# Appendix — Houk v. Franklin (No. 06-513)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

(9), Suoreme Cour, US.

06-5130CT 6 - 2006

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

MARC C. HOUK, Warden,

Petitioner,
Vv.

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

RECEIVED

OCT 11 2008

OFFICE OF THE
SUPREME COU U.S.

JIM PETRO
Attorney General of Ohio
DOUGLAS R. COLE
State Solicitor
STEPHEN P. CARNEY*
Senior Deputy Solicitor
*Counsel of Record
ELIZABETH T. SCAVO
Assistant Solicitor
CHARLES L. WILLE
Assistant Attorney General
30 E. Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614-466-8980
614-466-5087 tax

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Appendix A: Opinion, United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, 434 F.3d 412, January 9, 2006............ la

Appendix B: Order Denying Rehearing En Banc,
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

Appendix C: Decision and Entry, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western
Division, 267 F. Supp. 2d 768, March 31, 2003 ................ 38a

Appendix D: Magistrate Report and Recommendations,
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, August 21, 2002 ..................:0002- 88a

Appendix E: Magistrate Amended Supplemental Report
and Recommendations, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,
TR I oko cudukpsoncneutvodesedsieetete 342a

la
APPENDIX A
GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.

CARL S. ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 03-3636/03-3697
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT
434 F.3d 412
January 9, 2006, Decided

BEFORE: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and BATCHELDER and
CLAY, Circuit Judges.

BOGGS, Chief Judge. In December 1988, George
Franklin was found guilty of two counts of aggravated
burglary and one count of aggravated murder and was
sentenced to death. He began a long process of appeals, with
each state court affirming his convictions or dismissing his
claims as res judicata. On petition for habeas corpus to the
Southern District of Ohio, however, [**2] Franklin was
found to have two viable claims: service of a biased juror and
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, neither of which
the court found to be procedurally defaulted. The court
granted a [***2] conditional writ of habeas corpus on these
two issues. In addition, although denying Franklin’s petition
on the remaining 26 claims, the district court granted a
certificate of appealability (COA) on three issues: ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s failure to

2a

provide the defense with material exculpatory and
impeachment evidence at trial. Because Franklin did not
object to the district judge’s denial of habeas on any other
- issues, all other claims are forfeited on appeal and are not
before this court. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). The State appeals the conditional
grant of habeas, and Franklin cross-appeals the denial of
habeas on the three issues certified for appeal.

I

Franklin was convicted of the brutal murder of Gerald
Strauss in his Cincinnati home on the evening of July 23,
1988 and of the theft of a television from the [**3] nearby
apartment of Rosha Winston seventeen days earlier. The jury
recommended the death penalty, and the judge sentenced
Franklin to death in addition to two consecutive ten- to
twenty-five-year terms of imprisonment for the aggravated
burglaries at Strauss’s and Winston’s homes. State v.
Franklin, 62 Ohio St. 3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1, 3-5 (Ohio 1991).

Represented by new counsel, Franklin appealed his
conviction through the Ohio courts. After the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal,
a third set of attorneys took up his case and further attempted
to secure relief in the Ohio courts, first by requesting that the
Ohio Supreme Court recall its mandate and permit
supplemental briefing on direct appeal and, when that request
was denied without an opinion, State v. Franklin, 63 Ohio St.
3d 1402, 585 N.E.2d 424 (1992), by seeking post-conviction
relief. The Hamilton County Common Pleas Court denied the
petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary
hearing, a decision that was affirmed by the Hamilton County
Court of Appeals. See State v. Franklin, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 183, 1995 WL 26281 (Ohio App. [**4] ), appeal not
allowed, 72 Ohio St. 3d 1538, 650 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied,
516 U.S. 950, 116 S. Ct. 394, 133 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1995).

3a

Franklin also sought delayed reconsideration in the Ohio
Court of Appeals, and his motion was denied for failure to
file within the ninety-day time limit. State v. Franklin, No.
C-890028 (Ohio App. Mar. 3, 1994).

Franklin then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. The district court referred the matter to a
magistrate judge for a report and recommendations. The
magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and issued a
comprehensive report. After amending the report slightly in
response to objections filed by the parties, the magistrate
judge recommended that the court grant the requested writ of |
habeas corpus with respect [*417] to Franklin’s claim that
his convictions and sentences were unconstitutional because
one of the jurors could not impartially apply the law, a claim
the magistrate found was not procedurally barred because
Franklin had received ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel on direct appeal. The district court adopted the report
and recommendation, granting a conditional writ of habeas
corpus on the biased juror and ineffective assistance [**5] of
appellate counsel claims and dismissing all other claims as
meritless. In this appeal, we are asked to consider five issues:
(1) whether a juror, who was unable to follow the law, sat on
Franklin’s jury; (2) whether the prosecution dismissed
prospective jurors for reasons of race; (3) whether the
prosecution failed to provide Franklin with exculpatory
material and impeachment evidence; (4) whether Franklin’s
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct adequate
investigations during the trial and the mitigation phases; and
(5) whether his appellate counsel was ineffective.

As Franklin filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus on November 14, 1995, prior to the April 24, 1996
effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (AEDPA), we apply a pre-AEDPA standard of
review. Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir.

4a

2004). We review the district court’s judgment de novo
[***3] and its findings of fact for clear error. Carter v. Bell,
218 F.3d 581, 590 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, absent clear
and convincing evidence, we presume the state court’s
findings [**6] of fact to be correct. See Wainwright v.
Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 85, 104 S. Ct. 378, 78 L. Ed. 2d 187
(1983). We may issue a writ of habeas corpus only if we find
that the state court proceedings were fundamentally unfair
due to a violation of the Constitution or other federal law.
Sowell, 372 F.3d at 828.

tt

Franklin did not raise the issues under consideration in
this appeal on his direct appeal in the state courts, but rather
raised them for the first time in his Motion to Recall the
Mandate before the Ohio Supreme Court and then later in his
post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, the post-conviction
courts refused to consider the merits of all of the claims,
other than several of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, on the ground that they were barred by res judicata .
In Ohio, res judicata bars state courts from considering
constitutional claims in post-conviction collateral attacks
when those claims have already or could have been fully
litigated on direct appeal. Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568,
576 (6th Cir. 2002). Absent cause or prejudice, when a
habeas petitioner fails to obtain consideration of a claim by
the state [**7] courts due to a state procedural rule that
prevents the state courts from reaching the merits of the
petitioner’s claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted and
may not be considered by the federal court on habeas review.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L.
Ed. 2d 594 (1977); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 436
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1004, 124 S. Ct. 535, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 409 (2003); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50
(6th Cir. 2000). Demonstrating cause requires showing that
an “objective factor external to the defense impeded

5a

counsel’s efforts to comply” with the state procedural rule.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 397 (1986). Demonstrating prejudice requires
showing that the trial was infected with constitutional error.
See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169, 102 S. Ct.
1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982).

{[*418] Consequently, we must first decide whether
Franklin can show cause and prejudice to excuse his
procedural default. We focus on Franklin’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, because such a claim can
serve as both cause and prejudice, excusing a procedural
[**8] default in an underlying substantive claim, as long as
the petitioner can also show cause and prejudice to excuse
the procedural default of the ineffective assistance claim
itself. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-52, 120 S.
Ct. 1587, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518 (2000).

To determine whether Franklin had cause for his
procedural default, we apply the four-part test set forth in
Maupin v. Smith.

First, the court must determine that there is a state

procedural rule that is applicable to the
petitioner’s claim and that the petitioner failed to
comply with the rule.

Second, the court must decide whether the state
courts actually enforced the state procedural
sanction.

Third, the court must decide whether the state
procedural forfeiture is an “adequate and
independent” state ground on which the state can
rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional
claim.

6a

Once the court determines that a state procedural
rule was not complied with and that the rule was
an adequate and independent state ground, then
the petitioner must demonstrate . . . that there was
“cause” for him to not follow the procedural rule
and that he was actually prejudiced by [**9] the
alleged constitutional error.

785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986) (citations and footnote
omitted). We agree with the district court that Franklin’s
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is not barred
from review under the [***4] Maupin test because at the
time he filed his Motion for Delayed Reconsideration, in
which he raised the claims he makes on appeal in the instant
case, the Ohio courts did not have a “firmly established and
regularly followed” procedural rule governing the timeliness
of such motions. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348, 104
S. Ct. 1830, 80 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1984).

Franklin filed a Motion for Delayed Reconsideration
with the Ohio Court of Appeals on June 30, 1993, advancing
thirty-four assignments of error, including the claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On that date, the
Ohio rules controlling the filing of claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel through Motions for Delayed
Reconsideration were somewhat unclear. One year earlier,
the Ohio Supreme Court had decided State v. Murnahan, 63
Ohio St. 3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), holding that
ineffective assistance of appellate [**10] counsel claims had
to be brought under Ohio R. App. P. 26 (later to become Rule
26(A)), through an application for delayed reconsideration in
the court of appeals in which the alleged error took place, id.
at 1208-09. Prior to Murnahan, such claims had been brought
in the regular post-conviction hearings before the trial court.

7a

Ibid. However, Murnahan did not establish a time period for
filing Rule 26 motions.

Under Rule 26, as it existed at the time Murnahan was
filed, a petitioner had ten days from the date the previous
opinion was filed to file an application for reconsideration of
any cause or motion submitted on appeal. Ohio R. App. P.
26(A). However, in deciding Murnahan, the Ohio Supreme
Court had opined that the courts should take a more lenient
attitude toward timeliness in ineffective assistance of counsel
claims:

[*419] Since claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel may be left undiscovered due to
the inadequacy of appellate counsel or the
inability of the defendant to identify such errors
within the time allotted for reconsideration in the
court of appeals or appeal to this court, it may be
necessary for defendants to request delayed
{**11] consideration. Therefore, in an individual
case where a defendant has put forth a colorable
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, where the circumstances render the
application of res judicata unjust, and the time
periods for reconsideration in courts of appeals
and direct appeal to this court have expired, he or
she must: (1) apply for delayed reconsideration in
the court of appeals where the alleged error took
place pursuant to App. R. 26 and 14(B), and if
delayed reconsideration is denied, then (2) file for
delayed appeal in this court pursuant to Section 8,
Rule II of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court. Before granting reconsideration, the court
of appeals should determine whether there are
substantive grounds for relief.

8a

Murnahan, 584 N.E.2d at 1209 (footnotes omitted); see also
Henderson v. Collins, 101 F. Supp. 2d 866, 887 (S.D. Ohio
1999) (concluding that “neither the Murnahan decision nor
Ohio App. R. 14(B) set an outer limit or absolute deadline
that would have alerted Petitioner to a certain deadline for
filing a Murnahan Application pursuant to the rule
{announced in Murnahan }.”), vacated [**12] in part on
other grounds, 262 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2001). Furthermore,
the Murnahan court specifically noted that the state appellate
rules as then written may have been insufficient to provide
the remedy set forth in its opinion. The opinion stated:

In light of the fact that Ohio has no statutory
authority or court rules dedicated to the procedure
to be followed by defendants who allege
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we
recommend that the Rules Advisory Committee
appointed by this court review whether an
amendment to App. R. 14(B) or a new rule should
be adopted to better serve claimants in this
position.
584 N.E.2d at 1209 n.6. [***5]

Murnahan \ed to the creation of a special Application to
Reopen procedure, codified at Ohio R. App. P. 26(B). This
rule includes a timeliness provision that requires the
application to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the
journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant
shows good cause for filing at a later time. R. 26(B)(1). Rule
26(B) went into effect on July 1, 1993-the day after Franklin
filed his Motion for Reconsideration under R. 26.
Nonetheless, the [**13] Ohio Court of Appeals applied the
26(B) standard to Franklin’s motion, dismissing it because he
had not filed within 90 days of the journalization of his initial
appellate judgment, and notwithstanding the fact that he was
represented by the same counsel at his appeals before the

9a

Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court. In a
footnote to the decision, the court noted that applying App.
R. 26(B) was not unreasonable, even though it had not been
in force on the day Franklin filed his motion, because under
the previous rule, he would only have had 10 days to file,
whereas under the new rule he had 90 days.

