# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Otterson v. Pennsylvania (No. 08-1195) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_0332%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 2008 ## Text soomenn Captus OK (1) No. _ \ 081195 JAN 16 2009 OFFICE OF THE CLERK In we Wittam K. Suter, Cierk Supreme Court of the United States PATRICK H. OTTERSON, Petitioner, VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent. On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Superior Court Of Pennsylvania PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI PATRICK H. OTTERSON, Pro-se Prison No. GS-7641 SCI Coal Township 1 Kelley Drive Coal Township, PA 17866-1020 570-644-7890 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The Superior Court of Pennsylvania once again affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County’s decision refusing to grant suppression of evidence seized as a result of the execution of search warrants after the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the Petitioner’s previous Petition for allowance of Appeal and ordered the Superior Court’s original 2 to 1 decision vacated, and remanded the matter back to the Superior Court for consideration in light of Commonwealth wv. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (2001). In Torres, the search warrant failed eee probable cause under the requirements’ of the Fourth Amendment to our United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the Affidavit of Probable Cause did not establish the basis of knowledge or veracity of the anonymous sources or make a showing of the reliability of the information that they relayed tw the police; furthermore, there was no police corroboration of criminal conduct. 1. Did the Superior Court of Pennsylvania err in their decision affirming the Lower Court’s ruling which conflicts with the standards set forth in the Fourth Amendment to our United States Constitution as well as Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in that the tips from anonymous sources did not provide sufficient probable cause to issue the primary search warrant in absence of corroborating evidence for Warren Street, Norristown, Pennsylvania? ll QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW -—- Continued 2. Was the subsequent search warrant at Sterigere Street, Norristown, Pennsylvania fruit of the poisonous tree inasmuch as it was based upon information derived from the illegai search and arrest at the West Warren Street property and which was not supported by independent probable cause? ill LIST OF PARTIES 1. Petitioner, Patrick H. Otterson, is an inmate currently confined at SCI Coal Township, 1 Kelley Drive, Coal Township, Pennsylvania 17866. 2. Respondent, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is represented by the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, Airy & Swede Streets, Norristown, Pennsylvania: Patricia E. Coonahan (Counsel of Record) Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office The Montgomery County Courthouse P.O. Box 311 Norristown, PA 19404 610-278-3102. lV TABLE OF CONTENTS ee ae cs ss cvacicanedsnddesebioiessabanceaaws OCOMERION £0 FO ROVIOWOG .00cccsvccssccsveccssessscsessecessesrscsxsesee Vv 1 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... 1 1 BO EES EEO oR) RCTS Oe Ce RET INE, CE GI CRD a onsck vic cnnsecctceccocccadsesccsnssesecs 2 Reasons for Granting the Petition......................... 10 ED EER, OO OTL A TE CRED 37 APPENDIX Opinion of Superior Court dated April 29, 2008....App. 1 Order of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dated EPCOUNTIOE FG BOT isc cnniccecesscasascvvcssvessavisensats App. 27 Order of Superior Court dated October 19, sca tots ehehindandcenonnidssssotadsadcnsnintyat neenenaein App. 28 Memorandum of Superior Court dated August = The Rea LAPSE NPE NE Rae ONOEN res CRT. * ene TUE ORS eS App. 29 Opinion of Lower Court dated September 1, AKA App. 52 Opinion of Lower Court dated December 5, PII sii etasadiis vidcondbensamendvoucedaadiacscobataianiain ena App. 64 Order of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dated RN 0. SEE seidantinivincsavcccdeeesegdenseens App. 79 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. i a a a ee 16, 17, 26, 27 Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. a ee Te eR GER TS em el tg ert UO” eNO SEEN 24 Commonwealth v. Karns, 566 A.2d 74 (Pa. I DE so iscskcosciscrssccrvesiasictonaricoreeneeapiaeens 3, 24, 26 Commonwealth v. Knowles, 327 A.2d 19 (1974)........28 Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa. BE ici6siichsacakeovictetuicubasbsashankiteseucisituaesgcmhinides passim Florida v. J.L., 120 S.Ct. 1875, 529 U.S. 266 Is occa ee a ei ee ae 18, 26 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)....... 11, 87, 25, 26 United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424 (C.A. 9, | EER WERSRES otras Oo Nena ner dee Ele Wr ce ERY Tort 30, 33 United States v. Fields, 182 F.Supp.2d 575 ec aan cielo ay, 27 United States v. Wells, 223 F.3d 835 (C.A. 8, ee eeu aaa 7. a Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ....27, 28 CONSTITUTIONS Bee, OG, WORE, BV onic ssccescceceacecscccssss 1, 3, 16, 31, 33 OETA Pe ee IEE ROS kL, 3, 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued Page STATUTES Controlled Substance Act..............ccccccccccscccssoeses sicausielle a MP ITI FIIIE os neseccnecesencssncsesesvecscacecscoessseves 5,6 RULES SSE RE eee Nene PE np REP Rn eam ene, 1 eo. a. ssa caieenddaudensonisnudoensteniaee 1,5 kin css inkscdecanbinecpiatdoupiuntdasentacedsvasesen i, 0 1 OPINION TO BE REVIEWED Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Cer- tiorari issue to review the judgment below. The Order of the highest state Court, the Su- preme Court of Pennsylvania, to review the merits; appears at App. 27 to the Petition and is reported at 941 A.2d 1255. The Opinion of the Superior Court of Pennsy]l- vania appears at App. 1 to the Petition and is re- ported at 947 A.2d 1239. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure: Pa.R.Cr.P. 203, 42 Pa. C.S.A. — Requirements for issuance of a Search Warrant Pa.R.Cr.P. 205, 42 Pa. C.S.A. — Contents of Search Warrant Pa.R.Cr.P. 206, 42 Pa. C.S.A. — Contents of Application for Search Warrant JURISDICTION The date on which the Superior Court of Penn- sylvania decided my case on remand was April 29, 2008. A copy of that decision appears at App. 1. 2 A timely second Petition for Allowance of Appeal was thereafter denied on October 7, 2008. A copy of the order denying rehearing appears at App. 79. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a). STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner, Patrick H. Otterson, seeks review in a direct appeal from a judgment of sentence from the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, as per Criminal Docket No. 9849-2004. Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, Pennsy]- vania, serving a sentence imposed upon him by the Honorable Richard Hodgson, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, on July 20, 2006. Petitioner was convicted of having violated the Controlled Substance Act for possession and manu- facture of -aarijuana plants between October 27, 2004 and October 29, 2004 at Warren Street, Norristown, PA, and between October 29, 2004 and October 30, 2004 at Sterigere Street, Norristown, PA. In addition, Petitioner was also convicted of the same counts between March 5, 2003 and October 30, 2004 at both locations. These charges arose from the execution of a search warrant on October 27, 2004 at Warren Street, Norristown, PA. As a result of the seizure of marijuana 3 plants and other information, the police obtained a search warrant for the address on Sterigere Street and seized additional marijuana plants. A Motion to Suppress was timely filed. The constitutionality of the warrants was challenged at the suppression hearing on November 3, 2005, before the Honorable William T. Nicholas, where Petitioner’s counsel submitted to the Court “that there is no way that these search warrants can pass constitutional muster, either under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under the Pennsyl- vania Constitution” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 37, 80). Petitioner’s counsel argued “that there was insuffi- cient probable cause to issue the warrant at Warren Street in that the tips from the anonymous and confidential sources were not corroborated by the police, their reliability is not established (N.T. ' During the suppression hearing, Petitioner’s counsel asserted “that the three anonymous females must be presumed one and the same,” in which Judge Nicholas resolves, “even if it is the same female, it is someone other than the resident, so you have two sources, at least two sources” (N.T. 11/3/05 page 64). The District Attorney expressed to Judge Nicholas, “the number of sources would actually be three,” which Petitioner's counsel agreed (N.T. 11/3/05 page 87). However, on pages 5-6 of Judge Nicholas’ Opinion (App. 64), in his Findings of Fact No. 4, No. 5 and No. 6, Judge Nicholas rationalized that there were three anonymous informants and four confidential informants who served to corroborate each other in which he cites Commonwealth v. Karns, 566 A.2d 615 (Pa. Super. 1989). Petitioner contends that the three “anonymous females” are in fact one anonymous female and that there is no way of discerning whether this female is not one of the confidential sources who appear to be (Continued on following page) 4 11/3/05 pages 51-80), and the information the sources relayed to the police was stale in that it contained no time frame when the observations were made” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 51-80, 176-182); furthermore, he em- phasized “Pennsylvania does not have a ‘Good Faith’ exception that we recognize with regard to our search warrants” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 75, 172). Petitioner’s counsel then argued “that if the Warren Street war- rant falls, everything falls, (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 49-50) because the search at Sterigere Street is fruit of the poisonous tree (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 46, 81-83) in that Petitioner’s arrest and statement are fruits of the illegal search at Warren Street” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 81-83, 161-173). He further added “that the police trespassed when making observations at Sterigere Street during an ongoing investigation without a warrant” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 46-49, 175-176). The working with each other in providing information to the police and therefore they were not “independent” and do not corrobo- rate each other. * On page 8 of Judge Nicholas’ Opinion (App. 64) he states “We credit the suppression hearing testimony of Detective Altieri over that of the defendant on the question of whether the defendant was told that if he gave a statement, the police would not charge his girlfriend, Tammy Taylor.” Yet, when Detective Altieri was asked by Petitioner’s counsel, “And did you have a discussion with Mr. Otterson prior to taking the statement from him that you wouldn’t charge Tammy Taylor with regard to the marijuana if he acknowledged that the marijuana in both the car and residence was his?,” the Detective responded “I may have, sure. I don’t want to charge someone who doesn’t have involvement with a crime.” (N.T. 11/3/05 page 108). 5 Honorable William Nicholas denied that motion by Order dated December 5, 2005 (App. 64). The case was called to trial on March 29, 30, 2006 before the Honorable Richard Hodgson, sitting without a jury. In his Opinion, Judge Hodgson adopted the reasoning of the Honorable William Nicholas (App. 52). At the conclusionof the trial, Petitioner was found guilty of three Violations of the Controlled Substance Act and for Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA).° Judge Hodgson * The firearms seized during the subsequent search at the Sterigere Street property were not listed as “items to be seized” on the face of the Sterigere Street Warrant, nor were firearms mentioned anywhere in the Affidavit, which is a requirement of Pa.R.Cr.P. 205 and 206. Furthermore, the police had no reason to believe that the firearms would have been illegal or illegally possessed at the time of executing the search warrant. Nothing showed up on the NCIC check (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 14-15) in the Affidavit of the primary search warrant for Warren Street on pages 4-5, nor was there any information provided anywhere in either warrant that suggested that it was illegal for Petitioner to possess firearms. Petitioner was not charged for the double barrel shotgun mentioned on page 6 of Judge Lally-Green’s Opinion (App. 1), which was an old inoperable shotgun used as an ornament for above the fireplace (N.T. 3/29-30/06 page 72). Petitioner was charged for a .22 caliber Ruger target rifle legally purchased by Petitioner many years before an incident in New Jersey where Petitioner broke a man’s nose in a fight for which he plead out to 30 days in jail to be served on weekends in Cape May County, New Jersey, followed by probation (N.T. 3/29-30/06 page 23). Petitioner was not aware that he was no longer allowed to possess firearms. There was also a Glock pistol which was one of Petitioner’s Father’s guns that was legally owned and registered to his Father at that address where Petitioner’s Father lived (Continued on following page) 6 sentenced Petitioner on July 20, 2006 to a term of not less than five years on the main Bill as well as con- current terms of five years on Bill 9849.1 and 3-5 years on Bill 9849.2. A consecutive term of 1-5 years imprisonment was imposed with respect to the VUFA offense. Bail was revoked and Petitioner was sent to prison on that date. A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 25, 2006 with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The State- ment of the Questions Involved are as follows: 1. Did the lower Court err in denying the Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress Evidence seized as the result of an execu- tion of a search warrant which lacked probable cause for Warren Street, Norristown, PA? 2. Did the lower Court err in denying the Petitioner’s Motion to Sup- press Evidence seized at Sterigere Street, Norris- town, PA, which was tainted by the illegal search and seizure conducted at Warren Street and which was not supported by independent and lawfully acquired probable cause? 3. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to establish Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on Bill 9849.2 where the prosecu- tion did not establish that a corpus delicti existed as to this offense? until early 2004 (N.T. 1/26/05 pages 61-69). The pistol was among things left by Petitioner's Father that he had not yet picked up from when he moved (N.T. 3/29-30 pages 63-64). 