# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Environmental Protection Agency v. New York, 127 S. Ct. 2127 (2007) (No. 06-736)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

Suprame Court, U.S.
FILED

06-73 6N0V 27 2006

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, PETITIONER

Vv.
STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record

SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE
oe ny pensdny sain J we Assistant Attorney General
cting General Counse ;
Counsel of Record THOMAS G. HUNGAR
Biciorr B. Zenice Deputy Solicitor General
Assistant General Counsel JAMES A. FELDMAN

: ove Assistant to the Solicitor
yyy ac C. AVERBACK Fae
United States Environmental THOMAS A. LORENZEN
Protection Agency pyr rs — PURDY

Washington, D.C. 20460 eocihiote ad ;
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals erred in invalidating an
EPA rule on the ground that the phrase “any physical
change” in the definition of “modification” in Section
111(a)(4) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4),
unambiguously requires EPA to adopt the, broadest
meaning of the phrase.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The United States Environmental Protection
Agency is the petitioner in this Court and was the re-
spondent in the court of appeals. :

The following parties are respondents in this Court
and were petitioners in the court of appeals: State of
New York; People of the State of California ex rel. Bill
Lockyer, Attorney General of California, and California
Resources Board; State of Connecticut; State of Dela-
ware; State of Illinois; State of Maine; State of Mary-
land; Commonwealth of Massachusetts; State of New
Hampshire; State of New Jersey; State of New Mexico
ex rel. Patricia Madrid, Attorney General and Ron
Curry, Secretary of the Environment Department; Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environ-
mental Protection; State of Rhode Island; State of Ver-
mont; State of Wisconsin; District of Columbia; City of
New York; City of San Francisco; City of Groton, Con-
necticut; City of Hartford, Connecticut; City of
Middletown, Connecticut; City of New Haven, Connecti-
cut; City of New London, Connecticut; City of Stamford,
Connecticut; City of Waterbury, Connecticut; Town of
Cornwall, Connecticut; Town of East Hartford, Connect-
icut; Town of Greenwich, Connecticut; Town of Hebron,
Connecticut; Town of Lebanon, Connecticut; Town of
Newtown, Connecticut; Town of North Stonington, Con-
necticut; Town of Pomfret, Connecticut; Town of
Putnam, Connecticut; Town of Rocky Hill, Connecticut;
Town of Salisbury, Connecticut; Town of Thompson,
Connecticut; Town of Wallingford, Connecticut; Town of
Washington, Connecticut; Town of Westbrook, Connecti-
cut; Town of Westport, Connecticut; Town of Weston,
Connecticut; Town of Woodstock, Connecticut; South

(If)

Coast Air Quality Management District; Natural Re-
sources Defense Council; Environmental Defense; Si-
erra Club; American Lung Association; Communities for
a Better Environment; United States Public Interest
Research Group; Alabama Environmental Council;
Clean Air Council; Group Against Smog and Pollution;
Michigan Environmental Council; The Ohio :Environ-
mental Council; Scenic Hudson; Southern Alliance for
Clean Energy; Delaware Nature Society.

The following were intervenors in the court of ap-
peals: Adirondack Mountain Club; Commonwealth of
Virginia; State of Alabama; State of Alaska; State of
Arkansas; State of Kansas; State of Missouri; State of
Nebraska; State of North Dakota; State of South Da-
kota; State of Utah; State of Wyoming; Clean Air Imple-
mentation Project; Utility Air Regulatory Group; Na-
tional Environmental Development Association’s Clean
Air Regulatory Project; Equipment Replacement Rule
Coalition; Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; Illinois
State Chamber of Commerce; Illinois Environmental
Regulatory Group; Steel Manufacturers Association;
Specialty Steel Industry of North America; American
Tron and Steel Institute.

(IIT)

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I 55 die hs'0-6.05 hed ne bape dneeneeesens veeunee 1
0 ERE Oe aE ED an eaD Pe eS Sines 2
Statutory and regulatory provisions involved ..... Ceuwanins 2
ee ee cle ey ae Qhcawn eed eens 2
Reasons for granting the petition ....................000- 9
A. — The decision below is incorrect ................. 11
B. The question presented is important and war-
rants review at this time ............. naweewes 20
SEL Sindee ta dvieeeurcGecaueeewons wea PRE Rte 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bragdon v. Abbott, 542 U.S. 624 (1998) ................ 20
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
OS Os ce gai 9,11, 14, 15
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803
DMN oes ra cic fesse ees sdeeveanens Wieawed Gas 12
Department of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535
Bee OD ohh 4) eons bess ba eange ‘eves day ay 14
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) .. 20
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) ............ 13
Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) .......... 12
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ...... Késceehenba 13
National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005) .............. 11
Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125
RIG REISE Sate MER Seg oer ema em RGD PER? 7, 13

Cases—Continued: Page

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ....... 16
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D.D.C.