If we follow the reasoning of this footnote, and take as
our procedural starting point the rules that were actually in
place on the day that Franklin filed his Motion for
Reconsideration, there would be no procedural default. As
discussed above, Murnahan placed no time limit on
applications and specifically noted that the 10-day limit in
the then-current Rule 26 was too short. The State points to
Hicks v. Collins, {*420] 384 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 2004), as
holding that in the area of the Ohio First District Court of
Appeals, in which Franklin filed his Motion for [**14]
Reconsideration, the rule was established that (1) ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims had to be brought
according to the then-current Rule 26 (later 26(A)), and (2)
Rule 26 had an enforced 10-day limit on filing. However,
Hicks is inapposite here because it applies to a time before
Murnahan. In Hicks, the defendant brought his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding,
even though it was established in that District that the claim
should have been brought in a Motion for Reconsideration.
His claim was dismissed, and he waited approximately 18
months to file the Motion correctly. In the interim, the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled on Murnahan, and the Appeals Court
dismissed Hicks’s motion as untimely. We, in upholding the
procedural default, relied on the fact that pre-Murnahan there
was a procedure that Hicks could have followed in a timely
fashion, so his failure to do so could not constitute cause for
his later procedural default. 384 F.3d at 212.

If, on the other hand, we consider the Ohio Court of
Appeal’s application of the new Rule 26(B) to Franklin’s

10a

motion, we must also find that the State does not fulfill
{[**15] the elements of Maupin test necessary to bar review.
The first Maupin factor requires that there was a “state
procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s claim and
that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule.” 785 F.2d at
138. For the Rule 26(B) requireiment to be applicable to
Franklin, it would have to have been applied retroactively.
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
petitioner relying on prior rulings cannot be held to new
procedural requirements that go into effect after petitioner
raised his claim. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.
Ct. 850, 112 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1991). Furthermore, even if we
were to find that the new Rule 26(B) procedures were
applicable to Franklin, the Supreme Court in Ford concluded
that because the new rule had not been announced by the
time Ford could have raised his claim in a timely manner, it
was inadequate to serve as an independent state ground for
procedural default purposes because it was not “‘firmly
established and regularly followed’ by the time as of which it
[was] to be applied.” Jbid. (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341, 348, 104 S. Ct. 1830, 80 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1984)).
[**16] Therefore, the application of Rule 26(B) would not
meet the third prong of the Maupin test that the rule be an
“adequate and independent” state ground for foreclosing
review.

Rule 26(B) also fails to meet the second part of the
Maupin test, that courts “actually enforced the state
procedural sanction.” 785 F.2d at 138. A review of the
relevant case law reveals that the Ohio Supreme Court has
been erratic in its handling of untimely Rule 26(B)
applications in capital cases. For several years following the
enactment of amended Rule 26(B), the Ohio Supreme Court
regularly enforced the rule’s timeliness requirements. See,
e.g., State v. Mason, 90 Ohio St. 3d 66, 2000 Ohio 14, 734
N.E.2d 822, 822-23 (Ohio 2000); State v. Dunlap, 89 Ohio

lla

St. 3d 277, 2000 Ohio 159, 730 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio
2000); State v. Ballew, 89 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2000 Ohio 134,
729 N.E.2d 753, 754-55 (Ohio 2000); State v. Davis, 86 Ohio
St. 3d 212, 1999 Ohio 160, 714 N.E.2d 384, 385-86 (Ohio
1999); [***6] State v. Dennis, 86 Ohio St. 3d 201, 1999
Ohio 94, 713 N.E.2d 426, 427 (Ohio 1999); State v. Fox, 83
Ohio St. 3d 514, 1998 Ohio 517, 700 N-E.2d 1253, 1254
(Ohio 1998); State v. Hill, 78 Ohio St. 3d 174, 1997 Ohio
293, 677 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ohio 1997); [**17] State v.
Whalen, 74 Ohio St. 3d 633, 1996 Ohio 6, 660 N.E.2d 1174,
1175 (Ohio 1996); State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St. 3d 88, 1995
Ohio 249, 647 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ohio 1995). However, in
2000 it began ignoring the lower courts’ dismissals of Rule
26(B) applications as untimely and [*421] affirming the
dismissal of the applications on the merits. See State v. Mack,
101 Ohio St. 3d 397, 2004 Ohio 1526, 805 N.E.2d 1108,
1109 (Ohio 2004); State v. Goff, 98 Ohio St. 3d 327, 2003
Ohio 1017, 784 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Ohio 2003); State v. Mitts,
98 Ohio St. 3d 325, 2003 Ohio 1007, 784 N.E.2d 698, 699-
700 (Ohio 2003); State v. Bryant-Bey, 97 Ohio St. 3d 87,
2002 Ohio 5450, 776 N.E.2d 480, 481-82 (Ohio 2002); State
v. Sneed, 96 Ohio St. 3d 348, 2002 Ohio 4768, 774 N.E.2d
1216, 1217-18 (Ohio 2002); State v. Davie, 96 Ohio St. 3d
133, 2002 Ohio 3753, 772 N.E.2d 119, 120-21 (Ohio 2002);
State v. Smith, 95 Ohio St. 3d 127, 2002 Ohio 1753, 766
N.E.2d 588, 589-90 (Ohio 2002); State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio
St. 3d 150, 2002 Ohio 350, 761 N.E.2d 18, 19-20 (Ohio
2002). See State v. Moore, 93 Ohio St. 3d 649, 2001 Ohio
1892, 758 N.E.2d 1130, 1132-33 (Ohio 2001); State v.
Carter, 93 Ohio St. 3d 581, 2001 Ohio 1614, 757 N.E.2d
362, 363-64 (Ohio 2001); [**18] State v. Biros, 93 Ohio St.
3d 250, 2001 Ohio 1339, 754 N.E.2d 805, 806-07 (Ohio
2001); State v. Brooks, 92 Ohio St. 3d 537, 2001 Ohio 1278,
2001 Ohio 1323, 751 N.E.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ohio 2001);
State v. Jalowiec, 92 Ohio St. 3d 421, 2001 Ohio 164, 751
N.E.2d 467, 467-68 (2001); State v. Palmer, 92 Ohio St: 3d

12a

241, 2001 Ohio 188, 749 N.E.2d 749, 751-52 (Ohio 2001);
State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St. 3d 83, 2001 Ohio 150, 748
N.E.2d 528, 530-31 (Ohio 2001); State v. Bradley, 91 Ohio
St. 3d 570, 2001 Ohio 116, 747 N.E.2d 819, 820 (Ohio
2001); State v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio St. 3d 329, 2001 Ohio 52,
744 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ohio 2001); State v. Hill, 90 Ohio St.
3d 571, 2001 Ohio 20, 740 N.E.2d 282, 283-84 (Ohio 2001);
State v. Jells, 90 Ohio St. 3d 454, 2000 Ohio 93, 739 N.E.2d
345, 346 (Ohio 2000). Recently, in yet another reversal of
practice, the Ohio Supreme Court has renewed affirming the
dismissal of Rule 26(B) applications in capital cases as
untimely. See State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St. 3d 162, 2004
Ohio 4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, 862-63 (Ohio 2004); State v.
LaMar, 102 Ohio St. 3d 467, 2004 Ohio 3976, 812 N.E.2d
' 970, 971-72 (Ohio 2004); see also State v. Myers, 102 Ohio
St. 3d 318, 2004 Ohio 3075, 810 N.E.2d 436, 437-38 (Ohio
2004) [**19] (court affirms dismissal as the application was
both untimely and meritless).

In light of the fluctuating treatment of Rule 26(B)
applications by the Ohio Supreme Court, we cannot hold that
the state courts have regularly followed and enforced the
Rule’s timeliness requirement. The Ohio Supreme Court’s
treatment of Rule 26(B) applications does not constitute on
“occasional act of grace” in excusing the Rule’s
requirements, Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 737 (6th Cir.
2002) (quoting Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 429 (6th
Cir. 2001)), nor is the Supreme Court applying a clearly
delineated exception to the timeliness requirement in these
capital cases. See Hutchison, 303 F.3d at 738-39. While it
could be argued that the rule was regularly established and
followed at the time that the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on
Franklin’s Rule 26(B) application, such an interpretation
would render an injustice as the Ohio Supreme Court
apparently would not have applied the timeliness bar if
Franklin had delayed even further in filing his Rule 26(B)

1?a

application and submitted it for review to the Ohio Supreme
Court after 2000. Therefore, Rule 26(B) [**20] is not an
adequate and independent state rule that can preclude
consideration of Franklin’s ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim.

lil

As Franklin has shown cause for procedurally
defaulting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we turn
now to the question of whether any of his claims rise to the
level of constitutional defects such that appellate counsel’s
failure to raise them amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel. We first consider the claim that a juror who was
biased because she could not follow the law sat on Franklin’s
jury. As explained below, we affirm the district court’s
judgment that this case warrants a grant of a conditional writ
of habeas corpus. Since all of the claims on petitioner’s
cross-appeal relate to claims of trial-type error, those claims
are rendered [*422] moot by a grant of habeas corpus, and
we will not consider them further.

Franklin contends that one juror, Patricia Arthur, was
biased because she misunderstood the presumption of
innocence, Franklin’s right not to testify, and the burden of
proof in the case. Franklin also asserts that Arthur was
predisposed to find that he had committed the crime just
because he was the defendant [**21] in the case. The label
“biased” is applied to two sorts of jurors. In the usual sense, a
biased juror is one who has a predisposition against or in
favor of the defendant. In a more limited sense, a biased juror
is one who cannot “conscientiously apply the law and find
the facts.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S. Ct.
844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985). While we do not agree with
Franklin that [***7] Juror Arnold was “biased,” in the sense
of having a predisposition or prejudice against him, we,
nonetheless, do find that she was not an impartial juror

14a

because she demonstrated that she could not comprehend the
legal standard she was supposed to apply.

To understand Franklin’s claim, it is necessary to quote
at length the voir dire and later questioning of Juror Arthur:

Defense: Most people have a feeling somebody’s
charged with a crime-you all watch television and
you’ve seen L.A. Law. Some of you put it down
as your favorite program, so to speak. Pretty good
show. You see somebody charged get up there
and say I didn’t do it and here’s my side of the
story. Fairly common reaction for everybody. In
this case is there anybody here that feels George
[Franklin] [**22] should get on that stand, testify
and tell you his side of the story or whatever he
may feel to be appropriate? Anybody feel that
way? Nobody wants to hear George say anything?

Arthur: To prove he’s innocent.

Defense: Do you feel he should get on the stand to
prove he’s innocent?

Arthur: To me, I do, you know. I do.

Court: Let me interject. Three of the jurors have
said what you have said and what you think. The
law is that Mr. Franklin doesn’t have to do
anything at a trial, except be here. He’s not
required to prove that he’s innocent. He’s not
required to put on any evidence and if he chooses
to follow that route, you’re not allowed, under the
law, to consider that against him because the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The three
of you that answered the way you did, could you
accept my explanation of that?

15a

JA 1021-23. The record does not reflect that any of the
prospective jurors responded to the court’s question. During
the subsequent individual questioning of Arthur by the
prosecutor, the following exchange occuired:

Prosecutor: Considering all the questions that
were briefly asked by counsel [**23] and the
judge, do you have any answers at this point in
time that would cause you to hold up your hand,
anything different than before?

Arthur: No, I don’t.

Prosecutor: You understand it’s our burden of
proof and we must prove each and every element
of the crimes and specification charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, do you understand that?

Arthur: Yes, I do.
Prosecutor: Do you have any problem with that?

Arthur: No, I don’t have any problem with it.
Frere)

{[*423] Prosecutor: If we fail to prove one or
more of the elements of the offense, you would
acquit the defendant or find him not guilty, is that
correct?

Arthur: Yes, that’s right, if it’s proven, yes.

