# Amicus Curiae Brief — Ford Motor Motor Co. v. Buell-Wilson (No. 09-297) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_0973%3A7 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2009 ## Text Supteme Court, U,8. FILED OCT 5 - 2009 | No. 09-297 OFFICE OF THE Gira Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Petitioner. V. BENETTA BUELL-WILSON, ET AL., Respondents. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to The California Court of Appeal BRIEF OF THE PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER HUGH F. YOUNG, JR. EVAN M. TAGER The Product Liability Counsel of Record Adutisory Council, Inc. BRIAN D. NETTER 1850 Centennial Park Mayer Brown LLP Drive, Suite 510 1999 K Street, NW Reston, VA 20191 Washington, DC 20006 (703) 264-5300 (202) 263-3000 Counsel for Amicus Curtae The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. l TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ae ea ae ease ease eiaiidcesaneesne vsvess 3 A. The Product-Design Process Necessarily Requires Manufacturers To Make Complex Cost-Benefit Decisions About Proposed Design Features . The Imposition Of Punitive Liability In This Case Will Have An Irrational And Dangerous Impact On The Product- Sc aniewendweiucrun 6 ’. This Court Should Grant Review To Confirm That The Due Process Clause Prohibits States From Imposing Punitive Damages On A Product Manufacturer For Conduct That Reasonable Persons Could Have Concluded Was Lawl. ...............cccccccccccccccceee 7 eared a pein in ipa ted iveiisershetevencnsssaens 13 APPENDIX A: Corporate Members of the Product Liability Advisory Council .............0..0..0.00... la ll TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S, Beara c lice sevccssscce... 2,8 Burke v. Deere & Co., Oe yh 6 5 Oe 10 Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990).......cccccccecccecceceeeeeees 13 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 UG. Bras vrccesevnnssnsce.0.0.. ll Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., ZEO UB, Be aie cechcedscsssscesee. 1] Guaccio v. Pennsylvania, Bee UU oe cieveresecesces 8 Hillrichs v. Auco Corp., 14 NW. 2 Bee re Boo ncce cs cece esses ccsceceeese 10 Lankford v. Idaho, 5OO UB. Fe a vavisnicsvsscrcosccecee. 8 Loitz v. Remington Arms Co.., S63 N.EE.2e ae oars cn scessscsccevecescces00e 10 Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp.., TBO PD Ge Cee ac ccccnssescccssececccece 9 Mercer v. Pittway Corp., G16 N.W.2el Ge Gem Be voncncnsccneeoesces0....2...0.. LO Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, GB2 A.D TGs Ge erie casnvecacovsnece.s:........ 10 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 199 USS. 0 ear cecsuncnececesses. 2,9 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. eee ee iiciiscssenvessecscces 0, O 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page(s) Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., OS Ft SOLE COC Ce. FOGG). vvcscccsecscssssecevesccvneasss 10 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, Fe lec Me i asnisnecasonecnccsechesonseecssknasencesants 2,8 Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915)....... ee ee oe 1] MISCELLANEOUS go ace 4 WE Eon fae Ey 8 ES. : Se ne 6 Steven Garber, Punitive Damages and Deter- rence of Effictency-Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without a Solution?, 52 STAN. L. Wee RE CIEE a wixciacesiadecier scacrsmeen eee binestiss 9 David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Puni- tiue Damages Against Manufacturers of De- fective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982) LO, 1: Aaron D. Twerski, Punitive Damages: Through the Five Prisms, 39 VILL. L. REV. 353 (1994)...... 12 W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mi- streatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LE- CSAS STUHR, TF a hc koko a ee 13 ww BRIEF OF THE PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVI- SORY COUNCIL, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) is a non-profit association with 103 corporate members representing a broac: cross-section of Amer- ican and international product manufacturers. These companies seek to contribute to the 1mprove- ment and reform of law in the United States and elsewhere, with emphasis on the law governing the liability of product manufacturers. PLAC’s perspec- tive is derived from the experiences of a corporate membership that spans a diverse group of industries in every major facet of the manufacturing sector. In addition, several hundred of the leading product lia- bility defense attorneys in the country are sustaining (non-voting) members of PLAC. Since 1983, PLAC has filed over 850 briefs as amicus curiae in both state and federal courts, presenting the broad pers- pective of product manufacturers seeking fairness and balance in the application and development of the law as it affects product lability. A lst of PLAC’s corporate members is attached as Appendix A.! ! Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other tha. amicus and its counsel made a monetary contribu- tion to its preparation or submission. Counsel of record for all narties received notice at least 10 days prior to the due date of the intention of amicus to file this brief. The parties’ letters consenting to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk's office. As part of the regular product-design process, PLAC’s corporate members must routinely analyze and resolve questions about safety. PLAC members who manufacture products with the potential to cause serious physical injury or death—uincluding pharmaceuticals, medical devices, pesticides, foods- tuffs, chemicals, appliances, power tools, and auto- mobiles—have a particular interest in the legal rami- fications of product-design decisions. By imposing punitive lability against a manu- facturer without requiring any assessment of wheth- er its conduct was objectively reasonable, the Cali- fornia courts have embraced a regime of post hoc second guessing that would deprive any manufactur- er of the ability to know in advance whether its deci- sions will subject it to punishment. Such an ap- proach not only deprives manufacturers of “fair no- tice * * * of the conduct that will subject [them] to punishment” (BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)) but also “‘mak[es] the law se arb: trary that [manufacturers] will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or whim” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))). When punitive damages are imposed for objec- tively reasonable conduct, their assessment is di- vorced from their constitu‘‘onally-authorized pur- pose. It is particularly important to PLAC’s mem- bers that the law provide clear guidance on how manufacturers can avoid the imposition of punitive liability. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This case involves a $55 million punitive damag- es award attributable to the design decisions of peti- tioner Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). Notwithstand- ing the magnitude of the award, when Ford made its design decisions, it had no reason to believe that those decisions would subject it to any liability what- ever. Nonetheless, the California courts concluded that Ford could be mulcted for punitive damages without regard to whether its design decisions were objectively reasonable. The ramifications of this post hoc approach to the imposition of punitive damages are chilling. The rationale underlying a punitive award pre- supposes that the defendant could have—and should have—conformed its conduct to society’s expectations but strayed so far from its responsibilities that a sanction of a quasi-criminal magnitude is required. The imposition of punitive damages for objectively reasonable conduct unhinges punitive liability from these purposes and implicates the Constitution in two respects. First, it squarely breaches the due process imperative of fair notice. If a design decision may subject a manufacturer to punitive lability notwithstanding the existence of objective indicia that the design decision was reasonable, then the manufacturer could not have been on notice that it was committing sanctionable misconduct. Second, this approach runs afoul of the due process proscrip- tion against arbitrary punishments. Due process re- quires procedures to “cabin the jury’s discretionary authority” (Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007)) to impose lability for punitive dam- ages. every bit as much as it requires procedures to 4 limit the jury’s discretion regarding the amount of punishment. When a jury imposes punitive damages for conduct that an objective observer could have deemed lawful, the result is arbitrariness—the pro- verbial bolt from the blue. In the product liability context, the consequences of unpredictable and arbitrary punitive awards can be severe. Past punitive awards create powerful—if often irrational—incentives for manufacturers at- tempting to design products in similar situations. Safety-related decisions should be made on the me- rits of competing designs and not the fear that juries will, out of sympathy for a badly injured plaintiff or misplaced anger against a large corporation, levy massive punitive exactions without regard to wheth- er the manufacturer had an objectively reasonable basis for its design decision. To avoid the deleterious consequences of overdeterrence and ensure that manufacturers are afforded their due process rights to fair notice and protection against arbitrary depri- vations of property, this Court should grant review and hold that punitive damages cannot be imposed upon a manufacturer whose design decision was ob- jectively reasonable. A. The Product-Design Process Necessarily Requires Manufacturers To Make Com- plex Cost-Benefit Decisions About Pro- posed Design Features. No product is completely safe. Nor does tort law require manufacturers to build the safest product that money can buy. ‘Thus, airplanes are not con- structed entirely from the materials that comprise the indestructible “black box,” subway trains are de- signed to permit standees when sitting might be sa fer, and automobiles are not equipped with a NAS CAR-style roll cage. lhe process of product design necessarily involves complex cost-benefit decisions. When contemplating a particular design feature, a manufacturer must consider many factors: the risks nat are present in the design (including their like- lihood and severity), the risks present in alternative designs, and the relative costs and benefits of the feature with respect to other design considerations such as performance, efficiency, marketability, ap- pearance, ease of operation, durability, freedom from maintenance or repair, ease of manufacture, and costs to consumers. The task of a responsible manu- facturer is to strike a reasonable balance between these often countervailing interests. Of course, the result of this complex cost-benefit analysis can be affected by externalities. Sometimes, statutory and regulatory requirements—developed in daylight with public input and debate—can alter a manufacturer's independent judgment. Similarly, the threat of punitive damages can skew the design judgments of even the most con- scientious manufacturers. Put simply, when puni- tive damages are awarded for a defective product de- sign, they have the purpose and effect of deterring other manufacturers from making similar design de- cisions. This may be appropriate in some circums- tances, but when manufacturers are left to guess what decisions may be subjected to quasi-criminal condemnation and sanctions, the result is a scatter- shot of design deviations based on no effective policy foundation. 