# Opposition Brief — American Chemistry Council v. Sierra Club

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1161%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 559 U.S. 991

## Text

Court, U.S.

\S\ (A) JAN 27.200

No. 09-495 OFFICE OF THE CLERK |

Hn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

Vv.
SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION
ELENA KAGAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record

ScoTT FULTON IGNACIA S. MORENO

General Counsel Assistant Attorney General
SHEILA IGOE DANIEL R. DERTKE

Attorney Attorney

Environmental Protection Department of Justice

Agency Washington, D.C. 20580-0001
Washington, D.C. 20460 (202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a petitioner may challenge a Clean Air Act
regulation after expiration of the Act’s 60-day time pe-
riod for judicial review, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I
2007), on the ground that the regulatory context of the
regulation has changed sufficiently to alter the stakes
for judicial review.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
PEPE OTT eT eRe, eee ere Ee re 1
Sy 5 hs va wo 40 Os Ve Cos ae a ee 1
PE cd Sank eah cure Ee Tee ete eeeae Cone eee 1
PEE Pe CET Tee Cee Te rer et IS 9
CL ss os ba uae eae Calee kee Ree eee 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1008 (1990) ....7
American Road & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA,

688 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir, 2008)... ccc ecceccescsces 13
Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National

Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1997) ........... 12
Environmental Def. v. EPA, 467 F ..:d 1329

Cs. Ge I as cet ae saa aed ee Redo ho Rees 10
Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of the

Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ..... 7,10, 11,13
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA, 118 F.3d

Se Gee eG EE ho 6 oo cook ween es keh ake eses 12

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) ...9
National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of the Inte-

rior, 134 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ................ 10
National Mining Ass’n v. Department of the Inte-

rior, 70 F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .................. 9
NRDC vy. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ......... 11
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F 2d 654

ta SD vaca xa cde bse ee lease eae een ees 13

(III)

Cases—Continued: Page
PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir.
er ey err te eer re ee 10

Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm ’n,
901 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992

HERE ee Ee re ee ee 11

Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States,
O66 FBG TIO Ge Clr. TGG)) 2.0 nec ccc cc cccescsesee, 12

Statute and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:
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ee, ES i ise bb dn as be cao he danceesaees 2
ee EE ec cannseneckceapeeeasexenas 2
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42 U.S.C. T412(d) (§ 112(d)) .. cc ccscccces 8, 14, 15, 16
ne Se a bade canek sane Canneeeeses 2
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ee a oc cick ub us veeaeee pea ene. 3
GE UB. THR GG BU cc vcccccccessscneccsces 8
42 U.S.C. 7607(b) (Supp. I 2007) ................006. 3
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I 2007) .......... 3, 9, 18, 17
i lta sal Na ak at gs any Vues wa cae ek ae 5

40 C.F.R.:
ee eae gate cate Uw ex 3
Pe UND i d-cb 0.6 ciate teens dkiondsiweds 4,7
Section 63.6(e)(3){T) (1994) ...........08.. res 5
re oes ot Oa a eee awa ahaa a 4

SE ccc ky ccc ke ta ebe vies ks Aw en 5

Regulations—Continued: Page
OS os kgs ckanedacnsa tenes cede uae 5
eS . 0st ec dvadasese ne eanene ees 4
I sa ne ee eee vee ee oo 4
oo oho wasn cia amas ecto ewe aed 4
ic aa ees bund ee ce da eeeied 4
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PI RE) viv ce sc cer ccscccccccesceveseues 5
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BU RIED gov cake cee cccvcvsevaviscsse .........0.e eee eeee 14, 15, 16

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 09-495

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COUR’ OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-21a)
is reported at 551 F.3d 1019.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
December 19, 2008. Petitions for rehearing were denied
on July 30, 2009 (Pet. App. 22a-23a, 24a-25a). The peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on October 22, 2009.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reg-
ulates the emission of hazardous pollutants into the air

(1)

2

through National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAPs), which are promulgated under
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412.
Section 112 lists numerous “hazardous air pollutants,” 42
U.S.C. 7412(b)(1), and it authorizes EPA to add to the
list other pollutants that “present, or may present,
through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat
of adverse human health effects,” 42 U.S.C. 7412(b)(2).
The CAA requires EPA to enumerate “all categories and
subcategories” of sources of the listed pollutants and
then to revise that list periodically. 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(1).

