was reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water
Act. }3

When there is no majority opinion in a
Supreme Court case, controlling legal principles may
be derived from those principles espoused by five or
more justices.'4 Thus, regulatory jurisdiction under

"Id. at 2246.

'2 Id. at 2248. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring
opinion explaining his agreement with the plurality. See 126 S.
Ct. at 2235°36.

'" Id. at 2252-65. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting
opinion explaining his agreement with Justice Stevens’ dissent.
See 126 S. Ct. at 2266.

'* See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977):
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994) (Souter, J.
concurring) (analyzing the points of agreement between
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions to identify the
legal “test...that lower courts should apply,” under Marks, as
the holding of the Court); cf. League of United Latin American

22a

the CWA exists over a water body if either the
plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard is
satisfied.15 Since Rapanos, the United States has
filed pleadings in a number of cases interpreting the
decision in this manner.

The agencies are issuing this memorandum in
recognition of the fact that the EPA regions and
Corps districts need guidance to ensure that
jurisdictional determinations, permitting actions,
and other relevant actions are consistent with the
decision and supported by the administrative record.
Therefore, the agencies have evaluated the Rapanos
opinions to identify those waters that are subject to
CWA jurisdiction under the reasoning of a majority
of the justices. This approach is appropriate for a
guidance document. The agencies intend to more
broadly consider jurisdictional issues, including
clarification and definition of key terminology,
through rulemaking or other appropriate policy
process.

Citizens vs. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2006) (analyzing
concurring and dissenting opinions in a prior case to identify a
legal conclusion of a majority of the Court); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-282 (2001) (same).

'S 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given that all
four justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the
Corps’ jurisdiction in both of these cases—and in all other cases
in which either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is
satisfied—on remand each of the judgments should be
reinstated if either of those tests is met.”) (emphasis in
original).

23a

Agency Guidelines!®
To ensure that jurisdictional determinations,

administrative enforcement actions, and other
relevant agency actions are consistent with the
Rapanos decision, the agencies in this guidance
address which waters are subject to CWA § 404
jurisdiction.!7 Specifically, this guidance identifies

'© The CWA provisions and regulations described in this
document contain legally binding requirements. This guidance
does not substitute for those provisions or regulations, nor is it
a regulation itself. It does not impose legally binding
requirements on EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community,
and may not apply to a particular situation depending on the
circumstances. Any decisions regarding a particular water will
be based on the applicable statutes, regulations, and case law.
Therefore, interested persons are free to raise questions about
the appropriateness of the application of this guidance to a
particular situation, and the EPA and/or Corps will consider
whether or not the recommendations or interpretations of this
guidance are appropriate in that situation based on the statues,
regulations, and case law.

'7 This guidance focuses only on those provisions of the agencies’
regulations at issue in Rapanos—33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1), (a)(5),
and (a)(7); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3(s)(1), (s)(5), and (s)(7). This
guidance does not address or affect other subparts of the
agencies’ regulations, or response authorities, relevant to the
scope of jurisdiction under the CWA. In addition, because this
guidance is issued by both the Corps and EPA, which jointly
administer CWA § 404, it does not discuss other provisions of
the CWA, including §§ 311 and 402, that differ in certain
respects from § 404 but share the definition of “waters of the
United States.” Indeed, the plurality opinion in Rapanos noted
that “...there is no reason to suppose that our construction today
significantly affects the enforcement of § 1342...The Act does
not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable
waters from any point source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters.” (emphasis in original) 126 S. Ct.
2208, 2227. EPA is considering whether to provide additional

24a

those waters over which the agencies will assert
jurisdiction categorically and on a case-by-case basis,
based on the reasoning of the Rapanos opinions.!§
EPA and the Corps will continually assess and
review the application of this guidance to ensure
nationwide consistency, reliability, and predictability
in our administration of the statute.

1. Traditional Navigable Waters (.e., “(a) (D
Waters”) and Their Adjacent Wetlands

Key Points

e The agencies will assert jurisdiction over
traditional navigable waters, which includes
all the waters described in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3
(a)(1), and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 (s)(1).

e The agencies will assert jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable
waters, including over adjacent wetlands that
do not have a continuous surface connection to
traditional navigable waters.

