# Appendix — Lasting Beauty, LLC v. City of Chesapeake, Virginia (No. 06-1374)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

App. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix to Petition

Order of

The Supreme Court of Virginia

Re: Refusing Petition for Appeal
entered October 25, 2006

Memorandum Opinion of
The Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake
entered March 23, 2006

Order of
The Supreme Court of Virginia
Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing
entered January 19, 2007

Judgment and Final Order of
The Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake
Re: Refusing Petition for Appeal

entered May 3, 2006

App. 1

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the
Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on
Wednesday the 25th day of October, 2006.

Lasting Beauty, L.L.C., et al., Appellants,

against Record No. 061586
Circuit Court No. CH04-626

City of Chesapeake, et al., Appellees.
[Entered: October 25, 2006]
From the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake

Upon review of the record in this case and
consideration of the argument submitted in support
of and in opposition to the granting of an appeal, the
Court is of opinion there is no reversible error in the
judgment complained of. Accordingly, the Court
refuses the petition for appeal.

A Copy,
Teste:
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk

By: ae FF
Deputy Clerk

App. 2

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,
A Municipal Corporation, and
JAMES T. DAVIS, CZA, Zoning
Administrator,

Plaintiffs
Vv. Chancery No. 04-626

LASTING BEAUTY, L.L.C., and
DENISE HUMPHRIES,

Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 21, 2004, the City of Chesapeake (“the
City”) and James T. Davis, Zoning Administrator
(“Davis”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a Bill: of
Complaint seeking declaratory judgment and a
permanent injunction against Lasting Beauty,
L.L.C, (“Lasting Beauty”) and Denise Humphries
(“Humphries”) (collectively “defendants”) for their
alleged violation of section 7-602 of the Chesapeake
Zoning Ordinance.

On June 24, 2004, the defendants filed a
demurrer and answer and cross-bill, which alleged
that the zoning scheme relevant to tattoo parlors
and permanent makeup’ establishments’ be
declared invalid. Defendants also filed a Bill of
Particulars, which alleged that Chesapeake’s zoning
scheme relatin= to tattooing/intradermal
micropigmentation (1) violates the Dillon Rule; (2)
is not rationally related to a proper government

App. 3

purpose and fails to meet the “fairly debatable”
standard; (3) unconstitutionally burdens free speech
and expression rights guaranteed by the United
States and Virginia Constitutions; (4) denies equal
protection and due process rights guaranteed by the
United States and Virginia Constitutions; and (5)
constitutes an illegal attempt by the plaintiffs to
avoid the impact of a prior final order of this
tribunal striking down the former ban on tattooing.’

The plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the
defendants’ answer and cross-bill. By an agreed
Order, dated May 12, 2005, both the defendants’
and plaintiffs’ demurrers were overruled. At trial,
the parties stipulated that Lasting Beauty operated
in a B-2 zoning district and practiced intradermal
micropigmentation, which constituted tattooing
under the relevant zoning ordinance. The parties
agreed that the burden shifted to the defendants,
and they proceeded with their case. At the end of
the defendants’ case, the plaintiffs moved to strike
the evidence. The Court took the motion under
advisement.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence at trial established the following.
Humphries operates a business, Lasting Beauty,
located at 445 Battlefield. Boulevard, Suite Q,

’ Lasting Beauty filed an appeal from a decision of the
Chesapeake Board of Zoning Appeals denying Lasting Beauty’s
appeal of the violation letter issued to it on May 21,2003. By
Consent Order, dated May 5, 2005, this Court dismissed
Lasting Beauty’s appeal (CH04-26), but reserved to Lasting
Beauty the right to raise and pursue all claims and arguments
therein presented in this case.

App. 4

Chesapeake, Virginia 23320, that specializes in the
application of permanent makeup, also known as
micropigmentation. Lasting Beauty is located
within a B-2 zoning district. Section 7-602 of the
Chesapeake Zoning Ordinance does not permit the
operation of a tattoo parlor in the B-2 zoning
district. Section 3-403 of the Chesapeake Zoning
Ordinance defines tattoo parlor to _ include
permanent makeup services.