7 Petitioner’s counsel argued that the warrants were obtained in violation of Petitioner’s federal and state constitutional rights to be free from unreason- able searches and seizures in the respect that there was not constitutionally sufficient probable cause within the four corners of each Affidavit. The warrant for Warren Street was not supported by sufficient probable cause as it was based upon anonymous tipsters with no record of previous reliability, whose information was not corroborated by police investiga- tion other than noncriminal general facts. The infor- mants did not even offer how they would have acquired their knowledge. The warrant should have been suppressed and therefore the second warrant for Sterigere Street should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree inasmuch as it was based upon information derived from the illegal search at Warren Street. The Sterigere Street Warrant was not supported by independent probable cause and con- tained information unlawfully acquired when the police invaded the curtilage of Petitioner’s property to obtain information for the warrant. Petitioner’s counsel also argued that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence of Petitioner’s guilt with respect to Bill 9849.2 charging Petitioner with violat- ing the Controlled Substance Act for possession and manufacture of marijuana plants between March 5, 2003 and October 30, 2004 in the respect that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a corpus delicti, as to this offense existing independent of Petitioner’s oral and written 8 admissions as no marijuana was recovered to support this charge. The matter was heard in an oral argument on February 14, 2007 before a panel of the Superior Court Judges, Lally-Green, Gantman and Popovich, as per No. 1968 EDA 2006. On August 21, 2007 a Memorandum Opinion was issued on behalf of Judges Lally-Green and Gantman (App. 29), with Judge Popovich issuing a Dissenting Memorandum (App. 29). Judges Lally-Green and Gantman adopted Judge Nicholas’ analysis of the suppression hearing as their own (App. 29). In Judge Popovich’s Dissenting Memorandum (App. 29), he asserts that Affidavit for Warren Street fails to show the reliability of the informants on its face and the only facts corroborated by the police were noncriminal in nature, were easily obtained by the police, and do not point with a high degree of probability that Petitioner was engaged in a mari- juana growing operation (App. 29). Judge Popovich found that the tips from the anonymous “concerned citizens” and the tips from the confidential sources presented information that was substantially similar to each other. Based on the similarity of these tips he was led to the conclusion that these tips provided information that could have been obtained easily by the police and were therefore, not sufficient to form the basis for a warrant (App. 29). Judge Popovich concluded that the evidence obtained from the Sterig- ere Street property was the fruit of the search and arrest at the Warren Street property. Based upon his 9 finding that all of the evidence obtained from Peti- tioner’s arrest and statement following the illegal search of the Warren Street property should have been suppressed, Judge Popovich would reverse the case and would not reach Petitioner’s third issue (App. 29). Petitioner’s counsel filed an Application for Reargument En Banc with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on September 4, 2007 which was de- nied by Order dated October 19, 2007 (App. 28). On November 19, 2007 Petitioner’s counsel, filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as per No. 961 MAL 2607. “The Statement of the Issues Presented for Review,” was: Did the lower Courts err in refusing to grant suppression of evidence seized as a result of the execution of search warrants in Montgomery County which lacked probable cause and/or were tainted by the initial illegal search and seizure? Petitioner’s counsel argued the same points as before in the original appeal. In addition, Petitioner’s counsel challenged the ruling of the Superior Court (App. 29). By Order dated December 28, 2007 (App. 27), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the Petition for Allowance of Appeal and vacated the Order of the Superior Court, remanding the case to that Court for consideration in light of Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa. 2001). 10 The same three-judge panel that had heard this case in the first round of appellate activity before the Superior Court, Judges Lally-Green, Gantman and Popovich were once again assigned to this case. No new oral argument was scheduled, although supple- mental briefs were filed on February 26, 2008. That panel issued an Opinion authored by Judge Lally- Green on April 29, 2008 (App. 1), once again affirming the ruling of the lower Court. Petitioner’s counsel filed another Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on May 20, 2008 as per No. 312 MAL 2008. The “Statement of the Issues Presented for Review,” was: Did the Superior Court fail to follow the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in refusing to grant suppression of evidence seized as a result of the execution of sea:ch warrants in Mont- gomery County, which lacked probable cause and/or were tainted by the initial illegal search and seizure? That Petition was denied by Order dated October 7, 2008 (App. 79). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION On December 28, 2007, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted Petitioner’s previous Petition for Allowance of Appeal. In their Order (App. 27), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the ruling of the Superior Court (App. 29) and remanded the matter to that Court for consideration in light of Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa. 2001). 11 Thereafter, the same three-judge panel that had initially ruled on this case issued a new Opinion (App. 1), this time authored by Judge Lally-Green, once again affirming the judgment of sentence. In that first Opinion (App. 29), the Panel of the Superior Court provided no analysis at all of Peti- tioner’s claim that the search warrant for Warren Street, was constitutionally deficient in that it lacked probable cause to support its issuance under J/linois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) and Commonwealth v. Torres, supra. The panel merely adopted the Suppres- sion Court’s ruling (App. 29). In his Dissenting Memorandum (App. 29), Judge Popovich declared that he would have suppressed the evidence obtained from the search of the Warren Street and Sterigere Street properties. Judge Pop- ovich reasoned that the four corners of the Affidavit for the Warren Street property failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the anonymous sources had a basis of knowledge regarding Petitioner’s alleged criminal activity inside that location and also failed to estab- lish their reliability. Judge Popovich emphasized that the police provided corroboration only as to facts that were noncriminal in nature, covld have been easily obtained by the police and did ac. offer incriminatory information regarding Petitioner having been en- gaged in a marijuana growing operation. Judge Popovich also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the tips from the anonymous or confidential 12 sources could have provided self-corroboration since they were substantially similar to each other and could have been obtained easily by the police (App. 29). In the Opinion of Judge Lally-Green (App. 1), there is now a more full and extensive review of Petitioner’s claim regarding the probable cause issue. Nevertheless the Panel continued to adhere to the view that there was a substantial basis for the issu- ing authority to have found probable cause to support the search warrants. Petitioner respectfully disagrees and contends that his United States constitutional and Pennsylvania constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. On page 16 of Judge Lally-Green’s Opinion (App. 1) she states, Here, unlike in Torres, the Affidavit in ques- tion provided information regarding the ba- sis of the confidential sources’ knowledge. For example, the Affidavit specifically pro- vided that one of the confidential sources told the affiant that he/she smelled “skunk weed”, and another source said they saw marijuana growing inside the Warren Street property. However, the Affidavit does not provide how or when the sources would have come about in making their observations or offer their expertise on how they would know what marijuana looks or smells like. The source that claimed they saw marijuaiia growing 13 inside the property does not even give an actual description of the alleged observation. In fact, on page 3 of the Warren Street Affidavit in the original tip, the source stated “that he/she has seen several mari- juana plants growing in pots in the first floor, inside that residence.” However, when the police executed the search warrant, all of the marijuana was found growing on the second floor (N.T. 1/26/05 page 36), which was equipped to grow marijuana, where there were 64 plants (N.T. 3/29/06 page 31), which is a number that is not associated with several. The police do not corroborate eithér tip nor do they con- firm “several marijuana lan growing in the first floor” after executing the warrant. On pages 16-17 of her Opinion (App. 1) Judge Lally-Green states, In addition, the veracity of the sources’ in- formation was corroborated by independent police investigation. After the first anony- mous tip on August 31, 2004,* multiple law enforcement officers began periodic checks of the property. They saw the property as mul- tiple sources described it with windows cov- ered and air conditioning units running inside. Furthermore the officers attempted to con- duct a thermal imaging scan of the property. Although the scan provided inconclusive “ The Affidavit for Warren Street does not specify a date when the tip was provided by the source, only when the tip was relayed to Detective Altieri from Detective Kelly. 14 results, it did reveal air conditioning units running inside the property in the cold weather,’ as multiple sources had indicated to police. However, there is only one tip that the occupant of the property covered the windows which was provided by the final anonymous subject on page 9 of the Warren Street Affidavit. The police spoke to this source on October 27, 2004, the same date the war- rant was issued and executed so there is no way that the independent police investigation could have corroborated this tip. This source stated, “that after the police were ‘snooping’ around in late August, the occupant showed up shortly after that and cleaned up overgrown weeds in the rear of the property and also covered up the windows more thoroughly so no one could see inside.” Coincidently, Detective Altieri went to the property on August 31, 2004 where he spoke to a resident (Warren Street Affidavit, page 3). This was most likely the same person due to the fact that the only way this source would have known that the police were “snooping” around is if Detective Altieri introduced himself because he is a_plainclothes Narcotics Detective that also works in an undercover capacity (Sterigere Street Affidavit, page 2). There were two tips that the air conditioners were operating on a timer (Warren Street Warrant * At the suppression hearing trial counsel established, “that these units could just as well have been dual purpose heat- ing/cooling units” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 25-29, 54-55). 15 pages 6, 9). The latter tip on page 9, which is the final anonymous subject again, stated “the air conditioners still go on the same time every night,” suggesting that they provided this information before. Therefore, it is more than likely that this is the same source as the anonymous female from September 16, 2004 who also reported this on page 6 of the Affidavit, or that they are working together. The police do not corrobo- rate that the air conditioners are operating on a timer. They only observe them running. Petitioner submits that it is more than likely that there are only two sources and that they are working with each other in providing information to the police. Judge Lally-Green on page 17 of her Opinion (App. 1) then states, While the information that the officers cor- roborated was not necessarily criminal in na- ture, it was consistent with a marijuana growing operation. Finally, the information that was corroborated by the officers in this case was not “publicly available” in the same sense as the information corroborated by the affiant in Torres, who simply corroborated the source by looking in the phone book. Petitioner contends that seeing blinds and cur- tains completely closed and hearing air conditioning (or heating) units running which could be observed standing on the public sidewalk in front of the prop- erty was “publicly available” information just like in 16 Torres and that this does not qualify the veracity of the sources. In Commonwealth v. Torres, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the basis of knowl- edge and the veracity of the Affiant’s anonymous sources are factors to be considered in making a probable cause determination, and that these factors continue to retain a vital role in cases where the Affidavit of Probable Cause is almost entirely based upon information gleaned from anonymous sources. In Torres, there was no attempt to establish either prong and therefore, “a strong showing of the reliabil- ity of the information” relayed to the police would be required. /d. at 540. Importantly, in Footnote 8, the Court noted that limited corroboration of general information provided by the informant is not suffi- cient to sustain the warrant. See Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as U.S.C.A. Constitution Amendment 4. The Court concluded that the Affidavit of Probable Cause in that case failed to provide a substantial basis upon which to issue a warrant to search that defendant’s apartment. In accord is Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that an Affidavit for a search warrant lacked probable cause because the one fact which would have directly suggested criminal conduct (marijuana growing near premises) was not confirmed by the police, who were only able to confirm facts of a gen- eral and noncriminal nature. Because these facts were “thin” and equally consistent with noncriminal 17 as well as criminal conduct, the warrant was disap- proved. In accordance with Pennsylvania law, there is no “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. See Torres, supra, at 540 and Edmunds, supra, at 903- 906. The Affidavit