# Appendix — Brookens v. Solis (No. 09-463)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

| VL (2) Cupane a US.

09-463 0CT13 2009

APPENDIX
No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

3n Ghe
Supreme Court of the Mnited States

Benoit Brookens,

Petitioner,

Hilda L. Solis,
Secretary of Labor,

Respondent.

‘PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appench

TABLE OF CONTENTS

July 13, 2008 Order of
The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, En

er oe co cicaecmeieeewenee AS
U.S. District Court
ac sigan inehinnnnwieeiaie’ A-5
Applicable Constitutional Provisions,

Statutes,
seal cael aeknmasbeeuks A-19

Pleadings and Evidence Below:

Relevant Docket Entries ...............- A-21

Piaintif’s Exhibit (4) ..................... A-23

United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia

No. 08-5527 September Term 2008
1:08-cv-00086-ESH
Filed on July 13, 2009

Benoit Otis Brookens, II,
Appellant

v.

Hilda L. Solis, Secretary,

U.S. Department of Labor,
Appellee

Before: Sentelle, Chief Judge, and Ginsberg,
Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland,
Brown, Griffith, and Kavanaugh,
Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition for
rehearing en banc, and the absence of a request by
any member of the court for a vote, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer,
Clerk

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 08-5527 September Term
2008
1:08-cv-00086-ESH
Filed On: May 8,
2009
Benoit Otis Brookens, II,)
Appellant
v. )
Hilda L. Solis,
Secretary, )
U.S. Department of Labor,
Appellee )

BEFORE: Garland, Griffith, and Kavanaugh,
Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion for summary
affirmance, the response thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion be granted. The
merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to
warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog,
Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(per curiam). Appellant has failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact that the appellee's
proffered reasons for not promoting him were
pretextual or that he was denied the promotions
because of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. See
Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, U.S. House

A-3

of Representatives. 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir.
2008). The district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying appellant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f request
for discovery, because any information pertaining to
his qualifications under the delegated examining
authority would have been irrelevant, and the
remainder of the request lacked the requisite
specificity. See Messina v. Krakower. 439 F.3d 755,
762 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("A party making a Rule 56()
request must state concretely why additional
discovery is needed to oppose a motion for summary
judgment. We will not find an abuse of discretion —
where the requesting party has offered only a
conclusory assertion without any supporting facts to
justify the proposition that the discovery sought will
produce the evidence required.") (internal quotations
and citations omitted). The district court properly
dismissed appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim with
prejudice. See Hohri v. United States, 762 F.2d 227,
245 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds.
482 U.S. 64 (1987) (stating that § 1981 does "not
apply to actions against the United States").

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition
will not be published. The Clerk is directed to
withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven
days after resolution of any timely petition for
rehearing or petition for rehearing en bane. See Fed.

R. App. P. 41 (b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam

Case 1:08-cv-O0008ESH Document 18 Filed
10/21/2009

Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BENOIT BROOKENS, )

Plaintiff
Vv. ) Civil Action No. 08-
0086 ESH
ELAINE L. CHAO, )

Secretary, United States
Department of Labor, )
Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Benoit Brookens has filed an
amended complaint against Elaine Chao, in her
official capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of Labor ("DOL"), alleging race and age
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.;
and 42 U.S.C. §-1981.' According to plaintiffs

? Plaintiff has voluntarily withdrawn Count V of his
amended complaint, which relies on 42 U.S.C. §
1981, so this count will be dismissed. (See Pl's Opp'n
at 1 nl.)

A-5

complaint, he was unlawfully denied three
promotions in violation of Title VII and the ADEA
(Counts I - IID), and these denials also constituted
retaliation for his exercise of protected activity
(Count IV). Defendant has moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes this motion,
claiming that he was exempt from the qualifications
for these positions and from the requirement of prior
experience at a level above a GS-12. As explained,
more fully below, the Court concludes that plaintiff —
has failed to raise any material issues of fact
regarding his non-promotion to these positions, and
that no reasonable jury could conclude that race or
age played any role in the agency's decision to find
him unqualified for these positions.

