# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nisselson v. Lernout, 127 S. Ct. 2131 (2007) (No. 06-1160)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

05-1774 061160 FEB23 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States

ALAN NISSELSON, Trustee of the Dictaphone Litigation Trust,
successor-in-interest to claims of Dictaphone Corporation,

Petitioner,

JO LERNOUT, et al.,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MAX FOLKENFLIK

Counsel of Record
FOLKENFLIK & MCGERITY
1500 Broadway, 21st Floor
New York, New York 10036
(212) 757-0400

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

. Where an acquiring company succeeds in fraudulently
merging with its target, and the target’s securities fraud
claims pass first to the defrauding acquirer’s subsidiary
as a matter of law, and thereafter to a bankruptcy estate
and a litigation trustee, may the trustee be denied recov-
ery on the ground of in pari delicto only if the two-
part test adopted by this Court in Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) is met?

. Does a trustee or receiver “bear at least substantially
equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to
redress” as “a direct result of his own actions” thereby
satisfying the first prong of the Bateman Eichler test
whenever. principles of imputation make him respon-
sible for the wrongs of a “guilty” predecessor?

. Does Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code require a
finding that a trustee acquiring the claims of a debtor
bears “equal responsibility” as “a direct result of his
own actions” for the wrongs underlying those claims
whenever the debtor would have been found to have
“equal responsibility”?

. Does arule of law denying recovery to all trustee suc-
cessors for all defrauded merger targets “significantly
interfere with the effective enforcement of the securi-
ties laws and protection of the investing public” under
the second prong of the Bateman Eichler test, thereby
requiring the defense to be denied?

. Does Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code create a fed-
eral rule of imputation consistant with this Court’s rul-
ing in O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79
(1994), thereby requiring all trustees obtaining rights to
claims in bankruptcy to be found in pari delicto on all
state law causes of action whenever the debtor would
have been so found, irrespective of the provisions of
state law otherwise governing the claim and defense?

LIST OF PARTIES — Rules 14.1(b) and 29.6

A. Parties Originally Named in the District Court.

Jo Lernout; Pol Hauspie; Nico Willaert; Gaston Bas-
tiaens; Carl Dammekens; Ellen Spooren; Ju-Chul Seo:
Erwin Vandendriessche; RVD Securities N.V.; Dick
Cauwelier; Mare G.H. DePauw; Francis Vanderhoy-
donck; Gerard van Acker; S.AI.L. Trust V.Z.W., Flan-
ders Language Valley Fund; Flanders Language Valley
Fund Management; Lessius Management Consulting,
N.V.; Gewestelijke Investeringsmaatschapp1) Vlaanderen
N.V.; L&H Investment Company, N.V.; Language Invest-
ment Company: Language Development Services: Mer-
cator and Noordstar N.V.; Language Development Fund;
Velstra Pte Ltd., Louis H. Verbeke; Willem Hardeman;
Tony Snauwaert: Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
Bedrijfsrevisoven; KPMG LLP; Paul Behets; SG Cowen
Securities Corporation: Chase Securities, Inc., as suc-
cessor to Hambrecht & Quist: Deloitte & Touche; Ston-
ington Partners, Inc.: Stonington Capital Appreciation
1994 Fund L.P.; Stonington Holdings, LLC; John H.
Duerden; Albert J. Fitzgibbons, III]; Emil F. Jachmann;
Alexis P. Michas; Scott M. Shaw: Joseph D. Skrzypczak;
and Peter P. Tong.

B. Changes of Parties in the District Court.

The District Court entered judgment solely as to Jo
Lernout; Pol Hauspic; Nico Willaert: Gaston Bastiaens;
Carl Dammekens; Ellen Spooren; Ju-Chul Seo; Erwin
Vandendriessche; RVD Securities N.V.; Dick Cauwelier:
Marc G.H. DePauw; Francis Vanderhoydonck; Gerard
van Acker: S.AI.L. Trust V.Z.W., Flanders Language
Valley Fund, Flanders Language Valley Fund Manage-
ment; Lessius Management Consulting, N.V.; Gewest-
clijke Investeringsmaatschappij Vlaanderen N.V.; L&H

ill

Investment Company, N.V.; Language Investment Com-
pany; Language Development Services: Mercator and
Noordstar N.V.; Language Development Fund; Velstra
Pte Ltd., Louis H. Verbeke; Willem Hardeman; Tony
Snauwaert; Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijf-
srevisoven; KPMG LLP; Paul Behets; SG Cowen Secu-
rities Corporation. Chase Securities, Inc. and Deloitte &
Touche are no longer parties to the action. The case to
the remaining parties is pending.

C. Changes of Parties in the Court of Appeals.

None

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The Dictaphone Litigation Trust is a trust, without
shareholders, parents or subsidiaries. KBC Bank, N.V.
and Fortis Bank, N.V. each have a beneficial interest in
the Trust exceeding 10%.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CIEE See. F PUREST EAD oj nccedaxs siuseantewen
LIST OF PARTIES—Rules 14.1(b) and 29.6 ....
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.....
SPE EP PLATI Ee TORSO bs crab da Means cesta ncbenaens

FURR NEG TF NGIT OES 5 ccs tka bec baxnaboWhkesk beret

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS ....... 5.5.62: hee

PRE NCIS MPP Leh Cees ees veep sa eyavnsents

PRs SHEE ee Oa. © RAE eras oh pucae rece uekaeons

5. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. ...¢. 6.5:

C. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION...

. THE COURS OF APPEAL oi iss vcckans-

THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .

1. The Question of Whether a Trustee
May Be Held “Jn Pari Delicto”
on Federal Claims because of his
Predecessor’s Fault is an Important
Issue Left Open by this Court in
Bateman Eichler, which has Split

LUNE et Ta Se ar canes Mee S ie ey a a Le er

A. Under General Equitable Principles
and with regard to the Limited
Role of Jn Pari Delicto Defense

in Federal Claims, a Trustee is
Not “of Equal Fault” with the
Wrongdoer..... lok Rea canecunee beau

B. The Trustee Here Asserting a Claim
Originally Held by anInnocent —
Victim of Fraud was Not of
Equal Fault with Defendants.......

C. Bankruptcy Code §541 Neither
Prohibits Consideration of Equities
Presented by a Trustee Suit Nor —
Trumps this Cov *’s Bateman
Eichler Test in Determining the
Proper Application of Jn Pari
BE icacsoecuascostaensuedcasiness

Allowing In Pari Delicto to Defeat
Claims of Defrauded Merger

Targets Substantially Interferes

with the Policies of the Federal
ENG RI cn vr xvceaesscessausvoaneee

Allowing Bankruptcy Code Section 541
to Federalize the Application of State
Law Claims of Jn Pari Delicto Violates
this Court’s Holding in O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC and is also an Important
Issue Meriting Review by this Court...

RRP ROUES . evn ndcensayetVoutebsceuriuabencases

15

18

19

23

30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases: PAGE

Adelphia Communs. Corp. v. Bank of America
(In re Adelphia Communs. Corp.),

Bae ae, Oe COR, oo co bbb coco bdekcbanenceds 29
Baena v. KPMG, LLP. 453 F.3d |

CERES Sy SP bivcinbae keene hocks eciaabactuue }?
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.