— ————

guidance on these and other provisions of the CWA that may be
affected by the Rapanos decicion.

'® In 2001, the Supreme Court held that use of “isolated” non-
navigable intrastate waters by migratory birds was not by itself
a sufficient basis for the exercise of federal regulatory
jurisdiction under the CWA. See Solid Waste Agency _ of
Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). This guidance does not address
SWANCC, nor does it affect the Joint Memorandum regarding
that decision issued by the General Counsels of EPA and the
Department of the Army on January 10, 2003. See 68 Fed. Reg.
1991, 1995 (Jan. 15, 2003).

25a

EPA and the Corps will continue to assert
jurisdiction over “(alll waters which are currently
used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible
to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide.”!9 These waters are referred to in this guidance
as traditional navigable waters.

The agencies will also continue to assert
jurisdiction over wetlands “adjacent” to traditional
navigable waters as defined in the agencies’
regulations. Under EPA and Corps regulations and
as used in this guidance, “adjacent” means
“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.” Finding a
continuous surface connection is not required to
establish adjacency under this definition. The
Rapanos decision does not affect the scope of
jurisdiction over wetlands that are adjacent to
traditional navigable waters because at least five
justices agreed that such wetlands are “waters of the
United States.”20

2. Relatively Permanent Non-navigable Tributaries
of Traditional Navigable Waters and Wetlands with

' 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 (s)(1). The “(a)(1)”
waters include all the “navigable waters of the United States,”
defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 329 and by numerous decisions of the
federal courts, plus all other waters that are navigable-in-fact
(e.g., the Great Salt Lake, UT and Lake Minnetonka, MN).

- Id. at 2248 (Justice Kennedy, concurring) (“As applied to
wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’
conclusive standard of jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable
inference of ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of
jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the Act by
showing adjacency alone.”)

26a

a Continuous Surface Connection with Such
Tributaries

Key Points
The agencies will assert jurisdiction over non
navigable tributaries of traditional navigable
waters that are relatively permanent where
the tributaries typically flow year-round or
have continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g.,
typically three months).

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over those
adjacent wetlands that have a continuous
surface connection to such tributaries (e.g.,
they are not separated by uplands, a berm,
dike, or similar feature.)

27a

A non-navigable tributary?! of a traditional
navigable water is a non-navigable water body whose
waters flow into a traditional navigable water either
directly or indirectly by means of other tributaries.
Both the plurality opinion and the dissent would
uphold CWA _ jurisdiction over non-navigable
tributaries that are “relatively permanent’—waters
that typically (e.g., except due to drought) flow year-
round or waters that have a continuous flow at least
seasonally (e.g., typically three months).22 Justice
Scalia emphasizes that relatively permanent waters
do not include tributaries “whose flow is ‘coming and

” a tributary includes natural, man-altered, or man-made

water bodies that carry flow directly or indirectly into a
traditional navigable water. Furthermore, a tributary, for the
purpose of this guidance, is the entire reach of the stream that
is of the same order (i.e., from the point of confluence, where
two lower order streams meet to form the _ tributary,
downstream to the point such tributary enters a higher order
stream). The flow characteristics of a particular tributary will
be evaluated at the farthest downstream limit of such tributary
(i.e., the point the tributary enters a higher order stream). It is
reasonable for the agencies to treat the stream reach as a whole
in light of the Supreme Court’s observation that the phrase
“navigable waters’ generally refers to “rivers, streams, and
other hydrographic features.” 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (Justice Scalia,
quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131). The entire reach
of a stream is a reasonably identifiable hydrographic feature.
The agencies will also use this characterization of tributary
when applying the significant nexus standard under Section 3
of this guidance.

22 See 126 S. Ct. at 2221 n. 5 (Justice Scalia, plurality opinion)
(explaining that “relatively permanent” does not necessarily
exclude waters “that might dry up in extraordinary
circumstances such as drought” or “seasonal rivers, which
contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no
flow during dry months”).