On June 20, 2001, the City Council enacted an
ordinance, which amended section 8-602 of
the Chesapeake Zoning Ordinance, permitting
tattoo parlors, including permanent makeup
establishments, to operate in the M-l and M-2
(“industrial”) districts within the City of
Chesapeake. The Council did so in response to
discovering that the previous ban on tattoo parlors
within the City of Chesapeake was not legal. The
evidence established that at the meeting on the
proposed ordinance, most of the City Council
members expressed opinions that tattoo parlors
should be banned. Additionally, Council members
were not presented with any evidence on the safety
concerns of tattooing when they decided to enact
the ordinance allowing the parlors to operate only in
industrial districts.

Evidence at trial established that since the
relevant ordinance concerning tattoo parlors was
enacted, at least one conditional use permit has
been granted to a tattoo parlor named Wally’s
American Pie Tattoo Company. Additionally,
another business named Holly’s Hair Nails and
More, operates in a B-2 district within the City of

App. 5

Chesapeake that applies permanent makeup.
Although known to the City, the City. has not
sought to bring an action against her such as it has
with defendants.

Evidence estab’ished that the clientele of Lasting
Beauty consists of women, generally 45 to 80 years
of age, who have an average annual income of
$50,000 or more. Additionally, defendants
presented evidence that individuals who receive
tattoos today differ from the perception of past
recipients and involve a greater diversity of
individuals. Finally, the evidence established that
there are 501.97 acres in the Greenbrier area alone,
and over 3,500 acres in the entire City, that are
zoned consistent with defendants’ requested use.

ANALYSIS

Defendants’ first argument is that the zoning
scheme is invalid because it violates the Dillon
Rule. This is so, defendants argue, because the City
has not been given the authority to ban the
operation of tattoo parlors. Defendants rely on this
Court’s June 5, 2001 ruling that section 15.2-912
does not permit localities to completely ban tattoo
parlors. Defendants contend that the current zoning
scheme acts as a de facto ban of tattoo parlors
within the City, exceeding the authority granted to
the City by § 15.2-9127>4n-response, the plaintiffs
argue that the City’s authority to zone tattoo
parlors is granted in Code §$§ 2280 - 2286, and the
zoning ordinance at issue was not enacted pursuant
to Code § 15.2-912.

The Dillon Rule provides that “municipal
governments have only those powers which are

App. 6

expressly granted by the state legislature, those
powers fairly or necessarily implied from expressly
granted powers, and those powers which are
essential and indispensable.” City of Virginia
Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d 314, 316
(1999) (citing Commonwealth v. County Board of
Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 574, 232 S.E.2d s30,
40 (1977)). The General Assembly has granted
authority to localities to enact zoning regulations.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2280 - 2286. Additionally,
localities possess the authority to “regulate the
sanitary condition of the personnel, equipment and
premises of tattoo parlors... ..” VA. CODE ANN. §
15.2-912. On June 5, 2001, however, this Court
ruled that Code § 15.2-912 does not give localities
the authority to ban tattoo parlors. (Exhibit D-5.)

The operation of tattoo parlors, for conditional
use, is permitted in Chesapeake within those
districts zoned industrial. Chesapeake Zoning
Ordinance, § 8-602. The evidence at trial was that
over 3,500 acres of land is zoned consistent with
defendants’ requested use. The Greenbrier area of
Chesapeake alone contains 501.97 acres so zoned.
At trial, Humphries admitted that the Greenbrier
area, with the traffic that other businesses bring,
could be good for business. Additionally, on June 16,
2002, the Council approved a conditional use permit
for a tattoo parlor to operate within the City.
Accordingly, the evidence does not support the
defendants’ claim that the current zoning scheme
constitutes a de facto ban on tattoo parlors within

App. 7

the City of Chesapeake.’ Finally, the defendants
have not argued that the City has exceeded its
authority under Code §§ 15.2-2280 - 2286.
Therefore, the Court finds that the current zoning
scheme regarding tattoo parlors does not violate the
Dillon Rule.

Defendants’ next argument is that the subject
zoning restrictions, facially and/or as applied,
unconstitutionally burden free speech and
expression rights guaranteed by the United States
and Virginia Constitutions. Defendants maintain
that tattooing is an art form entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as well as similar protections
from the Virginia Constitution. Defendants argue
that the City must prove that there are “no less

restrictive ways to accomplish any legitimate goals
or purposes the City is able to articulate.”
Defendants’ Bill of Particulars, *| 2.