GSE i ROT ORE Koso bin bad hhc tka epivewns passim
A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines

OO ie Oe er PT ickcxcckpiwsnccnetes 24
Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co..,

og ee 1 EE 2 37-8 Bee ee een Comrie 16, 27
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du bois,

REZ Oy POR EOD oes esend ccabedodwaxbewds 2?

ELF. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979

Cy ee Oe Go re ieee ek OS ee ae 9
FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d i7

CPPS SO OAED 5 dhasneadededseis ites passim
Grassmueck v. America Shorthorn Association,

GE? Fi 3G BS9. (BU Cis, FOSS oe nv.cvcwdivenccsess 5
In re: Hedged-Investments Associates, Inc.,

BO F506 F205. CUR CH, FON cia cievncncncss 6
Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085—

Ce a Se BED core cate ecu redecaiewodwad sowie: 6,9

Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator
CO ce a Ae Psa c,h eae bodes 20

Vii
PAGE

McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935).... 16, 17

Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (in re Mediators,

Inc.), 105 F.3d 822 (2d Cir. 1997) .......... 6, 9, 11
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482

CIES ine kkccd candiesavussdsass si eie ate 22
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79

CP yaks Co oad bo as ed cs Ca passim

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145
(2006), cert. denied sub nom Laddin v.
Reliance Trust Co., 2006 U.S. LEXIS
5711) (Octoter Z, 2006) 6.0.6cccces 4, 15, 20, 23, 29

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340
CoG S56 Seeks osc cen 5, 15, 29

Perina Life Mufflers v. International Parts
as Pee, ES MK LG) | Bree ya 14, 24

Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988)...9, 13, 23, 24, 25

SEC v. North American Research &
Development Corp., 280 F.Supp. 106

CBee, 2a CE oon danhbewis dhe oo eas 24
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750
CFU SL Sik io dettectc ise, 5, 14, 17, 18

Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner,
O64 F206 134 (206 Cit, 1998) uns cadets ccciwec 6,9

Talz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion
Tech. Group, Inc.), 332 B.R. 225
C52 Pa aD nk bbc kaddseasnivadathiasescdhs 20

vill

PAGE

In re Telegroup, Inc. v. Telegroup, Inc.,

en Oe Gry RED ces isecencceeeves 22
Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec),

133 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4792 ........ 5
In re The Personal and Business Insurance

Agency v. McNamara, 334 F.3d 239

See eae cick nye tevaceeyerccssvesde @° Ua
McNamara vy. PFS (In re Personal &

Bus. Ins. Agency), 334 F.3d at 246

er du vacseesaeceyeees 17
Waslow v Grant Thornton LLP (in re

Jack Greenberg, Inc.), 240 B.R. 486

er Ba Cv awae vice sevaesuceters 29
Williams v. California Ist Bank, 859 F.2d 664

ee. ese poe dywac ese etees 9
Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591

rls ive pve tes eestsceseceen 13
State Cases:
Albers v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust

Be Bie PR. OHO CUDIE) . i... cece cee oee 18
Brooke v. Kennedy, 172 Ga. 461 (1931).......... 29
Camerer v. California Say. & Commercial

eS er Ee Be eo ks 18

Choquette v. lsacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329
SS ra 28

iX =

PAGE

ISP.com, LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767

CR; DE cdi osendcdeieccen eeawinedevetsaiesuee 17-18
Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin

Richter & Hampton LLP,

133 Cal. App. 4th 658 (2005) ................ 29
Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc.,

845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).................-. 10
Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge,

Bae. BOS FO, Sa CIM sv avdavyeneccqetyeauss 18, 29
Statutes:
DE a i hav ein eco enedasasdond osuatande 19
EE See WEE cncchccupacodsscncuxouturenese ceases passim
EE EA. Peete Me oh vin ca vicesbenecusaereasesans 27
RS UR © RR sive i ee cds ccs ceciice 28
ED ic B FOe vii heii evdeniedsavecadeensweeieces 12
BS Sites Oe PRs svi Sandvetasitiettikeecee 2
BO Wierd O BGO os vncicsinticcd saneerkstesGeatanere l
Ge Ra OE nhac i incke de cnessiseveaweWacctnens ]
1S U.S. OG 1967 OO8 TFGG onc cscseescceissevas oe
ee Oe EE ee PR Rae eer 2

Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pen... LATS, CS BAA, Beas cvescvvasceevess 28

Det: O03. 620 ai insincere 6, 19

PAGE
Miscellaneous
Slain & Kripke, The Interface between Securities
Regulation and Bankruptcy—Allocating
the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance
Between Securities Holders and the
Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 261.... yd.

Warren, Bankruptcy Policy,
Pe Aree EN FIG TOE soced cckoeshcswapees 22

Gerald L. Baldwin, /n Pari Delicto Should
Not Bar a Trustee's Recovery,
ra Se "Be ee Re Se ee mes pone 20

Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense:
The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has
Nothing to Do with What is § 541
Property of the Bankruptcy Estate,
Bt Mey TOOT. FAW; FL DTF oo kc di cre ccc cectss 20, 21

Making Sense of the In Pari Delicto
Defense: “Who's Zoomin’ Who?”
23 No. 11 Bankr. Law Letter |
GPR eR so ooo dk Cheeks coh adi ed 64 dak Pee bes 20

Robert T. Kugler, The Role of Imputation
and In Pari Delicto in Barring
Claims Against Third Parties,
| No. 14 Andrews Bankr. Lit. Rep. 13
ER i cient akuns Sass ouee Muanareciaueebiion 20

Tanvir Alalm, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit
Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How
In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted to
Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors,
77 Am Bannkr. L.J. 305 (Summer 2003).... 20

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 469
F.3d 143 (Ist Cir. 2006) and is reprinted in the Appendix
hereto at 1a to 25a.

-\ The opinion of the District Court granting the Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by SG Cowen
Securities Corporation (“Cowen”) is reported at 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13648 (D. Mass., July 21, 2004) and is
reprinted at 26a to 40a. A further Memorandum and
Order allowing the motions to dismiss of various other
defendants is not reported and is reprinted at 41a to 42a.
Two unreported orders of the District Court granting the
motions by certain defendants for an order pursuant to
Rule 54(b) to enter a separate judgment of dismissal are
reprinted at 43a to 45a, and 46a to 48a. A further unre-
ported order of the District Court amending the prior
judgment to correctly specify the parties against whom
all claims were dismissed is reprinted at 49a to 50a. An
unreported order of the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Rule 60(a), allowing the District Court to enter the cor-
rected judgment is reprinted at 5la to 53a.

