# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United States Forest Service v. Earth Island Institute, 127 S. Ct. 1829 (2007) (No. 06-797)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

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06-7975EC 8 - 2006

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

Uv.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor Genera
JONATHAN L. MARCUS
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
RONALD M. SPRITZER
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

In this action under the Administrative Procedure Act,
respondents challenge two projects adopted by the Forest
Service to restore portions of the Eldorado National Forest
that were severely damaged by fire. The court of appeals
ordered entry of a preliminary injunction barring the Forest
Service from proceeding with those projects.

The question presented is whether the court of appeals
erred in ordering a preliminary injunction, including by:

a. Relying on declarations filed by respondents in the
district court, rather than confining its review to the
administrative record, in determining that respondents had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits;

b. Holding that respondents could satisfy the “irreparable
injury” prong of the test for obtaining a preliminary
injunction by showing only a “possibility” of such injury; and

c. Discounting competing interests in the use of Forest
lands under multiple use principles, and the Forest Service’s
balance of those competing uses, in weighing the balance of
harms and the public interest.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners are: Dale Bosworth, Chief of the United
States Forest Service; Ramiro Villalvazo, Forest Supervisor
for the Eldorado National Forest; and the United States For-
est Service, an agency of the United States Department of
Agriculture.

Respondents who were Plaintiffs-Appellants below are:
Earth Island Institute, a California non-profit organization;
and the Center for Biological Diversity, a non-profit organiza-
tion.

Respondent who was the Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee
below is: Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc (SPI).

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Cpe DOI 6 oc.no5.00 i vakceversantesticsusaadves anwe
POOR. 3 6h. kkd te is eisieteteir tee 1
Statutory provisions involved .............0cccececeeeees 2
IE ss oo 5 5.0.45 0 kaos bes hake cknd enka 2
A. The statutory framework ..................e00e- 3
B. The facts and proceedings below ................. 5
Reasons for granting the petition ..................0005- 13
I. The Ninth Circuit erred with respect to each of the
four factors to be considered in ruling on a motion
for a preliminary injunction .............ccccseoces 14
A. Likelihood of suecess on the merits .............. 14
D. SUR INS, oik.sw keene Sooke bata eiesee ca ees 19
C. Balance of harms and the public interest ......... 26
II. Review by this Court is warranted .................. 29
PSN Cer er rey Mi rier mes 30
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1995) ....... 23
Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir.
AlliedSignal, Ivc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568
CURIE EE kk vascdexeeebanaacsterseeu 22
American Biosci., Inc. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 579
” GEE Se 56 65a oko enc eumnaenes 15
American Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d
Ss CAs Ek cbadhveccendtesnseceeeseaee 17
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531
SEUNG ik cdskcdeuvcscedvedvucescanvusuerenten 21, 26

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) ..........0000. 20

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition
for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992) ............00000. 20,
Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794

Se Git EE es bc ck was enmaeeeeun a scaeee-oue dos 17
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87

SR er here arene Pye arene ream 4
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500

ES fre oes ee ecuurccdueuelu iiss ese sau nee hes 20
Beltran v. Smith, 458 U.S. 1303 (1982) ............... 21
Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 868 F.2d

Pe A xcs cn cbkeedsuenseaeeesssee tes 20
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550

Fe A UTED Bice ce van saves ndene neues 22
Borey v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30

NE ae Get es odbc oe ste vanenens dete 22
Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973) ...........-ee00-- 28
Camp v. Pitie, 411 US. 198 (1973)... cece cc eee. 15, 16
Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d

Se CUE ecb cbsecsduecsararsearioebiwen 24
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish

& Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2006) ....... 17
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401

ik Ee | ery ee er ree rrr eer ry ere 15, 16, 17
Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,

BOD Fe BIO Cl. FOU) oc cc cccecverecvcesess 19

Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 133 F' 3d 1 (D.C. Civ. 1089) 2... cc ccccccccces 17

Cases—Continued: Page

Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024
to ot es eer rer re ‘ea dheesaceecayeeries 18

DOT v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) ......... 15, 18
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) ... 20, 22, 28
Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351

Fee Ce CE CA UD kine dh dddebeeneeseeedads 20
eBay Inc. v. MercExch., L.L.C., 1268S. Ct. 1837

NE a duh bud dns cvkae ne ek eee 21, 28
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729

Ep errer er ere ren te rer Tree reer y 15
Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of

N. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) ......... 23
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423

Cee OED 35 65 ddR ea hove ected ti eereleee 14
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167

CY hte 6505 40S beweso vas ke eee eeeieaes 23, 24
Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir.

EE aes ose ces eve dab dds are eee 25
Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply GNSS, Ltd. v. AO

Techsnabexport, 376 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2004) ....... 22
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250

Gk DN eg see rma 22, 23
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond

Fund, Fe, Bt UB. CBG kt cceecieveucvncess 20
Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562 (9th

Ra Se oso xv bre ren icekess a eereuuaieons 20

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) ......... 4,15

VI

Cases—Continued: Page
Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.
EE coh Dna hn Ceaan gees Uhadee be ba eet OC eee 20
Los Angeles Mem Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 634
ee ee ED vb oko bccdeabnoendseecums 19

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .... 24
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360

SY SaUh eis oud i aoe erak Meee aes beewewneress es 3
Matos ex rel. Matos v. Clinton Sch. Dist., 367 F.3d 68

SE EL EE» Gb.s bea &00s0 bend cheered ts carsovens 22
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) ........... 20
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

PR: Ba Se GP EE nn wan bho deus a ehoesaes 14
National Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7 (2d -

SUE cus cena aa dada ves uccnasasesaeeeeeuruee 18
Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d

SM MEE, base Gdn sa Vedeneesahaskccaveess 17
NLRB v. Columbian Enameting & Stamping Co.,

ee ED once sd deca d os viwebnanavesaeuses 4
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542

ok | ay Seen rr peter ee 18, 26
NVE, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs.,

Poe te SD rr ere 17
Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762

Fe tte GR CW. IGGD) ... c ccwcccsccvecsevecess 8, 20
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726

DE -. cur Oecccueuencas headbee ce eeunedeueawen 3, 4

Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353
EE OEE: SNe cakes kien dese pleeeert 22, 23

Cases—Continued: Page

Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.

SE 6a vevbewdsnededacsavedecwerntstustierineses 22
Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d

Ce = bes orcaksscdeveesensesvactease 20
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) .............. 20
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) ....... 22
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ............ 24
Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir.

NE Pm ne Dene se ep eee ee BE oe Teer oe 20
Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USFS, 100

POG L668 GU Clr. TOGR) occ cece sccesccccess 11, 15, 17
Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240

Pe ER EE) idee vik wancewisecesiensius 8
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) ......... 15
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

SE Cy HT nh knw bebe seks sens ckevectas .. 3, 15
Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir.

1986) ...... ABER EUR ge yee GAD seve ORION epee ery Fim cy 21
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d

BR CIE ce tscccudétewecsousde deine aseneeeene 20
Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515

GRE. ckwscsisensenaccokvuuabecacraeneeesan eas 26
Voyageurs Nat'l Park Ass’n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759

SR is EE wk swede veccenercesuwdcaseeanies 17

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) .... 20

Constitution, statutes and regulation:

te FF Ore re ere Tere Troe 24

Vill

Statutes and re, *. ion—Continued: Page
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. ...... 2
DIR PE oar o dos ¥neoindek ia bance 2
PEG PES oh: 0d00ba0d0 sensi ornt eee 4
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 531 et seg. .. 24
SEL. SO. sao avcksacesartenneoeitees 25
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,

SEU. Mee MEO. o k.p cca insndscdciseeuaesiaes 3

42 U.S.C. 4832(2)(C) (§ 102(2)(c)) ............6-- 3
National Forest Management Act.of 1976, 16 U.S.C.

UO vid vec cncdacevevesiecniieeiweenee 3
MURS. MD i siscisrsriees eas 28
MUS, BS skein 4
SB ch Ce dacvcs esthetic nee 4
USL: SOM on disacesscass eee 4
16 UBC. TORRE | oc deca convceudes caaces 28
UBL. BN oss bares 28
SU ULB TE bkkdecssssnccans eee ee 27
Rte Se rere rs perry erry 28

WOT, Ge okecaitns shea ee ee 28

SEUSS. COGS visdesccvsecuesteneeies eueunrne 4

BUSBG SE vccssckikicvensiteatineeeeeeee 28

RECT RGR castor iaeeeeeeee 4
Miscellaneous:

70 Fed. Reg. 35,607 (June 21, 2005) .................. 25

71 Fed. Reg. 29,886 (May 24, 2006) .................. 25

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

Vv.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States Forest
Service and the other federal parties, respectfully petitions for
a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-58a) is re-
ported at 442 F.3d 1147. The opinion of the district court
(App. 63a-78a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
March 24, 2006. A petition for rehearing was denied on July
12, 2006 (App. 146a-147a). On September 30, 2006, Justice
Kennedy extended the time within which to file a petition for
a writ of certiorari to and including November 9, 2006. On
October 31, 2006, Justice Kennedy further extended the time

(1)

2

to December 8, 2006. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
provides, in relevant part:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law[.] * * * The reviewing court shall—

* * kK *

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law[.]

* * * F *

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a

party[.]
5 U.S.C. 706.
STATEMENT

_ In this action under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seg., the Ninth Circuit ordered the
district court to enter a preliminary injunction barring the
United States Forest Service (Forest Service) from further
implementation of two projects in the Eldorado National For-
est in California. Those projects were adopted by the Forest
Service to address deteriorating conditions in the aftermath
of serious fires in the Forest and to restore the burned areas.
The court of appeals erred with respect to all four of the fac-
tors bearing on the propriety of a preliminary injunction. Of
particular concern, it applied a watered-down standard of

3

irreparable injury—allowing the mere “possibility” of irrepa-
rable injury to suffice—and erred in evaluating the likelihood
of success on the merits on the basis of declarations filed in
court rather than the administrative record. The Court
should grant review in this case to restore the proper frame-
work for evaluating applications for preliminary injunctions
in cases under the APA.

A. The Statutory Framework

The two forest projects respondents challenge in this case
are subject to the requirements of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4821 et seg., and the
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C.
1600 et seq. °

1. NEPA. NEPA mandates the procedure by which agen-
cies must consider the environmental impacts of their actions,
- but it does not dictate substantive results. Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989). Section
102(2)(C) of NEPA requires federal agencies to: :

include in every recommendation or report on * * * ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on—

(i) the environmental! impact of the proposed action.

42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c)(i). NEPA is designed to “insure a fully
informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a deci-
sion the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would
have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking
unit of the agency.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).

2. NFMA. NFMA governs the Forest Service’s manage-
ment of the National Forest System. See generally Ohio For-
estry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728 (1998). NFMA
directs the Forest Service to develop a land and resource

4

management plan (forest plan) for each unit of the System to
provide for multiple uses and sustained yield of the various
forest resources, including timber and wildlife. See 16 U.S.C.
1604(a) and (e); see also 16 U.S.C. 528-531 (requiring Forest
Service to administer renewable resources of National For-
ests for multiple use and sustained yield). A forest plan is a
broad, long-term programmatic planning document that es-
tablishes goals and objectives for units of the National Forest
System, ensuring consideration of economic as well as envi-
ronmental factors. 16 U.S.C. 1604(g)(1)-(3); 36 C.F.R. 219.1;
see Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 729-730. Where the forest plan
also establishes specific limitations or rules for site-specific
projects, 21 individual proposed project may proceed only if
it is consistent with such provisions. See 16 U.S.C. 1604(i);
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 730.

