# Appendix Brief for the United States — Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control (No. 06-948)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

APPENDIX CONTENTS

Page

U.S. Court of Appeals Opinion (10/10/06).................... 1A
U.S. District Court Order (10/22/04)............c:0cccceeeeeee 36 A
U.S. District Court Order Staying

Ss a 5B1A
United Nations Participation Act,

sn, cid sencinesendutoresveereerioes 53 A
Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 101-513, § 586C............. 54 A
Executive Order 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803

(Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

T(t iicebenedsoncasoroeenesersotesoveverousonse 56 A
Executive Order 12,724 § 2(b), 55 F.R. 33089

(Aug. 9, 1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

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TIED cs sindsbarepsseesedseseeteccascevsensoessneccocscee ses 62 A
Te nal isccnbbecnadatcesesveosevecosvccoocoss cede 63 A
UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N. SCOR,

2933" mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).......64 A
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

Of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T-:S.

access ica veseunensscbvecvorsonesetece coos 66 A
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened

for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577

ET 68 A

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
Of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
6 U.S.T. 3816, 76 U.N.T.S. 186 .....ccccccsescececes 72A

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA
Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at
BE eee incisuisiecatdicaitdloniardainandhaaiiaapaadaiaaie 74A

U.S. District Court Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Gt EEN cciciscbincistiindneiacmicatdeenialadeiseiausitauibeiiael 77A

SEA_DOCS:830944. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT

BERTRAM SACKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, United States
Department of the Treasury;
RICHARD NEWCOMB, Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Defendants-Appellees.

BERTRAM SACKS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, United States
Department of the Treasury;
RICHARD NEWCOMB, Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Defendants-Appellants.

LA

No. 04-36136

D.C. No.
CV-04-00108-JLR

No. 05-35001

D.C. No.
CV-04-00108-JLR

OPINION

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
July 24, 2006-Seattle, Washington

Filed October 10, 2006

Before: 1. Clifford Wallace, Kim McLane Wardlaw, and
Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

COUNSEL

Donald B. Scaramastra (argued) and Gary D.
Swearingen, Garvey Schubert’ Barer, Seattle,
Washington, for appellant/cross-appellee Bertram Sacks.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

H. Thomas Byron III (argued) and Douglas Letter,
Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
appellees/crossappellants Office of Foreign Assets
Control.

Kenneth S. Kagan, Carney Badley Spellman, P.S.,
Seattle, Washington, for amicus curiae Washington
Physicians for Social Responsibility.

OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated cross-appeals arise from a challenge
to the pre-2003 United States sanctions prohibiting both
travel to and the unlicensed donation of humanitarian
medical supplies to Iraq. We affirm the district court's
. decision that Bertram Sacks has standing to challenge
the ban on travel and that the travel ban regulation was
validly promulgated. Sacks fails, however, to
demonstrate a concrete and imminent likelihood that he
will be penalized for violations of the restriction on
medical donations. Therefore, his challenge to the
restriction on medical donations does not fulfill the
constitutional requirements of standing and ripeness. We
also affirm the district court's holding that the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulation in effect at the
time prohibited the government from referring Sacks's
unpaid penalty to a private collection agency.

I. BACKGROUND

Bertram Sacks traveled to Iraq nine times between
1990 and 2003 in violation of sanctions the United States
imposed against Iraq following the 1990 invasion of
Kuwait. According to Sacks's Amended Complaint, the

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

twelve years of United States and United Nations
sanctions were a dire time for Iraqi civilians, marked by
malnutrition, high rates of infant and child mortality,
and shortages of medicine.! Sacks, and an advocacy
group called Voices in the Wilderness (Voices), opposed
these sanctions on humanitarian grounds. In an effort to
draw attention to the effect of the sanctions, Sacks and
other Voices members traveled to Iraq repeatedly while
the sanctions were in effect, bringing with them medicine
and medical supplies for which they had failed to procure
an export license. They did so in knowing violation of the
United States regulations prohibiting travel and the
sending of unlicensed humanitarian donations to Iraq.

' In support of his claims, Sacks cites, among other
documents, the following sources: UNICEF, The
Situation of Children in Iraq 20 (2003), available at
http://www. unicef.org/publications/index_4439.html(revie
wing data on increased infant and child mortality during
the sanctions regime period and concluding that "most of
the children who are dying in Iraq are dying from
preventable illness"); UNICEF, Iraq's Children: A Lost
Generation 3 (2001), available at http://www.scn.org/ccpi/
Uniceflivfay2001].html ("Mounting evidence shows that the
sanctions are having a devastating humanitarian impact
on Iraq."); Mare Bossuyt, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, The
Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the
Enjoyment of Human Rights ~~ 63-67 (June 21, 2000),
available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/unreports/b
ossuyt.htm ("[{T]he sanctions upon Iraq have produced a
humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst
catastrophes of the past decades. . . . Owing to the lack of
medical supplies, it was estimated that, by 1997, 30 per
cent of hospitai beds were out of use, 75 per cent of ail
hospital equipment did not work and 25 per cent of Iraq's
1,305 health centres were closed.").

SA

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks has been assessed a penalty by the federal
government for one violation arising from these trips,
and he seeks relief from enforcement of that penalty.

A. Iraqi Sanctions

To place this case in context, it is necessary to review
the history of the Iraqi sanctions regime. On August 2,
1990, one day after Saddam Hussein's armies invaded
Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush issued Executive
Order 12,722, which declared a national emergency and
imposed sweeping prohibitions on numerous economic
and social transactions with Iraq. 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803
(Aug. 2, 1990). Four days later, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 661, which called on
all Member States to prevent their nationals from
engaging in economic and financial transactions with
Iraq except for humanitarian donations of food and
medical supplies. Prohibited activities included:

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or
from their territories or using their flag
vessels of any commodities or products,
including weapons or any other military
equipment, whether or not originating in
their territories but not including supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes,
and, in humanitarian circumstances,
foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or
Kuwait. . . and any activities by their
nationals or in their territories which
promote or are calculated to promote such
sale or supply of such commodities or
products;

S.C. Res. 661, 4 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
Following passage of this resolution, President Bush

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

replaced the earlier Executive Order with Executive
Order 12,724, a more thorough and detailed set of
sanctions, which likewise included an exception for
humanitarian donations of food and medicine. It
prohibited, among other things:

(b) The exportation to Iraq... , directly or
indirectly, of any goods, technology. . . or

) services either (i) from the United States,

1 or (ii) requiring the issuance of a license
by a Federal agency, or any activity that
promotes or is intended to promote such
exportation, except donations of articles
intended to relieve human suffering, such
as food and supplies intended strictly for
medical purposes;

(d) Any transaction by a United States
person relating to travel by any United
States citizen or permanent resident alien
to Iraq, or to activities by any such person
within Iraq, after the date of this order,
other than transactions necessary to
effect (i) such person's departure from
Iraq, (ii) travel and activities for the
conduct of the official business of the
Federal Government or the United
Nations, or (iii) travel for journalistic
activity by persons regularly employed in
such capacity by a news-gathering
organization;

55 Fed. Reg. 33,089, 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990). For the
President's authority to impose these sanctions,
Executive Order 12,724 relied upon the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et
seq., and the United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

§ 287c. 55 Fed. Reg. at 33,089. The Executive Order also
made clear that the sanctions described therein could be
modified or limited by future regulation, and authorized
the Treasury Secretary to promulgate whatever
regulations were necessary to carry out its proscriptions.

Id.

A month after its initial resolution on Iraq, the United
Nations Security Council became concerned that the
Iraqi government was diverting donated humanitarian
food and medical supplies to its military. U.N. SCOR, 4th
Sess., 2939th mtg. at 12-13, 19,25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2939
(Sept. 13, 1990). It therefore passed a new resolution
recommending, among other steps to be taken, “that
medical supplies should be exported under the strict
supervision of the Government of the exporting State or
by appropriate humanitarian agencies." S.C. Res. 666, q
8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (Sept. 13, 1990). When the
United States Congress engaged the issue that
November, it authorized the President to continue the
embargo and sanctions embodied in Executive Order
12,724, but also required that transactions involving
"foodstuffs .. exempted ‘in humanitarian circumstances"
be conducted pursuant to the later Security Council
Resolution, Resolution 666. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2048 (1990).

In January 1991, OFAC, an agency within the
Department of Treasury responsible for coordinating
international sanctions, published a final rule in the
Federal Register establishing the Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations (the Iraqi Sanctions). 56 Fed. Reg. 2112-01
(Jan. 18, 1991) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 575.101 et seq.).
These regulations included the two at issue here: 31
C.F.R. § 575.207, which prohibited all United States
persons from conducting “any transaction relating to
travel by any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien to

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Iraq, or to activities. . . within Iraq," except for
journalists, United States or United Nations officials,
and those assisting American citizens or permanent
residents to flee Iraq (the Travel Ban); and 31 C.F.R. §
575.205, which banned the export of goods, services, and
technology to Iraq but retained an exception for "donated
foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances, and donated
supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, the
exportation of which has been specifically licensed" (the
Medicine Restrictions). OFAC also established a
licensing program to enable humanitarian donations of
food and medical supplies, id. §§ 575.501, 575.520,
575.521, repealed by 68 Fed. Reg. 61,362, 61,363 (Oct. 28,
2003), and a process for assessing penalties against those
who violated the sanctions, id. §§ 575.701-705. The Iraqi
Sanctions remained in place until, soon after the
American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United
Nations lifted all non-weapons trade restrictions against
Iraq, S.c. Res. 1483, '110, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,
2003), and OFAC issued a general license permitting all
Iraq-related transactions that previously had been
prohibited, including unlicensed humanitarian
donations, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,188, 38,189 (June 27, 2003)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.533).