Based on the list of pollutants and the list of catego-
ries and subcategories of sources that emit them, EPA
must “establish{] emission standards” for each source
category and subcategory. 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(1). For
major sources, those technology-based standards, known
as maximum achievable control technology (MACT) stan-
dards, must

require the maximum degree of reduction in emis-
sions of the hazardous air pollutants subject to this
section * * * that the Administrator, taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emission re-
duction, and any non-air quality health and environ-
mental impacts and energy requirements, determines
is achievable for new or existing sources in the cate-
gory or subcategory to which such emission standard
applies, through application of measures, processes,
methods, systems or techniques.

42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(2). Under the CAA, MACT standards
for new major sources may permit no greater emissions
than those released “in practice by the best controlled
similar source,” while MACT standards for existing ma-
jor sources in large categories and subcategories must

3

allow for release of no greater emissions than the aver-
age of the “best performing 12 percent of the existing
sources.” 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(3). This provision is com-
monly called the “MACT floor.”

The CAA provides a mechanism for judicial review of
emissions standards and other actions taken by EPA to
implement the statute. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b) (Supp. I 2007).
The CAA states that a “petition for review of action of
the [EPA] in promulgating * * * any emission standard
or requirement under [Section 112] * * * may be filed
only in the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I 2007).
A petition for review

shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of
such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the
Federal Register, except that if such petition is based
solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then
any petition for review under this subsection shall be
filed within sixty days after such grounds arise.

Ibid.

2. In March 1994, EPA adopted a set of “General
Provisions” that, under the terms of the regulation, need
not be repeated in every separate emission standard.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408 (1994 Rule). Instead, EPA spec-
ifies in its category- and subcategory-specific emissions
standards which of these General Provisions “is or is
not included in such relevant standard.” 40 C.F.R.
63.1(a)(4).

This case involves one of these General Provisions.
The relevant General Provision states that, during peri-
ods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction (SSM), cov-
ered sources (7.e., sources subject to emissions standards
in which EPA has incorporated this General Provision)

4

are exempt from the category-specific emissions limita-
tions that apply during normal operating conditions. 40
C.F.R. 63.6(f)(1) and (h)(1). No party challenged the
SSM exemption within 60 days after it was published in
the Federal Register.

A separate, but related, General Provision also estab-
lished in 1994 requires sources at all times to operate “in
a manner consistent with safety and good air pollution
control practices for minimizing emissions.” 40 C.F .R.
63.6(e)(1)(i). This duty to minimize emissions applies
during normal operating conditions as well as during
SSM events, and it requires the source to reduce its
emissions “to the greatest extent which is consistent with
safety and good air pollution control practices.” Jbid.
However, this “general duty to minimize emissions dur-
ing a period of startup, shutdown, or malfunction does
not require the owner or operator to achieve emission
levels that would be required by the applicable standard
at other times.” /bid.

The General Provisions also require each source to
develop a plan that “describes, in detail, procedures
for operating and maintaining the source during periods
of startup, shutdown, and malfunction; and a program
of corrective action for malfunctioning process, air pollu-
tion control, and monitoring equipment used to com-
ply with the relevant standard.” 40 C.F.R. 63.6(e)(3)(i).
Sources must maintain current SSM plans and make
them available for inspection by the permitting author-
ity, and the permitting authority may request a copy
of the SSM plan at any time. 40 C.F.R. 63.6(e)(3)(v).
Sources may periodically revise their SSM plans,
and the permitting authority may order revisions.
40 C.F.R. 63.6(e)(3)(vii). Sources must also report any
malfunction and keep records of actions taken to mini-

5

mize emissions when malfunctions occur. Sources must
also report any actions taken to minimize emissions dur-
ing startup and shutdown if the source’s emissions ex-
ceed the standard that would apply during normal opera-
tions. 40 C.F.R. 63.6(e)(3)(iii) and (iv); see 40
C.F.R. 63.10(b)(2)(iv) and (v), 68.10(d)(5)(i) and (ii).