3. APA. Judicial review of a Forest Service decision ap-
proving a project is governed by the APA, under which review
is limited to the administrative record and a court may set
aside final agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). A reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to
whether the agency “considered the relevant factors and ar-
ticulated a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462
U.S. 87, 105 (1983). Factual determinations may be reviewed
only to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence. Such a determination by the agency must be upheld
unless no reasonable fact-finder could have reached that con-
clusion based on the evidence in the administrative record,
and the evidence is sufficient to sustain the agency’s decision
if, in a case to be tried to a jury, it would be sufficient to allow
the court to refuse to direct a verdict. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).

5

B. The Facts And Proceedings Below

1. In October 2004, a fire known as the Power Fire con-
sumed more than 14,000 acres of the Eldorado National For-
est. Approximately 48% of that area burned with high inten-
sity, killing between 75 and 100 percent of the trees and incin-
erating duff and natural litter protecting the soils. App. 64a.
Less than ten days later, another fire, known as the Freds
Fire, burned 4600 acres in the Forest, 2600 of which burned
with high intensity. /bid.

The Forest Service designed a project for each of the
burned areas “to restore portions of the fire-ravaged land-
scape.” App. 65a. The Forest Service identified four goals in
that regard: (1) to reduce long-term fuel loading (the presence
of combustible material) in order to reduce future fire sever-
ity and resistance to control; (2) to improve road drainage and
establish effective ground cover in severely burned areas to
alleviate erosion and sedimentation to streams; (3) to remove
certain dead trees while they retain economic value; and (4)
to reduce safety hazards to the public and forest workers
from trees falling in the future. Jbid.; see id. at 8la-84a,
115a-120a (Forest Service Records of Decision).

The Forest Service issued Final Environmental Impact.
Statements (FEISs) for each of the projects on July 1, 2005.
App. 65a. The Forest Service issued its Records of Decision
(RODs) for the projects on August 1, 2005. The Power project
permitted timber harvesting on 5574 acres in the area burned
in the Power Fire, and contemplated harvesting of an addi-
tional 2600 acres depending on ultimate tree mortality. The
Freds project allowed timber cutting on 2900 acres in the area
burned by the Freds Fire. /d. at 65a-66a.

The projects included mitigation measures designed to
minimize environmental effects. App. 65a. For example, the
projects provided for “snag (dead tree) retention areas of
various sizes, create[d] no harvest zones along perrenial
streams, and call{ed] for the preservation of additional dead

6

trees in other harvest areas of various dimensions and config-
urations in order to accommodate wildlife dependent on such
habitat.” Jbid. In addition, “[t|ree harvest would be accom-
plished using skyline and helicopter methods on steeper
slopes to minimize soil impacts, and slash (debris) from har-
vesting operations would be treated, so as to ensure accept-
able fuel loading levels while, at the same time, creating
ground cover as needed to reduce erosion.” Jbid.

Because the timber to be harvested was deteriorating and
its value declining rapidly, the Forest Service also issued
emergency situation determinations, which allowed the pro-
jects to be implemented immediately without administrative
appeals. App. 66a.

2. a. Respondents Earth Island Institute and the Center
for Biological Diversity filed this action under the APA on
August 11, 2005, challenging the Power and F reds projects on
several grounds. In their Amended Complaint (Compl.),
Earth Island Institute asserted a general interest in protect-
ing “all federal public forest lands from commercial exploita-
tion,” and that it is “a membership organization with over
15,000 members in the U.S., over 3,000 of whom use and enjoy
the National Forests of California for recreational, educa-
tional, aesthetic, spiritual and other purposes.” Compl.
para. 8. Earth Island alleged that it had recently appealed
numerous timber sales in the Pacific Northwest and Sierra
Nevada, and that it and its members participated in govern-
mental decisionmaking processes concerning National For-
ests. bid. The Center for Biological Diversity alleged that
it is concerned with “the preservation, protection, and resto-
ration of biological diversity, native species and ecosystems in
the Western United States and elsewhere.” /d. para.9. The
complaint contained general allegations that the interests of
both organizations and their members “will be irreparably
harmed if the defendants continue to violate NEPA and
NFMA,” 2d. paras 8, 9, but did not describe how (or even al-
lege that) any of their members would be injured specifically

7

by the measures to be undertaken in the Freds and Power
projects.

b. On August 16, 2005, respondents (collectively Earth
Island) moved for a temporary restraining order and prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent further implementation of the pro-
jects. Earth Island argued, inter alia, that the Forest Service
_(1) used faulty methodology in developing its guidelines for
projecting tree mortality, which were used to determine
which burnt trees would be-cut; (2) ignored adverse impacts
of the projects on the California Spotted Owl (CASPO); and
(3) failed to compile sufficient population data for certain so-
called Management Indicator Species (MIS) of birds identi-
fied in the applicable forest plan. App. 66a. In making those
arguments, Earth Island relied upon expert declarations gen-
erated specifically for use in court. /d. at 22a, 34a, 39a, 68a.
The declarations themselves totaled 45 pages, with dozens
of additional pages of exhibits. Earth Island did not provide
the declarations to the Forest Service during the comment
period on the FEISs.' Like their complaint, respondents’
' motion did not identify any of their members who would visit
the burned areas or how any such members would personally
be injured by the two projects.

On August 18, 2005, the district court entered a temporary
restraining order that prohibited further timber harvesting
while the district court considered Earth Island’s request for

' A Notice of Availability of the Draft EIS for the Power project was
published in the Federal Register on March 25, 2005. The comment period
closed on May 9, 2005. App. 97a. The Forest Service provided the same time
period for comment on the Freds Draft EIS. Both the Center for Biological
Diversity and the John Muir Project (described as a project of Earth Island,
see Compl., para. 8) submitted comments on the draft EISs, including
comments from experts criticizing the tree mortality guidelines and the Forest
Service's mitigation measures for bird species. During the litigation, however,
Earth Island did not rely on the comment letters, but instead submitted new
declarations that were not part of the administrative record.

8

a preliminary injunction. On August 25, 2005, the district
court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. App.
§3a-78a. Invoking Ninth Circuit standards, the district court
stated that, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, “a
party must demonstrate either: 1) a combination of probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury;
or 2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in [its] favor.” Jd. at 67a (citing
Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d
832, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2001)). The district court noted that
those two alternatives represent two points on a sliding scale,
“pursuant to which the required degree of irreparable harm
increases or decreases in inverse correlation to the probabil-
ity of success on the merits.” /bid. (citations omitted). The
district court further explained, however, that “[u|nder any
formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there
exists a significant threat of irreparable injury.” /b:d. (citing
Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374
(9th Cir. 1985)).

i. Applying that test, the district court first concluded
that Earth Island had not demonstrated a probability of suc-
cess with respect to any of its claims that the projects violated
NEPA and NFMA, reviewing the agency decisions under the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. App. 68a-77a.” De-
ferring to the opinions of the Forest Service’s experts, the
court concluded that Earth Island had not made that showing
in its challenges to the Forest Service’s tree mortality guide-
lines. Jd. at 69a-71a. The court explained that examination of
the FEISs “shows that the Forest Service identified the
methodologies it used in reaching conclusions in these areas,
provided supporting data for those conclusions, and cited the

* The district court did not specifically address the Forest Service's
objection to respondents’ reliance on the declarations filed for the first time in
court.

9

scientific literature relied upon for said conclusions.” /d. at
69a.

The district court also ruled that Earth Island was un-
likely to sueceed on its claim that the Forest Service violated
NFMaA by failing adequately to monitor populations of three
species—the hairy woodpecker (HAW), black-backed wood-
pecker (BBW), and Williamson’s sapsucker (WSS). The dis-
trict court accepted Earth Island’s contention that Appendix
E to the FEIS for the 2001 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan
Amendment (SNFPA)—a special framework applicable to
several forest plans —requires some level of population moni-
toring for two of the species, the HAW and the WSS. App.
7la-72a. But it noted that the SNFPA expressly contem-
plated varying levels of monitoring and “may consequently be
read as envisioning a lower level of monitoring, and some flex-
ibility,” for species identified in the SNF PA as being of “low”
vulnerability, such as the HAW and WSS. /d. at 72a. The
court concluded that the Forest Service had obtained suffi-
cient information on those species from a Breeding Bird Sur-
vey. Id. at 70a-74a.

The district court further determined that, even assuming
some monitoring violation had occurred, Earth Island had
failed to show irreparable harm. The court explained:

[E]ven if the Power and Freds projects proceed without
proper population monitoring for the two woodpecker
species at issue, that does not necessarily mean that any
immediate and irreparable injury will occur in the absence
of that monitoring. Any preference by those birds for
severely burned habitat may be more than satisfied by the
untreated/unharvested portions of the project areas,
which total some 36 percent for Freds and 40 percent for
Power. Additionally, even within areas to be harvested
some snags will be retained, and acreage for cavity-nest-
ing habitat is set aside in both projects * * *.

10

App. 74a (footnote omitted).

Finally, the court concluded that Earth Island had not
shown a likelihood of success with respect to possible impacts
on the CASPO. App. 75a-77a. The court noted that each of
the fire areas contained designated protected activity centers
(PAC) for the owls, but that it appeared undisputed that much
of the area occupied by those PACs was severely burned.
“Nonetheless,” the court explained, “in an effort to accommo-
date the needs of the CASPO, the [Forest Service] not only
retained as much suitable owl habitat that remained within
the project area, but also attempted to retain many of the
previously constituted PACs by including some burned habi-
tat.” Jd. at 75a. The court also pointed out that the Forest
Service had demonstrated that “prevailing scientific evidence
supports the notion that preferred spotted owl habitat entails
two canopy layers and between 40 and 70 percent canopy
cover, depending on whether the use in question is for nesting
or foraging,” id. at 76a—features that typically would not be
present in burned areas. Although Earth Island pointed to a
study indicating that spotted owls in southwestern Oregon
had spent a significant amount of time roosting and foraging
in burned areas, id. at 75a, the court noted that both FEISs
explained why that study was “preliminary and not dispositive
as to suitability,” 7d. at 76a.

ii. The district court further concluded that “(elven if
[respondents] were successful in demonstrating some envi-
ronmental harm, in balancing the relative hardships there is
no presumption that environmental harm should outweigh
other potential harm to the public interest.” App. 77a. Here,
the court observed, the projects serve important public inter-
ests, including protecting the Forest and its surrounding com-
munities from the threat of future devastating fires, protect-
ing forest workers and the public from the danger of falling
trees, and generating funds for future reforestation. Jd. at

+

77a-78a. The court thus concluded that the balance of hard-
ships did not tip sharply in Earth Island’s favor. /d. at 77a.

3. a. On March 24, 2006, the court of appeals reversed the
district court and directed it to issue a preliminary injunction.
App. la-58a. The court first determined that Earth Island’s
challenges to the projects were not moot, despite the substan-
tial progress that had been made to implement the projects
and harvest in the burned areas. The court reasoned that
some timber harvest remained and, in any event, “revising the
tree mortality guidelines, monitoring of the California spotted
owl, and obtaining more accurate population surveys of MIS
bird species” could provide “some effective relief” to Earth
Island. /d. at 13a. The court then proceeded to address the
four factors that must be considered in determining whether
a preliminary injunction would be proper.