B. Assessment of the Penalty

Following a_ highly-publicized November 1997
humanitarian trip to Iraq in which Sacks participated,
OFAC issued Sacks a Prepenalty Notice, pursuant to 31
C.F.R. § 575.702. The Prepenalty Notice accused Sacks,
other individuals, and Voices of violating the Iraqi
Sanctions.? In its Violations section, the Prepenalty

* It appears from the record that a single Prepenalty

Notice was issued to Sacks and the other named

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Notice described "your and [Voices]' exportation of
donated goods, including medical supplies and toys, to
Iraq absent specific prior authorization by OFAC." It
then listed ten specific violations. Six of these violations
accused Voices of exporting medical supplies and/or other
goods "absent prior specific license or other
authorization." Sacks was individually charged with only
one violation:

6. Between on or about November 21-30,
1997, Messrs. Handleman, Mullins, Sacks
and Zito engaged in currency travel-
related transactions to/ from/within Iraq
absent prior license or other authorization
from OFAC. These currency transactions
included, but are not limited to, the
purchase of food, lodging, ground
transportation, and incidenials;

The Prepenalty Notice proposed a $10,000 penalty for
Sacks and the other individuals described in the sixth
charge, and a $120,000 penalty for Voices ($20,000 for
each of the six violations). It further provided Sacks an
opportunity to respond to the charges in writing, which
he did. Although he was individually charged only with
violating the Travel Ban, in his written response Sacks
admitted that he had violated the Medicine Restrictions,
as well as the Travel Ban, stating, "You are correct to say
in your prepenalty letter (12/3/98) that I brought medical
supplies and toys to Iraq absent prior OFAC approval."
Although he did not explicitly address the travel charge,
the statement that he “brought medical supplies and toys
to Iraq” is an implied admission that he had traveled to
Iraq.

individuals. Presumably, a separate Prepenalty Notice
was issued to Voices.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Three-and-a-half years later, OFAC issued Sacks a
formal Penalty Notice, which described his prior
admission ambiguously: “You admitted the Notice's
allegation in Count 6 that you exported goods to Iraq
absent prior OFAC approval." Citing his willful violation
of the Iraqi Sanctions, OFAC imposed the full $10,000
penalty against him and demanded that it be paid within
thirty days. When Sacks did not pay the penalty, he
received a letter in August 2003 from the Ocwen Federal
Bank, which sought to collect the debt - $13,767.08
including interest and late fees - on behalf of the United
States Department of Treasury.

C. Procedural History

Seeking to prevent collection of the penalty, Sacks
brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington against OFAC and its
director, Richard Newcomb (collectively, OFAC). He
sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the theory
that the Medicine Restrictions and the Travel Ban lacked
statutory authority and violated principles of
international law. Sacks also alleged that OFAC's claims
against him were time-barred. The district court granted
OFAC's motion to dismiss, holding that the Travel Ban
was validly promulgated and enforceable; that,
regardless of whether Sacks had standing to challenge
the Medicine Restrictions, they too were validly
promulgated; that international law did not render these
regulations unconstitutional; and that enforcement of the
penalty was not timebarred. However, the court held
that OFAC was prohibited by its own regulations from
referring the unpaid penalty to a collection agency.

Sacks appeals the district court's dismissal only on the
ground that the two regulations were invalidly

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

promulgated.3

OFAC cross-appeals the district court's determination
that it could not use an outside collection agency to
collect the penalty and was required to refer the penalty
to the Department of Justice for collection in a federal
civil suit. We have jurisdiction over these consolidated
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we now affirm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's grant of a
defendant's motion to dismiss. See Decker v. Advantage
Fund, Lid., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004).
Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo, see S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d
461,474 (9th Cir. 2001), as are challenges that an
agency's regulations exceed its statutory authority, see

©* Perez-Martin v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir.

2005). On cross-appeal, we review the district court's
interpretation of OFAC's enforcement regulation de novo,
according deference to OFAC's interpretation of its own
regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. See League
of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity
Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002).

> Sacks does not appeal the district court's ruling that
enforcement of the penalty is not time-barred. Sacks
disclaims on appeal the argument that international law
forbids the President from placing limits’ on
humanitarian medical donations. Instead, he posits that
the international treaties and conventions he cites were
background principles that Congress intended to codify
when it limited the President's emergency authority in
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of
1977. We discuss this argument below.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Ill. STANDING

[1] Sacks challenges two provisions within the Iraqi
Sanctions: the Travel Ban and the Medical Restrictions.
We must first determine whether he has standing to
assert these claims. "[S]tanding is a threshold question
which we must resolve before proceeding to the merits."
Los Angeles County Bar Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 700
(9th Cir. 1992). This principle is grounded in the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III of the United
States Constitution: If Sacks suffered no injury-in-fact
caused by the Travel Ban or Medicine Restrictions
themselves, then any opinion we render on that provision
would be merely advisory. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified
Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2002).

The requirements of Article III standing are well
established:

[A] plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered
an "injury in fact" that is ( a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and
(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that: the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). Article ITI standing
requires the plaintiff to establish standing for each
challenge he wishes to bring and each form of relief he
seeks. See id. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, Sacks must allege facts in his Amended
Complaint that, if proven, would confer standing upon

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

him. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d
1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that, at this
stage, “general factual allegations of injury resulting
from the defendant's conduct may suffice"). Therefore, we
must determine whether Sacks's Amended Complaint
identifies an injury caused by each of the two regulations
that is both concrete and actual or imminent.

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

A. Travel Ban

[2] Sacks has standing to challenge the Travel Ban
and the government does not contend otherwise. The
Prepenalty Notice that explained the charge against him
explicitly mentioned his violation of the prohibition on
travel to and currency-related travel transactions within
Iraq. Where the "plaintiff is himself an object of the
action (or forgone action) at issue... there is ordinarily
little question that the action or inaction has caused him
injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the
action will redress it." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62. The
government, through the Ocwen Federal Bank, now
seeks to collect a civil penalty from Sacks for violating
the Travel Ban. A civil fine is a pecuniary injury, and
"(pecuniary injury is clearly a sufficient basis for
standing." Cent. Ariz. Water Conserv. Dist. v. EPA, 990
F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

B. Medicine Restrictions

[3] Sacks challenges only the facial validity of the
restrictions on unlicensed medical donations, and not the
application of the licensing regime. Sacks concedes that
he did not apply for an OFAC license to donate
humanitarian medical supplies to Iraq, as 31 C.F.R. §
575.521 allowed. We clarified in United States v. Hugs
that a plaintiff s failure to apply for an available permit
precludes him from challenging the operation of the
permitting scheme but not the facial validity of the
statute or regulations. 109 F .3d 13 75, 13 78 (9th Cir.
1997). Sacks therefore lacks standing to challenge the
operation of the licensing regime but is not prohibited
under Hugs from facially challenging the Medicine
Restrictions.

ISA

SACKS V, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks cites three reasons why he satisfies the injury-in-
fact requirement as to the Medicine Restrictions: (1) he
has been actually punished for violating the Medicine
Restrictions; (2) he will be called upon to pay the
penalties assessed against Voices; and (3) he legitimately
fears future prosecution for openly violating the Medicine
Restrictions. We find none of these to be persuasive.

[4] Sacks contends that his 2003 penalty was assessed
for violation of the Medicine Restrictions. We disagree.
OFAC's treatment of Sacks indicates its belief that
penalties were assessed only for the Travel Ban violation.
The Penalty Notice, while confusing, expressly references
"Count 6" of the earlier Notice, which referred only to the
Travel Ban. Moreover, it was reasonable for OFAC to
treat Sacks's admission that he "brought" medical
supplies to Iraq as an admission that he traveled to Iraq.
As Sacks concedes, bringing medical supplies to Iraq can
be accomplished only by traveling to that country to
deliver them. Finally, the $10,000 penalty ultimately
levied against Sacks was consistent with those proposed
in the Penalty Notice for violating the Travel Ban; in
contrast, the proposed penalties for violating the
Medicine Restrictions were $20,000 per violation.
Therefore, we conclude that Sacks was not penalized for
violating the Medicine Restrictions.

[5] Nor does Sacks's status as a member of Voices
expose him to liability for the penalties assessed against
the organization so as to confer standing. Sacks does not
suggest that he has third-party standing to challenge the
Medicine Restrictions on Voices's behalf; indeed, Voices
has already challenged the penalties assessed against it.
See Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the
Wilderness, 329 F. Supp. 2d 71 (.D.C. 2004). More
importantly, nothing in the Amended Complaint or in the
record indicates that Sacks has any financial

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

responsibility for Voices's fine; that action against him
has been initiated or is imminent; or even that OFAC has
ever turned to individual group members of an
unincorporated organization to collect civil fines against
the organization. Therefore, Sacks's mere membership
in a penalized organization does not create a " ‘realistic
danger of [his] sustaining a direct injury as a result of
the statute's operation or enforcement.' " LSO, Ltd. v.
Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979)).

[6] Finally, Sacks does not face imminent, or even
likely, prosecution for violating the Medicine
Restrictions. It is true that the Executive Order
terminating the "national emergency" in Iraq explicitly
reserved the government's right to bring proceedings
based on acts in violation of the sanctions committed
before the sanctions expired. Exec. Order No. 13,350, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,055,46,055 (July 29, 2004). Therefore, Sacks
theoretically may be subject to penalties for taking
medicine to Iraq, even though the United States has
allowed humanitarian medical donations to Iraq since
May 2003.

However, while it is well-established that an individual
need not await prosecution under a law or regulation
before challenging it, see Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298;
Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002)
(as amended), we require a "genuine threat of imminent
prosecution" and not merely an "imaginary or speculative
fear of prosecution." San Diego County Gun Rights
Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

The requirement that a fear of prosecution be fairly
certain to confer standing on the plaintiff is informed by

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

the same considerations as the doctrine of ripeness. The
ripeness requirement aims to "prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements."
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967),
abrogated on other grounds by Caifano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977). As we have previously observed, "the
constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry... , in
many cases, .. . coincides squarely with standing's injury
in fact prong." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Therefore, we employ the same test to determine if a
plaintiff has established standing based on a fear of
prosecution that we use to determine if a case or
controversy is sufficiently ripe.

In evaluating the genuineness of a
claimed threat of prosecution, we look to
whether the plaintiffs have articulated a
"concrete plan" to violate the law in
question, whether the prosecuting
authorities have communicated a specific
warning or threat to initiate proceedings,
and the history of past prosecution or
enforcement under the challenged statute.

See id. at 1139 (citing San Diego County Gun Rights
Comm. 98 F.3d at 1126-27). Whether viewed through the
lens of standing or ripeness, Sacks's challenge to the
Medicine Restrictions is not justiciable.

Sacks has established two of the requisite elements
required to survive the motion to dismiss on standing or
ripeness grounds. He had more than a "concrete plan" to
violate the Medicine Restrictions; he admits that he
actually did violate them on a number of occasions. See
Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

He also alleges that OFAC has historically targeted other
alleged violators of the Medicine Restrictions, including
Voices. Because, on review of a district court's Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, we assume all facts alleged in the
Amended Complaint are true, see Bassidji v. Goe, 413
F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2005), these allegations are
sufficient to satisfy the first two elements.

Sacks's fear of prosecution runs aground on the
government's decision to charge and penalize him for
only the violation of the Travel Ban and not for the
Medicine Restrictions violation. In Jacobus v. Alaska, we
similarly confronted a plaintiff who feared future
prosecution under a repealed statute. The plaintiffs in
Jacobus had knowingly violated Alaska campaign
finance laws capping contributions to political parties
and volunteer professional services to campaigns. 338
F.3d at 1101 the wake of a district court ruling against
the state, the Alaska legislature revised its campaign
finance laws to remove the offending provisions, but the
state continued to argue their legality on appeal. The
Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC) then wrote
Jacobus indicating that “if the law were upheld it
reserved the right to prosecute any past violations" he
had committed, “although it would not pursue any
enforcement action during the pendency of the
litigation." Jd. at 1104. We held that Jacobus faced a
genuine threat of imminent prosecution because even
though "the letter sent to Jacobus does not threaten to
initiate enforcement proceedings in so many words, it
indicates that APOC is only awaiting the outcome of the
litigation to initiate such proceedings." Jd. at 1105.