for Warren Street failed to qualify the anonymous sources’ basis of knowledge and veracity as well as the reliability of the tips to the police, which was the case in Torres. The police inves- tigation was only able to corroborate facts that were general and noncriminal in nature just like in Ed- munds. The tips provided no predictive conduct or information that would provide police with means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility as the tip in Gates provided. All the police had to rely on was bare reports from unknown, unaccountable _infor- mants who neither explained how or when they made their observations nor supplied any basis for believ- ing they had inside information. See U.S. v. Wells, 223 F.3d 835 (C.A. 8, 2000) (Anonymous tip itself insufficient); U.S. v. Fields, 182 F.Supp.2d 575 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (Generalized uncorroborated statements of an unidentified informant are insufficient to establish probable cause, even according great deference to the issuing magistrate’s determination. Furthermore, suppressing evidence in this case properly effectuates the purpose of the exclusionary rule of deterring unlawful police conduct.) The fact that the police discovered marijuana as a result of executing the search warrant at Warren Street does not imply that the police had provided 18 sufficient probable cause in the Affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrant. In Florida v. J.L., 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1379 (2000), the Supreme Court of the United States held: “That the allegation about the gun turned out to be. _-rect does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct.” A review of the primary Affidavit Search Warrant for Warren Street shows that probable cause was lacking here. On page 3, the Affidavit begins with August 31, 2004, when the Affiant, Officer Eugene Parsley, reports that a detective has received infor- mation from another detective that was provided by a “confidential source” to the effect that marijuana was growing inside this location, where that source had seen marijuana plants growing in the first floor, inside the residence.” Yet this information comes from a source whose reliability is not established; further- more, there is no time frame as to when the source allegedly made such observations or when they relayed this information to Detective Kelly.’ The * There was nothing found on the first floor that would have suggested that marijuana was ever growing on the first floor during the execution of the warrant (N.T. 1/26/05 page 36) including an air conditioner which the Affiant suggests in the conclusion of the Affidavit that Petitioner may be utilizing to offset the heat from the high-powered lamps used to grow marijuana (Warren Street Affidavit, page 9). Not only was this information not corroborated by the police, it was not confirmed after executing the search warrant. " On page 14 of Judge Lally-Green’s Opinion (App. 1), she states “The Affiant provided that on August 31, 2004, a confidential source (Continued on following page) 19 source did not give a detailed description of the marijuana growing inside Warren Street or demon- strate an inside basis of knowledge. Detective Altieri attempted to corroborate that information but there is no police corroboration of any actual criminal activity at that location. Detective Altieri states that the property was all locked up and the windows were covered but does not say in any unusual manner. The Affiant then provides information on page 4 of the Affidavit that Detective Altieri learned that Patrick Otterson, the Petitioner, is the lessee for “Wood Street, Norristown, PA” and that Petitioner “has been arrested in the past ... for possession of a small amount of marijuana.” However, the issuing authority, who is supposed to be neutral in their review, was not informed by the Affiant that Otter- son’s arrest had occurred on September 14, 1996, more than eight years prior to the issuance of the warrant, and that the charges against Petitioner had been dismissed. (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 14-15). At this point in the Affidavit, the Affiant has the name of Petitioner, however, none of the informants advised Detective James Kelly of the Upper Moreland Police Department that the Warren Street property was abandoned and that marijuana plants were growing inside.” However, the Affidavit docs not contain a date when the confidential source provided information to Detective Kelly 8 West Wood Street is a couple blocks south of West Warren Street in Norristown, PA. 20 in the Affidavit corroborate this information. Fur- thermore, a neighbor provided information that the occupant of Warren Street is a white male and that he operates a silver pick-up truck. The police never corroborated that the occupant is a white male or that he owns or operates a silver pick-up truck any- where in the Affidavit.’ The Affiant further claims that on September 14, 2004, information was received from an “anonymous female” that marijuana was being grown at that location (Warren Street Affidavit, page 5). A police officer went to the premises and once again observed that the residence was locked up and the windows were completely covered. Again, it is not suggested that the windows are covered in any unusual manner. No corroboration was obtained, however, with respect to the information provided by the “anonymous female” concerning marijuana. The issuing authority was provided with no information to suggest that the anonymous female was reliable nor was he provided with any information as to how or when this source had acquired her information. Next, the Affidavit refers to a “second anonymous tip” on September 16, 2004, but there is no informa- tion presented therein which would suggest that this * The Affiant testified that he made no attempt to link Petitioner to the silver pick-up truck or any address using the DMV or by accessing governmental records when preparing the Affidavit for Warren Street (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 22-23). 21 is a different “anonymous female” from the one on September 14, 2004; a female once again claims that marijuana is growing inside the residence. The source of that information is alleged to be a neighbor who has seen marijuana growing on the first floor. There- fore, as to the information in the Affidavit concerning marijuana, these paragraphs set forth no information that would establish either reliability or basis of knowledge that would support the tip. There is no time frame given as to when the neighbor made their observation or when it was relayed to the “anony- mous female.” No police corroboration of the criminal activity suggested in the tip is provided by the Affi- ant.” On page 6 of the Warren Street Affidavit the Affiant states “the reason why everyone is concerned is because of an incident that occurred in Philadel- phia concerning firemen that had died in a fire where marijuana had been growing.” The Affiant, Officer Parsley, testified, “that it was Detective Altieri’s idea to craft the two paragraphs about this incident in the Affidavit and that the Affiant did not have a role in making this decision” (N.T. 11/3/05 page 17). This irrelevant information is a tactic to sway a neutral magistrate to issue the search warrant. '° The tipster claimed that the air conditioners and lights operate on a timer, yet the police investigation disclosed that the lights and air conditioners were on all the time (Warren Street Affidavit pages 4, 7). 22 The Affiant then claimed that he had continually checked the “aforementioned location” and yet failed to observe Petitioner or his vehicle during the past month.” The police did obtain a sealed search warrant issued by the Honorable William Nicholas, the Sup- pression Judge, for the use of a thermal imaging device on October 12, 2004, which is discussed in the Warren Street Affidavit on pages 7-8." The supposed result of the search was that the police were unable to obtain an accurate reading because of the cold weather, although no temperature was _ recorded. However, the thermal imaging scan did indicate heat coming from two air conditioners on the second floor, which could have been dual purpose heating/air conditioning window units (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 25-29). Nevertheless, the Affidavit does not present any attempt by the police to use the thermal imaging detector on another occasion when the weather would not have been a factor. Accordingly, the Affiant could " During the execution of the warrant at Warren Street there was no automatic watering system found that would allow Petitioner to be away from the property for more than a couple days at a time. Petitioner contends that he was at the property almost every day even though he no longer spent the night. * Petitioner has never seen a copy of this sealed search warrant as it was not contained in his discovery packet. Peti- tioner’s counsel did not challenge this search warrant because his counsel’s strategy was to use the results of the thermal search to further prove that the Affidavit lacked probable cause (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 3-4, 68-73). 23 offer no criminal activity detected by the use of this scientific device. The Affidavit next reports that on October 27, 2004 Detective Jeffrey Koch contacted Detective Altieri and stated that an “unknown female” left a message on the Drug Tip Line that marijuana was growing inside Warren Street and that the neighbors have smelled strange odors emanating from the property. Once again no information is presented therein which would suggest that this source is a different “anonymous female” from those of Septem- ber 14 and 16 (N.T. 11/3/05 nage 29). There is no information that would establish the reliability or the basis of knowledge of the female that would support the tip nor is there any information as to how or when the “unknown female” had acquired her infor- mation from the neighbors or how and when the neighbors made their observations. In fact, Detective Koch does not advise Detective Altieri when he re- ceived the tip or when the female left the tip. Fur- thermore, no _ police corroboration is_ obtained. (Warren Street Affidavit, page 8). The Affiant along with Detective Altieri claimed to have spoken with an anonymous person on October 27, 2004, who allegedly reported to have smelled what they described as “Skunk” Weed odor coming from the residence, a term that supposedly means “Home Grown” marijuana due to the strong odor it 24 produces.” The police also claimed to have spoken to an unknown person who alleged to have personally seen marijuana growing from within this location. The issuing authority is not informed “when” these events occurred or “how” they came about. The Affi- ant offers no information on how the sources would have been competent to determine these observations were consistent with that of marijuana. Furthermore, the police obtained no corroboration of this informa- tion and the Affidavit sets forth no basis of knowledge or anything concerning the veracity or reliability of either “subject” (Warren Street Affidavit pages 8-9)." ‘* Importantly, no effort was made by the police to inspect the premises themselves in order to determine whether or not such an odor existed at that location. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the police can use a trained dog to ascertain whether there is a scent of marijuana in the premises. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa. 1987). Peti- tioner contends that it was of great moment that this was not done before the Affidavit was submitted to the issuing authority. “ Petitioner notes that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania appears to no longer be relying, as it did, in its Memorandum Decision of August 21, 2007, upon Commonwealth v. Karns, 566 A.2d 615 (Pa. Super. 1989). In the first panel decision, the Superior Court contended that under Karns, probable cause could be found from “independent sources” who supplied “identi- cal information.” However, in Karns, the Affidavit contained information from an informant who had supplied police with such information on ten previous occasions, resulting in seizures of drugs, while a second informant had often purchased mari- juana from the defendant over the previous two years, and both informants were able to independently describe a hydroponic system of marijuana growth at that location, thus establishing their “inside” basis of knowledge. As discussed above, the (Continued on following page) 25 In the Affiant’s “Conclusion” on page 9 of the Affidavit, Officer Parsley states, “As an experienced Narcotics Detective, Detective Altieri is aware that if a person was to cultivate marijuana in a residence, they would need Hydroponic lights, which would draw excessive electricity for them to operate. These high-powered lamps would create an excessive heat source to radiate inside the residence.” However, there is no information whatsoever ir tie Affidavit to support these statements.” Petitioner respectfully submits that the ruling of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Petitioner’s case cannot stand under Gates and Torres. As was the case in Torres, here too, the police have relied upon unnamed unidentified, and anonymous or confiden- tiai sources who satisfy neither the basis of knowl- edge nor reliability requirements under Gates and Torres, supra. A reviewing Court cannot say with confidence that these sources had a good reason to know of what they spoke or that their information was accurate. In the case at bar, none of the so-called “sources” gave a detailed description of the alleged growing marijuana they claimed to have seen. Contra, information provided by the informants in the instant case had no prior reliability and their tips clearly lacked police corrobora- tion. ‘© Petitioner is amazed that Detective Altieri is not the Affiant as he seems to have acquired most of the information within the four corners of the Affidavit (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 9-21). 