_ Prosecutor: If we prove each and every one of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, can
you join with the rest of the panel and sign a
verdict of guilty?

Arthur: Yes, if it’s proven, if it’s proven guilty.

l6a

Prosecutor: So, if the facts warrant and the law
allows it, can you join with eleven other jurors in
a verdict of guilty, knowing that the verdict would
lead to this man’s death?

[**24] Arthur: Yeah, if he’s proven it’s the right
thing, I can.

Prosecutor: Do you know of any reason, searching
your mind at this point, why you could not be a
fair and impartial juror in this case?

Arthur: No, I don’t.

Prosecutor: You can be just as fair to the State of
Ohio as you can to the defendant?

Arthur: Yes, I can. :
Prosecutor: And you’ll listen to all the evidence?
Arthur: Yes, I will, closely to them.

JA 1085-91. The State then passed Arthur for cause. The
foilowing dialog took place between Juror Arthur and
defense counsel:

Defense: As you sit there now, you consider
George, well, he’s just George. He’s sitting there,
he’s on trial. We’re officers of the court. He’s
sitting there he’s the defendant, but as to being
guilty, you have no idea whether he’s guilty of
this crime? Arthur: No, I don’t have no idea. But,
just like the counselor said before, I would have to
listen closely to why it happened.

Defense: Or how it happened?
Arthur: Yes, that’s right.

17a

Defense: Or whether George had anything to do
with it?

Arthur: Yes, that’s [**25] right.

Defense: In other words, one of the elements is to

prove George has something to do with this
crime; do you understand that? [***9]

Arthur: Uh huh.

Defense: And, although, if the prosecution was
just to put on those pictures [of the victim] and
say he’s dead, I mean George was sitting here,

that, alone, would not bring you to an opinion of
his guilt or innocence?

Arthur: No, because like I said, I mean like he
says, testimony, but ' would just wonder why
would he do it, you know?

Defense: Well, you say why would he do it, or if
he did it, would you like to know that, too?

Arthur: If he did it or why did he do it.

Defense: First of all, you’d like to know if he did
it?

Arthur: Yes, if he did it.

Defense: If you saw those pictures and the
prosecutor pointed and said he did it, would that
be enough to convince you?

Arthur: No.

Defense: In other words, you want to know more,
some evidence?

Arthur: That’s why I said what I did.

18a

Defense: I guess what we’re asking for is just a
fair trial.

Arthur: That’s right. [**26]

[*424] Defense: And as I say that, there’s this
innocence, presumption of innocence, and you
can accept that? In other words, you said that one
of the things you said that, I think, on the general
questions was you sort of require George to get on
the stand and prove his innocence. Would you do
that? Do you mean that really?

Arthur: I believe that he should bring himself out,
if he didn’t do it, just testify, tell what happened,
you know.

Defense: And that is -

Court: It’s time for the court to interrupt. Ms.
Arthur, that’s not the law, okay? I’ve sat here
plenty of times with a jury and I said to myself it
would be nice if this guy would tell what
happened. That’s not the law. He’s not required to
do that and he’s not required to do anything. He
comes in here cloaked with the presumption of
innocence. As he sits here now he’s presumed
innocent and under the Constitution, he’s not
required to do anything at all. Now, having told
you that, can you abide by that and in your mind
not require him to do anything? [***10]

Arthur: No, I don’t require, but I just think, to tell
you the truth, Judge, I don’t require, but I just
{[**27] think if the jury would listen, like
everybody says, he wants to have a fair trial. If the
jury would listen to both of the lawyers, you

19a

know, and whatever evidence they had to prove
him not guilty, I’d sit here and listen to it.

Court: Okay, but my point is that some point the
prosecution will stop presenting evidence. At that
point, once the state has stopped producing
evidence, then the defense may produce evidence,
if they so desire.

Arthur: Please?

Court: Once the state has stopped producing
evidence, then the defense, I’m talking about Mr.
Franklin, through his lawyers, may _ start
producing evidence, if they wish, but they’re not
required to do that. They’re not required to do
anything. They could stop right there, if they
wanted, have me give them the final instructions
and have you go out and make your decision on
the case. Arthur: Even if the evidence is not
against him, that they have brought evidence to
find that he’s not guilty.

Court: I missed that. I’m missing out.

Arthur: You said if the law would provide, stop
providing evidence. I said even if they’re for him
and they’re not against him, not saying he’s not
[**28] guilty, but they’re proving, have brought
evidence? You see what I’m talking about?

Court: I see what you’re talking about, but do you
see what I’m talking about? That is, they’re not
required to produce anything. The defendant isn’t
required to do anything in the trial except show
up, do you understand that?

Arthur: Uh huh.

20a

Court: And you’re not allowed to hold it against
him if he doesn’t produce anything. You might be
sitting there thinking maybe he could clear
something up or maybe another witness could
clear something up, but they’re not required to do
a thing. Can you abide by that and understand
that?

Arthur: I guess so, if that’s the law.

Court: That’s the law. Mr. Schmidt, do you have
any further questions?

Defense: I’m still not quite sure, Your Honor. In
other words, I guess, Mrs. Arthur, and, again, this
is in fairness, being fair to you, too, if we were to
try the case and the state put on evidence and
_ George didn’t take the stand, would you hold that
against him?

Arthur: No, I wouldn’t hold it against him.

[*425] Defense: Would you think that would
have something to do with his guilt?

{**29] Arthur: No.

Defense: You would think you wouldn’t consider
that at all? [***11]

Arthur: No, I wouldn’t.

Defense: .. . The way this goes, Mrs. Arthur, by
law and by rules of the court, the State of Ohio
has the burden of proving the elements of the
crime, all right?

Arthur: Uh huh.

2la

Defense: The state will go first and the law also
says that they will go last. They will have the final
argument and then the judge will give you the
law: do you understand?

Arthur: Uh huh.

Defense: Actually, they will paint a very dark
picture or try to paint a dark picture, if they’re
able. That’s their duty. But you’ve got to keep an
open mind until you hear the defense, or you hear
the law as it applies to what you heard. Can you
do that?

Arthur: Yes, I could.

Defense: And if the right thing, if [the death
penalty] was the right thing, you would do it,
right?

Arthur: That’s right.

Defense: What do you consider to be the right
thing?

Arthur: Well, what I consider to be the right thing
is if justice is done, either way. If he’s proven

guilty, [**30] then justice is done. If he’s proven
not guilty, then justice is done.

JA 1093-1108. Defense counsel later passed Juror Arthur for
cause.

After the jury was impaneled, a jury view of the scene
of the crime was conducted. During the viewing, Juror
Arthur asked where “he” got into the house. Afterward, the
judge called her into chambers, with the attorneys, and the
following conversation took place:

22a

Court: Okay, Mrs. Arthur, the reason we called
you in here is because it’s been reported back to
me that when the jurors were out on the view that
you might have asked some questions while you
were out there and specifically the way it was put
to me was that you may have asked a question
something like this: How did he get in? Did he get
in through the window downsiairs?

Arthur: No, the only thing I asked, I said, I didn’t
ask if he got in the window downstairs, I asked
was that the window he got in, the window when
they showed. That’s the only thing I asked.

Court: The thing I need to know from you is when
you say he, when you’re talking about he getting
in. I need to know have you formed a
predisposition in your mind about this man out
here, [**31] Mr. Franklin? [***12]

Arthur: No, I hadn’t formed no position. All I just
want to know is that was the house. I hadn’t
formed anything.

Court: Who were you talking about when you said
that he?

Arthur: I was talking about him, but I hadn’t
formed anything yet.

Court: When you talk about him, are you already
assuming he broke into the house, Mr. Franklin,
the man out here?

Arthur: All I know is they told me he burglarized
two places and I didn’t know if those were the
houses or not.

Court: Well, the fact, if somebody told you he
burglarized two places, can you accept the fact

23a

that doesn’t mean the man did it, just because
somebody said he did it?

Arthur: All I know is what I was told. That’s all I
know.

[*426] Court: Mr. Schmidt [defense counsel],
_ you want to tell us what your version of it is?

Schmidt: Yes, sir. When we were upstairs Mrs.
Arthur said where did he break in and that was all
she said.

Arthur: That’s all I said. That’s all I said. I didn’t
say anything else.

Court: Okay, are you able to keep an open mind in
this case and wait until you hear all the evidence
[**32] in this case?

Arthur: Yes, I will, because I hadn’t formed
nothing.

Court: Counsel, want to ask her any questions?
Mr. Rosenwald [defense counsel]?

Rosenwald: . . . . Miss Arthur, who told you he
burglarized two places?

Arthur: The only thing I heard, and I might have
misunderstood it, I thought she said when we
were talking in the room that he had burglarized
two places.

Rosenwald: When we were asking the questions
of the jurors?

Arthur: That’s all I know. Nobody did tell me.
That’s just what I got from you all.

24a

Rosenwald: Do you have the impression, feeling,
from what you’re saying that George did break
into two places?

Arthur: I really don’t know, sir.
Rosenwald: All right, that’s all.

Court: Anything further? Anything you gentlemen
want to ask her?

Prosecutor: We were saying that, also. Do you
understand that’s what he’s charged with and now
the evidence will show whether he did it or not?

Arthur: Right, that’s all I know, I don’t know, sir.
That’s all I know.

[***13]

JA 1551-54. Defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial
based upon [**33] Arthur’s comments at the jury view. The
judge denied the motion, saying, “I believe this jury can be
fair and impartial and I heard her answers to the questions
and I observed her demeanor... .”

Relying on this record, the district court found that
Juror Arthur was biased and that therefore a new trial was
warranted. We agree with the district judge’s conclusion but
point out that Juror Arnold was biased because she could not
understand the law rather than because she had a preexisting
opinion about Franklin.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, pre-AEDPA,
that juror bias is a factual issue and that reviewing courts
must give the factual assessments of the trial judge a
presumption of correctness subject to the exceptions
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d
383 (1995); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 431, 105 S.
Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.

25a

1025, 1036, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984). The
exception relevant in this case is whether “the factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record... .” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8)(1994), [**34] amended by 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2).

Under this standard, we cannot hold that the trial
judge’s decision that Juror Arthur’s statement at the jury
viewing and her subsequent statements in the conversation
with the judge did not indicate bias was not fairly supported
by the record. Juror Arthur stated unequivocally that she had
not made up her mind about Franklin’s guilt. As the Warden
points out, Juror Arthur’s comments at the viewing could
well be understood to indicate that she was asking whether
this was the window the prosecution said the defendant had
climbed through, without that question indicating that she
believed the prosecution’s story. After discussing the matter
with Juror Arthur, observing her demeanor, and listening to
her responses, the trial [*427] judge specifically stated that
he believed she could be impartial and fair. As nothing on the
record demands that we find otherwise, we are bound to
defer to the trial judge’s finding.

Juror Arthur’s statements at voir dire, however, require
a different conclusion because they leave us with the
conviction that she so completely misunderstood the
presumption of innocence and burden of [**35] proof that
she could not have made a fair assessment of the evidence of
Franklin’s guilt. In her voir dire testimony, Juror Arthur
made at least five statements indicating that she did not
understand that Franklin was not required to prove himself

not guilty:
1. {I think he needs to] prove he’s innocent.
2. I believe that he should bring himself out, if he

didn’t do it, just testify, tell what happened, you
know.

26a

3. I just think, to tell you the truth, Judge, I don’t
require, but I just think if the jury would listen,
like everybody says, he wants to have a fair trial.
If the jury would listen to both of the lawyers, you
know, and whatever evidence they had to prove
him not guilty, I’d sit here and listen to it.

4. Even if the evidence is not against him, that
they have brought evidence to find that he’s not

guilty.
5. If he’s proven guilty, then justice is done. If
he’s proven not guilty, then justice is done.