Sacks is in a materially different position than the
Jacobus plaintiffs. Contrary to Sacks's contention, the
government's decision to penalize him for only the Travel
Ban violation, when it was fully aware he had also

19 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

violated the Medicine Restrictions, indicates that the
government does not intend to penalize him for any of his
numerous violations of the Medicine Restrictions. OFAC
has not taken the step it normally would take to express
its intent to penalize Sacks and thus preserve its right to
do so, by sending him a prepenalty notice. The Amended
Complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting that
OFAC has communicated an intent to punish him
further.

[7] To demonstrate the requisite "specific warning or
threat to initiate proceedings," Thomas, 220 F.3d at
1139, Sacks points only to a footnote in OFAC's Motion to
Dismiss that reads: "Although OFAC has not yet acted in
response to Plaintiffs eight other trips to Iraq, it reserves
the right to do so in the future." While this language is
similar to the language used by the agency in Jacobus,
that alone does not demonstrate that prosecution is
imminent. First and foremost, unlike the agency in
Jacobus, which could not bring charges against the
plaintiff because the relevant law had been declared
unconstitutional by the district court, nothing has
prevented OFAC from charging Sacks under the
Medicine Restrictions over the last decade. OFAC's
declination to charge him for the Medicine Restrictions
violations during the last eight years, therefore, is a
strong indication of its lack of intent to do so in the
future. Furthermore, the footnote Sacks relies on to
demonstrate the threat of prosecution does not mention
the Medicine Restrictions at all, but rather references his
violation for engaging in travel-related transactions.
Therefore, Sacks has failed to demonstrate any specific
threat of prosecution for violations of the Medicine
Restrictions. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180
(noting that Article III requires plaintiffs injury to be
"actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical").

20A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Moreover, it is not clear from the Amended Complaint
that OFAC could still bring charges against Sacks for
violating the Medicine Restrictions. The relevant statute
of limitations for the government to bring proceedings
enforcing a civil penalty is five years from the date of the
act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462. A plaintiffs standing is
evaluated as of the date the complaint was filed, in this
case January 14, 2004. See Bernhardt v, County of Los
Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). The Amended
Complaint does not allege that Sacks violated the
Medicine Restrictions after January 14, 1999. The
alleged violations are thus likely time-barred,
diminishing any threat of prosecution that would have
supported standing at the outset of this suit. Moreover,
even if Sacks had more recently violated the Medicine
Restrictions, it is quite possible that the statute of
limitations on those violations has also passed, rendering
his fears of prosecution moot. See Jacobus, 338 F.3d at
1102 (noting that mootness may warrant dismissal

where it is" ‘absolutely clear that the litigant no longer
ha[s] any need of the judicial protection' " he seeks
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S.
216, 224 (2000))).

[8] Because Sacks fails to allege a concrete and
imminent injury-in-fact caused by the Medicine
Restrictions, this claim is not justiciable both for lack of
standing and ripeness. Of course, should OFAC take
action to penalize Sacks for violating the Medicine
Restrictions at a later date, he would then have standing
to challenge their legitimacy. We therefore do not reach
Sacks's challenge to the district court's ruling that the
Medicine Restrictions were validly promulgated. See
Mustang Marketing, Inc. v. Chevron Products Co., 406

. (9th Cir. 2005) ("Our review is not limited
to a consideration of the grounds upon which the district
court decided the issues: the Court can affirm the district

21A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

court on any grounds supported by the record.").
IV. VALIDITY OF THE TRAVEL BAN

Sacks does not challenge OFAC's basic authority to
restrict travel to Iraq at the President's direction under
the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA). See 22
U.S.C. § 287c(a) (allowing the President to prohibit rail,
sea, and air "communication" with another country in
order to comply with United Nations directives); Karpova
v. Snow, 402 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that the Iraq Travel Ban is duly authorized by
the UNPA). Instead, he alleges that the Travel Ban
regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 575.207, exceeded the President's
statutory authority because it indirectly regulated the
donation of humanitarian medical supplies, something
Sacks contends the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) forbids the President from doing.
Because the IEEPA imposes no such burden on the
President's powers when he acts under the UNPA, we
reject this argument.

[9] The IEEPA grants the President authority to
unilaterally impose regulations on economic transactions
between the United States or its nationals, and foreign
countries or their nationals. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1). To
trigger this authority, the President must declare a
"national emergency" necessitated by an "unusual and
extraordinary threat." Id. § 1701. However, the
President's power under the JEEPA is constrained: It
"does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit,
directly or indirectly. .. donations, by persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as
food, clothing and medicine, intended to be used to
relieve human suffering.” unless the President
determines that such donations would seriously impair
his ability to address the emergency or would endanger

22 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

the safety of American combat forces engaged in
hostilities, Jd. § 1702(b )(2). The President, acting under
the IEEPA, is also precluded from regulating the export
of postal, telegraphic, telephonic and personal
communications; information or informational materials,
including magazines, photographs, and artwork; and
travel to or from a country. Id. § 1702(b).

As the district court recognized, however, the IEEPA is
not the lone source of the President's power to enact
economic sanctions. Executive Order 12,724, which
instructed the Treasury Secretary or his designate
(OFAC) to promulgate regulations enforcing the
economic sanctions against Iraq, derived its power from
both the IEEPA and the UNPA. 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089
(Aug. 9, 1990). OFAC contends that Congress did not
intend the IEEPA's limits to interfere with the
President's authority under the UNP . Our review of the
Structure and plain language of the two statutes
convinces us that OFAC is correct.

{10] The economic restrictions authorized by the
IEEPA (and the related limits on that authority) are
confined to a particular circumstance: the declared
national emergency. See 50 U.S.C § 1701(b) ("The
authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of
this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual
and extraordinary threat with respect to which a
national emergency has been declared . . o 2 ta 4
1702(b) ("The authority granted to the President by this
sectton does not include the authority to regulate
[humanitarian aid, travel, etc.]." (emphasis added)). The
IEEPA also requires the president to consult with
Congress before acting, and to regularly consult and
report to Congress after exercising his authority. Jd. §
1703. By contrast, the UNPA allows the President to
impose sanctions that are more wide-ranging, without

23 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

any built-in congressional review and "(njotwithstanding
the provisions of any other law." 22 U.S.C. § 287c. When
called upon to enforce a Security Council directive, the
UNPA authorizes the President:

to the extent necessary to apply such
measures .. . [to] investigate, regulate or
prohibit, in whole or in part, economic
relations or rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio and other means of
communication between any foreign
country or national thereof. . .and the
United States or any person subject to the
jurisdiction thereof.

Id. The UNPA thus authorizes the President to take
measures when enforcing a Security Council resolution,
such as limiting postal communication and air travel,
that he could not take independently by declaring a
national emergency. Sacks's proposed interpretation
would treat Congress's passage of the IEEPA in 1977 as
a partial sub silentio repeal of the UNPA. Weare
reluctant to conclude that a statute has been repealed
without a clear statement from Congress: "[E]ven when
two statutes are in some conflict, repeal is to be regarded
as implied only if necessary to make the latter enacted
law work, and even then, only to the minimum extent
necessary." Lujan Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 744
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).

[11] We refuse to read Congress's passage of the
IEEPA as repealing key provisions of the UNPA. Proper
functioning of the IEEPA does not depend on a repealing
of the UNPA, since the two statutes authorize
presidential actions in unique, albeit sometimes
overlapping, situations. Reading the statutes to avoid a

244A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
EEN AODETS CONTROL

conflict maintains the complete viability of both Statutes
and is most faithfy] to Congress's plain language.

The bill js a4 response to two
developments: first, extensive use by
Presidents of emergency authority under
section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917 to regulate both
domestic and international]

Provides safeguards for the role of
Congress in declaring and terminating
national emergencies... .

at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977

The Senate Report then

the four national emergencies that were in

effect in 1976, two of which had been in place for more
than twenty-five years. Jd at 4541-42.

tions as
stated the Committee's belief rs were
necessary to fulfill the United States's obligations under
the United Nations Charter and make international

25A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

sanctions effective. As the House Report states,

The committee realizes that the powers
proposed to be granted to the President
under this section are very great.
However, the basic decision in this regard
was made when the Charter was ratified
and this provision is simply a necessary
corollary to our membership in. this
Organization [the U.N.]. The committee
also believes that the Security Council
must be placed in the most effective
position possible to act under article 41
since the prompt and effective application
of economic and diplomatic sanctions by
all the United Nations (or even the threat
or possibility thereof) may avoid the
necessity for the use of the armed forces
available to the Security Council.

The better prepared this country is to
participate promptly in action of this
kind, the more effective will be the
Security Council and the more hope there
will be that the United Nations may serve
its major purpose, namely, the prevention
of armed conflict.

U.S. Code Congo Serv., 79th Cong., p. 932 (1945). This
legislative history confirms what the plain text of the
statute indicates: that the IEEPA significantly restricted
the President's emergency authority but did not intend to
alter the President's” very great" powers to impose
economic sanctions enforcing a United Nations
resolution.

Nor does the IEEPA's legislative history indicate, as

26A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks contends, that the statute was intended to codify
and make binding international law principles on
humanitarian relief that had emerged since the passage
of the UNPA thirty years earlier. Neither the IEEPA nor
its legislative history mentions international law or a
universal right to medica] supplies. Congress's only
indication of its intent in exempting medical supplies
from the President's emergency powers is a statement in
the Senate Report that the exemption would "enable U.S.
persons to make humanitarian contributions in
accordance with their conscience." S. Rep. No. 95-466,
1977 US.C.C.A.N. at 4544 Sacks's claim of
congressional intent is further belied by the IEEPA
provision allowing the President to unilaterally regulate,
or even prohibit, humanitarian medical supplies simply
by declaring that doing so is necessary to address the
declared national emergency, as President George W.
Bush did when he prohibited the export of humanitarian
supplies to al-Qaeda and other terrorist entities following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. See Exec.
Order No. 13,224,66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49.080-81 (Sept.
23, 2001).