In first addressing the likelihood of success on the merits,
the court conducted an essentially de novo review and reached
a conclusion contrary to that of the district court, based pri-
marily on Earth Island’s non-administrative-record declara-
tions. The Forest Service again objected to consideration of
those declarations, but the court dismissed that objection,
stating without elaboration that it could consider them to
“determine whether the agency has considered all relevant
factors and has explained its decision.” App. 22a (quoting
Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USFS, 100 F.3d
1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996)). Crediting Earth Island’s experts,
the court concluded that Earth Island had shown a strong
likelihood of success on its NEPA challenges to the accuracy
of the tree mortality guidelines and to its related challenge to
the adequacy of the FEISs’ analyses of the projects’ effects
on the CASPO. /d. at 18a-33a, 38a-46a. The court also de-
cided that Earth Island was likely to succeed on its NFMA
claim that the Forest Service failed to conduct MIS monitor-
ing allegedly required under the SNFPA. /d. at 46a-54a.

With respect to a showing of irreparable injury, the court
of appeals held that the district court erred in requiring a

12

plaintiff to show a “significant threat of irreparable injury” in
order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. App. 13a-16a.
Instead, the panel interpreted prior Ninth Circuit decisions
to require a plaintiff to show only a “mere possibility of irrep-
arable harm” if it demonstrates a probability of success on the
merits. /d. at 15a. Here, the court held that Earth Island had
made such a showing, because the projects “may result in the
unnecessary cutting of trees that would otherwise survive, in
harm to the [CASPO], and * * * to several MIS bird spe-
cies.” Id. at 54a-55a.

The court also concluded, contrary to the district
court, that “the balance of hardships * * * tips in Earth Is-
land’s favor.” App. 55a. The court characterized the injuries
to the Forest Service and intervenor Sierra Pacific Industries
(SPI) as merely “economic losses”—presumably referring to
the lost economic value of the deteriorating timber—and
ruled that the public interest in prevention of potential irrepa-
rable environmental damage was paramount. /bid. In consid-
ering the public interest, the court did not mention the fire
prevention, public safety, and forest reforestation benefits of
the projects that the Forest Service had identified and that
the district court cited as supporting the denial of injunctive
relief.

b. Judge Noonan filed a concurring opinion. App. 57a-
58a. Judge Noonan suggested that the Forest Service has a
financial conflict of interest when it sells timber from Na-
tional Forests. \/d. at 57a. He reiterated his previously stated
view that if the Forest Service is a “biased adjudicator,” then
“its determination is a nullity.” /bid. (citation omitted). How-
ever, unlike the panel majority, Judge Noonan was uncertain
as to Earth Island’s likelihood of success. He observed that
it is difficult for a reviewing court to master the large record
in an environmental case “and to be confident in its discrimi-
nation between expert opinions.” /bid. Therefore, he would
have remanded the case to the district court to conduct an
“investigation and evaluation” of the Forest Service’s finan-

13

cial interest in the timber sales, to apply the correct legal
standard, and “to make its own estimate of the probability of
Earth Island’s success on the merits.” /bid.

4. After the court of appeals denied the government’s
petition for rehearing en banc, the case was remanded to the
district court. That court entered the required preliminary
injunction on August 31, 2006. Order Granting Prelim. Inj. 1-
5 (Aug. 31, 2006).’ The court allowed the Forest Service to
remove logs that have already been cut and hazard trees, but
enjoined further timber harvest. Although some of the timber
has deteriorated in value, timber not yet harvested retains
economic value and would be harvested if the injunction is
vacated.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In reversing the district court’s decision denying a prelim-
inary injunction, the court of appeals seriously erred with
respect to the showing a plaintiff must make to justify the
entry of a preliminary injunction. First, in determining that
respondents had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the

merits, the court of appeals relied on its own de novo review _

of declarations and appended material filed by respondents in
the district court, rather than confining itself to determining
whether the Forest Service’s decisions were arbitrary and
capricious on the basis of the administrative record. Second,
the court also held that respondents could satisfy the irrepa-
rable injury prong by demonstrating a “mere possibility of
irreparable harm,” App. 15a, expressly rejecting any require-
ment that they must show at least a significant risk of irrepa-
rable harm, id. at 15a-16a. Those rulings are fundamentally
wrong and squarely conflict with decisions of this Court and
other courts of appeals.

* The court of appeals had granted an emergency injunction pending appeal
on January 11,2006. App. 59a-60a. A motions panel of the court had previously
denied such an injunction. /d. at 6la-62a.

14

In addition, the court of appeals erred in evaluating the
third and fourth factors, the balance of harms and the public
interest. On both factors, the court gave dispositive weight to
impacts it perceived on habitat of certain species of birds,
none of which is listed as endangered or threatened under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, without addressing whether
there would be any resulting significant impact on the viabil-
ity of the species themselves. At the same time, the court
discounted or ignored entirely other interests that, by statute,
must be considered by the Forest Service in the administra-
tion of National Forests under principles of multiple use and
sustained yield. The net effect was to deprive the Forest Ser-
vice of its statutorily conferred role in weighing competing
objectives.

Review by this Court is warranted to correct the Ninth
Circuit’s significant legal errors and resolve the resulting
conflicts with decisions of this Court and other courts of ap-
peals. Review is also warranted because of the decision’s
considerable practical importance, given the vast tracts of
public land in the Ninth Circuit and the disruption to manage-
ment of those lands and circumvention of orderly administra-
tive processes that it allows. Review will enable this Court to
restore a workable standard for preliminary injunctions in the
Ninth Circuit for actions brought under the APA.

I. The Ninth Circuit Erred With Respect To Each Of The Four
Factors To Be Considered In Ruling On A Motion For A
Preliminary Injunction

A. Likelihood of success on the merits. The court of ap-
peals departed dramatically from this Court’s precedents and
those of other courts of appeals by relying on evidentiary
submissions outside the administrative record to hold that
Earth Island had established a likelihood of success on the
merits. The “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capri-
cious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n

15

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). And
as the Court has repeatedly stressed, “the focal point for judi-
cial review should be the administrative record already in
existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing
court.” FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423
U.S. 326, 331 (1976) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142
(1973) (per curiam)). The court therefore must review the
agency’s decision under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
test on the basis of the administrative record, Florida Power
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-744 (1985); Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 US. 402, 415,
419-420 (1971) (Overton Park), and must sustain the agency’s
factual determinations unless any reasonable fact-finder
would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion under the
standards applicable to a directed verdict or judgment not-
withstanding a jury verdict in court. See /NS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).

The rule limiting judicial review to the administrative
record on which the agency made its decision applies with
equal force to NEPA cases, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553-555 (1978), and to
rulings on preliminary injunction motions, see American
Biosci., Ine. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
By confining judicial review to the administrative record, the
APA precludes the reviewing court from substituting its opin-
ion for that of the agency, United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409, 422 (1941), and maintains the integrity and primacy of
the administrative process by requiring a party who wishes to
oppose the agency’s proposed action to submit his evidence
and arguments to the agency in the first instance, Depart-
ment of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764-
765 (2004).

The Ninth Circuit nonetheless held that it could consider
Earth Island’s new evidentiary submissions in court to “de-
termine whether the agency has considered all relevant fac-
tors and has explained its decision.” App. 22a (quoting South-

16

west Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450). In fact,
Earth Island offered the non-record declarations of Dr.
Edwin Royce and Monica Bond as new grounds for attacking
the Forest’s Service’s data and evaluations, and that is the
purpose for which they were used by the court of appeals. /d.
at 19a-45a. The court of appeals performed a detailed, side-
by-side comparison of those declarations and the competing
expert declarations the government felt compelled to file to
respond to those of Earth Island, decided that the opinions of
Earth Island’s experts were more persuasive, and found on
the basis of that exercise that Earth Island was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits. /bid.

The court of appeals’ approach finds no support in this
Court’s decisions and is fundamentally incompatible with
standard principles of deferential review of agency action.
This Court has made clear that supplementing the adminis-
trative record is allowed only when that record is so inade-
quate that the reviewing court cannot understand the
agency’s decision or the basis of that decision. And even in
that situation, any supplementation of the record would be in
the form of an explanation by the agency of the basis for its
decision. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 142-143 (“If * * *
there was such failure to explain administrative action as to
frustrate effective judicial review, the remedy [is] * * * to
obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testi-
mony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the
agency decision as may prove necessary.”); Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 420 (stating that where there are no formal findings,
examining the decisionmakers themselves may be the only
way there can be effective judicial review).*

* The preferable course where the agency’s explanation is inadequate might
instead often be to remand to the agency to afford it an opportunity to furnish
a more complete explanation within the established procedures for agency
decisionmaking.

—_—

17

That limited exception would not apply in a case like this,
in which the agency record includes a ROD and FEIS for each
project, as well as extensive administrative record material.
Those materials are far more than sufficient for the reviewing
court to understand the basis of the agency’s decision. And in
any event, the limited exception identified in Camp v. Pitts
and Overton Park would not permit consideration of new evi-
dentiary materials submitted in court by parties challenging
the agency’s decision.”

Other courts of appeals limit the exception to those cases
in which the agency’s decision is inadequately explained. £.g.,
Voyageurs Nat. Park Ass'n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759, 766 (8th
Cir. 2004); Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 133 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1998). When there is “a con-
temporaneous administrative record and no need for addi-
tional explanation of the agency decision, ‘there must be a
strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior’ before the
reviewing court may permit discovery and evidentiary
supplementation of the administrative record.” Newton
County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141, F.3d 803, 807-808 (8th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420). Consis-
tent with these principles, most courts of appeals do not per-
mit plaintiffs to attack the agency's decision on the basis of
materials outside the administrative record. See, e.g., Amer-
can Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); NVE, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human

* The Ninth Circuit itself has, in other cases, recognized the prohibitions on
the use of extra-record materials to attack the substantive basis of the agency's
decisfon. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943-944 (9th Cir. 2006); Southwest Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450-1451; Association of Pac. Fisheries v.
EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-812 (9th Cir. 1980).

18

Serv., 436 F.3d 182, 189 (8d Cir. 2006); Custer County Action
Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1028 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001).°

The court of appeals’ decision to consider such extra-re-
cord materials here thus was wrong, inconsistent with this
Court’s decisions, and in conflict with decisions of other courts
of appeals. The court’s consideration of those materials
tainted virtually its entire analysis of respondents’ likelihood
of success on the merits. If review is confined to the adminis-
trative record, under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
Earth Island has not begun to make the required showing of
a likelihood of success on the merits.

The court of appeals believed that the two projects must
be enjoined because the Forest Service had not conducted
adequate monitoring of certain MIS species of birds. See
App. 46a-54a. The general framework applicable to the Eldo-
rado National Forest under the SNFPA does contemplate
some degree of monitoring for the HAW and WSS, although
as the district court noted, it also contemplates flexibility in
the case of such species, whose vulnerability is “low.” See
Resp. C.A. E.R., Tab 1, at E-62 to E-64. More fundamentally,
however, the Forest Service interprets the monitoring provi-
sion as a plan-level goal dependent upon future funding, not
a binding commitment. See Pet. C.A. Br. 25-26 n.8. As this
Court made clear in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004), such “‘will do’ projections of
agency action set forth in land use plans” are “not a legally
binding commitment.” But even if the Forest Service had an

* In National Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 15 (2nd Cir. 1997), the
Second Circuit suggested that the scope of a court’s authority to allow
supplementation of the record might be greaterin NEPA cases, reasoning that
the court needs to understand whether the agency has ignored significant
environmental impacts of its action and the agency record itself may not
answer that question. That suggestion cannot be squared with this Court's
decision in Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764-765, which requires that objections
to the NEPA analysis be provided to the agency during the comment period.

19

obligation to conduct greater monitoring than it did, nothing
in the SNFPA purports to condition the Forest Service’s au-
thority to approve site-specific actions on the performance of
such general monitoring. Moreover, as the district court
ruled, the data from the Breeding Bird Survey, on which the
Forest Service relied, furnished an adequate evidentiary basis
for the Forest Service’s decisions for these two projects.