Three times the judge intervened to explain the law to her.
The second two times, during her individual voir dire, she
professed-albeit somewhzat reluctantly, saying, “I guess so, if
that’s the law”-to understand the judge’s explanations. Yet
despite the [**36] judge’s repeated attempts to rehabilitate
her, the last thing she said in her voir dire was: “If he’s
proven guilty, then justice is done. If he’s proven not guilty,
then justice is done.” Juror Arthur assured counsel and the
judge that she would consider all of the evidence before
making a decision, and there is no reason to [***14]
disbelieve her. Yet, that she would consider all of the
evidence does not remove the fact that she also seemed to
expect some of that evidence to come from Franklin by way
of proof of his innocence.

In the Witherspoon line of cases, the United States
Supreme Court has addressed the question of prospective
jurors excluded because of their insistence upon or
unwillingness to find a sentence of death. Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985) ;
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d
581 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57
L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). Although these

27a <

cases dealt with the exclusion of jurors who expressed the
opinion that they could not, or might not be able to, follow
the law, they [**37] also made the more general point that a
jury should be composed of jurors who “will consider and
decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law
as charged by the court.” Adams, 448 U.S. at 45. Jurors who
cannot apply the law are not impartial. Wainwright, 469 U.S.
at 423.

Although we normally defer to the assessment of the
trial judge, who hears the prospective juror’s tone of voice
and sees her demeanor, in this case, the cold record alone is
so extensive and so persuasive that it outweighs our
presumptive deference. Juror Arnold five times gave the
definite impression that she could not faithfully apply the law
concerning the burden of proof because she failed to
understand it. Even after she was corrected [*428] three
times by the judge, she still insisted with her last statement
that the defendant had to be proven innocent. C/
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 434 (juror who displayed inability to
follow the law four separate times was correctly excused).
While we appreciate the juge’s attempts to rehabilitate this
juror, he had a duty to dismiss a prospective juror who could
not follow the law. Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453,
464 (6th Cir. 2001). [**38] As such, the trial court’s failure
to dismiss her constituted manifest error and does not merit
the presumption of correctness normally due trial court
factual findings. See Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 844-45
(6th Cir. 1999).

“The seating of a biased juror who should have been
dismissed for cause requires reversal of the conviction.”
Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316,
120 S. Ct. 774, 145 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2000)). “‘Failure to
remove biased jurors taints the entire trial, and therefore . . .
{the resulting] conviction must be overturned.’” Jbid.

28a

(quoting Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir.
2000)). There is no situation under which the impaneling of a
biased juror can be excused. “The impaneling of a biased
juror warrants a new trial. . . . The ‘presence of a biased juror
cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a
showing of actual prejudice.’” Jbid. (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, IL111 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Accordingly, the State can make no argument that Franklin’s
trial counsel [**39] acted strategically in keeping Juror
Arthur on the panel because she was, like Franklin, African-
American. To permit this would be to allow trial counsel to
waive the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. ' Ibid.

The service of a biased juror was a constitutional defect
that should have been, but was not, raised [**40] on direct
appeal. Consequently, the failure of Franklin’s appellate
counsel to appeal this issue amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel and allows Franklin to show the
prejudice required to overcome his procedural default.
[***15]

IV

' However, we note that this holding should not be construed
so broadly as to eliminate our usual deference to trial
counsel’s assumed voir dire strategy. Counsel may well have
reasons for wanting perors who are confused or ignorant, and
we do not intend here to give defendants a free pass to argue
for ineffective assistance of counsel any time a prospective
juror is seated who demonstrates some lack of clarity about
the law. We consider the circumstances in this case to merit
particular scrutiny because of the length the judge and
counsel went to attempt to explain the burden of proof to
Juror Arthur and her continued inability to understand that
Franklin did not have to prove himself innocent.

29a

The district court found that Franklin’s appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance to him during his
direct appeal to the Ohio Court of Appeals and to the Ohio
Supreme Court by (1) failing to consult with their client, (2)
failing to provide hirn with any real opportunity to participate
or have input in his appeal, and (3) failing to raise the issue
respecting Juror Arthur’s bias on direct appeal.

A criminal appellant is constitutionally entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821
(1985); Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 441 (6th Cir. 2003).
In Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1999), the
court attempted to provide a non-exclusive list of factors to
consider when defining deficient performance:

[*429] 1. Were the omitted issues “significant and
obvious?”

2. Was there arguably contrary [**41] authority
on the omitted issues?

3. Were the omitted issues clearly stronger than
those presented? )

4. Were the omitted issues objected to at trial?

5. Were the trial court’s rulings subject to
deference on appeal?

6. Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral
proceeding as to his appeal strategy and, if so,
were the justifications reasonable?

7. What was the appellate counsel’s level of
experience and expertise?

8. Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet
and go over possible issues?

30a

9. Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the
facts?

10. Were the omitted issues dealt with in other
assignments of error?

ll. Was the decision to omit an issue an
unreasonable one which only an incompetent
attorney would adopt?

Ibid. In addition to the Mapes factors, a habeas court may
also consider “prevailing norms of practice as reflected in
American Bar Association standards and the like.” Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984). The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
instruct that “[a]ssigned counsel has a special responsibility
to develop a relationship of trust and confidence with the
client so that the client will [**42] appreciate that the lawyer
knows the case and has the client’s best interests clearly in
mind.” Comment to ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 4-3.8
(2d ed. 1980). Standard 4-8.3 itself states that, “the lawyer
has a duty to keep the client informed of the developments in
the case and the progress of preparing the defense.”

Franklin’s appellate counsel made many of the errors
included in the Mapes list. First, counsel failed to raise the
juror bias issue or any of the other issues for which the
district court issued a COA. Appellate counsel is, of course,
not required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. “As
the Supreme Court has recently observed, it is difficult to
demonstrate that an appellate attorney has violated the
performance prong where the attorney presents one argument
on appeal rather than another. In such cases, the petitioner
must demonstrate that the issue not presented ‘was clearly
stronger than issues that counsel did present.*” Caver v.
Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d
756 (2000)) (internal citations omitted); see also McFarland

3la

v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 710-12 (6th Cir. 2004). [**43] Just
as in Caver, “in the instant case, there can be little doubt but
that the omitted issue . . . was much stronger than the issues
[petitioner’s} appellate counsel presented.” Ibid. (footnote
omitted). Franklin himself suggested fourteen issues for his
attorneys to raise on appeal. Each of these issues found its
way into his habeas petition, including the biased juror,
Batson, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel errors that
are on appeal here, while none of the issues counsel raised on
appeal made it past the magistrate judge below. His attorneys
ignored his suggestions, telling him they were frivolous, had
already been litigated, or could be raised on post-conviction .
review. They also failed to tell Franklin that he could file a
pro se supplementary brief raising additional issues they
refused to include. [***16]

More egregious, appellate counsel never met Franklin
or even spoke to him over the telephone. His lead counsel,
Roxann Dieffenbach, only corresponded with him through
letters. His other counsel, Candace [*430] Greenham, had no
contact with him at all. Between December 4, 1989, and
November 26, 1991, Dieffenbach’s total communication with
Franklin consisted [**44] of 26 letters, none longer than one
page. Her first letter, sent on December 4, 1989, and thus her
first contact with Franklin, came eleven months after she had
been appointed to represent him and three weeks before she
had to file his brief with the Court of Appeals. Although she
asked him for input on the brief, she failed to respond to his
December 19, 1989, request for a copy of his transcript until
April 22, 1990, and she only sent him a copy of the Court of
Appeals brief one month after it had been submitted to the
court.

Twice Franklin asked Dieffenbach to withdraw from
his case. The first time she responded only by saying the she
had argued his case before the Court of Appeals. The second
time she responded only by saying that she had argued his

32a

case before the Ohio Supreme Court. At no point, therefore,
did Franklin’s counsel meet the ABA guidelines of keeping
Franklin “informed of the developments in the case” or of
developing a relationship of trust with him.

Counsel also failed adequately to represent Franklin at
oral argument before the Ohio Court of Appeals. The night
before the argument before the Court of Appeals, Greenham
had a family emergency and could not attend [**45] the
argument. The court denied Dieffenbach’s request for an
extension. At oral argument, Dieffenbach refused to discuss
Or answer questions on any part of the brief that Greenham
had prepared. Having counsel refuse to address half of the
issues raised before the appellate court is like having trial
counsel refuse to attend half the trial. On those issues,
therefore, Franklin suffered a total lack of meaningful
advocacy. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697, 122 S. Ct. 1843,
152 L. 2d. 2d 914 (2002).

Before the Ohio Supreme Court, counsels’ behavior
was unprofessional. As the magistrate judge wrote,

The transcript of their arguments include five
instances of wholly inappropriate laughing on the
part of both of Franklin’s lawyers, an admission
by Dieffenbach that she may be wrong about one
of her contentions, equivocal responses to
questions from the justices, and Greenham’s
introductory statement that she “wished we had
more to say on Mr. Franklin’s behalf.” In
addition, Franklin’s counsel displayed a lack of
familiarity with the facts relevant to the arguments
she made to the court. For instance, Greenham did
not recall the length of the videotape she argued
was gruesome and prejudicial, [**46] and stated
that “apparently it was very graphic,” strongly
suggesting she had not even viewed the allegedly

33a

offending videotape herself. Dieffenbach did not
know how many points of identification existed
between Franklin’s fingerprint and the print lifted
from the champagne bottle found in the Strauss
apartment. Greenham displayed an astounding
lack of solemnity under the circumstances when
she employed the term “overkill” to describe the
photographic and videographic evidence, then
laughed and said “Excuse the pun.”

JA 615.

There is, thus, no question that Franklin’s appellate
counsels’ performance was deficient. Although we do not
believe that appellate counsels’ shortcomings at oral
argument necessarily prejudiced Franklin, we find that
counsel did not meet the ABA standards in their dealings
with him concerning his appeals, and we hold that the failure
to raise the biased juror issue on appeal was prejudicial, since
no claims of [*431] strategy can excuse the seating of a
juror unable to follow the law. [***17]

V

In sum, Franklin’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is not procedurally defaulted because the Ohio Court of
Appeals’s refusal to hear Franklin’s Motion [**47] for
Reconsideration was not based on an adequate and
established state procedural rule and because his appellate
counsels’ failure to raise the constitutionally defective
service of a biased juror rose to the level of prejudice.
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of habeas
corpus and decline to consider Franklin’s cross-appeals on
the three issues certified for appeal.

DISSENTBY: ALICE M. BATCHELDER

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, dissenting. I respectfully
dissent. I would hold that Franklin’s claims shouid be

34a

dismissed for procedural default under Maupin v. Smith
because Ohio’s First District Court of Appeals relied on
independent and adequate state grounds when it denied
Franklin’s Application for Delayed Reconsideration. 785
F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). Franklin clearly failed to comply
with a state procedural rule that was both applicable to his
case and enforced by Ohio courts.'

The majority holds that the third prong of the Maupin
test was not satisfied due to uneven application of the good
cause exception, but prior Sixth Circuit cases suggest
otherwise. Under that prong of the test, this court must decide
whether the procedural rule relied upon by the state is an
‘adequate and independent’ state ground on which the state
can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional
claim.” Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. To be “independent,” the
procedural rule must rely in no part on federal law. Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732-33, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 640 (1991). To be “adequate,” the rule must have
been firmly established and regularly followed by state courts
at the time of its application to Franklin. Ford v. Georgia,
498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S. Ct. 850, 112 L. Ed. 2d 935
(1991). A rule is firmly established if, at the time of the
petitioner’s actions giving rise to the default, the petitioner
could be deemed to have been apprised of the rule’s

' Although the majority asserts that the Murnahan rule was
not enforced by Ohio courts, it cites nearly a dozen cases
enforcing the rule over the five-year period immediately
following Franklin’s motion. Furthermore, Sixth Circuit
precedent establishes that the rule was applied in Hamilton
County, where Franklin appeared, as early as 1983. See
Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 827 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Ohio v. Rone, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 11867, No. C-
820640, 1983 WL 5172, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31,
1983)).

35a

existence. Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 737 (6th Cir.
2002). Finally, whether a rule is regularly followed is
determined as of the date of the petitioner’s [**49]
conviction. Rogers v. Howes, 144 F.3d 990, 994 n.5 (6th Cir.
1998).

