# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Morrison v. United States (No. 06-749)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

Supreme Court. j
Pre es US.

06-749° Av 22 2006

No. ____ OPFICE OF THE CLERK

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH and ALICE MORRISON,

Petitioners,
Y.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

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vv

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

a.
4

DAMIEN M. SCHIFF M. REED HOPPER
Of Counsel Counsel of Record
Pacitic Legal Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation
3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200
Sacramento, California 95834 Sacramento, California 95834
Felephone: (916) 419-7111 Telephone: (916) 419-7111
Facsimile: (916) 419-7747 Facsimile: (916) 419-7747

Counsei for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Court of Appeals err by failing to assess whether
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act extends to Petitioners’
property in light of this Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United
States?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE
PETITION TO REQUIRE THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO APPLY CURRENT AND BINDING
PRECEDENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER
PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY FALLS WITHIN
CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION

CONCLUSION

iti

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Gerke Excavating, Inc. v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006)

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)

Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile County,
459 U.S. 1314 (1983)

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)

Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
511 U.S. 298 (1994)

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001)

United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,
437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006)

United States v. Morrison,
178 Fed. Appx. 481 (2006)

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985)

United States v. Williams,
435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006)

Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
§ 1344(a)

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

§ 1362(5)-(7)

Federal Regulations

BF ae © POE peng nesses
§ 328.3(c)

S. Ct. R. 10(a)
Miscellaneous

Kimura, Ken, A Legitimacy Model for the
Interpretation of Plurality Decisions,
77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593 (1992)

I
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Joseph and Alice Morrison (Morrisons),
respectfully petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorarito review
the judgment of the United Siates Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.

—
as

OPINIONS BELOW

The panel opinion of the Court of Appeals is unofficially
published at 178 Fed. Appx. 481 (6th Cir. 2006), and is included
in Appendix (App.) A. The panel opinion of the Court of
Appeals denying the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc
is not published but is included in App. G. The opinion of the
district court adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is not published but is included in App. B,
along with the report and recommendation.

JURISDICTION

On March 29, 2005, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation finding
jurisdiction under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (“Clean Water Act” or “CWA”). App. B.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirming the district court was entered on April 26, 2006.
App. A. That court’s denial of the Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc was entered on August 25, 2006, App. G.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

A

2

STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides in pertinent part:

Except as in compliance with this section and
section[] . . . 1344 of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (CWA § 301(a)).

The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (CWA § 404(a)).

(5) The term “person” means an individual,
corporation, partnership, association, State,
municipality, commission, or political subdivision of
a State, or any interstate body.

(6) The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil,
solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage,
sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar
dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste
discharged into water. ...

(7) The term “navigable waters” means the
waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(5)-(7) (CWA § 502(5)-(7)).

3

Federal regulations define “waters of the United States” to
mean:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in
interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate
wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes,
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams),
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce including
any such waters:

(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or
foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes;
Or

(1) From which fish or shellfish are or could be
taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iii) Which are used or could be used for
industrial purpose by industries in interstate
commerce;

(4)- All impoundments of waters otherwise
defined as waters of the United States under the
definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in
paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this section;

(6) The territorial seas;

4

C YVetlands adjacent to waters (other than
waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in
paragraphs (a)(1)-(6) of this section.

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).

Federal regulations define “adjacency” as “bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c).

7%
a od

INTRODUCTION

This case concerns the statutory scope of the CWA and,
specifically, whether a court of appeals may ignore the binding
precedent of this Court when determining the extent of federal
jurisdiction under the CWA. On June 19, 2006, this Court
decided Rapanos vy. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006),
reversing the Sixth Circuit’s determination that CWA
jurisdiction extends to any wetland that bears a mere
hydrological connection to a traditional navigable waterway.

The Morrisons have been found liable for a civil penalty of
$25,000 for discharging a pollutant into “navigable waters”
without a Corps permit. In Rapanos, this Court rejected the
Corps’s basis for jurisdiction over the Morrisons’ property.
Hence, the Sixth Circuit’s failure to cite, let alone discuss,
Rapanos in denying the Morrisons’ petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc constitutes such a “depart{ure] from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call
for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.” S. Ct. R.
10(a).

Further, the Morrisons respectfully suggest that certiorari
is appropriate here given that their case is essentially
indistinguishable from Gerke Excavating, Inc. v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006) (mem. opinion), in which the Seventh
Circuit had affirmed CWA jurisdiction over Gerke’s property
under pre-Rapanos standards. After Rapanos was issued, the

5

Court granted Gerke’s petition for certiorari, vacated the
Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with Rapanos. Because the Sixth Circuit
decided against the Morrisons prior to Rapanos and failed to
cite Rapanos in its denial of the Morrisons’ petition for
rehearing and rehearing en banc, this Court should grant the
Morrisons’ petition for certiorari to vacate the judgment of the
Sixth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings in
light of Rapanos.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Morrisons own and live on property on Harsens
Island, Michigan, near the mouth of the St. Clair River, a
navigable waterway. Some twelve years ago, the Morrisons

attempted to repair a malfunctioning water supply line on their
property, in the vicinity of which runs a canal that empties into
the St. Clair, approximately one quarter mile away. The United
States sued the Morrisons in a civil enforcement action for
violating Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, alleging that their
water line repair entailed the unpermitted discharge of dredge
and fill material into jurisdictional wetlands.

_ The CWA prohibits discharges of “fill material into
“navigable waters” unless permitted by the federal government.
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311](a) and 1344(a) (CWA § 301(a) and
404(a)). The Act defines “navigable waters” only as “waters of
the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5)-(7). Although the
CWA does not mention “wetlands” in any relevant provision,
federal agencies have defined “waters of the United States” to
include wetlands the “use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce” or any wetland
“adjacent” to a tributary of a “navigable water.” 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a). In this case, the government and the courts have
determined that these regulations authorize federal regulation
over any “adjacent” wetland, regardless of whether the wetland

6

is distinguishable from the navigable water or whether the
wetland significantly affects the chemical, physical, or biological
integrity of the navigable water. See Apps. A and B.

The District Court Decision

The United States brought this action for injunctive and
monetary relief in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan. The government contended
before the district court that the Morrisons had violated the
CWA by depositing “fill” material into jurisdictional wetlands.
The fill was placed there in the process of replacing a buried
water line. These actions, the government argued, amounted to
the discharge of a pollutant into a “navigable water” of the
United States. On the government’s renewed motion for
summary judgment, App. J, the district court found for the
United States and assessed a civil penalty of $25,000 against the
Morrisons, App. I. The district court subsequently vacated sua
sponte the civil penalty, App. I, but the Sixth Circuit on appeal
reversed the district court and directed it to reimpose the civil
penalty, Apps. D and E, which the district court did, App. C.
The Morrisons later moved to dismiss the entire action and for
relief from judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that
the motions be denied. App. B-3. The district court affirmed
the magistrate’s report. App. B-1.

The Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The Morrisons appealed the district court’s adoption of the
report and recommendation to the Sixth Circuit. The
government, in response to the Morrisons’ appeal, did not
address the appeal’s merits but rather limited the answering brief
to the position that the Morrisons’ notice of appeal was
untimely. Specifically, the government argued that the
Morrisons had no procedural right to contest, within the context
of a garnishment proceeding to collect the $25,000 fine, the
merits of the action several years after summary judgment had
been entered against them.

7

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court without
addressing the government’s timeliness argument. The Circuit
determmed that because the St. Clair is navigable-in-fact and the
Morrisons’ property is “adjacent” thereto, CWA jurisdiction is
present. The Morrisons moved for rehearing and rehearing en
banc on the grounds, inter alia, that their property lacked the
requisite “significant nexus” to the St. Clair. This Court decided
Rapanos a few weeks after the rehearing petition had been
filed. Thereafter the Morrisons submitted a notice of
supplemental authority to the Sixth Circuit, alerting it of this
Court’s decision. See App. H. Approximately two months
later, the Circuit denied the Morrisons’ rehearing petition
because “the issues raised in the petition were fully considered
upon the original submission and decision of the case.” App. G.
The petition denial contains no mention of this Court’s decision
in Rapanos and no legal analysis as to why pre-Rapanos

adjacency jurisdiction is equivalent to post-Rapanos adjacency
jurisdiction.