26 Karns at 615. Nor did they establish a time frame of the alleged observations. See Edmunds, supra, at 891. There were no accounts of marijuana use or sales and there were no predictive accounts of Peti- tioner’s conduct or activities as there were in Gates. There is no “inside” basis of knowledge demonstrated by any of the sources. Furthermore there is no police corroboration. Just as in Florida v. J.L., supra, where the Supreme Court of the United States found that there was no reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engag- ing in unlawful conduct even though the police found a gun, here the anonymous tips did not provide sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant even though the police found marijuana. The police investigation in this case had failed to establish that Petitioner was engaged in marijuana growing activity at Warren Street. Judge Lally-Green states that the police investigation produced information that “was consistent with a marijuana growing operation,” yet it was equally consistent with lawful and noncriminal conduct. As to the sources who claimed to have “smelled” or “seen” marijuana, there is no corrobora- tion of that information even though the police have '° Petitioner submits that the activity of a homeowner in locking up his residence and completely covering their windows by drawing the blinds and closing the curtains is surely not inconsistent with innocent behavior. It is actually more consis- tent with the notion that the homeowner is asserting that he has a right of privacy that the Constitution must recognize. 27 continuously checked the property in the month prior to filing the application for the warrant for Warren Street.’ Even the thermal imaging scan on October 12, 2004 failed to provide objective information that would have established that the information was valid. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided this case in a manner which conflicts with decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of the United States. As in Torres and Ed- munds, U.S. v. Fields, and U.S. v. Wells, supra, this Honorable Court cannot allow a search warrant to stand that is based upon information that comes from unestablished and unqualified anonymous sources where attempts by the police to corroborate that information were not successful except as to innocent details and facts that were essentially public in nature. Thus, there was no substantial basis for a finding of probable cause. Petitioner respectfully submits that in view of the fact that the warrant executed at Warren Street was unlawful, the warrant executed at Sterigere Street was unlawful as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). '’ One can only imagine how quickly the police would have inserted into the Affidavit of Probable Cause the fact that during one of their many checks of this location, they had the occasion to smell “skunk” weed or had obtained other informa- tion that would have corroborated the claim that marijuana was growing inside the house. 28 The Affidavit for the Warren Street property does not mention the Sterigere Street property despite the access to information available to the police. Review of the record will indicate that the suspicion of mari- juana growing at the Sterigere Street property arose only after the police obtained Petitioner’s permission to search his primary residence at [Home Address Omitted], Norristown, PA, after his arrest at the Warren Street property. The police had no informa- tion whatsoever on the Village Green Lane or the Sterigere Street addresses.” It is clear that this second warrant was obtained through exploitation of the previous unlawful police conduct. Probable cause did not exist to issue the second warrant absent the information obtained from the search and arrest at Warren Street. See Com- monwealth v. Knowles, 327 A.2d 19 (Pa. 1974); Wong Sun, supra. The Affidavit for the Sterigere Street search warrant, which Detective Altieri is now the Affiant, directly references the search at Warren Street where police discovered marijuana growing at that location, '* Petitioner contends that the search of his residence along with his statement was coerced in order to release his girlfriend without being charged. Detective Altieri testified that he would not charge Petitioner’s girlfriend if he acknowledged that the marijuana was his (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 108-110). Detective Altieri, Officer Parsley, and Lieutenant Bernstiel drove Peti- tioner’s girlfriend to Petitioner’s residence to conduct the search (Sterigere Street Affidavit, page 5). 29 including the facts that the blinds were drawn, win- dows were sealed, air conditioners were employed and PVC piping was present. (Sterigere Street Affi- davit, page 3). On page 5, the Affidavit references Petitioner’s statement to the police, but does not indicate that this statement makes no reference whatsoever to any location other than Warren Street. The Affidavit also references the consensual search that the police conducted at Village Green Lane, yet no evidence was seized at that residence which identified another location wherein a marijuana growing operation would be found. However, the Affiant relied upon the review of three calendars seized from that location that had different harvest dates to support his conclu- sion that the Petitioner would have more than one growing location. Furthermore, Petitioner’s driver’s license seized at that location, (Sterigere Street War- rant, at page 5) which was Petitioner’s old “expired” license, listed Sterigere Street as Petitioner’s address. Because of the evidence derived from the search at Warren Street, the Affiant, Detective Altieri, along with Officer Parsley, went to Sterigere Street on October 29, 2004. At that location, the police made observations that the location on Sterigere Street was consistent with the way they had seen the location at Warren Street. On page 6 of the Sterigere Street Affidavit, the police report that all the windows were all covered up so no one could look inside and newer 30 air conditioners were in the upper windows.” The police further report that the electric meter was spinning as if there was an excessive electric draw, yet offer no expert analysis of this issue. The Affiant then reports smelling the distinct odor of marijuana while standing at a lawful vantage point at the front door of the residence.” In U.S. v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424 (C.A. 9, 1993), the Ninth Circuit held that 6 feet from garage door and 50-60 feet from defendant’s house from which police officer smelled marijuana growing '* It is not reported in the Affidavit for Sterigere Street that the air conditioners were running as was the case in the Warren Street Affidavit every time during the many police checks of the property. ” On page 7 of the Sterigere Street Affidavit the Affiant states “At the time of Otterson’s arrest, we took his keys and one of the keys ‘opened’ the door of Sterigere Street, but we did not make entry.” The Affiant would have had to first open the storm door to access the front door. The Affiant uses the word “opened” not “unlocked.” This is most likely the unlawful vantage point that the Affiant smelled the distinct odor of marijuana. The marijuana at this location was found on the second and third floor loft or attic (N.T. 1/26/05 page 5). The marijuana at the Warren Street property was found on the second floor (N.T. 1/26/05, page 5) and yet the police were not able to corroborate the smell of “skunk” weed odor when check- ing the locked doors at that location or during many periodical checks. Petitioner finds it remarkable that on the face of the Sterigere Street Warrant the Affiant describes the premises to be searched as a 3-story white stucco home, yet from outside of the home it appears to be a 2-story home with small attic windows on either side, approximately one foot by one foot. There are no full size windows or dormers that would suggest that there was a third floor. 31 inside house, was within “curtilage” of house for Fourth Amendment purposes. Again, from an alleged lawful vantage point the Affiant claimed to have noticed a trash bag on the kitchen floor that matched the trash bags located in Warren Street that contained marijuana. Also, Officer Parsley noticed a magnet on the refrigerator with P.H. Otterson, which was a magnetic business card, even though the Affiant states near the beginning of the same paragraph, “all the windows were all cov- ered up so no one could look inside.” The police also observed several empty Heineken bottles and cases in the kitchen area (Sterigere Street Affidavit pages 6- 7). The Affiant concluded that the location on Sterig- ere Street had the “same characteristics to Warren Street” in that both properties appeared abandoned, had air conditioners in the windows, had windows sealed up so as to avoid detection and had similar PVC pipe outside (Sterigere Street Affidavit pages 7- 8). A conclusion that the search at Warren Street was unlawful will surely support a further conclusion by this Honorable Court that the search at Sterigere Street was tainted by that primary illegality and therefore, suppression of the second warrant is also required. The police did not have evidence independ- ent of the information obtained from Warren Street to support this second warrant. 32 During the entire police investigation, no evi- dence was developed that there was a location at Sterigere Street in which another marijuana growing operation would be present. Nothing spoken by Petitioner during his interview with police and noth- ing obtained by the search of his primary residence resulted in facts which would have supported such a conclusion. The three calendars seized at Petitioner’s residence that appeared to denote different harvest dates did not create a probability that marijuana was being grown at another location, and certainly pro- vided the police with no indication that such an operation could be found at Sterigere Street. There was no basis to support a conclusion that multiple harvest dates require different locations for growing marijuana and no expert declaration to establish that fact was offered. Furthermore, when the police approached the Sterigere Street house on October 29, 2004 at 7:00 pm, they had to trespass the curtilage of this residence. At the suppression hearing, Detective Altieri testified, “that the house is set back from the street, sitting at the end of a long driveway and that he pulled his truck in the driveway, went onto the property and proceeded to look into the windows” (N.T. 11/3/05 pages 40-43).” At that time the police officers put * On the face of the Sterigere Street Warrant, in the description of the premises to be searched, the Affiant states “This warrant also includes the curtilage surrounding the home which includes a green storage barn.” This contradicts Detective (Continued on following page) 33 themselves in a position where they could allegedly smell the odor of marijuana, yet they did not have a search warrant and there were no exigent circum- stances that would have excused one. Under the Fourth Amendment, there is an over- riding respect for the sanctity of the home and this protection has been extended to the curtilage, which is defined as an area where an individual reasonably may expect that he has a right to privacy. The curti- lage area is the area that surrounds and is immedi- ately adjacent to the residence and is afforded a greater privacy protection then that of an open field. In the instant case, the area surrounding the Sterigere Street premises was part of the “adjacent” area with respect to the home and therefore, the police clearly trespassed by leaving the public side- walk and proceeding down the long driveway, ap- proximately 40 yards, towards the home and then standing on Petitioner’s patio (N.T. 11/3/05 page 43), which was attached to the home, as they made visual and soon after olfactory inspections of the home. All without a search warrant. See Depew, supra. Petitioner took clear steps to shield his premises on Sterigere Street from public inspection. Petitioner Altieri’s testimony, “that the property was an open field and a yard,” then states “I think there was a fence around the back of the property.” (N.T. 11/3/05 page 41). Petitioner asserts that the one acre property is mostly surrounded by a fence including the front and that the mailbox is on the street. 34 took measures to safeguard his privacy in an area generally thought to be private, in a home that was deeply recessed from the public street and beyond the point at which a reasonable person would expect that there would be public traffic. Therefore, Petitioner exhibited an actual expectation of privacy with re- spect to the content of the Sterigere Street property, including but not limited to, the covering of windows and doors with the complete closing of blinds and curtains that shielded the inside of the house from public inspection. Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully submits that under all of these circumstances, the issuing author- ity did not have a substantial basis to authorize a search at Sterigere Street. The warrant that was issued was clearly influenced and tainted by the results of the police search and investigation con- ducted as a result of the unlawful search at Warren Street. The additional information that was set forth in the Affidavit for Sterigere Street was obtained by an unlawful trespass by the police into a private area that was not open to public traffic. An area that the police would never have entered had there not been the unlawful search at Warren Street. Therefore, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania should have reversed the Order denying suppression as to these premises as well. In the Affidavit for the primary search warrant at Warren Street the anonymous sources did not demonstrate an inside basis of knowledge and there is no information that qualifies their reliability or 35 veracity. The sources provide no predictive accounts of conduct or activity, criminal or otherwise and they do not provide when or how they came to make their observations. The sources did not know the occupant’s name or any other address associated with him. The police investigation revealed that the occu- pant was not at the property during their many periodic checks, the air conditioners and lights were on continuously, the windows were covered by the complete closing of blinds and curtains and the doors were locked. Notwithstanding the locked doors, this information could be observed from the “public” sidewalk or street. These general observations were publicly available and noncriminal in nature. The police investigation failed to corroborate that the occupant was a white male or that he owned or operated a silver pick-up truck, which was informa- tion presented to the police. Police did not associate the occupant with any other address except the one on Warren Street. The police did not corroborate that somebody comes to pick up the mail, which is deliv- ered every day, excluding Sunday, or that the occu- pant removes trash bags at night. Police do not see anyone coming or going to the property, yet there was supposedly a marijuana growing operation going on at the property. The police do not corroborate the two tips that the air conditioning units and lights are operating on a timer, only that they are continuously on. It is not corroborated by the police that the odor of marijuana existed or that marijuana could be seen growing on the first floor. In fact, it was not confirmed 36 that marijuana was growing or that it was ever growing on the first floor after the warrant was executed. The police failed to establish through a thermal search the existence of high powered hydro- ponic lamps or that there was an excessive amount of electricity being drawn at the property. Yet, this is how the Affiant concludes his Affidavit of probable cause. If our United States Supreme Court allows the primary search warrant at Warren Street to stand along with the fruits of such which was obtained in violation of Petitioner’s federal and state constitu- tional rights, it will lead the way for government intrusion of its citizens as well as corruption in our police to run amuck conducting unreasonable searches and seizures with unjust or no probable cause, breaking the very framework installed in our Constitution to prevent the loss of liberty of our citizens. The Supreme Court cannot allow our police to conduct searches and seizures on the grounds of accusations without any police or other corroboration where the reliability, basis of knowledge and veracity of anonymous sources are not established. 