JURISDICTION

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction of
this action pursuant to Section 27 of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and the
principles of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court’s dismissal of the claims against certain named
defendants on November 8, 2006. Pursuant to the Order
of Justice Souter dated February 2, 2007, this petition is
due to be filed on February 23, 2007. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

tJ

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

-Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 54],
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), Rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5( 2000), and
the pertinent provisions of the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1964
ure reprinted in the appendix hereto at App. 54a to 63a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. INTRODUCTION

This case involves the proper scope of the in pari
delicto defense when it is asserted against a claim by a
Trustee or receiver who has inherited the claim from a
wrongdoer. Both logic and experience indicates that this
is the context in which the defense its most likely to be
raised since a corporate wrongdoer is most likely to suc
its confederates after those in charge of the wrongful
acts have lost corporate control.

Absent clear guidance from this Court on the issue,
and there has been none, itt is perhaps not surprising that
the issue of whether a Trustee is continued to be bur-
dened with the in pari delicto defense to the same extent
as his predecessor-in-interest is one which has deeply
split the circuits. What is surprising, however, is how
frequently the circuits have decided the issue without
reference to the governing precedents from this Court,
und that even those who did address this Court's require-
ments applied them inconsistently.

The application of the in pari delicto detense in fed-
eral courts is governed by two decisions of this Court,
both of which were misapplied by the First Circuit
below. In the first, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Ince.

v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) this Court held that a pri-
vate securities fraud suit for damages, or other like cases
involving federal law claims implicating the public
interest, “may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiff’s
own culpability only where”

(1) as a direct result of his ow. actions, the plaintiff
bears at least substantially equal responsibility for
the violations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion
of suit would not significantly interfere with the
effective enforcement of the securities laws and pro-
tection of the investing public.

Id. at 310-11, emphasis supplied.

In the second, O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S.
79 (1994), this Court held that in contrast to those strict
requirements for allowing the defense in cases arising
under federal law, where the claims asserted arise under
State law, then, state law principals alone govern the
application of the defense to those state law claims.

In determining the critical issue under the first prong
of the Bateman Eichler test, whether the Trustee’s lia-
bility in this case is “substantially equal” to that of the
defendants, the First Circuit ignored Bateman Eichler
and the policies behind it. Instead, the court of appeals
focused exclusively on the “genealogy” of the Trustee’s
claim, as having passed through the hands of a wrong-
doer. Although the claim rose in innocence as a claim of
a defrauded merger target, and was asserted by an inno-
cent trustee, acting for the benefit of the innocent cred-
itors, the First Circuit applied a mechanical test. It held
that a bankruptcy trustee, and therefore the Trustee in
this case, “stands in the shoes” of his predecessor, and is
barred by in pari delicto if his predecessor would have
been. As we show below in Point 1.A, this approach is

/
ed

4

contrary to the Bateman Eichler rule and long standing
concepts of equity jurisprudence.

The second prong of the Bateman Eichler test was
misapplied following the same mechanical approach.
Since the Trustee was found by the court of appeals to
be a “guilty” participant (by imputation), the policies of
the securities laws were not interfered with since those
laws do not exist to give wrongdocrs a “second bite at
the cherry.” App. at 23a. Allowing the resolution of the
Bateman Eichler “equal guilt” prong (particularly when
guilt is solely through imputation) to determine the
result of the “significant interference” prong, effectively
nullifies the second prong of the Bateman Eichler test.
Further, as we show in Point 2 below, a rule of law that
insulates from suit those who participate in fraudulent
corporate acquisitions clearly does interfere with the

effective enforcement of the securities laws and pro-
tection of the investing public,” and for that reason alone
the decision below merits reversal.

The court of appeals also dismissed the state law
claims using its court devised federal law of imputation
which, as we show below in Point 3, is contrary to this
Court's holding in O'Melveny and contrary to governing
Massachusetts law.

This case calls for review by this Court, however, not
merely because of the errors of the First Circuit below,
however serious, but because those similar failures to
apply this Court’s rulings in Bateman Eichler and
O'Melveny have occurred in case after case, and in
growing numbers, and will continue to occur until this
Court clarifies the issues. The First Circuit decision in
this case below followed the Eleventh Circuit in Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v.
Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145 (2006) which contained the
same errors.

The Third Circuit in Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 357 (3d
Cir. 2001) applied in pari delicto to bar federal and state
law claims of a creditors’ committee without even citing
Bateman Eichler, and by applying a federal standard of
imputation, contrary to the command of O’Melveny and
of Pennsylvania law which governed the state law
claims. See Point 3, infra. In In re The Personal and
Business Insurance Agency v. McNamara, 334 F.3d 239
(3d Cir. 2003), the same circuit, again without citation to
Bateman Eichler, held a bankruptcy trustee was not pro-
hibited from recovering fraudulent conveyance based on
the debtor’s participation in pre-petition fraudulent con-
veyances.

The Seventh Circuit reached the conclusion in Scholes
v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995) that “the
defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person
who is in pari delicto is eliminated.” Citing [llinois
cases and Supreme Court precedent, but notably not the
Bateman Eichler decision, the defense was rejected for
both federal securities and state law claims. '

Similarly, the Eighth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have
held a bankruptcy trustee’s state law claims is barred by
in pari delicto if his predecessor would have been using
federal court made imputation law in violation of the
rule in O’Melveny.* The Second Circuit has followed its

| Accord FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir.
1995) (“While a party may itself be denied a right or defense on
account of its misdeeds, there is little reason to impose the same pun-
ishment on. . . [an] innocent entity that steps into the party’s shoes
pursuant to court order or operation of law.”)

2 E.g., Grassmueck v. Am. Shorthorn Ass'n, 402 F.3d 833, 836
(8th Cir. 2005) (applying in pari delicto to bar state law claims of
bankruptcy trustee based on federal court made imputation rule); Ter-
lecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec), 133 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4792 (October 5, 1998) (same); Jn re:

6

own drummer and held that a bankruptcy trustee loses
standing to assert claims where the debtor has partict-
pated in the wrongdoing.’

This large and growing list of circuit court cases dis-
regarding or conflicting with this Court’s governing
opinions and the still larger number of district court and
Bankruptcy Court cases containing the same defects,
have undermined the continuing vitality of both Bateman
Eichler and O'Melveny. There can be little doubt that
this case, presenting errors in application of both of
those precedents, merits review by this Court to
clarify the proper application of Bateman Eichler and
O'Melveny to suit by trustees and receivers.

B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On May 5, 2000, in a merger pursuant to Section 259
of the Delaware General Corporate Law, Dictaphone
Corporation (“Dictaphone™ or sometimes “Old Dicta-
phone”) transferred all its assets and its business, then
valued at approximately $900,000,000, to Dark Acqui-
sition Corp. (“Dark™ and subsequent to the merger, “New
Dictaphone”), a newly-created wholly-owned subsidiary
of L&H.

The Merger Agreement, which was executed on March
7, 2000, contains representations and warranties from
L&H to Dictaphone in Article IV. including representa-
lions concerning the accuracy of filed financial state-
ments. Those representations were the subject of extensive
“due diligence” by Dictaphone and in the course of

Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same).

3

See, e.g... Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 12d
114 (2d Cir. 1991): Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.).
10S F.3d 822. 825-26 (2d Cir. 1997): and Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 72 F.3d 1085. 1094 (2d Cir. 1995).

which defendants made face-to-face representations to
Dictaphone, upon which Dictaphone relied. Dictaphone
itself hired professional advisors, who were also sub-
jected to misrepresentations from defendants in per-
forming their work for Dictaphone.