28a

going at intervals...broken, fitful.”23 Therefore,
“relatively permanent” waters do not include
ephemeral tributaries which flow only in response to
precipitation and intermittent streams which do not
typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at
least seasonally. However, CWA jurisdiction over
these waters will be evaluated under the significant
nexus standard described below. The agencies will
assert jurisdiction over relatively permanent non-
navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters
without legal obligation to make a significaat nexus
finding.

In addition, the agencies will assert
jurisdiction over those adjacent wetlands that have a
continuous surface connection with a relatively
permanent, non-navigable tributary, without the
legal obligation to make a significant nexus finding.
As explained above, the plurality opinion and the
dissent agree that such wetlands are jurisdictional.24
The plurality opinion indicates that “continuous
surface connection” is a “physical connection
requirement.”25 Therefore, a continuous’ surface

23 [d. (internal citations omitted).

24 Td. at 2226-27 (Justice Scalia, plurality opinion).

2% Id. at 2232 n.13 (referring to “our physical-connection
requirement” and later stating that Riverside Bayview does not
reject “the physical-connection requirement”) and 2234
(“Wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ if they bear the
‘significant nexus’ of physical connection, which makes them as
a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United
States.”) (emphasis in original). See also 126 S. Ct. at 2230
(“adjacent” means “physically abutting”) and 2229 (citing to
Riverside Bayview as “confirm{ing] that the scope of ambiguity

of ‘the waters of the United States’ is determined by a wetland's

29a

connection exists between a wetland and a relatively
permanent tributary where the wetland directly
abuts the tributary (e.g., they are not separated by
uplands, a berm, dike or similar feature).26

3. Certain Adjacent Wetlands and Non-navigable
Tributaries That Are Not Relatively Permanent

Key Points

e The agencies will assert jurisdiction over
non-navigable, not relatively permanent
tributaries and their adjacent wetlands
where such tributaries and wetlands have
a significant nexus to a_ traditional
navigable water.

e Asignificant nexus analysis will assess the
flow characteristics and functions of the
tributary itself and the functions performed
by any wetlands adjacent to the tributary
to determine if the significantly affect the

physical connection to covered waters...”) (emphasis in original).
A continuous surface connection does not require surface water
to be continuously present between the wetland and the
tributary. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (defining
wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support ... a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions”).

26 While all wetlands that meet the agencies’ definitions are
considered adjacent wetlands, only those adjacent wetlands
that have a continuous surface connection because they directly
abut the tributary (e.g, they are nut separated by uplands, a
berm, dike, or similar feature) are considered jurisdictional
under the plurality standard.

30a

chemical, physical and biological integrity
of downstream traditional navigable
waters.

“Similarly situated” wetlands include all
wetlands adjacent to the same tributary.
Significant nexus includes consideration of
hydrologic factors including the following:

o volume, duration, and frequency of
flow, including consideration of
certain physical characteristics of
the tributary.

© proximity to the traditional
navigable water

o size of the watershed

© average annual rainfall

© average annual winter snow pack

Significant nexus also includes
consideration of ecologic factors including
the following:

© potential of tributaries to carrv
pollutants and flood waters to
traditional navigable waters

0 provision of aquatic habitat that
supports a_ traditional navigable
water

o potential of wetlands to trap and
filter pollutants or store flood waters

© maintenance of water quality in
traditional navigable waters.

The following geographic features generally
are not jurisdictional waters:

o swales or erosional features (e.g.
gullies, smal] washes characterized

3la

by low volume, infrequent, or short
duration flow)

o ditches (including roadside ditches)
excavated wholly in and draining
only uplands and that do not carry a
relatively permanent flow of water.

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the
following types of waters when they have a
significant nexus with a traditional navigable water:
(1) non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively
permanent,2’ (2) wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
tributaries that are not relatively permanent, and (3)
wetlands adjacent to, but not directly abutting, a
relatively permanent tributary (e.g., separated from
it by uplands, a berm, dike or similar feature).28 As
described below, the agencies will assess the flow
characteristics and functions of the tributary itself,
together with the functions performed by any
wetlands adjacent to that tributary, to determine
whether collectively they have a significant nexus
with traditional navigable waters.

The agencies’ assertion of jurisdiction over
non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands that
have a significant nexus to traditional navigable

27 For simplicity, the term “tributary” when used alone in this
section refers to non-navigable tributaries that are not
relatively permanent.