In Rapanos, both the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia and
the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy rejected the
hydrological connection test for establishing jurisdiction (and
adjacency). See Rapanos, 1268S. Ct. at 2227 (plurality opinion);
id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Below,
the government did not contend that the Morrisons’ property
qualifies as “adjacent” wetlands under the plurality’s or Justice
Kennedy’s test; and neither the district court nor the Sixth
Circuit made that finding.

8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I

THIS COURT SHOULD
GRANT THE PETITION TO
REQUIRE THE COURT OF APPEALS
TO APPLY CURRENT AND BINDING
PRECEDENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER
PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY FALLS
WITHIN CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION

The court of appeals determined that the Morrisons’
property is covered under the CWA because it is “adjacent” to
the navigable-in-fact St. Clair. The Sixth Circuit cited to Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County vy. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985), for the proposition that jurisdiction obtains where there
is a significant nexus between the wetlands and the
jurisdictionally sufficient waterbody; and that a significant nexus
is present where wetlands are “adjacent” to the jurisdictional
waterbody. 178 Fed. Appx. at 483, App. at A-4. The court of
appeals accepted as undisputed that the Morrisons’ wetlands are
adjacent to the St. Clair. Jd. at 482, App. at A-2. Because the
court of appeals’s opinion contains no substantive discussion of
the nature of the connection between the Morrisons’ property
and the St. Clair, it is appropriate to conclude that the Sixth
Circuit approved sub silentio the reasoning of the district court
(subsequently reaffirmed by the magistrate judge and district
court) in determining that the Morrisons’ property is adjacent to
the St. Clair.

The district court relied upon Riverside Bayview for the
rule that wetlands “adjacent” to waters covered under the CWA
are themselves subject to CWA jurisdiction. App. at F-5 to F-
6. The district court also concluded that the government had
carried its burden for summary judgment on this issue through

9

the declarations of Jean Battle, a Corps biologist, and
Dr. Donald Tilton, a botanist and wetlands scientist. App. at F-
6.

The Tilton Declaration is wholly concerned with
establishing that the Morrisons’ property qualifies as wetlands.
See Tilton Decl. {11-12 (App. at K-4). The declaration is
silent as to the type or quality of connection between the
Morrisons’ property and the St. Clair. The Battle Declaration is
similarly unilluminating. Although it discusses how the
Morrisons’ property qualifies as wetlands, it simply declares
without explanation that the property comprises jurisdictional
wetlands. See Battle Decl. J 8 (App. at L-3). The declaration
contains no discussion of the quantity or quality of connection
between the Morrisons’ property and the St. Clair.

Thus, the declarations upon which the district court relied,
and upon which the court of appeals affirmed, are insufficient in
themselves to support CWA jurisdiction after Rapanos. Under
the Rapanos plurality test, a wetland can be adjacent to a
jurisdictional body of water, and thus itself subject to
jurisdiction, if and only if the wetland has a continuous surface
water connection with the jurisdictional body of water such that
one cannot tell where the water ends and the wetland begins.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227 (plurality opinion). In contrast,
under the test announced in Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion, a wetland is adjacent and jurisdictional “if the wetlands,
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
‘navigable.’ Jd. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).

Although the Rapanos majority did not agree upon a single
legal standard for determining CWA jurisdiction, the rule
announced by the Court in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188 (1977), for determining the holding of the Court when no
opinion gamers a majority of justices’ votes suggests that the

10

Rapanos plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia is
controlling. Under the Marks rule,

[when a fragmented Court decides a case and no

_ single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken t |’ those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds....

Id. at 193 (quotations marks omitted).

Among the Rapanos majority opinions, the plurality
Opinion constitutes the “narrowest grounds” because its
rationale is a logical subset of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2006). The Marks rule is founded upon the principle that

[t]he Justices supporting the broader legal rule must
necessarily recognize the validity of the narrower
legal rule. That is, if a statute is found to be
constitutionally permissible pursuant to a strict
scrutiny standard of review, then it is necessarily
permissible pursuant to a rational basis standard of
review. From the text of the alternative concurring
opinions, it is possible to determine that if all of the
Justices apply the narrower rule, the outcome would
have been the same.

Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of
Plurality Decisions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593, 1603-04 (1992)
(footnote omitted). According to this understanding, in
Rapanos the plurality opinion functions as a strict scrutiny
standard of review and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as a
rational basis standard of review. That is so because a wetland
passing the plurality’s jurisdictional test—i.e., a wetland that is
“indistinguishable” from a traditional river, lake, or stream that
is connected to a navigable-in-fact waterway—will almost
certainly be found to have a “significant nexus” with a

1]

traditional navigable water, especially given that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence does not require a hydrological
connection to establish jurisdiction. See 126 S. Ct. at 2251
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

Although Justice Kennedy’s test would find jurisdiction in
all cases where the plurality opinion would, the converse is not
true. That is to say, the scope of jurisdiction under the plurality
test is not coextensive with the scope of jurisdiction under
Justice Kennedy’s test, but rather is narrower than Justice
Kennedy’s test. The plurality opinion made clear that it would
not find jurisdiction in the typical application of Justice
Kennedy’s test:

Wetlands are “waters of the United States” if they
[are]... as a practical matter indistinguishable from
waters of the United States. ... [Whereas, under]
Justice Kennedy’s test[, jurisdictional wetlands are
those that,] “either alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect . . . other covered waters more readily
understood as ‘navigable.’ But what possible
linguistic usage would accept that whatever (alone or
in combination) affects waters of the United States
is waters of the United States?

Id. at 2234 (plurality opinion). Given that the aquatic flow
between a wetland and jurisdictional waterbody must be so great
as to render the two indistinguishable to support jurisdiction
under the plurality test, whereas there need not even be a
hydrologic connection between wetland and waterbody to justify
jurisdiction under Justice Kennedy’s test, it is evident that the
plurality opinion 1s the logical subset and thus the controlling
opinion under Marks,

' Additional, practical reasons as to why the plurality opinion ought
to be controlling include that the plurality test has the virtue of ease of
—(continued...)

12

Under the plurality test, the declarations of Ms. Battle and
Dr. Tilton do not support a finding of jurisdiction. Given that
the Morrisons’ property is located on the landward edge of a
residential subdivision, see Battle Decl. Exhs. C and D (App. at
L-8 to L-9), their wetlands are easily distinguishable from the
river itself and thus do not meet the plurality test.

Even if jurisdiction may be proved under Justice Kennedy’s
test, the evidence offered by the government in this case is still
insufficient. Neither the Battle nor Tilton Declaration contains
any mention of the quantity or quality of the chemical, physical,
or biological connection between the Morrisons’ wetlands (or
all similarly situated wetlands on Harsens Island) and the St.
Clair.’ That finding is required for jurisdiction under Justice
Kennedy’s test.

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc even though, during the pendency of the
petition, the relevant rule for ascertaining jurisdiction had
changed. Assuming arguendo that the “significant nexus” test
intimated by Riverside Bayview and suggested by SWANCC
remains the standard today, the contents of that standard
after Rapanos have changed considerably. The government
measured “significant nexus” in Rapanos by the hydrological

' (...continued)

application for landowners and regulators alike, while also hewing
more closely to the government’s original interpretation of “waters of
the United States” as navigable-in-fact waters. See SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 168. One district court has already adopted the plurality
opinion as containing the controlling jurisdictional test. United States
v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006).

? In fact, the Corps stated in its environmental assessment reviewing
the Morrisons’ after-the-fact CWA permit application that the
Morrisons’ fill activity would have only “a minor, long term, negative
impact on water quality.” App. at M.

13

connection rule; presumably the government intended to use the
same rule to establish jurisdiction over the Morrisons’ property.
Yet in Rapanos a majority of this Court found the hydrological
connection rule to be legally insufficient for ascertammg CWA
. jurisdiction. Thus, the government has not established CWA
jurisdiction; and the Sixth Circuit’s failure to apply the correct
jurisdictional rule constitutes such a gross abdication of an
appellate court’s duty as to merit the invocation of this Court’s
supervisory power. Cf. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511
U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“It is this Court’s responsibility to say
what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the
duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the
governing rule of law.”’).

