# Respondents Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. New York, 127 S. Ct. 2127 (2007) (No. 06-736)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1799%3A7

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

2

No. 06-736

jn The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

+

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
STATE OF NEW YORK. ET AL..
Respondents.
.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit

.
BRIEF OF VIRGINIA, ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARKANSAS,
KANSAS, MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA,

SOUTH DAKOTA, UTAH, AND WYOMING AS
RESPONDENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

o

ROBERT FL. MCDONNELL WILLIAM C. MIMS
Attorney General of Virginia Chief Deputy Attorney

: —_ General
WILLIAM FE. THRO ;

State Solicitor General RICHARD B. CAMPBELL
Counsel of Record Deputy Attorney General
STEPHEN R. MCCULLOUGH ROGER L. CHAFFE
Deputy State Solicitor CARL JOSEPHSON

General Senior Assistant Attorneys

General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GFENERAL

900 East Man Sireet

Richmond. Virginia 23219
December 18, 2006 (S04) 786-2436

(S04) 786-1991 (facsimile)

Counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia

| Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Of Cover |

Cem hE LAW BRIER PRINTING C08 sen
one NPG eon keer. tre | a

TROY KING

Attorney General of Alabama

KEVIN NEWSOM

Solicitor General

ROBERT TAMBLING

Chief, Environmental
Division

State House

11 South Union Street

Montgomery, Alabama 36130

CRAIG J. TILLERY

Acting Attorney General
of Alaska

STEVEN E. MULDER

Chief Assistant Attorney
General

1031 West 4th Avenue,
Suite 200

Anchorage, Alaska 99501

DustTIN MCDANIEL
Attorney General
of Arkansas
TERESA MARKS
Deputy Attorney General
CHARLES MOULTON
Senior Assistant Attorney
General
KENDRA AKIN-JONES
Assistant Attorney General
323 Center Street, Suite 200
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

PAUL MORRISON
Attorney General of Kansas
Davin W. Davies, I]
120 S.W. 10th Avenue,
2nd Floor
Topeka, Kansas 66612

JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON

Attorney General of Missour!

JAMES R. LAYTON

Missouri State Solicitor

JOSEPH P. BINDBEUTEL

Chief Counsel, Agriculture
and Environment Division

TIMOTHY P. DUGGAN

Assistant Attorney General

227 W. High Street

Post Office Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri
65102

JON C. BRUNING

Attorney General of Nebraska

DAVID COOKSON

Special Counsel to the
Attorney General

NATALEE J. HART

Assistant Attorney General

2115 State Capitol

Post Office Box 98920

Lincoln, Nebraska 68509

WAYNE STENEHJEM

Attorney General
of North Dakota

LYLE WITHAM

Assistant Attorney General

600 Kast Boulevard Avenue.
Dept. 125

Bismarck, North Dakota
HRDOH

LAWRENCE EE. LONG
Attorney General

of South Dakota
ROXANNE GIEDD
Deputy Attorney General
1302 E. Highway 14, Suite 1
Pierre, South Dakota 57501

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
Fred G. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South,

5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

PATRICK J. CRANK
Attorney General
of Wyoming
JAY A. JERDE
Deputy Attorney General
NANCY E. VEHR
Senior Assistant Attorney
General
123 Capitol Building
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals erred in invalidating an EPA
rule on the ground that the phrase “any physical change”
in the definition of “modification” in Section 111(a)(4) of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4), unambiguously
requires EPA to adopt the broadest meaning of the phrase?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CASES
Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.,

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Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury,

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Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

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Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v.

National Sea Clammer’s Ass’n,

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New York v. EPA,

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Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,

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Small v. United States,

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STATUTES
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 through 7671q

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
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FEDERAL REGISTER

Environmental Protection Agency,
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR);
Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine
Maintenance Repair and Replacement Exclusion,
68 Fed. Reg. 61248 (Oct. 27, 2003) ..............csssseeercereeeeees 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Environmental Protection Agency,
New Source Review: Report to the President (2002)......... 4

BRIEF OF VIRGINIA, ALABAMA, ALASKA, AR-
KANSAS, KANSAS, MISSOURI, NEBRASKA,
NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, UTAH,

AND WYOMING AS RESPONDENTS IN
SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming (collectively “Intervening States”) were parties
in the court of appeals and, thus, technically are Respon-
dents in this Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.6 (“All parties other
than the petitioner are considered respondents. ...”). The
Intervening States entered this litigation to support the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and they continue to believe EPA’s position is correct.
Therefore, the Intervening States ask this Court to grant
the Petition for the reasons stated in EPA’s Petition for
Certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.6 (“a response supporting the
petition shall be filed within 20 days after the case is
placed on the docket”).

In the event this Court grants certiorari, the Interven-
ing States will file a Brief on the Merits as Respondents
supporting the Petitioner. See Sup. Ct. R. 25.1 (“Any
respondent ... who supports the petitioner ... shall meet
the petitioner’s . . . time schedule for filing documents.”).

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STATEMENT

As explained in more detail in the Petition, this
matter involves a challenge by New York, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the

2

District .of Columbia as well as various local governments
and private entities (collectively “New York”) to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s regulations for determining
when the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review provisions
apply. Specifically, New York contends that 40 C.FR.
§§ 52.21(b)(2)Gii)(a) and 52.21(cc) which is the Equipment
Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance,
Repair, and Replacement Exclusion (“the Rule”), is invalid.

