# Opposition Brief — CropLife America v. Baykeeper

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1194%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 559 U.S. 936

## Text

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Nos. 09-533 and

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

CROPLIFE AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

Vv.
BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

ELENA KAGAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
IGNACIA S. MORENO
Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS LORENZEN
ALAN GREENBERG
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

This case involves a challenge to a regulation promul-
gated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The EPA’s responsibilities include the administration of
both the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Federal! In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), The
challenged EPA rule interpreted the CWA not to re-
quire permits for the application of pesticides, in a man-
ner consistent with the relevant requirements of the
FIFRA, either directly to waters of the United States or
over, including near, such waters to control pests. The
question presented is as follows:

Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding
that the text of the CWA unambiguously foreclosed
EPA’s rule.

(T)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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IOI |. ss. 6:0-s co cwcee eae ed eae ee neice eee 2
IE ics 60 cad cases been sh eee ieee ee 2
PD nin Ke ncace Kevbantbacebasdeeteuneeeer aoe 9
CIE nus od cncinece cee ee ee ee 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Altman v. Town of Amherst, 47 Fed. Appx. 62
ote | errr rr Ter SS ere rrr rrr rrr 5

Association to Protect Hammersly, Eld, & Totten
Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.

EE bn ccivenvandaeael Aus ee leet eee 12
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States,

a es EE 640.6 54324 Ode eens ens 13
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..... 7
Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199

GEG EE sc kc ede ccceveuccusecdecasee. 13, 14, 15
Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) ..... 5
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d

a ED i-s-4 base eth ieescanaeeonearieeseeen 4

League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains
Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181

ee EE is sc odes cae eae euae uber ereneenens 4
No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York,
S61 FB GOR Gd Civ. BOOB)... ccc ccccscscccssess 5

Statutes and regulations:
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg. ................ 2

(IIT)

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
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EN cas cnn es ceed ChOLESRA ERED EERO OREO OS 3
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Pe EE as ons 9 4 nO o 4 a eed EROS SSeS SEN REE 2
38 U.S.C. 1862(14) ......... Js pata auautar wen eb ake 2

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,

Pum. 1. No. SB-O1G, SE tat. GIS ow cc ccc cecesecces 3
Fe ED os 5 54-04 45500005 50d kee we ees 4
I i wre ko 6.5 0: 400.4-4046 5.9 00094406445 4
Fe SD n'a vas 60 nddaapdaravonsericns 3

40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 122:
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I Sr Ser he de oak we bares oie 7
I ag Cees sae e te dee oe kees 3

8 Ferry rece rrr Te er re ere 4

os besu hes Ok REAR eo Ee OkE EAR eRe 4

So Perper rey Sere rr rere rrr rey 4

Miscellaneous:

68 Fed. Reg. (2003):
oe ns ah a 66 OES RON ESE ORCRSERERO TES 5,6
Se re ee Pee Sy ore cienaek asst 5, 6
70 Fed. Reg. (2005):
ey te 6s sca k edhe EERE KN ERA SORES ERS 6

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

71 Fed. Reg. (2006):

SE <\:th pp heeaes 4a eee shee are see cane sae 6
EGET ee eee TTT eT re re 12
EE hs 6 ica eencbas sas 4asaaes er enae cee 7, 10
EE ss 040 oad 450s aw nea eeaee ee sekce aie 6, 7

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 09-533
CROPLIFE AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

No. 09-547

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

Vv.
BAYKEEPER, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-25a)
is reported at 553 F.3d 927.'

' References to “Pet. App.” are to the appendix to the petition for a
writ of certiorari filed in No. 09-533.

(1)

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
January 7, 2009. A petition for rehearing was denied on
August 3, 2009 (Pet. App. 64a-65a). The petitions for a
writ of certiorari were filed on November 2, 2009
(a Monday). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Since the enactment of the Clean Water Act
(CWA or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., in 1972, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not required
persons applying pesticides directly to or over waters of
the United States for the purpose of controlling pests to
obtain a CWA permit. That longstanding practice was
codified in the 2006 EPA final rule at issue in this case.
Pet. App. 26a-63a.

a. CWA Section 301(a) states that “the discharge of
any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful” unless
the discharge is in compliance with certain other provi-
sions of the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). The Act defines the
term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”
33 U.S.C. 1362(12). The Act defines the term “pollut-
ant,” in turn, as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive mate-
rials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural
waste discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(6). A
“point source” is a “discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).