[13] Therefore, the district court correctly held that the
medical supplies exception to presidential power
embodied in the IEEPA did not limit the President's
ability to ban travel to and within Iraq pursuant to the
UNPA.4

Vv. USE OF COLLECTION AGENCY

* Because we conclude that the IEEPA provisions do not
restrict the President's authority under the UNPA, we do
not reach OFAC's argument that the Travei Ban is not
an indirect regulation of humanitarian medica]
donations.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

In its cross-appeal, OFAC asks us to vacate the district
court's injunction prohibiting OFAC's use of the Ocwen
Federal Bank to collect Sacks's unpaid penalty. Because
the OFAC regulation in effect when Sacks's penalty was
assessed clearly required referral exclusively to the
United States Department of Justice for collection in a
federal civil suit, we affirm the district court's issuance of
the injunction.

Neither Executive Order 12,724 nor the Iraq Sanctions
Act specified the method by which penalties should be
imposed or collected, effectively leaving that gap to be
filled by OFAC, the agency to which the President
delegated his regulatory powers over the Iraqi Sanctions.
See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power
of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.").
OFAC promulgated regulations for the collection of
unpaid penalties under the Iraqi Sanctions. In relevant
part, they read:

In the event that the person named does
not pay the penalty imposed pursuant to
this subpart oor make payment
arrangements acceptable to the Director
with*s 30 days of the mailing of the
written, notice of the imposition of the
penalty, the matter shall be referred to
the United States Department of Justice
for appropriate action to recover the
penalty in a civil suit in a Federal district
cout.

381 C.F.R. § 575.705 (2002). OFAC claims that this

provision also allowed it to use administrative collection

28A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

efforts, including outside collection agencies, to obtain
unpaid penalties.

Where an agency offers an interpretation of its own
regulations in federal court, we must give "substantial
deference" to that interpretation "unless an alternative
reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language
or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time
of the regulation's promulgation." Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 US. 504, 512 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We will defer to the agency's
interpretation of its own regulation, unless that
interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1965); Rendleman v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.
1994).

[14] Here, the agency's command is absolute: if the
penalty is unpaid after thirty days, "the matter shall be
referred to the [Justice Department] for appropriate
action to recover the penalty in a civil suit." Following
the guidance of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Lopez v.
Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (explaining the difference
between Congress's use of the "permissive 'may' " and its
"use of a mandatory 'shail' “), we have previously made
clear that Congress's or an agency's use of the word
"shall" indicates a mandatory duty that is not subject to
discretion. For example, in Center for Biological Diversity
v. United States Forest Service, 349 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th
Cir. 2003), we held that a Council on Environmental
Quality regulation Stating that an agency "shall" discuss
opposing viewpoints and its response to them in a final
environmental impact statement could not be satisfied
merely by including and analyzing a more
environmentally-restrictive alternative to the proposed
plan. Similarly, in Webber v, Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461
(9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), we held that a Bureau of

29A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Prisons regulation stating that wardens "shall identify"
outdoor smoking areas left the warden no discretion but
to do so. Although we will depart from the interpretation
of "shall" as mandatory where a “convincing argument to
the contrary is made," Newman v. Chater, 87 F.3d 358,
361 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 904 (9th
Cir. 2001), such occasions are rare. OFAC offers three
reasons to support its contentions that we should
disregard the plain language of the regulations. None of
these is persuasive.

First, OFAC argues that all government agencies are
authorized, and even encouraged, to utilize private
collection agencies and other administrative collection
efforts before referring cases to the Department of
Justice. We do not disagree. For example, 31 U.S.C. §
3718(a) expressly authorizes federal agency heads to
establish contracts with collection services to recover
United States assets. Current Treasury Department
regulations, codified in 2002, go even further, indicating
that every unpaid debt should be referied for debt
collection services, 31 C.F.R. § 5.9, that multiple
collection remedies should be utilized, id. § 5.2, and even
that "aggressive collection activity" should take place
before referral to the Department of Justice, id. § 5.16.
We may even accept, without deciding, OFAC's
contention that it would not need to adopt an explicit
regulation before utilizing administrative collection
efforts. As the district court noted, however, what OFAC
overlooks in emphasizing these general, permissive
provisions is that the one provision that specifically
addresses violations of the iraqi Sanctions, 31 C.F.R. §
575.705, did not take advantage of OFAC’s authority to
permit the use of outside collection agencies and, in fact,
made referral to the Justice Department mandatory. See
Bonneville Power Admin. v. FERC, 422 F.3d 908, 916

30 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

without ever having had an Opportunity to challenge
their penalties before an Article III court. Regardless of
the rationale for the regulation, there is nothing in the

Second, OFAC points to its recent revision of section
975.705 as evidence of how the previous section 575.705

> The Sanctions regulations established before the Iraqi
Sanctions Regulations similarly mandated referral to the
Department of Justice, and did not provide for other
collection efforts. At some point in the 1990s, however,
without the prompting of a court decision, OFAC began
including language in its sanctions regulations that unpaid
penalties shal] be, or may be, "referred for administrative
collection measures . . . or to the United States Department
of Justice" for recovery in a civil suit. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg.
13,199, 13,212-13 (Mar. 10, 1993) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §
585.705) (Yugoslavian sanctions regulations); 60 Fed. Reg.
47,061,47,073 (Sept. 11, 1995) (codified at 31 CFR. §
560.706) (Iranian sanction regulations); 61 Fed. Reg. 3805,
3812 (Feb. 2,1996) (codified at 3] C.F.R. § 595.705)
(terrorism sanction regulations); 70 Fed. Reg. 48,240,
48,524 (Aug. 16, 2005) (codified at 3] C.F.R. § 537.705)
(Burmese sanctions regulations).

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

was understood and should be interpreted. In response to
the district court's ruling in this very case, OFAC issued
a rule revising 31 C.F.R. § 575.705 to read that, if the
penalized individual does not make arrangements to pay
within thirty days, "the matter may be referred for
administrative collection measures by the Department of
the Treasury or to the United States Department of
Justice for appropriate action to recover the penalty in a
civil suit in a Federal district court." 70 Fed. Reg. 15,761,
15,762 (Mar. 29, 2005) (emphasis added). While OFAC
does not argue that the revised regulation applies
retroactively, it contends that the revision 1s dispositive
proof that OFAC consistently has interpreted the
collection regulation to provide for administrative
collection in addition to civil suits in federal court. See 70
Fed. Reg. at 15,761 (stating that the rule was revised "to
reaffirm that administrative collection of unpaid civil
penalties imposed by OFAC is authorized in addition to
judicial means of collection"). It is unclear why an
interpretive statement added to the Federal Register
post-litigation should be entitled to any more deference
than the litigation position OFAC already advances.
Indeed, although an agency interpretation first
articulated in a legal brief is not categorically "unworthy
of deference," OFAC's position appears to be little more
than a "post hoc rationalization advanced . . . to defend
past agency action against attack." Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 432, 462 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). Even if OFAC's interpretive
statement represents the agency's reasoned
interpretation as of 2005, it tells us nothing of the
agency's interpretation during the life of the Iraqi
Sanctions. As such, the statement in the Federal
Register is neither controlling nor particularly helpful.

Third, OFAC makes the novel claim that section
575.705's “silence concerning administrative collection

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

remedies" permits the use of those remedies in
satisfaction of the regulatory requirement. In other
words, a regulation or statute mandating that an agency
"shall" do x in fact means that it "shall" do x or y, unless
the statute or regulation explicitly states that it "shall
not" do y. This proposed "rule of the silent disjunctive" is
patently absurd. By OFAC's rationale, the Endangered
Species Act's requirement that the final determination of
whether a species is threatened "shall be published in
the Federal Register" could also be satisfied by
publishing that information in USA Today. Though the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires that the
sentencing court shall order the defendant to pay
restitution, applying OFAC's proposed interpretive rule,
the sentencing court could also comply with the statute
by ordering the defendant to make a public apology. Or,
to bring the examples closer to home, the requirement of
former 31 C.F .R. § 575.521 that an application for a
license to send medicine to Iraq "shall be made in
advance" of the exportation could have been satisfied by
Sacks if he submitted an application in advance I within
ten years following the exportation.

We rejected a similar argument in Webber, where the
warden asserted that a regulation Stating that he "shall"
identify outdoor smoking areas at federal prison
facilities, to prevent employee exposure to second-hand
smoke, also would allow him to achieve that goal by
banning all smoking at the facility, 158 F.3d at 461. Our
view has not changed. We will not require that Congress
or an agency articulate all of the acts the agency may not
engage in simply to guarantee that mandatory
prescriptions are followed.

Our decision in Lawrence v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 759 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1985), is aot to
the contrary. In Lawrence, a commodities broker

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

consented to findings that he had violated the
Commodities Exchange Act and agreed to pay a $3,500
civil penalty. Id. at 769. When he refused to pay the
penalty, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
suspended his registration pursuant to a statutory
provision allowing it to do so if an individual violated one
of its rules or orders. Id. at 770 & n.5 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§
]12a(3)-(4)). Lawrence argued that the Commission was
powerless to suspend him because a separate statutory
provision stated that “collection of overdue money
penalties imposed by the [Commission] shall be referred
to the Attorney General for recovery in a federal district
court action." Id. at 771 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 9a). We rejected
Lawrence's claim, holding that referral to the Justice
Department was not intended to be the Commission's
"exclusive remedy for violation of its orders to pay fines."
Id. at 772. Despite OFAC's multiple citations to it,
Lawrence is inapposite. The alternative remedy taken by
the Commission, suspension of Lawrence's registration,
was explicitly articulated in the same statute, whereas
nothing in the Iraqi Sanctions regulations mentions
administrative collection. Furthermore, as we recognized
in Lawrence, suspension of the license and referral to the
Justice Department were not mutually exclusive
remedies. See Id. at 771-72. The Lawrence court was not
required to reach the question of whether the agency
could collect the penalty using means other than Justice
Department referral because suspension of his
registration was 4 different punishment altogether.

[15] Rather than adopt OFAC's troublesome "rule of
the silent disjunctive," we hold that the plain language of
the regulation authorizes no other methods for the
collection of unpaid penalties. Because the regulation is
clear. no deference 1s owed to OFAC's questionable
interpretation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U S. at
512. If OFAC wishes to collect the $10,000 penalty from

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks, it may do so by referring the matter to the
Department of Justice for the filing of a civil suit in
federal district court as its own regulation mandates.

VI. CONCLUSION

Sacks lacks standing to challenge the Medicine
Restrictions, and his challenge to the Travel Ban fails
because OFAC's power to promulgate it was authorized
by the UNPA and not limited by any other statute.
Therefore, the penalty against Sacks is valid. However,
OFAC is precluded by its own then-operative regulations
from utilizing the Ocwen Federal Bank or any private
third-party entity to collect the $10,000 penalty from
Sacks. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's order
dismissing Sacks's complaint for declaratory relief. We
also AFFIRM the district court's order enjoining OFAC
from collecting the penalty from Sacks in a manner
inconsistent with the then-effective version of 31 C.F R. §
575.705.

AFFIRMED.

SEA_DOCS:830794.|

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff, NO. C04-108JLR

vs. ORDER

OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROL, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, and
RICHARD NEWCOMB,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL,

Defendants.