1972), aff'd, 4 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff’d by an equally divided

oust, GEE The GA I kk ka hk Kio och eed kes 3
Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) ............ 13
TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (2004) .......... 16, 19, 20
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) ........... 12
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610

CRN ka Mac ckake save ees ol tete caus 12, 13
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901

FRU Ga, DOE vs ong Sap wrens eae cece een ewan 5
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974

Ss hoa oka dk oes ae hbk cha a ee 16

Statutes and regulations:

Act of Nov. 16, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190,

De Fe es PON von do Sk ted ee teakaddneews 3
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7430 ef weg, 066 cece ccervesvces 2
GE IE bos hile dace oak ecaes bene easue car 2
Oe A Oe hts Soave valacu caw shehnsaneels 2
SEA ria COO i bance ee ed Aves keen esenner oases 2
GE STAs FE a Sinise chek ceca khawes ee 2,4
Se Ark PRR has Fe ckavnny cerenseeuen enews 4
Ue. Fe ee CS Aisi ieee 14
Ge Si sReei WOR UNCED cede bk 0d sae hnndiaa ches passim
Oe Shs FET has io a cone E8 oo Ree eae 3

MUSE Te Oe ee: ia

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
UE FO os sk i seria eet: 19
WO Fe a hb bs dosti Oia 4
SEULBL, TOFINO?) oso ce dodcdanticistinns eee
EUG: TER: oe ws Hike ee eee eet 3
OU, PEE he kciccaceeneidwaredene keris wes 3
PRES ER IN ee ier petites reno ae aac 4
ME TSR TD ven chek lneseephansss bc bene eee 3

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
A eR rer er rrr: Po es 4
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
96, 91 Stat. 685 ........ cc sceceveccecccsbeccccceees 3
40 C.F.R.:
Barta GERSON) cave cebecdcsbccdue POP en re 18
Section GRZUBNONED) .. ccc ce dewscvce pealte eee 17
Bact TE TIO vdo i dic chao ba savektas eabataaas 18
Sectiots GOAIMINOAE) 22 csc csrscesecsvessvesne 16
Section GOAT) 2... ivccecevcseses ee leicees 4
ok : Ee Papen aren man pars» Serre 17
Seti... ee 17
es GAGE co Si ins vb da leetes toueeres 17

Miscellaneous:

DO FOR I PEt AIR 65 Seve ce ci sveindeees 4,16
39 Fed. Reg. (1974):
Ef Oey er rer Tee nnn res 3

Vil

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

41 Fed. Reg. (1976):

PS 2 eee ee 5

EE rik ee 5
43 Fed. Reg. 26,403 - 26,404 (1978) .. 0.0... - eee eee ees 4
67 Fed. Reg. (2002):

ASE OPPS ree eee ee Cee ee 5

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, PETITIONER

Vv.
STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), respectfully
petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-17a)
is reported at 443 F.3d 880. The order of'the court of
appeals denying rehearing (Pet. App. 18a-19a) is unre-
ported. The order of the Environmental Protection
Agency (Pet. App. 20a-175a) is reported at 68 Fed. Reg.
61,248.

- (1)

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
March 17, 2006. A petition for rehearing was denied on
June 30, 2006. On September 21, 2006, Justice Stevens
extended the time within which to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari to and including October 30, 2006. On
October 23, 2006, Justice Stevens further extended the
time to November 27, 2006. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant sections of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
7401 et seq., and of EPA’s rules are set forth in the ap-
pendix to this petition at 176a-181a.

STATEMENT

1. Under the Clean Air Act, each State must estab-
lish a plan for attaining, and then maintaining, nation-
ally established standards for airborne levels of six “cri-
teria” pollutants. Specifically, the Act directs EPA to
promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) specifying allowable concentrations of each
criteria pollutant in the ambient air. 42 U.S.C. 7409.
Each State must adopt State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) for attaining and maintaining the NAAQS in all
areas within the State. 42 U.S.C. 7407(a), 7410.

Each SIP must include a program requiring precon-
struction review of “the modification and construction
of any stationary source within the areas covered by the
[SIP] as necessary to assure that national ambient
air quality standards are achieved.” 42 U.S.C.
7410(a)(2)(C). Depending on the attainment or nonat-
tainment status of the area and the results of the pre-

»
ee ee ee

3

construction review, the source may be required to in-
stall pollution controls as part of the construction or
modification.’ Those preconstruction review and permit-
ting requirements are known collectively as the New
Source Review (NSR) program. Congress adopted the
statutory major source NSR program as part of the 1977
amendments to the Act. Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.” Prior to enact-
ment of the statutory NSR program, EPA had promul-
gated a regulatory PSD program in response to a law-
suit claiming that the Act required EPA to ensure that
air quality did not deteriorate in areas meeting the
NAAQS. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d without opinion, 4 Env’t Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); see also 39
Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974).

Since 1977, when Congress created the statutory
NSR program, the Act has defined “modification” by
cross-reference to the-statutory definition of that term
in the Act’s New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)

' In areas meeting the NAAQS (attainment areas) and in “unclassi-
fiable” areas, the “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD)
requirements under Part C of Title I of the Act apply. See 42 U.S.C.
7470-7479. Permits for major sources subject to PSD must require the
facility to employ the “best available control technology,” or BACT. 42
U.S.C. 7475(a)(4). In areas not meeting the NAAQS (nonattainment
areas), the nonattainment NSR requirements of Part D of Title I of the
Act apply. See 42 U.S.C. 7501-7515. Permits for major sources subject
tononattainment NSR must require that the facility achieve the “lowest
achievable emission rate,” or LAER. 42 U.S.C. 7501(8), 7503(a)(2).

* Initially, only the nonattainment NSR program was made appli-
cable to “modified” sources. In a later technical amendment, Congress
clarified that the PSD program also applies to such sources. Act of
Nov. 16, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(54), 91 Stat. 1402.

4

program, originally included as part of the 1970 amend-
ments to the Act.* Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. Under that definition,
a modification is “any physical change in, or change in
the method of operation of, a stationary source which
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by
such source or which results in the emission of any air
pollutant not previously emitted.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4)
(NSPS definition); see 42 U.S.C. 7479(2)(C) (for PSD,
“‘construction’ * * * includes the modification (as de-
fined in section 7411(a) of this title) of any source or fa-
cility”), 7501(4) (for nonattainment NSR, “‘modifica-
tions’ and ‘modified’ mean the same as the term ‘modifica-
tion’ as used in section 7411(a)(4) of this title.”).