With respect to the possible impact on the CASPO, the
court of appeals acknowledged the extensive mitigation mea-
sures undertaken by the Forest Service to protect areas for
those birds. See App. 40a-43a. In nevertheless finding that
respondents had established a likelihood of success on the
merits, the court relied almost entirely on factual assertions
made in respondents’ declarations concerning the CASPO, 7d.
at 39a-40a, 45a, and on the court’s criticism of the Forest Ser-
vice’s mortality guidelines for selecting which trees to cut, id.
at 44a-45a, which in turn was also based.on such assertions
and was itself confused and seriously flawed. Moreover, as
the district court pointed out, App. 75a-76a, the FEISs specif-
ically addressed the study cited by respondents suggesting
that spotted owls might use burned habitat, and explained
why the Forest Service did not find it sufficiently probative.

B. Irreparable injury. The Ninth Circuit’s decision also
waters down the irreparable harm component of the
plaintiff’s burden in seeking a preliminary injunction to the
point that the requirement is effectively meaningless. On that -
ruling as well, the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with deci-
sions of this Court. It also conflicts with decisions of other
courts of appeals, which have held that at least a significant
likelihood of irreparable harm must be shown regardless of
the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.

1. The Ninth Circuit has generally applied a sliding scale
approach to preliminary injunctions, under which the re-
quired degree of irreparable harm increases as the probabil-
ity of success decreases. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810 (2003); Los Angeles

20

Mem’ Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-1201
(1980). The district court in this case held that no matter
where the case falls on the sliding scale, “plaintiffs must dem-
onstrate a significant threat of irreparable injury.” App. 67a.
The court of appeals expressly disagreed, holding that a show-
ing of a “mere possibility” of irreparable harm was sufficient
for Earth Island to carry its burden. /d. at 15a.’

a. The Ninth Circuit’s dilution of the irreparable harm
requirement conflicts with decisions of this Court. “The basis
of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irrep-
arable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-507 (1959), and citing Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (9th Cir.
1958)); accord Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972
(1997); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312
(1982). In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975),
the Court held that “(t]he traditional standard for granting a
preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in
the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury
and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits.” (emphasis
added). The Court has continued to apply that test. See
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Grupo Mexicano

‘ This express disavowal of a “significant risk” requirement marks the
resolution of two lines of decisions in the Ninth Circuit. In one line, the court
had held that a preliminary injunction may be issued based on nothing more
than a possibility of harm. See Earth Island Inst. v. USF'S,351 F.3d 1291, 1298
(9th Cir. 2003); Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002);
Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 972-973 (9th Cir.
2002); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2000). In
another line of cases, however, the Ninth Circuit had held that under any
formulation of the sliding scale, “plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists
a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175
F.3d 716, 725 (1999); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal, Inc. v. Coalition for
Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992); Big
Country Foods v. Board of Educ., 868 F.2d 1085, 1088 (1989); Oakland Tribune
Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (1985).

21

de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
340 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting)
(citing Doran, 422 U.S. at 931); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village
of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). See also eBay Inc. v.
MercExch., L.L.C., 1268. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).*

This is not the first time the Ninth Circuit has departed
from that requirement. In Gambell, the Ninth Circuit had
ruled that “[iJrreparable damage is presumed when an agency
fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impacts of a
proposed action.” 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (1985). It further de-
cided that injunctive relief was the appropriate remedy for
violation of an environmental statute “absent rare or unusual
circumstances.” /bid. This Court reversed, reiterating its
ruling in Romero-Barcelo that courts should apply traditional
equitable principles in deciding whether to enjoin violations
of environmental statutes absent an express limitation placed
on those principles by Congress. 480 U.S. at 541-543. The
Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s presumption of irrepa-
rable harm and stated that irreparable injury must be “suffi-
ciently likely” before an injunction is issued. Jd. at 545 (em-
phasis added).

The Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” stan-
dard in some ways strays even farther from traditional equi-
table principles than the Gambell presumption, since a pre-
sumption of harm can be rebutted, while disproving a “mere
possibility” of harm is rarely feasible, particularly in land-use
cases where a site-specific action will almost always have
some impact on the physical environment. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit’s “mere possibility” standard is akin to no standard at
all. See Beltran v. Smith, 458 U.S. 1303, 1305 (1982) (mere
possibility of additional risk did not rise to the level of irrepa-
rable injury necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction).

* eBay involved a permanent injunction, but the test for irreparable harm
is essentially the same when the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction. See
Gambell, 480 U.S. at 546 n.12.

22

b. Consistent with this Court’s requirements, the courts
of appeals have generally insisted that a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction show that it will be irreparably harmed
absent relief from the court, not just that such harm is possi-
ble. See, e.g., Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply GNSS, Ltd. v.
AO Techsnabexport 376 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2004); Siegel
v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc);
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 573 (7th
Cir. 1999); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 9 (ist
Cir. 1983). Accordingly, other courts of appeals have held
that a mere possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient to
justify an injunction, either by expressly so stating, see Borey
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir.
1991), or by holding that the plaintiff must show a “realistic
prospect” or “significant risk” or “substantial likelihood” of
irreparable injury, see, e.g., Matos ex rel. Matos v. Clinton
Sch. Dist., 367 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2004); Greater Yellowstone
Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003); Adams
v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-485 (3d Cir. 2000);
Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1179. Under those decisions, the plaintiff
must at a minimum show a significant risk of irreparable
harm in order to obtain an injunction. That standard is de-
manding. See Adams, 204 F.3d at 485.

Some circuits have adopted a version of a sliding scale, but
their tests retain the requirement that the plaintiff show at
least a significant risk of irreparable harm as the ticket for
admission to the enjoining of an action, regardless of the ac-
tion’s illegality. For example, in the Fourth Circuit a plaintiff
who raises serious questions on the merits, but cannot estab-
lish a likelihood of success on the merits, may obtain a prelim-
inary injunction by showing that the balance of hardships
strongly favors relief. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v.
Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir.1991); Blackwelder Furniture
Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). But the
plaintiff still “must show that it will sustain irreparable harm
without a preliminary injunction. The ‘balance of hardship’

23

test does not negate the requirement that the [plaintiff] show
some irreparable harm.” Rum Creek Coal Sales, 926 F.2d at
360. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a sliding scale
but requires the plaintiff to show at least a significant risk of
irreparable harm. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 321 F.3d
at 1258, 1261-1262.

The Second Circuit has endorsed a sliding-scale approach
in some circumstances (with a showing of irreparable harm as
a necessary component), but it will not apply that approach
when injunctive relief is sought “against government action
taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regula-
tory scheme.” Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of N.
Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1999). That rule re-
flects appropriate judicial deference to “legislation or regula-
tions developed through presumptively reasoned democratic
processes.” /bid. (quoting Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128,
131 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). The Second Circuit also will
not apply that approach when “an injunction will provide the
movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief
cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on
the merits.” /d. at 150 (citation omitted). Thus, the Second
Circuit would not apply the sliding scale here, where the pro-
jects were undertaken pursuant to statutory directive to serve
public interests identified by Congress. Moreover, for sal-
vage logging projects such as these, which attempt to derive
some value from a wasting asset, a preliminary injunction may
grant the plaintiff substantially all the relief it seeks because
the fire-damaged timber may deteriorate in value so much
prior to final judgment that the Forest Service may have to
cancel the timber sale even if it ultimately prevails.

2. Not only did the court of appeals base its ruling on a
mere possibility of injury, the court did not identify any injury
to any member of either of the respondents. Instead, the
court pointed merely to the general possibility of environmen-
talinjury. App. 55a. That is insufficient to justify an injunc-
tion. In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000),

24

the Court explained that in cases alleging environmental in-
jury, the relevant showing for purposes of Article ITI standing
“is not injury to the environment, but injury to the plaintiff.”
Id. at 180-181 (emphasis added). “(T]he ‘injury in fact’ test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It re-
quires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563
(1992) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-735
(1972)) (emphasis added).

Here, Earth Island’s burden was much greater because
“{a] plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm
sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate
immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary
injunctive relief.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige,
844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The plain-
tiff organizations failed to show that their members face any
such threat from implementation of the projects. Their
amended complaint alleged only generalized interests in pub-
lic forest lands. Compl. paras. 8, 9. Even assuming that the
record showed a possible risk of irreparable harm to Forest
resources, the organizations failed to show that their mem-
bers actually use those Forest resources, and that the mem-
bers’ use and enjoyment of those resources is in imminent
- danger of being irreparably injured if operations continue.

3. Had the court of appeals required Earth Island to dem-
onstrate a significant threat of irreparable harm rather than
a mere possibility of injury, Earth Island could not have pre-
vailed. The court of appeals concluded that Earth Island had
shown a “possibility” of injury to “several MIS bird species,”
without explaining the nature of that possible harm. App.
54a-55a. None of the MIS bird species for which the court of
appeals found monitoring violations (the HAW, WSS, and
BBW) is listed as an endangered or threatened species under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531
et seq.; nor are they designated as sensitive species in Forest
Service Region 5, C.A. E.R. Tab 9, at 184, Table 3-44. The

25

mere cutting of trees that a non-listed, non-sensitive bird
species might otherwise use as habitat is not irreparable
harm. See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 987
(D.C. Cir. 1975).? Moreover, as the district court noted with
respect to the HAW and WSS, “[aJny preference by those
birds for severely burned habitat may be more than satisfied
by the untreated/unharvested portions of the project areas”
and by burned habitat outside of the project areas. App. 73a-
74a & n.2."°

As for the CASPO, while it is not a federally listed threat-
ened or endangered species, it is designated as a “sensitive
species” for the Eldorado National Forest.'’ The district
court correctly concluded that, “in an effort to accommodate
the needs of the CASPO, the [Forest Service] not only re-
tained as much suitable owl habitat that remained within the
project area, but also attempted to retain many of the previ-
ously constituted [protected activity centers for the CASPO]

* In addition, the WSS is a "forest associate," a species “found to be less
abundant in recent high intensity burned forest as compared to unburned
forest.” Power FEIS, C.A.E.R. Tab A at 197 & Table 3-51.

' The district court did not make any specifie determination concerning
harm to the BBW. It did not need to do so because population monitoring is not
required for that species. The document the district court accepted as
requiring population monitoring for the HAW and the WSS does not mention
the BBW. Resp. C.A. E.R. Tab 1, Table E-9. In any event, the court of appeals
failed to identify any irreparable injury to the BBW, and the record rebuts any
such theory. See Power FEIS, C.A.S.E.R.249, Table 3-77 (showing that, while
timber harvest will reduce the heavily burned habitat added by the 2004 fires,
the estimated available habitat and number of BBW individuals in the Power
project area will still be greater after the timber harvest than before the fires).

" In June of 2005, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued a
“90-day finding” under the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)\(3)(A), determining that
sufficient information existed to warrant a review of whether the CASPO
should be listed under the Act. 70 Fed. Reg. 35,607 (June 21, 2005). The
Service has since determined that listing is not warranted. 71 Fed. Reg. 29,886
(May 24, 2006).

26

by including some burned habitat.” App. 74a; see also App.
40a-43a.

C. Balance of harms and the public interest. Finally, the
court of appeals erred in its cursory discussion of the balance
of harms and the public interest insofar as it bears on the
issuance of an injunction. The court acknowledged that, “with
some reason,” both the Forest Service and SPI contend that
“they will suffer economic losses if we enjoin the timber
sales.” App. 55a. But the court pointed to what it regarded
as the importance of “the public’s interest in preserving pre-
cious, unreplenishable resources,” and concluded that loss of
anticipated revenues did not outweigh the potential irrepara-
ble damage to the environment. /bid. (quotation omitted).
Similarly, the eourt concluded that a preliminary injunction
would advance the public interest, stating simply that “[t]he
preservation of our environment, as required by NEPA and
the NFMA, is clearly in the public interest.” /bid. The
court’s analysis was divorced from both the statutory scheme
and the record in this case.