3. EPA subsequently amended some of the SSM-re-
lated rules, but it did not amend the SSM exemption it-
self.

Title V of the Clean Air Act requires sources to have
permits embodying the relevant emissions limitations.
42 U.S.C. 7661a(a). As originally promulgated in 1994,
the General Provisions required that a source’s SSM plan
be “incorporated by reference into the source’s title V
permit.” 40 C.F.R. 63.6(e)(3)(i) (1994). At the time of
promulgation, industry groups (but not environmental
groups) challenged this provision of the 1994 rules, argu-
ing, inter alia, that the requirement to incorporate the
SSM plan into the source’s Title V permit could require
a permit revision any time the SSM plan was revised.
Because EPA agreed that such a result would be unduly
burdensome, EPA amended the General Provisions in
2002 to remove the requirement that the SSM plan be
incorporated into the source’s Title V permit. 67 Fed.
Reg. 16,587. Nonetheless, sources remained obligated to
develop an SSM plan and then operate in accordance
with it. /bid. At the same time, EPA also removed the
requirement that sources routinely submit their SSM
plans to the permitting authority, and it required permit-
ting authorities to obtain an SSM plan and make it pub-
licly available only if asked to do so by a member of the
public. Jd. at 16,600; see 66 Fed. Reg. 16,326 (2001) (pro-
posing rule change). In 2003, EPA further modified the
rules to specify that any request by a member of the pub-

6

lic that EPA or a permitting authority obtain a copy of a
source’s SSM plan (in order to make it publicly available)
must be “specific and reasonable.” 68 Fed. Reg. 32,591.

In 2006, EPA rescinded the requirement that sources
follow their SSM plans during SSM events on the ground
that this would “allow sources flexibility to address emis-
sions during periods of SSM.” 71 Fed. Reg. 20,447. The
agency also rescinded the requirement that EPA or the
permitting authority obtain a copy of the SSM plan after
a request from the public, although it stated its expecta-
tion that most permitting authorities would continue
to do so voluntarily upon “reasonable” request. /d. at
20,451. In the same rulemaking action, EPA noted that
some commenters had suggested eliminating the SSM
exemption altogether, but it explained that this exemp-
tion had been in place since 1994 and that these com-
ments were “outside of the scope of this rulemaking.” Jd.
at 20,449.

Petitions for review challenging these various post-
1994 rule changes (and an additional denial of reconsid-
eration in 2007, 72 Fed. Reg. 19,385) were filed by vari-
ous environmental groups (collectively Sierra Club).
Those groups are the private respondents in this Court.
Those petitions for review were consolidated by the court
of appeals.

4. Although Sierra Club raised subsidiary challenges
to the changes EPA made between 2002 and 2006 to the
SSM plan rules, its principal challenge in the court of
appeals was to the SSM exemption itself. Sierra Club
argued that the text of Section 112 does not permit such
an exemption. The court of appeals granted the petitions
for review and vacated the SSM exemption. Pet. App.
la-2la.

7

a. Although the petitions for review were filed more
than 60 days after the SSM exemption was promulgated
in 1994, the court of appeals held that the petitions were
timely. Pet. App. 8a-13a. The court noted that under
D.C. Cireuit precedent, an agency can “reopen” an un-
changed rule—and thus create a new window for judicial
review of it—if the agency puts the rule out for comment,
offers a renewed justification for it, and then responds to
comments when “promulgating the regulation in its final
form.” Jd. at 8a (quoting American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 397 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1003 (1990)). The court acknowledged, however, that
those circumstances were not present in this case be-
cause EPA had stated during the 2006 rulemaking that
comments on the propriety of the SSM exemption were
beyond the scope of the proceeding. /d. at 9a (citing 71
Fed. Reg. at 20,449). “Such agency conduct,” the court
of appeals recognized, “is not tantamount to an actual
reopening.” /bid.

The court of appeals held, however, that EPA had
“constructively reopen[ed]” the SSM exemption to judi-
cial review when the agency altered “the regulatory con-
text for its SSM exemption by stripping out virtually all
of the SSM plan requirements that it created to contain
that exemption.” Pet. App. 9a (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court saw these actions as effectively leav-
ing only the “general duty” to minimize emissions, 40
C.F.R. 63.6(e)(1)(i), in place during SSM events. Pet.
App. 10a-lla. The court explained that from “the per-
spective of environmental petitioners’ interests and allo-
cation of resources the general duty ‘may not have been
worth challenging in [1994], but the [revised] regulations
gave [that duty] a new significance.” /d. at 1la (quoting
Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of the Inte-

