# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control (No. 06-948)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

Supreme Co |
p rae pur U.S.

at 6-948 JAN g
No.06-__ - OFFICEOF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

BERTRAM SACKS,

Petitioner,

V.

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, United States
Department of the Treasury; R. RICHARD NEWCOMB,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Donald B. Scaramastra

Counsel of Record

Gary D. Swearingen

GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER
Eighteenth Floor

1191 Second Avenue

Seattle, Washington 98101-2939
(206) 464-3939

January 8, 2007

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

On several occasions before the Second Gulf War,
Petitioner Bertram Sacks transported medicine to civilian
hospitals in Iraq for use by children and other civilian
patients. Mr. Sacks did so with several other members of an
unincorporated association known as Voices in the
Wilderness. . 7

At the time, the federal Office of Foreign Assets Control
and its director, Richard Newcomb (collectively referred to
as the “agency”) had prohibited travel to Iraq. The agency
had also banned unlicensed humanitarian exports of food
and medicine to Iraqi civilians. It did so even though UN
Security Council Resolutions, Presidential Executive
Orders, and federal statutes pertaining to Iraq did not
authorize an absolute embargo on humanitarian exports,
an embargo that would have violated international law.

In response to Mr. Sacks’s actions, the agency sent Mr.
Sacks and Voices a joint prepenalty notice that charged:
“you and Voices in the Wilderness (‘VW’) have engaged in
certain prohibited transactions” that “concern your and
VW’s exportation of donated goods, including medical
supplies and toys, to Iraq.” When Mr. Sacks admitted to
exporting medicine, the agency sent him a penalty notice:
“You admitted the [Prepenalty} Notice’s allegation in Count .
6 that you exported goods to Iraq absent prior OFAC
approval.” Based on this admission, the agency found that
Mr. Sacks had “violated the Regulations as alleged in
Count 6 of the Notice” and imposed a $10,000 civil penalty.
The agency fined Voices separately for exporting medicine.

The Ninth Circuit held that notwithstanding these
penalties, Mr. Sacks lacked standing to challenge the
agency's prohibition.of humanitarian exports. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that Mr. Sacks had standing to challenge
the agency’s travel ban, but held that Congressional
statutes authorized such a ban, even if it had the intended

effect of preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Iraqi
children and other civilians.

i

Mr. Sacks now petitions for a writ of certiorari. The
petition raises two questions:

1. Does Mr. Sacks have standing to challenge the
agency's civil penalty and its direct or indirect restrictions
on humanitarian exports of food and medicine to Iraqi
civilians and children?

2, Are the agency’s direct and. indirect restrictions on
humanitarian exports of food and medicine to Iraqi
civilians and children, through a travel ban or otherwise,
lawful and enforceable as a matter of both international
and domestic U.S. law?

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous
Ruling on Standing Will
Prevent Judicial Scrutiny of
Regulations like Those at Issue

Injury in Fact
Causation and
Redressability
A Prohibition on Humanitarian
Donations Violates
International Law That
Congress Has Not Abrogated
A. International Law
Forbids the Deliberate,
Mass Starvation of

The UN Participation
Act Does Not Authorize
an Embargo on
Humanitarian Aid
The Irag Sanctions Act
of 1990 Does Not
Authorize an Embargo
on Humanitarian Aid
Conclusion

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. Art. 6

ASES

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S.
289 (1979)

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)

Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987)

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973)

Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804)
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)

Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in
the Wilderness, No. 03-1356 (JDB)
(D.D.C. July 9, 2004), at 2

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1

Vv

REP. No. 99-2, pt. I, reprinted in 28
Sm POR I 25

cks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control,
466 F.3d 764, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
25294 (9t Cir. 2006)

mon v. Kastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)

2el Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Paquete-Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700

arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
aunberger uv. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982)

iiiney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194

ungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)

‘ATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
U.S.C. § 287c

U.S.C. § 1254(1)

U.S.C. § 1331

U.S.C. § 1337

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)

U.S.C. § 2461(a)

ternational Emergency Economic Powers

Act (“TEEPA”) § 203(b)

Vi

Iraq: Are Sanctions Collapsing?: Joint
Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, 105th Cong., S. Hrg. 105-
650, at 59-60 (1998)

REGULATORY MATERIALS
31 CFR § 575

31 CFR § 575.205

31 CFR § 575.207

56 Fed. Reg. 2113 (Jan. 18, 1991)

Executive Order 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803
(Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

§ 1701 note

Executive Order 12,724 § 2(b), 55 F.R.
33089 (Aug. 9, 1990), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 1701 note |

Executive Order 13350, 69 Fed. Reg. 46055
(July 30, 2004)

COURT RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
MATERIALS

Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
78 U.N.T.S. 277

Convention on the Rights of the Child,
opened for sig ‘ure Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S

Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict, done on
May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex
I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000)

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, United States Dept.
of State, Treaties in Force (2006), a
PM <i sncctenibiseieineniiphataaiilitg age Pas Stes 26

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N.
SCOR, 2938rd mtg, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/661 (1990)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
GA Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at
71 (1948)

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
done on May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155

SECONDARY SOURCES

Alberto Ascherio, et al., The Effect of the
Gulf War on Infant and Child Mortality
in Iraq, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. at 931
(Sept. 24, 1992)

Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck
Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge
Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military |
Targets, THE WASHINGTON Post, June
DE IEA OD 1,3

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3581.5, at
BF BRI, cic sc cccererscenctvessvcvvvevaccccvecessovecsvesascesess 21

Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities,
Defense Intelligence Agency (Jan. 18,
oo ohlcaseoncnsveneepesuvevensvecsoereeeveveseceeerervane 2

Leon Eisenberg, The Sleep of Reason
Produces Monsters -- Human Costs of
Economic Sanctions, 336 NEW ENGLAND
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, at 1248-50 (April
BT 1h. 2s cimnaveheatavenevonsrvevessesesersonorsoveevooscouseees 4

_ Marc BossuytT, THE ADVERSE ;
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TE cds socsnscinkeckoqeanenavevenvnveeveyernvevcesscencesovesvevensoes 7

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
BE IEEE Ds catddanersectexcncesseopesceseccosceveseceresencesovevevees PES 27

The Harvard Study Team, The Effect of the
Gulf Crisis On the Children of Iraq, 325

New Eng. J. Med. 977-80 (1991)........sssssseseesersreeeeseeees 4
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2,

IEEE, RIN Rcossvevsecareesevoursrvesanecassveveenacerse cesses 3
UNICEF, THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN IN

Neen acc aacicnespunminncapesveennnenssein 6

Opinions and Orders Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is published at Sacks v. Office of Foreign
Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25294
(9th Cir. 2006) and is reprinted in the appéndix. The
opinion of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington is unpublished and is reprinted in
the appendix.