The Forest Service is charged with managing National
Forests under principles of multiple use and sustained yield
of resources. “Multiple use management is a deceptively sim-
ple term that describes the enormously complicated task of
striking a balance among the many competing uses to which
land can be put.” Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542
U.S. at 58. Any consideration of the balance of harms and
public interest in determining whether a court should exercise
its equitable discretion to issue a preliminary injunction must
be consistent with the governing statutory framework that
itself establishes that all of these competing uses, not merely
the use of some trees as habitat by certain non-endangered
species of birds, are in the public interest. See Gambell, 480
U.S. at 545-546; Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300
U.S. 515, 551 (1937). Indeed, because Congress has vested in
the Secretary of Agriculture, through the Forest Service, the
responsibility for balancing the various competing uses under

27

principles of multiple use and sustained yield, there is a de-
cided public interest in respecting the balance that has been
struck by the Forest Service, absent a clear showing at the
preliminary-injunction stage of the case that the Forest Ser-
vice’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that specifi-
cally identified and substantial irreparable injury will very
likely ensue. A court should not be able to use its sense that
some of the factors the agency must balance have at least the
possibility of causing irreparable injury to allow it to frustrate
the agency’s decision and ultimately the entire statutory
scheme.

Here, moreover, the court of appeals made no effort to
ascertain the wezght that should be accorded to the “possible”
irreparable injuries to burned trees and the bird species that
might use some of the habitat, much less the weight that
should be accorded to the as-of-yet unidentified injuries to
any of respondents’ members that might result from any
incremental impact on bird habitat. The court instead viewed
the possibility of irreparable injury to those interests to be
determinative.

The areas at issue in this case were already badly dam-
aged by severe fires, and the Forest Service adopted projects
having a variety of goals in response, including reducing fuel
loading to decrease the risk of future fires, alleviating erosion,
reducing safety hazards, and removing certain dead trees
while they still had economic value. See pp. 5, 10, supra. In
balancing harms, the court considered only the last factor,
and dismissed it on the ground that it was a mere economic
consideration. That approach, aside from focusing too nar-
rowly on just one of the projects’ goals, ignores the reality
that the damaged timber was a wasting asset that the Forest
Service, as a good steward of the public’s resources, had an
obligation to take into account, and that the loss of that asset
would be irreparable if not harvested within a reasonable time
after the fires. The court’s approach also ignores the direc-
tive of Congress itself, in the statutes governing management

28

of the National Forests, that such competing uses should be
taken into account by the Forest Service,” and therefore must
be taken into account by a reviewing court as well when con-
sidering whether to enjoin the Forest Service from proceed-
ing.

For these reasons, the court of appeals erred not only with
respect to the likelihood that respondents would succeed on
the merits and the mere “possibility” of irreparable harm, but
also in weighing competing harms and considering the public
interest.”

* NFMA encourages salvage logging. 16 U.S.C. 1604(k), 1611(b). NFMA
and related legislation also encourage the prevention of forest fires, public
safety protection, and reforestation. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 475, 551, 1601(d)(1),
1604(g)(3)B), 1606a.

'° The court of appeals also disregarded the deferential standard of review
applicable to appellate review of preliminary injunction rulings, see eBay, 126
S. Ct. at 1839; Doran, 422 U.S. at 931-932 (citing Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452,
457 (1973)), repeatedly ignoring the district court’s evaluation of the evidence
and substituting its judgment without pointing to any factual errors committed
by the district court. A vivid example of that disregard is the manner in which
it substituted its balancing of the hardships and interpretation of the public
interest for the district court’s exercise of its discretion. The district court
concluded that “lelven if plaintiffs were successful in demonstrating some
environmental harm,” important public interests favored the denial of
injunctive relief. App. 76a-77a. See pp. 27-28 & note 12. The court of appeals
ignored the public interests the district court relied upon and substituted its
view that the mere possibility of environmental injury outweighed the injuries
to the government and SPI (which it incorrectly claimed are limited to
“economic losses”). App. 55a. The abuse-of-discretion standard of review
required the court of appeals to defer to the district court’s reasonable
balancing of the hardships. Its refusal to do so reflects a hostility to the Forest
Service that it laid bare at the conclusion of its opinion, where it accused the
Forest Service of putting financial considerations above compliance with the
law. Id. at 57a.

29

II. Review By This Court Is Warranted

Review by this Court is warranted. As explained above,
the Ninth Circuit erred with respect to the showing respon-
dents were required to make on all four of the factors that
must be considered in determining whether a preliminary
injunction is proper. Moreover, as we have also explained, its
decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and other courts
of appeals.

In addition, the decision below is of substantial practical
importance, especially given the vast tracts of public land in
the Ninth Circuit that are now subject to the rules announced
by that court. The Ninth Circuit encompasses more than 120
million acres of the 192.7 million acres in the National Forest
System, and an additional 197 million acres of public lands
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision opens up a wide avenue for
wholesale circumvention of orderly agency processes by al-
lowing parties challenging land-use decisions to rely in court
on evidentiary materials never submitted to the agency. It
also invites broad disruption of the ongoing management of
federal lands by providing for the entry of a preliminary in-
junction on the basis of nothing more than a mere possibility
of irreparable injury. And it disregards the substantial public
interest in the balance struck by the agency, pursuant to stat-
utory mandate, among the various potential competing consid-
erations involved in the management of public lands. The
Court should grant review to restore the proper standards for
issuing preliminary injunctions in APA actions.

30

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General

JONATHAN L. MARCUS
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
RONALD M. SPRITZER
Attorney

DECEMBER 2006

APPENDIX

Ts

No. OFFICE OF THE ULEAK

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

U.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE AND THE CENTER FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor Genera!
Counsel of Record
SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
JONATHAN L. MARCUS
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
RONALD M. SPRITZER
Attorney

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Appendix A (court of appeals’ opinion, dated Mar. 24,

BOG) vncesanesscavdueevuasusuastegueeessen eee la
Appendix B (court of appeals’ order granting injunction
pending appeal, dated Jan. 11, 2006) .................. 59a
Appendix C (court of appeals’ order, dated Sept. 21,

ED aw oucedichavdneadens344issbuner arene 6la
Appendix D (district court memorandum and order,

oo me Ee Pe err eee 63a
Appendix E (Record of Decision Power Fire

RNG ks don kcnwesdugauguuuessesenseeeeel 79a
Appendix F (Record of Decision Freds Fire

POTRGUGEIOE) 5 vis ndveessnesditvcnesnssapeeeeee 112a

Appendix G (court of appeals’ denial of rehearing,
PR | Perrrrrerr erie err errr 146a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-16776

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, A CALIFORNIA NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATION; CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

U.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; DALE BOSWORTH,
)HIEF OF THE UNITED STATES FOREST SSERVICE;
JOHN BERRY, FOREST SUPERVISOR FOR EL DORADO
NATIONAL FOREST, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES,
DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR-APPELLEE

Filed: Mar. 24, 2006

BEFORE: NOONAN, TASHIMA, and W. FLETCHER,
Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Earth Island Institute and the Center for
Biological Diversity (collectively, “Earth Island”) appeal
the district court’s denial of their motion for a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining the implementation of two

(la)

2a

United States Forest Service (“USFS”) post-fire resto-
ration projects in the El Dorado National Forest. Sierra
Pacific Industries (“SPI”) has joined defendants USFS,
Dale Bosworth, and John Berry as an intervenor.

Earth Island contends that the Final Environmental
Impact Statements (“FEISs”) for both projects fail to
meet the requirements set forth in the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
et seqg., because the USFS used faulty scientific meth-
odology in developing its tree mortality guidelines, and
because the FEISs failed to consider adequately the
adverse impacts of the projects on the California spotted
owl. Earth Island also contends that the FEISs fail to
comply with the National Forest Management Act
(““NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., because the USFS
did not compile sufficient population data for certain
bird Management Indicator Species (“MIS”).

The district court denied Earth Island’s request,
finding (1) that the methodology employed in the FEISs
with respect to the tree mortality guidelines was not
arbitrary and capricious; (2) that the FEISs took a
“hard look” at the adverse impacts of the projects on the
California spotted owl, and (3) that the USFS had
gathered sufficient population monitoring data for
certain bird species that have been categorized as MIS.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Earth
Island has shown a “strong likelihood of success on the
merits” of its NEPA and NFMA claims, and that it has
otherwise satisfied the requirements for a preliminary
injunction. We reverse and remand to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

3a

I. Statutory and Factual Background

In October 2004, two substantial fires burned por-
tions of the El Dorado National Forest. The first,
known as the Power Fire, consumed 16,993 acres of
National Forest as well as additional acres of private
land. The Power Fire burned at varying levels of intens-
ity. According to the FEIS prepared for the Power Fire
Restoration Project, approximately 38% of the forest
area burned at low intensity; approximately 13% burned
at moderate intensity, killing 25% to 75% of the trees;
and approximately 48% burned at high intensity, killing
75% to 100% of the trees as well as burning the duff and
litter protecting the soil. Several Protected Activity
Centers (“PACs”), Home Range Core Areas (““HRCAs’”),
and Riparian Conservation Areas (“RCAs”) for the
California Spotted Owl were located in the Power Fire
area. Certain MIS cavity-nesting birds, notably the
hairy woodpecker, black-backed woodpecker, and
Williamson’s sapsucker, were present in Power Fire
area.

The second fire, known as the Freds Fire, burned
7,700 total acres, 4,600 of which were in the National
Forest. Like the Power Fire, the Freds Fire burned at
varying levels of intensity. According to the FEIS,
approximately 12% burned at low intensity; approxi-
mately 11% burned at moderate intensity, killing 33% to
66% of the trees; and approximately 61% burned at high
intensity, killing 66% to 100% of the trees as well as
burning the duff and litter protecting the soil. An
additional 16% of young plantations also burned at high
intensity. California spotted owl PACs, HRCAs, and
RCAs were located in the Freds fire area. The
hairy woodpecker, black-backed woodpecker, and

4a

Williamson’s sapsucker were also present in the Freds
Fire area.

In response to the two fires, the USFS undertook the
Power Fire Restoration Project and the Freds Fire
Restoration Project. Both projects must comply with
federal statutes as well as the relevant regional forest
plans.

Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare de-
tailed environmental impact statements on every pro-
posed action that “significantly affects the quality of the
human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). These
statements must include a description and analysis of
the environmental impact of the proposed action, any
adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided if
the action is implemented, alternatives to the proposed
action, the relationship between short-term uses and
long-term productivity, and any irreversible or irre-
trievable commitment of resources that would be
involved if the action were to be implemented. /d. In
short, NEPA requires that a federal agency “consider
every significant aspect of the environmental impact of
a proposed action” and “inform the public that it has
indeed considered environmental concerns in its de-
cisionmaking process.” Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal
. quotations omitted). NEPA does not contain substan-
tive environmental standards but instead establishes
procedural requirements designed to ensure that
agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental conse-
quences of their actions. /d.

Under the NF'MA, the USFS must develop land and
resource management plans for each unit of the
National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). In de-

5a

veloping such plans, “a systematic interdisciplinary ap-
proach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,
biological, economic, and other sciences” must be used.
The NFMA and regulations promulgated thereunder
impose substantive environmental requirements. See 36
C.F.R. § 219.12. Each forest plan must also comply
with NEPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1).

