# Opposition Brief — Brown v. Hovatter (No. 09-231)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED
\\5 qd) OCT 26 2009

7 No. 09-231 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHARLES BROWN, et a/,

Petitioner,
Vv.

DAVID HOVATTER, ef a/,
Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To the United States Court Of Appeals
For the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DOUGLAS F’. GANSLER
Attorney General of Maryland

STEVEN M. SULLIVAN*
KATHLEEN A. ELLIS

GRANT D. GERBER

Assistant Attorneys General
200 St. Paul Place
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 576-6324

Attorneys for Respondents
* Counsel of Record

1
QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that
a long-standing State enactment limiting funeral
business licenses to individual applicants, rather than
corporations, does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, where there was no showing that the
requirement either discriminated against or
unjustifiably burdened interstate commerce?

ul

TARLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .................. i
memes OP AUTHORITIES ................. lil
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............. ou
pememememers Below .................08- 1
Regulation of the Funeral Profession
Ne ely as ke bo eee 2
The Petitioners’ Efforts to Secure
Passage of Legislation
to Expand Corporate Licensing
in the Funeral Profession ......... 6

Recent Maryland Legislation Addressing
the Funeral Profession ........... /

The Current Makeup of
the Funeral Profession in Maryland

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 8

THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT
A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION. 5

A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not
Conflict With Any Decision of Another
Federal Court of Appeals or State Court
et ee ee eee ee 8

B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not
Conflict With Any Relevant Decision of
es sw ee ee ee 8 we 10

ill
c. The Court of Appeals Properly Applied
Established Principles Governing

Commerce Clause Challenges. ......... 11

CONCLUSION 1;

owt

1V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Ass'n of Int] Auto. Manufrs, Inc.

v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 1996) ... 9n
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,

481 U.S. CPUGST) 2. ccc cca 10, 12
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) ........ 11
Dept of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis,

126 BS. Ct. 1601 COGR) cc ces 10, 13
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,

ye Se Reh ye ts) | ne 10, 11, 12
Ford Motor Co. v. Muir,

874 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1989) ............ 9n

Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transportation,
264 F.5d 403 (5" Cir. 2001) ............ Qn

Gov't Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc.
v. Bavh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7'" Cir. 1992) . 9, 9n

Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) ....... 11
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond.

$36 U.S. 825 (1949) .........2c.ecc0eee il
Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff,

571 F.3d 1033 (10 Cir. 2009) ......... On

Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc..,
OOF eer CO ee oo ee LE OS 11

V

North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,
MOM EP, PEERS oo ee ke ee kes 12

Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envrt7
Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) ... 13

Prke v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970) 2,11

’ 6 « «2 8 BOS £16 & OA. % ee mys,

Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen,
656 F.3d 442 (6™ Cir. 2009) ............ 9n

United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Management Auth,
550 U.S. 330 (2007) ........ ae eet
Constitutional Provisions
i. oes. wrt. 1, 3G, Cl. SB . . c k e ce es passim

Statutes

Maryland Code Annotated

Health Occupations Article, title 7 ....... 4
eer © -eeel bis Cara ee 1
a, I ye 2 4
ED et mes tee tr tote Jee 5
By, ia ag exe eee eae ee 5
EN is a ee 5
Se ee Unrate eee eee 5
a ee 5
§ 7-306 ee ERR ee ae as
Dee os pee
IN onc) So) Pe tel Oy ected ees ee | ae
Se ee en atc 1

1902 Md.
1904 Md.
1908 Md.
1910 Md.
1924 Md.
1937 Md.
1937 Md.
1945 Md.
1962 Md.
1971 Md.
1980 Md.
1981 Md.
1996 Md.
2007 Md.
2007 Md.
2008 Md.

Laws of Maryland

Laws, ch.
Laws, ch.

Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,

ch

ch.

ch. !
on. <
ch.
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Laws, ch. 5

Sa ie a A to ae Ok ot ee ee en Se ey eet Te

“nee 6 6. 6.56 6 6°@° 8 12 8.8 6

Regulations

Code of Maryland Regulations 10.29.03.04 ...... 5

1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below

After repeatedly and unsuccessfully lobbying
the Maryland General Assembly for legislative action,
four individuals, each of whom operates a funeral or
cemetery business in Maryland, brought this lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of a seventy-year-old
provision of a State statute, which generally requires
that a mortician or funeral director license be held by
an individual rather than a corporation. The
complaint asserted equal protection, due process, and
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to the limits on
corporate licenses set forth in the Maryland
Morticians and Funeral Directors Act (the “Act”),
codified at Md. Code Ann., Health Occupations §§ 7-
101 to 7-602 (2005 Repl. Vol. and 2008 Supp.); see §§
7-309(a), 7-309(b). App. 100-01. Separate counts of
the complaint also asserted equal protection and due
process claims with respect to § 7-310 of the Act,
which requires that each licensed funeral
establishment must be owned and operated by at
least one licensed mortician or funeral director. App.
102-03.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
district court rejected all of the equal protection and
due process claims. App. 46°57. As to the dormant
Commerce Clause claim, the district court determined
that the Act does not discriminate against interstate
commerce in either its purpose or effect. Specifically,
the district court found that “there is simply no
evidence of discriminatory purpose,” and the Act
“regulates evenhandedly by treating in-state and out-
of-state interests the same.” App. 60 n.16, 62.
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the
Act’s lhmits on corporate licensing violated the
dormant Commerce Clause on the ground that the

2

burden on interstate commerce exceeded the putative
local benefits. App. 63-69.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of the equal
protection and due process claims, App. 4, 24-28, and
the petitioners do not seek further review of that
portion of the rulings below. The court of appeals
reversed the district court’s decision as to the
dormant Commerce Clause claim. App. 4, 11-24.
Noting that the plaintiffs advanced “no contention”
that “the Morticians Act discriminates against
interstate commerce,” App. 13, the court of appeals
conducted the balancing analysis set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). App.
13-24. The court of appeals concluded that the Act
“does not violate the dormant. Commerce Clause”
because it “does not place a barrier or burden on the
flow of interstate commerce,” and any arguable
“incidental burden would not be excessive in hght of
the putative benefits from the Act’s regulation.” App.
21.

Regulation of the Funeral Profession in
Maryland

The State of Maryland has regulated the
funeral profession since 1902, when the General
Assembly created the State Board of Undertakers,
required licensing of undertakers, and specified the
criteria for obtaining such a license. See 1902 Md.
Laws, ch. 160. Though the original legislation applied
only in Baltimore City, statewide licensing
requirements were established by 1910. See 1904
Md. Laws, ch. 389: 1908 Md. Laws, ch. 496; 1910 Md.
Laws, ch. 399. In 1924, the legislature also required
that embalmers become licensed. See 1924 Md. Laws,
ch. 575.

3

In the early years of regulation, Maryland law
permitted corporations to be licensed as undertakers.
See Md. Code Ann., art. 43, § 297 (1924 & Supp.
1935). In 1937, after nationwide calls for more
effective regulation of the funeral industry, the
General Assembly adopted various amendments that
included limits on licensing of corporations. The
legislation amended sections 290 through 309 of
Article 43 to create the State Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers, establish different
requirements for licensing, and substitute the term
“funeral director’ for “undertaker.” See 1937 Md.
Laws, ch. 503. ‘The 1937 amendments required “any
person, co-partnership or corporation .. . hcensed to
carry on the business of Funeral Directing in the
State of Maryland at the time of the passage of this
Act” to register with the Board: required the Board to
issue licenses to those persons and entities that
registered; and provided for the annual renewal of
those licenses. /d. ‘The provision that is most
pertinent to this case amended section 306 of Article
43 to provide as follows:

The Board shall not hereafter issue
licenses to, nor register any corporation,
nor shall any corporation be permitted
to conduct the business or profession of
Funeral Directing which has not already
been licensed and registered.

In 1945, to address the necds of servicemen and
women and their families, the General Assembly
authorized the Board to issue a license to any
corporation that was “formed during World War II to
carry on the business of any person who was hcensed
as a funeral director and was engaged in the business
of funeral directing or embalming at the time of
induction into the Armed Forces of the United States
during World War II,” as long as the corporation was

4

owned and operated by family members of the soldier.
See 1945 Md. Laws, ch. 741.

In 1962, the legislature again revised the
statutes regulating funeral directors and embalmers
to create a single license for funeral directing and
embalming. See 1962 Md. Laws, ch. 129. In 1971,
upon determining that the premises used for funeral
directing and embalming should also be licensed, the
General Assembly created the funeral establishment
license for that purpose. See 1971 Md. Laws, ch. 443.
Under the revised statute, only licensed funeral
directors and embalmers could obtain a funcral
establishment license. /d.