[Page 2 of 11]

BACKGROUND

Brookens is an African-American male and is
over forty years of age. (Amd. Compl. para. 7.) He
obtained law and business graduate degrees from
Columbia University, New York, NY. (7d. para. 8.) -
He has previously practiced law and taught as an
adjunct professor at the University of Virginia, Falls
Church, VA. (7d. para. 19.) Brookens has been
employed by the DOL as an International
Economist in the Bureau of International Labor
Affairs ("ILAB") at grade GS-12 since 1990. (/d.

para. 10.) He claims that he has met or exceeded his
employer's legitimate expectations. (Id. para. 11.)

In June 2005, Brookens expressed interest in a
temporary promotion as the Acting Director of the
Trade Policy Division in ILAB, a GS-15 position. (/d.
para. 19.) He was neither considered nor selected for
this position.? (7d para. 20-21,) As a result,
Brookens filed an administrative complaint of
discrimination in August 2005. (/d. para. 22.) Following
an investigation by the DOL's Civil Rights Center
("CRC"), Brookens requested an EEOC hearing. The
Administrative Judge ("AJ") found no discrimination
and specifically found that Brookens, as a GS-12
employee, was not eligible for the temporary
promotion because he did not have “at least one year
of service at the prior grade level -in this case, a GS-
14." (See Def.'s Ex: A, EEOC Case No. 570-2006-
0012IX, at 17. (Dec. 7, 2006).) Brookens timely
appealed. The EEOC Office of Federal Operations
("OFO") affirmed the AJ's decision. .See Brookens v.
Chao, EEOC Doc. 0120071829, 2007 WL 2161734
(July 17, 2007). Brookens also filed a motion for

> The person chosen for the temporary position,
Dobson, was 18 months older than plaintiff and was
the “more senior member of the eligible GS-14
employees who expressed an interest in the
position." (Def.'s Ex. A, EEOC Case No. 570-2606-
0012IX, at 15-16 (Dec. 7, 2006).)

[Page 3 of 11]

reconsideration, which was denied. See Brookens v.
Chao, EEOC Doc. 0520070890, 2007 WL 3051339
(Oct. 9, 2007).

In September 2006, Brookens submitted an
application in response to a vacancy announcement for
the Director of ILAB's Office of Trade and Labor
Affairs, a Senior Executive Service ("SES") position.
(Amd. Compl. paras. 24-25.) Brookens was neither
considered nor selected for this position. (/d. para. 26.)
A human Resources specialist informed Brookens that
he was not eligible for the position because he lacked
"significant senior level management experience." (Zd.)
Brookens consequently filed an administrative
complaint, alleging race discrimination and
retaliation. (/d. para. 27.) On March 14, 2008, the AJ
dismissed Brookens' complaint with prejudice because
Brookens sought relief in this civil action. (See Def.'s
Ex. C, EEOC Case No. 570-2007-00778X (Mar. 14,
2008).)

In October 2006, Brookens submitted an
application for a Deputy Director position in ILAB's
Office of International Relations at both the GS-14 and
GS-15 grade levels. (Amd. Compl. paras. 30-31.)
Brookens was neither considered nor selected for this
position. (/d. f 32.) He was told that he was not certified
for the position because he lacked the time-in-grade
requirement.? (/d_; see also Def.'s Ex. D, Witt Aff. at 3).

? For the GS-14 position, plaintiff was one of eight who
were not certified on the basis of a lack of qualifications,

A-8

As a result, Brookens filed an administrative
complaint of discrimination. (Amd. Compl para. 33.)
Following a CRC investigation, Brookens requested an
EEOC hearing. On March 14, 2008, the AJ dismissed
Brookens' complaint with prejudice because Brookens
sought relief in this civil action. (See Def.'s Ex. C,
EEOC Case No. 570-2007-00778X (Mar. 14, 2008).)