28 As described in Section 2 of this guidance, the agencies will
assert jurisdiction, without the need for a significant nexus
finding, over all wetlands that are both adjacent and have a
continuous surface connection to relatively permanent
tributaries. See pp. 6-7, supra.

32a

waters is supported by five justices. Justice Kennedy
applied the significant nexus standard to the
wetlands at issue in Rapanos and Carabell:
“[Wletlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus
come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,
if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of other covered waters more readily understood as
‘navigable.”29 While Justice Kennedy's opinion
discusses the significant nexus standard primarily in
the context of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
tributaries®®, his opinion also addresses Clean Water
Act jurisdiction over tributaries themselves. Justice
Kennedy states that, based on the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, “the
connection between a non-navigable water or
wetland may be so close, or potentially so close, that
Corps may deem the water or wetland a ‘navigable

29 Id. at 2248. When applying the significant nexus standard to
tributaries and wetlands, it is important to apply it within the
limits of jurisdiction articulated in SWANCC. Justice Kennedy
cites SWANCC with approval and asserts that the significant
nexus standard, rather than being articulated for the first time
in Rapanos, was established in SWANCC. 126 S. Ct. at 2246
(describing SWANCC as “interpreting the Act to require a
significant nexus with navigable waters”). It is clear, therefore,
that Justice Kennedy did not intend for the significant nexus
standard to be applied in a manner that would result in
assertion of jurisdiction over waters that he and the other
justices determined were not jurisdictional in SWANCC.
Nothing in this guidance should be interpreted as providing
authority to assert jurisdiction over waters deemed non-
jurisdictional by SWANCC.

30 126 S. Ct. at 2247-50.

33a

water under the Act....Absent a significant nexus,
jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.”*! Thus, Justice
Kennedy would limit jurisdiction to those waters that
have a significant nexus with traditional navigable
waters, although his opinion focuses on the specific
factors and functions the agencies should consider in
evaluating significant nexus for adjacent wetlands,
rather than for tributaries.

In considering how to apply the significant
nexus standard, the agencies have focused on the
integral relationship between the _ ecological
characteristics of tributaries and those of their
adjacent wetlands, which determines in part their
contribution to restoring and maintaining the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
Nation's traditional navigable waters. The ecological
relationship between tributaries and their adjacent
wetlands is well documented in the scientific
literature and reflects their physical proximity as
well as shared hydrological and _ biological
characteristics. The flow parameters and ecological
functions that Justice Kennedy describes as most
relevant to an evaluation of significant nexus result
from the ecological inter-relationship between
tributaries and their adjacent wetlands. For
example, the duration, frequency, and volume of flow
in a tributary, and subsequently the flow in
downstream navigable waters, is directly affected by
the presence of adjacent wetlands that hold
floodwaters, intercept sheet flow from uplands, and
then release waters to tributaries in a more even and

311d. At 2241 (emphasis added).

34a

constant manner. Wetlands may also help to
maintain more consistent water temperature in
tributaries, which is important for some aquatic
species. Adjacent wetlands trap and hold pollutants
that may otherwise reach tributaries (and
downstream navigable waters) including sediments,
chemicals, and other pollutants. Tributaries and
their adjacent wetlands provide habitat (e.g., feeding,
nesting, spawning, or rearing young) for many
aquatic species that also live in traditional navigable
waters.

When performing a _ significant nexus
analysis,?2 the first step is to determine if the
tributary has any adjacent wetlands. Where a
tributary has no adjacent wetlands, the agencies will
consider the flow characteristics and functions of
only the tributary itself in determining whether such
tributary has a significant effect on the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of downstream
traditional navigable waters. A _ tributary, as
characterized in Section 2 above, is the entire reach
of the stream that is of the same order (i.e., from the
point of confluence, where two lower order streams
meet to form the tributary, downstream to the point

52 [n discussing the significant nexus standard, Justice Kennedy
stated: “The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the
statute’s goals and purposes. Congress enacted the [CWA] to
‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters..."126 S. Ct. at 2248.
Consistent with Justice Kennedy’s instruction, EPA and the
Corps will apply the significant nexus standard in a manner
that restores and maintains any of these three attributes of
traditional navigable waters.