Unknown to Dictaphone, the consideration it received
for its transfer of $900,000,000 in business and assets,
including (but not limited to) stock of L&H and the
assumption of Dictaphone’s liabilities, was essentially
worthless due to the existence of a massive fraudulent
scheme to artificially inflate L&H’s reported revenues
and profits which L&H had been engaged in since at
least 1996. As a result, within months of the merger,
both L&H and Dictaphone were forced into bankruptcy
and Dictaphone lost nearly its entire net worth.

The L&H scheme involved the use of related or con-
trolled companies through which L&H would funnel
loans or venture capital, or sometimes its own money,
which would then be given to L&H and fraudulently
recorded by L&H as revenue. Initially, the scheme
involved two corporations called Dictation Consortium
and the Brussels Translation Group (“BTG”). The
scheme was later expanded to a series of twenty so-
called Language Development Companies (“LDCs”) and
Cross-Language Development Companies (“CLDCs”)
(the “LDC/CLDC Fraud”). Like the Dictation Consor-
tium and BTG, the LDCs and CLDCs were effectively
controlled by L&H, but that relationship was concealed.

Following the acquisition by L&H of a Korean
telecommunications company, Bumil, in September
1999, L&H also embarked on a related fraud to enter
into sales contracts at wildly inflated prices with a series
of essentially shell companies, and to fraudulently book
the revenues from these contracts, even though the pur-

chasers had not—and could not—pay the contract price
(the “Korean Revenue Fraud”).

L&H ultimately admitted that various fraudulent
schemes inflated L&H revenues in the period 1998
through June 2000 by $373 million, nearly two-thirds of
the total, and the profits of L&H, reported to Dictaphone
at the time of the merger as $70 million, in actuality was
a $70 million loss. L&H, which had boasted a market
capitalization of $8 billion, was essentially worthless.
Defendants were all alleged to have directly participated
in the L&H scheme. Absent the fraud, Dictaphone never
would have agreed to the merger.

Upon discovery of the fraud, L&H and its fraudu-
lently-acquired subsidiary Dictaphone were compelled
to file for protection under the United States Bankruptcy
Code. Pursuant to Dictaphone’s plan of reorganization,
Dictaphone’s claims were assigned to the “Dictaphone
Litigation Trust,” of which Plaintiff-Appellant, Alan
Nisselson, is the Trustee. Plaintiff-Appellant, by this
action, secks to recover the “damages suffered by Dic-
taphone as a result of the fraudulent course of conduct.”

The damages alleged in the Amended Complaint are
identified generally as “including, but not limited to,
loss or diminution of its value as a going concern and
consequential damages in an amount to be proven at
trial, but no less than $900,000,000.” The $900,000,000
number corresponds to the value of Dictaphone business
and assets which it surrendered in the merger. The
Amended Complaint does not assert any claim or cause
of action premised on any injury, other than injuries to
Dictaphone.

C. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION

The District Court addressed the issues presented by
the dismissal motions as sub-categories of the issue of

9

standing. The Court found that the case was “much com-
plicated by the fact that the bankrupt corporation was
wholly-owned by the alleged perpetrator of the fraud.”
App. at 34a. The Court first addressed the issue of in
pari delicto. Significantly, although federal securities
fraud and RICO claims were asserted, the District Court
did not even mention, let alone address, the standards
governing the application of the in pari delicto defense
to Federal claims as set forth by this Court in Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner et al,, 477 U.S. 299
(1985); and Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). Nor did
the District Court evaluate the state law claims applying
Massachusetts state law principals‘* as required by this
Court’s decision in O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512
U.S. 79 (1994).

Instead, the District Court, relying primarily on the
Second Circuit’s decision in Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991) and its
progeny,° the District Court held that “Courts have con-
sistently held that claims for fraud or misrepresentation
perpetrated on investors belong exclusively to those
investors to the exclusion of the corporation or its suc-
cessor in interest, where the corporation itself was

4 While the district court did not discuss choice of law issues

Massachusetts, the state where the merger was consummated, L&H
and Dark existed and many of the fraudulent misrepresentations
occurred was the state whose law would apply to the dispute.

? Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), 105 F.3d
822, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1997); and Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72
F.3d 1085, 1094 (2d Cir. 1995). The district court also relied on E. F-
Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 987 (11th Cir. 1990), where a
trustee for the perpetrator of a Ponzi scheme, GIC, had no standing to
on claims belonging only to GIC customer creditors, and Williams v.
California 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1988), where a
bankruptcy trustee was held not to have standing to pursue creditors
claims which the trustee had received by way of assignment.

10

involved in the wrongdoing.” App. at 35a. The court dis-
missed the Trustee’s argument that “Old Dictaphone”
was the victim of the fraud holding: “Old Dictaphone
cannot arise Phoenix-like to assert pre-merger claims
against third parties that New Dictaphone could not
assert.” App. at 36a.

As an alternative ground for its holding that the
Trustee had no standing, the District Court held that the
loss of value resulting from a stock for stock merger was
injury either directly to the shareholders, or directly to
the creditors. App. at 39a-40a. The court found any sep-
arate harm to the “value of the corporation as a going
concern” to be “speculative.” App. 40a. Applying the
test established by the Delaware Supreme Court in the
then-recently decided case of Tooley v. Donaldson,
Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004), the
District Court found no standing on that ground as well.
Id.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS

While the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court, it did so under very different reasoning. The
Court rejected entirely the standing conclusions of the
district court. It held that the in pari delicto defense is an
“affirmative defense,” not a matter of “standing.” App.
at 9a. It also held that the issue of who has the right to
assert a claim (in this case the shareholders, as held by
the District Court, or the Trustee ) turns on a question of
prudential standing not Article III standing, and there-
fore need not be resolved as a threshhold matter. App. at
10a. The court declined to address what it considered an
unsettled matter of Delaware law. App. at Ila.

In addressing the in pari delicto defense, the court of
appeals found that Massachusetts law paralleled federal
law as set forth in Bateman Eichler. App. at 12a-13a. It

11

also held that the application of the defense need not be
separately analyzed claim by claim because “the analy-
sis ordinarily will be the same across a spectrum of dif-
ferent causes of action,” App. at 13a, citations omitted,
and any argument that analysis differed claim by claim
or between state and federal law had been “waived.”
App. at 13a.°

Having disposed of the preliminaries, the court of
appeals proceeded to analyze the applicability of the
defense to the Trustee here without regard to the Bate-
man Eichler rule or the parallel state law. Instead, the
court emphasized that any claim for Old Dictaphone for
fraud committed upon it passed through New Dictaphone
before being acquired by the Trustee. The court con-
cluded that

Because the lineage of the trustee’s claims passes
directly through New Dictaphone, any right that the
trustee may have to assert those claims derives
directly from New Dictaphone. . . . The trustee
may assert only those claims that New Dictaphone
could have asserted prior to seeking the protection
‘of the bankruptcy court.

App at 14a.