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 through 7671q,
provides for a pre-construction permitting program re-
ferred to as New Source Review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475 and
7503. The New Source Review program applies in areas
where air quality does not meet the National Ambient Air
Quality Standard promulgated by EPA for a specified air
pollutant and in areas that do meet the National Ambient
Air Quality Standard or are unclassifiable. Jd.

Activities at existing stationary sources for which a
“pre-construction” permit may be required are those that
constitute a “modification” of the source.’ Routine mainte-
nance, repair, and replacement have been excluded from
New Source Review requirements since the program’s
inception. In the challenged Rule, EPA provided a category

* For New Source Review purposes, as provided by 42 U.S.C.

§ 7479(2\(C) and 42 U.S.C. § 7501(4), the term “modification” is defined
as:

The term “modification” means any physica] change in, or

change in the method of operation of, a stationary source

which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by

such source or which results in the emission of any air pol-

lutant not previously emitted.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4).

3

of equipment replacement activities that are not subject to
major New Source Review requirements under the routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement exclusion. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source
Review (NSR); Equipment Replacement Provision of the
Routine Maintenance Repair and Replacement Exclusion,
68 Fed. Reg. 61248, 61248-49 (Oct. 27, 2003). As provided
in the challenged Rule, replacement of broken or deterio-
rating equipment at a stationary source is not a modifica-
tion of that source if: (1) the replacement equipment is
identical or functionally equivalent to the equipment being
replaced; (2) the source’s basic design does not change; and
(3) it does not cause emissions in excess of any Clean Air
Act emission limitation to which the source is subject.
Even if the project meets all of these criteria, however, the
permitting authority must still review the project as a
potential modification if the project is very expensive (i.e.,
if the cost of the replacement equipment exceeds twenty

percent of the cost of a comparable new process unit). 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(cc).

In the court below, the Intervening States argued that
the Rule serves two important purposes. First, the Rule
provides a much-needed clarification of the meaning of the
terms “modification” and “physical change” in the Equip-
ment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance,
Repair, and Replacement Exclusion in the New Source
Review Program. The bright-line threshold established by
the Rule will give States and regulated entities the regula-
tory certainty needed to make rational choices about
environmental and energy impacts. See Knudsen v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7" Cir. 2005) (“[T]he first
virtue of any jurisdictional rule is clarity and ease of

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implementation.”). Second, the Rule removes any incentive
for the owners and operators of generating facilities to
delay the routine replacement of equipment. Although
making such replacements improves the reliability, effi-
ciency, and safety of generating facilities, owners and
operators frequently delay such replacement because they
fear that the New Source Review requirements will apply.
See Environmental Protection Agency, New Source Review:
Report to the President 30-31 (2002). The Rule ensures
that replacement decisions are based on reliability, effi-
ciency, and safety considerations.

Ultimately, the District of Columbia Circuit found
that the Rule was invalid, finding it “contrary to the plain
language of” the definition of “modification” in the Clean
Air Act. The court of appeals emphasized that the statu-
tory definition of modification uses the term “any physical
change,” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (emphasis added). “[W)hen
Congress places the word ‘any’ before a phrase with
several common meanings, the statutory phrase encom-
passes each of those meanings. ...” New York v. EPA, 443
F.3d 880, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Thus, “[allthough the
phrase ‘physical change’ is susceptible to multiple mean-
ings, the word ‘any’ makes clear that activities within each
of common meanings of the phrase are subject to [New
Source Review] when the activity results in emission
increase.” Jd. at 890. Moreover, the District of Columbia
Circuit found that the EPA interpretation was contrary to
history and the structure of the Act. Jd. Subsequently, the
court of appeals denied rehearing en banc.

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5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted for two reasons. First,
the legal effect of the lower court’s ruling is far reaching.
The court of appeals effectively held that when Congress
uses the word “any” in a statute to modify an ambiguous
term, an agency’s discretion to construe statutory terms is
eliminated. The agency must adopt the broadest possible
interpretation of a phrase that is otherwise ambiguous.
Such a result contradicts the principle that a statutory
term must be construed in context, rather than isolation.
See Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809
(1989). Indeed, this Court repeatedly has recognized that,
in some contexts, the word “any” can have something less
than the broadest possible meaning. See Small v. United
States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005); Nixon v. Missouri Mun.
League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004); Middlesex County
Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammer’s Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1,
15 (1981). Thus, it is possible that “any physical modifica-
tion” means something less than all conceivable physical
modifications. Moreover, by requiring the broadest possi-
ble construction whenever the term “any” is used with an
admittedly ambiguous term, the lower court contradicted
the principles of Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Second, the practical effect of the District of Columbia
Circuit ruling is to invalidate a significant EPA regulatory
initiative that was quite important to utilities with coal
burning power plants and to States that have such plants
and/or produce significant amounts of coal. Prior to the
EPA’s attempt to promulgate the Rule, application of the
routine maintenance exclusion depended upon a multi-
factor case-by-case determination that was uncertain and
inconsistent. The new Rule was an attempt to establish a

bright-line standard that would result in certainty and
consistency.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in the Petition itself,
the Petition for Certiorari should be GRANTED.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT F. MCDONNELL WILLIAM C. MIMS
Attorney General of Chief Deputy Attorney
Virginia General
WILLIAM E. THRO RICHARD B. CAMPBELL
State Solicitor General Deputy Attorney General
Counsel of Record Rocrr L. CHAPFE
STEPHEN R. MCCULLOUGH CARL JOSEPHSON
Deputy State Solicitor Senior Assistant Attorneys
General General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
900 East Main Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 786-2436
(804) 786-1991 (facsimile)

December 18, 2006
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia
[Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Of Cover]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1799%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.