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Petition for Certiorari to
ensure that its decision in Rapanos is applied to all pending and
future cases concerning the extent of federal jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act. In this case, the Sixth Circuit failed to
provide any. analysis regarding the effect of Rapanos on the
jurisdictional question presented. Rapanos was decided just two
weeks after the Morrisons filed their petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc. The Sixth Circuit denied the Morrisons’
petition over two months after Rapanos was decided,
notwithstanding the Morrisons’ submission of a notice of
supplemental authority alerting the Circuit to this Court’s
decision. The Sixth Circuit’s failure even to acknowledge the
precedent—let alone its failure to explain the precedent’s
application—constitutes a gross dereliction and abdication of
the duty of a court of appeals faithfully to apply the binding
precedent of this Court. Cf. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of
Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice
1983) (district court as well as Supreme Court Justice sitting as
Circuit Justice bound to apply decisions of Supreme Court);

14

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (lower courts
bound to apply even summary decisions of Supreme Court).

For these reasons, this Court should grant the Morrisons’
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

DATED: November, 2006.

Respectfully submitted,

DAMIEN M. SCHIFF M. REED HOPPER
Of Counsel Counsel of Record
Pacific Legal Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation
3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200
Sacramento, California 95834 Sacramento, California 95834
Telephone: (916) 419-7111 Telephone: (916) 419-7111
Facsimile: (916) 419-7747 Facsimile: (916) 419-7747

Counsel for Petitioners

Appendix A-1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-1552

Vz.

JOSEPH and ALICE PAULEY;
MORRISON,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

Filed: April 26, 2006

Before: DAUGHTREY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;
RUSSELL, District Judge.*

Jennifer J. Peregord, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Detroit, MI,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Keay Fallowfield, Keay Fallowfield Assoc., Croswell, MI,
for Defendants-Appellants.

* Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Appendix A~2

RUSSELL, District Judge.

Defendants-Appellants Joseph and Alice Pauley Morrison
(“Morrisons”) appeal the decision of the Eastern District of
Michigan in upholding the recommendation by the Magistrate
Judge that the Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America
(“Government”) had territorial jurisdiction over the Morrisons’
property located on Harsens Island, Michigan.

BACKGROUND

In its complaint, the Government asserts that in June of
1994, the Morrisons either “performed or caused to be
performed” actions within U.S. waters by either “trenching,
grading or filling wetlands” on their property located at
3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island, Michigan. Specifically, the
Government alleges that the Morrisons conducted an illegal fill

in the wetlands by depositing and grading fill material into that
area, and by digging, repairing and then reburying a broken
water line located in that area. The United States Army Corps
of Engineers determined that the land in question qualified as a
“wetland” as defined by the Clean Water Act.

The wetlands in question are adjacent to the St. Clair River.
The Morrisons do not dispute that fact in this appeal. In its
complaint, the Government also claims that the wetlands are
considered part of the United States for purposes of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 of the Clean Water Act. The Morrisons dispute that fact
in this appeal, claiming the land does not fall under U.S.
jurisdiction for purposes of the Clean Water Act.

The land in question involves territory that was disputed in
the past between the United States and British Canada. In 1828,
following an agreement on a border between the United States
and British Canada, the American Land Board recognized the
claim of Jacob Harsens (“Harsens”) to the upper part of the
island (“surveyed land”), providing him with patents that he
accepted at that time. In 1837, Michigan became a state

Appendix A-3

of the union. Thirteen years later in 1850, the U.S. Congress
passed the Swamp Land Act, which granted certain states title
to all swamp lands within their borders; Michigan was one of the
states included by Congress in that Act. In 1910, the Supreme
Court of Michigan determined that the “unsurveyed land,” or
lower part of Harsens Island, belonged to the State of Michigan
as set forth by the Swamp Land Act.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, using the same standards applicable to the
district court. City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co.,
43 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper
if the evidence submitted shows that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This Court
must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 804
(6th Cir. 1998). On appeal, the Court will not generally
consider new arguments that were not presented to the district
court unless such failure to consider the issue will result in a
miscarriage of justice. Roush v. KFC Nat’l Management Co.,
10 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

In 1828, when Harsens received his patents from the federal
government for the land, the federal government held title to the
surveyed wetlands. The fact that the patents provided to
Harsens came from the United States demonstrates that the
United States had made its claim to the island. Today, all of the
island is part of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States as
it has been a part of the State of Michigan since 1837, when
Michigan joined the union. As such, the United States has
territorial jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over the

Appendix A-4

surveyed lands because these wetlands belong to the United
States.

The title for the unsurveyed wetlands belongs to the State
of Michigan. The State of Michigan is a part of the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of the Clean Water
Act. Consequently, title to the unsurveyed wetlands in question
belongs to the State of Michigan, and Michigan falls within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of
enforcing the Clean Water Act.

The United States Supreme Court has held that there must
be a “significant nexus” between a wetland and navigable waters
in order for the Clean Water Act to apply. Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159, 167 & 173, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001)
_(“SWANCC”). The Court in SWANCC stated that “Congress’
concern for the protection of water quality and aquatic
ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands ‘inseparably
bound up with the “waters” of the United States.”” SWANCC
at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675; quoting United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88
L.Ed.2d 419 (1985) (“Riverside”). The Court held that there
must be a “significant nexus” between the wetlands and
navigable waters in order for the United States to have
jurisdiction over the wetlands in question. SWANCC at 167,
121 S.Ct. 675. A significant nexus between a wetland and a
body of water occurs when a wetland is adjacent to a navigable
body of water. /d.; Riverside at 133-135, 106 S.Ct. 455. The
Clean Water Act, under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) & (8) defines
“navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States.” In
Riverside, the United States Supreme Court specifically
mentioned wetlands that are adjacent to a river as falling within
the coverage of the Clean Water Act. Jd. at 134, 106 S.Ct. 455.

In the instant matter, regardless of whether or not the
property of the Morrisons is a part of the unsurveyed or

Appendix A-5

surveyed wetlands, both wetlands are adjacent to the St. Clair
River. Under the definition of a navigable body of water as
defined by the Clean Water Act and noted by the Supreme
Court in Riverside, the St. Clair River is a navigable body of
water within the United States. Accordingly, a significant nexus
exists between the wetlands and the St. Clair River. Therefore,
the United States has territorial jurisdiction over the Morrisons’
property for purposes of enforcing the Clean Water Act.

CONCLUSION

The District Court did not err when it adopted the report
and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in determining
the matter of territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, we AFFIRM
the order of the District Court adopting the report and
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and hold that the
Government has territorial jurisdiction over the Morrisons’

property.

Appendix B-1

FILED MAR. 29, 2005

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Case No. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HONORABLE DENISE
PAGE HOOD
VS.

ALICE MORRISON, and
JOSEPH MORRISON,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Steven
D. Pepe’s Report and Recommendation dated November 3,
2004. An objection has been filed to the Report and
Recommendation.

This Court has had an opportunity to review the Report
and Recommendation and finds that the Magistrate Judge
reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. The
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants [sic}
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is without merit. The Court further

Appendix B--2

agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there were sufficient facts
to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act and that the
United States and this Court unquestionably have jurisdiction
over Harsens Island and all matters related to it stemming from
this case.

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that final
judgment was entered almost four years ago and it was found
then, as it is found now, that there were sufficient facts to
establish a violation of the Clean Water Act. The Court also
agrees that Defendants have specified no reason, nor have they
stated an “extraordinary ground”, for relief from judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Defendants claim that a mistake has
been made regarding the Court’s jurisdiction of Harsens Island.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants’
claim of mistake is unfounded.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe’s
Report and Recommendation Denying Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss dated November 3, 2004 is ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED as this Court’s finding of fact and conclusions of
law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 167, filed July 14, 2004) is DENIED.

/s/ Denise Page Hood
DATED: MAR 28 2005 DENISE PAGE HOOD
United States District Judge

Appendix B-3

FILED NOV. 3, 2004

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Case No. 99-71069

Plaintiff, Honorable Denise Page Hood
Honorable Steven D. Pepe
VS.