[Page 4 of 11]

Plaintiff filed suit on January 16, 2008, and amended
his complaint on July 8, 2008. While defendant raises
several arguments to support dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court is not persuaded that the case can
be dismissed on timeliness grounds, failure to state a
claim or collateral estoppel. The Court concludes,
however, that plaintiff has failed to raise any genuine
issue of fact regarding his lack of qualifications for the
positions which are at issue, and that no reasonable
juror could find that defendant denied plaintiff any of
these positions because of a discriminatory or
retaliatory animus.

ANALYSIS
L Title VI, ADEA
A. Legal Standards

To succeed on a claim of discrimination under
Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of

and for the GS-15 position, plaintiff was one of eleven.
(Def.'s Ex. D, Witt Aff. At 3.)

discrimination by showing that "(1) she is a member of
a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action
gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Stella v.
Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973); Carter v. George Washington. Univ., 387 -
F.3d.:872, 878 | D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell
Douglas framework to ADEA claims). A prima facie
case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show that "(1)
she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is
a causal connection between the two." Jaylor v. Small
350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a).

When reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, a district court need not - and should not -
evaluate a plaintiffs prima facie showing where a
defendant sets forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its conduct. Brady v. Office of the Sergeant
at Arms, 520 F.3d 490,

(Page 5 of 11]

494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In the present case, the Secretary
has consistently proffered a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for not selecting. Brookens for the
positions described in Counts I - III. The Secretary
asserts that Brookens was not assigned to the GS-15
level Acting Director of the Trade Policy Division
temporary promotion (Count I) or the GS-14/15 level
Deputy Director of the Office of International Relations
position (Count ITD because both positions required at

A-10

least one year experience at either a GS-13 or GS-14
level. (See Def.'s Stmt. Material Fact 1; Def.'s Ex. D,
Witt Aff. at 3; Def.'s Ex. E, Broderick Decl. paras. [ 14-
15) The Secretary further alleges that Brookens was
not considered for the SES level Director of the Office of
Trade and Labor Affairs position (Count I) because he
lacked the necessary executive experience since he had
only obtained a GS-12 level. (See Def.'s Stmt. Material
Fact 2; Def.'s Ex. F, Holmes Decl. para. 15.)

Because the Secretary sets forth legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for the agency's actions, the
Court looks to whether Brookens has offered any
evidence upon which a jury could infer that the
Secretary's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were
not the true reasons for the employment decisions.
Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d
647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003). "At this stage, if [the
plaintiff] is unable to adduce evidence that could allow
a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [the
defendant's] proffered reason was a pretext for
discrimination [or retaliation], summary judgment
must be entered against [the plaintiff]." Paquin v. Fed.
Nat’ Mortgage Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 27-28 (D.C. Cir.
1997).

Applying these standards, the Court will now
turn its attention to the three positions which underlie
Counts I - ITI.

[Page 6 of 11]

B. Count I - GS-15 level Acting Director of
the Trade Policy Division

Count I alleges that Brookens, a GS-12
International Economist, was subjected to
discrimination based on his race and age when he was
neither considered nor selected for a GS-15 level Acting
Director of the Trade Policy Division position. (Amd.
Compl. paras. 18-22.)

The Secretary has shown that the Acting
Director position was a GS-15 temporary
promotion with a time-in-grade requirement,
meaning that an eligible employee had to possess
52 weeks of experience at the next lower grade
level. (See Def.'s Stmt. Material Fact 1 (citing
Def.'s Ex. D, Wiff. Aff} Def.'s Ex. E, Broadrick
Decl.).) Brookens was a GS-12 employee, who
had not performed work at either the GS-13
level] or the GS-14 level for the requisite 52
weeks. The Secretary insists, therefore, that
Brookens was not eligible for the GS-15 level
Acting Director position. The A.J agreed and
specifically found that the Acting Director
position was a “temporary promotion," and that
Brookens, as a GS-12 employee, was not eligible
for the position because he did not have “at least
one years of service at the prior grade level - in
this case, a GS-14." (See Def.'s Ex. A, EEOC
Case No. 570-2006-00121X, at 16-17, 20-22
(Dec. 7, 2006).)