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT

The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on October 10,
2006. Neither side petitioned for rehearing or for hearing
by the Ninth Circuit en banc. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

AUTHORITIES INVOLVED

The following are the principal constitutional provisions,
treaties, UN Security Council Resolutions, statutes,
regulations, and executive orders that are involved in the
case. Excerpts from these materials are set forth in the
appendix.

United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287c.
Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 101-513, § 586C.

Executive Order 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803 (Aug. 2, 1990),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

Executive Order 12,724 § 2(b), 55 F.R. 33089 (Aug. 9, 1990),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

31 CFR § 575.205.
_ 81 CFR § 575.207.

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

Corvention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T'S. 3.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A
(IIT), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).

x1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In 1990, the United States began a years-long military
and economic campaign that targeted Iraq’s civilian
population, contributing to the mass deaths of children and
other civilians there. The regulations at issue here, and
under which petitioner Bertram Sacks was fined, were part
of that effort.

Bombing worked hand in hand with an embargo,
exacerbating its effect. This was intended, one military
planner explained to the Washington Post:

The worst civilian suffering, senior [American]
officers say, has resulted not from bombs that went
astray but from precision-guided weapons that hit
exactly where they were aimed --- at electrical
plants, oil refineries and transportation networks.
... People say, ‘You didn’t recognize that it was
going to have an effect on water or sewage,” said
the planning officer. “Well, what were we trying to
do with [United Nations-approved economic]
sanctions -- help out the Iraqi people? No. What we
were doing with the attacks on infrastructure was
to accelerate the effect of the sanctions.”'

Before the First Gulf War, U.S. officials were aware of
the potential consequences of targeting Iraq’s
infrastructure. In January 1991, just as the First Gulf War
was beginning and six months into the embargo, the
Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency projected that the
embargo would cause Iraq’s ability to provide clean
drinking water to collapse within six months. Chemicals for
water treatment, the agency noted, were “depleted or
nearing depletion,” chlorine supplies were “critically low,”

* Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials
Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, THE
WASHINGTON Post, June 23, 1991, at Al.

1

the main chlorine-production plants had been shut down,
and industries such as pharmaceuticals and food processing
were already becoming incapacitated. “Unless the water is
purified with chlorine,” the agency concluded, “epidemics of
such diseases as cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid could
occur.”2

After the war, the United Nations Secretary- aie’
dispatched a mission to assess the situation in Iraq.’ The
mission reported that the ware had “wrought
near-apocalyptic results,” that the bombing had relegated
Iraq “to a pre-industrial age,” and warned that Iraq could
face “epidemic and famine if massive life-supporting needs
are not rapidly met.” The report called for an immediate
end to the embargo on imports of food and other
essential supplies to prevent “imminent catastrophe.

The U.S. embargo’s initial goal was to force an Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait. This was consistent with Security
Resolution 661, which called for sanctions “to secure °
compliance with paragraph 2 of resolution 660,” which in
turn “demand{ed} that Iraq withdraw immediately and
unconditionally “ from Kuwait.°

But after the First Gulf War ended, U.S. officials
expanded the embargo’s objective had expanded to
encompass the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In
a May 22, 1991 written statement prepared for delivery to
the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House
Appropriations Committee, then-Secretary of State James
Baker announced: “[W]e will act with others to continue to

n§

? Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities, Defense Intelligence Agency
(Jan. 18, 1991).

§ See Amended Complaint § 8. A copy of the report is available on the
UN's website at http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reports/
822366.pdf.

$ Td.

5 Td.

§S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990),
available on-line at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90. htm, last
visited 4/8/05.

2

isolate Saddam's regime. ... That means maintaining UN
sanctions in place sc long as Saddam remains in power.”

Military planners explained the logic underlying this
decision:

Col. John A. Warden III, deputy director of
strategy, doctrine and plans for the Air Force,
agreed that one purpose of destroying Iraq’s
electrical grid was that “you have imposed a long-
term problem on the leadership that it has to deal
with sometime.”

“Saddam Hussein cannot restore his own
electricity,” he said. “He needs help. If there are
political objectives that the U.N. coalition has, it
can say, ‘Saddam, when you agree to do these
things, we will allow people to come in and fix your
electricity.’ It gives us long-term leverage.”

Said another Air Force planner: “Big picture, we
wanted to let people know, ‘Get rid of this guy and
we'll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding.
We're not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his

regime. Fix that, and we'll fix your electricity.”

But the embargo remained in effect. As expected and
intended, its post-war continuation prevented Iraq from
rebuilding water and sewage treatment plants — and the
electric-generating plants used to power them — that were
destroyed during the First Gulf War.’ This, and the
resulting lack of potable water, had widespread lethal
consequences that were visited with particular ferocity on

7 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 21, May 27, 1991.

§ Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials
Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, THE
WASHINGTON PosT, June 23, 1991, at Al.

* Amended Complaint ¥ 18.

3

children under five.’® In 1992 the New England Journal of
Medicine reported:

strong evidence that the Gulf war and trade
sanctions caused a threefold increase in mortality
among Iraqi children under five years of age. We
estimate that an excess of more that 46,900
~children died between January and August 1991."

In 1997, the same journal reported:

The destruction of the country’s power plants had
brought its entire system of water purification and
distribution to a halt, leading to epidemics of
cholera, typhoid fever, and gastroenteritis,
particularly among children. Mortality rates
doubled or tripled among children admitted to
hospitals in Baghdad and Basra. Cases of
marasmus appeared for the first time in decades.
The team observed "suffering of tragic
proportions.... [with children] dying of preventable
diseases and starvation." Although the allied
bombing had caused few civilian casualties, the.
destruction of the infrastructure resulted in
devastating long-term effects on health.”