35a

such tributary enters a higher order stream). For
purposes of demonstrating a connection to traditional
navigable waters, it is appropriate and reasonable to
assess the flow characteristics of the tributary at the
point at which water is in fact being contributed to a
higher order tributary or to a traditional navigable
water. If the tributary has adjacent wetlands, the
significant nexus evaluation needs to recognize the
ecological relationship between tributaries and their
adjacent wetlands, and their closely linked role in
protecting the chemical, physical, and_ biological
integrity of downstream traditional navigable
waters.

Therefore, the agencies will consider the flow
and functions of the tributary together with the
functions performed by all the wetlands adjacent to
that tributary in evaluating whether a significant
nexus is present. Similarly, where evaluating
significant nexus for an adjacent wetland, the
agencies will consider the flow characteristics and
functions performed by the tributary to which the
wetland is adjacent along with the functions
performed by the wetland and all other wetlands
adjacent to that tributary. This approach reflects the
agencies’ interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s term
“similarly situated” to include all wetlands adjacent
to the same tributary. Where it is determined that a
tributary and its adjacent wetlands collectively have
a significant nexus with traditional navigable
waters, the tributary and all of its adjacent wetlands
are jurisdictional. Application of the significant
nexus standard in this way is reasonable because of
its strong scientific foundation—that is, the integral

36a

ecological relationship between a tributary and its
adjacent wetlands. Interpreting the phrase “similarly
situated” to include all wetlands adjacent to the same
tributary is reasonable because such wetlands are
physically located in a like manner (i.e., lying
adjacent to the same tributary).

Principal considerations when evaluating
significant nexus include the volume, duration, and
frequency of the flow of water in the tributary and
the proximity of the tributary to a traditional
navigable water. In addition to any available
hydrologic information (e.g., gauge data, flood
predictions, historic records of water flow, statistical
data, personal observations/records, etc.), the
agencies may reasonably consider certain physical
characteristics of the tributary to characterize its
flow, and thus help to inform the determination of
whether or not a significant nexus is present between
the tributary and downstream traditional navigable
waters. Physical indicators of flow may include the
presence and characteristics of a reliable ordinary
high water mark (OQHWM) with a channel defined by
bed and banks.33 Other physical indicators of flow

33 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e). The OHWM also serves to define the
lateral limit of jurisdiction in a non-navigable tributary where
there are no adjacent wetlands. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c). While
EPA regions and Corps districts must exercise judgment to
identify the OHWM on a case-by-case basis, the Corps’
regulations identify the factors to be applied. These regulations
have recently been further explained in Regulatory Guidance
Letter (RGL) 05-05 (Dec. 7, 2005). The agencies will apply the
regulations and the RGL and take other steps as needed to
ensure that the OHWM identification factors are applied
consistently nationwide.

37a

may include shelving, wracking, water staining,
sediment sorting, and sour.34 Consideration will also
be given to certain relevant contextual factors that
directly influence the hydrology of tributaries
including the size of the tributary’s watershed,
average annual rainfall, average annual witer snow
pack, slope, and channel dimensions.

In addition, the agencies will consider other
relevant factors, including the functions performed
by the tributary together with the functions
performed by any adjacent wetlands. One such factor
is the extent to which the tributary and adjacent
wetlands have the capacity to carry pollutants (e.g.,
petroleum wastes, toxic wastes, sediment) or flood
waters to traditional navigable waters, or to reduce
the amount of pollutants or flood waters that would
otherwise enter traditional navigable waters.*> The
agencies will also evaluate ecological functions
performed by the tributary and any adjacent
wetlands which affect downstream traditional
navigable waters, such as the capacity to transfer
nutrients and organic carbon vital to support
downstream foodwebs (e.g., macroinvertebrates
present in headwater streams convert carbon in leaf

34 See, Justice Kennedy's’ discussion of “physical
characteristics,” 126 S. Ct. at 2248-2249.

35 See, generally, 126 S. Ct. at 2248-53; see also 126 S. Ct. at
2249(“Just as control over the non-navigable parts of a river
may be essential or desirable in the interests of the navigable
portions, so may the key to flood control on a navigable stream
be found in whole or in part in flood control on its
tributaries....”) (citing to Oklahoma ex_rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 524-25(1941)).