EPA regulations have long excluded some activities
from the definition of “modification.” For instance,
since 1971, EPA regulations elucidating what constitutes
a “modification” for purposes of NSPS have provided
that “[rjoutine maintenance, repair, and replacement”
(RMRR) of equipment at a source is not a “modifica-
tion.” See 36 Fed. Reg. 24,887; see also 40 C.F.R.
60.14(e)(1); Pet. App. 119a. The regulations that EPA
promulgated in 1974 to implement the original regula-
tory PSD program defined “modification” in largely the
same way as it was defined for the existing NSPS pro-
gram, and they treated RMRR comparably to its treat-

‘ In those 1970 amendments, Congress defined a “new source” to
include stationary sources “the construction or modification of which”
began after a specified time. 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Major stationary sources are stationary sources that exceed annual
emission tonnage thresholds in the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7479(1), 7602().
For sources below the major thresholds, the 1977 amendments did not
impose the provisions of parts C and D. For those “minor” sources,
Section 110(a)(2)(C) alone controls. See 42 U.S.C. 7410(ay(2(C).

5

ment in the NSPS program. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514.‘
EPA’s 1978 regulations that first implemented the stat-
utory PSD program again excluded RMRR from the
scope of what constituted a “change” for purposes of the
definition of “modification.” 43 Fed. Reg. 26,403-26,404;
see Pet. App. 121a.

“Routine maintenance” is not defined in any of those
regulations. Rather, the RMRR exclusion has, since its
inception, relied on a “case-by-case determination * * *
weighing the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and
cost of the work as well as other factors to arrive at a
common sense finding” of whether the work involved
amounted to routine maintenance. Pet. 'App. 3a-4a
(quoting 67 Fed. Reg. 80,292-80,293 (2002)); see Wiscon-
sin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir.
1990).

2. EPA has historically interpreted the RMRR ex-
clusion narrowly, and it has often found that replace-
ment of plant components with identical or functionally
equivalent components does not qualify as RMRR. See
Pet. App. 31a, 34a. Over time, however, EPA concluded
that a narrow interpretation, while reasonable, produced
undesirable results.

In 2002, EPA proposed making changes to the
RMRR exclusion, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,290, and in 2003, EPA
adopted the new Equipment Replacement Provision
(ERP) at issue in this case. Pet. App. 20a-175a. EPA
noted that, under its pre-ERP approach, “it can be diffi-
cult for the owner or operator to know with reasonable
certainty whether a particular activity constitutes
RMRR.” /d. at 32a. EPA concluded that its pre-ERP

7

* The pre-statutory PSD program was followed by the first pre-
statutory nonattainment NSR program in 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524-
55,525, 55,558.

6

approach, and the uncertainties associated with it,
“tends to have the effect of leading sources to refrain
from replacing components, to replace them with infe-
rior components, or to artificially constrain production
in other ways,” without significant environmental bene-
fits over an alternative approach. /d. at 35a. EPA found
that its pre-ERP approach “can discourage replace-
ments that would promote safety, reliability and effi-
ciency even in instances where, if the matter were
brought to EPA, [the agency] would determine that the
replacement in question was RMRR.” Jbid. In EPA’s
view “[s]uch discouragement results in lost capacity and
lost opportunities to improve energy efficiency and re-
duce air pollution.” /bid.

The ERP, as adopted by EPA, provides that RMRR
includes, but is not limited to, an activity if “(1) [iJt in-
volves replacement of any existing component(s) of a
process unit with component(s) that are identical or that
serve the same purpose as the replaced component(s);
(2) the fixed capital cost of the replaced component(s),
plus costs of any activities that are part of the replace-
ment activity * * * , does not exceed 20 percent of the
current replacement value of the process unit; and (3)
the replacement(s) does not alter the basic design pa-
rameters of the process unit or cause the process unit to
exceed any emission limitation or operational limitation
* * * that is legally enforceable.” Pet. App. 41a (foot-
note omitted); see id. at 4a. EPA reasoned that equip-
ment replacements that satisfy those requirements
would be understood as maintaining existing functions
rather than as making a physical change. They would
thus satisfy Congress’s intent to generally exclude exist-
ing plants from the need to obtain NSR permits and “to
avoid the need to impose costly retrofits, but require

7

replacement of new control technology at a time when it
makes the most sense for it to be installed.” Jd. at 123a;
see id. at 126a.

3. The court of appeals held that the ERP violates
the Clean Air Act, and it vacated the rule. Pet. App. la-
17a. .

The dispute between the parties has to do with the
construction of the phrase “any physical change” in Sec-
tion 7411(a)(4) of the Act.” The court of appeals ac-
cepted that the phrase “physical change’ is susceptible
to multiple meanings.” Pet. App. 5a. The court con-
cluded, however, that the “essential disagreement” in
the case “centers on the effect of Congress’s decision in
defining ‘modification’ to insert the word ‘any’ before
‘physical change.” Jd. at 6a.

The court of appeals noted that “[iJn a series of cases,
the Supreme Court has drawn upon the word ‘any’ to
give the word it modifies an ‘expansive meaning’ when
there is ‘no reason to contravene the clause’s obvious
meaning.” Pet. App. 7a (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. v.
Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31-32 (2004)). Although the court
recognized that “EPA is correct that the meaning of
‘any’ can differ depending upon the statutory setting,”
the court concluded that “the context of the Clean Air
Act warrants no departure” from what it believed was
“the word’s customary effect.” Jd. at 8a (citation omit-
ted). The court noted that, unlike in Nixon v. Missour
Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004), where a
statute with the term “any” was construed less broadly,
“the question of statutory interpretation here does not

» The meaning of a different part of the definition of modification in
Section 7411(a)(4)—the phrase. “increases the amount of any air
pollutant emitted”— is currently before the Court in Environmental
Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848 (argued Nov. 1, 2006).