I.
INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.
(Dkt. #8). For the reasons stated below, the court
grants Defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part.
In addition, because there is no further relief to grant to
either party, the court dismisses this action.

il.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a member of Voices in the Wilderness
(“Voices”), an unincorporated organization that provides
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi citizens suffering as a
result of the worldwide embargo on trade with Iraq in

place since 1990. Although Plaintiff made several trips
to Iraq to deliver humanitarian aid, it was a November

issue in Plaintiffs current dispute
with the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”).

OFAC, an agency of the United States
Department of the Treasury, had issued two regulations
governing the activities of United States citizens in
Iraq. The first, the “Travel Ban,” prohibits travel-
related expenditures for travel to or within Iraq:

Except as otherwise
authorized, no U.S. person
may engage in any
transaction relating to
travel by any USS. citizen
or permanent resident
alien to Iraq.... This
section prohibits the
unauthorized payment by a
U.S. person of his or her
own travel or living
expenses within Iraq.

31 C.F.R. § 575.207. The second regulation, the
“Medicine Restriction,” prohibits the export of medicine
to Iraq except as licensed by OFAC:

Except as otherwise
authorized, no goods ... may
be exported from the
United States ... to any
entity operated from Iraq,
except donated foodstuffs
in humanitarian
circumstances, and donated
supplies intended strictly
for medical purposes, the
exportation of which has

been specifically licensed
pursuant to fother OFAC
- regulations].

31 C.F.R. § 575.205.

_ On December 3, 1998, OFAC sent a pre-penalty
notice to Mr. Sacks, Voices, and other members of
Voices. The only allegation specifically directed to
‘Mr. Sacks was that he had violated the Travel Ban by
traveling “to/from/within” Iraq and making incidental
payments for living expenses. OFAC also alleged that
Voices had violated the Medicine Restriction by
importing medical supplies, toys, and other goods into
Iraq.

On January 8, 1999, Mr. Sacks offered a written
response to the pre-penalty notice in which he admitted
to bringing medicine to Iraq. There was no further
contact between the parties until May 17, 2002, when
OFAC issued a penalty notice fining Plaintiff $10,000
for his violation of the Travel Ban.

OFAC has chosen to use a collection agency,
Ocwen Federal Bank, to collect the $10,000 penalty it
levied against the Plaintiff. Ocwen Federal Bank has
contacted Plaintiff at least once in an effort to collect
the penalty.

Plaintiff brought the instant action alleging that
OFAC lacked the statutory authority to issue bth the
Travel Ban and the Medicine Restriction. In addition,
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the challenged
regulations are unconstitutional because they violate
international law. He claims that OFAC’s effort to
collect the civil penalty against him is time-barred. He
also seeks injunctive relief against OFAC’s collection
efforts.

Il.
ANALYSIS

OFAC’s purely legal challenges to Plaintiffs
complaint are appropriately addressed in a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court may dismiss a
claim only if it appears beyend doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the allegations of - -

the complaint, all material allegations are accepted as
true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn ~™
from them. Id. A motion to dismiss is also properly .
granted where the plaintiff has no “cognizable legal
theory” to tie the factual allegations into a claim upon
which the court can grant relief. Id.

A. The Travel Ban Is Valid and Enforceable.

The Travel Ban (like the Medicine Restriction) is
the result of a series of executive and legislative actions
that began when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. On
August 6, 1990, the United Nations Security Council
issued Resolution No. 661, which called for member
nations to restrict all economic transactions with Iraq.
S.C. Res. 661(3)(c), U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). The Resolution exempted
humanitarian aid from the scope of the sanctions it
imposed. Id. (sanctions do not “includ[e}] supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs”). President
George H.W. Bush then issued Executive Order 12,724,
ordering the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate
regulations enforcing the sanctions called for in the
Security Council resolution.! 50 Fed. Reg. at 33089.

| Executive Order 12,722, which was similar,
was superseded by Executive Order 12,724. 50 Fed.
Reg. at 33089.

OFAC in turn issued regulations that included the
Medicine Restriction and the Travel Ban.

In August of this year, the court in Office of
Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness
upheld the Medicine Restriction against Voices’
contentions that OFAC lacked statutory and
constitutional authority to issue it. 329 F. Supp. 2d 71
(D.D.C. 2004). Although Voices is not precedential
authority, the court agrees with its analysis of the
Medicine Restriction. The Voices court determined that
the Executive Order authorized OFAC to issue the
Medicine Restriction. Id. at 77-78. It also determined
that the Executive Order itself was lawful, as it was
authorized by the United Nations Participation Act
(SUNPA”). Id. at 78. UNPA gives the President broad |
authority to take measures necessary to implement
Security Council resolutions. It provides that:

Notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law,
whenever the United
States is called upon by the
Security Council to apply
measures which said
Council has decided,
pursuant to article 41 of
said Charter, are to be
employed to give effect to
its decisions under said
Charter, the President
may, to the extent
necessary to apply such
measures, through any
agency which he may
designate, .. . regulate, or
prohibit, in whole or in
part, economic relations or
rail, sea, air, postal,

40 4

telegraphic, radio, and
other means of
communication between
any foreign country or any
national thereof or any
person therein and the
United States or any
person subject to the
jurisdiction thereof ....

22 U.S.C. § 287c(a). Although other federal statutes
provide more limited presidencial authority, and limit
the President’s ability to restrict humanitarian aid (e.g.,
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)), UNPA gives the President the
authority to implement Security Council resolutions
“[njotwithstanding the provisions of any other law.” 22
U.S.C. § 287c(a). In short, the court agrees with the
Voices court that the Medicine Restriction was valid.
The Voices analysis is equally applicable to the Travel
Ban.

Plaintiff Sacks advances one argument that the
Voices court did not expressly consider. He notes that
Resolution No. 661 expressly excludes humanitarian
aid from the scope of the sanctions to be imposed
against Iraq. S.C. Res. 661(3)(c), U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990)
(sanctions do not “includ[e] supplies intended strictly
for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian
circumstances, foodstuffs”). UNPA, in turn, only
authorizes presidential action “to the extent necessary
to apply” Security Council measures. 22 U.S.C.
§ 287c(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that
regulations on travel for humanitarian purposes were
not necessary to implement the Security Council
Resolution, and thus even if the Executive Order
authorized such measures, it did so without legal
authority.

Although Plaintiff presents a compelling
argument, it is an argument that ignores the decision of
Congress to ratify the Iraqi sanctions regime. In the
Iraqi Sanctions Act of 1990, Congress directed the
President to “continue to impose the trade embargo and
other economic sanctions with respect to Iraq and
Kuwait that the United States is imposing” pursuant to
Executive Order 12,724. Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat.
2047-2054 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701). As Congress
ratified the Executive Order on which the Travel Ban
and Medicine Restriction were based,? the court must
reject Plaintiffs argument that the Executive Order
directed measures that were not “necessary” (under
UNPA) to enforce Resolution No. 661.

B. Even if Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge
It, the Medicine Restriction is Valid and

Enforceable.

OFAC contends that Plaintiff does not have
standing to challenge the Medicine Restriction, because
OFAC has never contended that Plaintiff violated the
Medicine Restriction. A plaintiff seeking to challenge a
federal statute or regulation must generally prove that
he has suffered or will suffer an injury, that the
challenged statute or regulation caused the injury, and
that the court can provide redress for the injury. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992).

2 The Iraqi Sanctions Act also required that any
regulations promulgated after the Act (after
November 5, 1990) were to be submitted to Congress.
The challenged regulations were issued in January
1991, and it does not appear that they were submitted
to Congress. Although OFAC may have neglected its
statutory duties, this is not a basis for invalidating the
challenged regulations. In_ re Surface Mining
Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

4 2 A

He Ps « -
OFAC argues that Plaintiff Sacks has suffered no
injury as a result of the Medicine Restriction.

Plaintiff does not contest that OFAC has not
attempted to penalize him for violating the Medicine
Restriction,? but Plaintiff contends that his admitted
violation of the Medicine Restriction, coupled with
OFAC’s ageressive enforcement policy, means that the
threat that he will be penalized is sufficient to confer
standing. He notes that in its pre-penalty notice, OFAC
not only alleged that Plaintiff violated the Travel Ban,
but also that Voices, an organization to which Plaintiff
belongs, violated the Medicine Restriction.

Although the parties present an intriguing
argument on the standing issue, the court finds it
unnecessary to resolve it.’ Whether Plaintiff has
standing to contest the Medicine Restriction or not, his
challenge fares no better than his challenge to the
Travel Ban. The Court’s discussion of the statutory

authority for the Travel Ban, supra, applies equally to
the Medicine Restriction. The Medicine Restriction is a

3 At oral argument, Plaintiff suggested that
because one must necessarily “travel” in order to deliver
food and medicine, the court can conflate the Travel
Ban and the Medicine Restriction for standing
purposes. The court disagrees. The two regulations
proscribe different sets of conduct, and Plaintiff was
penalized only for his travel-related expenditures in
Iraq.

4 The court has considered OFAC’s late-filed
motion to file a supplementary brief on the standing
issue. (Dkt. # 28). The court has granted that motion,
and has considered OFAC’s arguments in the
supplemental brief. Given the court’s disposition of the
issue, the court finds it unnecessary to grant Plaintiff
an opportunity to respond to the supplemental brief.

valid exercise of authority granted to OFAC through
Executive Order 12,724 and the Iraqi Sanetions Act.

fed International Law Does Not Render the
Regulations Unconstitutional.

Plaintiff cites four sources of international law
that he believes render the challenged regulations
unconstitutional. Plaintiff does not explain how the
United States Constitution incorporates these
principles of international law. Nor does Plaintiff
contest that international law is not binding on the
United States unless the United States ratifies the law
or the law is “self-executing.” Whitney v. Robinson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

The court finds that the international law upon
which Plaintiff relies is not binding on the United
States. The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child is not self-executing, and the United States
Senate has declined to ratify it. Flores v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 165 (2d Cir. 2003).
. The same is true of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). Although the United States has ratified
part of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it also provided
that the Convention creates no “substantive or
procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any
proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1092. Finally, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is aspirational, not
binding, and is not recognized as law in the United
States. Flores, 343 F.3d at 165.

Customary international law also provides no
defense for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that even if
the international! law he cites has not been ratified or
enacted in the United States, customary international

law embodying the same principles is controlling. Even
if the court accepts the Plaintiffs interpretation of the
relevant customary international law, it cannot
overlook the executive and legislative acts that
expressly address sanctions against Iraq. Customary
international law is not binding where there is a
controlling legislative or executive act addressing the
same subject. Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th
Cir. 1996). International law does not provide Plaintiff
with a legally cognizable claim against the challenged
regulations.