37 CONCLUSION For all the reasons expressed herein, Petitioner, Patrick H. Otterson, respectfully prays that the Supreme Court of the United States grant this Peti- tion for Writ of Certiorari and allow further review of the ruling of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and award appropriate relief in the interest of justice and fundamental constitutional concerns. Respectfully submitted, PATRICK H. OTTERSON, Pro-se App. 1 2008 PA Super 85 COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR PENNSYLVANIA, : COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee Vv. PATRICK H. OTTERSON, . Appellant : No. 1968 EDA 2006 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 20, 2006, In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Criminal Division at No. CP-46-CR-0009849-2004. BEFORE: LALLY-GREEN, GANTMAN and POP- OVICH, JJ. OPINION BY LALLY-GREEN, J.: FILED APRIL 29, 2008 {1 Appellant Patrick H. Otterson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 20, 2006, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, following his conviction for possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) marijuana, violation of the Uniform Firearms Act,’ and related offenses. This case is before us once again on remand from our Supreme Court. We affirm. ‘ 35 P.S. § 780-113(aX30). * 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 (persons not to possess, use, manufac- ture, control, sell or transfer firearms). App. 2 42 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case were fully set forth in the trial court opinion as follows: On March 30, 2006, [Appellant] was con- victed of three separate Bills of Information for violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Acts (the “Drug Act”) and for possession of a firearm. The main Bill charged three counts of violation of the Drug Act for possession and manufacture of marijuana plants between October 27, 2004[,] and October 29, 2004[,] at 420 West Warren Street, Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter, the “War- ren Sireet property”). Bill of? Information 9849.1 charged the same counts for posses- sion and manufacture of marijuana plants between October 29, 2004[,] and October 30, 2004[,] at 1202-1208 Sterigere Street, Nor- ristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter, the “Sterigere Street property”). Bill of Information 9849.2 charged [Appel- lant] with the same three counts for continu- ous manufacture and _ possession’ of marijuana plants between March 5, 2003[,] and October 30, 2004[,] at both the Sterigere Street property and the Warren Street prop- erty. These convictions were the result of events that took place between October 27 and October 30, 2004. On October 27, 2004, Officer Eugene Parsley of the Norristown Police Department executed a search warrant on the Warren Street property. As a result of the search, the App. 3 police seized 64 marijuana plants, hydro- ponic lamps, two light timers, a timer for an air conditioner, duct work, and filter and fluorescent lights, among other items. The Affidavit of Probable Cause executed by Offi- cer Parsley may be summarized as follows: On August 31, 2004, Detective Mi- chael Altieri of the Montgomery County Narcotics Enforcement Team received information from Upper Moreland Police Detective James Kelly that a confidential source pro- vided him with information that the Warren Street property was aban- doned, and that there was mari- juana growing inside the residence at that location. The confidential source stated that he/she has seen marijuana plants growing in pots on the first floor inside that residence; On August 31, 2004, Detective Alti- eri went to the Warren Street prop- erty to corroborate the information from Detective Kelly. It appeared that the property was locked up; the windows were all covered; and an air conditioner was running on the second floor, front; A resident of the 400-block of West Warren Street told Detective Altieri that a white male lives at the War- ren Street property on a part-time basis; that he drives a silver pick-up App. 4 truck; only arrives once a week, stays for a couple of hours and then leaves; Periodic checks of the property by the police revealed that the lights on the first floor stayed on all night. A check of the entire neighborhood by the police failed to locate the pick-up truck; The detective learned that [Appel- lant] is the lessee of 420 West [War- ren] Street, Norristown, Pennsylvania, and that [Appellant] had been ar- rested in the past for possession of a small amount of marijuana; On September 14, 2004, an anony- mous female called the Norristown Police to report that marijuana was being grown inside the Warren Street property; that no one lives there, and that it was just a “front.” In response to the call, Officer Christopher Narkin went to the lo- cation and observed that the resi- dence was locked up, and the windows were covered so no one could see inside. He reported his findings to Detective Altieri because he felt that there was something suspicious about how the residence was covered up; On September 16, 2004, a second anonymous female called Detective App. 5 Altieri and stated that marijuana was growing inside the Warren Street property. She said that a white male arrives about once a week and removes large trash bags from the residence under the cover of darkness and loads them onto his pick-up truck, that the air condi- tioners and lights operate on a timer, and that the man does not live there. She also said that one of the neighbors has seen marijuana growing on the first floor and that she and the neighbors feared for their safety and preferred to remain anonymous for this reason; Periodic checks of the property by the investigating police officers dur- ing the month prior to the issuance of the search warrant on October 27, 2004[,] failed to reveal any sign of [Appellant] or the pick-up truck. Yet, the lights were seen to be always lit on the first floor, the windows and doors were covered up and the air conditioner was running on the sec- ond floor, even in extremely cool weather. On October 8, 2004, [the trial court] issued a sealed search warrant for the use of a thermal imaging device at the Warren Street property. App. 6 On October 12, 2004, the thermal imaging scan was conducted, but due to the cold weather conditions (surrounding properties had their heat on), an accurate reading could not be obtained. Two air condition- ers on the second floor were run- ning, despite the cold weather; On October 27, 2004, Detective Jef- frey Koch reported to Detective Alti- eri that an unknown female had telephoned the Drug Tip Hotline and left a message that marijuana was growing inside the Warren Street property; that no one lives there; that a suspicious male goes to the residence periodically; and that the neighbors have smelled strange odors emanating from the property; On October 27, 2004, Officer Parsley and Detective Altieri spoke to a con- fidential informant who told them that he/she smelled the strong odor of “skunk weed” or “homegrown” marijuana coming from the Warren Street property; On October 27, 2004, Officer Parsley and Detective Altieri also spoke to another confidential informant who reported that he/she personally had seen marijuana growing inside the Warren Street property. This person also said that, after the police began App. 7 to investigate the property in late August, the occupant appeared to clear up the overgrown weeds and also covered the windows more thoroughly so no one could see in- side. The confidential informant also said the air conditioners still go on every night, even with the cold weather; Both confidential informants said that the occupant only comes to the residence periodically and that he “hasn't been seen there since last week.” While the officers were executing the search warrant at the Warren Street prop- erty, [Appellant] arrived. Upon seeing the of- ficers, [Appellant] fled, but was apprehended with his girlfriend a short time later. That same night, [Appellant] was arrested and read his Miranda warnings. He gave a statement admitting that he had harvested approximately 50 marijuana plants four months earlier. [Appellant] thle]n signed a consent ic search form for another one of his residences located at 2804 Village Green Lane, Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. As a result of this search, the police seized calendars denoting different harvest dates. Many of these harvest dates overlapped[,] suggesting that [Appellant] had more than one location where he [grew] marijuana. The calendars included harvest dates between March 5, 2003[,] and October App. 8 30, 2004. The calendars and [Appellant’s] statement formed the basis for [Appellant’s] conviction on Bill of Information 9849.2. On October 29, 2004, Detective Altieri executed a search warrant on the Sterigere Street property, the address shown on [Ap- pellant’s] driver’s license. As a result of the search, the police seized a total of 121 potted marijuana plants, calendars, hydroponic lamps, and a double barrel shotgun, among other items. Subsequently, [Appellant] filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrants. A hearing on this mo- tion was held on November 3, 2005[,] in front of the Honorable William T. Nicholas. On December 5, 2005, Judge Nicholas entered an Order denying [Appellant’s] motion and placed his findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. [Appellant’s] trial was held on March 29, 2006[,] and March 30, 2006. The [trial court] found [Appellant] guilty of the three Bills of Information charging [Appellant] [with] violations of the Drug Act. On July 25, 2006, [Appellant] was sentenced to not less than 5 years on the main Bill, not less than 5 years on Bill of Information 9849.1 and 3 to 5 years on Bill of Information 9849.2. These sentences were to run concurrent with one another. [The trial court] also sentenced [Ap- pellant] to 1 to 5 years for possession of a firearm to run consecutive with the other App. 9 sentences. [Appellant] appealed his judgment of sentence on July 25, 2006. In accordance with [Rule] 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, [the trial court] di- rected [Appellant] to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal no later than August 8, 2006. Appellant filed such statement on August 4, 2006. Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/2006, at 1-5 (footnotes omit- ted). {3 This case was previously before this Superior Court panel in 2007. In an unpublished memorandum filed on August 21, 2007, we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Otter- son, 938 A.2d 1119 (Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In a per curiam order filed December 28, 2007, the Supreme Court granted Appellant’s petition, vacated this Court’s memorandum affirming the judgment of sentence, and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa. 2001). See Common- wealth v. Otterson, 2007 Pa. Lexis 2908 (Pa. Dec. 28, 2007). 4 On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 1. Did the [trial court] err in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence seized as the result of an execution of a search warrant which lacked probable App. 10 cause for 420 W. Warren Street, Norris- town, PA? 2. Did the [trial court] err in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Suppress evidence seized at 1202 Sterigere Street, Norris- town, PA which was tainted by the ille- gal search and seizure conducted at 420 W. Warren Street and which was not supported by independent and lawfully acquired probable cause? 3. Was the evidence insufficient as a mat- ter of law to establish the Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on Bill No. 9849.2 where the [Commonwealth] did not establish that a corpus delicti ex- isted as to this offense? Appellant’s Brief at 4.° 975 In his first and second issues, Appellant chal- lenges the denial of his motion to suppress. Appellant first argues that the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant for the Warren Street property did not provide probable cause to search. Appellant claims the affidavit was fatally flawed because it was based on information obtained from confidential * In his supplemental brief filed post-remand, Appellant did not raise the third issue challenging the Commonwealth’s failure to establish the corpus delicti of the drug offense. Never- theless, because our initial memorandum disposing of this claim was vacated, we will again address this issue in the instant memorandum. App. 11 informants who did not have a history of reliability, there was no showing of how the informants acquired their information, and the criminal information was not corroborated by independent police investigation. As a result, Appellant claims that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the Warren Street property. See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 8. In his second issue, Appel- lant asserts that because the Warren Street property search was improper, the warrant obtained for the Sterigere Street property was unlawful as “fruit of a poisonous tree.” Jd. at 17. 