Since 1992, sanctions have contributed to the deaths of
three to six thousand children under five in Iraq every

10 Td.

11 Alberto Ascherio, et al., The Effect of the Gulf War on Infant and
Child Mortality in Iraq, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. at 931 (Sept. 24, 1992); see
also Amended Complaint 4 19.

12 Leon Eisenberg, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters -- Human
Costs of Economic Sanctions, 336 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE,
at 1248-50 (April 24, 1997) (citing The Harvard Study Team, The Effect
of the Gulf Crisis On the Children of Iraq, 325 New Eng. J. Med. 977-80
(1991).

4

month." According to UNICEF's Director, sanctions
reversed a decades-long decline in infant mortality in
Iraq.'* She relied upon UNICEF reports that between 199]
and 1998, this reversal contributed to the deaths of a half
million children under five. c

Page 3 of a 2000 UNICEF report entitled “UNICEF in
Iraq” warned: “Mounting evidence shows that the sanctions
are having a devastating humanitarian impact on Iraq.” "5
UNICEF quoted a 1997 report by the UN Human Rights
Committee, which lamented that “the effect of sanctions
and blockades has been to cause suffering and death in
Iraq, especially to children.”'®

In 20038, UNICEF published another report, entitled
“The Situation of Children in Iraq.’ Page 13 of that report
stated that a country like Iraq, which had an infant
mortality rate of 40-60 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990,
was expected to achieve a rate of 20-30 by 2003."8 Instead,
the infant mortality rate in southern and central Iraq
climbed to 107 deaths per 1,000 live births by 1999," There
was a similar upswing in the under-five mortality rate,
which nearly tripled between 1985 and 1999.” UNICEF
attributed the increase in childhood mortality in Iraq to
economic sanctions.”!

- The “oil-for-food” program failed to eliminate widespread
embargo-related infant and child mortality” and the first
two directors of the oil-for-food program resigned from the
UN in protest.” The first, Denis Halliday, explained:

8 Amended Complaint q 19.

4 Amended Complaint q 21.

© Amended Complaint G 20.

16 Jd,

7 Amended Complaint { 22; see http /unicef org/publicationsindex 4439 html,
last visited 4/8/05.

‘8 Amended Complaint q 22.

19 Td,

20 Td,

21 Td.

*2 Amended Complaint § 26.

23 Amended Complaint 4 27.

Malnutrition is running at about 30 percent for
children under 5 years old. In terms of mortality,
probably 5 or 6 thousand children are dying per
month. This is directly attributable to the impact
of sanctions, which have caused the breakdown of
the clean water system, health facilities and all the
things that young children require... . I do not
want to administer a program that results in these
kinds of figures.” |

He later warned: “We are in the process of destroying an
entire society. [t is as simple and terrifying as that.””

The second director, Hans von Sponeck, resigned after
he “became aware that I was associated with a policy of
implementing an oil-for-food program that could not
possibly meet the needs of the Iraqi people.”” “If we
continue this policy when we fully recognize its
consequences,” he warned, “we move toward genocide.”””

UNICEF reports confirm that the oil-for-food program
“did not greatly improve conditions for most Iraqis. This is
partly because revenue has not been sufficient to
comprehensively rehabilitate the country’s
infrastructure.””* UNICEF's 2003 report, cited above,
concluded: “since the introduction of the Oil for Food
Programme, the nutritional status of children has not ;
improved. One in five children in the south and centre of
Iraq remain so malnourished that they need special
feeding, and child sickness rates continue to be alarmingly
high.”

24 Id.

26 Id.

26 Amended Complaint 4 28.

27 Amended Complaint 4 28.

78 Amended Complaint § 29.

79 Amended Complaint § 29; see UNICEF, THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN
IN IRAQ, at 11 (2003).

6

Meanwhile, a 2000 working paper for the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded, “The
sanctions regime against Iraq is unequivocally illegal under
existing international humanitarian law and human rights
law. Some would go as far as making a charge of
genocide,”””

Many in government not only anticipated these
consequences, they were aware or accepted them as they
unfolded. In 1996, for example, then-UN Ambassador
Madeleine Albright was asked: “We have heard that.a half
million children have died. I mean, that’s more children
than died in Hiroshima. ...[I]s the price worth it?”3! She
responded, “I think this is a very hard choice, but the
price -- we think the price is worth it.”82 Two years later, in
a prepared statement submitted to a May 21, 1998 joint
hearing before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations
and on Energy and Natural Resources, Senator Larry Craig
insisted: “The use of food as a weapon is wrong. Starving
populations into submission is poor foreign policy.”

In response to this, Mr. Sacks transported medicine to
. children and other civilians in Iraq. He expected to incur

the ire of the authorities by doing so. This, he expected and
hoped, would put the U.S. embargo before the judiciary of
the United States, where the rule of law prevails. And there
he proposed to ask the question: Is the deliberate targeting
of children and civilian populations — with resulting mass

80 MARC BossuyYt, THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000) § 71. This report
is available on-line at ;
www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa023802566870051
8ca 4/c56876817262a5b2c125695e0050656e/SFILE/G0014092.doc, last
visited April 8, 2005.

31 Amended Complaint ¥ 25.

32 Id. Ms. Albright later expressed regret for this statement, but
insisted that sanctions were justified notwithstanding the “starvation”
and “horrors” they caused. Jd.

® Traq: Are Sanctions Collapsing?: Joint Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, 105th Cong., S. Hrg. 1056-650, at 62-80 (1998).

7

deaths — legal under peremptory norms of international law
(also known as “jus cogens”), norms from which civilized
nations may not legally depart.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The U.S. embargo of Iraq has its genesis in °
Executive Orders 12,722 and 12,724, which the first
President Bush issued in response to the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait.” These orders prohibited certain economic
transactions with Iraq but exempted “donations of articles
intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing,
medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical
purposes.”

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council issued Resolution
661,°° which called for certain economic sanctions but also
exempted “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes”
and “payments exclusively for strictly medical or
humanitarian purposes.””” UN sanctions were limited to the
purpose of securing Iraq's departure from Kuwait.”