8

arise in a setting in which the Supreme Court has re-
quired heightened standards of clarity to avoid upset-
ting fundamental policies,” and no “strange and indeter-
minate results * * * would emerge from adopting” what
the court believed was “the natural meaning of ‘any’ in
section [7411(a)(4)].” Pet. App. 8a.

In the court’s view, other considerations supported
its conclusion. The court noted that it “has construed
the definition of ‘modification’ broadly” in other re-
spects. Pet. App. 9a. The court also believed that the
term “any” would be rendered superfluous if it were not
construed to require an expansive interpretation of the
words that follow. /d. at 10a. Finally, the court noted
that the statute itself imposes limitations on the “physi-
cal changes” that are covered; they must “increase|] the
amount of any air pollutant emitted * * * or * * * result||
in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emit-
ted.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4). The court stated that,
“{blecause Congress expressly included one limitation,
the court must presume that Congress acted intention-
ally and purposely when it did not include others.” Pet.
App. 12a (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see id. at 17a (“As Congress limited the broad
meaning of ‘any physical change,’ directing that only
changes that increase emissions will trigger NSR, no
other limitation (other than to avoid absurd results) can
be implied.”).

The court concluded that “when Congress places the
word ‘any’ before a phrase with several common mean-
ings, the statutory phrase encompasses each of those
meanings” and “the agency may not pick and choose
among them.” Pet. App. 12a; see id. at 14a (“Congress’s
use of the word ‘any’ indicates the intent to cover all of
the ordinary meanings of the phrase.”); id. at 17a (“Con-

9

gress’s use of the word ‘any’ in defining a ‘modification’
means that all types of ‘physical changes’ are covered.”).
In the court’s view, the pre-existing RMRR exclusion
did not contravene that principle, because it was “based
on ade minimis rationale.” Jd. at 15a. The court held,
however, that because “the ERP would allow equipment
replacements resulting in non-de minimis emission in-
creases to avoid NSR,” the ERP rule “violates the Act.”
Id. at 17a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals vacated the results of a signifi-
cant rulemaking initiative by EPA that was designed to
remedy problems with the former, case-by-case RMRR
approach, and thereby ease compliance by regulated
entities, lighten administrative burdens on state and
federal enforcement agencies, and, ultimately, encour-
age investment in newer, more efficient, and cleaner
facilities. The court of appeals reached that result by
holding that, although “physical change” is ambiguous,
the phrase “any physical change” is unambiguously
broad. In so holding, the court not only invalidated a
critically important rulemaking but also announced a
sweeping rule of construction that would operate to de-
prive administrative agencies of discretion to construe
ambiguous statutory terms whenever those terms are
preceded by the word “any”; in the court’s view, Con-
gress’s use of the word “any” generally compels adop-
tion of the broadest construction of whatever follows,
effectively eliminating ambiguities that would otherwise
be left for agency interpretation...That holding, with its
premise that the single word “any” effectively eliminates
agency discretion, is inconsistent with Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and with this Court’s

10

repeated admonitions that statutes must de construed in
context and as a whole. Moreover, it threatens to put
both EPA and other agencies charged with administer-
ing statutes that employ the term “any” in an unwar-
ranted straitjacket.

While the term “any” may be used to connote
breadth, it does not express the “clear intent” of Con-
gress to adopt one and only one meaning—namely, the
broadest reasonable construction—of the words that
follow. It therefore does not preclude the exercise of
discretion by EPA to define the phrase “physical
change” in a way that reasonably differentiates between
routine maintenance (which, as the phrase suggests,
maintains rather than changes an entity) and physical
changes. Indeed, the logic of the D.C. Circuit’s con-
struction of the word “any” would endanger far more
than just the EPA’s current rulemaking. Before EPA’s
promulgation of the ERP, there was a long history of a
variety of exclusions—including in the regulatory pro-
gram on which Congress modeled the PSD provisions of
the Act—from the scope of a “physical change * * * or
change in the method of operation,” 42 U.S.C.
7411(a)(4). Those exclusions cannot be justified on the
rationale that they cause only a de minimis increase in
emissions (and even a de minimis exclusion itself would
be hard to square with the court of appeals’ construction
of “any,” taken to its logical extreme). Accordingly, all
of those exclusions (including applications of even the
original RMRR exclusion itself) are placed into jeopardy
by the court of appeals’ holding in this case.

Absent this Court’s review, the court of appeals’ deci-
sion on this petition for review will be the final word on
this important regulatory initiative, and it will threaten
related and similarly significant Clean Air Act exclu-

1]

sions. Equally important, given the role of the D.C. Cir-
cuit in review of agency regulations generally, that
court’s unjustifiably broad reading of the common statu-
tory term “any” to eliminate virtually all ambiguity in
the terms that follow will needlessly and improperly
limit agency action in a wide variety of areas. Further
review is warranted.

A. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

1. The court of appeals acknowledged that, in pro-
mulgating the ERP, EPA was construing the definition
of “modification” in the Clean Air Act, and that the va-
lidity of EPA’s interpretation was accordingly governed
by the principles of Chevron. See Pet. App. 5a. Under
those principles, “{i]f the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.” 467 U.S. at 842-843. If
the intent of Congress is not “unambiguously ex-
pressed,” however, Chevron “requires a federal court to
accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if
the agency’s reading differs from what the court be-
lieves is the best statutory interpretation.” National
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005). 7

The court of appeals in this case correctly recognized
that the phrase “physical change” is ambiguous, and it
did not dispute that the ERP would represent a permis-
sible construction of that phrase. See Pet. App. 5a-6a
(citing various dictionary definitions of “change,” includ-
ing “make over to a radically different form”). Relying
almost exclusively on Congress’s use of the word “any,”
however, the court concluded that the phrase “any phys-
ical change” is unambiguous, and that it necessarily en-

12

compasses everything covered by “all of the ordinary
meanings of the phrase.” /d. at 14a. That conclusion
contravenes this Court’s consistent recognition that a
statutory term must be construed not in isolation, but in
light of its entire context. E.g., Davis v. Michigan Dep't
of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). The mere addi-
tion of the word “any” is insufficient to establish that
Congress had a clear intent that the phrase “physical
change” must necessarily be given its broadest meaning.

This Court has a long history of considering the im-
port of the word “any,” beginning with United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall,
C.J.). In some cases, the Court has concluded that use
of the word “any” was intended to give the term that
follows an “expansive meaning.” See, e.g., Norfolk S.
Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31-32 (2004); Department of
Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-131
(2002); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997);
Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 588-589 (1980).
Those cases, however, generally involved the Court’s
own determination of the best meaning of the language
at issue, not the clearly distinct question presented in
the Chevron context, namely, whether an agency inter-
pretation of statutory text is reasonable. In Norfolk
Southern, for example, the Court addressed “a simple
question of contract interpretation,” 543 U.S. at 30; in
Gonzales, a criminal sentencing statute; and in Harri-
son, the jurisdiction of federal courts of appeals. An
agency interpretation of a statute was involved in
Rucker, but the Court agreed with the agency construc-
tion at issue, see 535 U.S. at 130, and, as in the other
cases cited above, the Court expressly relied on a combi-
nation of factors—not merely the word “any” alone—to
support its conclusion that the phrase “any drug-related

13

criminal activity” did not contain an implicit knowledge
requirement. /d. at 130-131 (“Congress’ decision not to
impose any qualification in the statute, combined with
its use of the term ‘any’ to modify ‘drug-related criminal
activity,’ precludes any knowledge requirement.”) (em-
phasis added).

Moreover, the Court has concluded in other cases
that, while the word “any” does suggest breadth, it does
not necessarily mandate the broadest interpretation of
what follows. See, e.g., Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,
541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (“‘any’ can and does mean dif-
ferent things depending upon the setting”); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981); Palmer, supra. More re-
cently, in Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388
(2005), the Court noted that “a speaker who says, ‘T’ll
see any film,’ may or may not mean to include films
shown in another city.” The Court concluded that “even
though the word ‘any’ demands a broad interpretation,
* * * we must look beyond that word itself.” bid. (cita-
tion omitted); see zd. at 391 (“statutory language, con-
text, history, [and] purpose”); Nixon, 541 U.S. at 182
(meaning of the word “any” “depend[s] upon the set-
ting”). As the Court said in Flora v. United States, 362
U.S. 145, 149 (1960), in connection with the phrase “any
sum,” “[a] catchall the phrase surely is; but to say this is
not to define what it catches.”

° The court of appeals suggested that, if “any” does not serve the
function of requiring the broadest construction of what follows, it would
be superfluous. Pet. App. 10a. That would no more be true in this case
than in Nixon, Sea Clammers, Palmer, Small, and Flora, in each of
which this Court did not adopt the broadest construction of the statute
at issue. In all of those settings, the term “any” continues to serve its
ordinary function of suggesting the absence of any other limitation once

14

Indeed, the rule of construction announced by the
court of appeals—that “any” ordinarily requires the
phrase it modifies to be construed to encompass all of its
possible “ordinary meanings,” Pet. App. 7a—is irrecon-
cilable with this Court’s decision in Chevron itself, which
involved the same statute and the same definitional sec-
tion at issue here. This Court’s analysis in Chevron fo-
cused on the scope of EPA’s discretion to interpret the
term “stationary source,” which is defined in the Clean
Air Act’s NSPS provision to mean “any building, struc-
ture, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any
air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Referring to that definition, this Court emphatically
rejected the argument that the statutory text deprived
EPA of discretion to adopt an interpretation of “station-
ary source” that was less inclusive than its broadest pos-
sible construction. Even though the Court agreed with
the respondents’ argument that the text “could be read
to impose the [NSR] permit conditions on an individual
building that is a part of a plant,” 467 U.S. at 860, the
Court nonetheless concluded that EPA’s narrower inter-
pretation was also reasonable. /d. at 861. The Court
simply was “not persuaded that parsing of general terms
in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of

the agency has settled on a reasonable interpretation of the phrase
following “any”—here, “physical change.” Indeed, it appears that “any”
served precisely that function in Rucker, for example, where the
question was whether to add an extra-statutory knowledge requirement
to the statutory phrase “any drug-related criminal activity.” See 535
U.S. at 130-131. There was no indication in Rucker, by contrast, that
HUD would not have discretion to determine whether a crime designed
to raise funds to purchase drugs would be sufficiently “drug-related” to
satisfy the statute.

15

Congress,” ibid., and instead upheld the agency’s view
that “the definition itself is flexible,” id. at 864.

The decision below thus stands in flagrant opposition
to Chevron. Under the court of appeals’ approach, the
phrase at issue in Chevron would have had to encompass
the broadest meaning of “any building,” including a
building that was part of a larger plant. This Court held
the opposite. If the phrase “any building, structure,
facility, or installation,” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3), need not
be given the widest possible meaning, as Chevron
squarely concludes, it begs credulity to suggest that
such breadth is required by the use of “any” in the very
next paragraph of the same Section of the same Act.
This Court’s Chevron decision compels the conclusion
that the rule of construction announced by the court of
appeals is wrong, and egregiously so.