8

rior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court of
appeals concluded that the post-1994 modifications to the
regulatory framework “changed the calculus for petition-
ers in seeking judicial review, and thereby constructively
reopened consideration of the exemption from section
112 emission standards during SSM events.” Jd. at 12a-
13a (citation omitted).

b. On the merits, the court of appeals found that
CAA Sections 112 and 302(k) require not only continuous
emission standards, but emission standards that are con-
tinuously in compliance with CAA Section 112(d)’s mini-
mum levels of stringency. Pet. App. 15a. The court con-
cluded that because the general duty to minimize emis-
sions is the only standard that applies during SSM
events, and the general duty standing alone does not
comply with Section 112(d), “the SSM exemption violates
the CAA’s requirement that some section 112 standard
apply continuously.” Zbid. The court therefore vacated
the exemption and did not reach Sierra Club’s other ar-
guments. /d. at 17a.

c. Judge Randolph dissented. Pet. App. 18a-21a. He
agreed with the panel majority that an agency can re-
open a prior regulation, thereby giving interested parties
a new 60-day window for seeking judicial review, if the
agency “give[s] its regulation new significance by alter-
ing other regulations incorporating it by reference.” Jd.
at 18a. In the dissenting judge’s view, however, “nothing
of the sort occurred here.” Jbid. Judge Randolph con-
cluded that even if EPA’s amendments to the regulatory
regime had made it more difficult to enforce the general
duty to minimize emissions, “that could hardly have
amounted to agency ‘action’ re-promulgating the 1994
regulations.” Jd. at 18a-19a.

9

ARGUMENT

Although the court of appeals erred in invoking the
“constructive reopening” doctrine to find Sierra Club’s
attack on a 1994 regulation timely, the petition should be
denied. This little-used D.C. Circuit doctrine has not
posed a significant problem in agency review cases, and
there is no division among the circuits concerning its
proper application. Moreover, EPA is already taking
significant steps—with input from industry and other
interested parties—to minimize any disruption that
might flow from the court of appeals’ decision.

1. Although agency regulations often are not ripe for
judicial review until they are applied to specific factual
settings, some federal statutes authorize review of par-
ticular categories of regulations immediately upon their
promulgation. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990). The CAA provides for review in
the D.C. Circuit of various categories of EPA actions,
including the promulgation of “any emission standard or
requirement.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I 2007). “Any
petition for review under [the CAA] shall be filed within
sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation,
approval, or action appears” in the Federal Register.
Ibid. In applying the 60-day filing requirement, the D.C.
Circuit has held that, even when an agency leaves a pre-
existing rule in place, the agency may actually reopen the
rule to judicial review by seeking comment on the rule,
responding to comments, and offering a renewed expla-
nation of the rule. See, e.g., National Mining Ass’n v.
Department of the Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1352 (1995)
(agency reopens rule when it “undertake[s] a serious,
substantive reconsideration” of it). In such situations,
the court has concluded that the agency’s course of con-

10

duct should be treated as an effective repromulgation of
the rule that triggers a new 60-day review period.

This case involves what the D.C. Circuit has de-
scribed as “one extension of that rule” of actual reopen-
ing. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Department of the
Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1214 (1996) (Kennecott Copper).
This “extension” “covers a possible circumstance in
which an issue might be deemed to have been construc-
tively reopened even though it was not actually re-
opened.” /bid. When an agency does not actually reopen
a settled rule, but makes changes to related rules that
the court believes “changed the calculus for petitioners
in seeking judicial review,” the court may deem the
agency to have “constructively reopened” the settled rule
to judicial review. Pet. App. 12a.

To this point, the D.C. Circuit’s rarely-used construc-
tive reopening rule has not posed a substantial problem
for the government in agency review cases. We are
aware of only two decisions (other than the one at issue
here) in which that court found constructive reopening.
See National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of the Inte-
rior, 134 F.3d 1095, 1104 (1998); Kennecott Copper, 88
F.3d at 1214.’ In Kennecott Copper, the first D.C. Cir-
cuit case to discuss “constructive reopening,” the court
found the doctrine applicable to only one of the several
claims at issue. See id. at 1214-1215. The court in
Kennecott Copper also stressed that “the appropriate

" In a handful of other cases, the D.C. Circuit considered and rejec-
ted, or found it unnecessary to reach, a party’s claim that an agency had
constructively reopened a rule. See, e.g., PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, 198
F.3d 890, 894 (1999) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether con-
structive reopening had occurred because agency had expressly held
question open in earlier order); Environmental Def. v. EPA, 467 F 3d
1329, 1333-1334 (2006) (finding no constructive reopening).