The primary way that a person may discharge a pol-
lutant without running afoul of the Act is to obtain a per-

3

mit pursuant to CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342, which
establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES). Subject to certain conditions,
EPA and approved States “may, after opportunity for
public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants.” 33 U.S.C.
1342(a)(1). In addition to individual NPDES permits,
EPA issues general permits that can cover entire classes
of discharges by similarly situated dischargers. Dis-
chargers who comply with the terms of the general per-
mit, including specified technology and water-quality-
based effluent limitations, do not require individual per-
mits for any discharges within the covered class. 40
C.F.R. 122.28.

Congress authorized EPA to promulgate regulations
to administer the NPDES program. 33 U.S.C. 1361(a).
EPA regulations include a list of discharges that do not
require NPDES permits. 40 C.F.R. 122.3.

b. Three days after Congress enacted the CWA, it
passed comprehensive amendments to the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973, which regulates the
sale, distribution, and use of pesticides through a regis-
tration program. Before registering a pesticide, EPA
must determine, inter alia, that the pesticide “will per-
form its intended function without unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment,” and that “when used in ac-
cordance with widespread and commonly recognized
practice [the pesticide] will not generally cause unrea-
sonable adverse effects on the environment.” 7 U.S.C.
136a(c)(5). FIFRA defines the term “unreasonable ad-
verse effects on the environment” to include “any unrea-
sonable risk to man or the environment, taking into ac-
count the economic, social, and environmental costs and

4

benefits of the use of any pesticide,” including water-
quality and other ecological effects. 7 U.S.C. 136(bb).
If there are risks of concern, EPA considers which miti-
gation measures (e.g., establishing a buffer between the
area sprayed and a water body, or lowering the pro-
posed application rate to reduce toxicity to non-target
species) are necessary to reduce those risks. In per-
forming the FIFRA analysis, EPA examines, inter alia,
the ingredients of a pesticide, the intended type of appli-
cation site and directions for use, and supporting scien-
tific studies. 7 U.S.C. 136a(c); see 40 C.F.R. Pts. 152,
156, 158.

2. Since 2000, several cases in the Second and Ninth
Circuits have raised the question whether the CWA re-
quires NPDES permits for certain pesticide applica-
tions. Although the Ninth Circuit held in two cases that
a pesticide applicator was required to obtain an NPDES
permit, neither decision contained a square holding in-
terpreting the term “pollutant” in a manner inconsistent
with the EPA rule that is at issue in this case. See
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d
526, 532-533 (2001) (determining chemical residue from
herbicide application to be a pollutant, but without ana-
lyzing whether it constituted point-source pollution);
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Bio-
diversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 n.2
(2002) (assuming that the parties did not dispute that
insecticide applied above navigable waters qualified as
a pollutant); see also Pet. App. 49a-5la. In 2005, the
Ninth Circuit, relying in part on EPA’s interim interpre-
tation, held that chemical “pesticides that are applied to
water for a beneficial purpose and in compliance with
FIFRA, and that produce no residue or unintended ef-
fects, are not ‘chemical wastes,’ and thus are not ‘pollut-

5

ants’ regulated by the CWA.” Fairhurst v. Hagener,
422 F.3d 1146, 1150-1151 (2005). Neither of the perti-
nent Second Circuit decisions reached the merits of the
question presented in this case, let alone foreclosed EPA
from interpreting the Act not to require permits for the
type of pesticide applications at issue. Indeed, one of
those decisions essentially called on EPA to resolve the
issue. See Altman v. Town of Amherst, 47 Fed. Appx.
62, 67 (2002) (“Until the EPA articulates a clear inter-
pretation of current law—among other things, whether
properly used pesticides released into or over waters of
the United States can trigger the requirement for
NPDES permits * * * —the question of whether prop-
erly used pesticides can become pollutants that violate
the CWA will remain open.”); No Spray Coalition, Inc.
v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 605-606 (2003) (re-
serving the “complex question” whether a pesticide ap-
plication to waters of the United States constitutes a
CWA discharge of a pollutant).