2. In the context presented here, the word “any” is
plainly not sufficient to establish that Congress had an

“unambiguously expressed intent,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843, to adopt the broadest meaning of the phrase that
follows (“physical change * * * or change in method of
operation”) and to permit a narrower reading only when
justified on the ground that such a reading would lead to
a de minimis impact on emissions. To the contrary, the
statutory context demands that a distinction be made
between routine efforts to maintain a facility’s current
method of operation and efforts to change the facility or
its method of operation. Not only is there inherent am-
biguity in the phrase “physical change * * * or change in
the method of operation” in this context—whether or not
modified by “any”—but there is also other evidence that
Congress wanted to permit a degree of administrative
flexibility.

16

a. As this Court has explained, “where ‘Congress has
not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn [a prior]
administrative construction, but has ratified it with posi-
tive legislation,” that agency’s prior construction must
be accepted “as a defensible construction of the * * *
statute.” 7WA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 638, 76 n.11 (1977)
(quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-
382 (1969)). See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983 (1986). Congress is presumed to
legislate with awareness of prior administrative regula-
tions, and when it elects to use statutory language that
has already been given an interpretive gloss by the ad-
ministering agency, it should ordinarily be presumed to
intend to allow the-agency to continue to employ that
regulatory gloss.

That inference of congressional approval is fully ap-
plicable here. When Congress enacted the statutory
NSR program in 1977, cross-referencing the pre-exist-
ing NSPS statutory definition of “modification,” it acted
in a context in which EPA had already interpreted that
key provision to exclude some activities that would fall
within the broadest conception of “physical change * * *
or change in the method of operation,” 42 U.S.C.
7411(a)(4), including activities that unquestionably could
increase emissions in non-trivial ways. When EPA origi-
nally promulgated regulations to effectuate the NSPS
program in 1971, it had, subject to certain conditions,
excluded “{al|n increase in the production rate,” “[{a]n

increase in hours of operation,” and “[uJse of an alterna-
tive fuel or raw material” from the scope of what consti-
tutes a “modification.” See 36 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (40
C.F.R. 60.2(h)(2)(i)-(iii).1972)). When EPA established
the regulatory PSD program in 1974, it again provided
for the same exclusions, this time expressly tying them

17

to the terms “physical change * * * or change in the
method of operation.” See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514 (provid-
ing that “[a]n increase in the production rate” or in
“hours of operation,” or “[u]se of an alternative fuel or
raw material,” “shall not be considered a change in the
method of operation.”). The agency could presumably
~ have construed the statutory phrase “any physical
change * * * or change in the method of operation” to be
sufficiently broad to cover those excluded activities.
But, from the beginning, it has not done so. | 7

Although even the court of appeals suggested (with-
out fully justifying) that Congress’s use of the word
“any” could co-exist with an exclusion for activities that
had a de minimis impact on emissions, none of the above
exclusions were, or could have been, justified on that
ground. See Pet. App. 13la-132a. For example, as EPA
noted, “by doubling hours of operation, a 500 [tons per
year] emitting plant could conceivably double its emis-
sions,” an increase that would be “far above any level
EPA has ever thought justifiable as de minimis.” Id. at
134a. The same could easily be true of a source that in-
creased its production rate or switched to an alternative,
and more polluting, fuel. Yet those exclusions have
nonetheless been embodied in both the NSR program
and the NSPS program since their creation, and their
modern-day successors remain in those programs today.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(2)(iii) (NSR); 40 C.F.R.
60.14(e)(2), (3) and (4) (NSPS).

The same has been true of the treatment of RMRR
itself. The terms of the RMRR provision focus on
whether an activity is “routine,” not whether the in-
crease in emissions caused by the activity would be more
than de minimis, and EPA has never construed the ex-
clusion to encompass only de minimis emissions in-

18

creases. Rather, under the RMRR as it was applied
prior to promulgation of the ERP, EPA used a five-fac-
tor test to determine whether an activity constituted
RMRR, considering the activity’s nature, extent, fre-
quency, purpose, and cost. See Pet. App. 3a-4a. Only
one of those factors—the project’s extent—can be read
to refer even indirectly to the effect on emissions caused
by the project, and even that factor is properly read to
refer to the extent of the work required on the project,
not the extent of increase in emissions that would re-
sult.’

Thus, all of EPA’s longstanding regulatory exclu-
sions allow, and some necessarily contemplate, exclud-
ing from NSR and NSPS at least some activities that
could lead to more than de minimis increases in emis-
sions.” Those exclusions date from before Congress

‘ The court of appeals is correct that EPA stated that it had
“generally interpret{ed|” the RMRR exclusion—as well as other
related provisions—narrowly. Pet. App. 15a (emphasis added) (quoting
id. at 136a). But EPA has never taken the position that all of those
exclusions are categorically limited to activities that will result in only
de minimis emissions increases, nor can they plausibly be read in that
manner. Indeed, if the exclusions were limited to only activities of that
nature, there would have been little if any reason to create or retain
them, because the NSR program, which applies only to activities that
result in “significant” emissions increases, already excludes activities
that result in de minimis emissions increases. 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(2)(i)
and (23). To be sure, it has always been reasonable, and thus open to
EPA, to interpret the pre-ERP RMRR rule narrowly. But nothing in
EPA's past general practice precludes the agency from improving or
adjusting its regulatory approach in response to current conditions, as
it did in adopting the ERP.