On November 5, 1990, Congress enacted the Iraq
Sanctions Act of 1990,” which approved President Bush’s
two executive orders.”’ The orders’ exemption for
humanitarian aid did not escape Congress’s notice, for the
Act expressly referred to them and the fact that they “were
established by the United States pursuant to United

34 Exec, Order No. 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803 (Aug. 2, 1990) (emphasis
added), reprinted in 60 U.S.C. § 1701 note; Exec. Order No. 12,724, 56
F.R. 33089 (Aug. 9, 1990) (emphasis added), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

§ 1701 note.

36 Wxec, Order 12,722, § 2(b); see also Exec. Order 12,724, § 2(b).

36 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990),
available on-line at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm, last
visited 4/8/05.

37 Td. §§ 3(c) & 4.

38 See supra note 6.

39 P T,, 101-513, see 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

40P L. 101-513, § 586C(a).

8

Nations Security Council Resolution 661 ....”“' Finally, the
Act required that:

[aJny regulations issued after the date of
enactment of this Act with respect to the economic
sanctions imposed with respect to Iraq and Kuwait
by the United States under Executive Orders
Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 2, 1990) and
Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and 12725
(August 9, 1990) shall be submitted to the
Congress before those regulations take effect. ”

On January 18, 1991, the agency promulgated
regulations that imposed trade sanctions on Iraq,” but the
Federal Register contains no indication that the agency
submitted its regulations to Congress beforehand as
required.“ Unlike Executive Orders 12,722 and 12,724 and
Resolution 661, these regulations prohibited the unlicensed
export of “donated foodstuffs in humanitarian
circumstances, and donated supplies intended strictly for
medical purposes.”” Theoretically, the regulations allowed
one to obtain a license, but they stated no criteria, and
imposed no deadline, by which the agency would consider
applications for such licenses.“ The agency refused to
answer a Freedom of Information Act request for
information concerning its handling of license
applications.*’ Together, the agency’s regulations forbade
U.S. citizens from either sending or bringing humanitarian
aid to Iraq. The first, which the lower courts named the
“Medicine Restriction,” was 31 CFR § 575.205. The second,

41 Id. § 586C(b).

42 Td. § 586C(c)(1).

8 31 CFR Part 675; Amended Complaint 4 9.
“4 56 Fed. Reg. 2113 Wan. 18, 1991).

© Amended Complaint J 11; 31 CFR § 576.205.
46 Amended Complaint § 11; 31 CFR § 576.205.
47 Amended Complaint § 44.

9

which the lower courts called the “Travel Ban,” was 31 CFR
§ 575.207.

2. Mr. Sacks responded to the humanitarian
catastrophe — wrought in significant part by the agency's
implementation of the U.S. embargo — by bringing medicine
and medical supplies to patients in Iraqi civilian hospitals
on several occasions.” In November 1997, Mr. Sacks helped
bring roughly $40,000 worth of medicine for this purpose.”
His trip received national media coverage.” In December
1998, the agency responded with a written “Prepenalty
Notice” that was jointly addressed to Mr. Sacks, several
other individuals, and an organization called Voices in the
Wilderness.”

“fYJou and Voices in the Wilderness (VW’),” the
prepenalty notice began, “have engaged in certain
prohibited transactions.” These violations, the notice
continued, “concern your and VW’s exportation of donated
goods, including medical supplies and toys, to Iraq.” Count
6 of the notice charged: “Between on or about November
21-30, 1997 ... Sacks ... engaged in currency travel-related
transactions to/from/within Iraq absent prior license or
other authorization from OFAC. These currency
transactions included, but are not limited to, the purchase
of food, lodging, ground transportation, and incidentals.”™

The agency proposed a $10,000 penalty” and invited a
response from Mr. Sacks as to all of the charges, including
the charges against Voices. Mr. Sacks responded by
admitting that he donated medical supplies,” explaining:

48 Amended Complaint { 13.

49 Td.

60 Amended Complaint { 15.

61 Td,

52 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 1.
83 Td.

64 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 2.
66 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 3.
66 Td.

67 Amended Complaint { 16.

10

The decision to turn to civil disobedience to end
sanctions, in public defiance of the laws you are
entrusted with enforcing, was not a natural one for
me.... In deciding to publicly violate sanctions, two
events and two people played an important role for
me. [One was] knowing that 150 years ago it was
the highest law of the United States of America
that runaway slaves from the South were legally
“stolen property” of their owners. Anywhere in this
country, an American was breaking the law to help
such a slave escape via the “underground railroad.”
The people I greatly admire from this terrible era
in our history were not law-abiding citizens, but
those who broke the law to help slaves....*

Nearly four years later, the Agency sent Mr. Sacks a
May 2002 “Penalty Notice”” that claimed: “You admitted
the [Prepenalty] Notice’s allegation in Count 6 that you
exported goods to Iraq absent prior OFAC approval
.... OFAC notes that you have admitted to Count 6 alleged
in the Notice. .. .”” Based on this admission, the agency
found that Mr. Sacks had “violated the Regulations as
alleged in Count 6 of the Notice” and imposed a $10,000
penalty.” |

In August 2003, an organization named Ocwen Federal
Bank wrote Mr. Sacks to advise that the agency had
retained it to collect the penalty.” Meanwhile, the agency
sued Voices to collect a penalty for exporting medical
supplies to Iraq.” The district court in that case noted that
Voices “is an unincorporated association of individuals,”
that “Voices delegations delivered medical supplies to Iraq”

58 Amended Complaint § 16.

59 Amended Complaint q 41.

60 Amended Complaint, Ex. 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
6! Amended Complaint, Ex. 2, at 2.

62 Amended Complaint Jf 46 & 47.

63 Td.

11

without obtaining a license,” and that Voices’ website was
www.vitw.us/who_we_are.” That website, in turn,
identifies Mr. Sacks as a “representative” of Voices. In
addition, the agency’s motion to dismiss warned of further
enforcement efforts, stating that it “reserve[d] the right” to
“act{] in response to Plaintiffs eight other trips to Iraq.”™

Thus, Mr. Sacks was faced with a three-fold threat: (1)
the agency’s penalty based on Mr. Sacks’s admission that
he “exported goods to Iraq”; (2) a possible agency attempt to
collect its judgment against Voices from Mr. Sacks, a
judgment premised on Voices’ export of medicine to Iraq;
and (3) the agency’s threat to seek further penalties from
Mr. Sacks for violating its ban on humanitarian exports.
This suit followed.