D. OFAC’s Effort to Collect Its Penalty From
Plaintiff is Not Time-Barred.

Plaintiff contends that OFAC’s effort to collect
its $10,000 penalty is barred by the five-year statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which provides that:

Except as otherwise
provided by Act of
Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the
enforcement of any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise,
shall not be entertained
unless commenced within
five years from the date
when the _ claim first
accrued ....

Plaintiff argues that OFAC’s penalty arises from
Plaintiffs November 1997 trip to Iraq, which was more
than five years before OFAC initiated efforts to collect
its penalty through Ocwen Federal Bank in August
2003.

Both parties assume that the phrase “proceeding
for the enforcement of any ... penalty” applies
exclusively to proceedings to collect penalties like the
one that OFAC imposed against him. The phrase has.
been interpreted to include any proceeding for the
Lmposition of a penalty. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d
1453, 1457-59 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Browner court held
that an agency’s effort to impose a penalty is itself a
“proceeding for the enforcement” of the penalty. Id. at
1459 (holding that a contrary result would be
“inconceivable”); Federal Election Comm. v. Williams,
104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting the Browner
view of 28 U.S.C. § 2462). OFAC commenced its
proceeding to enforce its penalty against Plaintiff in
December 1998, when it sent its pre-penalty notice to
the Plaintiff. That proceeding concluded in May 2002,
when OFAC issued its final penalty notice against
Plaintiff. Regardless of which date is relevant, the
court finds that OFAC commenced its enforcement
proceeding within the five-year statute of limitations
(which would not have run until November 2002).

E. OFAC’s Regulations Bar the Use of a
Collection Agency to Collect Its Penalty
From Plaintiff.

Although OFAC met the applicable statute of
limitations for enforcing its penalty against Plaintiff,
the court asked the parties to provide supplemental
briefing to address whether OFAC is subject to
restrictions on its effort to collect on that penalty. In
particular, OFAC’s own regulations provide that in the
event that a person does not pay or make arrangements
to pay an OFAC penalty within 30 days of its issuance,
“[T]he matter shall be referred to the United States
Department of Justice for appropriate action to recover
the penalty in a civil suit in a Federal district court.”
31 C.F.R. § 57&.705. OFAC has not referred the matter

to the Department of Justice; it has chosen to use a
collection agency to collect its penalty.’

Plaintiff argues that 31 C.F.R. § 575.705
unambiguously bars any method of penalty collection
except reference to the Department of Justice for a civil
suit. Although a court should ordinarily defer to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, deference
is not necessary where the language of the regulation is
unambiguous. Ward’s Cove Packing Corp. v._ Nat'l
Marine Fisheries Serv., 307 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir.
2002).

OFAC argues that the regulation is ambiguous,
because while it might mandate a referral of a penalty
to the Department of Justice, it is silent as to the
availability of other remedies. Moreover, OFAC points
out that both statutes and regulations generally
applicable to the Treasury provide that multiple
collection remedies are usually encouraged. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3718(a); 31 C.F.R. § 5.2(e). OFAC thus contends that
the meaning of 31 C.F.R. § 575.705 is that OFAC may
refer penalties to the Department of Justice or it may
refer them to a collection agency.

Given the substantial deference owed to OFAC
in interpreting its regulations, the court might be
inclined to accept OFAC’s position. See Alhambra
Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing limitations on deference to agency
interpretation). To do so, however, would be to ignore
the 13 other regulatory subchapters that expressly

5 Plaintiff urges the court to hold that the
Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (“FDCPA”)
(28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3015) prevents OFAC from using a
collection agency. OFAC correctly points out that
31 U.S.C. § 3718 authorizes OFAC to use a collection
agency, although that agency must follow the FDCPA.

state what OFAC asks the court to read into 31 C.F.R.
§ 575.705. For example, the Iraqi sanctions’ closest
neighbor in the Code of Federal Regulations is at
31 C.F.R. subchapter 585. That subchapter establishes
sanctions for prohibited transactions with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. At 31 C.F.R. § 585.705, OFAC
provides that if a person does not pay an OFAC penalty
within 30 days, “[T]he matter shall be referred for
administrative collection measures or to the United
States Department of Justice for appropriate action to
recover the penalty in a civil suit in a Federal district
court.” This provision, or its substantial equivalent, is
repeated in three other subchapters relating to OFAC
prohibitions on transactions with regions in the Baltics
(31 C.F.R. §§ 586.705, 587.705, 588.705), six other
OFAC regulations on transactions with Angola
(31C.F.R. § 590.705), Iran (31 C.F.R. § 560.706),
Afghanistan (31 C.F.R. § 545.705), the Sudan (31 C.F.R.
§ 538.705), Burma (31 C.F.R. § 537.705), and Cuba
(31 C.F.R. § 515.718), as well as OFAC prohibitions on
transactions in weapons of mass destruction (31 C.F.R.
§ 539.705), highly enriched uranium (31 C.F.R.
§ 540.705), and narcotics (31 C.F.R. § 536.705). The

only regulations dictating that penalty collections “shall
be referred” to the Department of Justice without
mentioning administrative collection measures are the
Iraq sanctions regulations at issue here, older
regulations on transactions with Iran (31 C.F.R.
§ 535.705), and regulations on transactions with Libya
(31 C.F.R. § 550.706).°

6 The court recognizes that changes in the
political climate may have caused OFAC to rescind or
amend some of the regulations listed above, or at least
adopt different enforcement policies. Those changes
would not, however, affect the court’s analysis of the
regulation in question.

The court does not dispute that OFAC was
authorized to enact regulations that permit it to use
extra judicial means of collection. The statute and
regulation that authorize such means, however, are
merely permissive. 31 U.S.C. § 3718(a) (“Under
conditions the head of an executive ... agency considers
appropriate, the head of the agency may enter into a
contract with a person for collection service to recover
indebtedness owed”); 31 C.F.R. § 5.2(e) (“Use of multiple
collection remedies allowed.”). A review of OFAC
regulations shows that OFAC often chooses to exercise
that authority by issuing regulations that allow
multiple avenues for penalty collection. For the lraqi
regulations in question, OFAC chose not to do so. Even
giving substantial deference to OFAC’s interpretations
of its regulations, the court finds that 31 C.F.R.
§ 575.705 requires OFAC to use the Department of
Justice to collect penalties for violations of the Iraqi
Travel Ban.

: IV.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. #8) in part, and
DENIES it in part.

The only claim remaining in Plaintiffs
complaint is its request for injunctive relief against
OFAC’s unlawful attempts to collect a penalty against
him. It is not clear whether OFAC has any continuing
control over Ocwen Federal Bank’s efforts to collect
OFAC’s penalty from Plaintiff. To the extent that
OFAC continues to exercise such control, the court
ORDERS that OFAC is enjoined from using any means
of collecting its penalty against Plaintiff that is
inconsistent with this order. As Ocwen Federal Bank is
not a party to this action, the court cannot enter an
order enjoining it.

49 A

The court also notes that Plaintiff in his
supplemental brief, and at oral argument, suggests that
he has brought a claim contesting the amount of the
penalty that OFAC levied. Although Plaintiff could
possibly bring this challenge in the form of a claim
under the Administrative Procedures Act or otherwise,
the court finds that even a generous reading of the
complaint shows that Plaintiff has brought no such
claim. Even if there were such a claim, the court's
decision that OFAC cannot use extrajudicial means to
collect its penalty means that Plaintiffs objection to the
amount of that penalty is not yet ripe for consideration
by this court.

As there is no further relief to grant to either
party, this action 1s DISMISSED.

DATED this 22nd day of October, 2004.

s/ James L. Robart

JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

SEA_DOCS:830778.1

SOA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO, C04-108JLR
V.

ORDER

ASSETS

CONTROL, UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, et al.

)

)

)

)

OFFICE OF FOREIGN )
)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants. )

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on two related
motions from the Defendants: Defendants’ Motion for a
Protective Order Staying Discovery (Dkt. # 17) and
Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
Pending Discovery (Dkt. #20). For the reasons stated
below, the court GRANTS both motions and stays
discovery in this matter until the court orders the stay
lifted.

IL. BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Sacks filed this action challenging the
authority of the United States to issue various
restrictions on financial transactions and other activity
by United States citizens in Iraq. Defendants have
responded with a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
On August 26, 2004, the court ordered the parties to
provide supplemental briefing on two issues relevant to
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

The court is persuaded that the parties should not
engage in an expensive discovery effort before the
court determined the scope of this litigation in its
ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For that
reason, the court will stay discovery in this action
until further order of the court.

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS
Defendants’ motions (Dkt. ##17, 20). Discovery in
this action is stayed until further order of the court.

DATED this 31% day of August, 2004.

s/James L. Robart
United States District Judge

SEA_DOCS:830918.1

The United Nations (UN) Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. §
287c(a), provides in relevant part:

§ 287c. Economic and communication
sanctions pursuant to United, Nations Security
Council Resolution

(a) Enforcement measures: importation of Rhodesian
chromium

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,
whenever the United States is called upon by the
Security Council to apply measures which said Council
has decided, pursuant to article 4 I of said Charter, are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions under said
Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to
apply such measures, through any agency which he may
designate, and under such orders, rules, and regulations
as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or
prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication between any foreign country or any
national thereof or any person therein and the United
States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.

The Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub.L.101-513, §§ 586-586J, 104
Stat. 2047, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1701 note, provides in
part:

§ 586A. _ Declarations Regarding Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait.

The Congress-

(1) condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August
2, 1990;

(2) supports the actions that have been taken by
the President in response to that invasion;

(3) calls for the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

(4) supports the efforts of the United Nations
Security Council to end this violation of international law
and threat to international peace; :

(5) supports the imposition and enforcement of
multilateral sanctions against Iraq;

(6) calls on United States allies and other
countries to support fully the efforts of the United
Nations Security Council, and to take other appropriate
actions, to bring about an end to Iraq's occupation of
Kuwait; and

(7) condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq and its gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights in Kuwait, including widespread arrests,

torture, summary executions, and mass extrajudicial
killings.

§ 586C. Trade Embargo Against Iraq.

(a) CONTINUATION OF EMBARGO. -- Except as
otherwise provided in this section, the President shall
continue to impose the trade embargo and other
economic sanctions with respect to Jraq and Kuwait that
the United States is imposing, in response to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, pursuant to Executive Orders

FA

Numbered 12724 and 12725 (August 9, 1990) and, to the
extent they are still in effect, Executive Orders
Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 2, 1990).

Executive Order 12722 of
August 2, 1990

55 FR 31803
August 3, 1990 --

TEXT: By the authority vested in me as President by the
constitution and laws of the United states of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies
act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of
the United States Code.