46 We review orders denying a motion to suppress in accordance with the following, well established, standards: Our standard of review of a denial of sup- pression is whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the evidence of the prose- cution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts. App. 12 Commonwealth v. Brown, 924 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2002). { 7 Our Supreme Court has adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test for determining whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985). This test was first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test: [T]he task of the issuing authority is to make a practical, common sense assessment whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affi- davit, there is a fair probability that contra- band or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Further, [a] magistrate’s finding of probable cause must be based on facts described within the four corners of the affidavit[. ] Commonwealth v. Jones, 928 A.2d 1054, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal quotes and citations omitted). “(PJrobable cause does not demand the cer- tainty we associate with formal trials.” (Gates, 462 U.S. at 246.] Rather, a determi- nation of probable cause requires only that the totality of the circumstances demon- strates “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a par- ticular place.” (Torres, 764 A.2d at 537, quot- ing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239]. Thus, where App. 13 the evidence available to police consists of an anonymous tip, probable cause may be estab- lished upon corroboration of major portions of the information provided by the tip. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 246. Similarly, where the evidence consists of the allegations of a po- lice informant who has not previously pro- vided information, probable cause requires only corroboration of principal elements of information not publicly available. See Tor- res, 764 A.2d at 539-540. As recognized by the Court in Gates,“|iJt is enough, for pur- poses of assessing probable cause, that ‘{(clorroboration through other sources of in- formation reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,’ thus providing ‘a sub- stantial basis for crediting the hearsay.’” (Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-245, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960).] Brown, 924 A.2d at 1286-1287. 7 8 Our Supreme Court remanded the instant case to this panel for our consideration in light of Torres.‘ ‘ Torres involved consolidated appeals from two co- defendants. The Supreme Court explained that judicial economy was best served by disposing of the two appeals together because the police used the same affidavit of probable cause to support their applications for search warrants to both defendants’ apartments located at 5631 Rippey Street in Pittsburgh, Penn- sylvania. See Torres, 764 A.2d at 535. For our purposes in the instant matter, we note that our discussion of the Torres case reflects only the facts and holding of the Supreme Court with respect to the defendant identified as “Torres” in that case. App. 14 Therefore, we will review that case in detail. Torres was arrested and charged with three counts of homi- cide after the police found two guns and other in- criminating items during a search of his apartment conducted pursuant to a warrant. Torres filed a pre- trial motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment, asserting that the warrant was not sup- ported by probable cause. Following a hearing, the suppression court found that the affidavit of probable cause filed with the warrant application was “frus- tratingly sparse” in that it merely set forth in narra- tive form the information that the affiants had learned without clearly explaining where they ob- tained each piece of information. See Torres, 764 A.2d at 538. Further, the court found that there was no way for the issuing authority to tell from the affidavit how the anonymous sources cited therein had obtained their information.’ Finally, the suppres- sion court found that the only corroboration that imparted any reliability to the information obtained * The affidavit at issue in Torres identified the witnesses as follows: Numerous interviews have been conducted in this case. The identity of these witnesses is known to your affiants. These witnesses will be available to testify at any necessary court proceedings. Torres, 764 A.2d at 535. The Supreme Court explained that the tipsters were properly considered “anonymous sources” by the lower courts because “since none of them [was] named, there was no indication that any of them had previously provided information to the police and no reason was given for the failure to divulge their names.” Id. at 537 n.3. App. 15 from the anonymous sources was the officers’ obser- vations of a vehicle outside Torres’ apartment com- plex that matched the general description of the get- away car at the murder scene. In light of the lack of information regarding the basis of the unnamed sources’ knowledge or their veracity, as well as the failure of the affidavit to credit each piece of informa- tion to one of the sources, the suppression court concluded that the corroborated information was insufficient to sustain the search warrant. Id. As such, the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. {9 The Commonwealth appealed to this Court. We held that although the affidavit failed to expressly establish either the veracity of anonymous sources or the basis for their knowledge, the information that they provided to the police was sufficiently bolstered by certain indicia of reliability. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 714 A.2d 416, 420 (Pa. Super. 1998). As such, we concluded that the affidavit provided the issuing authority with a substantial basis to support his finding of probable cause to search, and reversed the order granting the defendant’s motion to sup- press. {10 On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court held that this Court “gave too much weight to the indicia of reliability attending the information included in the affidavit” and therefore erred in reversing the suppression order. Torres, 764 A.2d at 539. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s claim that a commonsense reading of the affidavit App. 16 indicated that at least one of the anonymous sources had personal knowledge of the events in question. The Supreme Court explained that: [T]he mere fact that one or more of the anonymous sources provided a somewhat de- tailed account of the activities of the victims and their assailants preceding the murders does not, in and of itself, constitute a signifi- cant indicia of the reliability of that informa- tion. In addition, the fact that the police verified the address, phone number and gen- eral age given to them for Torres — whose address and phone number were listed in the phone book and were therefore freely avail- able to the public — does not constitute a sig- nificant indicia of the reliability of the other information provided to the police by the anonymous sources. Id. {11 The Supreme Court also distinguished Torres from the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Gates, noting that the information provided by the anonymous sources in Gates contained not only a detailed account of the defendant’s activities in fur- therance of the crime, but also a correct prediction of future criminal acts. Id. at 539 n.7. No such predic- tive information was provided by the anonymous sources in Torres. Finally, the Court explained that the affiant’s observation of the vehicle parked outside Torres’ apartment complex (which matched the descrip- tion of the car seen fleeing from the murder scene) was not sufficient corroboration of the anonymous source’s App. 17 information. The Court explained that there was no clear indication in the affidavit as to how the police obtained their description of the fleeing vehicle. Even though the affidavit explained that the vehicle had a New York license plate, which was consistent with information that Torres indicated he was from New York, the affidavit did not provide that the police linked the plate to Torres or his co-defendant. Id. at 539-540. 412 The Supreme Court concluded in Torres: Although the basis of knowledge and verac- ity of anonymous sources are only factors to be considered by the issuing authority in making probable cause determinations, they retain a vital role in cases such as the in- stant one, where the affidavit of probable cause is almost entirely based on information gleaned from anonymous sources. Where, as here, there is no attempt made to estab- lish either the basis of knowledge of the anonymous sources or their general ve- racity, a strong showing of the reliabil- ity of the information that they have relayed to the police in the specific case is required in order to support a finding of probable cause. Such a showing is sim- ply not made by the affidavit of probable cause in the instant case. Id. at 540 (emphasis added). 413 The case presently before us is distinguishable from Torres. The affidavit at issue here was presented App. 18 as part of the application for a search warrant on October 27, 2004. The affiant provided that on August 31, 2004, a confidential source advised Detective James Kelly of the Upper Moreland Police Depart- ment that the Warren Street property was abandoned and that marijuana plants were growing inside. That day, Detective Altieri went to the Warren Street property and found the property locked up, the win- dows covered, and the air conditioning unit on the second floor turned on. In addition, the back deck of the property was overgrown with weeds. The affidavit provided that Detective Altieri spoke to an unidenti- fied neighbor who informed him that a white male typically arrived at the Warren Street property once per week, stayed a few hours, and then would leave. The neighbor stated that the man drove a silver pickup truck. 4114 The affidavit further provided that Sergeant Robert Sobeck of the Norristown Police Department performed periodic checks of the Warren Street property. During these checks, he noticed that there was no change in the condition of the property and the lights on the first floor stayed on all night. In addition, the affidavit indicated that Detective Alti- erl’s investigation revealed that Appellant was the lessee of the property and that he had previously been arrested for possession of marijuana. App. 19 715 The affidavit also cited two tips from anony- mous females.° The first anonymous tip provided that nobody lived at the Warren Street property and that it was being used as a “front” for a marijuana growing operation. The second anonymous source indicated that a white male visited the property once per week and was seen removing large trash bags under cover of darkness. The affidavit indicated that the second anonymous female stated that she and her neighbors wished to remain anonymous out of fear for their safety. 4716 The affiant indicated that in the month prior to filing the application for a search warrant, he con- tinuously checked the property and found no sign of Appellant or his vehicle. During the checks in the middle of the night, the affiant noticed that the lights remained on, the air conditioning remained on, and the windows and doors remained covered. {17 The affidavit provided that a warrant to use a thermal imaging device on the property was obtained on October 8, 2004. The thermal imaging scan was conducted on October 12, 2004. Due to cold weather conditions, an accurate reading could not be obtained. Nevertheless, the scan revealed two air conditioners running on the second floor of the property. * We note that it is unclear from the affidavit whether there were two separate anonymous female sources, or two separate tips from the same source. App. 20 718 The affidavit also provided that the affiant spoke with two confidential sources. One of these sources stated that he/she smelled “skunk weed,” a term commonly used to describe home grown mari- juana, coming from the Warren Street property. The other source informed the affiant that he/she person- ally saw marijuana growing inside the Warren Street property and that after the police began “snooping” around in late August, a person came and cleaned out overgrown weeds in the rear of the property and covered the windows more thoroughly. Both sources stated that the occupant came home only periodically and had not been there within the previous week. Again, the affidavit stated the confidential infor- mants did not want their identity revealed because they feared retaliation. 719 Here, unlike in Torres, the affidavit in ques- tion provided information regarding the basis of the confidential sources’ knowledge. For example, the affidavit specifically provided that one of the confi- dential sources told the affiant that he/she smelled “skunk weed,” and another source said they saw marijuana growing inside the Warren Street property. In addition, the veracity of the sources’ information was corroborated by independent police investigation. After the first anonymous tip on August 31, 2004, multiple law enforcement officers began periodic checks of the property. They saw the property as the multiple sources described it with windows covered and air conditioning units running inside. Further- more, the officers attempted to conduct a thermal App. 21 imaging scan of the property. Although the scan provided inconclusive results, it did reveal air condi- tioning units running inside the property in cold weather, as multiple sources had indicated to police. While the information that the officers corroborated was not necessarily criminal in nature, it was consis- tent with a marijuana growing operation. Finally, the information that was corroborated by the officers in this case was not “publicly available” in the same sense as the information corroborated by the affiant in Torres, who simply corroborated the source by looking in the phone book. 7 20 We have reviewed the four corners of the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant for Appellant’s Warren Street property. We conclude that the affidavit provided a substantial basis to support the issuing authority’s finding of probable cause to search. Furthermore, because we conclude the search of the Warren Street property was legal, it follows that Appellant’s claim that the evidence obtained from the Sterigere Street property is fruit from a poisonous tree also fails. Accordingly, we will not disturb the suppression court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Appellant’s first two issues are without merit. 