3. Mr. Sacks filed this action on January 14, 2004 and
amended his complaint shortly thereafter. He challenged
the agency’s restriction on humanitarian donations of
medicine and other medical supplies, and its ban on travel
for the purpose of making such donations.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (as it arose under the laws of
the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (as it arose under an
Act of Congress regulating commerce), under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(a)(2) (as it was an action against the United States

' founded upon federal law that involved more than $10,000),
and under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (as the court had jurisdiction
of the agency’s underlying claims).

The agency moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). After Mr. Sacks served discovery requests and
initial disclosures, the agency requested, and the district
court granted, a stay of discovery and initial disclosures
until the agency’s motion to dismiss was decided.”

84 Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness, No. 03-
1356 (JDB) (D.D.C. July 9, 2004), at 2; see also Amended Complaint 4 46.

85 Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness, at 2.

66 Motion to Dismiss, at 5 n.4.

’ A copy of the protective order staying discovery
appears in the Appendix.

12

as

The district court granted the agency’s motion to dismiss
in part. The district court held that the agency’s regulations
required it to refer its civil] penalty to the Justice
Department for enforcement in a civil proceeding rather
than collect its fine extra-judicially, (The Ninth Circuit
subsequently affirmed this ruling.)

But the district court ruled that the agency had not
exceeded its authority by prohibiting U.S. citizens from
bringing or sending humanitarian aid to Iraq. After
acknowledging that Mr. Sacks “present[ed] a compelling
argument” that the agency transgressed statutory limits,
the court concluded that the Iraq Sanctions Act authorized
those regulations, even if the Act ran counter to

international treaties or customary international law. The
court went so far as to hold that the Geneva Convention “is
not binding on the United States.”

Mr. Sacks timely appealed the district court’s decision
and the agency timely cross-appealed. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal, although on different grounds. Pertinent
to this petition, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Sacks
lacked standing to challenge the agency’s prohibition on
humanitarian exports of food and medical supplies to Iraq.
While agreeing that Mr. Sacks satisfied all other elements
of standing and ripeness,” the court concluded that his
“fear of prosecution runs aground on the government's
decision to charge and penalize him for only the violation of
the Travel Ban and not for the Medicine Restrictions
violation.””'

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the agency’s
penalty notice “described [Mr. Sacks’s] prior admission
ambiguously” and that the penalty notice was “confusing.” ””
Nonetheless, without the benefit of facts that might bear on

68 Order at 5.
69 Td. at 7.

7 466 F.3d 764, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25294, at *21.
) Id. at *21-*22,
72 Td. at *11 & *17,

13

the agency’s intent, the court made the factual
determination — on a rule 12(b)(6) motion ~ that “Sacks was
not penalized for violating the Medicine Restrictions” and
that the agency decided “to charge and penalize him for
only the violation of the Travel Ban and not for the
Medicine Restrictions violation ... when it was fully aware
he had also violated the Medicine Restrictions.”

Based on these factual findings, the Ninth Circuit.
concluded that Mr. Sacks had not demonstrated an actual
injury. Going further, the court concluded that Mr. Sacks
could not even demonstrate a threat of future injury. In the
Ninth Circuit's eyes, the agency's conduct “indicate[d] that
the government does not intend to penalize him for any of
his numerous violations of the Medicine Restrictions.” The
court next went entirely outside the confines of the
complaint, found that the agency had failed to pursue
additional fines against Mr. Sacks, and concluded that this
was “a strong indication of its lack of intent to do so in the
future.” The court also deemed insignificant the agency’s
pursuit of fines against Voices, and its reservation of its
right to impose additional penalties on Mr. Sacks.

Mr. Sacks now petitions for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case raises important issues regarding the scope of
executive power to punish U.S. citizens in violation of
Congressional statutes and international law. If left
uncorrected, moreover, individuals threatened with
punishment for voicing their opposition to illegal conduct by
the executive or acting for humanitarian purposes could
lose the right to judicial review of the penalty’s validity
through tactically worded penalty notices. As set forth in
the following sections, the case also presents a unique

3 Td. at *18.
™ Id, at *22-*23 (emphasis in original).
18 Id. at "24.

14

opportunity to address these issues without undue
interference with ongoing foreign policy initiatives of the
executive branch.

I. The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Ruling on
Standing Will Prevent Judicial Scrutiny
of Regulations like Those at Issue Here

The Ninth Circuit narrowly construed this Court's
standing jurisprudence in order to deny Mr. Sacks’
standing to challenge the agency’s restriction on
humanitarian donations of food and medicine (while
recognizing his standing to challenge the travel ban). By
doing so, the Ninth Circuit has done more than simply
depart from established law. Rather, under the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, it is difficult to conceive how the agency’s
authority to directly restrict humanitarian donations of
food and medicine could ever be subjected to review. Under
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the agency may indirectly
preclude all humanitarian exports through a travel ban,
perpetually rendering its restrictions on humanitarian
exports unreviewable.

Not only that, the Ninth Circuit's ruling on Mr. Sacks's 3
standing is wrong. Mr. Sacks has Article III standing to
challenge the agency’s restriction on medical exports if
three elements are present: (1) injury in fact to Mr. Se ‘ks;
(2) causation, i.e., a fairly traceable connection between
Mr. Sacks’ injury and the agency’s restriction on medical
exports; and (3) redressability, i.e., a likelihood that the
relief Mr. Sacks requests will redress the injuries he
alleges.”®

At this stage of the proceedings, a motion directed to the
pleadings, general factual allegations in support of
standing are sufficient.” And when standing is challenged

6 E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103
(1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 565, 560-61 (1992).
1 Steel Co., 623 U.S. at 105; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

15

on the basis of the pleadings, the court must “accept as true
all material allegations of the complaint, and ... construe
the complaint in favor of the complaining party.””

As will be seen, the Ninth Circuit failed to apply these
rules. Instead, it construed the complaint against Mr.
Sacks, looked to facts outside the complaint, including facts
that took place after the complaint was filed and, based on
this review, concluded that Mr. Sacks lacked i haneng and
that his claims were unripe.

A. Injury in Fact

A plaintiff has standing to challenge allegedly illegal
action if he or she faces “some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action.”” Here, Mr.
Sacks faces both actual and threatened prosecution under
. the agency’s medicine restriction.