The court relied on Bankruptcy Code Section 541,
Mediators, Inc., Edwards, and Lafferty to support its
conclusion.

Once having reached that conclusion, the court of
appeals completely disregarded the equities and com-
plexities of the case which Bateman Eichler and paral-
lel state law required it to consider. Instead, the
imputation of guilt to the Trustee effectively resolved

6

The Trustee had argued, with citations to authority, that bar-
ring the claim was inequitable under both federal and state law.

every other issue and overcame every other equity and
policy.

That the Trustee was of equal fault was dictated by the
fact that the Trustee was in effect New Dictaphone, and
the equities arising from the genesis of the claim or the
replacement of Old Dictaphone were disregarded. App.
at 16a-22a. The allowance of the defense would not
interfere with the purposes of the securities law because
the Trustee was guilty (by imputation) and the law ts not
designed to protect the guilty. App. at 23a.

The court found it “preferable” that the creditors sue
individually, rather than through a trustee, because it
speculated that L&H “may well” be a beneficiary of the
trust. App. at 23a.’ It noted that the creditors could still
sue former directors, controlling shareholders and out-
side accounting professionals, without noting the serious
policy implications of allowing direct participants tn
fraud to escape liability while holding merely negligent
parties to account. See App. at 24a.

THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Question of Whether a Trustee May Be Held
“In Pari Delicto” on Federal Claims because of
his Predecessor’s Fault is an Important Issue
Left Open by this Court in Bateman Eichler,
which has Split the Circuits

The language of Bateman Eichler allows for no excep-
tion. The in pari delicto defense may be applied to a suit
by a trustee or receiver “only” if the two prongs of the

Bateman Eichler test are met. The courts of appeals have

~~»
/

Any concern on that front should have been resolved by the
fact that L&H had been through its own bankruptcy and its creditors.
not its guilty principals, would benefit in that event. See, Buena v.
KPMG LLP. 453 F. 3d 1 (ist Cir. 2005).

13

discussed whether a trustee or receiver should be con-
sidered to be of “substantially equal” guilt. But like the
First Circuit below, they have not analyzed that issue
addressing the language used or the policies behind the
Bateman Eichler decision.

The first prong of the Bateman Eichler test was
framed in a way that suggested only the fault of the lit-
igant appearing before the Court is to be considered. As
the this Court held, an in pari delicto defense could
apply in federal securities fraud cases “where. . . asa
direct result of his own actions” there is “at least sub-
Stantially equal responsibility” for the violations he
seeks to redress.” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. at 310-11 (emphasis supplied).

The emphasis by this Court on the “direct result” and
the parties’ “own actions” would seem to preclude the
use of the defense when the parties’ liability for wrong-
ful conduct is a result of vicarious liability, principles of
agency, or imputation, rather than direct participation in
the wrongful conduct alleged. The need to show the
plaintiff’s direct personal involvement in the wrong was
re-emphasized in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988),
where this Court held:

Under the first prong of the Bateman Eichler test, as
we have noted above, a defendant cannot escape lia-
bility unless, as a direct result of the plaintiff's own
actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially
equal responsibility for the underlying illegality.
The plaintiff must be an active, voluntary partici-
pant in the unlawful activity that is the subject of
the suit. See Woolf v. §. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d
591, 604 (CAS 1975), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976). . .”

Id. at 635-636 (emphasis added).

14

A similar formulation also appears in Justice Harlen’s
concurrence and dissent in Perma Life Mufflers v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968): “Plaintiffs
who are truly in pari delicto are those who have them-
selves violated the law in cooperation with the defen-
dant.” /d. at 153. (emphasis supplicd).

lt is true that these cases did not address the question
presented here, whether a trustee who succeeds to the
rights of a corporate wrongdoer ts considered guilty to
the same extent as his predecessor. However, the least
that can be said about that issue is that the language of
the cases leaves it open to be resolved. That conclusion
is buttressed by the fact that the Bateman Eichler Court
declined to resolve the argument raised by an amicus
Securities Industry Association (“SIA”) as to whether a
lability of a “controlling person” of the defrauding party
has a better ground for asserting the defense when the
controlling person’s liability was only ‘vicarious’ and
‘secondary’.” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. vy.
Berner, 472 U.S. at 314.

The circuit court opinions have addressed the issue of
the application of in pari delicto to trustees or receivers
have deeply split. Those courts which have addressed
the issues in terms of general equitable principles or
specific state law have found that the Trustee is not
barred by his predecessor's wrongs. See, e.g., Scholes v.
Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995) (“the defense
of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person who is
in pari delicto is eliminated.”); FDIC v. O'Melveny &
Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding under
California law “While a party may itself be denied a
right or defense on account of its misdeeds, there ts lit-
tle reason to impose the same punishmenton. . . [an]
innocent entity that steps into the party's shows pursuant
to court order or operation of law”); /n re The Personal

15

and Business Insurance Agency v. McNamara, 334 F.3d
239 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).

Those courts to have allowed the defense against a
Trustee have generally followed a more mechanical
approach, concluding that a trustee “steps into the
shoes” of his predecessor and has no defenses that the
predecessor did not have. Those courts, including the
First Circuit below, have relied upon Bankruptcy Code
Section 541 as the basis for their assertion and have not
tried to reconcile that provision with Bateman Eichler.
See, App. at 14a-15a; Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145 (2006);
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty
& Co., 267 F.3d 340, 357 (3d Cir. 2001).

Under the general principles which underlie Bateman
Eichler, the defense should not be allowed unless the
particular equities of the case demand otherwise. Section
541 does not require that the important public policy
concern for enforcement of federally-protected rights
should be disregarded when a bankruptcy trustee pursues
those claims.

A. Under General Equitable Principles and with
regard to the Limited Role of Jn Pari Delicto
Defense in Federal Claims, a Trustee is Not
“of Equal Fault” with the Wrongdoer

The place to begin the analysis is with Bateman Eich-
ler itself. It is beyond question that allowing trustees to
pursue suits will advance the purposes of enforcement of
federal law. That result shall only be thwarted if there
are strong reasons to require it. But review of the equi-
table underpinnings of the rule supports barring the
defense, not enforcing it.

As this Court noted in Bateman Eichler, the in pari
delicto defense st ds on two grounds: “First, that the

16

Court should not lend their good offices to mediating
disputes among wrongdoers, and second, that denying
judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an affective
means of deterring illegality.” 472 U.S. at 306. Neither
of these grounds for the defense is truly implicated when
u trustee is suing wrongdoers to obtain assets for credi-
tors of a debtor.