11

way in which to challenge a longstanding regulation on
the ground that it is ‘violative of statute’ is ordinarily ‘by
filing a petition for amendment or rescission of the
agency’s regulations, and challenging the denial of that
petition.’” Jd. at 1214 (quoting Public Citizen v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990)).

There is no reason to suppose that the decision below
heralds a dramatic expansion of the “constructive re-
opening” doctrine within the D.C. Circuit. The court of
appeals’ decision in NRDC v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245 (2009),
issued after the court’s ruling in this case, confirms the
limited contours of the D.C. Circuit’s “constructive re-
opening” doctrine. In NRDC, the D.C. Circuit inter-
preted Kennecott Copper and the decision at issue here
to permit a finding of constructive reopening only when
the agency “work[s] * * * a sea change” in the regula-
tory landscape surrounding an unchanged rule. /d. at
1266. Applying that stringent standard, the court found
no reopening. See ibid.”

As we explain below (see pp. 16-18, infra), we agree
with petitioners that the court of appeals erred in treat-
ing as timely Sierra Club’s request for review of the SSM
exemption that was promulgated in 1994. In endorsing
the concept of “constructive reopening,” however, the
court of appeals invoked a doctrine that has been part of
D.C. Circuit case law for nearly 15 years and that has
had an insubstantial impact on agency practice during
that period. Given the infrequency with which the D.C.

* Judge Rogers, the author of the court of appeals’ opinion in this
case, dissented in NRDC. 571 F.3d at 1277. She would have found con-
structive reopening on the facts presented in NRDC, and she criticized
the majority’s approach for being so strict as to “render the construc-
tive reopening precedents nugatory.” /d at 1278.

12

Circuit has found constructive reopening, and its recent
decision in NRDC confirming that the doctrine applies
only in limited circumstances, the Court’s intervention is
not warranted at this time.*

2. Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 17-22),
the circuits are not divided on the question presented by
this case. No other court of appeals has addressed the
question whether the time for seeking review of an
agency regulation may be constructively reopened.

In the cases that petitioners cite, the courts of ap-
peals have held that a party may obtain judicial review of
even a long-established rule by petitioning the agency to
amend or rescind it and then seeking judicial review if
that petition is denied. See, e.g., Dunn-McCampbell
Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 112 F.3d
1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1997); Wind River Mining Corp. v.
United States, 946 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1991); Legal
Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1472-
1473 (11th Cir. 1997). Denial of a petition opens a new
period within which “to challenge * * * the agency’s
constitutional or statutory authority.” Dunn, 112 F.3d at
1287. The D.C. Circuit likewise recognizes that such a
procedure provides the normal route to judicial review of
a rule for which the statutory deadline has expired. See

* In their briefs to the panel, both petitioners and the government
contended that no constructive reopening had occurred in this case un-
der the standards set forth in prior D.C. Circuit decisions. After the
panel issued its opinion, petitioners (but not the government) filed a
petition for rehearing en banc. In that filing, petitioners contended that
the panel’s application of the “constructive reopening” doctrine con-
flicted with prior D.C. Circuit decisions. Petitioners did not argue that
the court of appeals should reject the concept of constructive reopening
altogether. Petitioners have advanced that argument for the first time
in this Court.

13

Kennecott Copper, 88 F.3d at 1214 (describing this as the
“ordinarly]” way of obtaining review).*

In holding that constructive reopening provides an
additional (though infrequently available) means of se-
curing judicial review of an agency rule, the D.C. Circuit
has not departed from the decisions of other courts of
appeals, but has simply resolved a question that no other
circuit has decided. No other court of appeals has specif-
ically rejected the concept of constructive reopening or
held that seeking review of the denial of a petition to re-
scind is the exclusive means of securing review of an old
rule. There is no circuit split.°

* In a decision released after the one at issue here, the D.C. Circuit
reiterated that “agency denial of a petition for a new rulemaking which
complains of substantive infirmities in existing rules is, for the most
part, judicially reviewable irrespective of time limits dating from the
rules’ enactment.” American Road & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA,
588 F.3d 1109, 1112 (2009). The court went on to hold, however, that in
a CAA case, this procedure could not be used to “raise points that could
have been brought to [the court’s] attention” when the rule was first
promulgated. Jd at 1113. That is because the CAA’s judicial-review
provision specifically addresses challenges filed after the initial 60-day
deadline expires, authorizing the court to entertain such challenges only
when they are “‘based solely on grounds arising after’” the deadline.
Id. at 1112 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 7607(b\(1) (Supp. I 2007)).