Under the United States Supreme Court’s
First Amendment analysis, conduct constitutes
protected speech if it is “sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication.” Spence uv.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). The
question, then, is whether the act of applying
permanent makeup, or tattoos, is sufficiently
communicative such that it falls within the
protection of the First and _ Fourteenth

* This conclusion also dispenses with the defendants’ claim that
the zoning scheme was enacted in an attempt to avoid the
impact of this Court’s order striking down the former ban on
tattoo parlors.

App. 8

Amendments. See Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp.
1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980).

Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor
the Supreme Court of Virginia has addressed this
- issue. Of the few courts that have, the majority of
them have concluded that the act of tattooing
cannot be considered speech under the First
Amendment. See State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420,
423, 348 S.C. 532, 537 (2002) (holding the appellant
had not made any showing that the process of
tattooing is communicative enough to
automatically fall within First Amendment
protection); Yurkew, 495 F. Supp, at 1253
(concluding that the process of tattooing was not
protected speech under the First Amendment);
State ex rel. Medical Licensing Bd. v. Brady, 492
N.E.2d 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (same); People v.
O’Sullivan, 96 Misc. 2d 52, 53 (N.Y. Misc. 1978)
(same). Moreover, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that when a
tattoo is intended only as a form of self-
expression, not intending to convey a
particularized message, it is not protected speech
under the First Amendment. Stephenson ov.
Davenport, 110 F.3d 1303, 1307, n.4 (8 Cir. 1997).

. Defendants direct the Court’s attention to one
unpublished opinion by the Superior Court of
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, which concluded
that the act of tattooing was expression protected
by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Lanphear v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Mass. Superior Court Slip Opinion
99-1896-B (October 20, 2000), aff'd Commonwealth
v. Lanphear, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 1107, 737 N.E.2d

App. 9

1281 (2000). The Massachusetts court did not find
Yurkew and Stephenson persuasive, concluding that
those cases simply decided, without analysis, that
tattooing did not constitute conduct protected under
the First Amendment. See id.

This court has the benefit of the analysis
conducted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
however, which the Massachusetts court did not
have when it decided Lanphear. The South
Carolina Court recognized that a_ general
presumption of validity attaches to legislative acts
when subjected to a constitutional attack. White,
560 S.E.2d at 422, 348 S.C. at 536. Virginia
precedent establishes the same presumption.
Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 462, 571 S.E.2d 100,
108 (2002). Unless the legislation is clearly shown
to violate a constitutional provision, it will be
upheld. Jd. Accordingly, defendants have the
burden of showing that the instant zoning scheme
clearly violates a constitutional provision.

The only evidence offered by defendants
attempting to show that the zoning scheme
violated the provisions of the First Amendment was
Humphries’ testimony that she considers a tattoo a
form of expression and considers herself an artist.
Defendant’s subjective belief, however, is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity.
Defendants were required to show how the act of
tattooing or applying permanent makeup is
intended to convey a particularized message and
whether there is likelihood that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it. See White,
560 S.E.2d at 423, 348 S.C. at 537 (citing Texas uv.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)). Here, as in

App. 10

White, the defendants have not shown how the act
of injecting dye to create the tattoo, or permanent
makeup, is sufficiently communicative in nature to
warrant protection under the First Amendment.

Defendants also argue, however, that the zoning
scheme, relative to tattoo parlors and permanent
makeup establishments, is not even rationally
related to a proper governmental purpose, and
therefore fails to meet the ‘fairly debatable’
standard. Defendants’ Bill of Particulars, 7 1.
Both in their pleadings and at trial, the defendants
argued that because they had challenged the
reasoning behind and authority for the subject
zoning scheme, it was incumbent upon the City to
come forward with evidence to support the need and
basis for the regulations.

Defendants’ attempt to place the burden on the
City to prove that the zoning scheme is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest is in
error. The standard for judicial review of the
validity of zoning ordinances is well settled.
Board of County Supervisors v. The Southland
Corporation, 224 Va. 514, 522, 297 S.E.2d 718, 722
(1982). The action of a local governing body in
“enacting or amending its zoning ordinance is
presumed to be valid.” Jd. Where a party challenges
the presumptive reasonableness of a zoning
ordinance with “probative evidence of
unreasonableness, the ordinance cannot be
sustained unless the governing body meets the
challenge with some evidence of reasonableness.”
Id. If the governing body supplies evidence of
reasonableness “sufficient to make the question
‘fairly debatable, the ordinance must_ be

App. 11

sustained.” Jd. at 522-23, 297 S.E.2d at 722 (citing
Fairfax County v. Snell Corp., 214 Va. 655, 202
S.E.2d 889 (1974) and Board of Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959)).