As to the first ground, allowing an innocent Trustee to
pursue claims against guilty parties for the benefit of
innocent creditors can hardly be said to compromise the
integrity of the courts. This Court has recognized the
propriety of proceeding on behalf of a receiver even
where the receiver's predecessor would have been barred
by fraud. In McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140
(1935), a suit was initiated by a receiver of an insolvent
corporation to compel the corporate promoters, their
confederates, to restore property that would be diverted
from the corporation as a result of a fraudulent scheme.
The corporation shareholders, promoters and directors
were all involved. The Court of Appeals had dismissed
the receiver's case on the ground that the consent of the
shareholders to the fraudulent transaction bound the cor-
poration and the receiver stood in no better position.
This Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Cardozo
holding:*

There is no occasion to consider whether the cor-

poration itself at the instance of new sharcholders

would be permitted to disaffirm the fraud and main-
‘4 McCandless was distinguished by this Court in Caplin vy.
Maurine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 429 (1972). Caplin
held that under the applicable bankruptcy statutes a bankruptcy trustee
was not entitied to pursue causes of action which belong to creditors.
In McCandless, the Court noted, the receiver was “suing on behalf of
the corporation, not third parties.” /d. The Trustee in this case ts like-
wise suing on behalf of the corporation, Dictaphone, for its own
losses.

17

tain a suit in equity for appropriate relief. We put
that question by. Enough that the receiver has the
requisite capacity. /d., at 160-161.

Relying on McCandless and general equitable princi-
pals, in Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir.
1995) Judge Posner explained the reason and the policy
behind denying the in pari delicto defense when a suit is
brought by a receiver or trustee.

Now that the corporations created and initially con-
trolled by Douglas are controlled by a receiver
whose only object is to maximize the value of the
corporations for the benefit of their investors and
any creditors, we cannot see an objection to the
receiver’s bringing suit to recover corporate assets
unlawfully dissipated by Douglas.

Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d at 754-755.

Similar conclusions about the equity of allowing
trustees or receivers to pursue claims free of the in pari
delicto defense have been reached by other circuit courts
applying general equitable principals. McNamara v. PFS
(In re Personal & Bus. Ins. Agency), 334 F.3d at 246
(“as the bad actor, Kesselring, has been eliminated and
the trustee comes to us with clean hand, representing the
interests of innocent creditors. If the doctrine of impu-
tation were applied to bar PBI’s recovery, that applica-
tion would lead to an inequitable result (loss to innocent
creditors).”). FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17,
19 (9th Cir. 1995) (“While a party may itself be denied
a right or defense on account of its misdeeds, there is lit-
tle reason to impose the same punishment on... . [an]
innocent entity that steps into the party’s shoes pursuant
to court order or operation of law.”) (applying Califor-
nia law). Similar rulings have been made by state courts
applying general equitable principals. See, e.g. 1SP.com,

18

LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767, 772-773 (Ind. 2004);
Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 430
Pa. 550 (Pa. 1968): Albers v. Continental Illinois Bank &
Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 596. 599 (Il. App: Ct. 1938);
Camerer v. California Say. & Commercial Bank, 4 Cal.
2d 159, 170 (Cal. 1935). |

There is no case of which we are aware which articu-
lates a principled basis for denying the creditors recov-
ery through a trustee or receiver and allowing wrongdoers
to escape liability.

In addition, there are practical benefits of allowing
such recoveries, as Judge Posner also observed.

The conceivable alternatives to these suits for get-
ting the money back into the pockets of its rightful
Owners are a series of individual suits by the
investors, which, even if successful, would multiply
litigation: a class action by the investors — and class
actions are clumsy devices: or, most plausibly, an
adversary action, in bankruptcy, brought by the
trustee in bankruptcy of the corporations if they
were forced into bankruptcy.

Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d at 755.

For all of these reasons, denying application of the
defense to a Trustee furthers the policies behind the
Bateman Eichler rule.

B. The Trustee Here, Asserting a Claim Origi-
nally Held by an Innocent Victim of Fraud,
was Not of Equal Fault with Defendants

In addition to the equities of allowing a trustee gen-
erally to be free of the burden of the in pari delicto
defense. there is a further reason to deny the defense
here because the wrongdoer, New Dictaphone, only
acquired the claim for fraud on Old Dictaphone as a

19

result of the success of the wrongful merger. Because of
the merger, the creditors of Old Dictaphone, became
creditors of New Dictaphone. See Del. G.C.L. § 259.

In effect, the merger was a fraud on the creditors of
Old Dictaphone and it destroyed the entire enterprise
value of the entity the creditors were entitled to look to
for recovery. Where the Trustee is seeking to obtain rec-
ompense from the participants in the fraud for the ben-
efit of creditors who were the target of the fraud, barring
that action is particularly inequitable.

C. Bankruptcy Code § 541 Neither Prohibits
Consideration of Equities Presented by a
Trustee Suit Nor Trumps this Court’s Bate-
man Eichler Test in Determining the Proper
Application of In Pari Delicto

The First Circuit below and the other circuits applying
in pari delicto to defeat federal law based claims
asserted by a bankruptcy trustee rely on their reading of
Bankruptcy Code Section 541. As the Eleventh Circuit
stated in Edwards, in language which best articulates the
argument:

Under the plain meaning of section 541(a), the
debtor estate includes all “legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor as of the commencement of the
case.” 11 U.S.C. §541(a) (emphasis added). “A
bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor
and has standing to bring any suit that the debtor
could have instituted” when the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, and there is no suggestion in the text of
the Bankruptcy Code that the trustee acquires rights
and interests greater than those of the debtor.
O'Halloran, 350 F.3d at 1202; see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a). If a claim of ETS would have been subject
to the defense of in pari delicto at the commence-

20

ment of the bankruptcy, then the same claim, when
usserted by the trustee, is subject to the same affir-
mative defense.

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v.
Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1150.

However, the argument has been expressly rejected by
numerous commentators” and at least one Bankruptcy
court,'’ and is unsound for several reasons. First, Section
541 does not address the rights of trustees or the appli-
cation of defenses at all, it merely identifies what is
“property of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Nothing in
that section would seem to place any restriction on the
discretion of a court of equity to apply equitable
defenses in a manner which was equitable. Indeed, the
discretion of the court in applying equitable defenses
was a settled law at the time the section was enacted.
See, Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290
U.S. 240, 245-246 (1933) (“courts of equity do not make
the quality of suitors the test. They are not bound by for-
mula or restrained by any limitation that tends to tram-
mel the free and just exercise of discretion.”); | Story,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 423, at 399-
' See Jeffrey Davis. Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto
Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What is § 541 Property of the
Bankruptcy Estate, 21 Emory Bankr. Dv. J. 519 (Summer 2005); Tan-
vir Alatm., Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy
Code: How In Part Delicto Has Been Perverted to Prevent Recovery
for Innocent Creditors, 77 Am Bannkr. L.J. 305 (Summer 2003): Ger-
ald L. Baldwin, Jn Pari Delicto Should Not Bar a Trustee's Recovery,
23 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 8 (Oct. 2004): Making Sense of the In Pari
Delicto Defense: “Who's Zoomin’ Who?” 23 No. 11 Bankr. Law Let-
ter | (Nov. 2003): Robert T. Kugler. The Role of imputation and In

Part Delicto in Barring Claims Against Third Parties. 1 No. 14
Andrews Bankr. Lit. Rep. 13 (2004).

Talz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (lr re Fuzion Tech. Group, Inc. ).
332 B.R. 225 (S.D. Fla 2005).