ALICE MORRISON, and
JOSEPH MORRISON,
Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

Report and Recommendation Denying
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#167)

I. Background

On March 5, 1999, the United States filed a complaint
against Alice Pauley and her father, Samuel Pauley, who
together owned certain real property on Harsens Island,
Michigan; Joseph Morrison, who claimed to have an ownership
interest in the property; and John Horvath, a construction
contractor. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated

Appendix B-4

the Clean Water Act', which requires permits for the discharge
of dredged or fill material, by trenching, grading, and filling
wetlands on the Pauleys’ property without a permit. The
complaint sought a civil fine and an injunction requiring the
defendants to restore the property to its natural condition.

On October 31, 2000, summary judgment was awarded to
the United States. The court found that the defendants had
“discharged a pollutant, from a source point, into navigable
waters of the United States, without a permit” within the
meaning of the Clean Water Act. On March 30, 2001, a civil
penalty of $25,000 was entered against Joseph Morrison and
Alice Pauley pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). This penalty was
vacated sua sponte on June 7, 2001. The U.S. appealed and on
February 26, 2003, a slip opinion from the U.S. Court of
Appeals was issued reversing and remanding the case for
reimposition of the fine. On March 17, 2003, the $25,000 fine
was reinstated. On October 22, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied a writ of certiorari. On April 22, 2004, the undersigned
denied Defendants’ motion to stay execution of garnishment and
Defendants’ motion for a hearing regarding the attempted
garnishment and claim for exemptions. On September 16, 2004,
Defendants filed the current motion to dismiss, which was
referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A)
and (B). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion should
be DENIED.

Il. Standard of Review

1. Dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations
as true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 117 (1990); SA
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL

' Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1977).

Appendix B-5

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 304 (2d ed. 1990).
See also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969);
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976). A complaint
will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Moreover, pro se
complaints are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). It is also well established, however,
that conclusory, unsupported allegations of constitutional
deprivation do not state a claim.

2. Relief from final judgment

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-tion, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Appendix B-6

The “catch-all” category of “any other reason justifying
relief” is reserved for extraordinary circumstances.”

Ii. Analysis

Defendant motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is without merit.
Defendants maintain, once again, that there are no facts which
would show a violation of the Clean Water Act and there are no
facts to show that this Court has jurisdiction over Harsens
Island. Both of these issues have been addressed extensively in
previous orders. Final judgment was entered almost four years
ago and it was found then, as it is found now, that there were
sufficient facts to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act.
Additionally, the issue of jurisdiction has been addressed in a
order by the undersigned of April 22, 2004; the United States
and this Court unquestionably have jurisdiction over Harsens
Island and all matters related to it stemming from this case.

Defendants have specified no reason, nor have they stated
an “extraordinary ground”, for relief from judgment under
F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Defendants claim that a mistake has been
made regarding the Court’s jurisdiction of Harsens Island. As
stated above, this issue has been rejected by all of the courts that
have been involved in this case. Defendants claim of mistake is
unfounded.

? See, e.g., Pierce v United Mine Workers, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, (the court should allow relief under Rule
60(b)(6) only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are
not addressed by the other five subsections of the rule); Reform Party
of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174
F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (available only in extraordinary
circumstances, and commenting that intervening developments in the
law will, by themselves, rarely constitute basis for relief under Rule
60(b)(6); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, (used “sparingly” as equitable remedy to prevent
manifest injustice).

Appendix B—7

IV. Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that
Defendants’ motion be DENIED.

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation
must be filed within ten (10) days of its service. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file
objections within the specified time constitutes a waiver of any
further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);
Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 957-58 (6th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Pursuant to
E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be
served upon this Magistrate Judge.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2004 — s/Steven D. Pepe
Ann Arbor, Michigan United States Magistrate Judge

Appendix C1

FILED MAR. 17, 2003

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Case Number: 99-CV-71069-DT

Plaintiff, HON. GEORGE E. WOODS
v.

SAMUEL PAULEY,
ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH
MORRISON, and JOHN
HORVATH, jointly and
severally,

Defendants.

ORDER REINSTATING $25,000 FINE

On February 24, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that this Court lacked the power to
vacate, sua sponte, a $25,000 fine imposed against Defendants
Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison. The appellate court
remanded the matter for reimposition of the fine.

IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the March 30, 2001, civil
penalty entered against Defendant Alice Pauley Morrison and

Appendix C--2

Joseph Morrison, jointly and severally, in the amount of $25,000
shall be, and hereby is, REINSTATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Alice Pauley Morrison
and Joseph Morrison shall pay the penalty by a check made
payable to the United States of America, in care of Geneva
Halliday, Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, 211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001, Detroit Michigan,
48226. Plaintiff shall be entitled to interest as provided by law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ George E. Woods
GEORGE E. WOODS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 17, 2003
Detroit, Michigan

Copies mailed this date to:

James K. O’Brien, Esq.

Geneva S. Halliday, Esq.

Alice Pauley Morrison and Joseph Morrison
United States Marshal Service

Appendix D-1
FILED FEB. 24, 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-2107

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

V.

SAMUEL PAULEY; JOHN HORVATH,
Defendants,
ALICE PAULEY; JOSEPH MORRISON,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GUY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH,
District Judge.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district
court and was submitted on briefs without ora] argument.

IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ORDERED that
the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the cause
is REMANDED for reimposition of the $25,000 fine.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Leonard Green
Leonard Green, Clerk

Appendix E-1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 01-2107
v.

SAMUEL PAULEY; JOHN
HORVATH,

Defendants,

ALICE PAULEY; JOSEPH
MORRISON,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit
No. 99-71069—George E. Woods, District Judge

Submitted: January 28, 2003
Decided and Filed: February 24, 2003

Before: GUY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH,
District Judge.*

* The Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith, United States District Judge
for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

Appendix E-2

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Jennifer J. Peregord, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Alice
Pauley, Joseph Morrison, Harsens Island, Michigan, pro se.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The United
States, which had been granted summary judgment cn its Clean
Water Act action against defendants Alice Pauley and Joseph
Morrison, appeals from the district court’s sua sponte order that
vacated the $25,000 fine that the district court had previously

imposed. Because the district court lacked the power to grant
such relief sua sponte, we REVERSE the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 1999, the United States filed a complaint
against Alice Pauley and her father, Samuel Pauley, who
together owned certain real property on Harsens Island,
Michigan; Joseph Morrison, who claimed to have an ownership
interest in the property; and John Horvath, a construction
contractor. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated
the Clean Water Act by trenching, grading, and filling wetlands
on the Pauleys’ property without a permit. The complaint
sought a civil fine and an injunction requiring the defendants to
restore the property to its natural condition.

On October 31, 2000, U.S. District Judge Cleland awarded
summary judgment to the United States. The court found that
the defendants had “discharged a pollutant, from a source point,
into navigable waters of the United States, without a permit,”

Appendix E-3

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 29, within the meaning of the Clean
Water Act. Accordingly, the court scheduled a penalty hearing
on February 8, 2001, to determine the scope of any relief. At
the hearing, the government presented a consent decree between
the United States and defendant Samuel] Pauley. Samuel Pauley,
who had quit-claimed his interest in the property to Alice Pauley
and Joseph Morrison on January 26, 2001, shortly before the
scheduled penalty hearing, agreed to hire a contractor to restore
the property. According to the consent decree, Samuel Pauley
would hire a contractor to remove all fill material from the
wetland by May 15, 2001. The consent decree was contingent
on either Samuel Pauley receiving permission from the new
owners, Alice Pauley and her husband, Joseph Morrison, to
enter the property and complete the restoration or on a court
order requiring the new owners to permit him the necessary
access. On February 8, 2001, the court ordered Alice Pauley to

“allow access to the property by the Contractor and Corps of
Engineers to complete the restoration as set forth in the Consent
Decree.” J.A. at 81.