Defendants presented evidence, in the form of
testimony from a former City Council member, that
at the time the provisions of the zoning scheme
regarding tattoo parlors were enacted, a number of
the Council members expressed opinions showing
bias against tattoo parlors and that the Council
members did not think they should be allowed at all
in the City. The former Council member also
testified that in his opinion, the decision not to
allow tattoo parlors in retail areas was politically
motivated. He further testified that there was no
evidence or information presented to the Council
that tattoos are unsafe.

This evidence, however, falls short of probative
evidence of unreasonableness. First, in considering
whether a legislative act is reasonable, generally
the motives of the governing body in undertaking
the act are immaterial. Helmick -v. Town of
Warrenton, 254 Va. 225, 231, 492 S.E.2d 113
(1997). Accordingly, whether the Council members
thought that tattoo parlors should be allowed in
the City is immaterial, particularly in light of the
Court’s ruling above that the extant zoning scheme
is not a de facto ban of tattoo parlors within the
City. Secondly, merely because the Council did not
receive information that tattoos are unsafe is not
relevant to whether permitting tattoo parlors to
- operate only in industrial districts is unreasonable.

App. 12

At most, defendant Humphries presented her
own testimony that she desired to operate her
business in its present location, along with her
opinion that the zoning scheme was unreasonable.
Although the City did not supply any evidence of
reasonableness at trial, the burden rested on the
defendants to supply probative evidence of
unreasonableness. The defendants simply did not
meet their burden. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity given to the zoning ordinance remains
intact.

The same analysis is applicable to the
defendants’ argument that the zoning scheme at
issue denies them equal protection and due process
rights. Defendants argue that the “zoning scheme
is much more burdensome on them than the
majority of the rest of the zoning scheme is on
similarly-situated businesses and providers of
services.” Defendants’ Bill of Particulars, f 3.
Defendants also failed to meet their burden on this
issue.

The classifications of the relevant zoning
scheme are not inherently suspect and, as
‘discussed above, do not infringe upon the exercise
of -a fundamental right. Accordingly, the
classifications at issue are “permissible if the
governmental objective is legitimate and the
classifications bear a reasonable or substantial
relation thereto.” Estes Funeral Home v. Adkins,
266 Va. 297, 304, 586 S.E.2d 162, 165 (2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The
classifications carry with them the same
presumptions and burdens as an ordinance itself

App. 13

and are presumed to be valid. Jd. at 304, 586 S.E.2d
at 165-55.

Accordingly, defendants must produce probative
evidence that the classification of which they
complain is discriminatory and not rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. Board
of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 135, 216
S.E.2d 199, 206 (1975). As discussed above,
however, defendants offered little more than their
opinion that there can be no legitimate government
interest for limiting tattoo parlors and permanent
makeup establishments to industrial areas.
Moreover, defendants have not shown that the
zoning scheme treats similarly-situated businesses
differently. The zoning scheme does not allow any
business supplying tattoos or permanent makeup
to operate outside of an industria! district.

Defendants’ arguments that the City is
selectively enforcing the subject zoning scheme,
ignoring other similarly-situated businesses that
are operating in violation of the zoning ordinances,
does not save their equal protection claim.
Defendants’ contention on this point is that
defendants have been singled out and given an
undue amount of attention, and that selective
enforcement violates both equal protection and due
process rights. The most evidence that defendants
presented at trial on this issue established that
another business operates within the City of
Chesapeake that applies permanent makeup, and,
although kncewn to the City, it has not sought to
bring an action against her such as with defendants
here.

App. 14

To succeed on a selective-prosecution claim, the
defendants must “demonstrate that the prosecutor’s
decision ‘was based on an_ unconstitutional
motive.” Boyd v. County of Henrico, 42 Va. App.
495, 522, 592 S.E.2d 768, 781 (2004) (citing Rowsey
v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 2003)). The
prosecution must be “deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification, ‘including the exercise
of protected statutory and constitutional rights.” Jd.
(citation omitted). Defendants have not supplied
any evidence that the “undue attention” they claim
they have received from the City has been
deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard.