This circuit’s precedent reveais that the rule applied to
Franklin was both independent and adequate at the time of its
application. Significantly, Franklin’s case arose in Hamilton
County. In Sowell v. Bradshaw, this court declined to review
an ineffective assistance claim based on a Rule 26 procedural
bar. 372 F.3d 821, 827 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004). We held that “the
procedure required by Murnahan was the procedure that had
been required since at least 1983 by the Ohio Court of
Appeals in Hamilton County, where [the petitioner’s] trial
and appeal were conducted.” /d. (citing Ohio v. Rone, 1983
Ohio App. LEXIS 11867, No. C-820640, 1983 WL 5172, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1983)). In Coleman v. Mitchell,
we held that “before the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Murnahan, it was well established in [Hamilton County],
[*432] the appellate district in which Coleman’s appeal was
heard, that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel were to be raised in a delayed motion for
reconsideration and were not cognizable in state post-
conviction proceedings.” 244 F.3d 533, 540 (6th Cir. 2001).
[**50] In Hicks v. Collins, we held that a petitioner had
procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appeliate
counsel claim because Murnahan’s rule was “well settled” in
Hamilton County by September of 1992 and was therefore an
independent and adequate state ground. 384 F.3d 204, 212
(6th Cir. 2004). Based on the foregoing, there is no question
that Ohio courts’ application of Murnahan’s good cause
exception does nct fail the third prong of the Maupin test.

The majority attempts to distinguish Hicks by noting
that the petitioner in that case filed his motion prior to the
Murnahan decision, which the majority views as overriding

36a

the ten-day period allotted to motions for reconsideration. I
think the majority over-states Murnahan. That case explicitly
stated that motions such as Franklin’s should be filed “in the
court of appeals where the [***19] alleged error took place
pursuant to App. R. 26... .” State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.
3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ohio 1992). In light of the
court’s directive, it cannot be said that Franklin was not
apprised of the rule for purposes of the Hutchison and Ford
cases. [**51] The fact that Rule 26 was later amended to
extend the filing period is irrelevant. Consequently, there is
little to distinguish Franklin’s case from the Hicks case. I
would hold that his claims are procedurally barred.

37a
APPENDIX B
GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
Vv.

CARL S. ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 03-3636/03-3697
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT
434 F.3d 412
May 9, 2006, Decided

The court having received a petition for rehearing en
banc, and the petition having becn circulated not only to the
original panel members but also to all other active judges of
this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote
on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for
rehearing has been referred to the original panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for
rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition
were fully considered upon the original submission and
decision of the cases. Accordingly, the petition is denied.
Judge Batchelder would grant rehearing for the reasons stated
in her dissent.

38a

APPENDIX C

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,
Petitioner,
v.
CARL S. ANDERSON, WARDEN,
Respondent.

Case No. C-1-95-1007
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION
267 F. Supp. 2d 768
March 31, 2003, Decided

Petitioner George Franklin (“Franklin” or “Petitioner”’)
was charged with one count of aggravated murder, with death
penalty specifications, arising out of the homicide of Gerald
Strauss (“Strauss”), as well as two counts of burglary. His
case was assigned to Judge Ralph Winkler of the Hamilton
County Common Pleas Court. On December 7, 1988, a jury
in Hamilton County convicted him of those offenses. On
December 12, 1988, the penalty phase of Franklin’s trial
occurred, with the jury finding that the state had proved
beyond a _ reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors and
returning a recommendation that the death penalty be
imposed. Thereafter, Judge Winkler conducted his own
independent review of the evidence and found that the state
had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Franklin to death.

39a

In accordance with Ohio law as it [**4] then stood,
Petitioner appealed to the Hamilton County Court of
Appeals. That appellate court rejected Franklin’s assignments
of error and, after conducting its own independent review of
the evidence, concluded that the state had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating factors. State v. Franklin, 1990
Ohio App. LEXIS 3385, 1990 WL 117140 (Ohio App.
1990). Thus, the court of appeals affirmed Franklin’s
conviction and the death penalty imposed upon him. The
Petitioner appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court,
which affirmed the Hamilton County Court of Appeals. State
v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 960, 119 L. Ed. 24 235, 112 S. Ct. 2315
(1992). The Ohio Supreme Court also independently
weighed the aggravating circumstances and mitigating
factors, concluding that the state had met its burden of proof
in that regard. In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
summarized the facts and circumstances surrounding the
crimes for which the Petitioner was convicted:

About 4:00 p.m. on July 21, 1988, Rosha Winston
returned to her one-room apartment on Eden
Avenue in Cincinnati to [**5] find that her TV
set had been taken. A framed picture and some
decorative glass dishes had been moved from the
top of the TV and placed on the kitchen table. A
window screen at the rear of the apartment had
been partly [*772] torn out and the windowsill
had mud on it.

The window that had a torn screen was about six
feet off the ground from the outside. Police
noticed a circular imprint made in the muddy
ground under the window. The circle was thought
to have been made by a metal garbage can, on
which the burglar stood to reach the window.

40a

Several metal cans sat on concrete across the.
driveway separating Winston’s apartment from
the building next door. One of the cans had mud
around the top. A large barking dog, chained to a
nearby handrail, prevented police from
approaching the cans.

Winston told police she suspected George
Franklin, a neighbor, of the burglary. Franklin
lived in an apartment next door with his
grandfather. When questioned by police on the
same day as the burglary, Franklin used the name
of George Fichtel. Franklin appeared nervous, and
wanted to know what evidence the police had. He
admitted that the dog belonged to his grandfather,
and controlled it long enough for the [**6] officer
to inspect the garbage cans.

Police found Franklin’s fingerprint on the picture
that had been on top of the stolen TV. By the time
police identified Franklin as the burglar, he had
disappeared.

On or about July 23, 1988, Gerald R. Strauss and
his fiancee Karen Strain moved into a townhouse
on Corry Street in Cincinnati. On Saturday,
August 6, 1988, Strauss and Strain picked up
Richard Thompson, a friend of Strauss, at the
airport. The next morning, Strain left on a
business trip. Thompson and Strauss spent the day
in various activities, including a cookout on the
apartment patio. Strauss dropped Thompson off in
downtown Cincinnati at around 10:00 that
evening.

At about 10:30 p.m. a neighbor, Leonard Bass,
saw Strauss cleaning the patio and apartment.
Shortly after 11:00 Bass saw Strauss go upstairs,

4la

and saw lights turned. off in the apartment.
Another neighbor, Catherine Schaffner, while out
walking her dog between 11:00 and 11:30, heard a
“horrible,” “very loud, very forceful” scream that
lasted two or three seconds. The sound seemed to
come from the direction of Strauss’s building. A
few minutes later, after Schaffner got home, her
dog started barking which usually indicated [**7]
a stranger passing close to the house.

The next morning Mitch Walker, a co-worker at
Proctor & Gamble, tried to call Strauss when he
did not show up for work. After getting busy
signals, Walker asked the operator to break in.
The operator determined that the phone was off
the hook. Walker then drove to Strauss’s
townhouse, and found the front door ajar. He
asked a police officer to investigate. The officer
entered the townhouse and found Strauss’s body
in an upstairs bedroom.

The coroner arrived that morning and concluded
that Strauss had been dead six to eighteen hours.
Upon laboratory examination, the body revealed
bruises on the right hand; lacerations, broken
bones and a crushed eyeball from two blows to
the face; and lacerations and broken bones from a
large number of blows to the back of the head.
The cause of death was bone fragments driven
into the brain. The wounds were described by the
coroner as consistent with having been caused by
a claw hammer.

According to both Thompson and Strain, Strauss
had left a Marion brand claw hammer in the
upstairs guest bedroom. The hammer was not
found in the house. Other, items were missing

42a

[*773] from the house, including Strauss’s
money clip [**8] with several twenties, his credit
cards, his watch, a VCR, and a briefcase with
personal papers. In a wooded area a few blocks
away, police found the briefcase and personal
papers, credit cards, and a placemat that matched
others in the townhouse. Assisted by a tracking
dog, the police found a bloodstained Marion
brand claw hammer in the woods. The VCR,
watch, money clip and money were never
recovered, despite the offer of a reward.

A screen had been torn out in a patio window of
the townhouse. Karen Strain testified that she and
Strauss kept an empty champagne bottle as a
souvenir on the inside sill of that window. When
police found the body, the bottle had been carried
upstairs and left in the guest bedroom.

The police noticed a similarity to the Winston
burglary. Both crimes occurred in the same
neighborhood, within seventeen days of each
other. A TV was taken from Winston, a VCR
from Strauss, and both entries had been obtained
by tearing or cutting a screen from a rear window.
A latent fingerprint lifted from the champagne
bottle in the Strauss townhouse matched
Franklin’s known prints.

Police traced Franklin to the apartment of a Glenn
Davis. When officers arrived on August [**9] 18,
Davis answered the door and said he lived there
with his cousin, Gerald Evans. The police
recognized “Gerald Evans” as Franklin and
arrested him.

Michael lumibolt, who spent the evening of the
Strauss murder, August 7, with Franklin, testified

43a

that both had been using drugs. Franklin left at
about 10:30 p.m., at which time he apparently had
no money. Franklin returned and woke Turnbolt
at about 2:30 a.m. Tumbolt described this as
unusual. Franklin had changed his shirt, and had $
100 to $ 150, which he later sed to purchase a
gram of cocaine.

Id. at 118-20, 580 N.E.2d at 3-4.

Thereafter, Franklin continued to attempt to secure
relief in the Ohio courts, by seeking post-conviction relief
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21, as well as by
requesting that the Ohio Supreme Court recall its mandate
and permit supplemental briefing. The Ohio Supreme Court
denied Petitioner’s requests, without an opinion. State v.
Franklin, 63 Ohio St.3d 1402, 585 N.E.2d 424 (1992). In
addition, Franklin’s petition for post-conviction relief was
denied by the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court
without an evidentiary hearing, [**10] a decision which was
affirmed by the Hamilton County Court of Appeals. See State
v. Franklin, 1995 WL 6281 (Ohio App.), appeal not allowed,
72 Ohio St. 3d 1538, 650 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied, 516 U.S.
950, 133 L. Ed. 2d 315, 116 S. Ct. 394 (1995).

After having exhausted his available state remedies,
Petitioner initiated this action, requesting a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that his convictions and sentences violated a
number of provisions of the United States Constitution. In his
Petition (Doc. # 5) and Amended Petition (Doc. # 25), the
Petitioner set forth 28 separate grounds or claims for relief.
This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Michael
Merz for a Report and Recommendations. On August 21,
2002, after having conducted an evidentiary hearing, Judge
Merz issued his Report and Recommendations. See Doc. #
105. In particular, that judicial officer recommended that the
Court grant the requested writ of habeas corpus on the Sixth

44a

Claim and that it deny such relief with [*774] respect to the
other 27 claims.’ Both the Respondent (Doc. # 106) and the

' With his Sixth Claim, the Petitioner alleged that his
convictions and sentences are unconstitutional, as a result of
the fact that one of the jurors was biased, rather than being
impartial. Although the Petitioner had not raised that claim
during his direct appeals, Judge Merz concluded that this
claim was not barred by procedural default, because
Petitioner's appellate counsel were constitutionally
ineffective as a result of their failure to raise that issue during
Petitioner's direct appeals. The ineffective assistance of
counsel provided cause and prejudice, excusing the
procedural default. With his First Claim, the Petitioner
asserted that his convictions and sentences violated the
constitution because of the failure of his appellate counsel to
render effective assistance. The First Claim was based, inter
alia, upon the failure of appellate counsel to raise the issue of
the biased juror during his direct appeals. Judge Merz also
recommended that the Court grant Petitioner the requested
relief on that aspect of his First Claim. Judge Merz also noted
that appellate counsel had failed to consult with their client
and by failing to afford him an opportunity to have input in
_ his appeals. Since both this aspect of the Petitioner’s First
Claim and his Sixth Claim are predicated upon the assertions
that he was denied effective assistance by his appellate
counsel and that his constitutional right to an impartial jury
was infringed by the presence of a biased juror on the panel
which convicted him and recommended that he be sentenced
to death, the Court wil! discuss those issues only in
connection with the Sixth Claim. If it concludes that the
Petitioner is entitled to the requested relief on his Sixth
Claim, it will also award him relief on the corresponding
aspect of his First Claim, without expressly discussing that
claim further. [**12]

45a

Petitioner (Doc. # 108) filed Objections to that judicial
filing. Thereafter, Judge Merz filed an Amended [**11]
Supplemental Report and Recommendations,’ in which he
reaffirmed his earlier judicial filing and recommended that
the Court overrule both parties’ Objections. See Doc. # 112.
The Petitioner, in turn, filed Objections to the Amended
Supplemental Report and Recommendations of the
Magistrate Judge. See Doc. # 114.