The Sierra Nevada Framework Plan Amendment
(the 2001 Framework) is the relevant NFMA forest plan
for the E] Dorado National Forest. The 2001 Frame-
work is a comprehensive forest plan that establishes a
“comprehensive conservation strategy” for national
forests in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, including the
- establishment of PACs for the California spotted owl,
defined as the best available 300 acres of owl habitat
surrounding a known or suspected nesting site. Karth
Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1296
(9th Cir. 2003). Logging within PACs under the 2001
Framework is severely restricted, “generally to the
reduction of surface and ladder fuels.” Jd. In addition,
the 2001 Framework requires that HRCAs, defined as
1000-acre foraging grounds for the California spotted
owl, be maintained surrounding each PAC. /d.

In 2004, the 2001 Framework was supplemented by
a Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(the 2004 Supplement) that included a revised plan to
improve fire prevention and suppression, reduce fuel
loads, restore fire-adapted ecosystems, and promote
community assistance. The Record of Decision (“ROD”)
implementing the 2004 Supplement provides that “|s|ite-
specific decisions [regarding timber sales] will be made
on projects in compliance with NEPA, [the Endangered
Species Act], and other environmental laws following

6a

applicable public involvement and administrative appeal
procedures.”

The El Dorado National Forest is also managed
under the El] Dorado National Forest Land and Re-
source Management Plan (the “LRMP”). The LRMP
identifies certain bird Management Indicator Species
(“MIS”) that aid the USFS in establishing objectives for
improving habitat and for evaluating the quantity and
quality of habitat and species population trends, in
accordance with the NFMA.

Both the Power and Freds Project must conform
with the 2001 Framework, the 2004 Supplement, and the
LRMP, each of which must in turn comply with NEPA
and the NFMA. The USFS identified four key goals for
the two post-fire restoration projects:

(1) to reduce long-term fuel loading in order to
reduce future fire severity and resistance to control;
(2) improve roads and establish effective ground
cover in severely burned areas to reduce erosion and
sedimentation to streams in the short term, and to
contribute to long term soil productivity; (3) recover
the economic value of timber killed or severely
injured by the fire, in an expeditious manner, for the
purpose of generating funds to offset the cost of
future restoration activities; and (4) reduce safety
hazards to the public and forest workers.

Freds Fire Restoration, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,175-02 (Dec. 27,
2004).

In furtherance of the third goal, the Power Project
was divided into six timber sales. One of these, the Fast
Panther sale, was awarded to SPI, which contracted to
remove dead trees from 1,363 acres of the Power Fire

7a

area. The Freds Project was divided into two sales.
One of these, the Fred Fire Salvage sale, was also
awarded to SPI, which contracted to remove dead trees
from 1,363 acres of the Freds Fire area.

A Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement for the Power Fire was published in
the Federal Register on December 22, 2004, and for the
Freds Fire on December 27, 2004. Power Fire Re-
storation, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,686-01 (Dec. 22, 2004); Freds
Fire Restoration, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,175-01 (Dec. 27, 2004).
After a comment period, Draft Environmental Impact
Statements were published in the Federal Register on
March 25, 2005. Environmental Impact Statements;
Notices of Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,315-01 (Mar. 25,
2005).

On June 16, 2005, the Forest Supervisor for the El
Dorado National Forest, John Berry, requested an
Emergency Situation Determination from the Regional
Forester pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 215.10. According to
the request, “substantial loss of economic value to the
Federal Government will occur if implementation of the
[Record of Decision] were delayed. Loss of economic
value wil! in turn jeopardize the implementation of the
project(s} resulting in long term consequences to the
environment.” The request noted that with an Emer-
gency Determination, RODs for the two projects could
be issued as early as August 1, 2005, but without such a
determination, the RODs might not be issued until the
end of October. A delay would have the consequence of
postponing large portions of the logging operations until
summer 2006.

Such a delay would cause deterioration of the timber
to be salvaged, which would thereby reduce USFS’s

8a

revenues from those sales. The Forest Supervisor anti-
cipated that the loss from delay would be $11.3 million
for the Power Project and $800,000 for the Freds
Project. On July 1, 2005, the Regional Forester granted
the requests for Emergency Situation Determinations
for both Projects.

On July 1, 2005, the USFS issued FEISs for both
Projects. Both FEISs used mortality guidelines to
predict which trees will eventually die from their fire-
related injuries, and which trees should therefore be
logged. The guidelines are based on a draft study by
Sharon M. Hood, Sheri L. Smith, and Daniel R. Cluck
(the Hood Study). The Hood Study estimated the
probability of mortality for different tree species based,
according to the study, “on an analysis of the largest
dataset available in terms of numbers of trees and
species from wild-fires in California.”

On August 1, 2005, the final RODs for both projects
were issued. The Power ROD chose Alternative Four;
the Freds ROD chose Alternative One. Both RODs
stated that the risk of cutting trees that would otherwise
survive is mitigated by relying upon the data contained
in the Hood Study, which provides models “that allow
managers to select the desired level of predicted
mortality based on land management objectives.”
Among the stated reasons put forth for having chosen
Alternatives Four and One was the fact that each Alter-
native would generate the greatest revenue for the
USFS: $19,056,425 for the Power Project, and
$3,345,872 for the Freds Project.

Earth Island brought suit in federal district court
seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction against
the implementation of the Power and Freds Projects.

9a

On August 18, 2005, the district court granted Earth
Island’s motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) pending that court’s determination of whether
a preliminary injunction should issue. On August 25,
2005, the district court vacated its August 18 TRO and
denied Earth [sland’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.

In this expedited appeal, Earth Island argues that
the district court (1) applied an erroneous legal standard
for preliminary injunctions by requiring a showing of
significant irreparable harm; (2) applied an erroneous
legal standard to Earth Island’s claim that the USFS
failed to ensure scientific integrity in its tree mortality
guidelines; (3) erred as a matter of law by concluding
that both FEISs met NEPA’s requirement that they
take a “hard look” at the adverse effects of the projects
on the California spotted owl; (4) erred as a matter of
law by concluding that the USFS did not violate the
NFMaA by failing to conduct population surveys of cer-
tain MIS bird species; (5) erred as a matter of law by
concluding that Earth Island had not shown the
possibility of irreparable harm to the California spotted
owl and certain bird species; and (6) erred as a matter of
law by concluding that the balance of hardships did not
tip in Earth Island’s favor., On September 15, 2005,
Earth Island filed an emergency motion for an injunc-
tion pending appeal with this court, which was denied by
a motions panel on September 22, 2005. After oral
argument, we sua sponte reconsidered our September
22 denial and, in an order filed January 11, 2006, issued
an injunction pending the issuance of this opinion.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291(a)(1). We now reverse the decision of the district

10a

court and hold that Earth Island has met the require-
ments for a preliminary injunction. We remand to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

II. Standard of Review

A district court’s decision granting or denying pre-
liminary injunctive relief may be reversed only if the
court abused its discretion. See Harris v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004); Earth
Island, 351 F.3d at 1298. A court abuses its discretion
if it based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or
clearly erroneous findings of fact. Earth Island, 351
F.3d at 1298. We review findings of fact for clear error
and conclusions of law de novo. See Hawkins v.
Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001);
Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 321 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th
Cir. 2003). We “typically will not reach the merits of a
case when reviewing a preliminary injunction .... By
this we mean we will not second guess whether the court
correctly applied the law to the facts of the case, which
may be largely undeveloped at the early stages of
litigation. As long as the district court got the law right,
it will not be reversed simply because the appellate
court would have arrived at a different result if it had
applied the law to the facts of the case.” Karth Island
Inst., 351 F.3d at 1298(quoting Rucker v. Davis, 237
F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

We view Earth Island’s challenges through the lens
of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). Under
the APA, agency decisions may be set aside only if
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Review under this standard is narrow, and the reviewing

lla

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6-
7, 122 S. Ct. 431, 151 L. Ed. 2d 323 (2001). The agency,
however, must articulate a rational connection between
the facts found and the conclusions reached. Midwater
Trawlers Co-op v. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 282 F.3d 710, 716
(9th Cir. 2002). We reverse under the arbitrary and
capricious standard only if the agency has relied on
factors that Congress has not intended it to consider,
has entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, or has offered an explanation for that decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 346
F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 352 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2003).

III. Mootness

In light of the extensive logging that has already
taken place pursuant to the Power and Freds RODs, we
asked the parties to advise us whether this appeal may
have become moot. The USFS concedes that this appeal
is not moot with respect to the Power Project. For the
Power Project, the USFS reported that 100% of the
timber harvest has been completed for the East Panther
and Camp Creek sales, but that only 77% of harvesting
has been completed on the Cole Creek sale, only 73%
has bee completed for the Ellis sale, only 29% has been
completed for the Bear River sale, and only 15% has
been completed for the Rocky Knob sale. The USFS
indicated that due to winter weather conditions, logging
operations on the uncompleted projects has now ceased
but are expected to resume during the spring of 2006.

12a

According to the USFS, as of January 5, 2006, the
timber harvesting that had been authorized for the
Freds Project was completed, and it was expected that
all harvested timber would be removed from the land
and transported to mills by January 9, 2006. However,
Earth Island argues that even if current logging
operations have been completed for the Freds Project,
the logging sales contracts were issued for a term of two
years, meaning that SPI has a continuing right to cut

trees that meet the tree mortality guidelines contained
in the FEIS.

“A case becomes moot whenever it loses its character
as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist
if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract pro-
positions of law . . . [T]he question is not whether the
precise relief sought at the time of the application for an
injunction was filed is still available. The question is
whether there can be any effective relief.” Cantrell v.
City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). In Neigh-
bors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059
(9th Cir. 2002), we concluded that challenges brought
under NEPA and the NFMA were not moot simply
because logging operations had already been completed.
There, we noted that remedial measures continued to be
available. For example, the USFS could still study and
mitigate the impact of the sales on species viability,
adjust future timber sales to compensate for the
allegedly unlawful sale, and directly monitor bird popu-
lation trends. /d. at 1066. In Cantrell, we evaluated
mootness under NEPA and concluded that although
historic buildings with important bird habitats had
already been torn down, the defendants in that case
could still consider alternatives and develop ways to

13a

mitigate the damage to the birds’ habitat. Cantrell, 241
F.3d at 678-79.

Similarly, we conclude in this case that the com-
pletion of current logging operations in the Freds Fire
area does not render the controversy about the Freds
Project moot. Not only is it possible that SPI might cut
more trees. In addition, as in Neighbors of Cuddy
Mountain and Cantrell, there are a variety of measures
that could provide some effective relief, including
revising the tree mortality guidelines, monitoring of the
California spotted owl, and obtaining more accurate
population surveys of MIS bird species.

IV. Preliminary Injunction Standard

Earth Island seeks to enjoin logging operations in
the Power and Freds Project areas until its NF MA and
NEPA claims are adjudicated in federal court. It argues
that the district court applied an erroneous legal
standard by requiring something beyond the “possibility
of irreparable harm” when it denied Earth Island’s
request for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, Earth
Island points out that in analyzing the USFS’s obliga-
tion to monitor certain woodpecker species, the district
court found that “immediate and irreparable” injury had
not been shown. With respect to the California spotted
owl, the district court did not discuss harm at all;
instead, it simply concluded that Earth Island had
shown no probability of success on the merits.

A district court “necessarily abuses its discretion
when it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard
or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Rucker v.
Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bance),
rev'd on other grounds, Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 152 L. Ed. 2d 258

14a

(2002). In this case, we conclude that the district court
applied an improper legal standard when assessing
whether a sufficient level of injury had been shown.