* The court of appeals was mistaken insofar as it relied on the theory
that, “[a]s Congress limited the broad meaning of ‘any physical change,
directing that only changes that increase emissions will trigger NSR,
no other limitation (other than to avoid absurd results) can be implied.”

19

adopted the statutory NSR program in 1977. Yet Con-
gress did not repudiate EPA’s settled understanding of
those terms. To the contrary, Congress defined “modifi-
cation” for the NSR program through a cross-reference
to the preexisting NSPS statutory definition that EPA
had already construed to include those exclusions. See
42 U.S.C. 7479(2)(C). And the new NSR program that
Congress adopted was modeled on the pre-existing PSD
regulatory program, which also included those exclu-
sions. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514 (1974). The court of ap-
peals disregarded the fact that Congress’s acceptance of
the prior regulatory constructions, which clearly applied
to activities that had more than a de minimis effect on
emissions, necessarily confirms the permissibility of
those exclusions in the NSR context.

Indeed, Congress specifically demonstrated its
awareness and approval of the prior regulations (includ-
ing the exclusions) by mandating that most of the pre-
existing regulations (including the cited exclusions)
“shall remain in effect” until implementation plans are
put in place. 42 U.S.C. 7478(a). While Congress made
clear that EPA would have discretion to change the reg-
ulations after that time, its awareness of the prior regu-
latory program, and its evident satisfaction with that
program in pertinent part, establishes that the prior
program, with its exclusions that cannot be justified on
the basis of a de minimis rationale, is at the very least “a
defensible construction” of the Act. TWA, 432 U.S. at

Pet. App. 17a. The fact that a “modification” is limited to a “change”
that results in an increase in emissions provides no guidance whatever
as to which of the several permissible meanings of “change” was
intended by Congress.

20

76 n.11." It necessarily follows that, contrary to the
court of appeals’ holding, the term “any physical change
* * * or change in the method of operation” does contain
ambiguities that the agency may reasonably resolve, and
that those ambiguities encompass interpretations that
exclude some activities that have more than a de
minimis impact on emissions.

B. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants Re-
view At This Time

This Court’s review is warranted in this case because
the court of appeals’ ruling conflicts with Chevron, an-
nounces an erroneous and harmful rule of statutory con-
struction that unduly constrains agency discretion, and
overturns an important regulatory initiative that affects
a broad range of industrial activity and that sought to
bring greater certainty—and, ultimately, both environ-
mental and economic benefits—to a complex regulatory
scheme. The breadth of the court’s ruling suggests that,
even aside from the specific ERP rule, EPA may be
hamstrung in developing other approaches in the future
to remedy the deficiencies of the current RMRR exclu-

” That the 1977 Amendments render EPA’s pre-1977 approach a
“defensible construction” of the Act. see TWA, 432 U.S. at 76n.11, does
not mean that it is the only permissible interpretation. See U.S. Br. at
47 n.18, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848
(argued Nov. 1, 2006). This Court has concluded that Congress's use of
a pre-existing statutory term demonstrated its intent to freeze a pre-
existing regulation only when it has found additional clear demonstra-
tions of such congressional intent inthe statute or legislative history.
See, ¢.g., Bragdon vy. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-632 (1998) (citing
statutory language prohibiting use of lesser standard than that
incorporated in agency regulations); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,
476 U.S. 426, 437-438 (1986) (noting legislative history specified that
statutory definition included prior existing regulatory definition).

21

sion. More generally, the court of appeals’ broad hold-
ing threatens a number of other pre-existing exclusions
under the Clean Air Act. It also threatens to put EPA
into a regulatory straitjacket that Congress did not in-
tend, with few if any options to tailor the program to
changing conditions and policies, and thereby to achieve
environmental benefits. Given the primacy of the D.C.
Circuit in review of administrative action generally, the
court of appeals’ decision in this case similarly threatens
the ability of other agencies that administer statutes
employing the word “any” to adapt their regulatory pro-
grams to the needs and policies of the governing statute.

1. In adopting the ERP, EPA concluded that a
“bright-line rule that would obviate the need for case-
by-case review under our multi-factor test of appropri-
ate categories of equipment replacements would be ex-
tremely useful in addressing many of the problems that
we have identified with the current operation of the
NSR program.” Pet. App. 57a. EPA concluded that the
policy of the NSR program “is not to cut back on emis-
sions from existing major stationary sources through
limitations on their productive capacity, but rather to
ensure that they will install state-of-the-art pollution
controls at a juncture where it otherwise makes sense to
do so.” Id. at 35a. Yet EPA noted criticisms of its pre-
ERP RMRR approach, which often “disallows replace-
ment of significant plant components with identical or
functionally equivalent components,” such that “the ef-
fect is to discourage plant owners or operators from en-
gaging in replacements that are important to restoring,
maintaining and improving plant safety, reliability, and
efficiency.” /d. at 31a; see id. at 35a (RMRR approach
has led “sources to refrain from replacing components,

22

to replace them with inferior components, or to artifi-
cially constrain production in other ways”).

The problems of the pre-ERP approach were exacer-
bated by the uncertainties inherent in its case-by-case,
multifactor nature. EPA noted that, under the pre-ERP
rule, “it takes a year, on average, to obtain a determina-
tion whether a proposed replacement is routine.” Pet.
App. 57a. Such a delay “creates perverse disincentives
to refrain from equipment replacements and instead
repair existing equipment or find some other solution.”
Ibid. It is “also problematic for State and local review-
ing authorities,” who must “devote scarce resources to
make complex determinations” that “are consistent with
determinations made for similar circumstances in other
jurisdictions.” /d. at 34a. Indeed, the uncertainties act
to “discourage replacements that would promote safety,
reliability and efficiency even in instances where, if the
matter were brought to EPA, we would determine that
the replacement in question was RMRR.” /d. at 35a.