421 In Appellant’s final issue he claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction on Bill 9849.2 for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. More specifically, Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to establish the corpus delicti for the crimes charged on Bill 9849.2. Appellant App. 22 claims that the evidence the trial judge relied upon in finding him guilty was limited to his oral and written admissions that he possessed 21 to 50 marijuana plants between March 5, 2003 and October 30, 2004. He asserts that the court erred in relying on his admissions because there was no evidence presented that the crime occurred. He claims, therefore, that his admissions should not have been considered by the court in reaching its verdict. See Appellant’s Brief at 29. {22 Initially, we point out that even though Appel- lant has framed his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the corpus delicti rule applies to the admissibility of evidence. See Com- monwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1097 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 781 (Pa. 2005). “Our standard of review on appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. To the extent that Appellant’s argu- ment challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that our standard of review for such claims is also limited: The standard we apply in reviewing the suf- ficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. App. 23 Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa. Super. 2006). {23 The corpus delicti rule provides that the Com- monwealth bears a burden of showing that the charged crime actually occurred before a confession or admission by the accused can be admitted as evi- dence. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 828 A.2d 1094, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 842 A.2d 406 (Pa. 2004). “The corpus delecti sic] is literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss er injury has occurred as a result of the criminal conduct of someone.” Id. “The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against ‘the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed.’” Com- monwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1158 (Pa. 2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Reyes, 681 A.2d 724, 727 (1996) (“Reyes I”). 124 In Commonwealth v. Reyes, 870 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2005) (“Reyes II”), our Supreme Court explained that Pennsylvania law requires courts to apply the corpus delicti ru e in two phases: In the first phase, the court determines whether the Commonwealth has proven the corpus delicti of the crimes charged by a pre- ponderance of the evidence. If so, the confes- sion of the defendant is admissible. In the second phase, the rule requires that the Com- monwealth prove the corpus delicti to the fact- finder’s satisfaction beyond a_ reasonable App. 24 doubt before the factfinder is permitted to consider the confession in assessing the de- fendant’s innocence or guilt. Id. at 894 n.4 (citations omitted). 4 25 Pennsylvania has adopted an exception to the corpus delicti rule. This exception, known as the “closely related crimes” exception, provides: [Wlhere a defendant’s confession relates to separate crimes with which he is charged, and where independent evidence establishes the corpus delicti of only one of those crimes, the confession may be admissible as evidence of the commission of the other crimes. This exception applies only where the relationship between the crimes is sufficiently close so as to ensure that the purpose underlying the corpus delicti rule, i.e., to prevent conviction where no crime has occurred, is not violated. Dupre, 866 A.2d at 1099. {26 In the instant matter, the record reflects the following. The Commonwealth initially filed 23 separate Bills of Information charging Appellant with multiple violations of the Drug Act between the dates of March 5, 2003 and October 30, 2004. The location of these offenses was both the Warren Street and the Sterigere Street properties. The Commonwealth con- solidated the charges into one Bill, number 9849.2, because all of the charges stemmed from a continuous course of conduct by Appellant. See N.T., 3/29/03, at 25-30. App. 25 {27 Following his arrest, on October 27, 2004, Appellant made a statement to police in which he admitted that he had been growing and selling mari- juana for over one and one-half years. Appellant argues that this statement should not have been admitted into evidence or considered by the court in reaching its verdict because the corpus delicti of the crime was not established. We disagree. {28 The record reflects that the Commonwealth introduced into evidence several photographs show- ing Appellant with marijuana plants. In addition, the Commonwealth introduced numerous calendars that had been found during the search of Appellant’s properties. On these calendars, on specific dates, were handwritten notes indicating when plants were to be watered as well as projected harvesting dates and other information related to harvesting. These dates spanned from March 2003, through October 2004. Furthermore, the search of Appellant’s Warren and Sterigere Street properties revealed multiple marijuana plants at these locations. This combined evidence was certainly sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was involved in an ongoing operation of growing mari- juana. Therefore, the corpus delicti was sufficiently proven and the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Appellant’s statement to police into evi- dence. Moreover, the combined evidence was suffi- cient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant violated the Drug Act between March 2003 and October 2004. Therefore, we conclude that the App. 26 trial court did not act erroneously or abuse its discre- tion in considering Appellant’s admission in reaching its verdict. Reyes I. 47 29 Furthermore, even if the corpus delicti for the crimes charged in Bill 9849.2 was not established by independent evidence, we nevertheless would affirm the trial court based on the “closely related crimes” exception. At the very least, Appellant’s statement to the police was related to his other drug charges on Bills 9849 and 9849.1. The corpus delicti for those charges is not in dispute. Therefore, because inde- pendent evidence established the corpus delicti of the other crimes charged, Appellant’s confession was properly considered as evidence for the closely related charges on Bill 9849.2. Dupre. {30 For the reasons set forth above, Appellant’s conviction on Bill of Information 9849.2 was sup- ported by sufficient evidence. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary fail. Accordingly, we affirm the judg- ment of sentence. {31 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/ Karen Reid Bramblett Prothonotary Date: App. 27 2007 WL 4555270 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Patrick H. OTTERSON, Petitioner. No. 961 MAL 2007. Dec. 28, 2007. Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered August 21, 2007, at No. 1968 EDA 2006, affirming the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Criminal Division, entered July 20, 2006, at No. CP- 46-CR-0009849-2004. ORDER PER CURIAM. AND NOW, this 28th day of December, the Peti- tion for Allowance of Appeal is hereby GRANTED, the Order of the Superior Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for consideration in light of Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa.2001). App. 28 COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR PENNSYLVANIA, : COURT OF Appellee - PENNSYLVANIA v. PATRICK H. OTTERSON, . Appellant : No. 1968 EDA 2006 ORDE AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2007, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: THAT the application filed September 4, 2007, re- questing reargument/reconsideration of the decision dated August 21, 2007, is DENIED. PER CURIAM App. 29 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE SUPERIOR OF PENNSYLVANIA, COURT OF é PENNSYLVANIA ppellee V. PATRICK H. OTTERSON, Appellant . No. 1968 EDA 2006 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 20, 2006, In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Criminal Division at No. CP-46-CR-0009849-2004. BEFORE: LALLY-GREEN, GANTMAN and POP- OVICH, JJ. MEMORANDUM: FILED AUGUST 21, 2007 Appellant Patrick H. Otterson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 20, 2006, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, following his conviction for possession with intent to deliver (‘PWID”) marijuana,’ violation of the Uniform Firearms Act,’ and related offenses. Upon review, we affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case were fully set forth in the trial court opinion as follows: ' 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). * 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 (persons not to possess, use, manufac- ture, control, sell or transfer firearms). App. 30 On March 30, 2006, [Appellant] was con- victed of three separate Bills of Information for violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Acts (the “Drug Act”) and for possession of a firearm. The main Bill charged three counts of violation of the Drug Act for possession and manufacture of marijuana plants between October 27, 2004[,] and October 29, 2004[,] at 420 West Warren Street, Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter, the “War- ren Street property”). Bill of Information 9849.1 charged the same counts for posses- sion and manufacture of marijuana plants between October 29, 2004[,] and October 30, 2004[,] at 1202-1208 Sterigere Street, Nor- ristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter, the “Sterigere Street property”). Bill of Information 9849.2 charged [Appel- lant] with the same three counts for continu- ous manufacture and possession of marijuana plants between March 5, 2003[,] and October 30, 2004[,] at both the Sterigere Street prop- erty and the Warren Street property. These convictions were the result of events that took place between October 27 and October 30, 2004. On October 27, 2004, Officer Eugene Parsley of the Norristown Police Department executed a search warrant on the Warren Street property. As a result of the search, the police seized 64 marijuana plants, hydro- ponic lamps, two light timers, a timer for an air conditioner, duct work, and filter and fluorescent lights, among other items. The App. 31 Affidavit of Probable Cause executed by Offi- cer Parsley may be summarized as follows: On August 31, 2004, Detective Michael Altieri of the Montgomery County Narcotics Enforcement Team received information from Upper Moreland Police Detective James Kelly that a confidential source pro- vided him with information that the Warren Street property was aban- doned, and that there was mari- juana growing inside the residence at that location. The confidential source stated that he/she has seen marijuana plants growing in pots on the first floor inside that reside::ce; On August 31, 2004, Detective Alti- eri went to the Warren Street prop- erty to corroborate the information from Detective Kelly. It appeared that the property was locked up; the windows were all covered; and an air conditioner was running on the second floor, front; A resident of the 400-block of West Warren Street told Detective Altieri that a white male lives at the War- ren Street property on a part-time basis; that he drives a silver pick-up truck; only arrives once a week, stays for a couple of hours and then leaves; App. 32 Periodic checks of the property by the police revealed that the lights on the first floor stayed on all night. A check of the entire neighborhood by the police failed to locate the pick-up truck; The detective learned that [Appel- lant] is the lessee of 420 West [Warren] Street, Norristown, Penn- sylvania, and that [Appellant] had been arrested in the past for posses- sion of a small amount of marijuana; On September 14, 2004, an anony- mous female called the Norristown Police to report that marijuana was being grown inside the Warren Street property; that no one lives there, and that it was just a “front.” In response to the call, Officer Christopher Narkin went to the lo- cation and observed that the resi- dence was locked up, and the windows were covered so no one could see inside. He reported his findings to Detective Altieri because he felt that there was something suspicious about how the residence was covered up; On September 16, 2004, a second anonymous female called Detective Altieri and stated that marijuana was growing inside the Warren Street property. She said that a App. 33 white male arrives about once a week and removes large trash bags from the residence under the cover of darkness and loads them onto his pick-up truck, that the air condi- tioners and lights operate on a timer, and that the man does not live there. She also said that one of the neighbors has seen marijuana growing on the first floor and that she and the neighbors feared for their safety and preferred to remain anonymous for this reason; Periodic checks of the property by the investigating police officers dur- ing the month prior to the issuance of the search warrant on October 27, 2004[,] failed to reveal any sign of [Appellant] or the pick-up truck. Yet, the lights were seen to be always lit on the first floor, the windows and doors were covered up and the air conditioner was running on the sec- ond floor, even in extremely cool weather. On October 8, 2004, [the trial court] issued a sealed search warrant for the use of a thermal imaging device at the Warren Street property. On October 12, 2004, the thermal imaging scan was conducted, but due to the cold weather conditions (surrounding properties had their App. 34 heat on), an accurate reading could not be obtained. Two air condition- ers on the second floor were run- ning, despite the cold weather; On October 27, 2004, Detective Jef- frey Koch reported to Detective Alti- eri that an unknown female had telephoned the Drug Tip Hotline and left a message that marijuana was growing inside the Warren Street property; that no one lives there; that a suspicious male goes to the residence periodically; and that the neighbors have smelled strange odors emanating from the property; On October 27, 2004, Officer Parsley and Detective Altieri spoke to a con- fidential informant who told them that he/she smelled the strong odor of “skunk weed” or “homegrown” marijuana coming from the Warren Street property; On October 27, 2004, Officer Parsley and Detective Altieri also spoke to another confidential informant who reported that he/she personally had seen marijuana growing inside the Warren Street property. This person also said that, after the police be- gan to investigate the property in late August, the occupant appeared to clear up the overgrown weeds and also covered the windows more App. 35 thoroughly so no one could see in- side. The confidential informant also said the air conditioners still go on every night, even with the cold weather; Both confidential informants said that the occupant only comes to the residence periodically and that he “hasn't been seen there since last week.” While the officers were executing the search warrant at the Warren Street prop- erty, [Appellant] arrived. Upon seeing the of- ficers, [Appellant] fled, but was apprehended with his girlfriend a