6 B. The Imposition Of Punitive Liability In This Case Will Have An Irrational And Dangerous Impact On The Product- Design Process. In this case, there was no way for Ford to know that it risked punitive liability when it made its de sign decisions. It complied with the standard on roof strength (FMVSS 216, 49 C.F.R. § 571.216) set by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), whose experts believed that vehicles with roofs designed to meet the standard were rea- sonably safe. Likewise, NHTSA considered and re- jected the roll-over stability standards relied upon by plaintiffs’ experts after the fact. Pet. 4. When the Explorer was designed, Ford’s engi- neers faced an inevitable dilemma in determining the center of gravity: A high center of gravity in- creases the risk of injuries caused by rollovers, while a low center of gravity increases the risks of injuries from head-on collisions. See, e.g., Ford's Ct. App. Br. 47-48. Likewise, experts disagreed about how to measure vehicle stability. Jd. at 47-49. The exis- tence of these genuine ongoing disputes among ex- perts over the merits of the disputed “safety fea- tures’ colors the nature of Ford’s design decision in this case. Ford had to analyze competing expert opi nions on the fundamental safety-related merits of various design features. There was no consensus about whether certain alternatives created an unrea sonable risk. Indeed, with respect to the Explorer's center of gravity, there was no consensus about how to balance the tradeoff between rollover risk (with its high severity but low probability) and head-on risk (with relatively lower severity but higher probability) in crafting a safe vehicle overall. Ford’s ultimate de cision was based on its attempt to strike a reasonable balance between all of the diverse factors discussed above. In other words, the design decision involved in this case was not simply a question of dollars and cents versus safety but involved a fundamental con troversy about the relative safety of different product designs. re We take no position on the merits of these com peting viewpoints or whether [ord’s ultimate deci sion was correct in hindsight. Those are questions that are appropriately resolved by a factfinder when deciding whether to award compensatory damages Nor do we take a position on the more complicated question of when a design decision that straightfor wardly chooses costs over known safety risks should give rise to punitive liability. Instead, our point is that, contrary to plaintiffs’ theory of the case, punt tive liability is never appropriate when, at the tim¢ that design decisions were being made, there was an objectively reasonable basis for making the deci 31i0n—and no reason to believe that it would be sub jected to punitive sanctions C. This Court Should Grant Review To Confirm That The Due Process Clause Prohibits States From Imposing Puni- tive Damages On A Product Manufac- turer For Conduct That Reasonable Persons Could Have Concluded Was Lawful. This Court repeatedly has stated that “[u]nless a State insists upon proper standards that will cabin the jury's discretionary authority, its punitive dam ages system may deprive a defendant of ‘fair notic *** of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose” and “threaten ‘arbitrary punishments,’ Le 5 punishments that reflect not an ‘application of law’ but ‘a decisionmaker’s caprice.” Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352. Accordingly, “this Court has found that the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as ‘grossly excessive.” Id. at 353. By the same logic, a State that fails to cabin the jury's discretion deprives a defendant of fair no- tice of the conduct that will expose the defendant to punitive liability in the first place. Both the requirement of “fair notice” and the li- mitation on “arbitrary punishments” are implicated when California courts sustain punitive liability without regard to whether the defendant had an ob- jectively reasonable basis for believing that its con duct was permissible. l. “[T]he concept of fair notice is [the] bedrock of iny *** procedure.” Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120-121 (1991). As this Court has explained, ‘the point of due process—of the law in general—is to allow citizens to order their behavior.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted). It follows inexorably that an unpredictable sanction does not permit a party to order its behavior and therefore violates due process. Accordingly, ‘leJlementary notions of fairness enshrined in [this Court's] jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice * * * of the conduct that will subject him to punishment.