Mr. Sacks was fined, the agency’s penalty notice
claimed, because he “admitted the [Prepenalty] Notice’s
allegation in Count 6 that you exported goods to Iraq
absent prior OFAC approval.”™ This claim followed a
prepenalty notice directed jointly to Voices and him
(making clear that the agency did not view Mr. Sacks as
any ordinary dues-paying member of that organization).
The prepenalty notice claimed that “you and Voices in the
Wilderness (‘VW’) have engaged in certain prohibited
transactions” which “concern[ed] your and VW's
exportation of donated goods, including medical
supplies and toys, to Iraq.””

78 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

7 E.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 490; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 (1973); see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 736 (1984) (“actual
or threatened injury” is required).

80 Amended Complaint, Ex. 2, at 1 (emphasis added).

8! Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 1.

82 Jd.

16

As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit dismissed
the language of the penalty notice as ambiguous and
“confusing.” It then resolved the ambiguity against Mr.
Sacks and concluded that Mr. Sacks had not been pursued
or punished for exporting medical goods. But the court did
not stop there. It went further and found that the agency’s
conduct did not suggest that the threat of future
enforcement of the medicine restriction was anything more
than conjectural.

These rulings do not comport with this Court’s
jurisprudence regarding standing. The complaint,
construed in Mr. Sacks’ favor, alleges that he was fined
because he “exported goods to Iraq.” The Ninth Circuit had
no license to resolve factual issues on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, which is precisely what it did when it found
ambiguity in the penalty notice. A proper reading of the
complaint reveals an actual injury in fact — a $10,000 civil
penalty — imposed because he admitted that he “exported
goods to Iraq.” This satisfied the first prong of Article III's
tripartite standing requirement.

The Ninth Circuit compounded its error by dismissing
the threat of future prosecution as insufficiently concrete to
satisfy Article III. But the combination of the agency’s
enforcement actions against Voices and Mr. Sacks plainly
raises, at least on the pleadings, a credible threat of future
prosecution. In Babbitt v. United Farm Workers”, this
Court articulated the difference between prosecutorial
threats that are sufficient to confer standing and those that
are not:

When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected
with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a
statute, and there exists a credible threat of -
prosecution thereunder, he should not be required

® 442 U.S. 289 (1979).

17

to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the
sole means of seeking relief. But persons having no
fears of state prosecution except those that are
imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as
appropriate plaintiffs. When plaintiffs do not claim
that they have ever been threatened with
prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even
that a prosecution is remotely possible, they do not
allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a
federal court.™

Here, as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, Mr. Sacks had
done more than merely-assert an intention to engage in
conduct that violated the medicine restriction. He has
actually done so on several occasions. The question was
therefore reduced to whether the threat of prosecution was
something other than remote or speculative.

This Court has, from time to time, dismissed a threat of
future prosecution as insufficient. In Poe v. Ullman,™ this
Court dismissed the threat of prosecution under a statute
as insignificant where the statute had never been enforced
in nearly a century (save for a single test case to establish
its constitutionality and then not to the point that anyone
was punished). In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),
the threat of future abusive or discriminatory prosecution
was dismissed where the plaintiffs did not allege any
specific threats against them, where they did not challenge
the validity of the any of the laws under which they might
be prosecuted, and where the court “assume[d] that
[plaintiffs] will conduct their activities within the law and
so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to
the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by
(defendants].” Here, of course, the regulations at issue are
being enforced, and enforced against an association of

84 442 U.S. at 298-99 (citations and quotations omitted).
86 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

18

which Mr. Sacks is a member in connection with acts Mr.
Sacks committed.

The threats Mr. Sacks faces are akin to those presented
in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). There, the Court
upheld the standing of physicians to challenge a law
proscribing doctor assistance at most abortions where the
statute was “recent and not moribund” and the Court was
informed at oral argument that physicians had been
prosecuted under it.

The threats here are certainly more concrete than those
found to confer standing in Pennell. There, this Court ruled
that an association of landlords had standing to challenge a
rent control ordinance that limited their right to raise the
rent where it would impose a hardship on the tenant and
subjected landlords who violated the ordinance to civil and
criminal penalties. It was enough, this Court ruled, that the
complaint stated that the plaintiffs were “subject to the
ordinance” and counsel stated, during oral argument, that
most landlords had hardship tenants.”

Here, in contrast, the agency has assessed one civil
penalty against Mr. Sacks because he admitted “exported
goods to Iraq.” It alleged — in a prepenalty notice sent to
him as well as Voices — that “you and [Voices] engaged in
certain prohibited transactions” including “your and ~
[Voices’] exportation of donated goods, including medical
supplies.” Having identified Mr. Sacks as one of the
individuals involved in this exportation, the agency sued
Voices and pursued the claim to judgment. There is every
reason to believe, on this record, that the agency intends to
enforce its restriction on humanitarian donations and that
Mr. Sacks is one of small handful of individuals in whom
the agency is particularly interested in penalizing. The
agency never disclaimed interest in doing so, warning the
district court that it “reserve[d]he right” to “act[ ] in
response to Plaintiff's eight other trips to Iraq.”"’

86 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 7-8.
87 Motion to Dismiss at 5, n.4.

19

Surely this was enough to move Mr. Sacks’s claim past
the pleading stage. To the extent there were doubts about
the agency's enforcement philosophy, resolving those
doubts on a motion to dismiss was improper. Factual
questions regarding the agency’s enforcements should have’
awaited discovery and development of the factual record.

In short, this Court’s teaching in Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife applies here:

When the suit is one challenging the legality of
government action or inaction, the nature and
extent of facts that must be averred (at the
summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial
stage) in order to establish standing depends
considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself
an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.
If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the
action or inaction has caused him injury, and that
a judgment preventing or requiring the action will
redress it.™

Here, Mr. Sacks himself has made humanitarian donations
of medicine to civilians in Iraq, something the agency's
regulations prohibit. The agency has accused him of
exporting goods to Iraq and has fined him for admitting he
did so. And it has reduced its claim against Voices to
judgment, a claim that arises from the same conduct
alleged in the prepenalty notice, conduct in which Mr.
Sacks is alleged to have participated. For all these reasons,
Mr. Sacks has alleged both a past injury as well as
threatened future injuries. These satisfy the first element

of standing.