38a

litter making it available to species downstream),
habitat services such as providing spawning areas for
recreationally or commercially important species in
downstream waters, and the extent to which the
tributary and adjacent wetlands perform functions
related to maintenance of downstream water quality
such as sediment trapping.

After assessing the flow characteristics and
functions of the tributary and its adjacent wetlands,
the agencies will evaluate whether the tributary and
its adjacent wetlands are likely to have an effect that
is more than speculative or insubstantial on the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of a
traditional navigable water. As the distance from the
tributary to the navigable water increases, it will
become increasingly umportant to document whether
the tributary and its adjacent wetlands have a
significant nexus rather than a_ speculative or
insubstantial nexus with a traditional navigable
water.

Accordingly, Corps districts and EPA regions
shall document in the administrative record the
available information regarding whether a tributary
and it adjacent wetlands have a significant nexus
with a traditional navigable water, including the
physical indicators of flow in a particular case and
available information regarding the functions of the
tributary and any adjacent wetlands. The agencies
will explain their basis for concluding whether or not
the tributary and its adjacent wetlands, when
considered together, have a more than speculative or

39a

insubstantial effect on the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of a traditional navigable water.

Swales or erosional features (e.g., gullies,
small washes’ characterized by low’ volume,
infrequent, or short duration flow) are generally not
waters of the United States because they are not
tributaries or they do not have a significant nexus to
downstream traditional navigable waters. In
addition, ditches (including roadside ditches)
excavated wholly in and draining only uplands and
that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of
water are generally not waters of the United States
because they are not tributaries or they do not have a
significant nexus to downstream traditional
navigable waters.*6 Even when not jurisdictional
waters subject to CWA § 404, these geographic
features (e.g., swales, ditches) may still contribute to
a surface hydrologic connection between an adjacent
wetland and a traditional navigable water. In
addition, these geographic features may function as
point sources (i.e., “discernible, confined, and discrete
conveyances”), such that discharges of pollutants to
other waters through these features could be subject
to ‘a CWA regulations (e.g., CWA §§ 311 and
402).37

Certain ephemeral waters in the arid west are
distinguishable from the geographic features
described above where such ephemeral waters are
tributaries and they have a significant nexus to

36 See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
37 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14).

40a

downstream traditional navigable waters. For
example, in some cases these ephemeral tributaries
may serve as a transitional area between the upland
environment and the traditiciial navigable waters.
During and following precipitation events, ephemeral
tributaries collect and transport water and
sometimes sediment from the upper reaches of the
landscape downstream to the traditional navigable
waters. These ephemeral tributaries may provide
habitat for wildlife and aquatic organisms in
downstream traditional navigable waters. These
biological and physical processes may further
support nutrient cycling, sediment retention and
transport, pollutant trapping and filtration, and
improvement of water quality, functions that may
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of downstream traditional
navigable waters.

Documentation

As described above, the agencies will assert
CWA jurisdiction over the following waters without
the legal obligation to make a significant nexus
determination: traditional navigable waters and
wetlands adjacent thereto, non-navigable tributaries
that are relatively permanent waters, and wetlands
with a continuous surface connection with such
tributaries. The agencies will also decide CWA
jurisdiction over other non-navigable tributaries and
over other wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
tributaries based on a fact-specific analysis to
determine whether they have a significant nexus
with traditional navigable waters. For purposes of
CWA § 404 determinations by the Corps, the Corps

4la

and EPA are developing a revised form to be used by
field regulators for documenting the assertion or
declination of CWA jurisdiction.

Corps districts and EPA regions will ensure
that the information in the record adequately
supports any jurisdictional determination. The
record shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
explain the rationale for the determination, disclose
the data and information relied upon, and, if
applicable, explain what data or information received
greater or lesser weight, and what professional
judgment or assumptions were used in reaching the
determination. The Corps districts and EPA regions
will also demonstrate and document in the record
that a particular water either fits within a class
identified above as not requiring a significant nexus
determination, or that the water has a significant
nexus with a traditional navigable water. As a
matter of policy, Corps districts and EPA regions will
include in the record any available information that
documents the existence of a_ significant nexus
between a relatively permanent tributary that is not
perennial (and its adjacent wetlands if any) and a
traditional navigable water, even though a
significant nexus finding is not required as a matter
of law.