The ERP “significantly reduce[s}” those problems.
Pet. App. 35a. Its effect “should be to remove disincen-
tives to undertaking RMRR activities falling within the
rule, thereby enhancing key operational elements such
as efficiency, safety, reliability, and environmental per-
formance.” /d. at 36a. The ERP’s effects include “pro-
viding the certainty needed to plan and undertake effi-
ciency investments,” encouraging firms “to take advan-
tage of * * * new, innovative pollution-reducing technol-
ogies,” and “preserv|ing|] powerful incentives * * * to
adopt ‘leap-frog’ technologies,” all of which will lead to
reduced costs and reduced pollution. /d. at 107a-108a
(emphases omitted). Indeed, EPA concluded that the
ERP’s effect of “promoting proper operational planning
to facilitate safe, reliable, and efficient operations,” “will

23

have the corresponding environmental benefit of reduc-
ing the amount of pollution generated per product pro-
duced,” as well as “reduc{ing] the resource burden on
reviewing authorities” under “the existing, case-by-case
process.” /d. at 44a.

2. The court of appeals’ decision invalidating the
ERP thus negated a very substantial EPA regulatory
initiative to resolve deep-seated problems in the NSR
program and the RMRR exclusion, while achieving both
economic and environmental benefits. If not reversed,
the decision below also threatens to eliminate EPA’s
ability to address those problems in the future. The
court ruled that the agency must choose the broadest
reading of the phrase “any physical change,” because
“Congress’s use of the word ‘any’ indicates the intent to
cover all of the ordinary meanings of the phrase.” Pet.
App. 14a. That ruling casts into doubt even the pre-ex-
isting RMRR exclusion, which by its terms and as his-
torically construed encompasses activities that are
within the broadest meaning of “physical change.”

To be sure, the court of appeals did concede that a
narrower construction could be used if the broadest con-
struction would lead to “strange and indeterminate” or
“absurd” results, Pet. App. 8a, 14a, or if the narrower
construction would have a de minimis effect on emis-
sions, 7d. at 13a-14a. Those qualifications, however, do
not alleviate the problems created by the court of ap-
peals’ mistaken reading of the statute. The pre-existing
RMRER exclusion, and the multifactor test that has been
employed to apply it, have never expressly been limited
to activities that have a de minimis effect on emissions,
nor have they been limited to the avoidance of “absurd”
results. Instead, the agency has engaged in a reason-
able effort to differentiate routine efforts designed to

24

maintain an existing facility from activities that amount
to a change in the physical plant or its method of opera-
tion. Any other means that EPA may consider to ad-
dress the basic problems targeted by the RMRR exclu-
sion would likely be problematic or impracticable in view
of the severe constraints imposed by the court of ap-
peals.

Moreover, as noted above, both the NSPS and NSR
programs have included since their inception additional
exclusions for hours of operation increases, production
rate increases, and fuel and raw material switching. The
court of appeals’ conclusion places in doubt those other
longstanding exclusions as well, because they may be
found to exclude activities that fit within “one of the or-
dinary meanings” of “physical change * * * or change in
the method of operation.” Pet. App. 7a. The de minimis
exception recognized by the court of appeals is of no
avail, because none of those exclusions can be justified
on the ground that it will have only a de minimis effect
on emissions. See pp. 16-19, supra. Without further
review, the court of appeals’ decision will cast a shadow
over even those exclusions and long-settled expectations
regarding the scope and coverage of the NSR and NSPS
programs. ;

3. Finally, even aside from its effects on EPA’s abil-
ity to tailor the NSR and NSPS programs to changed
circumstances and policies, the court of appeals’ decision
poses a substantial threat to every regulatory agency
entrusted with administering a statute that uses the
word “any.” The court of appeals stated that, aside from
settings “in which the Supreme Court has required
heightened standards of clarity to avoid upsetting fun-
damental policies,” Pet. App. 8a, “when Congress places
the word ‘any’ before a phrase with several common

25

meanings, the statutory phrase encompasses each of
those meanings; the agency may not pick and choose
among them,” id. at 12a. Thus, although this Court has
never used the mere presence of the word “any” in a
statute to reject an agency’s choice among several per-
missible meanings of the words that follow, and indeed
took the opposite approach in Chevron itself, the court
of appeals’ reasoning threatens to eliminate all agency
discretion whenever the word “any” appears before an
ambiguous word or words in a statute.

It is entirely consistent with this Court’s decisions,
common sense, and the Chevron doctrine to acknowl-
edge that the word “any” has a generally expansive
meaning, while also acknowledging that it does not elim-
inate all statutory ambiguities that would otherwise be
open to agency interpretation. As this Court’s frequent
cases construing statntes that use the word “any” under-
score, the court of appeals’ non-contextual interpreta-
tion of that term threatens agency authority in a broad
range of areas. Further review is warranted to correct
the court of appeals’ failure to abide by the dictates of
this Court’s decision in Chevron, and to remedy the
harms caused by its drastic and unjustifiable constric-
tion of agency discretion.

26

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully. submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General

ROGER R. MARTELLA, JR. SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE
Acting General Counsel Assistant Attorney General
ELLIOTT B. ZENICK THOMAS G. HUNGAR
Assistant General Counsel Deputy Solicitor General
JONATHAN C. AVERBACK - JAMES A. FELDMAN
Attorney Assistant to the Solicitor
General

United States Environmental

Protection Agency THOMAS A. LORENZEN

ANGELINE PURDY
Attorneys

NOVEMBER 2006

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1799%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