B. Causation and Redressability

85 Tujan, 604 U.S. at 561-62.
20

Before the Ninth Circuit, the agency did not contend
that the second and third prongs of Article II] standing
were absent and the Ninth Circuit did not so rule.

Causation simply requires “a fairly traceable connection
between the plaintiffs injury and the complained. of
conduct of the defendant.’ Here, the agency’s own penalty
and prepenalty notices trace the connection between the
agency’s restriction on medical exports and the pending
civil penalty against Mr. Sacks. These notices demonstrate
that the agency imposed the penalty because ‘Mr. Sacks
“exported goods to Iraq.”

This Court’s decision in Duke Power Co. uv. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc.” shows that courts may
and should tolerate fairly attenuated causal chains, ones
that might not satisfy traditional notions of causation
under tort law. There, neighbors of a nuclear power plant
under construction challenged the constitutionality of a
statute that limited the liability of such plants. This
Supreme Court found two injuries that conferred standing:
~ thermal pollution of a nearby lake and non-natural
radiation from the plant, neither of which was directly
caused by the liability limitation at issue. Nor was the
plaintiffs’ alleged injury caused by the (alleged) illegal
aspects of the defendant's behavior.”’ To the contrary, as a
respected treatise notes, the plaintiffs’ injuries arose from
actions that were entirely lawful: the operation of a
properly licensed generating plant.” But because the plant
would not be built in the absence of a liability limitation,
this Court concluded that the plaintiffs had satisfied the
causation element of standing.

Redressability is likewise satisfied. It is fair to say that
generally speaking, redressability only presents a problem
where a third party, not the defendant, is the direct cause

89 Steel Co., 423 U.S. at 103 (citations omitted).

90 438 U.S. 59 (1978).

91 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.5, at 879 (2004 supp.
$2 Td.

21

of the plaintiffs injury.” In those instances, an order
directed to the defendant may not redress the problem,
because there is no guarantee that the third party will
change its conduct in response to the order.” Here, of
course, the agency, and not some third party, is the direct
cause of Mr. Sacks’s injury. An injunction prohibiting the
agency from enforcing its regulatory prohibition against
‘humanitarian exports of food and medicine would redress
Mr. Sacks’s injury.

Article ITI standing, ‘therefore, was present. The Ninth
Circuit should have proceeded to addresses the merits of
Mr. Sacks’s challenge to the medicine restriction, just as
the district court did. Having done so, the Ninth Circuit
should have reached a different conclusion than the district
court, one that was not premised upon the determination
that Geneva Converition “is not binding on the United
States” and similar observations.”

Ul. A Prohibition on Humanitarian Donations
Violates International Law That Congress
Has Not Abrogated

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling left unresolved the question of
the executive’s authority to punish U.S. citizens who try to
relieve human suffering with humanitarian aid. The scope
of the executive’s power, especially in the face of clear and
contrary legislation from Congress, is an important one
worthy of this Court’s consideration.

This case provides an excellent vehicle for addressing
that issue because the Court may address the issue without

8 Fig, Linda R.S. uv. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (suit by
unwed mother to force state to prosecute father who refused to pay child
support); Simon uv. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976) (suit by indigent persons challenging IRS elimination of
requirement that hospitals provide services to indigents to extent of
financial ability to qualify as charitable organization).

94 Td.

36 Order at 7.

22

concern for interference with either the political processes
or ongoing foreign policy initiatives. This is so because the
embargo on Iraq was lifted after the fall of the Saddam
Hussein regime in 2008, without mooting the issues, since
the executive reserves the right to punish past violations.”

As the district court noted below, the agency’s embargo
on Iraq is but one of over a dozen sets of regulations under
which the agency has sought to restrict trade with foreign
states.” Thus, issues concerning the proper use and scope
of such restrictions are likely to recur. As the following
sections show, the agency lacks the authority to impose the
regulatory embargo that it did.

A. International Law Forbids the
Deliberate, Mass Starvation of
Children and Other Civilians

The prohibition against the deliberate starvation of
civilian children is a peremptory norm, or “jus cogens,”
which means that it cannot be overruled by. any other law
or local custom.” The notion that a state may not
intentionally target children and civilians during peacetime
is not codified in a treaty. Rather, it is derived from treaty
and international custom. Custcmary international law,
like international law embodied treaties, is part of our
law.

See Executive Order 13350, 69 Fed. Reg. 46055 (July 30, 2004).

Order at 9-10. |

98 The concept of peremptory norms finds expression in a number of
international legal sources. Among these is Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which declares void any treaty that
“conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.” Article
53 defines a peremptory norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, done on May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1156
U.N.T.S. 331.

99 The Paquete-Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
23

A number of international agreements evidence the
international community’s consensus that the intentional
mass killing of civilians, especially children, is a crime. In
the modern era, these begin with the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.! Article 26(1) of the
Universal Declaration states:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services ....

Article 25(2) provides that “[mJotherhood and childhood
are entitled to special care and assistance.” Civilized
nations thus recognize that depriving people — particularly
mothers, infants, and young children — of “food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services”
constitutes a deprivation of their human rights.

Although the Declaration itself does not have the force of
a treaty under U.S. domestic law, it provides evidence of
peremptory norms and customary international law, i.e.,
law that has not been codified in a treaty.

Moreover, many of the rights set forth in the Declaration
were subsequently enshrined in other treaties. One is the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War’°! entered into force in 1956. Article
23 of the Geneva Convention states that even during war,
parties to the treaty:

shall allow the free passage of all consignments of
medical and hospital stores ... intended only for
civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if
the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit
the free passage of all consignments of essential
foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children

100 GA Res. 217A (IIT), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
101 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T:S. 135.

24

under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity
cases.

Another is the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,!°? which entered into
force in 1951. This Convention, drafted in response to Nazi
atrocities, largely embodied the principles of law that
were applied during the post-war Nuremberg trials. The
Senate ratified the Convention in 1988. Article II of the
Convention defines genocide to include killing or causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group as
well as deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to
bring about the partial or total physical destruction of the
group.