Brookens does not dispute that he failed to
satisfy the time-in-grade requirement. Rather,

A-12

he asserts that the time-in-grade requirement
did not apply to him because the Acting Director
position was a “detail” position lasting 120 days
or less. (PL's Ex. 1, Brookens Decl. para. 2; PL's
Ex. 2, Agreement Between Local 12, AFGE,
AFL-CIO and DOL.) The difficulty with
Brookens' position is that the unrebutted
evidence regarding this position is that it was a
"temporary promotion" and not a "detail," and,
contrary to Brookens' suggestion in his

[Page 7 of 11]

complaint,‘ these two types of positions are not
interchangeable, for a temporary promotion involves
a pay increase to the next grade level, whereas a
detail does not. Therefore, in order to receive a
temporary promotion, the employee needed a
minimum of one year of experience in the next lowest
gerade level. (Def.'s Ex. A, EEOC Case No. 570-2006-
0012IX, at 14 (Dec. 7, 2006).)

While plaintiff, as well as others, may well
have been confused about the difference between a
"detail" and a "temporary promotion" (/d. at 16-17),

‘ See, e.g., Amd. Compl. para. 19 (referring to Acting
Director Position as a “detail and temporary
position"), para. 20 ("detail and/or temporary
promotion"), para. 21 ("detail and/or temporary
promotion"). (See also Def.'s Ex. A, EEOC Case No.
570-2006-0012IX, at 13 (Dec. 7, 2006).)

there is no dispute that there is a difference between
the two classifications and that since the Acting
Director job was to be paid at the higher GS-15 level,
plaintiff was not considered to be eligible because he
had not had a year in service as a GS-14. (7d. at 17.)
Therefore, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the reason for his non-selection was pretextual.

C. Count II - SES level Director of the
Office of Trade and Labor Affairs

Count II alleges that Brookens was subjected
to discrimination based on his race, age, or prior EEO
activity when he was neither considered nor selected
for the SES level Director of the Office of Trade and
Labor Affairs position after he submitted an
application in response to the vacancy
announcement. (Amd. Compl. paras. 23-28.)

In response, defendant argues that Brookens
lacked the qualifications for the position and
was therefore "determined unqualified under
vacancy announcement DOL-SES-06-021
because he did not possess significant senior
level management experience. (Def.'s Stmt.
Facts para. 2.) In making this argument,
defendant relies on the declaration of the
Human Resources Specialist who was
responsible for filling this vacancy. As she
explained, the vacancy announcement for

[Page 8 of 11]

this position stated that the candidate must have
experience "at a major management level (normally
equivalent to the GS-15 level in the Federal
Service)." (Def.'s Ex. F, Holmes Decl. para. 13.) Based
on the qualifications listed in the vacancy
announcement, Holmes determined that Brookens
"was not minimally qualified for this SES position.
Because Mr. Brookens had been a GS-12 employee
since 1990, he had not achieved the executive
experience needed for this SES position." (/d
para. 15.)

In response, plaintiff merely asserts that he
was qualified for the position. (See PI's Stmt.
Material Fact para. 2.) He offers no evidence to
support this assertion in violation of the well-settled
rule that a plaintiff cannot establish pretext, simply
based on his own subjective assessment of his-own
performance, for "plaintiffs perception of {himself,
and of [his] work performance, is not relevant."
Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 124 F Supp. 2d
1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) Gnternal citation omitted), aff'd,
298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir: 2002). See also Hastie v.
Henderson, 121 F. Supp.2d 72, 81 (D.D.C. 2000)
(finding no genuine issue of fact where plaintiff
provided no evidence “other than her own self:
serving and conclusory statement that she completed
more work than [her co-worker]"); Sounders v.
DiManio, No. Civ. A. 97-1002, 1998 WL 525798, at *4
(D.D.C. August 14, 1998) ("Plaintiff has otherwise
offered the type of self-serving allegations that are
simply insufficient to establish pretext.").

Count I must therefore be rejected since there

is no showing of pretext.

D. Count III - GS-14 / GS-15 level
Deputy Director of the Office of
International Relations

Count III alleges Brookens was subjected to
discrimination based on race, age, or prior EEO
activity when he was neither considered nor selected
for a GS-14 and GS-15 Deputy Director of the Office
of International Relations position after he submitted
an application. (Amd. Compl. para 29-34.)