Following the 1962 creation of the unified
license for funeral directing and embalming, the
Board issued the new unified license to some
practitioners, but continued to issue funeral director
licenses to others. To resolve the situation, the Act
was amended in 1980 to prohibit the practice of the
unified occupation of funeral directing and embalming
without a license and to permit hcensees who held
funeral director licenses to continue to renew those
licenses. See 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 330. In 1981, the
State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers was
renamed the State Board of Morticians. See 1981 Md.
Laws, ch. 8, § 2. The legislation also discontinued the
use of the term “embalmer” and adopted the term
“mortician” as the appropriate title for heensees of the
new Board. Jd.

Today, the provisions of the Act are codified in
title 7 of the Health Occupations Article (“Health
Occ.”) of the Maryland Code. The express purpose of
the Act and each of its provisions is the protection of
the health and welfare of the public. See Md. Code
Ann., Health Oce. § 7-103. To accomplish that
purpose, the Act establishes a State Board of

Morticians and Funeral Directors (the “Board”),
which consists of 11 members, including six licensed
morticians or funeral directors and five consumer
members who are not employed by or affiliated with
the funeral industry. Health Occ. §§ 7-202(a), 7-
202(d). The Board has responsibility for licensing
morticians, funeral directors, and _ funeral
establishments: investigating alleged violations of the
Act; enforcing the provisions of the Act; inspecting
licensed funeral establishments: and establishing
standards for the practice of mortuary science. See
Health Occ. §§ 7-201, 7-205.

The Act defines four principal types of license:
mortician, funeral director, apprentice, and funeral
establishment. See Health Occ. §§ 7-302, 7-306, 7-310.
To become a licensed mortician or funeral director, an
applicant must complete an apprenticeship and
appropriate education courses, pass written national
and state examinations, and pass a_ practical
examination. See Health Occ. § 7-303. Section 7-306
lists the requirements for an apprentice license, and
§ 7-310 provides that only a licensed funeral director
or mortician may obtain a funeral establishment
license. The requirements for a licensed funeral
establishment are further specified in the Board’s
regulation promulgated as Code of Maryland
Regulations (““COMAR”) 10.29.03.04. One other type
of license, a corporation license, is available only to
those entities that held such a license before the
iegislature changed the licensing law to prohibit the
issuance of new licenses to corporations. See Health
Occ. § 7-309.

6

The Petitioners’ Efforts to Secure
Passage of Legislation to Expand
Corporate Licensing in the Funeral
Profession

Petitioners Charles Brown and Gail Manuel
each own a cemetery in Maryland, but neither is a
licensed mortician. App. 6-7. Petitioners Brian
Chisholm and Joseph Jenkins are licensed morticians,
each of whom owns his own funeral home business in
Maryland. /d. Mr. Chisholm is the only plaintiff who
does not reside in Maryland. Mr. Chisholm runs his
Maryland funeral business from his home in Florida.
ld. Each of the petitioners has expressed a desire to
form a corporation and to effect a merger between an
existing funeral home business and a cemetery. Jd.

In 1996, the Maryland General Assembly
created the Task Force to Examine the State's
Cemetery and Funeral Industry. See 1996 Md. Laws,
ch. 209. Petitioners Charles Brown and Joseph
Jenkins were both members of the Task Force. Jd.
The Task Force’s final report included a
recommendation that corporations be permitted to
practice mortuary science in Maryland. /d.

Every year from 1997 through 2005, legislation
was introduced to permit the issuance of some
additional corporate licenses. Petitioners Brown,
Jenkins, and Chisholm lobbied or testified in favor of
each of these bills.