9
Accordingly, to the extent that defendants argue
that the City has selectively enforced the extant
zoning scheme, their argument fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant
the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendants’
evidence. Additionally, the Court finds that
defendants are in violation of section 7-602 of the
Chesapeake Zoning Ordinance, and the City’s
prayer for an injunction permanently enjoining the
defendants from providing permanent makeup
services at 445 Battlefield Boulevard, Suite Q,
Chesapeake, Virginia, 23320 should be granted.
The Office of the City Attorney is hereby directed
to draft an order in accordance with this
Memorandum Opinion and circulate it for counsel’s
endorsements.

App. 15

The Clerk is hereby directed to send a certified
copy of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of
record.

Entered: [March 23, 2006]

| San
Circuit Court Judge

App. 16

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the
Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on
Friday the 19th day of January, 2007.

Lasting Beauty, L.L.C., et al., Appellants,

against Record No. 061586
Circuit Court No. CH04-626

City of Chesapeake, et al., Appellees.
(Entered: January 19, 2007}
Upon a Petition for Rehearing

On consideration of the petition of the appellants
to set aside the judgment rendered herein on the
25th day of October, 2006 and grant a rehearing
thereof, the prayer of the said petition is denied.

A Copy,
Teste:
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk

By: original order signed by a
deputy clerk of the Supreme
Court of Virginia at the
direction of the Court

Deputy Clerk

App. 17

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,
A Municipal Corporation,

and

JAMES T. DAVIS, = CZA,
Zoning Administrator,

Plaintiffs,
v. IN CHANCERY NO.: CH04-626
LASTING BEAUTY, L.L.C.
and
DENISE HUMPHRIES,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDER

In accordance with the Court’s memorandum
opinion dated March 23, 2006, the Court grants the
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Defendants’ evidence
introduced in support of the Defendants’ Cross Bill
and will grant the Plaintiffs’ prayer for a permanent
injunction. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the
Defendants’ Cross Bill is dismissed and ORDERS
that the Defendants are perpetually enjoined from
providing permanent makeup services at 445
Battlefield Boulevard, Suite Q, Chesapeake, Virginia
23320. However, by agreement, the injunction
granted herein is stayed pending exhaustion of
Defendants’ appeal rights.

App. 18

Entered: [May 3, 2006]

/s/
Circuit Court Judge

ASKED FOR REGARDING THE RULING
RESULT, AND OBJECTED TO REGARDING THE
COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NO
EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED AT TRIAL OF THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE LOCATION OF TATTOO
PARLORS. EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED AND
ACCEPTED BY THE COURT THAT 501.97
ACRES IN THE GREENBRIER AREA AND OVER
3,500 ACRES IN THE ENTIRE CITY ARE
ZONED FOR THE OPERATION OF A TATTOO
PARLOR. THIS EVIDENCE CONSTITUTES
REASONABLENESS UNDER THE ‘FAIRLY
DEBATABLE” STANDARD.

/s/
Grady A. Palmer, Esq.
Office of the City Attorney
306 Cedar Road
Chesapeake, VA 23322
(757) 382-6586
(757) 382-8749 (facsimile)

Counsel for City of Chesapeake,
James T. Davis, CZA, Zoning Administrator

SEEN AND OBJECTED TO IN ACCORDANCE
WITH MATERIALS FILED WITH THE COURT,
EVIDENCE PRESENTED, AND ARGUMENTS
MADE ON THE RECORD. ALSO OBJECTED TO
ON THESE GROUNDS: 1) THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT HUMPHRIES MADE

App. 19

ANY SORT OF MEANINGFUL ADMISSION
RELATING TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE
ZONING SCHEME OPERATES AS A DE FACTO
OR QUASI-BAN; 2) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ITS INTERPRETATION OF DEFENDANTS’
DILLON RULE ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE;
3) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REJECTING
DEFENDANTS’ UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE AND
APPLYING THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD ON A
MOTION TO STRIKE.

/s/
Kevin E. Martingayle, Esq.
Stallings & Bischoff, P.C
2101 Parks Avenue, Suite 801
Virginia Beach, VA 23451
(757) 416-6009
(757) 428-6982 (facsimile)

Counsel for Lasting Beauty, LLC.
and Denise Humphries

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_2435%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