(Page 9 of 11)

The Secretary contends that Brookens was not
eligible for the Deputy Director position at either GS-14
or GS-15 because, as a GS-12 employee, Brookens failed
to meet the time-in-grade requirement under the
agency's merit staffing procedures. (Def.'s Mot. at 5;
see also Def.'s Ex. D, Witt Aff.at 3.)

Once again, Brookens does not dispute that he
failed to satisfy the time-in-grade requirement.
Instead, he argues that the time-in-grade requirement
did not apply to the Deputy Director job posting
because the position was subject to the delegated
examining authority process, which allows for
consideration of candidates regardless of their time-in-
grade experience. (See Pl.'s Stmt. Material Fact 1; Pl.'s
Ex. 1, Brookens Decl.paras. 2-4; Pl.'s Ex. 3.)

There is no probative evidence, aside from-
Brookens’ conclusory assertion,® that the Deputy
Director position was subject to the delegated
examining authority process, as opposed to the merit
staffing process. Instead, the record clearly indicates
that Brookens' application was subject to the merit
staffing procedures. Joanne T. Broderick, the Human
Resources Specialist who reviewed Brookens'
application, described his.application under the merit
staffing procedures. She explained that Brookens “is no
eligible for a promotion to GS-14 positions that are
advertised under merzt staffing procedures for DOL
employees because Mr. Brookens does not possess the
required 52 weeks in GS-13 position.” (Def.'s Ex. E,
Broderick Decl. para. 14 (emphasis added).) Broderick
also stated that Brookens "is not eligible for a
promotion to GS-15 positions that are advertised under
merit staffing procedures for DOL employees because
[he] does not possess the required 52 weeks in a GS-14
position." (/d. at para. 15 (emphasis added).)
Broderick further concluded that Brookens was not
eligible for an exclusion from the time-in-

° In support of his assertion, Brookens refers the Court
to an application he submitted under the delegated
examining authority process. (See Pl.'s Ex. 4.)
However, that application was for a Supervisory
International Economist position (LAB 07-068DE), not
for the Deputy Director position (ILAB 07-010M), and
is thus irrelevant to this case.

(Page 10 of 11]

grade requirements under 5 C.F.R. § 300.603(b)
(listing delegated examining authority process as
grounds for exclusion from grade-in-time
requirement). (/d at para 16.) Ericka Witt, another
Human Resources Specialist, explained that
"[blecause [the Deputy Director position] was a merit
promotion announcement, [Brookens] would need to
have worked for at least 52 weeks at the GS-13
grade level before he would be eligible for a GS-14
position.” (Def.'s Ex. D, Wit Aff. at 3 (emphasis
added).)

Based on this uncontroverted evidence, it must
be concluded that the Deputy Director position was
governed by the merit staffing process, and,
consequently, Brookens' failure to meet the time-in-
grade requirement made him ineligible for the
position. Brookens has thus failed to show pretext
with respect to Count III.6

E. Count [V-Retaliation

Because the Court grants summary judgment
to defendant on Brookens' non-selection
claims, it must also grant summary judgment

° For these same reasons, plaintiff has no basis for
asserting that the temporary position (Count I) was
available under the delegated examining process.
(See Pl's Ex. 1, Brookens Decl. para 2.)

on Count IV. No jury could infer that
Brookens' non-selections were retaliatory
because Brookens has failed to rebut the
Secretary's legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for not selecting him for the positions.

Rule 56() Request For Discovery

In his declaration, plaintiff requests the
opportunity to conduct discovery because he
"would need the assistance of expert witnesses,
e.g. regarding his qualification and eligibility
under the delegated examining authority ...."
(PL's Ex. 1, Brookens Decl. para. 5.)