{**12]

The Court begins by setting forth the standard of
review it must apply when it reviews Reports and
Recommendations of a Magistrate Judge in a habeas corpus
proceeding. The Sixth Circuit has indicated that a District
Court must apply a de novo standard of review to such a
judicial filing. Flournoy v. Marshall, 842 F.2d 875 (6th Cir.
1988). Accordingly, this Court reviews both Judge Merz’
factual findings and his legal conclusions de novo.

Herein, the Court rules upon the parties’ Objections to
the Report and Recommendations and the Petitioner’s
Objections [**13] to the Amended Supplemental Report and
Recommendations. In addition, the Court decides whether
Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability on any
claims upon which he is deemed to be not entitled to relief.

? Each of the parties filed a memorandum in opposition to the
other’s Objections. See Docs. # 109 (Respondent’s Reply to
Petitioners Objections) and # 110 (Petitioner’s Reply to
Respondent’s Objections).

> That judicial filing was preceded by Judge Merz’s
Supplemental Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 111).
Since Judge Merz’s Amended Supplemental Report and
Recommendations (Doc. # 112) superceded his Supplemental
Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 111), the Court does
not discuss the latter filing further.

46a

The requirement for such a certificate is found in 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c), which provides:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be
taken to the court of appeals from-

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding
in which the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court; or .

[*775] (B) the final order in a proceeding under
section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under
paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under
paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue
or issues satisfy the showing required by

paragraph (2).

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542,
120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that an
applicant for a certificate of appealability could make “a
substantial showing [**14] of the denial of a constitutional
right,” as required by § 2253(c)(2), in accordance with the
standard adopted in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 77 L.
Ed. 2d 1090, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).* 529 U.S. at 483-84.

* In Slack, the Supreme Court also held that the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), with
its requirement that a petitioner obtain a certificate of
appealability, was applicable when a appeal was sought after
the effective date of that statute, even though the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus had been requested before that
effective date. 529 U.S. at 481-82. Since an appeal of this

47a

The Slack Court explained that when the District Court has
rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claim on the merits, he
must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Jd. at 484. With respect to instances in which the
District Court denies relief on procedural grounds, the Slack
Court held:

When the district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a
[certificate of appealability] should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional nght
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.

Id. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029,
154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003), [**15] the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the standards for the granting of a certificate of
appealability that had been established in Slack.

Initially, this Court must decide whether the version of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), added by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (““AEDPA”), 110 Stat.
1214, is applicable herein. In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
138 L. Ed. 2d 481, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), the [**16]
Supreme Court held that the amended version of § 2254(d)
did not apply to a request for habeas corpus which was
already pending on the day that the AEDPA became
effective, April 24, 1996. Herein, Franklin’s request for such

Court’s decision will occur after the effective date of the
AEDPA, the requirement that a certificate of appealability be
obtained is applicable herein.

48a

relief was pending on that date, given that he filed his
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 5) on
November 14, 1995. Consequently, the version of § 2254(d)
added with the AEDPA is inapplicable, and this Court
applies the pre-amendment version of § 2254(d). In Mapes v.
Coyle, 171 F.3d 408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946,
145 L. Ed. 2d 284, 120 S. Ct. 369 (1999), the Sixth Circuit
reiterated that under the pre-AEDPA version of § 2254(d),
state court findings of historical facts are presumed to be
correct and are rebuttable only in certain circumstances. /d. at
413. Moreover, an individual seeking a writ of habeas corpus
must rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.

As a means of analysis, the Court will initially rule
upon Petitioner’s Objections, [*776] following which it will
turn to those submitted by the Respondent. However, since
there is a question as to whether the Petitioner’s [**17]
claims are barred by procedural default, the Court will set
forth the standards it must apply to decide whether a claim is
barred by the doctrine of procedural default, before
addressing the Objections.

I. Standards to Determine Procedural Default

In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594,
97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977), the Supreme Court held that, in the
absence of cause and prejudice, a District Court cannot grant
a writ of habeas corpus, when the state courts have refused to
address the merits of a federal constitutional argument, on the
ground that the defendant failed to follow a state procedural
requirement. Thus, in Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 716
(6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit noted that “we have
consistently held that, absent cause and prejudice, ‘a federal
habeas corpus petitioner who fails to comply with a state’s
rules of procedure waives his right to federal habeas corpus
review.’ Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir.

49a

1996).” In Wickline v. Mitchell, 319 F.3d 813 (6th Cir.
2003), the Sixth Circuit reiterated the four part test, adopted
in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986),
{[**18] by which a court determines whether a claim has
been procedurally defaulted:

First, the court must determine whether there is a
state procedural rule that is applicable to the
petitioner’s claim and with which the petitioner
failed to comply.[Maupin, 785 F.2d] at 138.
“Second, the court must decide whether the state
courts actually enforced the state procedural
sanction.” /d. Third, the court must determine
whether the state procedural rule “is an adequate
and independent state ground on which the state
can rely to foreclose: review of a_ federal
constitutional claim.” Jd. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A procedural rule is adequate
only when it is firmly established and regularly
followed at the time it was applied ... [and is] an
independent basis for disposition of a case if the
state courts actually relied on the procedural bar.”
Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir.
2001). Finally, if the court answers the first three
questions in the affirmative, it will not review the
procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner
can show cause for not following the procedural
rule and actual prejudice resulting from the
alleged constitutional [**19] violation. Maupin,
785 F.2d at 138-39.

Id. at 818 n. 2. Accord, Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380,
385-86 (6th Cir. 2002); Cooey v. Coyle, 289 F.3d 882, 897-
98 (6th Cir. 2002). This Court must look to the last,
explained state court decision to determine whether a claim
has been procedurally defaulted. Wickline, 319 F.3d at 818.

50a

Il. Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. # 108) to Report and
Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and Petitioner’s Objections
(Doc. # 114) to Amended Supplemental Report and
Recommendations (Doc. # 112)

As is indicated above, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that this Court deny 27 of Petitioner’s 28
claims. The Petitioner has objected to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendations concerning six of his claims. He has not
objected to Judge Merz’ recommended denial cf the Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth through Twelfth, Fourteenth through
Nineteenth and Twenty-First through Twenty-Eighth
Claims.’ [*777] Based upon its own, independent review of
the record, this Court concurs with Judge Méerz’s
recommendation that the Petitioner be denied relief on those
20 claims. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report [**20]
and Recommendations (Doc. # 105), as that judicial filing
relates to the Petitioner’s Fourth, Seventh, Ninth through
Twelfth, Fourteenth through Nineteenth and Twenty-First
through Twenty-Eighth Claims. In addition, since the
Petitioner has not shown that reasonable jurists would find
this Court’s assessment of those 20 claims debatable or

* As is indicated previously, Judge Merz recommended that
the Court grant relief to the Petitioner on the aspect of his
First Claim with which he raised the issue of juror bias. See
Footnote |, supra. The Petitioner has not objected to the
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that he be denied
the requested relief on the remaining aspects of that claim.
Based upon its independent review of the record, this Court
concurs with that recommendation and will decline to issue a
certificate of appealability on same.

Sla

wrong, the Court will not award a certificate of appealability
for any one or more or all of those 20 claims.°

[**21]

The Petitioner has objected to the Initial and Amended
Supplemental Reports and Recommendations with regard to
the Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Twentieth
Claims. As a means of analysis, the Court addresses the
parties’ argument relating to those six claims in the above
order, discussing the Eighth and Thirteenth Claims together,
as does Franklin.

A. Second Claim

With this claim, Petitioner contends that his convictions
and sentences were obtained in violation of the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because the attorneys
representing him during his trial failed to provide effective
assistance of counsel. In his Objections, the Petitioner
contends that the performance of his trial counsel was
deficient in preparation for the guilt phase of his trial,
because they failed to canvass the neighborhood where
Strauss lived and was murdered. Doc. # 108 at 1-3; Doc. #
114 at 2-4. According to Franklin, such a canvassing would
have led to the discovery of Jay Lazarus, who would have
testified that he had seen someone on the east side of Strauss’
condominium around the time that he was murdered and that
he thinks he saw another individual in the vicinity [**22] of

° Parenthetically, it would be futile to grant a certificate of
appealability on any one or more or all of those 20 claims,
since objecting to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendations is a predicate to appellate review. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435, 106 S. Ct.
466 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50
(6th Cir. 1981).

S$2a

Strauss’ condominjum later that night. /d. Petitioner states
that neither of the individuals seen by Jay Lazarus looked
like him. In addition, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective because they failed to obtain an expert who
could have challenged the Prosecution’s evidence relating to
the fingerprint retrieved from the champagne bottle in
Strauss’ condominium. Doc. # 108 at 3-6; Doc. # 114 at 4-7.
Franklin also challenges the performance of his counsel
during the penalty phase of his trial. He charges them with
failing to conduct a meaningful investigation prior to the
penalty phase and, thus, failing to introduce the following
evidence, to wit:

1. Franklin’s parents separated when he was an
infant, and his father has had a number of
girlfriends, fathering children with a number of
those relationships. Additionally, Petitioner had
minimal contact with his father during his
childhood, who was uninvolved in his discipline.

2. Franklin also had minimal contact with his
mother, who worked full-time [*778] for Ford
Motor Company as well as other jobs on a part-
time basis. As a consequence, she did not have the
energy to discipline her son and tended to [**23]
give him money and other material objects to
compensate for her lack of personal contact with
him.

3. Since his mother and father did not spend t'me
with Petitioner during his childhood, he was
raised by his grandmother and great grandmother,
who used a “switch” to discipline him.

4. Franklin was a hyperactive child who would
attempt to put sugar on his vegetables. His mother
had to keep him away from sweets.

53a

5. Franklin had a bowel control disorder, which
' persisted into his teenage years and required him
to wear a diaper. This subjected him to ridicule,
and he occasionally skipped school to avoid the
ridicule. ;

6. Petitioner’s mother has a history of psychiatric
illness, including two _ hospitalizations for
depression which occurred after the Petitioner had
been convicted and the jury had recommended
that he be sentenced to death. ’

7. At the age of 15, Franklin was referred to a
rehabilitation program, after having been arrested
for selling marijuana.

8. Petitioner’s mother sent him to live with his
grandfather during his junior year, since she did
not believe that she was abie to provide him with
appropriate discipline. Moving to live with his
grandfather [**24] caused Franklin to transfer
schools. He was unable to keep up with the
demands of his new school, which resulted in his
failing. His failure made him ineligible to
participate in sports which infuriated him.
Franklin lost all motivation for school and began
spending time with his cousin who was no longer
in school and was involved in criminal activities.
Petitioner dropped out of school at the end of his
junior year.

’ The Petitioner was convicted and the jury recommended
that he be sentenced to death in December, 1988. His mother

was hospitalized in 1989 and 1991.

54a

9. The administration of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-Revised showed that the
Petitioner’s intellectual functioning fell in the low
average range. In addition, his vocabulary and
mathematical skills are limited. He tends to have
difficulty with abstract concepts, and his poor
performance in school reflects both limited ability

~ and limited skills. An area of potential strength is
Petitioner’s ability to understand social situations
and to establish a conventional response to a
social dilemma. In light of his _ overall
performance, however, it is likely that Petitioner
may have difficulty applying this knowledge and
may act inappropriately in spite of his social
awareness.