Taken together, those decisions created uncertainty
among the regulated community and other affected citi-
zens about the applicability of the NPDES permit pro-
gram to certain pesticide applications. Pet. App. 30a-
32a. In 2003, EPA sought to resolve that uncertainty by
addressing the issue administratively. See 68 Fed. Reg.
48,385 (2003). In an Interim Statement and Guidance,
EPA identified two circumstances for which it had con-
cluded that pesticides applied to waters of the United
States consistent with all relevant requirements of
FIFRA are not “pollutants” under the CWA and there-
fore do not require an NPDES permit. /d. at 48,387.
The first circumstance was the application for pest-con-
trol purposes of pesticides directly to waters protected
by the CWA. /bid. The second circumstance was the

6

application of pesticides to control pests that are present
over waters of the United States where the application
results in a portion of the pesticides being deposited to
covered waters. /bid.

EPA solicited public comment on the Interim State-
ment and Guidance. 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,385. After con-
sidering the public comments, EPA issued a final Inter-
pretive Statement confirming its interim position. 70
Fed. Reg. 5095-5096 (2005). At the same time, EPA
published notice of a proposed rulemaking to incorpo-
rate the substance of the Interpretative Statement into
EPA regulations, and it solicited public comment on the
proposed rulemaking. /d. at 5093.

On November 27, 2006, EPA issued its final rule.
71 Fed. Reg. 68,483. The rule revised EPA’s NPDES
regulations to add a paragraph to the list of discharges
in 40 C.F.R. 122.3 that do not require NPDES permits.
71 Fed. Reg. at 68,492. The rule covered the application
of pesticides, “consistent with all relevant requirements
under FIFRA (2.e., those relevant to protecting water
quality),” in the following two circumstances:

1. The application of pesticides directly to waters of
the United States in order to control pests. Ex-
amples of such applications include applications
to control mosquito larvae, aquatic weeds, or oth-
er pests that are present in waters of the United
States.

2. The application of pesticides to control pests that
are present over waters of the United States, in-
cluding near such waters, where a portion of the
pesticides will unavoidably be deposited to waters
of the United States in order to target the pests
effectively; for example, when insecticides are

7

aerially applied to a forest canopy where waters
of the United States may be present below the
canopy or when pesticides are applied over or
near water for control of adult mosquitoes or
other pests.

Tbid. (40 C.F.R. 122.3(h)).

EPA further concluded that “if there are residual
materials resulting from pesticides that remain in the
water after the application and its intended purpose
(elimination of targeted pests) have been completed,
these residual materials are * * * pollutants under
CWA section 502(6) because they are wastes of the pes-
ticide application.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487. EPA ex-
plained, however, that such applications “do not require
NPDES permits” because, “while the discharge of the
pesticide is from a point source (generally a hose or an
airplane), it is not a pollutant at the time of the dis-
charge. * * * Instead, the residual should be treated
as a nonpoint source pollutant.” /bid.

3. After various parties petitioned for review of
EPA’s rule in 11 different courts of appeals, the peti-
tions were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit. Applying
the principles set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the court of appeals vacated
the rule. Pet. App. la-25a.

a. The court of appeals stated that the first question
under Chevron is whether the CWA unambiguously in-
cludes pesticides within its definition of “pollutant.”
Pet. App. 14a. The court interpreted the term “chemical
waste,” part of the Act’s definition of “pollutant,” to in-
clude discarded, superfluous, or excess chemicals. /d. at
16a. Applying that interpretation, the court concluded
that so long as a chemical pesticide is intentionally ap-
plied to waters to perform a useful purpose and leaves

8

no excess portiens after performing its intended pur-
pose, it is not a “pollutant” and therefore does not re-
quire an NPDES permit. Jbid. At the same time, the
court concluded that excess chemical pesticide and pesti-
cide residue—.e., any portions of the pesticide that re-
main in the water after the pest-control purpose has
been served—“unambiguously fall within” the term
“chemical waste” and therefore are “pollutant[s]” under
the CWA. /d. at 16a-18a.

EPA had recognized that excess or residual portions
of a discharged pesticide are “pollutant[s]” within the
meaning of the CWA. The agency had concluded, how-
ever, that the application of a pesticide that leaves such
a residue does not require a CWA permit because such
portions are neither excess nor residual (and therefore
are not “pollutant[s]”) at the time of the discharge. EPA
contended that such residues are properly viewed as
non-point source pollutants. The court of appeals re-
jected that conclusion, finding it contrary to the CWA’s
plain language and purpose. The court held that, when
pesticide discharges result in the entry of excess or re-
sidual portions into waters of the United States, those
discharges require a permit because excess or residual
pesticides are pollutants discharged from a point source,
as they are introduced into the water by the applicator
from a point source. Pet. App. 2la-24a.

b. The court of appeals also addressed the question
whether the term “biological materials,” another compo-
nent of the CWA definition of “pollutant,” includes bio-
logical pesticides applied to control pests. Pet. App.
18a-20a. Citing the dictionary definition of “material,”
the court concluded that the “plain, unambiguous na-
ture” of the statutory text compelled the conclusion that
biological pesticides qualify as biological materials. /d.