I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of
America, find that the policies and actions of the
Government of Iraq constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States and hereby declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. All property and interests in property of
the Government of Iraq, its agencies, instrumentalities
and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iraq that
are in the United States, that hereafter come within the
United States or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of United States persons, including
their overseas branches, are hereby blocked.

Section 2. The following are prohibited, except to the
extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be
issued pursuant to this Order:

(a) The import into the United States of any goods or
services of Iraqi origin, other than publications and other
informational materials;

(b) The export to Iraq of any goods, technology
(including technical data or other information controlled
for export pursuant to Section 5 of the Export

56 A

administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2404)) or services
from the United States, except publications and other
informational materials, and donations of articles
articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as
food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended
strictly for medical purposes;

(c) Any transaction by a United States person
relating to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of
transportation to or from the United states by any Iraqi
person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraqi registration; or
the sale in the United States by any person holding
authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended (49 U.S.C. 1514), of any transportation by air
which includes any stop in Iraq;

(d) The purchase by any United States person of
goods for export from Iraq to any country;

(e) The performance by any United States person of
any contract in support of an industrial or other
commercial or governmental project in Iraq;

(f) The grant or extension of credits or loans by any
United States person to the Government of Iraq, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities;

(g) Any transaction by the United States person
relating to travel by any United States citizen or
permanent resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any
such person within Iraq, after the date of this Order,
other than transactions necessary to effect such person's
departure from Iraq, or travel for journalistic activity by
persons regularly employed in such capacity by a
newsgathering organization; and

(h) Any transaction by the United States person
which evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading cr
avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this Order

For purposes of this Order, the term "United States
person" means any United States citizen, permanent

TA

resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws
of the United States, or any person in the United States.

Section 3. This Order is effective immediately.

Section 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby
authorized to take such actions, including the
promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order, Such
actions may include prohibiting or regulating payments _
or transfers of any property or any transactions involving
the transfer of anything of economic value by any United
States person to the Government of Iraq, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities, or to any Iraqi
national or entity owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by Iraq or Iraqi nationals. The Secretary may
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and
agencies of the Federal government. All agencies of the
United States government are directed to take all
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out
the provisions of this Order, including the suspension or
termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect
as of the date of this Order.

This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published in the Federal Register.

SEA_DOCS:830911.1

Executive Order 12724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33089 (Aug. 9,
1990) reprinted at 50 U.S.C. §1701 note, provides in part:

Executive Order 12724: Blocking Iraqi
Government Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Iraq

By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws.of the United States of America,
including the international Emergency Economic Powers
Act(50U.8.C.1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 301 of title 3 of the
United States Code, and the United Nations
Participation Act (22 U .S.C. 287 c), in view of United
Nations Security Council Resolution No. 661 of August 6,
1990, and in order to take additional steps with respect
to Iraqis invasion of Kuwait and the national emergency
declared in Executive Order No. 12722,

I, GEORGE BUSH, President of he United States
of America, hereby order:

¥*K*

Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, except to the
extent provided in regulations that may hereafter be
issued pursuant to this order:

(a) The importation into the United States of any
goods or services of Iraqi origin, or any activity that
promotes or is intended to promote such importation;

(b) The exportation to Iraq, or to any entity
operated from Iraq, or owned or controlled by the
Government of Iraq, directly or indirectly, of any goods,
technology (including technical data oor other
information), or services either (i) from the United
States, or (ii) requiring the issuance of a license by a

S9A

Federal agency, or any activity that promotes or is
intended to promote such exportation, except donations
of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as
food and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(c) Any dealing by a United States person related
to property of Iraqi origin exported from Iraq after
August 6, 1990, or property intended for exportation from
Iraq to any country, or exportation to Iraq from any
country, or any activity of any kind that promotes or is
intended to promote such dealing;

(d) Any transaction by a United States person
relating to travel by any United States citizen or
permanent resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any
such person within Iraq, after the date of this order,
other than transactions necessary to effect (i) such
person's departure from Iraq, (ii) travel and activities for
the conduct of the official business of the Federal
Government or the United Nations, or (iii) travel for
journalistic activity by persons regularly employed in
such capacity by a news-gathering organization;

(e) Any transaction by a United States person
relating to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of
transportation to or from the United States by any Iraqi
person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraqi registration; or
the sale in the United States by any person holding
authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended (49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.), of any transportation
by air that includes any stop in Iraq;

(f) The performance by any United States person
of any contract, including a financing contract, in support
of an industrial, commercial, public utility, or
governmental project in Iraq;

60 A

(g) Except as otherwise authorized herein, any
commitment or transfer, direct or indirect, of funds, or
other financial or ~conomic resources by any United
States person to t » ‘xovernment of Iraq or any other
person in [raq;

(h) Any transaction by any United States person
that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order.

kEK

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take
such actions, including the promulgation of rules and
regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this order. Such actions may include
prohibiting or regulating payments or transfers of any
property or any transactions involving the transfer of
anything of economic value by any United States person
to the Government of Iraq, or to any Iraqi national or
entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
Government of Iraq or Iraqi nationals. The Secretary of
the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to
other officers and agencies of the Federal Government.
All agencies of the Federal Government are directed to
take all appropriate measures within their authority to
carry out the provisions of this order, including the
suspension or termination of licenses or other
authorizations in effect as of the date of this order.

31 C.F.R § 575.205 (including the Medicine
Restriction), provides:

§ 575.205. Prohibited exportation and
reexportation of goods, technology, or services to
Iraq. 3

Except as otherwise authorized, no goods, technology
(including technical data or other information), or
services may be exported from the United States, or, if
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, exported or reexported from a
third country to Iraq, to any entity owned or controlled
by the Government of Iraq, or to any entity operated
from Iraq, except donated foodstuffs in humanitarian
circumstances, and donated supplies intended strictly for
medical purposes, the exportation of which has been
specifically licensed pursuant to § 575.507, 575.517 or
575.518.

62 A

31 C.F.R. § 575.207 (the Iraq Travel Ban),
provides:

§ 575.207 Prohibited transactions relating to
travel to Iraq or to activities within Iraq.

Except as otherwise authorized, no U.S. person
may engage in any transaction relating to travel by any
U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien to Iraq, or to
activities by any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien
within Iraq, after the effective date, other than
transactions: .

(a) Necessary to effect the departure of a U.S.
citizen or permanent. resident alien from Kuwait or Iraq;

(b) Relating to travel and activities for the
conduct of the official business of the United States
Government or the United Nations; or

(c) Relating to journalistic activity by persons
regularly employed in such capacity by a newsgathering
organization.

This section prohibits the unauthorized payment by a

U.S. person of his or her own travel or living expenses to
or within Iraq.

63 A

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N. SCOR,
2933"4 mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990)

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,

Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been
implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait
continues, with further loss of human life and material
destruction,

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of
Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has
expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660
(1990),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international
peace and security,

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq
against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply
with paragraph 2 of the resolution 660 (1990) and has
usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of
Kuwait;

2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following
measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2

64A

a

of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of
the Government of Kuwait;

kkk

4, Decides that all States shall not make available to
the Government of Iraq, or to any commercial, industrial
or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any
funds or any other financial or economic resources and
shall prevent their nationals and any persons within
their territories from removing from their territories or
otherwise making available to that Government or to any
such undertaking any such funds or resources and from
remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within
Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly
medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian
circumstances, foodstuffs;

5. Calls upon all States, including States non-
members of the United Nations, to act strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution
notwithstanding any contract entered into or license
granted before the date of the present resolution;

KEKE

Adopted at the 2933" meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2
abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).

SEA_DOCS:830900.1

65 A

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide

Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or
accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9
December 1948 ,

Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with
article XIII

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (1)
dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under
international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has
inflicted great losses on humanity, and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from
such an odious scourge, international co-operation is
required,

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:
Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent
and to punish.

Article Il

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole

66 A

ar in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;

(c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its phy ical destruction in
whole or in part;

( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;

( e )Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;

(b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

(c ) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide:
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;

(e ) Complicity in genocide.

Article [V

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they
are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals

67 A

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of .
20 November 1989 |

Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance
with article 49

Preamble
The States Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations
have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in
fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth
of the human person, and have determined to promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom, .

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed
and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that
childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

68 A

Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care
to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of
the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly
on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in
articles 23 and 24), in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in
article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments
of specialized agencies and international organizations
concerned with the welfare of children,

Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and
Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement

and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules);
and the Declaration on the Protection of Women and
Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, Recognizing
that, in all countries in the world, there are children
living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such
children need special consideration,

Have agreed as follows:
Article 24

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to

69 A

ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of
access to such health care services.

2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this
right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures:

(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;

(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical
assistance and health care to all children with emphasis
on the development of primary health care;

(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within
the framework of primary health care, through, inter
alia, the application of readily available technology and
through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and
clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the
dangers and risks of environmental pollution;

(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health
care for mothers;

(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular
parents and children, are informed, have access to
education and are supported in the use of basic
knowledge of child heaith and nutrition, the advantages
of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation
and the prevention of accidents;

(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for
parents and family planning education and services.

3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate
measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices
prejudicial to the health of children.

4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage
international co-operation with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the right recognized

70A

in the present article. In this regard, particular account
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.

SEA_DOCS:830906.!

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Geneva, 12 August 1949.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments
represented at the Diplomatic Conference held at Geneva
from April 21 to August 12, 1949, for the purpose of
establishing a Convention for the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, have agreed as follows:

Art. 23. Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free
passage of all consignments of medical and hospital
stores and objects necessary for religious worship
intended only for civilians of another High Contracting ~
Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise
permit the free passage of all consignments of essential
foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children
under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the
free passage of the consignments indicated in the
preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this
Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons

for fearing:

(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their
destination,

(b) that the control may not be effective, or

(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the
military efforts or economy of the enemy through the
substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for
goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by
the enemy or through the release of such material,
services or facilities as would otherwise be required for
the production of such goods.

The Power which allows the passage of the consignments
indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make
such permission conditional on the distribution to the

72 A

persons benefited thereby being made under the local
supervision of the Protecting Powers.

Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible, and the Power which permits their free passage
shall have the right to prescribe the technical
arrangements under which such passage is allowed.

SEA_DOCS:830904.1

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res.
217A (IID), U.N. Doc 1/810 at 71 (1948)

Preamble

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, Justice and peace in
the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the
conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to
have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be
protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of
friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the
Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and
in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to
achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the
promotion of universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and
freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full
realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,
The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive
measures, national and international, to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance, both
among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.

Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special
care and assistance. All children, whether born in
or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social
protection.

bo

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the

TSA

destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein.