In recent years, the legislature has considered
and rejected at least thirteen such bills, each of which
took a slightly different approach to amending the
statute. See 2004 Session, S.B. 340; 2004 Session,
H.B. 795, H.B. 1341; 2003 Session, H.B. 956; 2002
Session, H.B. 1113; 2001 Session, H.B. 1036: 2001
Session, H.B. 1464; 2000 Session, H.B.188, H.B. 503;

7

1999 Session, H.B. 107, H.B. 475; 1998 Session, H.B.
591; 1997 Session, H.B. 1321.

Recent Maryland Legislation
Addressing the Funeral Profession

Although the legislature has declined to relax
licensing requirements in the manner favored by the
petitioners, in 2007 the General Assembly revised
those requirements to establish the funeral director
license. See 2007 Md. Laws, chs. 185, 186. This
license category was added to accommodate
professionals who, for religious or personal reasons,
prefer not to be trained or licensed to embalm bodies.
The adoption of the funeral director license also
benefits out-of-state funeral directors who are not
trained in embalming, by enabling them to become
licensed in Maryland. The General Assembly also has
responded to constituent concerns by enacting recent
legislation to create a guarantee fund for all pre-need
contracts, as a means of protecting consumers from
sharp practices in the funeral home industry. See
2008 Md. Laws, ch. 532.

The Current Makeup of the Funeral
Profession in Maryland

As of April 24, 2007, there were 870 active
mortician licenses, 17 active funeral director licenses,
and 283 funeral establishment licenses issued by the
Board of Morticians. App. 37. Of those 283 funeral
establishment licenses, 11 were held by surviving
spouse licensees, 214 were held by licensed morticians
or funeral directors, and 58 were keld by corporate
licensees. /d. Thirty of the 58 corporate licenses were
owned by publicly held corporations and national
chains, and 28 were privately held by Maryland
corporations. App. 6.

8
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT A
SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION.

A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does
Not Conflict With Any Decision of
Another Federal Court of Appeals or
State Court of Last Resort.

Further review of this case is unwarranted
because the petition does not identify any decision of
another federal court of appeals or a state court of last
resort that actually conflicts with the conclusion
reached by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in this
matter. Though laws limiting professional licenses to
individual licensees, rather than corporations, are
typical of licensing schemes for lawyers, physicians,
and other professions throughout the various States,
the petition does not cite a single decision of a federal
appellate court or a state high court disagreeing with
the Fourth Circuit's holding that such an individual
licensing requirement does not offend the dormant
Commerce Clause.

The purported split of authority suggested by
the petitioners is not a genuine conflict. Differences
among the multiple appellate decisions cited in the
petition are primarily attributable to the respective
courts’ application of established constitutional
principles to widely divergent facts and diverse
regulatory schemes.' Of the supposedly conflicting

‘For example, among the_ disparate
circumstances and regulatory schemes addressed in
the cases cited by the petitioners are a State law
preventing automobile manufacturers from owning

2

decisions cited in part I of the petition, only one found
a dormant Commerce Clause violation, Govt
Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267,
1279 (7th Cir. 1992). Unlike this case, in which the
challenged statute is conceded to. be
nondiscriminatory, Gov't Suppliers involved a waste-
hauling regulation that was found to “discriminate in

dealerships, Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dept of
Transportation, 264 F.3d 493 (5™ Cir. 2001)(rejecting
dormant Commerce Clause challenge on the ground
that plaintiff failed to show either discrimination or
any actual burden on interstate commerce); a State
law preventing insurance companies from affiliating
with savings and loans, Ford Motor Co. v. Murr, 874
F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1989)(same); a local ordinance
requiring scrap metal dealers to “tag and hold” scrap
metal for a 10-day period, Jenn. Scrap Recyclers Assn
v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442 (6'" Cir. 2009) (same); a
State statute requiring that attorneys who act as
trustees with respect to in-state real property must
maintain an office in the State, A/leznsmith v.
Shurtleff 571 F.3d 1033 (10 Cir. 2009)(same); a
State statute requiring automobiles sold or leased in
state to have a “bumper quality label” stating the
results of impact tests, Assin of Int7 Auto. Manufrs,
Inc. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 1996)(remanding
on the ground that factual dispute precluded summary
judgment); a State statute limiting the number of
other items that may be hauled in trucks used to haul
municipal waste, Govt Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc.
v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7 Cir. 1992) (finding a
dormant Commerce Clause violation because the
statute had a direct, discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce).

10

practical effect against interstate commerce,” and,
therefore, was “subject to the higher level of scrutiny”
required for discriminatory regulations. /d. at 1279.
See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801,
1808 (2008) (a “discriminatory law is ‘virtually per se
invalid”)(citation omitted).