9

at 18a-19a. The court of appeals also relied on Con-
gress’s use of the term “biological materials,” rather
than “biological wastes,” to justify the court’s different
treatment of biological and chemical pesticides. /d. at
19a-20a (emphasis added).

4. EPA moved to stay the mandate for two years in
order to avoid significant disruption to (i) EPA and
those States that administer NPDES permit programs,
and (ii) the thousands of persons and businesses nation-
wide who apply pesticides to or over, including near,
waters protected by the CWA. EPA explained that the
stay would provide it and state permitting authorities
time to develop and issue general CWA permits contain-
ing appropriate terms to govern the discharge of pesti-
cides to covered waters in a more administratively work-
able manner. Pet. App. 105a-123a. The court of appeals
granted EPA’s motion and stayed issuance of the man-
date until April 9, 2011.

ARGUMENT

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals disre-
garded settled principles governing the deference owed
to agency interpretations, and that the court’s construc-
tion of the CWA is in tension with decisions of this Court
and other courts of appeals. 09-533 Pet. 14-22; 09-547
Pet. 18, 20, 25-28. Although the government agrees that
the court of appeals misapplied Chevron to EPA’s 2006
rule, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling does not conflict with any
decision of this Court or another court of appeals. And
while the decision below potentially applies to thousands
of applications of pesticides to or over, including near,
waters protected by the CWA, the court of appeals’ two-
year stay of its mandate has provided time to EPA and
authorized States to mitigate the administrative burdens

10

resulting from the decision. Indeed, EPA is currently in
the process of developing general permits governing the
types of pesticide applications covered by its rule. Fur-
ther review is therefore unwarranted.

1. Although the court of appeals recited the correct
standard of review under Chevron (Pet. App. 9a-10a), it
misapplied that standard to EPA’s rule. Contrary to the
court of appeals’ conclusion, the relevant CWA terms do
not unambiguously foreclose EPA’s interpretation. Con-
gress defined the term “pollutant” to encompass 16 spe-
cific items. 38 U.S.C. 1362(6); see p. 2, swpra. None of
the 16 items clearly encompasses pesticides applied to
waters, in a manner consistent with FIFRA require-
ments, in order to control pests. In particular, Con-
gress’s use of the terms “chemical wastes” and “biologi-
cal materials” does not indicate a clear intent to cover
the application of pesticides to covered waters under the
circumstances specified in EPA’s rule.

a. Although the court of appeals viewed the term
“chemical waste” as unambiguous and therefore did not
rely on EPA’s interpretation as reflected in the 2006
regulation, the court’s construction of that term with
respect to chemical pesticides is consistent with EPA’s
rule. Both EPA and the court of appeals determined
that pesticides intentionally applied to or over, including
near, water to perform a particular useful purpose (7.e.,
control pests) are not chemical wastes if they leave no
residue after performing their intended purpose. See 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,487; Pet. App. 16a-17a. Both EPA and
the court further concluded that any pesticide residue
remaining in the water after the intended purpose has
been served constitutes “chemical waste” and is there-
fore a “pollutant” within the meaning of the CWA. /bid.

1

The court of appeals departed from EPA’s 2006 rule,
however, when it concluded that the CWA unambigu-
ously classifies excess or residual pesticide as a pollut-
ant discharged from a point source. The court of ap-
peals stated that “it is clear that under the meaning of
the Clean Water Act, pesticide residue or excess pesti-
cide * * * is a pollutant discharged from a point source
because the pollutant is introduced into a water from the
outside world by the pesticide applicator from a point
source.” Pet. App. 23a-24a (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court rejected EPA’s conclusion that,
because such an excess or residue becomes a “chemical
waste” (and therefore a “pollutant”) only at some time
after discharge, it should be treated as a nonpoint
source pollutant. Compare zd. at 21a-25a, with 71 Fed.
Reg. at 68,487; see p. 7, supra.