SEA_DOCS:830902.1

76A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

BERTRAM SACKS,
Plaintiff, NO. C04-108C

vs. AMENDED COM-
PLAINT FOR
OFFICE OF FOREIGN DECLARATORY
ASSETS CONTROL, UNITED | AND INJUNCTIVE
STATES DEPARTMENT OF RELIEF

THE TREASURY, and
RICHARD NEWCOMB,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bertram Sacks alleges:

I,
PARTIES

l. Plaintiff Bertram Sacks is a citizen of the
State of Washington. He resides in Seattle,
Washington, in the Western District of Washington.
This case arises from Mr. Sacks’s journeys to Iraq. On
each trip, Mr. Sacks has brought medicine and medical
supplies for use in civilian hospitals there. He has done
so to publicize and ameliorate the effect of economic
sanctions imposed by the government of the United
States. These sanctions have led to widespread

suffering and death of Iraqi civilians, especially
children.

2. Defendant Office of Foreign Assets
Contrel is an agency of the United States government.
Defendant R. Richard Newcomb is, and at all material
times has been, the Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control. For the sake of convenience, the
defendants, and each of them, shall be referred to as
“OFAC.” In furtherance of, and as part of, economic
Sanctions, OFAC has promulgated regulations that
prohibit certain transactions in Iraq. Purporting to act
under those regulations. OFAC has announced its
intention to impose a $10,000 civil penalty on Mr. Sacks
for traveling to Iraq with medical supplies.

3. OFAC’s fine, and the regulations under
which OFAC imposed that fine, violate statutory law,
executive orders, international law, and the United
States Constitution. Mr. Sacks seeks injunctive relief,
and declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that will
stop OFAC’s unlawful enforcement of an alleged
$10,000 civil penalty against Mr. Sacks.

Il.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4, This Court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter under 28 U.S.C. §1331, as this case arises under
the laws of the United States. This Court also has
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, as
this case arises under an Act of Congress regulating
commerce. This Court further has subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), as this is an
action against the United States for an amount not
exceeding $10,000 and founded upon the Constitution,
Acts of Congress, and regulations promulgated by the
defendant. This Court further has subject matter of
this action, as it has jurisdiction of the underlying
claims by OFAC against Mr. Sacks under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1337, and 2461(a).

5. Venue in the Western District of
Washington is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), as Mr.
Sacks resides therein and no real property is involved
in this action.

Il.
OPERATIVE FACTS

A. Background.

6. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.
In response, then-President George H.W. Bush declared
a “national emergency” pursuant to Executive Order
12722. That “national emergency” remains in effect to
the present day. Executive Order 19890 (July 31,
2003). In Executive Order 12722 and in Executive
Order 12724 dated a week later, President Bush
authorized the imposition of economic sanctions on
Iraq.

3 Iraq’s invasion led to the First Gulf War.
A coalition led by the United States defeated Iraq after
an extensive bombing campaign.

8. Immediately after the conclusion of the
First Gulf War, in March 1991, the United Nations
reported on the extensive damage to Iraqi
infrastructure caused by the U.S.-led bombing
campaign. Then-Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar dispatched a mission headed by Under-
Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari to assess the
situation in Iraq. The Under-Secretary-General
reported:

I and the members of my
mission were fully
conversant with media
reports regarding the
situation in Iraq and, of
course, with the _ recent

T9A

WHO/UNICEF report on
water, sanitary, and health
conditions in the Greater
Baghdad area. It should,
however, be said at once
that nothing we had seen
or read had quite prepared
us for the particular form of
devastation which has now
befallen the country. The
recent conflict has wrought
near-apocalyptic results
upon the economic
infrastructure of what had
been, until January 1991, a
rather highly urbanized
and mechanized society.
Now, most means of
modern life support have
been destroyed or rendered
tenuous. Iraq has, for some
time to come, '_ been
relegated to a _pre-
industrial age, but with all
the disabilities of post-
industrial dependency on
an intensive use of energy
and technology.

The report recommended an immediate end to the
embargo on imports of food and other essential supplies
to prevent “imminent catastrophe.”

B. OFAC’s Regulations in Response to the
“National Emergency.”

9. In January 1991, OFAC first
promulgated regulations to enforce economic sanctions

igainst the people of Iraq. Those regulations appear at
{1 CFR Part 575.

10. OFAC purported to act under 50 U.S.C.
‘§ 1701(a) & 1702. These statutes grant the President
ertain powers to deal with an “unusual and
‘xtraordinary threat” posed by a “national emergency”
leclared by the President. Among those powers is the
vower to regulate certain financial transactions. These
sowers “may only be exercised to deal with an unusual
ind extraordinary threat with respect to which a
1ational emergency has been declared... .” 50 U.S.C.
+ 1701(b).

11. OFAC’s regulations prohibit the
mportation of goods into Iraq. The regulations include
donated foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances, and
lonated supplies intended strictly for medical purposes”
inless those imports are “specifically licensed” by
IFAC. 31 CFR § 575.205. OFAC’s regulations do not
tate the criteria by which OFAC grants such licenses.
Nor do the regulations impose any deadline on OFAC to
rrant such licenses. Hence, OFAC has reserved to itself
‘he unrestricted and unfettered power to keep food and
nedical supplies from reaching people in Iraq who need
‘hem.

12. OFAC has also prohibited travel to Iraq,
ncluding travel for the purpose of bringing food and
nedical supplies to the Iraqi people. 31 CFR § 575.207
yrovides in relevant part, and subject to very limited
*xceptions, that “no U.S. person may engage in any
ransaction relating to travel by any U.S. citizen or
yermanent resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any
J.S. citizen or permanent resident alien within Iraq.”
JFAC also prohibited “[aJny transaction by a U.S.
yerson relating to transportation to or from Iraq.”
31 CFR § 575.208.

Beh Enter Bert Sacks.

13. Bert Sacks has traveled to Iraq nine
times. On each trip, Mr. Sacks has brought medicine
and medical supplies and distributed them to civilians,
many of them children, in civilian hospitals in Iraq. In
1997, he helped bring roughly $40,000 worth of
medicine into Iraq for the purpose of relieving human
suffering. Mr. Sacks also brought medicine and medical
supplies to Iraq to publicize the effect of economic
sanctions on the people of Iraq, especially children.

14. While in Iraq, Mr. Sacks has visited
medical clinics and pediatric hospitals. He has seen the
children who are dying there. Mr. Sacks has met with
other U.S. citizens in Iraq to highlight the effects of
U.S. policy there. Probably the best known among
them is United States Representative Jim McDermoit,
who traveled to Iraq in 2002. :

15. Mr. Sacks’ November 1997 trip to Iraq
was covered in the national news media. In response to
this particular trip, OFAC sought to punish Mr. Sacks.
On December 3, 1998, OFAC sent a written “Prepenalty
Notice” to Mr. Sacks and others. A true and correct
copy of the Prepenalty Notice is attached hereto as
Exhibit 1. In the Prepenalty Notice, OFAC claimed
Mr. Sacks had violated its regulations enforcing
economic sanctions during his 1997 trip to Iraq. The
Prepenalty Notice contained ten “counts,” only one of
which, Count 6, was directed at Mr. Sacks. Count 6
made the following charge:

Between on or about [sic]
November 21-30, 1997,
Messrs. Handelman,
Mullins, Sacks, and Zito,
engaged in currency travel-
related transactions

to/from/within Iraq absent
prior license or other
authorization from OFAC.
These currency
transactions included, but
are not limited to, the
purchase of food, lodging,
ground transportation, and
incidentals.

OFAC proposed a penalty of $10,000 for Mr. Sacks “for
Count 6” and invited written comments within thirty
days.

16. On December 28, 1998, Mr. Sacks wrote
back to OFAC:

I appreciate that you must
see yourselves as_ doing
your job to uphold US
sanctions laws _ against
Iraq, which I have violated.
However I want to explain
here, as I would to any
personal friends of mine,
why I have done this... .

You are correct to say in
your prepenalty letter
(12/3/98) that I brought
“medical supplies and toys
to Iraq” absent prior OFAC
approval. We all recognize,
I hope, that the $40,000 of
medicines we brought to
Iraq --- despite the lives it
saved --- was essentially a
symbolic act: it lasted the
22 million people of Jraq

about 15 minutes, given
their pre-sanctions needs of
$1,000,000 of imported
medicines per day.
Further, we brought
nothing towards the
$10,000,000 of food imports
Iraqis need per day. And
we brought nothing
towards the
$22,000,000,000 of
essential repairs for the
life-supporting
infrastructure needed to
stop the water-borne
epidemics in Iraq. These
numbers long ago
convinced me that the
human crisis in Irag cannot
be solved by humanitarian
aid --- but only by an end of
economic sanctions.

The decision to turn to civil
disobedience to end
sanctions, in public
defiance of the laws you are
entrusted with enforcing,
was not a natural one for
me. | first spent two years
of research, - writing, and
contacting people about the
situation, but this failed to
cast any significant public
attention on the thousands
of Iraqi children who were
dying every month because
of the bombed civilian

infrastructure (unsafe

84 A

drinking water) and
sanctions (lack of food and
medicines). In deciding to
publicly violate sanctions,
two events and two people
played an important role
for me.

The first is knowing that
150 years ago it was the
highest law of the United
States of America that
runaway slaves from the
South were legally “stolen
property” of their owners.
Anywhere in this country,
an American was breaking
the law to help such a slave
escape via the
“underground railroad.”
The people I greatly admire
from this terrible era in our
history were not law-
abiding citizens, but those
who broke the law to help
slaves....

The second event
influencing me is_ the
deaths of milbions of
innocent civilians during
WWII. I visited Auschwitz
one year ago, just before
my trip to Irag. At both
places over a million
innocent civilians have
died. I greatly admire the
people who took personal
risks to help Jews, against

85 A

prevailing indifference and
prejudice. ...

These two events are
certainly not identical with
events in Iraq, but the
example of people
motivated by high moral
considerations to “break
the law” has given me
encouragement to do the
same....

17. After writing this letter, Mr. Sacks
continued his work to call attention to the effect of
economic sanctions, and the regulations through which
OFAC seeks to enforce them, on the people of Iraq.
Those sanctions have deprived many Iraqi civilians,
especially children, of the food, clean water, and
medicine they need to survive.

D. Economic Sanctions Contribute To the

Deaths of Thousands of Young Children in

Iraq Every Month.

18. Economic sanctions have prevented Iraq
from rebuilding water treatment plants destroyed in
the First Gulf War. Water treatment facilities were
fairly widespread in Iraq until many were bombed
during the First Gulf War, along with virtually all of
the country’s electrical-generating plants that powered
Iraq's water and sewage treatment facilities. The
resulting lack of potable water has led to the outbreak
of severe diarrhea among young children, which is often
fatal in the absence of medical treatment. OFAC
regulations, however, have prevent people like
Mr. Sacks from bringing medicine and medical supplies
to Iraq. OFAC regulations also effectively prohibit the

importation of the amount of food needed to feed th

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_2004%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