Before considering a civil penalty, the court adjourned the
penalty hearing for six weeks so that Alice Pauley and Joseph
Morrison could retain counsel. When the hearing resumed, and
the defendants informed the court that they would proceed pro
se, Judge Cleland imposed a $25,000 fine against Alice Pauley
and Joseph Morrison for their Clean Water Act violations. The
fine was imposed pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), which
authorizes civil penalties up to $25,000 per day of violation and
requires the court to consider the seriousness of the violation,
any history of violations, good-faith efforts to comply with
requirements, the impact of the fine on the offender, and any
other factors that “justice may require.” 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
Granting the United States’s request to impose the maximum
fine allowed for one day of violation, Judge Cleland noted that
the land had been in violation for approximately six years.
Although the scope of the violation was not huge, Judge

Appendix E-+4

Cleland said, as it affected only a small piece of land, Alice
Pauley’s and Joseph Morrison’s history of refusing to comply
with the law warranted the fine. Judge Cleland said that they
had failed to keep their promises that they would remedy the
violation, and he cited the “strong indications that the
defendants were, essentially, stringing the Corps along, and
trying to see if . . . the Corps would simply give up after a
period of time,” J.A. at 245. The court also considered Alice
Pauley’s and Joseph Morrison’s economic situations and the
costs to the government of their intransigence before imposing
the $25,000 fine.

Despite the injunction, Alice Pauley refused Samuel
Pauley, the contractor, and the Army Corps of Engineers access
to the property to comply with the terms of the settlement.
According to the United States, Alice Pauley sent the
government a letter in late February stating that “we have
decided that we will NOT allow ANY .. . ONE on our
property,” and that “we do not plan on being bullied into
anything especially by the Court or the Plaintiff(s).” J.A. at 83-
84. On May 9, 2001, the government received a letter from
Samuel Pauley’s attorney, who stated that on at least five
separate occasions, Alice Pauley had told Samuel Pauley that
she would not allow him or his contractor access to the
property. That day, the United States filed an emergency
motion to enforce the consent decree. Judge Cleland
disqualified himself, and the case was reassigned to U.S. District
Judge Woods.

At the hearing on the United States’s emergency motion,
Judge Woods appears to have succeeded in convincing Alice
Pauley to comply with the court’s order. However, Judge
Woods also vacated sua sponte the $25,000 fine that Judge
Cleland had levied against Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison.
Judge Woods announced early in the hearing, “The Court
expects the imposition of fines will not motivate Alice Pauley[]
to comply. I told you I’m not impressed with fines. I’m not

Appendix E~-5

interested in fines being imposed.” J.A. at 263. Then, after
recounting the case’s history, Judge Woods invited Alice Pauley
to the lectern and announced, “Tell you what I’m going to do
right now. I’m setting aside [the] $25,000 fine. I don’t think it
serves any purpose at all and I do not feel that it. is a sword
hanging over your head at all.” J.A. at 273. In denying the
United States’s motion to reconsider, Judge Woods said, “I’ve
set aside the $25,000 fine which may have had something to do
with getting this baby settled. .So be it. It’s set aside.” J.A. at
288. Judge Woods entered an order vacating the civil penalty.

The United States timely appealed from the order vacating
the civil penalty, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.

Il. ANALYSIS

As Judge Cleland’s comments in imposing the $25,000 fine
indicate, Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison have a history of
obstructing the Corps’s efforts to enforce the Clean Water Act
and to remedy the violations on Alice Pauley’s property.
Accordingly, when the case came before Judge Woods on the
United States’s emergency motion to compel compliance, Judge
Woods was understandably prepared to use whatever tools he
had available to accomplish compliance with the court’s earlier
injunction. However, vacating sua sponte one order in an effort
to encourage a party to comply with another order was not,
under our precedent, an available tool.

Judge Woods did not explicitly indicate the basis on which
he vacated the $25,000 civil penalty, but we interpret the district
court as having relieved the defendants from a final judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), as this
rule most nearly describes the district court’s action. Rule
60(b)(6) provides that, “{o}n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal
representative from a final judgment” for “any . . . reason

Appendix E-6

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The civil fine from which the district court
granted relief constituted a final judgment, as it had been
imposed in connection with a judgment granting summary
judgment with respect to all of the plaintiff's claims against ail
remaining defendants. That the district court had maintained
jurisdiction to ensure that the injunctive relief was properly
accomplished is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether
the grant of summary judgment and imposition of a civil penalty
constituted final judgment, as “the court may enter a final and
appealable judgment and still retain jurisdiction over the action
sO as to make sure that its order ts applied correctly.” 10
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2651 at 14 (3d ed. 1998)
(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a), which defines “judgment” as
used in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Accordingly, the
question is whether the Rule 60(b) relief was properly granted.
We review orders granting relief from a prior order under
Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion, but we review questions of
law de novo. Blackard v. Memphis Area Med. Ctr. for Women,
Inc., 262 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, -- U.S. --,
122 S. Ct. 1908 (May 13, 2002).

We have held that a district court may not sua sponte grant
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b).' In Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d

' Circuits are split on the question whether a district court may grant
Rule 60(b) relief sua sponte. The Tenth Circuit agrees with our view
that such relief is impermissible. See Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882,
884-85 (10th Cir. 1968) (noting that whereas Rule 60(a) permits the
district court to correct clerical errors “of its own initiative,” Rule
60(b) permits corrections only upon motion). The Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held that such sua sponte relief is
permissible. See Fort Knox Music Inc. v. Baptiste, 257 F.3d 108, 111
(2d Cir. 2001) (“While normally such relief is sought by motion of a
party, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), nothing forbids the court to grant

(continued...)

Appendix E~7

760 (6th Cir. 1993), we reasoned that because Rule 60(b)
explicitly requires relief under the rule to occur “on motion,”
courts may not grant such relief except upon “a motion from the
affected party.” Jd. at 762; accord Lewis v. Alexander, 987
F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Eaton decided . . . that a district
court may not act sua sponte to grant relief from judgment
through Rule 60(b).”). Here, no motion for Rule 60(b) relief
was made. Accordingly, under our precedents the order
vacating the relief exceeded the district court’s authority.

We also note that even if the district court had the
authority to vacate the order, district courts should not use their
authority under Rule 60(b) to reward parties’ contempt of prior
orders. The initial district judge had imposed the fine after
carefully considering the factors required under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d), and the fine’s purpose was to punish violations of the
Clean Water Act, not to induce these offenders to remedy the
violation. Of course, if any of the considerations listed in
§ 1319(d), such as the economic impact that the judgment
would have on the offenders, had changed, relief from the
judgment might have been appropriate. Similarly, upon motion
of a party, the district court might have used its Rule 60(b)
authority to grant relief in the presence of “exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances” that this court held are necessary
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) in Hopper v. Euclid Manor

' (...continued)

such relief sua sponte.”’); Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. y. Lake Alice
Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that although rule
says “on motion,” it “does not explicitly say ‘by a party,’” suggesting
that the relief could be on the court’s own motion); McDowell v.
Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (Sth Cir. 1962) (“The Court could
initiate this on its own motion.”’); United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d
469, 472 (4th Cir. 1961) (“The rule need not necessarily be read as
depriving the court of the power to act in the interest of justice in an
unusual case in which its attention has been directed to the necessity
for relief by means other than a motion.”’).

Appendix E-8

Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989).
However, those circumstances are not present here. Rather, the
only unusual circumstance present was that the defendants
intransigently refused to comply with the district court’s order
to allow access to the property for remediation. Vacating a
prior order for the sole purpose of inducing compliance with
another order would reward contempt.

This case is somewhat analogous to the circumstances that
we faced in Hopper. There, a prevailing plaintiff was required
to pay certain costs pursuant to Rule 68, because the plaintiff
had refused the defendant’s offer to settle for an amount that
turned out to be greater than the nominal damages that the
plaintiff was ultimately awarded. The district court then used
Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the earlier judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, and the court entered judgment in favor of the
defendant, a move that rendered Rule 68 inapplicable. See
Hopper, 867 F.2d at 293. We reversed, because the district
court had “sought to negate the operation of Rule 68,” which
encourages plaintiffs to consider settlement offers seriously lest
the plaintiff win a smaller judgment and be forced to pay costs,
and because granting Rule 60(b) relief would reward the
plaintiff's refusal to accept an appropriate settlement offer. /d.
at 294-95. Similarly, here, granting relief from the civil penalty
served to reward the defendants’ refusal to comply with court
orders.