° Petitioners’ claim (Pet. 21) of an “intra-circuit conflict” is likewise
incorrect. In Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654,
666 (1975), the D.C. Circuit recognized that, in cases where new infor-
mation is alleged to cast doubt on the reasonableness of an existing
EPA regulation, allowing judicial review of EPA’s “refusal to revise”
the agency rule in light of the new information is “considerably more
desirable” than permitting “direct review of a new information chal-
lenge.” The court in that case had no occasion, however, to decide whe-
ther and under what circumstances EPA’s amendment of related as-
pects of a regulatory regime might constitute constructive reopening
of unchanged portions of a pre-existing rule.

14

3. Although the question presented in the petition
for a writ of certiorari does not encompass any challenge
to the court of appeals’ holding on the merits (see Pet. i),
petitioners contend that the court’s vacatur of the chal-
lenged SSM exemption will lead to “practical conse-
quences so stark that they warrant review.” Pet. 23; see
Pet. 22-25. Petitioners greatly overstate the likely im-
pact of the court of appeals’ holding.

First, the court of appeals’ decision directly applies
only to a minority of EPA’s Section 112(d) standards.
Most of those standards do not simply rely on cross-ref-
erences to the general rules that were vacated by the
court below, but rather include “specific regulatory text
that exempts or excuses compliance during SSM events.”
See Letter from Adam M. Kushner, Director, Office of
Civil Enforcement, to counsel, 2, Tbl. 1 and 2 (July 22,
2009) (explaining EPA’s view that the decision below
applies directly to only 35 of 99 standards) (Kushner Letter); 74 Fed. Reg. 43,124 (2009) (noti-
fying public of availability of Kushner letter, which “ad-
dresses concerns that have been raised regarding the
impact of the decision in [this case]”). Those standard-
specific SSM exemptions were not before the court below
and therefore remain in force. To the extent the court’s
decision may raise questions about the validity of those
standards, “EPA intends to evaluate each of them in
light of the court’s decision.” Kushner Letter 2-3.

Second, with respect to most of the standards that
relied on only cross-references to the general SSM ex-
emption, EPA’s initial analysis indicates that for “various
reasons” the decision below should raise no significant
“compliance issues.” Kushner Letter 3. For example,
some sources use “pollution control equipment [that] is

15

not affected by SSM events,” and some standards impose
work practice requirements that can be met during SSM
events. In addition, some standards are expressed over
such long periods of time (such as an annual rolling aver-
age) that deviation from normal emissions levels during
SSM events is unlikely to have a material impact on reg-
ulated entities’ ability to achieve compliance. /bid.

That leaves the minority of the minority of EPA’s
Section 112(d) standards—+.e., those that rely solely on
a cross-reference to the general SSM exemptions and
that cover sources for which the lack of such an exemp-
tion is likely to have a material impact on regulated par-
ties’ ability to satisfy the standards. EPA announced in
July 2009 that, in light of the decision below, the agency
was “evaluating * * * which Section 112(d) source cate-
gory standards should be revised, and of these, which
should be revised on an expedited basis.” Kushner Let-
ter 4. As part of that process, EPA explained that it
“intend[ed] to give highest priority to reviewing and re-
vising those Section 112(d) source category standards
that may be difficult for sources to meet during an SSM
period given the technological limitations of the process
involved.” bid.

After receiving comments from industry and other
interested parties, EPA recently promulgated Section
112 rules that treat SSM events in a manner consistent
with the court of appeals’ holding. For example, in issu-
ing a new Section 112(d) standard for chemical manufac-
turing area sources, EPA “established different stan-
dards for [startup and shutdown] periods where appro-
priate.” National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Chemical Manufacturing Area Sources,
74 Fed. Reg. 56,033 (2009); see also National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Area Sourc-

16

es: Asphalt Processing and Asphalt Roofing Manufac-
turing, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,250-63,251 (2009) (measuring
compliance over 24 hours “during periods of startup and
shutdown” and over three hours at other times); Pet.
App. 14a (court of appeals holds that EPA must apply a
Section 112(d) standard at ali times “without necessarily
continuously applying a single standard”).