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 574; see also Giacciwo \ ennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-403 (1966) (“a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardl« that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits ) 9 Punitive damages can violate this principle in two ways. A statute that is vague on its face makes it impossible for any defendant to predict what con- duct will be penalized. Alternatively, the circums- tances of a particular case can render punitive dam- ages unpredictable such that the governing statute is vague as applied. Both concerns are particularly po- tent in the product-liability context. Tort law ex- pects manufacturers to make risk-utility assess- ments of design proposals. If they cannot adequately anticipate the risk of punitive damages, however, those calculations will be less likely to maximize e1 ther utility or public safety. As one commentator has observed, in the prod- uct-liability context an award of punitive damages can give rise to “indirect’ costs that manufacturers appear to take very seriously, such as publicity about litigation that may damage the company’s reputation or trigger additional lawsuits, reactions of consumers that could reduce product demand, and reactions of safety regulators such as investigations, product re- calls, or stricter regulations.” Steven Garber, Pun tiue Damages and Deterrence of Efficuency-Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without a Solution?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1809, 1814 (2000); see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is a stigma at tached to an award of punitive damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory award. The punitive character of punitive damages means that there is more than just money at stake. This factor militates in favor of strong procedural safeguards.”): Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989) (punitive damages “can stigmatize the defendant in much the same way as a criminal con viction’ and therefore “can be onerous when loosely assessed’) 10 Sensitive to these concerns, several courts have held as a matter of state law that punitive liability is inappropriate when the manufacturer has made a design decision that was supported by contempora- neous expert opinion—such that an objective observ- er could have concluded that the decision was rea- sonable—even though other experts might have be- lieved that the design created an unreasonable risk of injury.” 2 See, e.g., Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacating punitive award in part because “there is a genuine dispute in the scientific community as to whether leg guards do more harm than good”); Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 51i (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing denial of j.n.o.v. because “fa]n award of punitive damages ts not appropriate when room exists for reasonable disagreement over the relative msks and utilities of the conduct at issue”); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397, 407 (ill. 1990) (reversing punitive award in part because there was a good-faith disagreement among metal- lurgical experts regarding the safety of the material used in making the gun barrel that exploded, causing plaintiffs injury); Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 618 (lowa 2006) (con- cluding that, where there was reasonable disagreement among experts about adequacy of product design and testing, rational jury could not find defendant liable for punitive damages even though it could reasonably find hability on plaintiffs’ underly- ing tort claims); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 N.W.2d 94, 100 (lowa 1994) (affirming j.n.o.v. on punitive damages because “an award of punitive damages is inappropriate where room exists for reasonable disagreement over the relative risks and utilities of the conduct and device at issue”); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 682 A.2d 1143, 1163-1165, 1167-1168 (Md 196) (reversing punitive award in part because there was a genuine scientific dispute regarding the safety of the product at issue); see generally David G. Owen. Problems tn Assessing Pu- nittue Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38 (1982) iat Likewise, in equivalent contexts, this Court has recognized that due process precludes the imposition of punishment whenever t. > defendant reasonably could have concluded that its conduct was lawful. See generally Colauttit v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 401 (1979) (finding criminal statute predicating liability on a “complex medical judgment about which experts can—and do—disagree” to be unconstitutionally va- gue); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 392 (1926) (criminal law “should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another”); Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490 (1915). Nevertheless, the court below specifically refused to consider whether punitive lia- bility could coexist with the objectively reasonable belief that the design decision was correct. This case accordingly exemplifies the need for this Court to clarify that the fair notice component of due process—not just state law—precludes imposi- tion of punitive damages when the record contains objective indicia of the reasonableness of the defen- dant’s conduct. 