The district court’s sole purpose in vacating the civil fine
here was not, of course, to reward the defendants’ disregard of
the law. The district court’s primary purpose appears to have
been to remedy the violation of the Clean Water Act. That
purpose was appropriate, and Judge Woods noted that the
hearing on the emergency motion to comply had resulted in a
new settlement. There was, however, nothing to settle: Judge
Cleland had already determined that Alice Pauley and Joseph
Morrison had an obligation to permit contractors to remedy a
violation, and he had ordered them to comply. The problem

Appendix E~9

was not that the parties failed to agree on an appropriate
resolution, but that Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison
had refused to fulfill their court-ordered obligations. Alice
Pauley’s and Joseph Morrison’s blatant refusal to comply with
a court order would have warranted contempt proceedings, but
certainly not a reward for their obstruction.

lif. CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not have the power to vacate
the civil penalty sua sponte, we REVERSE and REMAND for
reimposition of the fine.

Appendix F-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, Case No. 99-CV-71069-DT
Plaintiff,

v.

SAMUEL PAULEY;

ALICE PAULEY; JOSEPH

MORRISON; and JOHN

HORVATH,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING “PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT”

Plaintiff United States of America (“the Government’)
brought this action against Defendants Samuel Pauley, Alice
Pauley, and Joseph Morrison, alleging that they had violated
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, by
placing, or causing to be placed, fill material in a wetland
adjacent to a water of the United States without first securing a
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The
instant motion for summary judgment was filed by the

Appendix F-2

Government on August 25, 2000. Defendants failed to file a
timely response.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants own property located at 3010 Green Drive,
Harsens Island, Michigan. At the front of the site is a
grandfathered fill area, on which a building that was formerly a
gas station is situated. The Corps of Engineers, however,
alleges that in June 1994 it discovered a recent, unpermitted fill
in the wetland behind the gas station. Specifically, the
Government alleges that Defendants violated the Clean Water
Act (1) by depositing and grading fill material into the wetland
area and (2) by digging up, repairing, and then reburying a
broken water line located in the wetland area.

Ii, STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Where the moving party
has carried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the
record construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not
raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, entry of summary
judgment is appropriate.” Gutierrez y. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534,

' After the hearing on this matter had been cancelled, counsel for
Defendants did fax to the court a one-page “Summary of Oral
Argument to be Given in Open Court.” The facsimile, however, was
both untimely and in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.
Moreover, the substance of Defendants’ proposed argument—that the
entire property is grandfathered out of the Clean Water Act—was
unavailing. Under the Act’s grandfather clause, only certain activities
occurring prior to 1977, not property itself, are excluded from the
Act’s coverage. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.3. The activities alleged in this
case do not qualify under this grandfather provision.

Appendix F-3

1536 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986)).

Failure by the non-moving party to respond to a motion for
summary judgment is not necessarily fatal to that party’s case.
The movant bears the initial burden on summary judgment and
to prevail must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to
all material facts. Only then does the burden shift to the non-
movant and the failure to respond become fatal. Accordingly,
if the Government can demonstrate that all elements of its cause
of action are satisfied, summary judgment should be granted
based on Defendants’ failure to respond. If, on the hand, the
Government’s prima facie case is incomplete, summary
judgment should be denied. See Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d
451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991).

Ii. DISCUSSION

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any
pollutant, from a point source, into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(a), 1344, 1362(12) (1986). The Secretary of the Army
is authorized, however, to grant permits authorizing the
discharge of “dredged material” and “fill material” under certain
conditions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344. Therefore, to satisfy
its burden under Rule 56, the Government must show that no
material questions of fact remain as to whether (A) Defendants
discharged a pollutant, (B) from a source point, (C) into
navigable waters, (D) without a permit. Because the United
States has satisfied this burden, and because Defendants have
failed to otherwise raise a genuine issue of material fact, the
Government’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

A. Defendants Discharged a Pollutant

The phrase “discharge of a pollutant” is defined under the
Clean Water Act as “the addition of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12). “Pollutant” is defined to include, among other

Appendix F—4

things, dredged spoil,’ biological materials, rock, sand, and
cellar dirt. The Government alleges that Defendants discharged
a pollutant in essentially two ways: (1) by placing and grading
fill material into the wetlands and (2) by digging a trench in the
wetland area, sidecasting the dirt, and then refilling the trench.

These actions unquestionably constitute the “discharge of
a pollutant” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. First,
bringing fill material and dumping and grading it into a wetland
is the core example of “adding a pollutant.” Second, while
initially it may be less clear that sidecasting material dredged
from a wetland area back into the wetland is “the addition of a
pollutant,” all federal courts addressing the issue have concluded
that such acts indeed violate the Clean Water Act. See, e.g.,
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
923-35 (Sth Cir. 1983) (holding that interpretation of “addition”
to include “redeposit” of trees and vegetation dredged or
excavated from the wetland itself is consistent with both the
purposes and legislative history of the Clean Water Act);
National Mining Assoc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d
1399, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at
924 n.43 (“‘[D]redged’ material is by definition materia] that
comes from the water itself. A requirement that all pollutants
must come from outside sources would effectively remove the
dredge-and-fill provision from the statute.”)); United States v.
Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (adopting similar
holding).

Defendants have acknowledged in deposition testimony
their responsibility for the alleged acts. All three Defendants
have ownership interests in the property, (Answer {fj 2, 3), and
deposition testimony shows that Defendants Samuel Pauley and
Joseph Morrison either performed, or hired Defendant John
Horvath to perform, the work done in the wetland area,

? Dredged spoil is “material that is excavated or dredged from waters
of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2.

Appendix F—5

(Morrison Dep. at 15, 19, 23; Horvath Dep. at 13). In the
absence of exculpatory evidence from Defendants, this is
sufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden under summary
judgment of showing that Defendants discharged a pollutant.

B. From a Point Source

To constitute a violation of the Clean Water Act, a
pollutant must be discharged from a “point source,” which is
defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14). Courts unanimously have held that
earthmoving equipment such as dump trucks, bulldozers, and
backhoes qualify as “discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance[s]” and are thus point sources of pollution. United
States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980);
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp.
525 (W.D. La. 1979).

The Government alleges that Defendants discharged
pollutants using a backhoe and a plow blade attached to a truck.
These allegations are supported by the deposition testimony.
(Morrison Dep. at 19, 22-23.) Accordingly, this element has
been satisfied for purposes of summary judgment.

C. Into Navigable Waters

Defendants can be liable under the Clean Water Act only
if they discharged pollutants into “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12). Navigable waters is defined as “waters of the
United States,” which in turn is defined to include “wetlands . . .
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” including
wetiands which are adjacent to interstate waters or their
tributaries. 343 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). In United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), the

Appendix F—6

United States Supreme Court upheld this definition as within the
scope of authority granted by Congress.

The Government has satisfied its burden of showing that
the land on which the pollutants were dumped is a wetland
covered by the Clean Water Act. The Government has
submitted the declarations of Jean Battle, a Corps of Engineers
biologist, and Donald Tilton, a doctor of botany and a Certified
Professional of Wetland Scientist. Both testify that the subject
property is a wetland as defined by the regulations and support
their testimony with factual data. In addition, the wetland is
adjacent to the St. Clair River, which is an interstate water or a
tributary of interstate waters. Accordingly, for purposes of
summary judgment, the Government has satisfied its burden of
showing that the pollutants were discharged into navigable
waters.

D. Without a Permit

It is undisputed that no permit was issued authorizing the
discharge of pollutants. No recorded permit has been located
with the Corps of Engineers. And, although in their Answer
Defendants neither denied nor admitted the absence of a permit,
Defendant Morrison testified in deposition that “I never applied
for a permit at any time, expressed an interest for applying for
a permit because I believe the property is not a wetland.”
(Morrison Dep. at 33.)

Il. CONCLUSION

Because the Government has demonstrated that no genuine
issue of material fact exists with regard to whether Defendants
discharged a pollutant, from a point source, into navigable
waters of the United States, without a permit, it has satisfied its
burden imposed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

Appendix F~7

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment against Defendants Samuel Pauley, Alice
Pauley, and Joseph Morrison is GRANTED.

FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a brief
regarding the scope and necessity of an injunctive order and the
amount of a civil penalty by November 13, 2000. Defendants
shall file a response brief by November 27, 2000. A hearing on
the matter will be held on December 13, 2000 at 2:00.

/s/ Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: Oct. 31, 2000.