10. Petitioner’s employment history included a
stint with a bakery and brief periods [**25] with
different fast food restaurants. His longest period
of employment was for approximately one year in
the dietary department of a nursing home.
Petitioner enjoyed working with and talking to the
elderly residents of that facility. As a
consequence, he pursued certification as a nursing
assistant when he joined the Job Corps.

Doc. # 108 at 7-9; Doc. # 114 at 7-9.

As a means of analysis, the Court will initially set forth
the standards which it must apply to determine whether the
Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are unconstitutional,
due to the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel,
following which it will apply those standards to the [*779]
alleged shortcomings of counsel set forth above.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth the
standards which must be applied whenever [**26] a person

55a

convicted of a crime asserts that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel:

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s
assistance was so defective as to require reversal
of a conviction or death sentence has two
components. First, the defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that renders the result
unreliable.

Id. at 687. In United States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730 (6th Cir.
1999), the Sixth Circuit elaborated upon the first prong of
that test: .

We “presume from the outset that a lawyer is
competent, and[,] therefore, ‘the burden rests on
the accused to demonstrate a constitutional [**27]
violation.’“ Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 833 (quoting
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984)). Moreover, in
applying Strickland, “a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

56a

The trial process contains a myriad of complex
decisions that, for strategic reasons, are sound
when made, but may appear unsound with the
benefit of hindsight. The defendant, thus, must
“overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Jd. (citation
Omitted).

Id. at 736.

The Court cannot conclude that the failure of trial
counsel to canvass the neighborhood in which the murder
occurred and, thus, their failure to discover Jay Lazarus,
rendered their performance deficient. As is discussed below,
Petitioner’s trial counsel requested on two occasions that an
investigator be appointed at public expense. However, those
requests were rejected by Judge Winkler. The Petitioner has
cited no authority for the proposition that, [**28] in order to
avoid being deemed to be constitutionally deficient, counsel,
who have unsuccessfully attempted to secure the services of
an investigator, must themselves canvass the neighborhood
in which a crime occurred, in order to discover unknown
witnesses who may be able to provide exculpatory testimony.
This is not an instance where a criminal defendant’s trial
counsel neglect to interview witnesses who have been
identified to them. On the contrary, trial counsel did not
know that Jay Lazarus existed or that he could have provided
testimony which the Petitioner believes to be exculpatory.®

® As is discussed below, the prosecution was aware of Jay
Lazarus. Petitioner contends that the prosecution violated its
obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed.
2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and its progeny, by failing to
disclose the information Jay Lazarus gave to police officers.
That failure is part of the Petitioner’s Eighth and Thirteenth

57a

[**29]

[*780] With respect to the failure of trial counsel to
obtain an expert to challenge the fingerprint evidence, the
Petitioner suggests that the state’s evidence concerning the
fingerprint went unchallenged, as a result of trial counsel’s
failure to secure an expert. Judge Merz concluded that,
assuming for sake of argument that this claim was not
procedurally defaulted, the representation by trial counsel
was not deficient, because they adequately challenged that
evidence through the cross-examuination of the prosecution
witnesses. Doc. # 105 at 203. The Magistrate Judge also
pointed out that the Petitioner had failed to explain what
favorable evidence would have been brought out, if a
fingerprint expert had been retained. /d. Thus, the prejudice
prong of Strickland was not met. /d. This Court agrees with
Judge Merz’s reasoning in that regard and concludes that,
assuming the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim predicated upon their failure to obtain a
fingerprint expert has not been procedurally defaulted, trial
counsel’s performance was not deficient and there is no
showing that the failure to obtain such a witness caused the
Petitioner to suffer prejudice. [**30]

With respect to the alleged shortcomings of trial
counsel in the penalty phase of the trial, some of the
information which Petitioner claims his counsel should have
presented during the penalty phase was presented during that

Claims, which are discussed below. Parenthetically, the
Court concludes that the prosecution did not violate Brady in
that regard, because the information Jay Lazarus would have
provided was not material. Based upon that same reasoning,
the Jay Lazarus information would not be mate: al under a
Strickland analysis.

58a

phase of the trial. Thus, as Judge Merz pointed out, the jury
was informed during the penalty phase that Franklin’s
parents were separated when he was young, that he had a
bowel disorder, that he had moved in with his grandfather
during his teen years as a result of his mother’s inability to
control him and that he enjoyed his job in the nursing home
working with the elderly residents. In addition, the jury was
informed about his overall work history. Doc. # 105 at 209.
The fact that trial counsel failed to present evidence during
the penalty phase of the hospitalizations of Petitioner’s
mother for depression does not constitute deficient
performance, since those hospitalizations occurred, after the
penalty phase of the trial occurred. With respect to the other
alleged shortcomings of counsel, Judge Merz pointed out that
Franklin had the burden of: proving that the performance of
his trial counsel was deficient, as a result of their failure to
conduct an adequate [**31] investigation. Doc. # 105 at 210.
Even though trial counsel testified during the evidentiary
hearing, Judge Merz noted that they were not asked to
describe the steps they took to investigate the mitigation
factors which could be presented to the jury during the
penalty phase or whether any tactical or strategic reasons had
caused them to omit any of these matters from their
presentation to the jury. Jd. Thus, the. Magistrate Judge
concluded that the Petitioner had failed to show that trial
counsel failed to “make some effort at an independent
investigation in order to make a reasoned, informed decision”
(Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 596 (6th Cir. 2000)) respecting
the presentation of such evidence during the penalty phase.
This Court concurs fully with the Magistrate Judge’s
reasoning in that regard. Moreover, even if it disagreed, the
Petitioner would not be entitled to the requested relief. A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that
prejudice be demonstrated, in addition to showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient. Simply stated, this
Court [*781] cannot conclude that the alleged shortcomings

59a

of trial counsel during the penalty phase resulted [**32] ina
trial the result of which was not reliable.

In sum, the Court concludes that the Petitioner was not
denied effective assistance of counsel during his trial.
Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s Objections
(Docs. # 108 and # 114) to the Report and Recommendations
(Doc. # 105) and Amended Supplemental Report and
Recommendations (Doc. # 112), as they relate to the Second
Claim. However, since “reasonable jurists could find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong,” the Court will grant a certificate of
appealability on this claim.

B. Third Claim

With his Third Claim, the Petitioner contends that his
convictions and death sentence are void, because the trial
court refused to appoint an investigator, in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Judge

* In support of this claim, the Petitioner also cites the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. Given that this
claim is based upon Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L. Ed.
2d 53, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), wherein the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause requires that the
prosecution provide expert assistance to an indigent
defendant under certain circumstances, and, further, since the
Petitioner has failed to cite authority in support of the other
constitutional provisions, the Court limits its discussion to
the question of whether the denial of an investigator
constituted a denial of due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Petitioner also cites provisions
of Ohio law to support this claim. However, since a federal
court cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of “a
perceived error of state law,” (Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,

60a

Merz recommended that the Court deny this claim, because
the Petitioner had not exhausted it and could not demonstrate
cause and prejudice, given that the failure to appoint an
expert did not deprive him of due process of law. See Doc. #
105 at 53-57. For reasons which follow, this Court agrees.
The Court begins by examining the right the Petitioner
f**33] seeks to enforce with this claim.

[**34]

In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 105
S. Ct. 1087 (1985), Ake was charged and convicted of two
counts of capital murder. Prior to his trial, Ake’s counsel had
indicated that his client wanted to raise an insanity defense
and requested that the court appoint a psychiatrist or provide
funds for one, since his client was indigent and without funds
to hire such an expert. The trial court denied that request and
the Oklahoma appellate court affirmed. Upon further appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates that the state provide a
psychiatrist’s assistance to an indigent defendant who “has
made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the
offense is likely to be a significant factor at tral.” Jd. at 74.
Ake had made such a showing, since he was found to be
incompetent to stand trial shortly after having been arrested,
being diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, and was
returned to competence as a result of being prescribed an
antipsychotic drug. In Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604 (6th
Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit noted that Ake was one of a
number of cases which stand [**35] for the proposition that
“indigent prisoners are constitutionally entitled to the basic
tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are

41, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984)), the Court does
not discuss the state law cited by the Petitioner.

6la

available for a price to other prisoners.” Jd. at 615 (internal
quotation ~““782] marks and citation omitted).'°

In C well v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d
231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), a case decided about four
months after Ake, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
when due process requires that the state pay for expert
assistance to an indigent defendant.'' Therein, the Supreme
Court wrote:

Petitioner also raises a challenge to his conviction,
arguing that there was constitutional infirmity in
the trial court’s refusal to appoint various experts
[**36] and investigators to assist him.
Mississippi law provides a mechanism for state
appointment of expert assistance, and in this case
the State did provide expert psychiatric assistance
to Caldwell at state expense. But petitioner also
requested appointment of a criminal investigator,
a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert, and
those requests were denied. The State Supreme
Court affirmed the denials because the requests
were accompanied by no showing as to their
reasonableness. For example, the defendant’s
request for a ballistics expert included little more
than “the general statement that the requested
expert ‘would be of great [necessity].’"“ 443 So.2d

'0 In Mason, a death penalty habeas case, the Sixth Circuit
held that the Ohio Supreme Court had not unreasonably
applied Ake when it denied the petitioner a soil and debris
expert, a shoe-print expert, a mitigation investigator and an
independent mental health expert.

'! Both Ake and Caldwell were written by Justice Marshall.

62a

806, 812 (1983). Given that petitioner offered
little more than undeveloped assertions that the
requested assistance would be beneficial, we find
no deprivation of due process in the trial judge’s
decision. Cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-
83, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 105 S. Ct. 1087(1985)
(discussing showing that would entitle defendant
to psychiatric assistance as matter of federal
constitutional law). We therefore have no need to
determine as a matter of federal constitutional law
what if any showing would have entitled [**37] a
defendant to assistance of the type here sought.

Id. at 323-24 n. 1.

Herein, the Petitioner requested the assistance of an
investigator with a pretrial motion, which indicated, in its
entirety:

Now comes the Defendant, George T. Franklin,
by and through his undersigned counsel, and
hereby states that he is indigent and does so move |
the Court to appoint investigative services, experts’
and any other services as are reasonably necessary
to assist in the proper representation of the
Defendant in the above captioned cause.
Furthermore, Defendant moves the Court that
payment of fees and expenses for said services be
paid at public expense.

Trial Court Docket No. 6. Judge Winkler overruled that ~
motion, and the Petitioner renewed his request during a
pretrial proceeding conducted on November 17, 1988. At that
time, Petitioner’s counsel argued:

The final motion I want to bring to the court’s
attention that’s been previously [**38] overruled
is the motion for investigative services. Quite

63a

frankly, this county doesn’t have the investigative
services that the Public Defender’s Office
probably should have. It’s our position we have
done the best we can do with the limited resources
available to Mr. Schmidt [Petitioner’s co-counsel]
and myself to conduct an investigation and
contact witnesses and check things out, if you
will, but I think in a capital case that there’s no
question when you have a defendant who’s
indigent, who [*783] has appointed counsel, that
investigative services can be extremely beneficial
in tracking down people we can’t find who could
be very essential witnesses to the defense.

In comparison, we have the State of Ohio,
represented by the prosecution, and I don’t
remember exactly how many law enforcement
officials there are in this county anymore,
somewhere around a thousand Cincinnati police
officers who can or could be available to the state
through the auspices of whatever officer they
want to ask. That puts the defense, obviously, at a
distinct disadvantage. So we’re asking the court to
reconsider the granting of the motion for
investigative services so we can, even at this date,
get proper [**39] assistance to help us prepare the
case. ee

Transcript of November 17, 1988 Proceeding at 12-13.