21

400 (14th ed. 1918); Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence,
4th Ed., Section 941, pp. 1998-9. There is no reason to
believe that in enacting the section Congress intended to
change that settled law.

Second, the defense of in pari delicto is one which is
historically based on personal fault. The legislative his-
tory of the Section 541 expressly states that defenses
that are “personal against the debtor” are not effective
against the estate:

Thus, as section 541(a)(1) clearly states, the estate
is comprised of all legal or equitable interests of the ,
debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case. To the extent such an interest is limited in the
hands of the debtor, it is equally limited in the
hands of the estate except to the extent that defenses
are personal against the estate.

11 U.S.C.A § 541 note (West 2004) Legislative State-
ments (emphasis added); 124 Cong. Rec. 32,399 (1978).
See, also, 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 9541.04 (15th rev.
ed. 2004) (“To the extent an interest is limited in the
hands of the debtor, it is equally limited as property of
the estate except to the extent that defenses which are
personal against the debtor are not effective against the
estate.” (emphasis added)); Jeffrey Davis, Ending the
Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to
Do with What is §541 Property of the Bankruptcy
Estate, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 519, 538-39 (Summer
2005) (same). See also In re Fuzion Tech., 332 B.R. at
231-232 (same).

Third, finding that the Trustee is not barred by in pari
delicto is consistent with by the rule of “absolute priority”
embodied in the Bankruptcy Act and underlying much of

American jurisprudence.'' Under “absolute priority” rule,
where there is a business failure, creditors should recover
prior to equity holders. The rule is abandoned by denying
a Trustee the right to pursue such claims, but allowing
sharcholders to proceed unencumbered by the defense.

Fourth, and most importantly, there is nothing in Sec-
tion 541 which would allow it to override the Bateman
Eichler rule in cases brought by bankruptcy trustees. Were
this Court to allow the broad interpretation of Section 54]
to prevail, than Bateman Eichler would become largely
irrelevant, applicable only in the exceptional cases where
the defense ts raised outside the bankruptcy context.

% The principles that creditors are paid in full before equity

recovers any return, known/as the “absolute priority” rule, has roots

going back to Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913)
and has repeatedly been re-affirmed since. To allow equity holders to
elevate their claims through the back door of direct actions would
defeat the “absolute priority” rule. which underlies both bankruptcy
practice and much of American business law. Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy. 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775. 792 (1987) (*An almost axiomatic
principle of business law ts that, because equity Owners stand to gain
the most when a business succeeds. they should absorb the costs of
the business's collapse—up to the full amount of their investment.”).
See also Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du bois, 342 U.S. 510. 520-21
(1941) (“stockholders seeking to recover their investments cannot be
paid before provable claims have been satisfied in full”); Slain &
Kripke, The Interface between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy
—Allocating the Risk of legal Securities Issuance Between Securi-
ties Holders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 261 (1973)
(hereinafter “Slain/Kripke”).

Accordingly. Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted
to subordinate any claim for damages “arising from the purchase or
sale” of the securities of the debtor. That section was adopted as part
of the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code to prevent “disap-
pointed shareholders from recovering their investment loss by using
fraud and other securities claims to bootstrap their way to parity with
general unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.” Jn re Tele-
group, Inc. v. Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 142 Gd Cir. 2002).

23

2. Allowing In Pari Delicto to Defeat Claims of
Defrauded Merger Targets Substantially Inter-
feres with the Policies of the Federal Securities
Law

The First Circuit’s fixed focus on the Trustee as a
wrongdoer by imputation also caused the court of
appeals to misapply the second prong of the Bateman
Eichler test. The First Circuit held:

As we have pointed out, the trustee is not bringing
claims on behalf of an innocent target of the fraud
but, rather, on behalf of a complicit party. Viewed in
that light, the trustee’s policy concerns ring hollow.
See Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1155 (finding public pol-
icy exception inapplicable in analogous circum-
stances) . . . To permit the trustee to proceed in
these circumstances would be equivalent to giving
New Dictaphone a second bite at the cherry, allow-
ing it first to reap the benefits of the fraud and then
to attack the defrauders.

App. at 23a, footnote omitted.

A similar approach was taken by the Eleventh Circuit
in Edwards to bar a suit by a Trustee under RICO. Offi-
cial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v.
Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1155.

It is, of course true, that, as the First Circuit held, that
“[t]he securities laws were enacted to protect investors
from deceptive practices, see Pinter, 486 U.S. at 638,
not to give the intended beneficiaries of deceptive prac-
tices a back-door means of ensuring a profit.” App. at
23a. Yet, if the second prong of the Bateman Eichler
were readily avoided by simply labeling the plaintiff a
wrongdoer, there would be no case where the court could
find that the plaintiff was “equally” culpable under Bate-
man Eichler’s prong one, yet application of the defense

24

could nonetheless be barred under prong two on the
ground that it “interfere[d] with the effective enforce-
ment of the securities laws.”

As this Court has noted, “labels, as often is the case,
merely state the conclusion reached, but do not aid in
solution of the problem. The ultimate issue is whether
the result in the particular case would effectuate or frus-
trate the purposes of the [Securities] Act.” 312 U.S., at
44. n. 2. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,
472 U.S. at 311, n. 20, citing A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 (1941)

Indeed, an argument that the First and Eleventh Cir-
cuits rely on was raised and rejected by this Court in
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 637 (1988). As the Court
there held, the “broad policies” of the securities laws are

“protection of investors as a group, not as individ-
uals, and the need for a healthy economy constantly
purged by full disclosure. See, e. g., SEC v. North
American Research & Development Corp., 280
F. Supp. 106, 121 (SDNY 1968) (purpose of § 5 is
to protect public investors through disclosure), aff'd
in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 424
F.2d 63 (CA2 1970).

Id. at 637, n. 14.

Allowing a relatively culpable party to recover may
therefore be allowed when that approach serves to pro-
tect “the unknowing and innocent investor.” See, id. at
637. As this Court held in Perma Life Mufflers v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968):

The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble dam-
ages may be no less morally reprehensible than the
defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further
the overriding public policy in favor of competition.
A more fastidious regard for the relative moral

25

worth of the parties would only result in seriously
undermining the usefulness of the private action as
a bulwark of anti-trust enforcement.

Id. at 139.

Such an approach would seem to be particularly
appropriate in this case where the “guilt” of the Trustee
is only by imputation, and the claim was acquired by the
“guilty” entity only because of the success of the fraud.

Applying the more searching analysis required by
Bateman Eichler and Pinter makes it clear that denying
recovery in this case would dramatically interfere with
the purposes of the securities laws under which the
Trustee seeks to recover. Here, Old Dictaphone was the
target of a fraud designed to cause the corporation to
surrender its business and assets for consideration that
was essentially worthless. Since the object of the fraud
was the acquisition of Old Dictaphone by L&H through
its subsidiary “New Dictaphone,” by definition, the
fraud only could succeed if, as occurred here, Old Dic-
taphone and its fraud claim were acquired by New Dic-
taphone. If the fact of that acquisition by itself is
sufficient to bar even an innocent successor Trustee from
pursuing claims against the participants in the fraud,
than fraud by an acquirer against a merger target would
always, a fortiori, be insulated from damage claims.