We recently had occasion to pass upon the proper
legal standard governing preliminary injunctive relief in
a case involving the same parties, the same district court
judge, and a very similar set of facts. Harth Island, 351
F.3d 1291. In that case, Earth Island sought a pre-
liminary injunction against logging operations provided
for in the USFS’s Star Fire Restoration Project after
the 2001 Star Fire in the Sierra Nevadas. /d. at 1295.
We identified two sets of criteria for preliminary
injunctive relief. Under the “traditional” criteria, a court
may grant a preliminary injunction if a plaintiff shows
“(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the
possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if pre-
liminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships
favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public
interest (in certain cases).” Jd. at 1297 (internal quota-
tions omitted). Alternatively, a court may grant a pre-
liminary injunction if a plaintiff “demonstrates either a
combination of probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable harm or that serious questions
are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in
his favor.” Jd. at 1298 (internal quotations omitted).

In Earth Island, we held that the district court had
applied an improper legal standard by requiring that
Earth Island demonstrate “actual harm . . . as op-
posed to speculation that some such harm could possibly
occur.” Jd. In that case, the district judge noted that
Earth Island had “failed to show that measures already
in place . . . will not afford sufficient protection” and
that Earth Island had “failed to identify any concrete

15a

probability of irreparable harm in any other respect.”
Id. We concluded that “[eJach of these statements
places a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff than is
warranted.” /d. We emphasized that a preliminary
injunction “only requires plaintiffs to show probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable
harm.” /d.

In its August 25, 2005 order in this case, the district
judge stated, correctly, that in order to prevail on a
motion for a preliminary injunction, a party must de-
monstrate either “(1) a combination of probable success
on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or
(2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in favor of granting the requested
injunction.” However, the district judge continued,
stating that under either standard, a party must show a
“significant threat of irreparable injury.” During the
hearing, the district judge stated that “even if there is
shown to be a probability of success on the merits by the
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have not shown at this time that
there is a significant threat of irreparable injury by
clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard.”

The USFS argues that the district court applied the
appropriate legal standard as set forth in our decision in
Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d
1374 (9th Cir. 1985), because the words “significant
threat of irreparable injury” are not the equivalent of
the “concrete probability of irreparable harm” standard
we held to be erroneous in Earth Island. While it is true
that “significant threat” and “concrete probability” are
different words, what matters is that both standards
impose a higher burden of proof on Earth Island by
going beyond the “mere possibility of irreparable harm”

16a

standard. In Oakland Tribune, we first determined that
the plaintiff had shown a very low likelihood on the
success of the merits of its claim, thereby justifying the
higher standard of harm. Here, the district court ap-
plied the higher standard from the outset without first
determining the probability of Earth Island’s success on
the merits.

We conclude that the district court applied an
erroneous legal standard. As we discuss below, we
conclude that Earth Island has shown a “strong likeli-
hood of success on the merits,” and has also satisfied the
other criteria of degree of injury, balance of hardships,
and advancement of the public interest.

V. Diseussion

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Earth
Island’s NEPA Challenges

NEPA’s procedural requirements require agencies
to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences
of their actions. A hard look includes “considering all
foreseeable direct and indirect impacts.” [daho Sporting
Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 973 (9th Cir. 2002).
In addition to direct and indirect impacts, NEPA also
requires that agencies assess the cumulative impacts of
their actions, defined as the “incremental impact of the
action when added to past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions.” 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.7.

A hard look should involve a discussion of adverse
impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side
effects. Native Ecosytems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
428 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the USFS
must “undertake a thorough environmental analysis
before concluding that no significant environmental

17a

impact exists.” /d. at 1239 (internal quotations omitted).
We review whether the USFS has taken a hard look
under the arbitrary and capricious standard. When re-
viewing the adequacy of an FEIS’s hard look, we follow
a “rule of reason” approach, which requires “a prag-
matic judgment whether the [FEIS’s| form, content and
preparation foster both informed decision-making and
informed public participation.” Native Ecosystems
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.
2005); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541
U.S. 752, 767, 124 8. Ct. 2204, 159 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2004).

Under NEPA, “[ajgencies shall insure the pro-
fessional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the
discussions and analyses in environmental impact state-
ments. They shall identify any methodologies used and
shall make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific
and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the
statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24. Agencies have wide
discretion in assessing scientific evidence, but they must
“take a hard look at the issues and respond{ | to reason-
able opposing viewpoints.” Earth Island, 351 F.3d at
1301. “Because analysis of scientific data requires a
high level of technical expertise, courts must defer
to the informed discretion of the responsible federal
agencies.” Jd. “When specialists express conflicting
views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the
reasonable opinions of its own experts, even if a court
may find contrary views more persuasive. At the same
time, courts must independently review the record in
order to satisfy themselves that the agency has made a
reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the evi-
dence.” Jd. (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res.
Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d
377 (1989)). If an agency has failed to make a reasoned

18a

decision based on an evaluation of the evidence, we may
properly conclude that an agency has acted arbitrarily
and capriciously. /d. at 1301.

The primary purpose of an FEIS is to allow for
informed public participation and informed decision
making. See Native Ecosystems, 418 F.3d at 965. In
furtherance of this purpose, 40 C.F.R.§ 1502.8 requires
that FEISs “be written in plain language and may use
appropriate graphics so that decisionmakers and the
public can readily understand them.” As we have
interpreted this regulation, an FEIS “must be organized
and written so as to be readily understandable by
governmental decisionmakers and by interested non-
professional laypersons likely to be affected by actions
taken under the [FEIS].” Or. Envtl. Council v.
Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 494 (9th Cir. 1987).

1. NEPA Challenges to FEISs’ Analyses of Logging
Activities

Earth Island challenges various aspects of the
analyses of logging contained in the two FEISs. Most
significantly, it challenges the analysis of tree mortality
and the use of the proposed mortality guidelines con-
tained in the Power and Freds FEISs. It also challenges
the FEISs’ conclusions that there is a lack of adequate
soil cover in the project areas, and that the retention of
large snags (dead trees) would result in a hazardous
level of surface fuels.

a. Tree Mortality Guidelines

Earth Island argues that the FEISs’ guidelines for
cutting burned and scorched trees substantially over-
predict tree mortality, with the result that many more
trees will be cut than are necessary to meet the

19a

legitimate objectives of the Power and Freds Projects.
Earth Island argues that by cutting many trees that will
not die, the USFS will unnecessarily destroy valuable
habitat for the California spotted owl and certain MIS
bird species.

The tree mortality guidelines contained in the FEISs
are based upon the 2005 draft Hood Study. That study
predicts post-fire mortality for trees burned or scorched
in forest fires. The guidelines for both projects are
keyed to the percentage of the tree’s green crown that
has been scorched by the fires.

Based on data contained in the Hood Study, the
USFS chose two different marking guidelines, one for
areas to be logged by tractor and one for areas to be
logged by helicopter or skyline. Table 3-5 of both of the
FEISs is entitled “Mortality Guidelines for marking as
applied to [various alternatives].” For simplicity of
explanation, we will describe the guidelines only as they
apply to yellow pine and white fir, and only as to
helicopter and skyline logging. Yellow pine with 65% or
more of the length of their crown scorched are con-
sidered dead, and are to be marked for cutting. The
same crown length scorch percentages apply to white fir
over 20" in diameter.

For the convenience of the reader, we reproduce
Table 3-5:

20a

PP/JP/SP White White
[yellow Fir Fir Incense Red _ Douglas
pine] <20" >20" Cedar Fir Fir

Tractor Logging System

Crown
Seorch* 75% 95% 80% 100% ? ?
Crown Scorch
+ RTB
or Ambrosia
Beetle ?
Helicopter and Skyline Logging Systems
Crown
Seorch* 65% 85% 65% 95% ? ?
Crown Scorch
+ RTB
or Ambrosia
Beetle ?

* As a percentage of the original live crown. Percentage of green foliage
would not be used for ponderosa or Jeffrey pine until the 2005 needle flush
is visible. Any marking prior to needle flush would be limited to pines with
100% black crown.

Table 3-6 of the FEISs is entitled “Probability of Tree Mortality.” Both
FEISs state, “Table 3-6 indicates the probability of tree mortality to
individual trees meeting the Power (and Freds| Fire marking guidelines
(Correctly Predicted Mortality) and the predicted survival of trees with
less fire damage than the minimum requirements of the marking
guidelines (Correctly Predicted Survival).” According to Table 3-6, a
yellow pine cut in accordance with the 65% crown length scorch guideline
of Table 3-5 has a 90% “Correctly Predicted Mortality.” A white fir over
20" in diameter cut in accordance with the guidelines has a 87% “Correctly

Predicted Mortality.”

2la

For the convenience of the reader, we reproduce Table 3-6. We have
italicized the numbers 90 and 87 to indicate the “correctly predicted
mortality” percentages for yellow pine and white fir cut in accordance
with the 65% crown length scorch guideline:

PP/JP/SP White Incense Red Douglas
[yellow pine] Fir Cedar Fir Fir

Tractor Logging System

Correctly
Predicted
Mortality (%) 96 95 100 100

Correctly
Predicted
Survival (%) 51 63 88 _ _

Helicopter and Skyline Logging Systems

Correctly
Predicted
Mortality (%) 90 87 85 100 —
Correctly

Predicted
Survival (%) 65 74 89 _ uate

Earth Island contends that the findings contained in
the draft Hood Study, as well as in other studies, have
substantially different percentage estimates of tree
mertality from the percentages contained in Table 3-6.
F.arth Island relies upon the declaration of Dr. Edwin B.
Royce in support of its contention. Royce has a Ph.D. in
Botany with a specialization in Forest Plant Ecology
from the University of California at Davis, and a Ph.D.
in Applied Physics from Harvard University. Royce has
had twelve years of experience in the characterization of
forest vegetation.

22a

The USFS challenges the admissibility of Royce’s
declaration, as well as other expert declarations offered
by Earth Island, because they were not before the
agency during the administrative review process. We
allow extra-record materials if necessary to “determine
whether the agency has considered all relevant factors
and has explained its decision.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th
Cir. 1996). Because Earth Island’s expert declarations
are offered for this purpose, they were properly before
the district court and are properly before this court on
review.

According to Royce, yellow pine and white fir are
both “thick bark trees” whose bark provides significant
protection of the living tissue beneath the bark.
According to Royce, “|c|rown kill is commonly the do-
minant source of fire-induced mortality in large trees
having thick bark, such as white fir or yellow pine.”
However, “[flall fires, such as the Power and Fred’s
fires, are least damaging to conifers. In part this is
because reserves of stored products of photosynthesis
are high and because new growth throughout the trees
is less vulnerable to damage then, as compared to that
same growth during the summer growing season.” “A
low-intensity surface fire commonly produces only
partial crown kill and only minimal mortality in larger
trees. Trees tolerate partial crown kill in a surface fire
in part because only the lower part of the crown is
normally killed. The lower part of the crown is less
photosynthetically productive than is the upper part.”

For yellow pine, Royce states, “[t|he mortality
guidelines for yellow pine (ponderosa and Jeffrey pine)
will permit the harvest of trees with a substantial

23a

probability of surviving if they were not harvested.”
The Royce declaration contains tables showing pre-
dicted tree mortality in the Hood Study, as well as in
three other studies. Those other studies were by Ryan
and Reinhardt, by Stephens and Finney, and by
McHugh and Kolb. Royce states as to yellow pine, “[{fJor
helicopter and skyline logging, mortalities from
the{ Hood Study] models are 60% and 70%, as compared
to a 90% mortality claimed in the FEIS and ROD.”
Mortalities predicted by the three other studies are even
more at variance from the mortality predicted in the
FEISs. Royce states,

[T]he guidelines for helicopter and skyline logging
will allow the cutting of small trees that have
probabilities of mortality between 12% and 57% and
large trees with mortality probabilities between 11%
and 32% (compared with 90% mortality claimed by
the FEIS’s). Even if one accepts only the largest of
the probabilities of mortality—that given by the Ryan
and Reinhardt paper—this still translates into a
worst case probability of survival of up to 68% for
trees that could be cut (meaning 68% of the trees
logged would otherwise survive). (emphasis in
original.)