While summary judgment ordinarily "is proper

only after the plaintiff has been given adequate time
for discovery," First Chicago Int v. United Exch. Co.,
836 F.2d 1375, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the information
Brookens seeks through discovery is simply not
necessary to decide

[Page 11 of 11]

this case. As discussed above, the record indicates
that the Deputy Director position was:subject to
merit staffing procedures. Because Brookens has

failed to show that the delegated

examining authority procedures apply here, the
Court concludes that Brookens' eligibility under
those procedures would have no bearing on this

case.

In addition, Brookens has failed to provide
sufficient particularity to justify his request for
discovery. See Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d J55, 762
(D:C. Cir. 2006) (party seeking a continuance must —
"state[] concretely why additional discovery is needed
to oppose [the motion]") (internal quotation omitted);
Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 248 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(party seeking discovery bears the burden of identifying
the factors to be discovered that would create a triable
issue and reasons why the party cannot acquire those
facts without discovery to challenge a motion for

summary judgment).

For these reasons, there is nothing to suggest
that this vague request for discovery will help plaintiff
to respond to defendant's summary judgment motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's
motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment is GRANTED. An Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge

Date: October 21, 2008

Statutes

42 U.S.C.A. Art. 2000e-2(a) provides that

“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer—

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual,.or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his
compensatin, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

41 U.S.C. 198la “Section 1977A. Damages in Cases
of Intentional Discrimination in Employment.

(a) Right of Recovery—
“(1) Civil Rights—In an action:brought by a
complaining party under section 706 or 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5) against a respondent who engages in
unlawful intentional discrimination (not an
employment practice because of disparate
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or
717 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3),
and providing that the complaining party
cannot recover compensatory and punitive
damages as allowed under 1977 of the Revised
Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981), complaining party
may recover compensatory and punitive
damages as allowed in subsection (b), in
addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the
respondent.

TITLE 28 > PART IV > CHAPTER 83 > § 1291

§ 1291. Final decisions of district courts

The courts of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
jurisdiction of appeals-from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct
review may be had in.the Supreme Court. The
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall be limited to.the
jurisdiction described in sections 1292 (c) and (d) and
1295 of this title.

Relevant Docket Sheet Entries
Civil Docket for case #1;08-cv-00086-ESH

Brookens v. Chao Date filed: 1/16/2008

Plaintiff Represented by

Benoit Brookens Boniface K. Cobbina, PC

Defendant Represented by

Elaine Chao Alan Burch

Secretary, U.S. Attorney's Office

Date Fued Item# Docket Text

12/19/2008 13 Notice of Appeal
by Benoit Brookens

10/21/2008 18 . Memorandum Opinion
Regarding 14 defendant's
motion for summary
judgment

10/21/2008 17 Order granting 14

defendant's motion
For Summary Judgment
filed by Elaine Chao

Date Filed Item # Docket Text

9/3/2008 16 Reply to opposition re 14
Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint
or in the alternative
Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Elaine
Chao.

7/25/08 14 Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint or in
the alternative, Motion for
Summary

7/8/2008 11 Memorandum in
opposition to re 5
Motion to Dismiss, or, in
the alternative, Summary

Judgment

7/8/09 10 Amended Complaint filed
by Benoit Brookens with
Attachments

5/22/2008 7 Notice of Appearance by

Boniface K. Cobbina on
behalf of Benoit Brookens

1/16/2008 ] Complaint against Elaine
Chao

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT
{ Plaintiff's Ex. 4.]

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Office of Administration
Washington, DC 20503

[Seal]
CERTIFICATE OF ELIGIBLES
DELEGATED EXAMINING CERT:
USTR-04-62-VM

TO: Lorraine Green
Deputy, AUSTR for Admin
and HR Director

FROM: Vel McClure
Human Resources Specialist

POSITION: Policy Analyst (Labor)
GS-301-14/15
(FPL: GS-15)

DATE: 7/19/04

Candidates Eligibility Veterans
Preference

Brookens, Benoit GS-14 NV
Quintana, Carlos GS: 15 NV
Selectee:

Signature a

of Selecting Official:

Name and Title
of Selecting Official:

Date:

{handwritten comment: “Posn cancelled by
Lorraine Green on 12-7-04 Posn no longer

required. D Hardesty”]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_1132%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.