As can be seen, Petitioner’s counsel merely indicated
during the November 17th proceeding that an investigator
could be beneficial in tracking down witnesses who might be
essential. Simply stated, the oral and written statements of
Petitioner’s counsel are “little more than undeveloped
assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial”
(Caldweil), rather than constituting the preliminary showing

64a

required by Ake. In any criminal prosecution, defense counsel
might state that an investigator could be helpful, as did
Petitioner’s trial counsel. If that constituted the preliminary
showing required in Ake, then the Due Process Clause would
require the appointment of an investigator-to assist every
indigent defendant charged with a crime. In Moore v. Kemp,
809 F.2d 702 (ilth Cir.) (En banc), cert. denied, 481 US.
1054, 95 L. Ed. 2d 847, 107 S. Ct. 2192 (1987), the Eleventh
Circuit rejected such a proposition, writing:

Ake and Caldwell, taken together, hold that a
defendant must demonstrate something more than
a mere possibility of assistance [**40] from a
requested expert; due process does not require the
government automatically to provide indigent
defendants with expert assistance upon demand.
Rather, a fair reading of these precedents is that a
defendant must show the trial court that there
exists a reasonable probability both that an expert
would be of assistance to the defense and that
denial of expert assistance would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial.

Id. at 712. In Thacker v. Rees, 841 F.2d 1127, 1988 WL
19179 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit followed the
analytical framework set forth in Moore. Accord, Frazier v.
Mitchell, 188 F. Supp. 2d 798, 849 (N.D.Ohio 2001).

Since the Petitioner failed to make a preliminary
showing that he needed the assistance of an investigator, this
Court cannot conclude that he suffered a deprivation of due
process, as a result of being denied the appointment of such
assistance at public expense. Accordingly, the Court
overrules Petitioner’s Objections (Docs. # 108 and # 114) to
the Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and
Amended Supplemental Report and Recommendations (Doc.
# 112), as they relate to the Third Claim. Moreover, since no

65a

[**41] “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,”
the Court declines to grant a certificate of appealability on
this claim.

C. Fifth Claim

With his Fifth Claim, the Petitioner alleges that his
convictions and sentences are void because he was denied his
right to a representative jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In particular, he contends that the prosecution
violated [*784] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed.
2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), by using two of its
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who are
African-Americans. Judge Merz recommended that the Court
deny this claim, because the Petitioner had not exhausted
same, due to his failure to raise it in his direct appeals, and
could not demonstrate cause and prejudice for that default.
The Petitioner had argued that the ineffective assistance of
his appellate counsel, in failing to raise the Batson claim
during his direct appeals, established cause and prejudice.
Judge Merz disagreed, concluding that Franklin had failed to
meet the prejudice prong of a claim of inefft ‘ive assistance
since the prosecution had not violated equal [**42]
protection by exercising those two challenges. See Doc. #
105 at 63-76. For reasons which follow, this Court agrees.
The Court begins by setting forth the standard it must apply
to resolve this claim, following which it examines the facts
and circumstances giving rise to it.

In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by challenging prospective jurors solely on the
basis of their race. In United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d
$82, 2003 WL 431897 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit
reviewed the standards which are applicable to a Batson
challenge:

66a

In Ratsan the Synreme Court held that a
prosecutor is precluded from exercising a
peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Under
Batson, once the opponent of a peremptory
challenge has made out a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the
government to demonstrate a race-neutral reason
for the exclusion of the juror. The government is
not required to persuade the court that its reasons
for dismissing the juror were well-founded; rather,
it need only demonstrate that its reasons were
race-neutral. United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d
422, 438 (6th Cir. 2002). [**43] Once the
government offers a race-neutral justification,
“the challenging party must demonstrate that the
purported explanation is merely a pretext for a
racial motivation.” McCurdy v. Montgomery
County, 240 F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001). The
burden of persuasion always rests with the
opponent of the strike. /d.

321 F.3d 582, 599, [WL] at *10. Herein, since the
prosecution was required to identify the race-neutral reasons
for challenging the two prospective jurors and the trial court
ruled on the ultimate question of whether there was
intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether
the Petitioner made a prima facie showing of discrimination
becomes moot. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359,
114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Lancaster v.
Adams,324 F.3d 423, 2003 WL 1524231 (6th Cir. 2003).
Moreover, it bears emphasis that this Court is ruling upon a
request for a writ of habeas corpus, predicated in part on the
allegation that the prosecution violated Batson by
peremptorily challenging two prospective jurors who are
African-Americans. In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 834, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), a habeas [**44] action

67a

raising a Batson challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the
state court’s factual finding of no discrimination is presumed
to be correct. /d. at 769. Accord, Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d
1239, 1248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 972, 145 L. Ed.
2d 324, 120 S. Ct. 415 (1999); Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d
363, 367 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061, 130 L. Ed.
2d 607, 115 S. Ct. 674 (1994).

During Petitioner’s trial, at the conclusion of the voir
dire, the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. The
prosecution exercised twu of its challenges to exclude
prospective African-American jurors, Mr. Colston
(“Colston”) [*785] and Mrs. Fowler (“Fowler”).'?
Franklin’s trial counsel objected, and requested that Judge
Winkler require the prosecution put its reasons for exercising
those challenges on the record. Judge Winkler acceded to that
request. The prosecutor explained that, during the first day of
voir dire, Colston had indicated that serving on a jury could
cause him a problem with his employment, that he had heard
something about the case in the media which could cause him
a problem and that he knew some police officers. Trial
Transcript [**45] at 658. However, those problems

'2 The prosecution did not exercise a preemptive challenge to
exclude a third African-American juror. Of course, the
presence of an African-American on the jury does not
preclude a finding that the prosecution excluded other jurors
because of their race. United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580,
587 (6th Cir. 1999). Therein, the Sixth Circuit indicated that
the fact that one African-American was seated on the jury,
standing alone, did not warrant the finding that the defendant
had failed to prove that the prosecution had intentionally
discriminated against other jurors on the basis of their race.
Id. The Harris court did not, however, suggest that the fact
that the prosecution allowed one African-American to remain
on the jury was irrelevant to that question.

68a

seemingly disappeared on the second day, when Colston
appeared to the prosecutor to be unusually anxious to be
selected as a juror. Jd. Simply stated, Colston was challenged
because he seemed to be unusually anxious to serve as a
juror. Jd. The prosecutor explained that Fowler had been
challenged because she immediately indicated that she felt
sorry for the defendant, when she learned that she might be
sitting on a death penalty case. /d. at 661. The prosecutor also
explained that Fowler had been challenged, because she had
worked as a cook for a number of years in a synagogue. /d.
Although the prosecutor did not know how she had been
treated in that employment, he assumed that she had been
treated badly at times. Jd. Since the victim was Jewish, the
__ prosecutor decided to challenge Fowler. /d. Based upon the
prosecution’s explanations, Judge Winkler excused each of
the challenged jurors, thus indicating that the prosecution had
not engaged in intentional discrimination by exercising those
peremptory challenges.

[**46]

__ With respect to Colston, the Petitioner argues that other
jurors who expressed similar problems were not the subject
of peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution. Juror
Bostic admitted that he had an employment conflict, that he
knew police officers and that he had been exposed to media
coverage of the case. Juror Sikorski admitted to the
possibility of employment problems and to exposure of
media coverage. Juror Bergh stated that he had been exposed
to the case at Proctor & Gamble, where he and Strauss had
worked in different divisions of the advertising department,
and that his brother-in-law was a police officer. As the
Petitioner argues, the prosecution did not challenge those
prospective jurors, who were not African-Americans. The
flaw in the Petitioner’s argument is that it is based upon a
misperception of the nature of the prosecutor’s explanation
for challenging Colston. The prosecutor did not challenge

69a

Colston because serving on the jury could cause him an
employment problem, he knew police officers and had been
exposed to the case through pretrial publicity. Rather, the
prosecutor excused Colston because he indicated during the
first day of voir dire that the foregoing [**47] might cause
him problems with jury service, while those problems
seemingly disappeared the second day, which caused the
prosecution to believe that he had an unusual desire to be on
the jury. The Petitioner has not pointed to a single white juror
who underwent a transformation similar to Colston’s, yet was
not peremptorily [*786] challenged by the prosecution. As a
consequence, the Court concludes that the Petitioner has
failed to overcome the presumption of correctness with
respect to Judge Winkler’s decision to permit the prosecutor
to exercise a peremptory challenge and excuse Colston.

With respect to Fowler, the Petitioner has failed to
identify a white, prospective juror who was not peremptorily
challenged by the prosecution after indicating that he or she
felt sorry for the defendant because the death penalty was
being sought. Nevertheless, the Petitioner points out that
Fowler also indicated that she felt sorry for the victim.
However, the Petitioner has not pointed to a white,
prospective juror who was not challenged by the prosecution,
after indicating that he or she felt sorry for both the Petitioner
and the victim. Thus, the prosecution’s initial reason for
challenging Fowler [**48] was race-neutral. It bears
emphasis that, in Batson, the Supreme Court said that a
prosecutor’s explanation for exercising a particular
peremptory challenge need not rise to the level justifying the
exercise of a challenge for cause. 476 U.S. at 97. See also,
United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (6th Cir.
1996). Therefore, the fact that Fowler may have been
impartial, due to her feeling sorry for both the Petitioner and
the victim, is not dispositive of the Batson question. The
other stated reason for challenging Fowler, that she may have

70a

been treated badly during her employment in synagogues,
thus causing her to be unsympathetic to Strauss, the Jewish
victim, is in part a product of the prosecutor’s imagination,
since he conceded that he did not know how she had been
treated in her employment. Nevertheless, that reason is race-
neutral, given that the Petitioner has not identified a similarly
situated white, prospective juror who was not peremptorily
challenged by the prosecutor. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the Petitioner has failed to overcome the
presumption of correctness with respect to Judge Winkler’s
decision to permit [**49] the prosecutor to exercise a
peremptory challenge and excuse Fowler.

Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s
Objections (Docs. # 108 and # 114) to the Report and
Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and Amended Supplemental
Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 112), as they relate to
the Fifth Claim. However, since “reasonable jurists could
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong,” the Court grants a certificate of
appealability on this claim.

D. Eighth and Thirteenth Claims

With these two claims, the Petitioner contends that the
prosecution violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and its
progeny, by withholding favorable evidence from him. Judge
Merz recommended that this Court reject the Respondent’s
assertion that these claims are procedurally defaulted and
deny them on the merits.'? As a means of analysis, this Court
will briefly review the jurisprudence pertaining to Brady and

13

The Respondent has not objected to the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that the Court decline to find these
claims procedurally defaulted.

Tla:

its progeny, following which it will turn to the parties’
arguments concerning this issue.

[**50]

As the Sixth Circuit has noted, Brady did not create a
general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases;
rather, the rule established therein “is concerned only with
cases in which the government possesses information which
the defendant does not, and the government’s [*787] failure
to disclose the information deprives the defendant of a fair
trial.” United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir.
1994). Brady imposes upon the government “an obligation
‘to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable
to the accused and material to guilt ... ““ United States v.
Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40,
107 S. Ct. 989 (1987)) (emphasis supplied by the Sixth
Circuit). In Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th
Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit elaborated upon the materiality
requirement of Brady:

When the defendant, as in this case, asserts that
the newly discovered Brady evidence is
exculpatory, the defendant will be entitled to a
new trial if he shows that the favorable evidence
at issue was “material.” United States v. Frost,
125 F.3d 346, 382 (6th Cir. 1997). [**51] In
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490,
‘115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995), the Supreme Court
clarified the “materiality” analysis. The Court
explained that a showing of materiality does not
require the suppressed evidence in question
establish the defendant’s innocence by a
preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the
“question is not whether the defendant would
more likely than not have received a different

72a

verdict with the evidence, but whether in its
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
Id. at 434; Frost, 125 F.3d at 382-83. Nor does the
defendant need to “demonstrate that after
discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of
the undisclosed evidence, there would not have
been enough left to convict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at
434-35; United States v. Smith, 316 U.S. App.
D.C. 199, 77 F.3d 511, S515 (D.C.Cir. 1996)
(material

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1597%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