In addition, Royce states that he personally evaluated 39
yellow pine that were part of the data base for the Hood
Study, and “found evidence of measurement errors that
would lead to the development of models that over
predict mortality.” According to Royce,

I measured the average amount of crown kill on these
trees to be 88%, whereas, the [Hood Study] field
workers evaluated the same damage to average 64%.
A small part of this difference may be due to the fact
that my measurements were crown volume measure-

24a

ments, whereas, the [Hood Study] measurements
were linear measurements. However, as discussed
[earlier in my declaration], this should produce only
a few percent difference between the two measure-
ments. I suggest that at least a substantial part of
the difference between the two measurements is a
result of the [Hood Study] field workers underesti-
mating crown kill. This will result in a model that
over predicts mortality when correct crown kill values
are used. A corrected [Hood Study] model yielding
lower mortality predictions would make the proposed
guidelines even less defensible.

For white fir, Royce states, “[t]he mortality guidelines
for large white fir will permit the harvest of trees with
a substantial probability of surviving if they were not
harvested.” As he does for yellow pine, Royce presents
tables showing predicted tree mortality in the Hood
Study, as well as in the three other studies. He states as
to white fir, “[fJor the helicopter and skyline logging of
large trees, mortalities from the[ Hood Study] models
are between 25% and 45%, as compared to an 87%
mortality claimed in the FEIS and ROD.” Just as with
yellow pine, mortalities predicted by the three other
studies are even more at variance from the mortalities
predicted in the FEISs. Royce states,

the guidelines for helicopter or skyline logging will
allow the cutting of large trees with mortality
probabilities between 7% and 50%, as compared to
the 87% mortality claimed in the FEIS’s. Even if one
accepts only the largest of these predictions of
mortality—that given by the Ryan and Reinhardt
paper—this still translates into a worst case pro-
bability of survival (in helicopter units) of up to 50%
for trees that could be cut. (emphasis in original).

25a

In response, the USFS relies on a declaration of Sheri
L. Smith. Smith is one of the three co-authors of the
draft Hood Study. She has B.S. and M.S. degrees in
Biology and Entomology from Utah State University.
She has been an USFS employee for 15 years. She has
been “involved in evaluating fire-injured trees in
California since 1991.”

Smith makes three points in response to the Royce
declaration. First, she contends that Royce misunder-
stood Table 3-6. As noted above, that table is entitled
“Probability of Tree Mortality.” Royce understood the
percentages contained in that table as indicating the
probability that a tree will die. For example, Table 3-6
indicates that a yellow pine with a minimum of 75%
scorched crown (the guideline for tractor logging) has a
“correctly predicted mortality” of 96%, and a “correctly
predicted survival” of 51%. Royce understood the table
to mean that 96% of yellow pine with a minimum of 75%
scorched crown will die.

Smith responds,

The marking guidelines used for the Power and
Freds fire are based on models that use percent
crown kill. . . . I attach a true and correct copy of
an excerpt of the models which are the basis for the
Power and Freds marking guidelines (Attachment A).

Mr. Royce states that Table 3-6 represents that
96% of trees with 75% crown kill will die. This is
simply incorrect. The 96% in Table 3-6 (classification
table) shows that the marking guideline model used
by the Forest Service is correct in predicting mortal-
ity 96% of the time when our individual study trees
are run through the model. In other words, the 96%
is an estimate of the accuracy of the model, not of the

26a

percentage of mortality as Mr. Royce states. Both
FEISs accurately interpret the findings of our paper
in light of the specific marking guideline model
selected by the Forest Service.

The percentages shown in Table 3-6 (classifi-
cation table) of both the Power and Freds FEIS are
derived from the entire [Hood Study] dataset, which,
for yellow pine, is based on measurements of 1,969
trees. The models in our paper take these percent-
ages to arrive at a statistical probability of mortality
for an individual tree. The probability of mortality
(Pm) ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being certain
mortality. The Forest Service selected a Pm of 0.90
for all ground-based harvest units. For yellow pine,
a Pm of 0.90 corresponds to a crown length kill of
75%. Using this criterion, the marking guideline
model correctly predicted mortality for yellow pine
trees in the [Hood Study] dataset 96% of the time and
correctly predicted survival 50% of the time. In other
words, using a Pm of 0.90 (75% crown kill), only 4% of
the trees the model predicts will die, actually
survived, but 50% of the trees predicted to survive
eventually died... .

This means that there is a high likelihood of cor-
rectly predicting mortality, but a lower likelihood of
correctly predicting survival using the 75% crown
scorch model, which means that it is much more
likely that the Forest Service is leaving trees behind
that will later die, than it is taking trees that would
have survived. This is directly contrary to Mr.
Royce’s assertions [.] . . The same misinterpreta-
tion of the data is true for Mr. Royce’s discussion of
yellow pine on helicopter and skyline harvest units

27a

and all white fir, all of which misinterpret the
percentages in Table 3-6 to be something other than
what they are—a verification of the accuracy of the
marking guideline model using the [Hood Study]
dataset.

(emphasis in original).

Second, Smith responds that Royce estimated the
probability that a tree will die based on the percentage
volume of crown kill. By contrast, the Hood Study
estimated the probability based on the percentage
length of crown kill. Therefore, according to Smith,
Royce’s comparisons are “problematic.”

Third, Smith responds that two of the three other
studies upon which Royce relies for his comparison—the
studies of Stephens and Finney, and of McHugh and
Kolb—are based on “prescribed fires.” According to
Smith, “[m|]ost often, the objective of a prescribed fire is
to limit the mortality of the overstory while reducing
fuel loadings and ingrowth of smaller trees. Our model
is more appropriate to the type of fire represented by
the Freds and Power fires, which killed not only the
ingrowth of smaller trees, but also resulted in high
levels of crown kill of larger trees.”

We analyze Smith’s three points in turn. First, Smith
contends Royce has misunderstood Table 3-6. Accord-
ing to Smith, the percentage figures given for “correctly
predicted mortality”—such as 96% for yellow pine with
a minimum of 75% crown length scorch—do not predict
the percentage of trees that will die. Rather, these
figures predict the accuracy of the prediction of the
percentage of these trees that will die. Similarly,
according to Smith, the percentage figures for “cor-
rectly predicted survival”—such as 51% for yellow pine

28a

with a minimum of 75% crown length scorch—do not
predict the percentage of trees that will live. Rather,
they predict the aceuracy of the prediction of the
percentage of these trees that will live. Smith may well
be correct. Indeed, it appears from the face of Table 3-6
that she may be, for if the table predicted the
percentage of trees that will die or live, as distinct from
predicting the accuracy of the predictions of these
percentages, the percentages given in the table should
add up to 100%. Instead, in the example given for
yellow pine with 75% crown length scorch, they add up
to 147% (96% plus 51%).

But even if Smith is correct, this does not solve the
problem. Table 3-6 is, to say the least, misleading. Its
title is “Probability of Tree Mortality,” rather than
“Probability that Predictions of Probability of Tree
Mortality and Survival are Correct.” Second, there is no
other table in the FEISs providing the probability of
tree mortality. The absence of such a table is signifi-
cant. The single most important aspect of the FEISs is
their estimate of the likelihood that trees with certain
amounts of fire damage will die. This is so for the
obvious reason that the justification for cutting burned
or scorched trees is the likelihood that they will die.
Any reader of the FEISs will therefore look for a table
providing probability of tree mortality. The only table
in the FEISs that appears to provide that information is
Table 3-6. It is not unforeseeable that a reader—even
an expert reader such as Royce—would misunderstand
the table. Further, the explanation for Table 3-6 pro-
vided by Smith’s declaration in the district court is
nowhere provided in the FEISs. For example, Attach-
ment A to Smith’s declaration is not provided, or even
referred to, in the FEISs. The absence of such an

29a

explanation in the FEISs obviously increases the chance
that the table will be misunderstood.

Further, the Royce declaration provides tree
mortality percentages given in the draft Hood Study,
and he compares those percentages to those given in
Table 3-6. The Hood Study percentages provided by
Royce are not contested by Smith. (This is not
surprising, given that Smith is a co-author of the Hood
Study.) The Hood Study mortality percentages are
substantially lower than the percentages given in Table
3-6. Yet those percentages are not provided in the text
of the FEISs. If the USFS had been truly interested in
educating the reader as to the actual percentages of
trees likely to die from scorch damage, it would have
provided those percentages in the FEISs. Instead, it
provided Table 3-6 (entitled “Probability of Tree
Mortality”) giving percentages of “correctly predicted
mortality.” Even if the USFS could properly rely on the
draft Hood Study instead of other tree moriality
studies—a question we do not here decide—it should
have provided the mortality percentage figures in the
Hood Study rather than, or in addition to, the figures in
Table 3-6.

Second, Smith responds that the comparisons used by
Royce to estimate tree mortality are based on percen-
tage volume of crown kill rather than percentage length
of crown kill. We note initially that Smith’s response
has no application to the comparison between the per-
centage numbers given in Table 3-6 and those given in
the Hood Study. Both Table 3-6 and the Hood Study
were based on the same methodology—correlating
percentage length of crown kill with likelihood of tree
death. Further, we note that with respect to studies

30a

that relied on percentage volume rather than percentage
length of crown kill, Royce had explained in his declara-
tion why the FEISs’ emphasis on the difference in the
two type of crown kill measurements is misleading. He
wrote:

Tables 3-4 in both the Power and Fred’s fire
FEIS’s show a relationship between these two mea-
sures of crown kill in which the volume measure is
much larger than the linear measure for the same
amount of damage. However, these tables are valid
only for young trees with a tapered shape, similar to
the classic conical Christmas tree shape shown in
figure F-1 of the Powers FEIS or figure A-1 of the
Fred’s FEIS. Large, mature trees growing in a forest
surrounded by other trees have a shape more like a
cylinder, tapered only in the topmost branches. . . .
It is to mature trees that the guidelines [in the
FEIS’s] are to be applied to determine if the trees are
dying and hence subject to salvage harvest. In the
context of the salvage of mature trees, the inclusion
of these tables and figures in the FEIS’s is
completely misleading.

My experience measuring mature trees on the
Eldorado-Star fire site . . . was that, within the
uncertainty with which these determinations can be
made in the field, the two measures give the same
numerical value for crown kill.

Third, Smith responds that two of the three other
studies used by Royce for comparison were based on
“prescribed fires.” According to Smith, reliance on

these two studies—the Stephens and Finney study and
the McHugh and Kolb study—was inappropriate
because the Power and Freds Fires “resulted in high

3la

levels of crown kill of larger trees” compared with the
levels of crown kill in the prescribed fires. It may well
be that, as Smith says, the prescribed fires resulted in
lower levels of crown kill in larger trees. But Smith
does not explain why that makes a difference. As those
two studies are described by Royce, they predict tree
mortality based on the actual percentage of crown kill in
particular trees. The fact that fewer trees have that
degree of crown kill in a prescribed fire should not make
any difference in the predicted mortality of those trees
that actually have a high level of crown kill.

Further, Smith does not mention the third study upon
which Royce relie

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1859%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