Appendix G-1
No. 05-1552

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
.
J

Plaintiff-Appellee, ORDER

)

)

) Filed

) August 25, 2006
)

)

)

v.
ALICE MORRISON, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY and GILMAN, Circuit
Judges; and RUSSELL,’ District Judge.

The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc,
and the petition having been circulated not only to the original
panel members but also to all other active judges of this court,
and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the
suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has
been referred to the original panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing
and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully
considered upon the original submission and decision of the
case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Leonard Green
Leonard Green, Clerk

“Hon. Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Appendix H-1

CITATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES
RULE 28(J)

Case Number 05-1552
Decided April 26, 2006

United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

United States of America
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Alice Morrison: Joseph Morrison
Defendants-Appellants.

This is [sic] inform the Court of the recent decision made
by the United States Supreme Court in Ramanos [sic] vs.
U.S.A., 8. C. Docket number 04-1034, argued Feb 21, 2006 -
Decided June 19, 2006 that may help the Court render it’s
decision. In the appellants brief page 4, and pages 6-9 the
defendants argue the “Nexus Theory.”

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keay Fallowfield
Keay Fallowfield
Attorney at Law
60 N. Howard Street
P.O. Box 162
Croswell, Mi. 48422
810-679-3660

Counsel for Appellant

Appendix I-1

Text from the United States District Court’s docket report.

* * * *

03/30/2001

ORDER by Judge Robert H. Cleland,
assessing a civil penalty as to defendants
Alice Pauley Morrison and Joseph
Morrison, only with proof of mailing
[EOD Date 4/2/01] (dh) (Entered:
04/02/2001)

03/30/2001

JUDGMENT entered by Judge
Robert H. Cleland for USA against
Joseph Morrison, Alice Pauley with
proof of mailing [EOD Date: 4/2/01]
(dh) (Entered: 04/02/2001)

06/07/2001

ORDER by Judge George E. Woods,
vacating the judgment awarding plaintiff
a civil penalty from defendants Alice
Pauley Morrison and Joseph Morrison
in the amount of $25,000.00 entered
by Judge Cleland on 03/30/01, is
vacated, plaintiffs oral motion for
reconsideration of the vacating of the
judgment of $25,000.00 is denied.
Defendants Alice and Joseph Morrison’s
motion for a stay pending appeal is
denied. (see order for further details)
[EOD Date 6/28/01] (dh) (Entered:
06/28/2001)

Appendix J-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT CF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, CIVIL NO. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HON. ROBERT H.
CLELAND
VS.

SAMUEL PAULEY,
ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH
MORRISON, and JOHN

HORVATH, Jointly and
Severally,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
DEFENDANTS PAULEY AND MORRISON

NOW COMES Plaintiff, United States of America, by and
through its attorneys, Saul A. Green, United States Attorney
and Geneva S. Halliday, Assistant United States Attorney, and
moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 as to Defendants Samuel Pauley, Alice Pauley and
Joseph Morrison, only. Plaintiff relies on the attached brief,
declarations of Dr. Tilton and Jean Battle with attachments,
and the depositions of Joseph Morrison and John Horvath

Appendix J—2

previously filed in this matter in support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

SAUL A. GREEN
United States Attorney

/s/ Geneva S. Halliday
GENEVA S. HALLIDAY (P28140)
Assistant U.S. Attorney
211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001
Detroit, MI 48226-3211
(313) 226-9778

Dated: August 25, 2000

Appendix K~1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, CIVIL NO. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HON. ROBERT H.
CLELAND
vs.

SAMUEL PAULEY,
ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH
MORRISON, and JOHN
HORVATH, Jointly and
Severally,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF DONALD L. TILTON, Ph.D.

I, Donald L. Tilton, in lieu of an affidavit as permitted by
28 U.S.C. § 1746, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. From 1996, to the present I have been President of
Tilton & Associates, Inc. which is a private consulting firm that
specializes in wetland management, ecological restoration, and
resource policy. In 1975, I received my Ph.D. in botany from
the University of Minnesota. In 1996, I became a Certified
Professional of Wetland Scientist.

2. Attached to this declaration is my curriculum vitae
which ts hereby incorporated by reference.

Appendix K-2

3. I was retained by the United States of America to
conduct a wetland delineation for a parcel of land located at the
corner of M-154 and LaCroix Road on Harsen’s Island,
Michigan. The property I was retained to do the wetland
delineation on were Lots 1249 and 1250 of Supervisor Roy T.
Gilbert’s Plat No. 14, Clay Township, County of St. Clair;
commonly known as 3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island,
Michigan.

4. On November 1, 1999, I visited the site commonly
known as 3010 Green Drive, Harsens, Island, Michigan, and
conducted an investigation in order to do a wetland delineation.

5. As part of this investigation the following resources
were used. Aerial photographs of the site, Corps of Engineers
Wetlands Delineation Manual, Waterways Experiment Station,
U.S. Department of Army, Corps of Engineers, 1987; Hydric

Soils of the State of Michigan, National Technical Committee
for Hydric Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil
Conservation Service, 1985; Soil Survey of St. Clair County,
Soil Conservation Service, United States Department of
Agriculture; Wetland Plants of the State of Michigan (1988),
Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of Interior;
and field inspection reports (various dates) by Corps of
Engineers personnel.

6. The methods I used to delineate wetlands are
described in the 1987 Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation
Manual. The methods used in the field include evaluation of
plant species dominance, soil characteristics and observations of
the evidence of hydrology. This particular delineation required
use of techniques developed for disturbed or atypical sites
because the site had been filled and the vegetation
was maintained in a mowed condition. The procedures
described include evaluation of plant species, soil characteristics
and evidence of temporary or seasonal hydrology. These

Appendix K-3

procedures are typically utilized in all Tilton & Associates, Inc.
wetland determinations in the State of Michigan.

7. The property at 3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island,
Michigan, consisted primarily of mowed open fields with a few
scattered trees. There is a building on the road frontage. My
wetland delineation identified two wetlands on the property that
are separated by a layer of fill that had been placed in the
wetlands. It appears from the soil profile and characteristics
thai the wetlands were once a single wetland until the wetland
was divided by the fill activities. The delineation lines were
marked with pink “Wetland Delineation” flagging on pin stakes.
The wetlands identified on the property is an emergent wetland

type.

8. The vegetation on the site was a strong indicator of
wetland presence. Plant species observed in the disturbed
wetland area included: Reed canary grass (Phalaris
arundinacea) FACW+; Purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria)
OBL; Soft stem bulrush (Juncus effusus) OBL; Common reed
(Phragmites australis) FACW+. Wetland species observed in
the wetland adjacent to the disturbed area included the above
species as well as silky dogwood (Comus amomum) and a
species of sedge (Carex sp.). The dominant plants in the
wetland area were all considered hydrophytic plant species.

9. Standing water was not observed in the wetland area
at the time of field investigation in November 1999, but there
was visible evidence of saturation in the soil borings taken in the
wetland area. In most instances, soil auger tests indicated
saturated soils beneath the fill within twelve inches of the
surface wetland soil horizon.

10. Soils on the site tended to be uniform except for
variation in the thickness of fill placed over hydric soils (see
attached photographs). A total of four soil pits and soil borings
were investigated in the undisturbed wetland and seven soil pits
and soil borings were observed in the fill area. The soil profile

Appendix K-4

in the undisturbed wetland area showed a black organic muck
surface horizon six inches thick. Beneath the organic muck
surface horizon there was a layer of silty fine sand with organic
streaking. The soil color of the silty fine sand was 10 YR 7/3.
Live roots were observed in the soil horizons. Soil borings
taken in the till area showed an unconsolidated layer of fill
consisting of mostly silty sand. The silty sand fill layer
overlayed a dark black organic soil that was typically 6-8 inches
thick. Beneath the organic soil layer there was a soil with a silty
sand character with organic streaking similar to the soil
observed in the undisturbed wetland. Within the buried organic
soil horizon, live roots were observed indicating that the soil
horizon was recently buried.

11. My investigation of this property indicated that based
on the observance of a predominance of hydrophytic plant
species, hydric soils and evidence of wetland hydrology, there
are wetlands on this property that meet the criteria of wetlands
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

12. My investigation, including my soil investigation,
further showed that fill material had been placed in-wetland
areas on the property in question. A sketch of the fill area that
I prepared on November 1, 1999 is attached hereto.