Finally, EPA has spoken directly to its use of en-
forcement discretion during the period before it updates
remaining emissions standards to address SSM events.
EPA has explained that where “a source * * * fails to
comply with the applicable Section 112(d) standards dur-
ing SSM events, EPA will determine an appropriate re-
sponse based on, among other things, the good faith ef-
forts of the source to minimize emissions during SSM
periods.” Kushner Letter 3. EPA has also encouraged
“sources that anticipate compliance difficulties to contact
EPA or the appropriate state regulatory authority” since
“EPA or the state may be able to take action to resolve
a source’s compliance concerns by, for example, issuing
an Administrative Order on Consent.” Jd. at 4. To facili-
tate that process, EPA sought and obtained from the
court of appeals a 60-day stay of the issuance of the
court’s mandate. See EPA Mot. to Stay Mandate, Sierra
Club v. EPA, No. 02-1135 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 5, 2009);
Order (Sept. 23, 2009) (No. 02-1135) (granting motion).
Given that the court of appeals’ decision impacts only a
minority of EPA’s Section 112 standards, and in light of
the steps EPA is taking to address these impacts, review
by this Court is not warranted.

4. Although this Court’s review is unwarranted for
the reasons discussed above, the government believes
that the court of appeals erred in treating as timely Si-
erra Club’s challenge to the 1994 SSM exemption. Un-

17

der the CAA’s judicial-review provision, a petition for
review challenging an “emission standard or require-
ment” promulgated under Section 112 of the CAA
must be filed within 60 days after “the date notice of
such * * * action appears” in the Federal Register.
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I 2007). In this case, how-
ever, the court of appeals reviewed an “action” from 1994
in response to petitions for review filed within 60 days of
Federal Register notices of separate regulatory
“action[s]” taken by EPA between 2002 and 2006.

The CAA’s requirement that a petition for review of
an EPA regulation must be filed within 60 days after
promulgation of that regulation is easy to administer and
promotes certainty about which agency rules are and are
not subject to challenge. Allowing judicial review after
that initial 60-day window under the “actual reopening”
rule—i.e., when EPA has expressly reconsidered and
then effectively readopted a regulation—is unlikely to
reduce that certainty to an appreciable degree.

The “constructive reopening” doctrine as applied in
this case has some hypothetical potential to cause confu-
sion because the mode of analysis used by the court be-
low is less determinate than the standard for determin-
ing whether actual reopening has occurred. Both in a
conventional challenge to an EPA rule filed immediately
upon its promulgation and in a later challenge filed after
an “actual reopening” of the rule, the timeliness of a peti-
tion for review turns exclusively on the agency’s actions.
The constructive reopening rule, by contrast, allows or
disallows judicial review depending on the court’s assess-
ment of an outside party’s reaction to the agency’s ac-
tions. Thus, in theory, the D.C. Circuit’s adoption of the
“constructive reopening” doctrine in Kennecott Copper
might have resulted in litigation and uncertainty as to

18

the timeliness of various challenges to agency regula-
tions made reviewable by statute.

As we explain, however, those consequences have
never in fact occurred. Since the 1996 decision in Kenne-
cott Copper, plaintiffs have rarely invoked the “construc-
tive reopening” doctrine, and the D.C. Circuit has even
more rarely found that a constructive reopening has
been established. Petitioners offer no sound reason to
believe that the court will apply the doctrine more ex-
pansively in the future, and the D.C. Circuit’s subse-
quent decision in NRDC indicates that the court will con-
tinue to exercise restraint. See p. 11, supra. Because
the practical significance of the question presented in the
petition for certiorari is slight, and because EPA is tak-
ing appropriate steps to minimize any disruption that
might be caused by the court of appeals’ merits decision,
review by this Court is not warranted.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

ELENA KAGAN

SCOTT FULTON Solicitor General
General Counsel IGNACIA S. MORENO
SHEILA IGOE Assistant Attorney General
Attorney DANIEL R. DERT
Environmental Protection Ati » DERTAE
Agency v

JANUARY 2010

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1161%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