Thus, the critical question is whether the portion of
a chemical pesticide that ultimately becomes excess or
residue is a “pollutant” at the time it is released from
the point source, or whether it becomes a “pollutant”
only after the pesticide has served its intended purpose
and the excess takes on the character of “waste.” The
court of appeals identified no provision of the CWA that
speaks directly to that question. The court’s conclusion
that the CWA unambiguously foreclosed EPA’s inter-
pretation—notwithstanding the Act’s silence as to the
temporal issue of when such pesticide loses its character
as product and becomes a pollutant; EPA’s past practice
of not requiring permits for such discharges (p. 2, sw-
pra); and FIFRA’s specific regulation of pesticide use
(pp. 3-4, supra)—reflects an erroneous application of
Chevron.

b. The court of appeals also erred in holding, con-
trary to EPA’s rule, that the CWA term “biological ma-

12

terials” unambiguously encompasses biological pesti-
cides. Pet. App. 18a-20a. As the Ninth Circuit previ-
ously concluded, the CWA is ambiguous on whether that
term, read in conjunction with the other items specified
in the definition of “pollutant,” includes all biological
material (waste or not) within its scope. See Association
to Protect Hammersly, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor
Resources, Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1016 (2002) (holding that
natural byproducts of live mussels grown on harvesting
rafts were not “biological materials”). The court below
nevertheless found clear congressional intent to include
biological pesticides within the term “biological materi-
als,” even though few biological pesticides existed at the
time Congress adopted this definition. Compare Pet.
App. 18a-19a, with 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486. The court of
appeals’ decision also creates the peculiar result that,
although a chemical pesticide (except for excess or resi-
due) applied to waters for pest control is not a “pollut-
ant,” a biological pesticide applied to the same waters in
the same manner for the same purpose is a “pollutant.”
That result is particularly anomalous in light of EPA’s
assessment that biological pesticides generally pose less
serious adverse environmental consequences than chem-
ical pesticides. /bid.; see Valent Biosciences Amicus Br.
11-12.

ce. Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ errors, the
decision below does not warrant this Court’s review.
The court of appeals recited the correct standard under
Chevron and did not purport to articulate a new analytic
framework for review of agency rules. Pet. App. 9a-10a.
The result below does not conflict with a decision of this
Court or any other court of appeals. The court below
was the first to review the validity of EPA’s 2006 final
rule, and no court of appeals has held that pesticide ap-

13

plications to navigable waters resulting in chemical resi-
due or involving biological pesticides do not require an
NPDES permit. See pp. 4-5, supra. And, as explained
below (pp. 15-16, infra), EPA is in the process of fash-
ioning a regulatory response to mitigate the impact of
the court of appeals’ decision.

2. In addition to challenging the court of appeals’
application of Chevron principles to EPA’s rule, petition-
ers in No. 09-533 contend that the court’s interpretation
of the CWA term “chemical waste” conflicts with this
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009), and
with the Second Circuit’s decision in Cordiano v.
Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2009). Pet. 17-
22. Petitioners’ reliance on those decisions is misplaced.

In Burlington Northern, the Court interpreted the
phrase “arrange for disposal” as used in the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Specifically, the Court
held that a manufacturer had not “arrange[d] for dis-
posal” of pesticide that had spilled during its transfer
from the delivery truck to the customer’s storage tanks.
129 S. Ct. at 1875-1879. Relying on the intent element
implicit in the CERCLA term “arrange for,” the Court
explained that the manufacturer had not entered into
the transaction with “the intention that at least.a portion
of the product be disposed of during the transfer pro-
cess.” Jd. at 1880.

Although the purpose of a pesticide discharge is rele-
vant to whether the discharge involves a “chemical
waste” within the meaning of the CWA, this Court’s de-
cision in Burlington Northern does not speak directly to
the question presented here. As discussed above (pp.
10-11, supra), the Sixth Circuit agreed with EPA’s con-

14

clusion, as reflected in the 2006 rule, that chemical pesti-
cides do not constitute “chemical waste” within the
meaning of the CWA unless some excess or residue re-
mains after the pesticide has accomplished its intended
purpose. And nothing in Burlington Northern sheds
meaningful light on whether such excess or residue
has been discharged into covered waters from a point
source. Moreover, the ultimate question whether there
has been a “discharge of any pollutant” under the
CWA differs on its face from the question whether
someone has “arrange[d] for disposal” of a pollutant
under CERCLA. For example, the spilled pesticide at
issue in Burlington Northern, like the excess or residual
pesticide discussed in the EPA rulemaking and in the
decision below, would constitute a “pollutant” within the
meaning of the CWA if it had been spilled into waters of
the United States.