2. This Court’s oft-expressed concern about arbi- trary punishments further supports the need for re- view. For a variety of reasons, product lability cases pose significant and persistent risks that punitive damages will be imposed arbitrarily. First, such cas- es frequently involve catastrophic injury or death. Second, many products—no matter how well- designed—carry unavoidable risks. Third, the de- sign process necessarily involves attempts to identify and valance risks. Thus, manufacturers are parilcu- larly susceptible to findings of punitive liability by 12 juries that are exhorted to conflate intent to design a product in a certain way with intent to injure.3 Serious injuries viewed through the lens of hind- sight can result in scrious penalties that have no power to deter future misconduct. As Judge Easterbrook has explained: The ex post perspective of iitigation exerts a hydraulic force that distorts judgment. Engi- neers design [complex products] to minimize the sum of construction, operation, and in- jury costs. * * * Come the lawsuit, however, the [plaintiff] injured by {the product] presents himself as a person, not a probability. Jurors see today’s injury; persons who would be injured [by an alternative design] are invisible. Although witnesses may talk about them, they are spectral figures, insubstantial compared to the injured plaintiff, who appears in the flesh. *** j{N]jo matter how conscientious jurors may be, there is a bias in the system. Ex post claims are overvalued and technical arguments discounted in the process of litiga- tion. And the claims of crippled neighbors receive more weight than do potential inju- ries to be felt by [consumers] (and stockhold- ers) in other states. Design defect cases inevitably involve “conscious design choice{s]’ * * * impheat[ing! a manufacturer’s decisionmaking process concerning risk-utility’; “[uJnlike the standard negli- gence case of yesteryear, the modern products liability case comes with ‘intent’ built in.” Aaron D. Twerski, Punitive Dam- ages: Through the Five Prisms, 39 VILL. L. REV. 353, 35€ (1994); see also Owen, supra note 2, at 22—26. 13 Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215-216 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, -ludges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LE- GAL STUD. 107, 116 (2001). The arbitrary nature of punitive damages in the product liability context is at its zenith when such damages are imposed in the face of objective evi- dence of the reasonableness of the design decision— such as evidence that the decision complied with NHTSA standards or evidence of a legitimate, good- faith dispute among experts over the best way to balance risk against functionality. If punitive dam- ages are permitted in such circumstances, there is no way (other than building a fortress on wheels) for the manufacturer to protect itself from punitive damag- es. That is the height of arbitrariness. For this rea- son as well, review is warranted to make clear that the Due Process Clause prohibits the imposition of punitive damages when the defendant had an objec- tive basis for believing its conduct to be permissible. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. HUGH F. YOUNG, JR. EVAN M. TAGER The Product Liability Counsel of Record Advisory Council, Inc. BRIAN D. NETTER 1850 Centennial Park Mayer Brown LLP Drive, Suite 510 1999 K Street, NW Reston, VA 20191 Washington, DC 20006 (703) 264-5300 (202) 263-3000 Counsel for Amicus Curiae The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. OCTOBER 2009 APPENDIX APPENDIX A Corporate Members of the Product Liability Advisory Council 3M A.O. Smith Corporation ACCO Brands Corporation Altec Industries Altiria Client Services Inc. American Suzuki Motor Corporation Andersen Corporation Anheuser-Busch Companies Arai Helmet, Ltd. Astec Industries BASF Corporation Bayer Corporation Beretta U.S.A Corp. BIC Corporation Biro Manufacturing Company, Inc. BMW of North America, LLC Boeing Company Bombardier Recreational Products BP America Inc. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. Briggs & Stratton Corporation Brown-Forman Corporation Caterpillar Inc. Chrysler LLC Continental Tire North America, Inc. Crown Equipment Corporation Daimler Trucks North America LLC The Dow Chemical Company Kf. DuPont De Nemours and Company Mili Lilly and Company Emerson Electric Co. Engineered Controls Internatiozial, Inc sD, tac Estee Lauder Companies Exxon Mobil Corporation Ford Motor Company Genentech, Inc. General Electric Company GlaxoSmithKline The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company Great Dane Limited Partnership Harley-Davidson Motor Company Hawker Beechcraft Corporation The Heil Company Honda North America, Inc. Hyundai Motor America Illinois Tool Works, Inc. International Truck and Engine Corporation Isuzu Motors America, Inc. Jarden Corporation Johnson & Johnson Joy Global Inc., Joy Mining Machinery Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. Kia Motors America, Inc. Koch Industrics Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc. Kraft Foods North America, Inc Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc Lincoln Electric Company Magna International Inc. Mazak Corporation Mazda (North America), [ne Medtronic, Inc. Merck & Co., Inc. Microsoft Corporation Mitsubishi Motors North America, In Mueller Water Products Newell Rubbermaid Ine Nintendo of America, Inc 3a Niro Inc. Nissan North Amcrica, Inc. Novartis Pharmaccuticals Corporation PACCAR Inc. Panasonic Pfizer Inc. Porsche Cars North America. Inc. Purdue Pharma L.P. Remir ston Arms Company, Inc. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company Schindler Elevator Corporation SCM Group USA Inc. Senco Products, Inc. Shell Oil Company The Sherwin-Williams Company Smith & Nephew, Inc St. Jude Medical, Inc. Subaru of America, Inc. Synthes (U.S.A.) Terex Corporation Textron, Inc. TK Holdings Inc. The Toro Company Toshiba America Incorporated Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. Vermeer Manufacturing Company The Viking Corporation Volkswagen of America, Inc. Volvo Cars of North America, [nc. Vulcan Materials Company Watts Water Technologies, Inc. Whirlpool Corporation Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. Yokohama Tire Corporation Zimmer, Inc --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_0973%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.