At most, the petition adumbrates some possible
variation in language or emphasis in the cited
opinions, but these do not amount to a conflict that is
outcome determinative. Notably absent from the
petition is any discussion of appellate court decisions
that have either acknowledged or discussed the
supposed split of authority described in the petition.
The absence of such an illuminating discourse in the
appellate case law indicates that the purported
conflict remains, at most, an inchoate difference of
approach that has not percolated sufficiently to
warrant this Court’s review at this time.

B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does
Not Conflict With Any Relevant
Decision of This Court.

Nor does the petition purport to show that the
holding of the court of appeals below conflicts with the
holding in any relevant decision of this Court. On the
contrary, the petition faults the court of appeals for
adhering to this Court's precedents. Compare
Petition at 14 (criticizing this Court’s decision in C7'S
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69
(1987), and its application of Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)) with court of
appeals’ decision at App. 16, 18-19, 22 (applying
Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126-28, and CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at
93). The “confusion” that petitioners purport to find
in these precedents, Petition at 12, 14, is belied by
this Court’s recent case law, which indicates no such
doubt as to their meaning or proper application. See

11

United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Management Auth’y, 550 U.S. 330, 344
(2007)(qucting Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127, for the
proposition that the “Commerce Clause does not
protect ‘the particular structure of method of
operation’ of a market”). As the petition itself
acknowledges, the decision in this case does not
conflict with the holding of the other Supreme Court
decision cited by the petitioners, Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980). See Petition at 10
(acknowledging that “Lewis did not expressly hold”
the proposition for which the petitioners cite it, .¢.
“that interstate investment capital and professional
expertise are articles of commerce’).

C. The Court of Appeals Properly Applied
Established Principles Governing
Commerce Clause Challenges.

Thus, as the petition effectively confirms, the
court of appeals followed this Court’s precedents in
determining that Maryland’s Morticians and Funeral
Directors Act does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. See App. 11-14 (citing Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S.
324, 326 n.1 (1989); Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis,
128 S. Ct. at 1808; HP. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949); Oregon Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Dept of Envrt] Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93,
98 (1994); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at
142).

The court of appeals first observed that the Act
does not “purport to regulate activity outside
Maryland.” App. 14. The court then determined that
the Act does not discriminate against interstate
commerce because it “does not treat persons from out-
of-state any differently than persons in-state,” and
the Act permits those corporate lhcenses that are

|
authorized to be owned by “any person or corporation,
out-of-state or in-state,” including “publicly-held out-
of-state corporations.” App. 15. The petition does not
challenge any of these portions of the court of appeals’
ruling.

The court of appeals then determined that the
Act does not. unjustifiably burden interstate commerce
because the Act’s limits on corporate licensing address
only “the particular structure or methods of operation
in a retail market” and do not “prohibit the flow of
interstate goods, place added costs upon them,” or
otherwise affect “the flow of articles of commerce
across state lines.” App. 16, 19 (quoting Hxxon, 437
U.S. at 127, 126). The court concluded that, even if
the Aci were deemed to place some incidental] burden
on commerce, that incidental burden “is not excessive
and is justified by th. very real benefits of protecting
the public health, safety, and welfare by encouraging
familiarity of the owner of a funeral business with the
day-to-day workings of that business and creating
accountability to regulators and to clients.” App. 23-
24.

To support this conclusion, the court of appeals
noted that “promoting familiarity between an owner
and his business 1n a licensed and regulated industry”
has been recognized by this Court as “a legitimate
local interest.” App. 22 (citing North Dakota State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’ Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156, 166-67 (1973)). The court of appeals also
cited this Court's finding that a State “has a
substantial interest in preventing the corporate form
from becoming a shield for unfair business dealing.”
App. 22 (quoting C7'S Corp., 481 U.S. at 93). To
further demonstrate that the Act’s general insistence
on individual rather than corporate’ licensing
“provides individual liability and therefore more
direct accountability for owners of funeral

13

establishments,” the court of appeals quoted from the
plaintiffs’ own statement that “they desire to use the
corporate form because they ‘want to be insulated
from personal liability for... negligence.” App. 23.

Therefore, the court of appeals applied
established precedent to reach a_ reasonable
conclusion that does not warrant the exercise of this
Court’s discretionary review.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the petition should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER
Attorney General of Maryland

STEVEN M. SULLIVAN*
KATHLEEN A. ELLIS

GRANT D. GERBER

Assistant Attorneys General
200 St. Paul Place
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 576-6324

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

October 26, 2009

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_0852%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.