short time later. That same night, [Appellant] was arrested and read his Miranda warnings. He gave a statement admitting that he had harvested approximately 50 marijuana plants four months earlier. [Appellant] thle]n signed a consent to search form for another one of his residences located at 2804 Village Green Lane, Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. As a result of this search, the police seized calendars denoting different harvest dates. Many of these harvest dates overlapped[,] suggesting that [Appellant] had more than one location where he [grew] marijuana. The calendars included harvest dates between March 5, 2003[,] and October 30, 2004. The calendars and [Appellant’s] statement formed the basis for [Appellant’s] conviction on Bill of Information 9849.2. App. 36 On October 29, 2004, Detective Altieri executed a search warrant on the Sterigere Street property, the address shown on [Ap- pellant’s] driver’s license. As a result of the search, the police seized a total of 121 potted marijuana plants, calendars, hydroponic lamps, and a double barrel shotgun, among other items. Subsequently, [Appellant] filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrants. A hearing on this mo- tion was held on November 3, 2005[,] in front of the Honorable William T. Nicholas. On December 5, 2005, Judge Nicholas entered an Order denying [Appellant’s] motion and placed his findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. [Appellant’s} trial was held on March 29, 2006[,] and March 30, 2006. The [trial court] found [Appellant] guilty of the three Bills of Information charg- ing [Appellant] [with] violations of the Drug Act. On July 25, 2006, [Appellant} was sen- tenced to not less than 5 years on the main Bill, not less than 5 years on Bill of Informa- tion 9849.1 and 3 to 5 years on Bill of Information 9849.2. These sentences were to run concurrent with one another. [The trial court] also sentenced [Appellant] to 1 to 5 years for possession of a firearm to run consecutive with the other sentences. [Appellant] appealed his judgment of sen- tence on July 25, 2006. In accordance with [Rule] 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of App. 37 Appellate Procedure, [the trial court] di- rected [Appellant] to file a Concise State- ment of Matters Complained of on Appeal no later than August 8, 2006. Appellant filed such statement on August 4, 2006. Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/2006, at 1-5 (footnotes omit- ted). On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 1. Did the [trial] court] err in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence seized as the result of an execution of a search warrant which lacked probable cause for 420 W. Warren Street, Norris- town, PA? Did the [trial court] err in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Suppress evidence seized t 1202 Sterigere Street, Norris- town, PA which was tainted by the ille- gal search and seizure conducted at 420 W. Warren Street and which was not supported by independent and lawfully acquired probable cause? Was the evidence insufficient as a mat- ter of law to establish the Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on Bill No. 9849.2 where the [Commonwealth] did not establish that a corpus deliciti existed as to this offense? Appellant’s Brief, at 4. App. 38 In his first and second issues, Appellant chal- lenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to sup- press. Appellant first argues that the affidavit of probable cause was not sufficient to support the search warrant for the Warren Street property. Spe- cifically, Appellant asserts that the confidential informants did not have a history of reliability, there was no showing of how the informants acquired their information, and the information was not corrobo- rated by independent police investigation. See Appel- lant’s Brief at 11. In a related argument, Appellant asserts that because the search of the Warren Street property was improper, the warrant obtained for the Sterigere Street property was unlawful as “fruit of a poisonous tree.” Id. at 20. Our review of such claims is governed by the following, well established, stan- dards: Our standard of review of a denial of sup- pression is whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the evidence of the prose- cution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its Jegal conclusions based upon the facts. App. 39 Commonwealth v. Brown, 2007 PA Super 149, 4 6, quoting Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super 2002). We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the findings of fact and conclu- sions of law issued by Judge William T. Nicholas, dated December 5, 2005. The record reveals support for Judge Nicholas’s findings of fact and we are satisfied that the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not erroneous. Therefore, we adopt Judge Nicholas’s analysis related to the legitimacy of the warrant for the Warren Street property as our own. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Sur Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, 12/5/05, at 1-7, 12. Furthermore, because we conclude that the search of the Warren Street property was legal, it follows that Appellant’s ciaim that the evi- dence obtained from the Sterigere Street property is fruit from a poisonous tree also fails. Accordingly, we will not disturb the suppression court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Appellant’s first two issues are without merit. In Appellant’s final issue he claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction on Bill 9849.2 for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. More specifically, Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to establish the corpus delicti for the crimes charged on Bill 9849.2. Appellant claims that the evidence the trial judge relied upon in finding him guilty was limited to his oral and written admissions that he possessed 21 to 50 marijuana App. 40 plants between March 5, 2003 and October 30, 2004. He asserts that the court erred in relying on his admissions because there was no evidence presented that the crime occurred. He claims, therefore, that his admissions should not have been considered by the court in reaching its verdict. See Appellant’s Brief at 29. Initially, we point out that even though Appellant has framed his argument as a challenge to the suffi- ciency of the evidence, the corpus delicti rule applies to the admissibility of evidence. See Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1097 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 781 (Pa. 2005). “Our stan- dard of review on appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether the trie! court abused its discretion.” Jd. To the extent that Appellant’s argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that our standard of review for such claims is also limited: The standard we apply in reviewing the suf- ficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa. Super. 2006). The corpus delicti rule provides that the Com- monwealth bears a burden of showing that the App. 41 charged crime actually occurred before a confession or admission by the accused can be admitted as evi- dence. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 828 A.2d 1094, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 842 A.2d 406 (Pa. 2004). “The corpus delecti {sic} is literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or injury has occurred as a result of the criminal conduct of someone.” Id. “The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against ‘the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed.’” Com- monwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1158 (Pa. 2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Reyes, 681 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1996) (“Reyes I’). In Commonwealth v. Reyes, 870 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2005) (“Reyes II”), our Supreme Court explained that Pennsylvania law requires courts to apply the corpus delicti rule in two phases: In the first phase, the court determines whether the Commonwealth has proven the corpus delicti of the crimes charged by a pre- ponderance of the evidence. If so, the confes- sion of the defendant is admissible. In the second phase, the rule requires that the Commonwealth prove the corpus delicti to the factfinder’s satisfaction beyond a reason- able doubt before the factfinder is permitted to consider the confession in assessing the defendant’s innocence or guilt. Id. at 894 n.4 (citations omitted). App. 42 Pennsylvania has adopted an exception to the corpus delicti rule. This exception, known as the “closely related crimes” exception, provides that: [Where a defendant’s confession relates to separate crimes with which he is charged, and where independent evidence establishes the corpus delicti of only one of those crimes, the confession may be admissible as evidence of the commission of the other crimes. This exception applies only where the relationship between the crimes is sufficiently close so as to ensure that the purpose underlying the corpus delicti rule, i.e., to prevent conviction where no crime has occurred, is not violated. Dupre, 866 A.2d at 1099. In the instant matter. the record reflects the following. The Commonwealth initially filed 23 separate Bills of Information charging Appellant with multiple violations of the Drug Act between the dates of March 5, 2003 and October 30, 2004. The location of these offenses was both the Warren Street and the Sterigere Street properties. The Commonwealth consolidated the charges into one Bill, number 9849.2, because all of the charges stemmed from a continuous course of conduct by Appellant. See N.T., 3/29/03, at 25-30. Following his arrest, on October 27, 2004, Appel- lant made a statement to police in which he admitted that he had been growing and selling marijuana for over one and one-half years. Appellant argues that this statement should not have been admitted into App. 43 evidence or considered by the court in reaching its verdict because the corpus delicti of the crime was not established. We disagree. The record reflects that the Commonwealth introduced into evidence several photographs show- ing Appellant with marijuana plants. In addition, the Commonwealth introduced numerous calendars that had been found during the search of Appellant’s properties. On these calendars, on specific dates, were handwritten notes indicating when plants were to be watered as well as projected harvesting dates and other information related to harvesting. These dates spanned from March 2003, through October 2004. Furthermore, the search of Appellant’s Warren and Sterigere Street properties revealed multiple marijuana plants at these locations. This combined evidence was certainly sufficient to establish by a preponderance of tne evidence that Appellant was involved in an ongoing operation of growing mari- juana. Therefore, the corpus delicti was sufficiently proven and the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Appellant’s statement to police into evi- dence. Moreover, the combined evidence was suffi- cient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant violated the Drug Act between March 2003 aad October 2004. Therefore, we conciude that the trial court did not act erroneously or abuse its discre- tion in considering Appellant’s admission in reaching its verdict. Reyes IT. Furthermore, even if the corpus delicti for the crimes charged in Bill 9849.2 was not established by App. 44 independent evidence, we nevertheless would affirm the trial court based on the “closely related crimes” exception. At the very least, Appellant’s statement to the police was related to his other drug charges on Bills 9849 and 9849.1. The corpus delicti for those charges is not in dispute. Therefore, because inde- pendent evidence established the corpus delicti of the other crimes charged, Appellant’s confession was properly considered as evidence for the closely related charges on Bill 9849.2. Dupre. For the reasons set forth above, Appellant’s conviction on Bill of Information 9849.2 was sup- ported by sufficient evidence. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary fail. Accordingly, we affirm the judg- ment of sentence, in part on the basis of the suppres- sion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Popovich, J. files a Dissenting Memorandum. Judgment Entered. /3s/ Karen Reid Bramblett Prothonotary Date: App. 45 FILED AUGUST 21, 2007 DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY POPOVICH, J.: Respectfully, I dissent from the Majority’s affir- mation of the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s sup- pression motisn. Based upon my review of the record, I would reverse the trial court’s order and suppress the evidence obtained from the search of both the Warren Street property and the Sterigere Street property and would remand the case to the trial court. Consequently, I would not reach Appellant’s final issue regarding the corpus delicti rule. When testing the sufficiency of an affidavit to obtain a search warrant, this Court applies the following guidelines: Before an issuing authority may issue a constitutionally valid search warrant, he or she must be furnished with information suf- ficient to persuade a reasonable person that probable cause exists to conduct a search. The information offered to demonstrate probable cause must be viewed in a common sense, nontechnical, ungrudging and positive manner. It must also be remembered that probable cause is based on a finding of the probability, not a prima facie showing of criminal activity, and that deference is to be accorded a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. [ ... ]. And the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for [... ] concluding that probable cause existed. App. 46 Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 647 A.2d 583, 585-86 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).' Additionally, the propriety of the issuance of a search warrant to an affiant must be judged solely upon the information before the magisterial district judge at the time of its issuance. Id., 647 A.2d at 586 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Con- sequently, the magistrate’s decision must be based on the four corners of the affidavit in support of the issuance of the warrant. Id., 647 A.2d at 586 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Often, the basis for issuing a search warrant arises from information provided to police by an informant’s tip. The reliability of an informant should be established by some objective facts that would enable any court to conclude that the informant [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386017_0332%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.