It is hard to see how protecting perpetrators of fraud
from the consequences of their actions would not inter-
fere the purposes of the securities laws, for “full dis-
closure.” By contrast, allowing suits, such as the suit by
the Trustee in this case, provides a strong incentive to
disclosure, which advances the purposes of the securities
laws. Such a rule serves to protect innocent investors in
other cases and to deter, rather than encourage, fraud in
connection with the merger transactions.

26

‘oa

Allowing Bankruptcy Code Section 541 to Fed-
eralize the Application of State Law Claims of /n
Pari Delicto Violates this Court’s Holding in
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC and is also an
Important Issue Meriting Review by this Court.

The effect of the approach adopted by the First Circuit
in this case and by the Lafferty and Edwards courts does
not merely interfere with the Federal policies on appli-
cation of the in pari delicto defense, it also overrides
state in pari delicto law in a manner which is in direct
conflict with this Court's decision in O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).

In O'Melveny, the FDIC as a receiver for a failed bank
brought suit against the bank's attorneys for negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the attorneys’
failure to discover the bank’s fraudulent conduct. The
district court dismissed based on the imputation of the
bank's knowledge to the receiver, but the 9th Circuit
reversed holding that finding “federal pre-emption not
over the law of imputation generally, but only over its
application to the FDIC suing as receiver.” /d. at 85. The
9th Circuit held the receiver was not barred from pro-
ceeding with claims that the bank could not itself assert.

This Court reversed finding that the creation of federal
law of imputation was inappropriate, and the rules
regarding whether receivers could or could not suc
where their predecessor corporation was barred from suit
must be decided as a matter of state law. /d. at 87-88.

Justice Stevens concurred, joined by Justices Black-
mun, O’Conner and Souter, to emphasize that “[ilt
would be entirely proper for a state court of general
jurisdiction to fashion a rule of agency law that would
protect creditors of an insolvent corporation from the
consequences of wrongdoing by corporate officers even

27

if the corporation itself, or its shareholders, would be
bound by the acts of its agents. /d. at 90.

Justice Stevens’ concurrence also noted that where the
state law is unclear “federal judges must do their best to
estimate how the relevant state courts would perform
their lawmaking task.” /d.

On remand, the 9th Circuit adhered to its prior ruling
as a matter of state law. FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61
F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995).

While the First Circuit below did rely on state law of
imputation to determine whether “New Dictaphone”
would be held to be “of equal fault,” on the determina-
tive issue of whether the Trustee was barred by in pari
delicto if the defense was applicable to New Dictaphone,
the court of appeals ignored state law entirely. Instead,
citing only Federal law, Bankruptcy Code Section 541,
and Federal Cases, the court of appeals held that “the
trustee may assert only those claims that New Dicta-
phone could have asserted prior to seeking the protection
of the bankruptcy court.” App. at 14a. 2

The reasoning, however, is flawed. There is no more
basis for a federal rule of Trustee standing in this case
than there was in O’Melveny. Bankruptcy Code Section
541 does not address the standing of a Bankruptcy
Trustee (let alone a Litigation Trustee like plaintiff).
Instead it merely identifies property of the Estate.’

While the First Circuit and the cases on which it relies
interpret the language of Section 541 broadly to create

12 § 541. Property of the estate

(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title [11 USCS § 301, 302, or 303} creates an estate. Such estate is
comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by
whomever held: (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of
this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case.

28

federal law regarding defenses available against a
bankruptcy trustee, this court was faced with similar lan-
guage in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183, which established the right of the
FDIC as receiver in O'Melveny." Yet, in'O'Melveny,
FIRREA did not compel a federal rule of law denying
the FDIC receiver the right to pursue claims barred us to
its predecessor. For the same reasons, Section 541 does
not establish a federal rule denying bankruptcy trustees
the right to pursue claims which might be denied to the
debtor itself.

While this Court will leave the resolution of the state
law issue to the court of appeals on remand, there is
good reason to believe that under general equitable prin-
ciples, the Massachusetts courts would allow the Trustee
in this case to pursue the wrongdoers free of the in pari
delicto defense. See, Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d
329, 332-333 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). Here, at the time
the claim arose, it was the claim of the innocent victim,
Dictaphone. It only briefly passed through the hands of
“New Dictaphone. Massachusetts law does recognize
limitations on the defense based on the equities of the
case. It could well be determined that Massachusetts law
would bar the defense of in pari delicto against the
Trustee under these facts.

Similarly, the other cases to have likewise applied
Section 541 to federalize the issue of defenses available
against the Trustee have done so without attempting to
analyze conflicting state law on the issue. Compare,

13

Section 1821d)(2 Ai). which ts part of a tithe captioned
“Powers and duties of [the FDIC] as . . . receiver.” states that
HN4“the [FDIC] shall. . . . by operation of law, succeed to—all
rights. tithes. powers. and privileges of the insured depository insti-
tution. . . 2” 12 USC. § T821(d 2 ANG) (1988 ed.. Supp. TV).
O'Melveny & Myers vy. FDIC, S12 U.S. at 86.

29

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty
& Co., 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying in
pari delicto to Pennsylvania law claim by Creditors
Committee), with Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon
Motor Lodge, Inc., 430 Pa. 550 (Pa. 1968) (holding
under Pennsylvania law that in pari delicto defense
should not be applied to deny a plaintiff bankruptcy
trustee recovery); Adelphia Communs. Corp. v. Bank of
Am. (In re Adelphia Communs. Corp.), 330 B.R. 364,
381 (Bankr. D.N.Y. 2005) (same); Waslow v Grant
Thornton LLP (In re Jack Greenberg, Inc.), 240 B.R. 486
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (Sigmund, J.) (“Jack Greenberg”)
(rejecting in pari delicto defense in action brought
against accountants by chapter 7 trustee) and Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards,
437 F.3d 1145, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006) (“the defense of in
pari delicto may be asserted against a bankruptcy
trustee”) with Brooke v. Kennedy, 172 Ga. 461, 463-464
(Ga. 1931) (rejecting the defense against a receiver
“These contracts were assets which came into the hands
of the receiver, and from which creditors should be paid.
It would require a strong case for a court of equity under
such circumstances to refuse the creditors protection
through a receiver. . .”).

Equally pernicious, the federalization of defenses to
State law causes of action by a Trustee has distorted the
application of the defense of in pari delicto in state
courts as well. See, Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658,
680 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (applying in pari delicto
defense to claims of bankruptcy trustee on the basis of
federal cases construing Section 541.)

Section 541 should not be used to federalize state law
of imputation in cases where state law governs the
defense. For this reason as well, this case merits review
by this Court.

30

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, each of which is inde-
pendently sufficient, petitioner respectfully requests that
this Court issue a writ of certiorari.

Dated: New York, New York
February 22, 2007

Respectfully Submitted,

MAX FOLKENFLIK

Counsel of Record
FOLKENFLIK & MCGERITY
1500 Broadway, 21st Floor
New York, New York 10036
(212) 757-0400

Attorneys for Petitioner

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_2205%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