In Metacon Gun Club, the Second Circuit addressed
a part of the definition of “solid waste” in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)— spe-
cifically the term “discarded material,” which RCRA
regulations define as “abandoned” by being “[d]isposed
of.” 575 F.3d at 206-207 (citations omitted). The plain-
tiffs had brought claims under both RCRA and the CWA
arising from alleged lead contamination attributable to
the firing of bullets at a shooting range. Jd. at 202. The
Second Circuit first determined under RCRA that lead
shot used at a shooting range is not a “discarded mate-
rial” and therefore is not a solid waste. /d. at 207-209.
Petitioners emphasize the Second Circuit’s inquiry into
the ordinary, intended use of a product. 09-533 Pet. 20-
21. As noted above, however, the Sixth Circuit’s con-
struction of the term “chemical waste” in the CWA is
consistent with that in the EPArule. In any event, the

15

Second Circuit did not reject the plaintiffs’ CWA claims
on the ground that lead shot used for its intended pur-
poses is not a “pollutant.” Rather, the court found no
CWA liability for independent reasons, explaining that
the plaintiffs had not established that certain discharges
were from a point source or that other discharges were
into waters of the United States. Metacon Gun Club,
575 F.3d at 222-225.

3. In arguing that the decision below warrants fur-
ther review, petitioners emphasize the potentially wide-
spread impact of the court of appeals’ ruling. 09-533
Pet. 28-33; 09-547 Pet. 14-20. The court of appeals’ deci-
sion will make the NPDES permitting regime applicable
to thousands of pesticide applications that were not pre-
viously subject to CWA requirements. Pet. App. 106a-
107a, 126a-127a. But because the court of appeals has
stayed its mandate for two years to enable EPA and
authorized States to develop and issue general permits,
the regulatory burdens of the court of appeals’ decision
will be reduced.

Immediate issuance of the mandate by the court of
appeals likely would have caused significant disruption
to both regulators and the regulated community. EPA
and the States that administer the NPDES program
lack the resources to issue individual permits in a short
timeframe. Without NPDES permits and without a stay
of the mandate, the many persons and businesses na-
tionwide who apply pesticides to or over, including near,
waters of the United States would have faced a choice
between ceasing such applications or risking CWA viola-
tions.

For that reason, the government sought a stay of the
mandate from the court of appeals. As the government
explained at the time, EPA and authorized States plan

16

to create NPDES permits to cover a large number of
similarly situated dischargers in lieu of issuing an indi-
vidual permit to each discharger for the type of pesticide
applications addressed in EPA’s rule. Pet. App. 127a-
128a. EPA estimated that the development and issuance
of general permits would take two years, and it there-
fore requested a stay of the mandate until April 9, 2011.
Id. at 128a-129a.

The court of appeals’ grant of that motion mitigates
the potentially adverse consequences of its decision.
The two-year period should provide EPA and other au-
thorized permitting agencies sufficient time to develop
and issue general CWA permits to cover the activities at
issue. In light of the Sixth Circuit’s stay of the mandate,
there is no pressing need for this Court’s review.”

—— - ee ———————

* Petitioners also suggest that the opinion below could be read to
extend the CWA’s coverage to discharges having a more attenuated
connection to waters of the United States than the discharges ad-
dressed in EPA’s 2006 rule. 09-533 Pet. 29-30; 09-547 Pet. 15-17. The
possibility that future plaintiffs might invoke the Sixth Circuit’s de-
cision in substantially different (and currently hypothetical) factual cir-
cumstances does not independently warrant this Court’s review. In any
event, the opinion below is better read as limited to the issues actually
before the court of appeals: pesticide applications to or over, including
near, waters of the United States that are covered by EPA’s rule.

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CONCLUSION

The petitions, for a writ of certiorari should be de-
nied.

Respectfully submitted.

ELENA KAGAN
Solicitor General

IGNACIA S. MORENO
Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS LORENZEN
ALAN GREENBERG
Attorneys

JANUARY 2010

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1194%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