All pertinent documentation and analyses for
a given jurisdictional determination (including the
revised form) shall be adequately reflected in the
record and clearly demonstrate the bases _ for

42a

asserting or declining CWA jurisdiction.48 Maps,
aerial photography, soil surveys, watershed studies,
local development plans, literature citations, and
references from studies pertinent to the parameters
being reviewed are examples of information that will
assist staff in completing accurate jurisdictional
determinations. The level of documentation may vary
among projects. For example, jurisdictional
determinations for complex projects may require
additional documentation by the project manager.

s/ Benjamin H. Grumbles

Benjamin H. Grumbles

Assistant Administrator for Water
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

s/ John Paul Woodley, Jr.

John Paul Woodley, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Civil Works)

Department of the Army

38 For jurisdictional determinations and permitting decisions,
such information shall be posted on the appropriate Corps
website for public and interagency information.

43a

E.R. pg. 132

1

2
3
4

sentencing memorandum, has gone way
beyond 2002, 2003,

and 2004.

And in the presentence report, the probation
officer talks about how the Court could
enhance and

maybe should enhance the penalty in this case
based on

the fact that there is a 25-year history in this
case.

Now, if the Court is - -

THE COURT: No. I understand your
position.

Again, just so we're clear, Mr. Breitsameter,
the Government is willing to stipulate that
there was

no discharge into any wetlands arising out of
this

case; correct?

MR. BREITSAMETER: That’s correct, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: But you cannot bind the
Government

by way of a stipulation that the Government
perceives

discharges into wetlands as being more serious
than

discharges into other riparian non-wetland
areas?

MR. BREITSAMETER: To my knowledge,
we have

19
20
21
22
23

24

25

44a

not explored that issue and I am not prepared
to

stipulate to that.

THE COURT: All right. I will allow the
witness to testify factually as to his
understanding of

the Corps of Engineers’ views during the time
period

that he was employed there, and limit it in
that

fashion.

45a

E.R. pg. 225

l A. That’s correct.

2 Q. Have you observed the creek when there
is

3 water in the creek itself?

4 A. Oh, yes.

9) Q. Flowing?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And what time of the year does that 8
generally occur?

9 A. The creek usually starts to run about
first

10 week of May, and it runs on into July.

1] Q. Does the duration of the flow vary
depending

12 on the snow pack and the rainfall?

13 A. Quite a bit, yes. In a dry year, it will
flow |

14 for a while and shut down and then flow again.
A good

15 wet year may flow pretty much continually for
that

16 two-month period.

17 Q. And whether it does flow, Mr.
Fitzgerald, can

18 you describe for the jury what it’s like?

19 A. It can be a raging torrent when there is
a lot

20 of water in it. It can be a dangerous creek to
Cross.

21 My wite and I frequently sit on the back porch

that

46a

22 faces the creek, and we can hear big trees
coming down,

23 being eroded away and falling into the creek
and them
24 being moved downstream.

25 So it’s a major torrent when it’s flowing.

47a

E.R. pg. 117

1 this stream, correct, because of its intermittent

2 nature?

3 A: You mean in the reach that we’re
speaking of?

4 Q: Yes.

5 A: Yes, that’s correct.

6 Q: There is really no aquatic wildlife issue
with

7 regard to this stream; is there?

8 A: That’s correct.

9 MR. ATKIN: That's all I have.

10 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr.
Ocsterle?

11 MR. OESTERLE: No, our Honor.

12 THE COURT: You may step down, Mr.
Miller.

13 Thank you.

14 I assume the witness can be excused?

15 MR. ATKIN: Yes, Your Honor.

16 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Call your next witness. Mr.
Peak,

18 I assume?

19 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: Mr. Peak, will you step
before the

21 clerk and be sworn.

22 CHARLES PEAK,

23 called on behalf of the Government, having
been first

24 duly sworn upon oath, was examined and

testified as

4&a

VAs) follows:

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1301%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