Finally, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child! “recognize[s] the right of the child to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities
for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.” 105.
The Convention states that nations “shall strive to ensure
that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such
health care services.” Accordingly, the Convention requires
countries to:

take appropriate measures: (a) To diminish infant
and child mortality; (b) To ensure the provision of
necessary medical assistance and health care to all
children with emphasis on the development of
primary health care; (c) To combat disease and
malnutrition, including within the framework of
primary health care, through, inter alia, the
application of readily available technology and
through the provision of adequate nutritious foods
and clean drinking-water, taking into

102 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

103 S. REP. No. 99-2, pt. I, reprinted in 28 1.L.M. 754, 762 (1989).

104 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for stgnature Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.

105 Tq

25

consideration the dangers and risks of
environmental pollution; [and] (d) To ensure
appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care
for mothers, 06

The United States admittedly has not ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (although not
because it expressed an interest in exposing children to the
hazards of international conflict). It has, however, ratified
the “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the involvement of children in armed

_ conflict.”"” The preamble to that Protocol condemns “the
targeting of children in situations of armed conflict and
direct attacks on objects protected under international law,

_ including places generally having a significant presence of
children, such as schools and hospitals.” The Protocol
accordingly increases the strictures against the military
recruitment of children.

These treaties and international documents embody or
reflect certain principles of international law, most notably
the principle is that one state may not carry out its foreign
policy objectives vis-a-vis another state by intentionally
targeting and killing the civilians, especially children, of
the other state. Under the Supremacy Clause, these
principles are the highest law of the land,'”

In other sanctions-related contexts, Congress has
enacted legislation that avoids conflict with these
principles. Thus, the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (“IEEPA”) § 203(b) contains the following
restrictions on executive authority:

106 Tq
107 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2006), at 389-90.
106 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on

the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, done on May 25, 2000,

G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 654 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc.

A/54/49, Vol. ITI (2000).

'? U.S. Const. Art. 6.

26

The authority granted to the President by this
section does not include the authority to regulate
or prohibit, directly or indirectly --

(2) donations ... of articles, such as food,
clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to
relieve human suffering ... ; or

(4) any transactions ordinarily incident to travel
to or from any country, including importation of
accompanied baggage for personal use,
maintenance within any country including
payment of living expenses and acquisition of
goods or services for personal use, and
arrangement or facilitation of such travel including
nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages.!!°

Nonetheless, before the Court of Appeals, the agency
contended that two statutes each abrogated these
peremptory norms of international law and authorized its
restrictions on humanitarian donations. This brings into
play this Court’s admonition, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, that “a statute ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains.”''' Where fairly possible, a United States statute
is to be construed so as not to conflict with international
law or with an international agreement of the United
States.”''? And “when the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”’”

110 Section 203(b) of IEEPA is codified at 60 U.S.C. § 1702(b).

'! Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); see also
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (narrowly interpreting a
federal statute in deference to an executive agreement between the
United States and the Philippines); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987) (using a definition from an international treaty to interpret
the Refuge Act of 1980); Whitney uv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

'!? RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1987).

113 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J. concurring). This assumes, of course, that Congress has the

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B. The UN Participation Act Does Not
Authorize an Embargo on
Humanitarian Aid

The first statute the agency cited to support its
restriction on humanitarian aid was the UN Participation
Act. That statute authorizes the executive branch to
regulate trade with other countries when a UN Security
Council resolution calls upon the United States to do so.
Specifically, 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) states that “whenever the
United States is called upon by the Security Council to
apply measures which said Council has decided .. are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions .., the president
may, to the extent necessary to apply such measures,
regulate or prohibit ... economic relations,”114 Thus, UN
Participation Act only authorizes the agency to regulate or
prohibit economic relations “to the extent necessary to
apply” Security Council measures.

Here, the pertinent Security Council resolution is
Resolution 661, But that resolution did not call for an
embargo on medicine and medical supplies. To the
contrary, it exempted “supplies intended strictly for
medical purposes” and “payments exclusively for strictly
medical or humanitarian purposes” from the embargo. Nor
was the purpose of Resolution 661 unlimited. Its
self-proclaimed goal was “to bring the invasion and
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Kuwait.”'” Nothing in the resolution purports to authorize
an embargo until Saddam Hussein was removed from
power. Because the UN Security Council rejected an

Constitutional authority to act, which it plainly does when it comes to
embargoes on foreign countries. Article 8, section 3 of the federal
Constitution gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.”

422 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (emphasis added).
as See, supra, note 6.

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embargo on humanitarian supplies, the UNPA does not
authorize the imposition of such an embargo.

Hence, the agency’s medicine restriction falls to extent
that it is applied to implement such an embargo. The same
is true of the travel ban. While the President has the
authority to limit international travel, he is bound by
statutory limits.

C. The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 Does
Not Authorize an Embargo on
Humanitarian Aid

The agency also claimed that the Iraq Sanctions Act of
1990 “ratified” its regulations.!16 But the Act could not have
ratified those regulations, since they were promulgated
after the Act’s November 5, 1990 passage.!!? The Act
admittedly approved President Bush’s earlier executive
orders by name, but noted that these orders exempted
' humanitarian aid from their scope.!!8 Perhaps most
_ important, the Act required any regulations issued after it
took effect to be submitted to Congress before taking
effect.1!8 The agency did not follow this Congressional
directive. Nothing in the Act, therefore, can be read to
approve the agency’s regulations. This conclusion extends
both to the medicine restriction and, to the extent employed
to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching Iraq, the travel
ban as well.

II. Conclusion
The agency has pursued Mr. Sacks for violating its

restrictions on humanitarian aid to the people of Iraq. Mr.
Sacks has standing to challenge the agency’s restrictions.

116 PL. 101-513. see 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.
117 See 56 Fed. Reg. 2113 (Jan. 18, 1991).
118 PL, 101-513, § 586C(a) & (b).

119 Td, § 586C(c)(1).

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Those restrictions contravene the highest principles of the
law of nations, principles Congress has never abrogated.
Congress likewise has never authorized the agency’s ban on
humanitarian aid. For all these reasons, this Court should
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Donald B: Scaramastra
Counsel of Record

Gary D. Swearingen

GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER
Eighteenth Floor

1191 Second Avenue

Seattle, WA 98101-2939

(206) 464-3939

January 8, 2007

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_2004%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