I affirm that the information contained herein is true and
accurate.

[no signature]
DONALD L. TILTON, Ph.D.

Appendix L~I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, CIVIL NO. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HON. ROBERT H.
CLELAND
VS.

SAMUEL PAULEY,
ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH
MORRISON, and JOHN
HORVATH, Jointly and
Severally,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF JEAN BATTLE

I, Jean Battle, in lieu of an affidavit as permitted by
28 U.S.C. § 1746, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. From 1992 to 1999, I was employed by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Detroit District. From 1992 to 1997,
I was a Biologist in the Enforcement Section of the Regulatory
Branch, Corps of Engineers. I graduated from the University of
Michigan in 1988 with a Bachelor of Science in Natural
Resources.

2. OnJune 16, 1994, having completed an inspection of
another property on Harsens Island, Michigan, I was on my way
to the ferry when I observed recent fill material on a site

Appendix L~2

vegetated with wetland plants. The site was on M-154 behind
a Mobile Gas Station on Harsens Island.

3. I observed fresh, sandy subsoil material with no
vegetation, that did not conform to the contours of the
vegetated land surrounding it on the site. The material was
mounded in some areas in piles and had been flattened in other
areas, and was above the grade of the surrounding vegetated
landscape. The material was a light color that indicated that it
was a mineral subsoil layer, not a dark organic soil that would
normally be found as the surface soil layer of a wetland in the
Harsens Island area. The bare material had been placed in an
area heavily vegetated with wetland species of sedges and
grasses. I also observed fresh track marks of heavy equipment
on some of the fill.

4. OnJune 16, 1994, I took the photographs of the fill
area. At the time I placed the photographs together to show the
area. Copies of these photographs are attached to this
declaration as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.

5. The address of the property where the fill had been
placed in a wetland was 3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island,
St. Clair County, Michigan. The register of deeds indicated that
the owners were defendants Samuel and Alice Pauley.

6. I spoke with defendant Alice Pauley who indicated
that the fill had come from the removal of an underground
storage tank. Defendant Joseph Morrison, originally told me
that the fill material was already on site. When I pointed out
that the fill was obviously new, he recanted this statement. He
indicated that the property deed did not say that the property
was a wetland. See Conversation Record dated June 16, 1994,
and attached as Exhibit B to this Declaration.

7. I advised Alice Pauley I would conduct an inspection
to determine if the site was a wetland. On July 8, 1994, I

Appendix L-3

inspected the site. The report I prepared on July 13, 1994 of my
July 8, 1994 inspection is attached as Exhibit C.

8. J determined that the property was a wetland within
the Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.

9. Hydrophytic vegetation was present in the area of the
fill. The wetland was an Emergent (cattail, rushes, etc.) and
Wet Meadow (wetland grasses, sedges, and herbaceous
vegetation) type wetland. One hundred percent of the dominant
species in the areas adjacent to and under the fill material were
wetland indicators.

10. Wetland hydrology was also present. I dug several
test pits and the water was within 10" of the surface in the
undisturbed areas or 20" of the surface in the filled areas.

11. Hydric soils, which are wetland indicators, were
present under the sandy land fill material on the site and next to
it, in adjacent undisturbed portions of the site.

12. I examined previous aerial photos of the site area
including 1984 aerial photographs, copies attached. The 1984
aerial photographs showed existing (“grandfathered”) fill on the
east side of the building. Also, there was some fill on the north
and west sides of the building that showed only in five year old
photographs; however, I also considered this fill grandfathered
for purposes of my inspection and enforcement action. Based
on my evaluation of the aerial photos and my inspection of the
site on June 16, 1994 and July 8, 1994, I determined that
approximately .65 acres and approximately | ,020 cubic yards of
new, unauthorized fill had been recently placed in the wetland,
north and west of the mobile station on the property owned by
Samuel and Alice Pauley.

13. Based on my inspection of aerial photographs from
prior to 1994 and my inspection of the site, I, at the time,
prepared the sketch that is attached to my inspection report and

Appendix L4

the sketch that is attached hereto as Exhibit D. The area marked
“unauthorized fill,” outlines the area of the obviously new,
freshly placed unauthorized fill that I observed on June 16,
1994, on the property on Harsens Island, Michigan owned by
defendants Samuel and Alice Pauley.

14. I reviewed the Corps of Engineers permit files and
determined that no permits had been issued for fill on the
property in question.

15. By letter dated July 25, 1994, Alice Pauley indicated
that it was their intention to voluntarily restore the property to
the satisfaction of the Corps of Engineers. See letter attached
as Exhibit E.

16. I met and spoke several times with Alice and Samuel
Pauley regarding this restoration of the site. Alice Pauley

indicated that some of the fill also came from the installation of
a water line that had occurred in the winter of 1994 and that the
contractor had done a poor job of refilling the trench, instead
spreading the material across the wetland. The Pauleys had
several excuses over the ensuing years for delaying voluntarily
restoring the site including: could not find a contractor; wanted
to get the same contractor, John Horvath, who placed the fill to
remove it; and financial hardship. Eventually, they stopped
responding to letters and phone calls.

I affirm that the mformation contained herein is true and
accurate.

/s/ Jean Battle
JEAN BATTLE

Date: _ 8/17/00

Appendix L-5

—— es ae

Exhibit C
CENCE-CO-L 94-012-073-0 July 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: File

SUBJECT: Pauley property, Section 404 violation, Harsen’s
Island, MI

1. Inspection on 16 June 94 and 8 July 94 showed discharge
of fill material and grading in wetland adjacent to St. Clair
River. Some material came from excavation of leaking
underground storage tanks at the old gas station on the
property. Filled and graded area is irregular in shape and fill
depth, approx. .65 acres, and 1020 cubic yards.

2. 1984 Aerial shows some existing fill on the east side of the
building. In addition, some fill near the north and west sides of
the building appears to be at least five years old.

3. Recommendation: Send violation letter. Grandfather area
of fill as shown on field sketch and have owner either apply for
remainder or restore site.

/s/ Jean Battle
JEAN BATTLE
Project Manager
Regulatory Functions Branch

* *

Appendix L-6

CENCE-CO-94-012-073-0 DATE 13 July 94
MEMORANDUM FOR Chief, Regulatory Functions Branch

SUBJECT: Inspection Report of Mobile Service Station,
Harsen’s Island, MI

1. Owner/Permittee Alice Pauley

* *« * *

{x} Jurisdiction [ ] No work/wetlands in Corps jurisdiction
[ | Section 10
[x] Section 404
[x] Wetlands (Determination Forms
attached)
[x] Adjacent to: St. Clair River
[x] Below Headwaters
[ ] Above Headwaters
{ ] Isolated: Size of Wetland
Complex ___

* * * *

Appendix L-7

16 June 94
DATE OF INSPECTION 8 July 94
DATE REPORT PREPARED 13 July 94

INSPECTORS REPORT

Waterway (County) St. Clair River File No. 94-012-073-0
(No. 012)

Name(s) of Land Owner(s) Alice Pauley

a ar *

X_ Wetland Adjacent to Section 10 Water
Tributary to Navigable Water

Signature of Investigator _/s/ Jean Battle

JOB TITLE

* * * *

Appendix L-8

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Appendix L-9
Exhibit D

x St Mark cy
* BM'S8O “
/ “4 P

Appendix M-1

Detroit District
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

File Number 94-012-073-0

Department of the Army Permit Evaluation
MORRISON - ATF FILL

* * * *

b. Operational Impacts:

The existing work adversely impacts an area that filters
rainfall, runoff, groundwater, and floodwaters by eliminating
0.65 acres of wetlands, and would replace it with a new source
area for runoff pollutants. Pollutants from this area may include
lawn fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. This would cause a

long-term negative impact on water quality, as more water with
less filtering time enters the road side ditches and goes directly
into the canal system. The cumulative impact of similar
discharges in wetlands along the waterway wil] increase the
minor adverse impacts to water chemistry, temperature, and
turbidity. Overall, the operation and use of the activity has a
minor, long term, negative impact on water quality.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1812%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
